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Summary 
Upland agriculture and watershed conservation are often juxtaposed in China’s 
sustainable development discourse. Intensive upland agriculture sustains the 
livelihoods of a majority of China’s poorest farming communities, but is perceived as 
environmentally destructive. Deteriorating watershed quality has prompted efforts 
to convert agricultural land to forest and grassland, which reduces farmers’ 
productive land. Resolving the impasse between upland food security and rural 
development, on the one hand, and the need to control watershed degradation, on 
the other, has become one of China’s most pressing development challenges.  
More recently, efforts to intertwine upland development interests with downstream 
conservation priorities have taken a new form. Recognizing farmers’ lack of 
conservation incentives, government agencies and industry groups in China have 
begun to experiment with innovative payment schemes that attempt to offset 
farmers’ opportunity costs for taking land out of agricultural production. These 
schemes range from national (e.g. Sloping Land Conversion Program & the 
Ecological Forest Compensation Program) to catchment (e.g., hydropower 
station-community agreements) in scale.  
This paper provides an overview of the promise and pitfalls of payment mechanisms 
for watershed services in China’s upland areas, drawing on a specific case study 
from Kejie Watershed. Although preliminary surveys and experience with actual 
arrangements have demonstrated its potential in China, payment schemes are 
regularly hindered by a lack of the awareness, market infrastructure, and 
institutional support necessary for their success. On the other hand, lacking of 
grassroot participation and poor governance structure in PES implementation has 
limited the success as its initial aimed. 
The stakes are high, and continued experimentation and research is needed. 
Mechanisms that appropriately reward upland farmers for conservation provide an 
enduring match between upland development interests and watershed 
conservation. Failure to provide adequate rewards and appropriate policies and 
markets threatens farmers’ food security and livelihoods, and consequently the 
viability of conservation programs. 
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What would work for PES in China 
Security of forest property rights: Security of forest property rights is essential in 
order to give poor households control over, and right to benefit from, current 
Chinese policies and the environmental service they provide in the long run. 
Social space for multi-stakeholders to negotiate and participate: A social space 
is important in order to facilitate negotiation, bargaining, and participation about 
improving 
Enhanced local participation for payment schemes. However, at present, the 
limited participation by both local governments and residents in the design of 
payment schemes has impaired their willingness to pay; and, on the other hand, 
monitoring and evaluation by the tertiary sector is lacking in current policy 
implementation. 
Good governance and a cooperative institution: For sustainable management of 
natural resources to guarantee environmental services can be provided and 
improved continuously and improvement of policy design and implementation to 
ensure environmental payment can be made constantly and fairly, a cooperative 
institution is needed to manage both sectors. This institution should be established 
through participation with multi-stakeholders. The institution should be 
transparent, accountable, responsive, equitable, and efficient in policy design and 
implementation. 
Developing market mechanism: the integration of market mechanism in the PES 
is significant to enhance the effectiveness and equity, which state-led program has 
failed to address.   
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Introduction and Background 
China is a mountainous country with poor forest resources. Hence the forest 
ecosystem at the headwaters of rivers plays a key role in environmental services for 
local people and those downstream. For half a century, a policy of forest exploitation 
in China led to disastrous consequences: degradation of forests and landscapes, 
loss of biodiversity, unacceptable levels of soil erosion, and catastrophic flooding. 
Given this dilemma in forest management, it is clear that how forestry policy and 
forest governance structure address the issues of payment for environmental 
services and poverty alleviation is a crucial issue in developing countries. In the 
mountainous regions of China, especially, where there are biodiversity hotspots and 
an enormous population living in poverty, it is a just concern not only for 
researchers and development practitioners, but also for government officials and 
central policy-makers. In this respect, people are not only seeking possibilities for 
market mechanism development, but are also focused on how current policy can be 
adjusted to arrive at a win-win situation of reducing poverty while improving forest 
and watershed conservation . 
In China, socioeconomic changes have been occurring rapidly, significantly in the 
transition from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system. The forest 
sector in China lags behind other sectors in this transition process. The government 
has launched a limited program of decentralized reform, as it is concerned about 
negative environmental externalities caused by losing control of forest resources. 
The government held strict control even over collectively-owned resources through 
mandatory policies such as log harvesting quotas, logging bans, conversion of 
sloping farmland to forest, and establishment of nature reserves. Collective forests 
are a crucial component in farmers’ livelihood development and environmental 
protection in China. In 1982, reform in forestland tenure was undertaken to create 
more incentives for forest owners to manage their land. In 1985, a centralized 
harvest quota system was established to control widespread illegal logging. In 
1996, two types of forest classification were identified to serve different objectives: 
(1) commercial forests and (2) public beneficiary forests, and these became the 
working basis of the Forest Ecological Compensation Program. 
 In 1998, the logging ban component of the Natural Forest Protection Program was 
launched, characterized by a sizeable investment from the Central Government to 
strengthen the forest guard system. Owners of collective forests were stimulated 
when economic opportunities from forest resources arose as a result of market 
development. Some laws and regulations (e.g., Organic Law of the Village 
Committee) were favorable to collective forest owners. Challenges to the legitimacy 
of mandatory policies made by the government forest administration emerged. In 
1998, following the Yangtze River flood, the failure of the log harvesting quotas and 
other forest policies instigated a policy shift from using mandatory instruments to 
applying more inductive instruments. That is, the government gave forest owners 
incentives to protect forest resources by providing subsidies, rewards, and taxation 
breaks, rather than forcing forest owners into compliance with the threat of 
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penalties, taxation, and quotas. The Sloping Land Conversion Program is an 
example of this policy shift that subsidizes farmers by providing grain, cash, and 
saplings to encourage owners to convert sloping land into forestland or grassland to 
reduce soil erosion. However, the funding source for forest conservation is not so 
stable. It is unlikely that this program will be sustainable once funding is finished. 
Clearly, most payment schemes for environmental services in China have been 
publicly financed, including the two forest conservation program introduced on a 
large scale by the central government. Current observations on the implementation 
of the payment schemes prompt us to understand the significance of policy 
perspectives on forest governance in this regard, rather than jumping into 
developing market mechanisms. From a policy perspective there are several critical 
issues that should be addressed. 
This paper provides an overview of the promise and pitfalls of payment mechanisms 
for watershed services in China’s upland areas, drawing on a specific case study 
from Kejie Watershed. Although preliminary surveys and experience with actual 
arrangements have demonstrated its potential in China, payment schemes are 
regularly hindered by a lack of the awareness, market infrastructure, and 
institutional support necessary for their success. On the other hand, lacking of 
grassroots participation and poor governance structure in PES implementation has 
limited the success as its initial aimed. 
Service, Actors and Payment 
The idea of PES is to provide incentives and benefits for people who now utilize 
environmentally valuable ecosystems in return for them agreeing to utilize them in 
such a way as to protect or enhance their environmental services for the benefit of 
a wider population (van Noordwiik, et al, 2004). However, until now, no formalized 
definition of PES schemes exists in the literature, which causes some conceptual 
confusion. The most widely accepted definition provided by Wunder (2005) of PES is 
that is based on five principals  
• a voluntary transaction where 
• a well defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) 
• is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer 
• from a (minimum one) ES provider 
• if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality) 
Based on this definition, PES features contrast with those of some other 
conservation approaches. PES is generally more direct than approaches like 
Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDPs) which aim to indirectly 
promote conservation and explicitly combine conservation and development goals 
(Wunder, 2005)-or communicative instruments, which use communication to 
advocate certain types of environmentally positive behavior. PES is also generally 
more flexible than approach such as command-and-control systems or other 
protected area schemes (Leimona and Lee, 2008). 
Page 11 of 852
PN67-2010-01 
Payment for Environmental Services (PES): Insights from Kejie Watershed, Yunnan Province, Southwest 
China 
He Jun, Xu Jianchu, Ma Xing 
 6 
In China, the government leads the PES scheme with public finance. In 1999, 
central government has initiated largest ecosystem service payment policy to 
achieve the environmental goal of reducing soil erosion and desertification and 
increasing China’ Forest cover and area by retiring steeply sloping the marginal 
lands for agricultural production. It is has been widely recognized as Sloping Land 
Conversion Program (SLCP) which aims to increase vegetative cover by 32 million 
ha by 2010. of this area, 14.7 million ha will be converted from cropland on steep 
slopes back to forest and grassland. Slope steepness greater then 25 degree is the 
main criterion by which plots are chosen for inclusion in the SLCP. In addition to the 
primary goal of reducing environmental degradation, two associated goals with the 
SLCP are to alleviate poverty and to promote local economic development (Liu, et 
al. 2008). 
Under the SLCP, the government provide farmers 2,250 and 1,500 kg of grain ( or 
3,150 and 2100 yuan at 1.4 yuan per kg of grain) per ha of converted cropland per 
year in the upper research of the Yangtze River basin and in the upper reach of the 
Yangtze River Basin and in the upper and middle reaches of the Yellow River Basin, 
respectively. In addition, 300 yuan/ha per year for miscellaneous expenses and a 
one-time subsidy of 750 yuan/ha for seeds or seedlings are provided. The duration 
of subsidies depends on the outcome of cropland conversion: two years if the 
cropland is converted into grassland, five years if converted into economic forests 
by using fruit trees, or eight years if converted to ecological forests by using tree 
species such as pine and black locust. Furthermore, no taxes on the converted 
cropland are collected. By the end of 2005, 90 billion yuan had been invested in the 
SLCP. The SLCP began to receive more cumulative investment. The planned total 
investment in the SLCP will reach 220 billion yuan by 2010 
Forestry line agency is primarily implementer of SLCP program, which state grain 
bureau and ministry of finance has been involved in the payment. This centralized 
on policy post the government at the buyer and farmers as the provider of the 
service, while the beneficiaries are a large group beyond the tax-payers and even 
the boundary. Since the actors from multi-level and sectors involved and the 
program plan makes significant allowances for diversity in local implementation, the 
degree to which compliance and outcomes are linked appears to be strongly 
contextual.    
Research Site and Methods 
Kejie watershed, lying upstream on the Salween, provides environmental goods 
and services to Baoshan Prefecture in Yunnan and downstream to Myanmar and 
Thailand. It is located in the western part of Yunnan at a latitude of 24°46′06″N 
-25°22′39″N and longitude of 98°55′47″E -99°40′28″E and covers a total area of 
1,755 km2 (see below Map). Elevations range from 963 to 3076 masl. Donghe 
River, a major tributary of the Upper Salween, is the main water course and runs for 
95.2 km with an average slope of 11° ranging from 1 to 88°. The valley includes 
Longyang City, one of the most productive farming areas in Yunnan, at elevations of 
less than 1,700 m. The mountain area is dominant with elevations of from 2000 to 
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3000 m. The climate is sub-tropical in the valley and temperate in mountain areas. 
Annual precipitation varies between 970 to 1290 mm with an average of 966.5 mm. 
The dry and wet seasons are clearly defined in this region. More than 80% of 
precipitation is in the monsoon from May to October, the wet season. The average 
temperature is 15.9°C with an extreme highest of 32.4°C and an extreme lowest of 
-3.8°C. Climate is influenced by topography also. Temperature decreases 0.6 °C 
with every 100 m of altitude. The main soil type is red soil. The natural vegetation 
of semi-moist broadleaved forest disappeared many decades ago and has been 
replaced by conifer with a mix of alder (Alnus nepalensis) and other broadleaved 
species.  
There are 10 townships in Kejie watershed with a total population of 597,638 
(2005). Longyang City is the political and economic centre of Baoshan Prefecture. 
Agriculture predominates: two crops a year are planted, corn in summer and wheat 
or barley in winter for the uplands; rice in the wet season and wheat in the dry 
season for the lowlands. Tea in the uplands, tobacco in the foothills, and intensive 
vegetable cultivation in the lowlands are common cash crops. Natural forests were 
replaced by pine forests when shifting cultivation occurred in the 14th century. More 
recent causes of deforestation are a) shifting cultivation, intensive planting of poppy 
and buckwheat, and overgrazing (early part of the twentieth century); b) cutting 
trees for fuel for the army, housing, and, road construction during World War II, c) 
logging for fuel for iron and steel refining during the ‘Great Leap Forward’ in 1958, 
and d) over-harvesting of forest resources following grants of individual household 
rights in the early 1980s. 
Fig 1 Location of Kejie Watershed 
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This research is built based on previous research and data. Critical review of former 
study and data was the first stage applied in this report. Besides, the Participatory 
action research on public water sources, water demand, and supply was conducted 
in 2002, based on household interviews with 44 respondents in the watershed. User 
water demands (ownership, type, location, household/people, and water 
availability) were noted and the physical parameters of water (yield, temperature, 
conductivity, odor, color and taste) were tested. To better understand 
socioeconomic status, a participatory assessment was undertaken in 1998 by 
project staff, in concert with local villagers. This assessment utilized a range of 
techniques, including key informant interviews with government officials, farmers, 
and village leaders; village meetings; field observations; matrix score methods; 
participatory mapping on water availability and access to water resources for 
domestic and agriculture use; and policy review and analysis. Stakeholder meetings 
were organized in natural villages, administrative villages, and townships to 
introduce the principles of integrated water resource management and participatory 
action research at watershed level. 
Results 
Planning and Program Implementation  
The planning and implementation process for the SLCP is much more complex 
program because its target population is much larger—millions of smallholders, not 
hundreds of state forest enterprises. It includes a much broader set of government 
agencies, and a great diversity of land-use types and technologies.  
The program design is centralized. The central government first defines the overall 
area and scale of the program. The relevant provinces then formulate provincial 
SLCP plans; and submit these to relevant central government bodies, including the 
State Forestry Administration (SFA). Next, the SFA examines and balances the 
plans of various provinces; and, on the basis of this work, formulates the national 
SLCP plan, which is then submitted to the State Council for approval. Once the 
national plan is ratified, the SFA—jointly with other central agencies, such as the 
State Development Planning Commission—assigns tasks to the provinces according 
to this plan and requires the provinces to formulate annual implementation plans 
accordingly. The provinces then assign program tasks to lower-level governments, 
which in turn assign tasks to governments at even lower levels. Local-level 
governments—normally county forestry departments in cooperation with township 
governments—conduct field surveys and delineate tasks by household. These 
grassroots-level implementation annual plans are then reported up level-by-level to 
the SFA, which examines and approves the plans, sending them back down 
level-by-level to county-level governments and forestry departments. 
Decision making Mechanism in PES 
The SLCP involves government agencies at all levels. At the central level, the key 
players are the State Development Planning Commission, the Office of the State 
Council's Western Development Leading Group, the Ministry of Finance, the SFA, 
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and the State Grain Bureau. The State Development Planning Commission and the 
State Council's Office of Western Development are responsible for overall planning 
and coordination. The Ministry of Finance is responsible for fund appropriation, 
management, and supervision, while the State Grain Bureau is responsible for 
providing grain compensation for farmers. The SFA is the highest government 
agency responsible for implementation of the Sloping Land Conversion Program. 
The SFA has established a Sloping Land Conversion management office, which is 
responsible for overall planning and annual plans and the management and 
supervision of implementation. The office is designed to be staffed by 30 people and 
is now staffed by 20. In addition, the SFA carries out field investigations and surveys 
in order to provide the State Council with advice for related decision-making. 
Governments at the provincial and county levels are held responsible by higher 
levels of government for the implementation of the SLCP within their jurisdictions. 
They are responsible for identifying priority areas for cropland conversion, providing 
the necessary conditions for implementation (such as matching funds), setting up 
leading groups to direct the work of relevant agencies, and examining and 
approving the proposed plans of relevant agencies. Provincial leading groups are 
typically made up of heads of planning, finance, grain, forestry, animal husbandry, 
agricultural, and land bureaus. Because many provincial governments are 
undergoing institutional reform and are very short-staffed, the provincial SLCP 
management office in some provinces is just a nominal body and is usually located 
in the Division of Afforestation in the Forestry Bureau. Due to the importance of 
forestry in southwestern China, forestry departments in southwestern provinces 
have greater authority and their SLCP management offices are generally much 
better staffed and effective. 
Local-level forestry departments are considered the actual implementers of the 
SLCP. Departments at the county level, which are the lowest-level forestry 
authorities, shoulder the greatest responsibility in actual implementation of the 
program. Local-level forestry departments typically set up a SLCP management 
office to be responsible for formulation of relevant plans, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation, management of program funds, formulation of specific 
management rules, and provision of technical support and saplings. Greater 
variation is seen at the county level in terms of SLCP management offices. Some of 
these offices are located in the county forestry bureaus, directed by a top official 
from the county forestry bureau, and staffed by forestry bureau personnel. On the 
other hand, some SLCP management offices at the county level are separately 
organized by the county government, with their staff coming from various county 
agencies. Research results also indicate that different county-level SLCP 
management offices have different levels of authority. Some have complete control 
over fund management, while others need to secure signatures of a deputy county 
mayor for final fund management decisions.  
At the local level, other government institutions may be involved in implementation. 
The township-level governments are responsible for mobilizing and organizing 
farmers to implement the program on the ground. Another significant local 
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government institution involved is the county-level land resources management 
bureau, which is responsible for issuing land use certificates. In some provinces, 
additional government agencies are involved at the provincial level. In Inner 
Mongolia, the Ecological Restoration Leading Group serves as a coordinating agency 
for the program, while in Province, that role is played by the Landscape 
Beautification Office. 
Governance of Government-led PES  
A number of line agencies are involved in the SLCP. They includes commission of 
planning commission of minority nationality affairs department of finance, 
department of grain supply, department of land, department of forestry and 
department of animal husbandry. Given those involvements of different agencies, it 
is already a difficult work to coordinate. Forestry agencies obviously is the main 
actors to implement this program. Therefore, regarding the governance issues, it is 
curial to examine who make decision and at what level is decision are make in the 
process of program implementation.   
Since centralized control of land use the SLCP, there is a little space for local people 
to play. In the process of program implementation, we can easily found that forestry 
sector is dominating the process with assistance of township government. Based on 
the quota area of SLCP for each year, the Baoshan Forestry Bureau would distribute 
this quota to each township. The township would reallocate this quota to each 
village in accordance to village application and ecological priority.  
Besides, there is a major principle for program implementation is to respect to local 
desires. This principle however is an ambiguous principle, which can be interpreted 
in different way. It can be that officials should respect local willingness in 
participation of this program. It also can be should respect local consideration in 
grogram implementation. In reality, there is only respect to local willingness to 
participate, however little respecting of local consideration. In Kejie, a number of 
farmers would to plant diverse tree species to meet their local needs. And also, 
several villages had expressed their interests in mixture of tree species plantations.  
But, practically, walnut tree became the only species for plantation in most villages 
we visited. From official side, the walnut tree can be regarded as ecological tree with 
economic benefits in future. In the other words, the farmers can get 7 years 
subsidies recent, since regarding as ecological tree; and in the future farmers can 
get cash income from walnut selling. It is seem be a win-win strategy. Practically, 
density of plantation would excess to 85 trees per mu so as to be regarded as 
ecological tree plantation with 7 years subsidies. But, to have walnut harvest, there 
are only allowed 30 trees as maximum. Otherwise, there would never have walnut 
fruiting. In addition, future market for walnut is also unpredictable.          
Given that much uncertainty, people have express numbers of concerns at the 
village level. In our investigation, whether can local people cut the walnut tree in 
order to promote the production of walnut are the most common concerns that local 
people think about. As a youth villagers said, if they cut the some of the walnut tree, 
it means turn the ecological forest into economic tree. In this respect, function and 
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utilization of forest would be changed. It also would conflict with the initial objective 
of government who approval the program in the village. Therefore, it is quite 
reasonable to worry about it. Moreover, in case the walnut cutting is permitted, that 
large-scale plantation of walnut would also push the price of walnut rapid dropped 
down. In this respect, most villagers, who have experiences on previous 
government program of large-scale plantation on economic crop such as sugar can, 
worry about it very much. Therefore, selection of tree species is the very respect for 
questioning governance issues in the current trend of decentralization process, 
because it seems that centralization process has been promoted in SLCP.           
In addition, selection of priority target area, preparation and distribution seedling 
tree, monitoring, elevations and so forth are all centralized in the forestry sectors 
and township government. Various task has increase the burden of local 
government. As a result, local government prefers to work on those place where is 
ecological environment without most difficulty. However, it is always opposite the 
initial objectives of SLCP.  
As Zuo (2002) augured, Rushed implementation of the program has led to less than 
ideal results, as local governments have not had time to establish effective 
implementation systems. In addition, the burden on local governments in terms of 
personnel is quite high. Generally speaking, if a township is involved in the 
program, most of its own government staff will have to be involved for a period of 
more than two months annually. In some areas, local governments who are short of 
staff organize special teams to complete assigned tasks as quickly as possible. 
Clearly, this centralized structure of governance framework might not achieve both 
ecological and economic development in the mountainous watershed of Yunnan.    
SLCP led Land-use and Hydrological Change in the watershed 
From 1991 to 2001, forest increased by 50.1 km2, 119.7% of which was gained 
from grassland; grassland decreased by 132 km2 and 45.5, 39, and 15.5% of it had 
been converted to forest, barren land, and cropland, respectively; cropland 
increased by 40.3 km2, 64.1 and 50.7% of which was gained from barren land and 
grassland, respectively, and 12.8% of which had been converted to settlement 
respectively; settlement increased by 12D6 km2, 41.2, 31, and 22.3% of which had 
been gained from cropland, barren land, and forest respectively; barren land 
increased by 27D2 km2, 188D9 and 22D5% of which was gained from grassland 
and forest and 94.9 and 14.3% had been converted to ropland and settlement 
respectively; water bodies increased by 1.8 km2, 109D5 and 35.1% of which was 
from forest and barren land and 47D3% had been converted to settlement. 
From 2001 to 2006, forest increased by 123D6 km2, 44.8% of which was gained 
from cropland, 33D6% from grassland, and 20D1% from barren land; grassland 
decreased by 75 km2, 54.7% of which had been converted to forest, 38D2% to 
barren land, and 5D8% to settlement; cropland decreased by 97D8 km2, 55D7% of 
which had been converted to forest, 30D9% to barren land, and 15D2% to 
settlement; settlement increased by 28D2 km2, 52D8% of which was gained from 
cropland, 28D1% from barren land, and 15D6% from grassland; barren land 
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increased by 27D9 km2, 103D6% of which was gained from grassland and 109D4% 
from cropland, whereas 88D6% had been converted to forest and 28.6% to 
settlement; water bodies decreased by 4.8 km2, 42.4% of which had been 
converted to forest, 24D4% to barren land, 24.1% to cropland, and 16.6% to 
settlement. Thus, it is hardly to use this result to interpret that the SLCP lead to a 
great environmental output. 
Discussion 
Ecological Outcome of SLCP 
The SLCP program is current ambitious project that government would to re-adjust 
the negative of rapid economic development on ecological environment by tree 
plantation. It is also the main grogram to deal with heavy soil erosion in the 
mountain watershed. However, due to the weakness of governance framework in 
program implementation, the ecological consequences can be foresee is not as good 
as SLCP initial design. Achievement of original objects is restricted by poor 
implementation of the program. Poor defining and misdefining priority target area 
are the main factor to constrain the objective achievement. A number of land with 
high productivity and less steep slop were converted became a common 
phenomena which researcher observed. As a result, in comparison with agriculture 
cultivation, control of soil erosion through this program is problematic. Therefore, 
strictly obeying by the policy to define the priority target area can be one of the 
ways to avoid this.     
Moreover, due to simplification and short-cut implementation of SCLP, less choice in 
tree species and centralized control of tree selection might result the new problem 
of monoculture. Ecologically, monoculture in plantation had been verified at the 
worldwide, which might cause economical and ecological instabilities, such as 
market surplus, disaster of insect. It is clear diversification of species plantation is 
curial. Fundamentally, therefore, promotion local participation in decision-making 
of tree selection is core for improving the promising outputs of SLCP. Also, it is the 
principles of the SLCP policy------respect for local desire. In the other word, official 
should not only respect for local willingness but more carefully consider local needs.      
Socio-economic Implications   
Socio-economic factors are critical aspects in SLCP. With the subsidies from 
government, it provides the incentive of local people to involve in this program for 
tree plantation and management. Also, SLCP has the sense of poverty reduction 
aim, due to subsidies offering. In this respect, SLCP is main current force for 
agrarian transformation. Based on initial idea of central government, converting 
less productivity land and providing subsidies can play the role to balance social 
inequity, which are resulted from difference in geographical and ecological factors. 
It also aims to promote re-distribution of welfare via government activities.  
However, poor implementation of the program has cause further agrarian 
transformation and social differentiation. As discussed above, lack of information 
made most of “remote villages” lack of recognition the potentials of benefits and 
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advantages of this program. In contrast, the villages where information can easy 
reach can not only get benefit from SLCP, but also earn more from the program at 
expense of those “poor and remote villages”. In this case, the compensation for 
poor has unexpectedly gone to the rich villages. This social differentiation might 
cause the further social problem. Therefore, transparency of information and 
information dissemination is essential for the program implementation at the first 
place. Also, this transparency can limit the chance that the one have access to 
authority get more benefit. It consequently can improve social justice and social 
equity. 
In addition, in term of further market development, as discussed above, 
emphasised on one or two species of fruit tree plantation might result further 
market surplus of products. Eventually, the farmers would suffer from that. SLCP as 
a strategy to restructure local economic structure, therefore, should well consider 
diversification of rural production. Enhancement of local participation in this case 
can achieve the goal of diversification of local production and economic structure 
and improve stability of local economy.  
Policy Implications                        
It is clear the ecological and social-economic gaol eventually can be achieved via 
political adjustment. The negative and unexpected consequences somehow are all 
resulted from the weakness of governance framework in a political sense. In 
addition to enhancing transparency of information, local participation in 
decision-making and social equity, there are still several points should be 
highlighted here. 
Security of property rights as the fundamental issues in creating farmers’ incentive 
should be considered. We do not mean privatization is the best to security land 
tenure. However, respect for local rights of resource use and extend the contract 
periods are the significant strategies should be adopted. Besides, use rights of land 
and forest should be heritable in legal space. And, village counts should be 
established to defend local rights.  
Finally, as argued above, SLCP is a centralized program in the current tendency of 
decentralization process. As a result, democratized local body can play a little in this 
program implementation, which obviously restriction the political reform of 
decentralization. As mentioned, this centralized program has not only increase the 
burden of local government, but make the program inefficient and ineffective. 
Clearly, increasing the role of democratized local body in the program 
implementation can improve the ecological, economic and social outcome and 
consequences of SLCP.               
Conclusion 
As the largest state-led PES program, SCLP has been provides a insights and 
arguable PES schemes that with numerous government influences. While 
addressing the issues related to ecological effectiveness, participation/voluntarism 
and social equity, the SCLP has been economically and timely efficient in term of 
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largest vegetation recovery and great population of social benefits, which also 
resulted from comparative low transaction cost. This typical positive side of the 
centralized and state-led PES schemes differ from other mechanism of 
private-sector and market schemes where the high transaction and facilitation cost 
might always require an additional actor involved as breaker.  
However, it is also clear this centralized PES could be improved significantly through 
the strengthening the good governance structure, which require much more 
meaningful grassroots participation in decision-making at all the levels. The 
institutional capacity should be built to ensure public participation as in many forms. 
Furthermore, security of property rights is a precondition to enable local 
participation and negotiation in PES. The integration of the market mechanisms also 
provides a potential to improve the program, while market infrastructure and 
different financial instruments should be well developed.         
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1. Water Allocation Policies 
1.1 Water Resource Policies in China 
In China, water resources are owned by the state, which promulgates laws and 
regulations to guide the allocation of water resources. For the time being, there are 
four important laws and regulations: Water Law of the People‘s Republic of China 
enacted on October 1st, 2002, Regulation on the Administration of Water Permit 
and the Levy of Water Resource Fees enacted on April 15th, 2006, Interim Measures 
for Water Quantity Allocation effective as of February 1st, 2008 and Measures for 
Administration of Water Permit effective as of April 9th, 2008.  
According to these laws and regulations, the state allocates water resources to 
administrative regions from the top to the lowest level in accordance with the total 
water quantity available for allocation, and in line with the water quantity 
consumable in domestic use and production in administrative regions of all levels.  
Water resources in China are under the uniform management of the state. And 
Ministry of Water Resources (MoWR) is the administrative department responsible 
for the management and supervision of water resources around the country. Water 
resources agencies at all levels are responsible for the management and supervision 
of water resources in their respective regions. In addition, the State Council has 
established seven River Basin Commissions, which respectively manage and 
supervise the development and utilization of water resources in seven main river 
basins.  
In China, water resources are theoretically allocated according to the following five 
principles. Firstly, water resources are owned by the state, and the State Council, 
on behalf of the state, exercises the right of ownership. For water resources, the 
state applies a management system that combines a river basin and administrative 
regions to allocate water resources. And the Ministry of Water Resources under the 
State Council is in charge of the management and supervision of all the water 
resources. Secondly, on the basis of river basins and administrative regions, the 
water resources agencies formulate and approve unified and strategic plans on 
water resources, which shall be abided by in development and utilization of water 
resources. And the Development and Reform Commission (DRM) and MoWR both 
under the State Council are responsible for the macro-allocation of water resources 
around the country. Thirdly, according to the laws, the state implements a system 
of water permit and payment for water use, and water gross and ration are two 
major instruments to allocate water use. Fourthly, water resources shall be 
allocated in accordance with the principle of fairness and justice. And in accordance 
with the conditions of water resources, the past and present water supply, and 
future water supply and demand in different river basins and administrative 
regions, and also in line with the requirements of building a water-saving society, 
the state shall take into consideration the interests of the regions in both upper and 
lower reaches and on both the right and left banks of a river, balance the use of 
surface water and groundwater and the use of water in the river and outside it, and 
make an unified plan on water supply for domestic use, industry/agriculture and 
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ecological environment. Fifthly, rational arrangements for development and 
multipurpose use of water resources shall be made according to the principle of 
combining the tapping of new sources with saving water, giving priority to saving 
water, and water re-use. And the government shall first pay attention to satisfying 
the need of domestic water of urban and rural residents, while taking into account 
the need of water in agriculture, industry and ecological environment, and the need 
of navigation. In areas where the water sources are insufficient, the scale of the 
cities and the development of industrial, agricultural and service projects which use 
a large amount of water shall be restricted. 
Under the guidance of these principles, water resources are allocated in strict 
accordance with unified plans, procedures of approval and implementation, and 
quota. Water resources agencies and Development and Reform Commissions at the 
each level will examine and approve the water resource development projects. 
According to river basin plans, medium- and long-term plans of water supply and 
demand, the approved water allocation plans and the predicted annual volume of 
in-coming water, River Basin Commissions and the local water resource agencies 
shall regard river basins as a unit in formulating water allocation plans that regulate 
runoff and store water in order to allocate and distribute water.   
Any organization or individual that takes a large amount of water directly from 
rivers and lakes or from underground shall, in accordance with water permit and 
payment for water use, apply for the licenses of water permit and pay water 
resources fees, in order to acquire the right to take water. Water quantity to be 
examined and approved by relevant authorities shall not exceed the water ceiling of 
a water basin or administrative region. In a river basin or administrative region 
where water quantity examined and approved reaches the ceiling, no more water 
shall be approved. Organizations or individuals shall use water according to the 
approved annual plan. Water used shall be measured, and one will pay more for 
water use if one exceeds the permit in the plan and the quota.  
Regarding water resources development projects, the government examines 
information on hand, development plans and water demand in society, and 
approves the projects in accordance with relevant procedures. In order to 
strengthen and regulate the water resources development projects, MoWR issued 
the Interim Measures for Administration of Investment Plans of Capital Construction 
of Water Conservancy on October 30th, 2003.  
1.2 Water Resources Development 
Water is regarded as a public good and is owned by the state which is the main 
investment body in the development and utilization of water resources. These make 
the government play the most important role in the development and utilization of 
water resources. Government makes decisions on water resource development 
projects according to certain procedure, approach and standard. There are four 
stages: the proposal of projects, the feasibility study of projects, the construction of 
projects and the operation of projects. 
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In the first stage, projects of developing and utilizing water resources are proposed. 
Water resources agencies can propose development project within their respective 
jurisdictions. Other interest parties can also propose water development project 
through various approaches. During annual meeting, People’s Congress and CPPCC 
raise proposals when relevant departments have not paid attention to water 
resources development projects, which concern people’s livelihood. Experts in 
various fields can suggest water resources agencies to propose water resources 
development projects according their studies. Media can also gather public options 
and pressure government take measures to deal with water resources issues. For 
example, media plays a very important role in Dianchi Lake governance. Since 
1990s, the pollution of Dianchi became worse. Lots of experts, scholars and citizen 
called on the government and society to do something to protect Dianchi by media. 
Due to the influence of media, the government paid more attention to the Dianchi 
governance. 
In the second stage, the feasibility study of the projects is undertaken. After the 
proposal is examined, Development and Reform Commissions approve the proposal 
to undertake feasibility if the proposal in line with social-economic development. 
The feasibility study will produce several reports for further examine. The reports 
often include technical feasibility report, economic feasibility report, environment 
impact assessment report, and resettlement plans if necessary. These reports will 
be the most important documents to be appraised. The feasibility study will require 
tenders from various institutes, like surveying and design institutes, which have 
licenses, issued by government. The feasibility study reports will submit to 
government agencies to review and approve.  
In the third stage, the projects shall be constructed. After the feasibility study ad 
design, Financial Department shall place the projects, which meet the requirements 
in the annual budget. When money for the projects is ensured and a construction 
tender will choose proper constructors and monitoring companies. A steering 
committee often forms to supervise the construction. Qualities Institutes and 
government departments will be invited to assess the construction and submit a 
project completion report. 
The fourth stage is the operation of the project. If accepted, the projects can 
transfer to city water supply companies, a state-owned company and start to 
operate. Pricing Bureau of Development and Reform Commission will decide the 
water price.  
According to the stages above, the government governs the development and 
utilization of water resources based on laws, procedures and the leads of 
government. 
2. Water Supply and Demand in Kunming 
2.1 Water Resources  
Kunming is among the 14 cities, which suffer severe water shortages. According to 
the statistics in 2007 from Kunming municipal Bureau of Statistics, the annual 
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per-capita amount of water resources in Kunming is 1,180 cubic meters that is only 
55.44% of that of China and 10.93% of that of the world. In Kunming, water supply 
mainly relies on surface water supplemented by groundwater. Its average amount 
of water resources is 7.313 billion cubic meters (Bm3) per year, of which 75% (or 
5.5 Bm3) comes from surface water and 25% (or 1.798 Bm3) from groundwater. 
Rivers in Kunming municipality belong to three main river systems: Jinsha River, 
Panlong River and Yuanjiang River. There are 61 rivers with a catchment area 
greater than 100 km2 such as Panlong River, Tanglangchuan River, Pudu River, Ba 
River and Baidu River. There are three main lakes in Kunming, Dianchi Lake with an 
area 298 km2, Yangzonghai Lake with an area of 31.9 km2 and Qingshuihai Lake 
with an area of 7 km2. The average water storage capacity of these three lakes is 
2.22 Bm3 per year. 
Yunlong Reservoir, Songhuaba Reservoir and Dianchi Lake are the surface water 
sources around Kunming City. With a catchment area of 749 km2, Yunlong Reservoir 
has average annual runoff of 454 Mm3. With a catchment area of 595 km2, 
Songhuaba Reservoir has average annual runoff of 210 Mm3, while that of the 
Dianchi Lake, with a catchment area of 2,920 km2, is 750 Mm3. Besides, there are 
over 300 wells (groundwater sources) in Kunming including Jiulong well Heilong 
well, Bailong well, Longtan well in Haiyuan temple. Annual rainfall distribution is 
uneven. Every year, during the rainy season from May to October, the rainfall is 
84-90% of the whole year. But during the dry season from November to April of 
next year, the rainfall is 10-16% of the whole year. Every reservoir stores water 
during the flood season. In addition, Dianchi Lake drainage area can support the 
gross of water more than 1000 Mm3 per year. The water demand of Kunming citizen 
could have been met by Dianchi Lake drainage area. However, Since 2001 Dianchi 
Lake has been abandoned as a source to domestic use because of water pollution. 
Kunming has to look for other water resources outside. 
At present, the main sources of water supply tapped by Kunming are Yunlong 
Reservoir, Songhuaba Reservoir, Dahe Reservoir, Chaihe Reservoir, Baoxianghe 
Reservoir, Hongpo Reservoir and the water-taking station of Shalanghe River. The 
whole system is often called as ‘six reservoirs and one station’ (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: Map of Water Supply Sources to Kunming City 
 
2.2 Social and Economical Development in Kunming 
Two factors are crucial to regulate water demand and supply in Kunming. One is the 
increasing growth of population and urbanization. In 1949 when People’s Republic 
of China was established, the city of Kunming was only an area of 7.8 km2 with a 
population of 192,700. In 2006, the urban area of Kunming reached 233 km2 with a 
population of 2,319,600. From 1950 to 2006, its population grew by 6.88 times. 
Especially after 1978, its population grew quickly (Figure 2). 
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Data Sources: China City Statistical Yearbook (1990-2007) 
 
The other is the social and economical development of Kunming. From the year 
1950 onward, its economy has changed from agriculture dominance to industry 
dominance. From 1950 to 1965, its economy recovered and laid the foundation for 
industrialization. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, its economy 
stopped growing because of the political turmoil. After the Cultural Revolution, its 
economy gradually got on the right track and has grown steadily ever since. Figure 
4 shows the GDP growth of Kunming during the period from 1952 to 2006.  



















Data source: Statistics Bureau of Kunming municipality 
2.3 Water Demand and Supply  
Economy growth and population increase result in fast urbanization and a 
demanding for more water in Kunming. After 1978, its urban water consumption 
increased annually by 10%, and the conflict between water demand and supply is 
becoming increasingly evident. In 1978, there were 3 waterworks in the main city 
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and in 2006, there were 10 water supply facilities (Table 1). The domestic and 
industrial uses of water increased dramatically. During the 28 years from 1978 to 
2006, the annual total water supply increased by 6.8 times from 53 Mm3 to 365 
Mm3. In Kunming, water use includes domestic use, industrial production and 
irrigation. 
The gross of urban demand generated pressure on water resources after 1978. 
Since 1982, water in Songhuaba Reservoir is no longer used for irrigation and has 
been used for domestic use of urban residents. From 1992 onwards, due to other 
water sources were polluted, Songhuaba Reservoir became the most important 
water source of Kunming City. It became even more important after 1998, when the 
pollution of Dianchi Lake became increasingly severe. The water taken from the 
Lake was gradually reduced and had to be stopped in 2001. The Songhuaba 
Reservoir then provided 450,000 m3 per day, which was 50% of the total water 
supply to Kunming. In 2000, the daily demand for water of urban residents was over 
310L per person per day but the daily water supply was 300L per person per day or 
so. In 2004, because of the drought, water in reservoirs reduced severely and 
caused the shortage of drinking water of 360,000 residents. In 2005, Kunming 
suffered the drought which could be seen once every 50 years and caused the 
shortage of drinking water of 570, 000 residents.  
 













1954 1 4.50 92.40 15.43 
1965 3 504.88 757.31 52.61 
1977 3 1328.58 1595.88 66.93 
1984 4 2926.80 3738.32 85.00 
1988 4 5369.00 4087.00 116.00 
1990 5 5782.00 5094.00 118.00 
1998 8 10946.00 7926.00 173.06 
2004 10 4039.00 14565.00 204.23 
2006 10 4370.00 14619.00 220.00 
Data source: Kunming municipal Bureau of Statistics 
 
Industrial water use has been increasing with different sources in different period. 
Before 1960s, water for industrial use in Kunming was taken directly from Dianchi 
Lake and aquifers, and after 1970 it was supplied by water supply companies. For 
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several decades, the scale of industry in Kunming has been expanded so that the 
water consumption in industrial production has increased significantly. For 
example, water consumption in industries in the lakeshore area of Dianchi Lake was 
10.16 Mm3 in 1952, 18.56 Mm3 in 1962, 43.2 Mm3 in 1972, 87.32 Mm3 in 1982 
and 124.5 Mm3 in 1985. And the annual increase rate was about 10%. Water 
consumption in industries of Kunming increased by 6.72% annually from 40.95 
Mm3 in 2001 to 43.7 Mm3 in 2006. In Table 1 water consumption in industries 
declined significantly from 1998 to 2004. The reason is that the government limited 
the water supplied by waterworks for industries in order to guarantee the supply of 
water for domestic use of urban residents. Meanwhile, in order to avoid water 
shortage, industries had been allowed to take water from Dianchi Lake again and 
from underground, and also encouraged to use recycled or second water.  
After the foundation of People’s Republic of China, agriculture in Kunming has 
further developed. A lot of water conservancy projects have been constructed and 
water-saving irrigation technologies popularized and applied. Since 1995 water 
from Songhua Watershed was no longer used for irrigation but solely for cities. 
Dianchi Lake is polluted and could not be source to domestic use. So water for 
irrigation was mainly taken from Dianchi Lake because of its water was polluted and 
stopped using for cities, and from rivers and reservoirs in the irrigation area. And 
because the water used in irrigation is only a small part that is under 3% of the 
annual runoff volume of Kunming, it has little influence on the urban water supply. 
In 2006, under the jurisdiction of Kunming municipality, there are 129,500 mu of 
farmland and 22,100 mu of forestland. Their annual water demand is 210 Mm3 
which is 2.87% of the annual runoff volume of Kunming.  
2.4 Challenges 
Kunming is faced with three challenges in development and utilization of water 
resources.  
The first is rapid growing population and the demand for water. By the end of 1988, 
Kunming Tape Water Company (KPWC) is responsible for supplying domestic water 
to 1.66 million residents or 134,000 households. The annual water consumption 
was 40.87 Mm3 and 35.23 cubic meters per capita. By June of 2007, KPWC was 
responsible for supplying domestic water for 2.2 million residents or 370,300 
households. The annual consumption rose to 330 Mm3 and 150 cubic meter 
per-capita annum.  
The second is the over abstraction of groundwater. As the society and economy 
develop, conflicts between domestic water and production water occur. Enterprises 
accelerate over abstraction of groundwater in order to meet needs of increasing 
production. Abstraction of groundwater was 10,500 cubic meters in the early 1950s, 
29,100 cubic meters in the 1960s, over 100,000 cubic meters in the 1970s, 101,500 
cubic meters in 1980 and increased to 165,600 cubic meters in 1983. And at its 
maximum, the abstraction of groundwater was one third of the total water supply.  
The third is water pollution. The over-abstraction of groundwater results in the 
decline of aquifers in some areas. The polluted surface penetrates into deep ground 
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water. Some springs are dried out and some are polluted and can not be drunk. This 
worsens the situation of water supply in the city. In 1988 the Fifth Waterworks of 
KPWC had to be closed because Dianchi Lake was polluted. This waterworks had 
been taking 150 Mm3 water annum from Dianchi Lake. Many water sources like 
springs and Dianchi Lake are polluted and go out of use. New sources have to be 
found.  
3. Water Resources Management in Kunming 
3.1 Water Resources Management 
Kunming Municipal Bureau of Water Resources, Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform, and Municipal Bureau of Public Utilities are the most 
important government entities in charge of water development projects. Kunming is 
one of the fourteen cities in China that suffer from severe water shortages. In order 
to protect water resources and to increase the efficiency of water use, Kunming City 
has, in accordance with the laws and regulations of the state and Yunnan province, 
formulated and issued a series of local regulations and measures (Table 2). These 
show that the government tries to strengthen the control of water use and make the 
governances of water resources systemization. 
Table 2: List of Regulations and Measures of Water Management in Kunming  
Regulations, Measures and rules 
Promulgated 
on 
Enacted on By  
Regulations for Administration of 
Protection Zone of Songhuaba 






Measures for Administration of 






Implementation Measures of 
Kunming Municipality on the 





Rules for Administration of Water 





Congress   
Measures for Administration of 
Construction of Water Facilities 





 Penalty Measures for 
Administration of Water 
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Rules for Administration of Water 







Kunming Municipal Bureau of Water Resources is responsible for allocation of water 
resources within Kunming administrative boundary. The development and 
allocation of water resources must be in accordance with Kunming socio-economic 
development plan coordinated by Kunming Municipal Commission of Development 
and Reform. Meanwhile, the government emphasizes that its work shall comply with 
the principles of rational use and scientific protection of water sources, combination 
of the planned use of water with water conservation, giving priority to the domestic 
use of water of residents while taking into consideration of water use in industry and 
other uses, and encouraging the use of advanced technologies and facilities for 
effective water sue. And water management includes the tapping of new resources 
and saving water sources.  
3.2 Management of Water Development Projects 
According to the Interim Regulations for Administration of Investment Projects of 
Kunming Municipality enacted on February 6th, 2007 and the Regulations on 
Procedures of Major Decisions of the People’s Government of Kunming Municipality 
enacted on December, 1st, 2004, the Kunming Municipal Commission of 
Development and Reform is in charge of the appraisal and approval of investment 
projects, including water development projects on behalf of Kunming Municipal 
People’s Government. The Kunming Municipal Bureau of Finance is responsible for 
managing and supervising the financial activities concerning the construction of 
projects invested by Kunming Municipal People’s Government; and other relevant 
departments within their limits of specified powers are responsible for supervising 
the investment of the government. And the Kunming Municipal People’s 
Government has the final say in the investment projects. It can, in accordance with 
the importance of the issue, hold working meetings of the mayor, executive 
meetings of the Kunming Municipal People’s Government or its plenary meetings in 
order to make decisions. And as for the issues of special importance, the municipal 
government first holds consultative meetings to listen to the opinions from deputies 
of the Kunming Municipal People’s Congress and Kunming Municipal CPPCC 
Committee, and from people’s organizations, and then holds executive meetings or 
plenary meetings to discuss the issue, and finally the discussion reports shall be 
submitted to the Kunming Municipal CPC Committee for examination and approval. 
Figure 5 shows the system of management of investment projects and the 
decision-making procedures of the municipal government.  
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3.3 Management of Water Demand 
Kunming applies incremental price and other measures to encourage water 
conservation. Running water and exploited groundwater shall be metered and their 
fees shall be charged separately. 
The incremental water price can automatically regulate the demand. It is required in 
Kunming that water shall be metered and fees shall be charged. Water is charged 
according to five categories. These five kinds include: water for domestic use, water 
for public use, water for industrial and agricultural use, water for service sector, and 
water for special use.  
In the aspect of domestic use of water, the incremental charges are applied. If the 
monthly water consumption of a household is within 10 cubic meters, the fee is 
charged at CHY3.45 per ton. Additional water used over 10 cubic meters, 
incremental charge shall be applied as: if the additional consumption is within 1-5 
cubic meters, 50% more shall be collected; if the additional consumption is 6-10 
cubic meters, 100% more shall be collected; and if consumption is over 11 cubic 
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Figure 4: the system of management of investment projects and 
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In the past twenty years, the price of domestic water has dramatically changed. 
Before 1990 the rice was CHY0.14 per ton. In September of 1990, the price was 
raised for the first time. And after that, continual increase of the water price have 
been undertaken (See Table 3).  
 
Table 3: Domestic Water Price Change in Kunming from 1990 to 2009 
Years 
Pre-adjustment 







1990 0.14 0.22  
1993 0.22 0.32  
1996 0.32 0.6  
1999 0.6 1.2  
2002 1.2 1.8 Including charges of sewage treatment 
2006 1.8 2.8 Including charges of sewage treatment 
2009 2.8 3.45 Including charges of sewage treatment 
 
The Kunming Municipal People’s government exercises unified management on 
development and utilization of groundwater, applies the system of water permit, 
collects fees of water and charges a progressive higher price for the amount that 
exceeds the quota. The several principles guide the exploitation of ground water. In 
an area where the tap water can guarantee the supply and groundwater reserve is 
small, the exploitation of ground water shall be controlled. The fee of groundwater 
shall be charged equally to the price of tap water. In an area where the tap water 
can not guarantee the supply and groundwater reserve is abundant, the 
groundwater must be exploited. The fee of groundwater is 50% of the price of tap 
water. The charge for using groundwater by township enterprises and by other 
production and business units in rural areas is 30% of the price of tap water. When 
groundwater is used for emergent water sources of domestic use and production 
use, its fee shall be not lower than the price of the tape water and specific standard 
of charge shall be formulated separately; as for unauthorized use of groundwater 
which exceeds the quota, its charge shall be 2-5 times as much as the standard.  
Measures of rewards and punishments are also applied to management of water 
demand. Firstly, In Kunming, all organizations have to make annual water use plan 
and submit to relevant departments. Those who have outstanding achievements in 
saving water shall be rewarded, and those whose water use exceeds the approved 
plans shall be punished. Secondly, water consumers are encouraged to use 
advanced water-saving technologies and facilities and to use recycled water. The 
government encourages the construction of facilities of using recycled water, 
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promotes the use of recycled water and subsidizes the project of using recycled 
water.  
In order to ensure that the water-saving measures are implemented, the municipal 
government has issued the Punishment Measures for Administration of Water 
Conservation of Kunming Municipality. For example, it requires that water 
consumers shall be punished if the following conditions occur: they don’t renew the 
facilities as is required or stop using water-saving facilities without authorization; 
their rates of using recycled water do not meet the requirements; they discharge 
water directly while it can be recycled and used for multi-purposes as is required; 
and they do not recycle cooling water of facilities as is required. 
The special office is established to manage and guarantee the implementation of 
water-saving measures. The Kunming Municipal People’s Government prescribes 
that the Kunming Municipal Bureau of Public Utilities is the administrative 
department for water use and water saving. And the Kunming Municipal Office of 
Water Supply Planning and Water-saving is responsible for the implementation of 
specific tasks. Meanwhile, departments under the Kunming Municipal People’s 
Government popularize water-saving polices, promote water-saving techniques 
and enhance the water-saving awareness of the residents and the organizations. 
3.4 Management of Water Supply 
Kunming City has taken several measures to manage water supply. These 
measures include tapping new sources and diverting water, protecting water 
sources, regulating the management of water production and operation facilities, 
strengthening coping with the emergency water supply, and encouraging the use of 
advanced technologies and facilities.  
In 1959, Songhuaba Reservoir was first built to hold 70 Mm3 of water for flood 
prevention and irrigation. After 1960, it began to supply water for the city. In 1988, 
the expansion of the reservoir was started. When the expansion was completed, the 
reservoir could supply 150 Mm3 of water. 
In 1999, another water diversion project was put into construction. This project 
diverted water from Zhangjiuhe River to supply Kunming with annual flow of 250 
Mm3. Yunlong Reservoir was then built to store the water. The water-diverting 
project of Zhangjiuhe River includes the project of water source, the project of 
water conveyance and the project of water purification and distribution. The project 
of water source is the construction of Yunlong Reservoir which was started on 
December 19, 1999 and completed on March 1, 2004. Its capacity is 454 Mm3 and 
the volume of annually diverting water is 250 Mm3. The water is transferred to pass 
Luquan County, Fumin County, Wuhua District and Panlong District. Its length is 98 
km. The project of purification and distribution gave way to the construction of the 
seventh water treatment station which is designed to supply 600,000 m3 of water a 
day and is the largest water purification plant in Yunnan province. 
In 2007, another project diverting water from Qingshuihai Lake was initiated, with 
partial financing by ADB. The Qingshuihai Reservoir will be completed in 
2011,.When completed, it will have a capacity of 169 Mm3. The reservoir is 
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designed to be the multi-year regulating storage reservoir and Jinzhong Mountain 
reservoir the safety regulating storage reservoir. Water from Banqiao River, Shiqiao 
River, Xintianhe Reservoir, Tabizi Dragon pool, the east and west brunches of 
Qingshui River, Enze River and Luobai River will be diverted into Qingshuihai 
Reservoir. Qingshuihai Reservoir can supply water for industrial use and domestic 
use in Chenggong, the news urban area of Kunming city. This project will be 
completed in two stages. The first stage started from November 1, 2007 and will 
last for four years. After the construction in this stage is completed, the project will 
supply 104 Mm3 of water. The sources and routes of the water conveyance are in 
Xundian County and Songming County and the length of all the routes is 63.18 km. 
 
Figure 5: The Qingshuihai water diversion project 
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Data source: Statistics Bureau of Kunming municipality 
 
In August of 1981, protection of water sources was initiated. The protection zone of 
Songhuaba water source was established after government of Yunnan province 
approved. It is a prefecture-level protection zone and is the first protection zone of 
drinking water sources in China. And in 1989, the municipal government 
promulgated the Regulations for Administration of Protection Zone of Songhuaba 
Water Sources of Kunming Municipality. In May of 2005, the Municipal Commission 
of Protection Zone of Key Water Sources was established. It is in charge of the 
comprehensive management of protection zones of Songhuaba water source and 
other sources. In August of 2005, the zone of water sources of Songhuaba reservoir 
was placed by the Ministry of Water Sources in the list of China’s ten reservoir zones 
of water sources of cities.  
The operation of urban water infrastructure opens windows of opportunity for 
private investment. In order to use private funds and to improve water-supply 
technologies and water management, on May t, 2006, the municipal government 
sold 49% of the shares of Kunming Tape Water Company to the Kunming 
Investment Co. LTD. of Veolia Water of France. Kunming CGE Water Supply Co., 
LTD. was established as joint venture responsible for the operation, management 
and development of the water supply of the city of Kunming. It has 10 water 
treatment stations and can supply 1.515 Mm3 of water per day for 2.2 million 
people. The municipal government requires that the water supply company shall at 
regular intervals submit reports on operation of facilities and relevant data to the 
administrative department for water supply. It also shall strengthen the system of 
checking and reporting on water quality to ensure that supply water meets national 
standard. The operation must accept supervisions of administrative departments on 
water supply, health and quality. The administrative department for water supply 
shall enhance the management and examination of the water quality, and the 
quality information shall be made public every month. Meanwhile, the water price 
shall be fixed in accordance with the principles of supply cost recovery, gaining 
reasonable benefits, saving water and fair sharing of the cost. 
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The municipal government also encourages strengthening emergency measures to 
water supply and use of advanced technologies and facilities. It is required by the 
municipal government that the water-supply operation shall maintain the secure, 
continual and steady water supply, and shall not stop supplying water without 
authorization. In order to protect the living right of people, the government 
emphasizes that when normal water supply is affected by natural disasters and 
unexpected incidences, they shall adopt necessary water-distribution and 
engineering measures to guarantee the water supply for domestic use of residents. 
If the municipal government approves, the administrative department for water 
resources can make decisions of temporary limitation of water supply and the 
decisions shall be disseminated to the public. The municipal government prescribes 
that attention shall first be paid to satisfying the need of residents in their daily 
lives, while taking into consideration the need of water in industry etc. Meanwhile, 
it gives rewards to organizations and individuals who make contributions to saving 
water.  
4. Songhuaba Water Resources Allocation 
4.1 Panlong River 
Panlong River is an important water source to Kunming. It originates from 
Liangwang Mountain, in north of Kunming. In its upper reach, there are two 
branches, Shaodian River in the west and Muyang River in the east, which meet at 
Chahezui of the Songhua Town. And after the junction, it is called Panlong River, the 
largest river flowing into Dianchi Lake. It has a length of 95.3 kilometers, of which 
the main stream is 46.4 kilometers. The watershed area of Panlong River is 761 
km2 and the catchment area of Songhua Reservoir is 593 km2. After Songhuaba 
reservoir, Panlong River runs into the wide and flat Dianchi basin where the city of 
Kunming is located. The rainfall distribution in Kunming is uneven in a year due to 
monsoon. It is the rainy season during June to October. The river has an annual 
average runoff of 213 Mm3 and was a major flood threat to Kunming. According to 
the historical records, during the 714 years from 1274 (the tenth year of Xianchun 
of Song Dynasty) to 1988, there were 44 floods. However, from November to May 
of the next year, rainfall is less and the runoff of Panlong River drops in volume.  
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Figure 7: The Panlong River and Songhuaba Reservoir 
According to the historical data, the earliest development and utilization of Panlong 
River was in Han Dynasty, more than 2,000 years ago. At that time, people dug 
canals to divert water from Panlong River for irrigation. Dali kingdom at the time of 
Song Dynasty dug Jinzhi Canal in order to irrigate more than 100,000 mu (6667 
hectares) of farmland. Jinzhi Canal was diverted water from Panlong River for 
irrigation and also reduced the runoff of Panlong River when floods came. In Yuan 
Dynasty, in order to prevent floods by water control and to bring more farmland 
under irrigation, Saiyid Ajall Shamsal-Dn the manager of governmental affairs and 
Zhang Lidao the agricultural promoter built the bifurcation gate of earth and 
wooden structure at Songhuaba to divert water from Panlong River to Jinzhi Canal, 
and they also dug Haikou Canal. When the bifurcation gate was built, water was 
stored in the raining season and was used for irrigation in case of drought, which 
promoted agricultural development. In 1946, Guchang dam was built at 
Qincaichong in the upper reaches 7 km away from Songhuaba. It could hold 2.2 
Mm3 of water for the irrigation of 40,000 mu of farmland. 
4.2 Construction of Songhuaba Reservoir in 1959 
Songhuaba reservoir lies to the northeast of Hailongtan Spring in the northern 
suburb of Kunming, 15 kilometers away from the town. The dam is located between 
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Fengling ridge and Pengfeng Peak of Songhua Mountain, is 62 meters high and has 
a capacity of 219 Mm3. 
In 1949 when People’s Republic of China was founded, water for agricultural 
irrigation was taken mainly from small reservoirs and rivers. From the end of 1957 
to 1960, the first nationwide upsurge of water conservancy construction was set off. 
The water conservancy construction was a part of the strategic deployment of 
national construction and its purpose was to resume and develop agriculture which 
had been ruined in years of wars. At that time, building reservoirs was an important 
part of water conservancy construction or a political movement. Meanwhile, 
because the altitude of the upper reaches of Panlong River was 20 meters higher 
than that of the Kunming city, flood disasters often took place during the raining 
season. From November to May of the next year, the rainfall in Kunming was small 
and runoff of Panlong River dropped, which tended to cause drought in the lower 
reaches and affected the irrigation in spring. Thus, in January of 1958, Kunming 
Municipal CPC Committee decided to build the Songhuaba Reservoir and control 
floods. At that time, because of shortages of funds and materials, the government 
mobilized the masses to participate in the construction. Fees and labor services 
were shared out among villages around the reservoir according to their distances 
from the reservoir and the benefits they might have from the reservoir. In addition, 
the government was donated money from those villages which did not benefit from 
the reservoir, businesses and collective enterprises, and appealed for donations 
from society, and called for cadres, workers, students and urban residents to take 
part in the construction. However, in the years of the Great Leap Forward, local 
governments followed the policy of achieving greater, faster, better and more 
economical results and placed undue emphasis on results and speed. Thus 
“construct while benefiting” was adopted as the policy in Songhuaba Reservoir 
construction. On March 25, 1958 the construction started and on May 1 of the same 
year, the dam reached 24 meters with the capacity of 10 Mm3. On July 9, 1959 the 
backfill and 58% of the spillway were completed. On August 1 of the same year, the 
Headquarters held the completion ceremony. It is estimated that the costs 
amounted to CHY2.602 millions. The original Guchang dam was submerged. The 
Songhuaba Reservoir became the largest among the medium-sized water 
conservancy projects in Kunming. 
According to incomplete statistic data, 1,000 local residents were reallocated 
without proper compensation. Villages around the reservoir were asked to help 
resettlement. Each village had a quota to receive a certain number of affected 
people. Kunming Municipal People’s Government also established a factory to 
provide jobs for affected people. At that time, the reservoir construction and 
relocation were orders that residents had to follow. The resettlement was not 
properly dealt with and left some problems behind. 
4.3 Establishment of Watershed Protection in 1981 
Songhuaba Reservoir is the most important water source of Kunming. In 1949 when 
People’s Republic of China was founded, potable water sources to Kunming were 
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mainly springs. Since 1960, Songhuaba Reservoir and other reservoirs have 
become potable water sources to Kunming. Songhuaba Reservoir has often been 
referred as ‘a bowl of water on the top of the head’ of Kunming. Because of its large 
capacity, higher altitude and close distance to the city, Songhuaba Reservoir plays 
a strategic role. In August of 1981 Songhuaba Watershed was established as a 
protective area of potable water source. It is a municipal-level protected area and 
the very first protected area for drinking water source in China. The protected 
watershed has an area of 629.8 km2 and consists of five towns, including Dianyuan 
town and Aziying town of Songming County, and Songhua town, Longquanjie 
administrative community of Wuhua District and Shuanglong town of Panlong 
District. There is a population of 82,600 in 325 villages, of which rural population 
accounts for 79,800. 
After the establishment of the protected watershed, the municipal government has 
enacted regulations such as Regulations for Administration of Protection Watershed 
of Water Source and System of Songhuaba Reservoir of Kunming Municipality in 
1982, Regulations for Administration of Protection Watershed of Songhuaba Water 
Source of Kunming Municipality in 1989 and Rules for Protection of Songhuaba 
Reservoir of Kunming Municipality in 2006. According to these regulations, 
industrial development in the protected area shall be restricted, especially 
industries of chemicals, pesticides, electroplating, papermaking, tanning leather, 
printing and dyeing, asbestos and sulfur. Use of phosphate fertilizer shall be 
banned. Grazing shall be forbidden within the area 200 meters higher than the 
normal water storage level. Tobacco growing and baking shall be controlled. 
Construction of entertainment facilities around the reservoir shall be regulated. 
Entry of vehicles and tourists shall be restricted. Thus, people in the protected areas 
can only engage in agricultural and not-harmful sectors. These limitations constrain 
economic development of the protected area and living standards enhancement. 
Agricultural income is 60% of their total income. In 2004, the net income of the 
rural in the protected area was about CHY1,742 and was CHY839 less than 
CHY2,581 of average income in rural areas of Kunming.  
Residents in the protected watershed have to intensively farm due to the lack of 
other livelihoods alternatives. Heavy use of fertilizers and pesticide is common. 
There were no facilities to treat domestic wastes discharged by residents. After 
1991, the water environment and water quality had been deteriorating. In 1996, 
the water quality in part of the reservoir fell to Grade Four, which means not 
suitable to human consumption and the urban water supply was threatened. To 
combat environment degradation, government has intensified efforts to protect the 
environment and paid farmers more financial support. Firstly, it has strengthened 
the construction of agricultural infrastructure. Over 1,500 small-sized water 
infrastructure projects were completed, which has guaranteed the agricultural 
irrigation in the protect watershed. Secondly, over 400,000 cubic meters of waste in 
the reservoir was dredged in order to increase self-purification capacity. Thirdly, 
173 km2 of land has been afforested and 33 km2 of farmland has been converted to 
forestry for environment improvement. Fourthly, in order to manage, supervise and 
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remove pollutant sources around the reservoir, the government has established 5 
management stations and closed down 3 quarrying areas, 11 quarrying points and 
23 water-washing sites. Other facilities like house-based restaurants and other 
entertainment facilities were closed. Unnecessary traffic was highly controlled 
around the reservoir. Fifthly, every year, the government invests CHY50 millions to 
protect Songhuaba Watershed for the water sourse and improving drinking water 
quality. Sixthly, in order to motivate farmers’ interest in crop and tree planting, to 
restrict the use of chemical fertilizers and to reduce pollution from agriculture, the 
government has been subsidizing production and life in The Protection Watershed 
from the late half of 2005 onward. Because they are restricted by the policies of the 
government, people within the watershed are sacrificed for the water supply of 2.2 
million residents in the city, and their economical development and living standard 
are low. In 1992, after the expansion of the reservoir was completed, its role in 
water supply became more important and could not be substituted. In the process 
of protecting water sources, the government has gradually paid attention to 
people’s living conditions and interests and has increased financial subsidies. These 
policies included hillsides closed to natural regeneration, farmers subsidized for gas 
use and organic fertilizer, organic agriculture encouraged and waste properly 
managed. In 2002, the protection of Songhuaba water source was put into priority 
of 10 government agenda and CHY7.9 million was allocated for the watershed 
protection. 
4.4 Expansion in 1989 
By 1988, the population in the city was about 1.5 million and required a water 
supply of 100 Mm3. The annual inflow from the upper reaches of Panlong River was 
210 Mm3 and the capacity of Songhuaba reservoir was only 70 Mm3. According to 
a study result, the water source was not fully used. The current reservoir could not 
properly control historic large floods. It was also argued that when the reservoir 
built in 1957, the government had made decision to develop Panlong River in 
different phases according to needs. It was also found that the dam had safety 
problems. Construction of the dam was undertaken during the period of Great Leap 
Forward. Limited technology and financial support led to potential defects. From 
1959 to 1987, the Bureau of Water Resources continuously maintained the dam by 
the construction of accessory facilities, digging flood-discharge tunnels, 
strengthening the dam, extending spillways, extending the wave wall of the dam, 
dredging special spillways and building highways for emergency, and consolidating 
water tunnels. The Bureau made efforts to guarantee the safety of the reservoir and 
submitted several times to the municipal government the report on perfecting the 
construction of accessory facilities and extending the reservoir. 
In 1976, the Kunming Municipal Bureau of Water Resources contracted to Yunnan 
Inventory and Design Institute of Water Resources to undertake pre-feasibility 
study whole watershed of Panlong River. In 1978, the finished report proposal two 
suggestions. One was to expend Songhuaba reservoir and another was to build 
Huangshiyan reservoir. In 1982, the feasibility study report on the expansion of 
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Songhuaba reservoir and the construction of Huangshiyan reservoir were finished. 
Because Songhuaba reservoir had potential safety risk, the removal of the risk had 
to be done in a short period, and because the proposed Huangshiyan reservoirs was 
not good for civil work, on 29 December 1982, the Kunming Municipal People’s 
Government and the Water Resources Department of Yunnan Province made the 
decision to expand Songhuaba reservoir. 
In 1983, the Kunming Municipal People’s Government and the Water Resources 
Department of Yunnan Province jointly submitted proposal for Expansion of 
Songhuaba Reservoir to the National Commission of Reform and Development. In 
the proposal, it was stated that Kunming, downstream of the reservoir was the 
industrial center in central Yunnan province and its flood control standards both of 
the reservoir and of Kunming didn’t meet the requirements of national standards. 
The Ministry of Water Resources fully supported that Songhuaba reservoir shall be 
consolidated in a short period. In 1983, they jointly submitted to the State Planning 
Commission the report on the expansion of Songhuaba reservoir and it was 
approved. In April of 1985, undertook the survey and design of the expansion of 
Songhuaba reservoir. The preliminary design was finished in September of 1986 by 
Yunnan Inventory and Design Institute of Water Resources. In 1987, the Water 
Resources Department of Yunnan Province submitted a proposal to the People’s 
Government of Yunnan Province to approve the project of Songhuaba Reservoir 
expansion in the list of ten key construction projects of Yunnan province in 1988 and 
it was approved. In the same year, upon the approval of the Ministry of Water 
Resources, the project of Songhuaba reservoir expansion was placed in the list of 
state plans.  
In preparation for the Songhuaba Reservoir expansion, the Ministry of Water 
Resources provided the financial support. It was estimated at that time that the 
construction would cost CHY61.13 million. On March 28th, 1987, Yang Zhenghuai, 
vice minister of Ministry of Water Resources made it clear in his speech that the 
Ministry could provide CHY20 million for the expansion when he came to Kunming to 
make inspections and gave instructions on water conservancy. In June of 1987 
when Li Zhengyou, vice governor of Yunnan province reported in Beijing for the 
Songhuaba Reservoir expansion to Lu Youmei, vice minister of Ministry of Water 
Resources, Lu said that the Ministry could support CHY23 million which would be 
allocated by twice or three times. The People’s Government of Yunnan Province and 
the Kunming Municipal People’s Government shared the rest of CHY38.13 million 
with 50% each respectively. In 1988, the Reform and Development Commission of 
Yunnan Province placed the project of Songhuaba Reservoir expansion in the list of 
key construction projects of Yunnan province. The Songhuaba Reservoir expansion 
started. According to the design, the dam would be raised by 14.7 meters higher 
with capacity to store 219 Mm3. Table 4 provides more in formation. The expansion 
was started in March of 1989 and completed in 1992. 
Table 4: Songhuaba Reservoir before and after the Expansion 
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Pre-expansion  70 46.75 1961.3 47.3 1954 
Post-expansion 219 110 1976 62 1964 
Source: the Local Chronicles of Kunming Municipal (the second part) 
In the expansion, 2,673 mu of farmland was submerged and 5,606 people were 
resettled. It was also decided that after the expansion, the reservoir was mainly 
used for supply water for the city. Water for irrigation was pumped from Dianchi 
Lake. Thus the government implemented an integrated water distribution plan of 
Songhuaba Reservoir and Dianchi Lake, which costs CHY134 million. According to 
this plan, five-stage pump irrigation infrastructure would be built along Panlong 
River to pump water from Dianchi Lake for irrigation. People from the inundated 
area were resettled outside the reservoir area. The government would allocate land 
for them to build houses, compensated them for the building and their losses. 
Farmland would be provided accordingly.  
Since 2002, the daily water supply of Songhuaba reservoir is 450,000 cubic meters, 
accounting for 50% of the total water supply to Kunming city. Songhuaba reservoir 
is also a flood control device. The water from Songhuaba was not used for irrigation 
but only for domestic use. Instead, the water for irrigation was pumped from 
Dianchi Lake by a five-stage pump irrigation infrastructure. Government had to pay 
for operation costs. Since 1999 the urbanization took most of farmland and 
irrigation did not function anymore. 
4.5 Water Price Adjustments 
Water pricing is another means that government undertakes macro-control on 
water demand. Kunming Municipal People’s Government has held four times of 
water price hearings. 
On December 18th, 2001, the first hearing on water price raising was held. The price 
department of Kunming invited deputies from the Kunming Municipal People’s 
Congress, Kunming Municipal CPPCC Committee, Labor Union and Customers’ 
Association, and customers, relevant technical and economical experts to attend 
the hearing. In that hearing, it was planned that the water price would be raised, 
and the price standard would be set for water in special use like sauna, 
entertainment and car washing. At that time, the fee of tap water was CHY1.20 a 
cubic meter including CHY0.85 for water charge and CHY0.35 for sewage treatment 
charge. According to Kunming Water Supply Corporation and Kunming Sewage 
Company, the fee was moderate and relatively low in China. If the charge of sewage 
treatment remained unchanged, the Sewage Company could only maintain the 
operations of existing sewage treatment plants and drainage networks and had no 
fund for maintenance, innovation and depreciation of equipments and pay for loan 
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and interest from World Bank. After discussion, the hearing presented the 
preliminary examination opinions: to further regulate the price of domestic water 
use of residents, to raise significantly the charge for groundwater usage, for special 
sector of water use like sauna, entertainment and car washing. 
On November 8th, 2005, the Development and Reform Commission of Yunnan 
Province and the Kunming Municipal Commission of Development and Reform 
jointly held a hearing on water price adjustment. 25 representatives from deputies 
of the Kunming Municipal People’s Congress, members of the Kunming Municipal 
CPPCC Committee, experts, scholars, operators, employees of enterprises and 
community residents attended the hearing. At the hearing, Li Jinhua the vice 
director of the municipal Bureau of Water Resources put forward the suggestion for 
raising price and said that it was necessary to raise funds through rational price 
adjustment to develop and protect water resources. Jin Zuxin the chairman of the 
board of directors of Kunming Dianchi Investment Co., Ltd. said that if the charge 
for sewage treatment could be raised, the company could make financial surplus 
that serve its debt, improve equipment and properly treat sewage. Zhu Zhi the 
chairman of the board of directors of Kunming Water Supply Group said that 
because of the high cost and low price of tap water, the more water the company 
supplied, the more loss it got. He also argued that increasing water price can 
promote the rational use of water, water conservation and the sustainable 
utilization of water resources.  
In addition, in the first half of 2007 and the first half of 2009, the municipal 
administrative department for price held two hearings on raising water price. The 
plan to raise water price for the reason of loan repayment on July 1st, 2007 was 
aborted because it was not approved. On May 20th, 2009, the Development and 
Reform Commission of Kunming issued a public notice of raising water price on June 
1st. 
5. Conclusions 
Kunming is one of 14 cities that suffer severe water shortages. Songhuaba 
Reservoir is one of its most important sources of tap water. The case study on 
Songhuaba Reservoir presents water demand and supply of Kunming and the 
management of water resources allocation. 
Firstly, In China, water is a public resource, which is owned by the state and 
managed by its line agency according to integrated plans within river basin and 
administrative boundary. The government sets up the principle of allocation of 
water resources by making relevant laws and regulations, guides the development 
and utilization of water resources by making annual development plans, medium- 
and long-term plans and strategies, guides and supervises the development and 
utilization of water resources by examining and approving projects of development 
and utilization, and promotes water conservation by setting quotas for water use, 
specifying measures of rewards and punishments and adjusting water price. While 
the government is the most important actor in allocation and development of water 
resources, other actors like tap water companies, consulting companies like 
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institutes of inventory and design, scholars and media also play roles. Tap-water 
companies are responsible for supplying water for cities. Faced with the growing 
requirements of urban residents on water demand and quality, they can assist the 
government to prioritize sources of tap water. In order to lower the cost of water 
supply and improve the water quality, they can resort to the government in the 
adjustment of water price. In addition, consulting companies and scholars by their 
studies results can influence or promote the decision of the government. Public 
opinions can be transferred to decision makers through channels. Media, by 
presenting various actors opinions can also influence the decision. 
Secondly, the water resources shall be developed according to certain procedures. 
Usually the government is the investor of projects of water resources development 
and utilization. The projects must be in line with relevant laws and regulations. In 
Kunming, Peoples’ Conference, Peoples’ Political Consultation and Tap Water 
Company, or Water Resource Bureau can propose water resources development 
projects. Tap Water Company can contract the pre-feasibility study to licensed 
consulting companies and submit project proposals to Bureau of Water Resources 
and the Development and Reform Commission of Kunming. And the project 
proposals examined and approved by the Bureau and Commission shall be 
submitted to the municipal government and the municipal CPC committee for 
further examination and approval. After project approval, either tap water company 
or water resource bureau contracts to consulting company to undertake the 
feasibility study and design of the projects. And project of which the design meets 
the standard will be placed in the annual management plan of investment for unified 
arrangement. 
Thirdly, according to the Water Law of People’s Republic of China, domestic water 
use shall be first taken into account. So the domestic water is given priority in 
Kunming when there are conflicts among water for industrial use, domestic use and 
for agriculture. When domestic use is guaranteed, the government allocates the 
water for industrial production and for agricultural irrigation. Government also 
seeks alternatives to requirements of industry and agriculture.  
Fourthly, in Kunming, limited water sources are mainly used for domestic use. It is 
costly for industry to use water. Water price for domestic use is the lowest 
comparing with water price for industry. The government policy requires that 
industries shall improve ratio of using recycled water and treat their waste water. 
This increases the water use costs of industry. Farming irrigation is partially 
dependent on groundwater pumping or diversion of Daichi water. Farmers do not 
need to pay for water use but for water pumping. Recent development of converting 
farmland into urban use decreased diversion of Diachi Lake Water to irrigation.  
Fifthly, as the society and economy develop in Kunming, water demand grows 
larger. And this is the most important objective factor which influences the 
allocation and management of water resources of Kunming. Since the reform and 
opening up in 1978, the economy of Kunming has achieved steady development 
and city proper has been enlarged. And as the population grows, the groundwater 
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can not meet the need of domestic use of urban residents and the government has 
to find other water resources outside the city. For example, Songhuaba Reservoir 
was originally used for supplying water for irrigation but now is used for supplying 
domestic water for urban residents. 
Sixthly, because of the water pollution, Kunming City has to rely on the existing 
water resources and on the diversion of water across basins. Dianchi Lake was one 
of the important sources of Kunming with a capacity is 750 Mm3. The water demand 
of Kunming could have been met by Dianchi Lake. However, since the Since 2001 
Dianchi Lake has been abandoned as a source to domestic use because of water 
pollution. Meanwhile, the limited groundwater resource has been threatened by 
pollution. Thus Kunming had to find other water resources outside city and divert 
water to Kunming from other basins. The sources of current water-supply mode of 
the “six reservoirs and one station” are outside the city.  
Seventhly, the government has established the protective watersheds around 
Kunming, which restricts the economical development within the protective 
watersheds. The existing compensation mechanism is imperfect and effective to 
protect water sources. Within protected watersheds, limited development of 
industries and services force local people intensive agricultural production. Their 
income is lower than that of farmers outside of the protected watershed. The 
government’s financial compensation and support are insufficient. Meanwhile, 
because of the rapid growth of population in the protected watersheds, increase 
domestic waste and sewage may threat water quality. The irrational use of chemical 
fertilizers and insecticides, deforestation and overgrazing also affect the 
environment and water quality. 
Eighthly, recognizing scarcity of water sources, government pays more attention to 
water conservation. Government takes measures to conserve water use. These 
measures include differentiating water prices, implementing the system of water 
permit, rewarding these units and individuals who make outstanding achievements 
in water saving and penalizing those who waste water. Meanwhile, the government 
popularizes water-saving policies, increases the urban residents’ awareness of 
saving water, and improves and promotes water-saving technologies and products. 
Acknowledgements 
This research paper forms a part of the Improving Mekong Water Allocation Project 
(PN67) that was funded by the Challenge Program on Water and Food, IFAD and 
European Commission. 
Literature Cited 
1. China Research Society of Urban Development. 1991-2008. The Yearbook of 
China’s Cities (1990-2007). Beijing, China: the Yearbook of China’s Cities Press 
(Chinese) 
Page 49 of 852
PN67_2010_02 
A Study on the Water Allocation in Kunming 






2. Department of Urban Social and Economic of National Bureau of Statistics. 
1991-2008. China City Statistical Yearbook(1990-2007). Beijing, China: China 
Statistics Press (Chinese) 
3. Kunming Municipal Government. 1992-2008 Kunming Yearbook (1991-2007). 
Kunming: Yunnan Nationalities Press (Chinese) 
4. Kunming Municipal Committee for Local Chronicles Compilation. 2001. The Local 
Chronicles of Kunming Municipal (the second part). Beijing, China: People’s 
Publishing House (Chinese) 
5. Kunming Municipal Committee for Local Chronicles Compilation. 1997. The Local 
Chronicles of Kunming Municipal (the fourth part). Beijing, China: People’s 















Page 50 of 852
PN67_2010_03 
Hydrological and water resources modelling in the Mekong River Basin: Current status, major gaps 
and opportunities 
Matti Kummu and Robyn Johnston 
1 
PN67_2010_03 
Hydrological and water resources modelling in the Mekong River Basin: 
Current status, major gaps and opportunities 
Matti Kummu1 and Robyn Johnston2 
[1] Water & Development Research Group, Aalto University, Finland 
(matti.kummu@iki.fi) 
[2] International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Colombo 
(R.Johnston@cgiar.org) 
 
Table of Contents 
Table of Contents ....................................................................................... 1 
Introduction .............................................................................................. 1 
2 Hydrology and water resources development in the Mekong Basin .................. 2 
2.1. Mekong Hydrology: Brief synopsis ..................................................... 2 
2.2 Recent Development plans in the Mekong Basin ................................ 4 
Hydropower .............................................................................................. 5 
Development activities: spatio-temporal scales and hydrological impacts ......... 7 
3.1.  Spatial scales and hydrological impacts .......................................... 7 
3.2.  Temporal scales and hydrological impacts ...................................... 9 
3.3.  Spatio-temporal scales .............................................................. 11 
Impact assessment and models ............................................................... 12 
4.1. Role of modelling in impact assessment ........................................ 12 
4.2.  Models for impact assessment in the Mekong ................................ 14 
Basin-wide hydrological models in the Mekong ........................................... 17 
5.1.  Modelling arenas and actors in those ........................................... 20 
5.2.  Comparative case analysis ......................................................... 22 
Cross comparison of model results ........................................................... 25 
Broad implications of the models: gaps, challenges and future opportunities .. 27 
7.1. Major gaps in the Mekong modelling ............................................. 27 
7.2.  Discussion of general issues related to the modelling attempts ........ 28 
7.3.  Challenges and opportunities in the Mekong modelling ................... 29 
7.4.  Possible role of MRC in the modelling ........................................... 30 
Final remarks ........................................................................................ 31 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................. 31 
Annex: Annotated bibliography .................................................................. 32 
Full list of references ................................................................................ 34 
 
Introduction 
Water Resources in the Mekong River basin today are facing rapid development 
particularly in China, Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. Hydropower development is 
the most remarkable and its impacts will be potentially felt by all other water 
uses in the Basin. Simulation models may assess such impacts.  
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There have been various modelling activities in the Mekong during the past years. 
The hydrological models have been developed and applied in basin-wide scale 
(Kite 2001; ADB 2004; World Bank 2004; Costa-Cabral et al. 2007; MRCS/BDP2 
2009b), and more local scale (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007; Thanapakpawin et al. 2007; 
Veijalainen, Kummu, and Lauri 2007). The other large modelling entities are the 
hydrodynamic models applied to mainly to the floodplains in Cambodia and Lao 
PDR (Fuji et al. 2003; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2003; ADB 2004; World Bank 2004; 
Kummu et al. 2006; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007), and economic and policy models 
(Ringler 2001; Rowcroft 2005; Ringler and Cai 2006; Varis and Keskinen 2006; 
Dung et al. 2009).  
In this paper we aim to give an overview of the modelling activities in the Mekong 
basin with a particular attention to the modelling activities to the ones used for 
basin-wide impact assessment. The paper further aim to identify the major gaps 
in the modelling activities and to analyse the challenges that hydrological 
modelling faces in the basin and identifies opportunities that emerge from such 
challenges. 
The paper gives also a brief introduction to the recent development activities and 
plans in the basin. We also attempt to give state of the art syntheses on the 
macro level water allocation issues by identifying the main development activities 
in the Mekong and reviewing how those will impact on hydrology in different 
spatio-temporal scales.  
The paper has been written as a part of Challenge Programme on Food and Water 
(CPWF) project “Improving Mekong Water Allocation” (PN 67), funded by CPWF, 
IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development) and EC (European 
Commission). The project aims to analyse under what conditions, and via what 
political drivers, do selected ‘progressive’ processes and tools reduce the severity 
of disputes over, and improve the fairness of, water allocation in the Mekong 
Region (Dore 2008). The allocation has been defined in the project as “formal and 
informal decision processes (and non-decisions) that alter the physical 
distribution of water, and water-related rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities 
(4Rs)” (Dore 2008).  
Modelling is one of very few tools able to assess impacts at multiple spatio-
temporal scales, and across a range of disciplines. It thus plays an important role 
in the impact assessment process and potentially, therefore, in the decision 
processes. Hydrological and water resources modelling was thus selected to be 
among the analysed tools in the PN67 that have been used directly or indirectly 
for decision processes in the Mekong.  
2 Hydrology and water resources development in the Mekong Basin  
2.1. Mekong Hydrology: Brief synopsis  
The Mekong is the largest river in South East Asia (Figure 1), share by 6 
countries, with a basin area of 816×103 km2,  (Kummu 2008), estimated long-
term mean annual runoff of 475 km3 (Mekong River Commission 2003; 2005) and 
population of 70 million people (Mekong River Commission 2003).  
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Figure 1.  The mainland Southeast Asia and major river basins of it (left) and Map of the Mekong 
Basin; Lower Mekong Basin and Upper Mekong Basin are separated with different tones 
of grey (right) (modified from Kummu 2008).  
The climate in the Mekong Basin varies from tropical to temperate. On the 
Tibetan plateau the high peaks are permanently snow-capped, while most of the 
lower basin is tropical. Part of the dry season flow and the rise to the wet season 
stage come from snowmelt. In the lower parts of the basin, the climate is 
seasonal. Between November and February the Northeast Monsoon brings 
dryness and cooler temperatures, while the Southwest Monsoon dominates the 
hot wet season from June to September.  
The tributaries in central and southern Laos are the most important contributors 
to the Mekong's flow in the lower basin (Mekong River Commission 2005). 
Although only 16% of the total discharge originates from the upper Mekong Basin 
(UMB)  it is important part of the basin as 35% of the spring flow and over 55% 
of the sediment flux originates from there (Kummu and Varis 2007).  
The hydrology of the Mekong is dominated by the annual flood pulse (Mekong 
River Commission 2005). The flood pulse concept (Junk 1997) has been widely 
accepted as describing the highly productive floodplain environments and the 
ecology of pulsing systems in the Mekong as well. Therefore, from ecosystem 
productivity point of view, it is highly important to maintain the natural 
hydrological pattern of the Mekong River (Kummu and Sarkkula 2008). The 
Cambodian floodplains and the Mekong Delta are among the most productive 
ecosystems in the Mekong. They receive more than 90% of the available water 
resources and 95% of the total suspended sediment flux from upstream. This part 
of the basin is thus directly dependent on the conditions of the Upper Mekong, 
and therefore vulnerable for any changes in flow or sediment flux due to the 
upstream development (Kummu and Sarkkula 2008).  
2.2 Recent Development plans in the Mekong Basin 
The Mekong River is one of the world’s most diverse river ecosystems, and one of 
the few large rivers globally whose flow has not yet been drastically modified by 
human development (Mekong River Commission 2005). However, the Mekong 
region is experiencing rapid population growth and economic development, with 
associated increase in demand for and development including:  
• Construction of dams and reservoirs for hydropower or irrigation  
• Withdrawals for irrigation, domestic and industrial use  
• Deforestation and other land use changes (including urbanization) 
• Inter- and intra-basin diversions   
• Construction of roads, embankments, levees and bank protection works  
Significant water-related infrastructure has already been built (Figure 1), or is 
under construction, in major tributaries and upper reaches of the mainstream 
(King, Bird, and Haas 2007; Mekong River Commission 2008a). There are 
increasing concerns about the impact that further development will have, both on 
the availability and quality of water for downstream users; and on the riverine 
and floodplain ecosystems that sustain the Mekong’s highly productive fisheries 
and contribute to the livelihoods of millions of subsistence and semi-subsistence 
users.  The transboundary nature of the river, running through six countries 
(China, Myanmar, Lao PDR, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam), adds an extra 
dimension of complexity to the debate about equitable sharing of the river’s 
resources.   
A changing global climate may place additional pressure on Mekong water 
resources (Eastham et al. 2008; Penny 2008; TKK and SEA START RC 2009). 
However, based on the recent estimates, the timescale for significant change in 
climate is much longer than that for development (TKK and SEA START RC 
2009); dams, diversions and withdrawals are likely to have much greater impact 
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on water resources in the next 20 to 30 years than the direct effects of climate 
change (TKK and SEA START RC 2009). 
Hydropower  
It is difficult to keep track of all proposed hydropower developments in the Basin, 
let alone estimate their potential impacts. A recent inventory of existing and 
potential hydropower projects in the 6 Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
countries came up with a total of 261 hydropower projects  (King, Bird, and Haas 
2007). Out of this total, at least 28 were under construction and at least a further 
179 large projects identified as most probable development sites.  
More recently, the Mekong River Commission (Mekong River Commission 2008a) 
has published a map indicating the location of different dams planned in the Basin 
(Figure 2). Notable in this map is that it also indicates plans for several 
mainstream dams in Lower Mekong Basin in both Laos and Cambodia. The 
storage capacity of the reservoirs may increase from around present 5 km3 to 
over 100 km3 if all the planned dams will be constructed (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 2.  Existing (left ) and planned & existing (right) dams in the Mekong Basin. Based on the 
MRC/BDP data.   
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The realistic potential for hydropower generation is, however, likely to be 
considerably lower after taking into account costs and local environmental and 
social factors (King, Bird, and Haas 2007). The actual cumulative downstream 
impacts of these developments will depend on the amount of the dams 
constructed as well as on their operational procedures, but the impacts are in any 
case most likely to be remarkable.  
Table 1.  Summary of the existing, on-going and proposed hydropower dams projects in six 
Mekong countries; figures for all dams plus those within the Mekong Basin (Mekong River 
Commission 2008a).  
  
Existing Under construction Planned TOTAL
Cambodia 1 0 13 14
China 3 1 4 8
Laos 10 8 82 100
Thailand 7 0 0 7
Vietnam 7 5 2 14
28 14 101 143  
 
Figure 3.  Cumulative storage of the existing and planned reservoirs in the Mekong Basin.  
Irrigation 
Diversion of surface waters for irrigation results in increased evaporation and 
thus, a net loss of water in the basin (Vörösmarty and Sahagian 2000). Between 
1961 and 2002 the irrigated area in Mainland Southeast Asia has increased from 
1.7% to 5.4% of the total land area (FAO Statistical Databases 2005) or, in other 
words, leaving approximately 21.8% of agricultural land irrigated. In 2002 the 
most heavily irrigated countries were Thailand and Vietnam where 9.0% and 
9.7% of the total land area was equipped for irrigation, respectively, while in Laos 
the same figure is 0.7% (FAO Statistical Databases 2005).  
The irrigation intensity is, however, rather low in the region compared to other 
parts of Asia (Barker and Molle 2004). The total land area equipped for irrigation 
in the entire Mekong basin in 2002 (FAO Statistical Databases 2005) was 2.9%. 
In the Lower Mekong Basin the irrigation ratio (irrigated area over cultivated 
area) is rather low in international standards, being estimated at 7-10% while the 
ration is e.g. for the whole Asia 45% (Mekong River Commission 1998). There 
are, however, significant differences in the extent of irrigation in the basin, with 
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irrigation in the Vietnam Delta, for example, covering approximately 60% of 
cropland area (Mekong River Commission 2002). 
Recent years have brought also new players in the field of agricultural 
development, among other sectors, from Arab world and also China. In Cambodia 
countries such as Kuwait and Qatar has announced significant investments into 
country's agricultural sector, to secure their own food security (Economist 2009).  
Deforestation 
Deforestation has for a long time received the most attention among all types of 
land cover change in the region. However, recently the increased hydropower 
construction is changing the focus towards dams and reservoirs and, partly, even 
overshadowing the large deforestation happening in Lao PDR (e.g. Shi 2008) and 
Cambodia (e.g. FAO 2006). In Thailand large forest areas have been already 
cleared and changed to rice fields and other agricultural lands (Nipon 1994; 
Douglas 1999).  
The forest cover in the mainland Southeast Asia has decreased from 53.4% to 
41.9% of the total area during the period of 1963-1994 (FAO Statistical 
Databases 2005) or an annual deforestation rate of 0.64%. At the same time 
agricultural area has increased from 17.4% to 24.7% during the period of 1963-
2002 (FAO Statistical Databases 2005). In the Lower Mekong Basin the forest 
cover decreased from 36.7% to 35.9% between years 1993 and 1997 (Mekong 
River Commission 2003). This means that the annual deforestation rate was 
0.53%. The deforestation continues to be a large issue modifying the landscape 
particularly in Cambodia and Lao PDR.  
Interbasin water diversion 
There are various plans to divert water from the Mekong Basin to Thai internal 
basins (Molle and Floch 2008). None of the plans have, however, materialised so 
far. There have been, nevertheless, water diversions lately between the Mekong 
tributaries (ADB 2004) within Lao PDR. The impacts of such actions might be 
significant in local scale, while the basin-wide impacts are not necessary 
significant.  
Development activities: spatio-temporal scales and hydrological impacts 
Scales are important in the impact assessment discipline as it often works with a 
variety of spatio-temporal scales on various disciplines (Kummu 2008). Scales are 
particularly important when a) identifying the critical processes and areas of 
possible consequences, b) selecting the spatio-temporal scales of the assessment, 
c) identifying the data needed and available, d) selecting the methodologies and 
tools related to the process, and e) presenting the results of the assessment to 
the decision-makers and planners. Kummu (2008) concludes that, instead of 
down-/up-scaling, a multiscale approach often appears to be a more preferable 
solution. A more extensive inclusion of scale issues in the impact assessment 
process is believed to contribute to building a more profound connection between 
researchers and decisions makers. 
3.1.  Spatial scales and hydrological impacts 
Every development action presented in previous Section has a spatial scale of its 
own in regard to its consequences (Figure 4). The actions, such as irrigation or 
dam construction, are often occurring at the local or tributary scale. The impacts 
are, however, occurring in most of the cases at a variety of scales ranging from 
local to basin scale. The local impacts, taking place in the immediate vicinity of 
the action, can be relatively obvious, for instance, a dam reservoir flooding large 
areas of agriculture land and local settlements. The downstream impacts from 
tributary to basin scale, being either positive or negative on the environment and 
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human beings, are usually more complex to first identify and then to assess 
(Kummu and Sarkkula 2008). The water related actions in the Large River Basin 
(LRB) context are listed in Table 2 from actions having an impact on a widest 
range of scales to those having an impact on a limited range of scales. 
 
Figure 4.  Spatial scales of the possible hydrological impacts due to variation of actions (note: areas 
smaller than 102 km2 cut off from the figure) (Kummu 2008). 
Table 2.  Water resources related actions in the LRB context with definition and impacts of the 
actions including the range of scales (Kummu 2008).  
Action  
(scale of impacts) 
Definition Hydrological Impact (HI) a 
Water diversion 
(Local – Regional) 
The transfer of water from a stream, 
lake, aquifer, or other source of water 
by a canal, pipe, well, or other conduit 
to another watercourse or to the land, 
as in the case of an irrigation system 
(Water Words Dictionary 2008).  
Changes in a hydrograph in both watercourses: the one the 
water is transferred from and the one it is transferred to. 
The water diversion can occur either within the basin (e.g. 
between two tributaries) or between two basins. Thus, the 
HI may occur from local to regional scale. 
Dam and reservoir 
construction 
(Local – Basin) 
Refers here mainly to a construction 
of large dams on either tributaries or a 
main stream. The cumulative impact 
of smaller dams should not be 
neglected either when conducting a 
larger scale assessment. 
Depends on many variables, such as operation of the dam, 
size of reservoir, height of the dam, etc. Most common 
impacts are changes in hydrograph, e.g. higher dry season 
flow and lower wet season flow due to the storing of water 
in a reservoir (see e.g. Paper IV), sudden water level 
fluctuations, losses in discharge due to evaporation, 
trapping the sediments (see e.g. Kummu, Varis, and 
Sarkkula 2008), etc.. 
Irrigation system 
(Local – Basin) 
The controlled application of water for 
agricultural purposes through man-
made systems to supply water 
requirements not satisfied by rainfall; 
applying water to soil when rainfall is 
insufficient to maintain desirable soil 
moisture for plant growth (Water 
Words Dictionary 2008). The intra-
basin irrigation falls within water 
diversion activities.  
Today, about 67% of the global water withdrawal and 87% 
of the consumptive water use (withdrawal minus return 
flow) is for irrigation purposes (Shiklomanov 1997). Thus, 
irrigation is one of the most important factors influencing 
water resources globally. In general, irrigation leads to 
decreased streamflow and increased evapotranspiration 
(Haddeland, Lettenmaier, and Skaugen 2006). The most 
remarkable impacts of irrigation on hydrology include: a) 
changing the flow regime by shifting the discharge pattern, 
b) groundwater level changes, and c) irrigation may 
increase evaporation. For more details, see Kummu et al. 
(2008). 
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Action  
(scale of impacts) 
Definition Hydrological Impact (HI) a 
Deforestation 
(Local – Sub-Basin 
/Basin) 
Definitions of deforestation have been 
categorized into ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ 
types (Wunder, 2000; cited in 
Mahapatr and Kant, 2005). The broad 
version includes forestland use 
conversion and forest degradation or 
reduction in forest quality (density and 
structure, ecological services, 
biomass stocks, species diversity 
etc.) while the narrow version focuses 
only on change in forestland use 
(Mahapatr and Kant 2005). The FAO 
uses the narrow version and defines 
deforestation as a ‘change in land use 
with depletion of crown cover to less 
than 10%’ (ibid). 
Land-cover changes, including deforestation, and impact 
on total stream flow is a complicated issue, discussed by 
Douglas (1999) and Walker (2002), among others. 
Deforestation in most of the studies increases the total 
stream flow volume, but at the same time also changes the 
pattern of the flow (Paper I). In general, after deforestation, 
wet season flows grow and dry season flows decline. 
However, this is a generalisation, and the issue is 
discussed in more detail by e.g. Walker (2002) and 
Bruijnzeel (2004). In small watersheds (< 1,000 km2), 
increases in water yield translate directly onto increases in 
stream-flow, and forests have great influence on flood 
peaks, whereas in large river basins, the link between 
deforestation and flooding has not been found (Bruijnzeel 




(Local – Sub-basin) 
Roads and embankments can be 
situated basically everywhere in the 
basin. Here the focus is on the 
floodplains and other areas with 
significant overland flow.  
Roads and similar structures divert the floods normally 
back to the river and may increase floods in some other 
areas downstream as the natural storage of the river is 
blocked. In forested and grassland areas, roads may have 
major impact on the overflow (Ziegler et al. 2004). For more 
details, see Kummu et al. (2008). 
Bank protection 
(Local – Tributary) 
Bank protection is used normally for 
protecting the river banks from 
erosion in various ways, e.g. rip rap, 
concrete structures, natural 
vegetation mats, etc. 
Bank protection structures along a meandering river affect 
channel morphology and dynamics by restricting the width 
of wandering belts (Xu, 1997). It may also locally change 
the flow velocities and reduce the suspended sediment 
entering the river from the banks.  
Urbanisation 
(Local – Tributary) 
Urbanisation refers here mainly to the 
paved non-permeability areas that 
change or disturb the natural 
hydrological cycle.  
Urbanisation is spatially not a dramatic change but it often 
markedly changes local hydrological conditions (Bruijnzeel 
2004) and has a considerably effect on some of the mass 
flows, e.g. nutrients, pathogens and micropollutants. For 
more details, see Kummu et al. (2008). 
3.2.  Temporal scales and hydrological impacts 
Nature changes over time, but human actions have often significantly modified, 
either increased or slowed down, the rate of that change (Kummu 2008). The 
temporal scale is always present in such changes and should be taken into 
account in the IA process. Two different temporal scales can be discussed within 
the discipline of temporal scales: a) assessment scale; and b) impact scale 
(Kummu 2008). Assessment scale is defined to be the time frame covered by the 
assessment in a case predicting the consequences of a proposed action in the 
future. Impact scale can be defined to be the time frame of the proposed 
action(s) impacts, i.e. how long the action will have an influence on the 
environment. Each project within the group of actions (e.g. irrigation system) is 
unique and conducted in diverse ecosystems and environments. Therefore, it is 
nearly impossible to define the definite temporal impact scale for any of the group 
of actions. Additionally, even though an action would be cancelled (e.g. dam 
removed), only some of the impacts are restorable while others are non-
restorable. It is, nevertheless, necessary to illustrate the order of magnitude of 
each group’s impact scale (Figure 5; Table 3). The temporal impact scales of each 
group are then briefly discussed and commented in.  
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Figure 5.  Temporal scales of the possible hydrological impacts due to variation of actions (Kummu 
2008). 
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Table 3.  Water resources related actions in the LRB context with definition and impacts of these 
actions including the range of scales (Kummu 2008).  
Action  Temporal 
impact scale  
Remarks 
Water diversion - centuries-
millenniums 
Impacts of a large scale water diversion 
project can last for a very long time, from 
centuries to even millenniums. The 
temporal impact scale depends on the 
spatial scale, technology used for the 
diversion, and other factors. An example of 
a rather small scale water diversion project 
having a long term impact is given in 




- centuries Large dam project impacts have a very 
long life-span and may last for centuries or 
even more. There are, however, various 
dam removal projects particularly in 
Northern America and Europe. These 
kinds of projects will, naturally, shorten the 
timescale of the impacts. Silting up of a 
dam reservoir may also shorten the 
lifespan of a dam.   
Irrigation 
system 
- decades Irrigation projects do not necessarily 
include large scale infrastructure, except 
the possible irrigation channels and 
irrigation reservoirs. Thus, depending on 
the type and life-time of the project, the 
impacts may last from a few to several 




Deforestation may change the land cover 
for decades or centuries, depending on the 






Roads, particularly major ones, are a 
result of long-term planning and thus, the 
impacts are there for several centuries. 
Smaller roads and paths may impact 
hydrology only for some decades.  
Bank protection - decades-
centuries 
Depending on the bank protection method 
used, the impacts may last from decades 
to even centuries. 
Urbanisation - centuries Urban areas, as roads, are normally 
planned to be there for centuries, in one 
way or another. Thus, the duration of the 
impacts is counted in terms of centuries.  
3.3.  Spatio-temporal scales  
Each of the actions has a slightly different spatio-temporal scale form. There is, 
however, one unifying feature in all of them; over smaller spatial scales (local-
tributary) the impacts may occur on shorter time scales (of the order of hours) 
while over larger spatial scales, they may occur over a longer period of time (of 
the order of days or weeks) (Kummu 2008). One example is operation of a dam 
that may lead to sudden water level fluctuations close to the dam while the 
impacts further downstream are happening over a longer time-span (Figure 6).  
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Figure 6.  Spatio-temporal scales of the consequences of human actions (Kummu 2008). 
Impact assessment and models 
4.1. Role of modelling in impact assessment 
Impact assessment can be broadly defined as “the prediction or estimation of the 
consequences of a current or proposed action (project, policy, technology)” 
(Vanclay and Bronstein 1995). In the context of water management in large 
basins, both the drivers and impacts of hydrological change act over a wide range 
of sectors, and of spatial and temporal scales, as briefly presented in previous 
Section.  This results in a very complex set of interactions, with cumulative 
impacts across sectors and scales.   
The impacts of changes due to water resources development and climate change 
will be felt in five main disciplinary domains, which must be approached more or 
less sequentially – it is not always feasible to answer questions about impacts in 
one until you know something about the previous one: 
• Hydrological: flow volume and distribution, river water level, river 
connectivity, flood dynamics, water quality, sediment and nutrients 
• Ecological: habitat quality, wetland functioning, fish migration, aquatic 
organisms 
• Livelihood: water availability for agricultural and aquacultural production, 
availability of fish and other aquatic products, vulnerability to floods and 
droughts 
• Economic: economic costs and benefits of different water use options 
• Social: migration, gender relations, family structure, public health 
(nutrition, HIV/AIDS). 
Coherent assessment frameworks must be developed in each of these domains in 
order to characterise impacts comprehensively.   
Modelling is one of very few tools able to assess impacts at multiple spatio-
temporal scales, and across a range of disciplines, and it therefore plays an 
important role in the impact assessment process (Sarkkula et al. 2007).  A model 
is simply a representation of a system that allows for investigation of the 
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properties of the system and, in some cases, prediction of future outcomes1. In 
the hydrological domain, models are mostly numerical simulations of natural 
processes, but in the social and economic domains, they may be more qualitative, 
conceptual descriptions of system interactions.   
As Adamson (2006) points out, even within the single domain of hydrology: 
There will never be a single integrated modelling system, a unified complex 
of numerical routines that can simulate hydrological processes at any 
prescribed spatial and temporal scale with the focus on any element of 
interest..... Rather, there will be a family of custom-built models, some 
locally specific and physically very detailed, others more generalised at the 
macro and basin scale.  
It is clear that a range of modelling tools will be needed in order to assess 
impacts comprehensively. The purpose of each model activity should be also 
tailored for the needs of the question at hand. Adamson (2006) discussed the 
trade-off between complexity, error and sensitivity on the one hand, and utility 
on the other (Figure 7) in selecting a model which is “fit for purpose” for a 
particular set of simulation and modelling objectives. He stressed the importance 
of finding models suited to the question and available data, and the dangers 
inherent in adapting or redefining the problems to suit available models or 
software.  
Modelling across disciplinary boundaries is notoriously difficult, in part because of 
the different intellectual frameworks and assumptions underlying different 
disciplines; and in part because of differences in availability and quality of data in 
the different disciplinary domains. However, numerical models can be constructed 
linking the different domains within a system if the critical interactions can be 
determined and quantified.  
 
Figure 7.  Relationship between model utility and complexity (from Adamson 2006, after Snowling 
and Kramer 2001). 
                                          
1 http\://www.investorwords.com/5662/model.html  
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4.2.  Models for impact assessment in the Mekong 
Impact assessments in the Mekong Basin can be grouped into four main groups: 
• Basin-scale assessment of changes due to projected broadly-based WR 
development or climate change (usually scenario-based) (e.g. World Bank 
2004; Costa-Cabral et al. 2007; Eastham et al. 2008; MRCS/BDP2 2009a).  
• Basin-scale assessment of the impact of a specific large-scale development 
(e.g. Nam Theun 2 CIA – ADB 2004, Nam Ngum 3 CIA – ADB 2008) 
• Local assessment of impacts of basin-scale changes including climate 
change (e.g. Friend et al. 2006; Kummu and Sarkkula 2008) 
• Local assessment of impacts of specific developments (environmental 
impact assessments) (Hoanh et al. 2009). 
A variety of tools have been developed at different scales to assess various 
aspects of flow modification in the Mekong: a listing of the main ones is set out in 
Table 4.  The greatest focus to date has been in the hydrological domain: a 
number of quantitative models have been developed and applied for assessment 
of hydrology, hydrodynamics and sediment dynamics. Tools for assessing 
ecological and livelihood impacts of changed flow regimes are limited, and are 
mainly assessment frameworks or methods, rather than numerical models. Two 
economic models have been developed for the LMB (Ringler 2001; Rowcroft 
2005), but neither model addresses ecological nor livelihood impacts in any 
detail.  None of the major models provide assessment of groundwater resources 
or address the issue of groundwater – surface water connectivity. 
While the number of models available can seem confusing, diversity is useful on a 
number of counts.  First, a range of different models is needed for different 
categories and issues: for example, hydrological models do not provide 
information on flood extent. Secondly, within the same category a range of 
different models are needed to deal with the variation in spatial and temporal 
scales.  Thirdly, different configurations of models have different strengths and 
limitations.   
Adamson (2006) reviewed and compared the four main regional hydrological 
models for the Mekong (MRC’s DSF, VIC, MikeBasin and Mike11, WUP-Fin) and 
concluded that each is appropriate for different applications.  For example, MRC-
DSF is the preferred system for regional scale appraisal of impacts of resource 
development in the LMB; VIC was the only basin scale model that incorporates 
the Upper Mekong (presently also WUP-Fin toolkit includes a basin wide 
hydrological model); MikeBasin has significant advantages in assessing specific 
infrastructure; and the WUP-Finn suite has advantages in assessing eco-
hydrological issues such as sedimentation and water quality in the floodplain.  
However, to gain the greatest benefit from model diversity, and to minimize 
duplication, a degree of coordination and consistency is required. The 
opportunities to improve this in the Mekong are briefly discussed at the end of the 
paper. The main themes include:  
• tailored modelling (range of tools for different applications) 
• cross-comparison of models in the same category 
• transparency of model engine, scenario building, model results, calibration 
and validation 
• communication between modellers, planners and decisions makers and 
other stakeholders 
• local knowledge building – engagement of local universities and research 
institutes. 
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Table 4.  Models for impact assessment used in the Mekong grouped to six main entities, namely 
hydrological models; water balance models; hydrodynamic models; economic, policy and 
Bayesian models; IA (impact assessment) frameworks; and e-flow concepts. 




















in Adamson (2006) 
MRC DSF – input data for IQQM 













Whole basin Washington 
University  




Hydrology of Mekong, Sediment 






Whole basin WUP-FIN 
(MRCS/WUP-FIN 
2006, 2007) 
Basin wide model developed by 
EIA Ltd under IKMP programme 
of MRC. Several smaller scale 



















Rainfall – runoff 
model  
UMB Chinese Academy 
of Surveying and 
Mapping 
(Liu et al. 2007 ) 
Lancang flows 
 
IQQM  Water balance, 
flow routing   
LMB to Kratie MRC 
MRC Technical 
Reports, described 
in Adamson (2006) 
MRC DSF – Scenario 
assessment 
Assessment of flow regimes as 
input to negotiation of rules and 
procedures for  water utilisation 
CSIRO Water 
use account 
Water accounting LMB CPWF / CSIRO 
(Kirby, Mainuddin, 
and Eastham 2008; 
Kirby et al. 2008; 
Mainuddin, Kirby, 
and Chen 2008) 
Assess impact of climate 
change on water resource 
Water productivity assessment 
 
MikeBasin Water balance, 
flow routing 
LMB to Kratie NORPLAN and 
EcoLao for ADB 
(ADB 2004) 
CIA for Nam Theun 2 
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Tonle Sap and 
Delta 
MRC – Halcrow 
MRC Technical 
Reports, described 
in Adamson (2006) 
MRC DSF – Scenario 
assessment 
Sediment  transport 
VRSAP Hydrodynamic 
model 
Delta VN SI-WRP 
(Khue 1986; Hoanh 
et al. 2009) 
Water allocation in the Mekong 
Delta; sluice gate operations 







SYKE; EIA Ltd. and 
TKK) 
(MRCS/WUP-FIN 
2003, 2007)  
Modelling of Tonle Sap flood 
pulse 
Modelling of Songkhram basin 
Modelling of Delta 








reports and Fuji et 
al. (2003)  
Modelling of Cambodian 
floodplain 
MIKE11 Hydraulic Tonle Sap and 
Delta 
NORPLAN and 
EcoLao for ADB 
(ADB 2004) 
































Ringler and Cai 
2006) 
Economic optimisation of water 
allocation; valuing fisheries 
RAM Economic – 
hydrology model 
LMB MRC – Rowcroft 
(2005) 





LMB WorldFish / MRC  - 
Halls and Kshatriya 
(2009) 
Model of  cumulative effects of 
mainstream hydropower dams 
on migratory fish populations in 
LMB 
Bay-Fish Bayesian decision 
model 
Tonle Sap,  
Bac Lieu  
WorldFish 
(Baran, Makin, and 
Baird 2003; Baran 
et al. 2004) 






Tonle Sap TKK 
(Varis and Keskinen 
2006)  
Policy model  
ComMod Agent-based 
models and role 
playing games 
Nam Haen,  
Bac Lieu 
(Bousquet and 
Trebuil 2005; Dung 
et al. 2009) 
Support collective decision 
making on water resources 
(aquaculture and agriculture) 
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IBFM  Impact 
assessment 
framework 
LMB MRC  
(MRCS/IBFM 2006) 
Impacts of flow change on 








Impacts and trade-offs from 
water resources development in 









E-flows (not used in 
Mekong) 
Poff et al. (2010) Framework for assessing and 
managing environmental flows 





Rapid assessment of 
environmental flow requirements 
RVA / IHA E-flows (not used in 
Mekong) 
Richter et al. (1997) Statistical method for setting 
streamflow-based river eco-
system management targets 
Basin-wide hydrological models in the Mekong 
Four of the most recent and comprehensive basin-wide modelling activities in the 
Mekong were selected for more detailed review and discussion. These include   
• Mike Basin model application by ADB (2004) as a part of CIA of the Nam 
Thuon II hydropower project 
• DSF (Decision Support Framework) model package under Mekong River 
Commission (World Bank 2004) by WUP-A consortium led by Halcrow 
Group Ltd.  
• VIC (Variable Infiltration Capacity) model by Washington University (see 
e.g. Costa-Cabral et al. 2007) 
• VMod model by former WUP-FIN team that consist of SYKE, EIA Ltd. and 
Aalto University (former TKK) (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007) 
The basin information of the four models is presented in Table 5. Three of them 
are coupled with a hydrodynamic floodplain model downstream from Kratie (see 
location in Figure 1). Mike Basin is coupled with Mike 11 model. DSF with iSIS 
model and VMod with EIA 3D model. VIC is planned to be coupled with the EIA 
3D model in the future. This review, however, concentrates mainly on the 
hydrological models.  
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Table 5.  Introduction to the compared basinwide hydrological models. 
Model Spatial scale Model engine(s) Institutional set up and the 
main reference(s) 
Mike Basin The Mekong 
Basin 
Mike Basin model is defined 
as River Basin management 
model.  
Modelling work was done by 
Norplan as a part of Nam 








Model package that consist 
of SWAT hydrological model 
and IQQM basin 
management simulation 
model.  
DSF has been develop for 
Mekong River Commission by 
WUP-A consortium 








VIC: distributed hydrological 
model with resolution of 
~10km 
VIC model has been 
developed and applied by 
Washington University 
(Costa-Cabral et al. 2007; 
Thanapakpawin et al. 2007) 
VMod The Mekong 
Basin 
VMod: distributed 
hydrological model with 
resolution of 5km 
VMod model has been 
developed by EIA Ltd. and the 
modelling work has been a 
joint effort of EIA Ltd., SYKE 
and Aalto University (former 
TKK) (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2006, 
2007) 
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Mike Basin 
Mike Basin is a water balance model for simulation of water allocation, reservoir 
operation, irrigation and other water uses. It provides a framework for managers 
and stakeholders to address multi-sectoral allocation and environmental issues in 
river basins. It is designed to investigate water sharing issues at international or 
interstate level, and between competing groups of water users, including the 
environment. The model has been developed by DHI (www.dhigroup.com).  
For hydrologic simulations, the model builds on a network model in which 
branches represent individual stream sections and the nodes represent 
confluences, diversions, reservoirs, or water users. The ArcGIS interface has been 
expanded accordingly, e.g., such that the network elements can be edited by 
simple right-clicking. Technically, Mike Basin is a quasi-steady-state mass balance 
model, however allowing for routed river flows. The water quality solution 
assumes purely advective transport; decay during transport can be modelled. The 
groundwater description uses the linear reservoir equation 
The application for the Mekong basin was done by Norplan as a part of Nam 
Theun 2 CIA work (ADB 2004). The whole basin was included in the simulations 
and cumulative impact of hydropower development across the basin was 
simulated. A baseline scenario was established by attributing catchment runoffs 
to gauging stations at Chiang Saen, Vientiane, Thakek, Savannakhet, Pakse and 
Kratie. The runoff series were established by subtracting the discharge at the 
gauging station upstream (ADB 2004). Cumulative impacts for years 2010 and 
2025 are included the operation of a number of new hydropower projects. The 
active storages for the included projects are 19 km3 and 44 km3 for years 2010 
and 2025, respectively.  
DSF: MRC Decision Support Framework 
The DSF has been developed for Mekong River Commission by WUP-A 
consortium2 (MRCS/WUP-A 2003; World Bank 2004). The DSF consist of three 
different simulation models: SWAT, IQQM and iSIS (MRCS/WUP-A 2003). A series 
of hydrological models, based on the SWAT software of US Department of 
Agriculture, have been set up to simulate catchment runoff. The SWAT model was 
used to estimate inflows to the other simulation model, namely IQQM.  
The basin simulation model uses the IQQM software developed in Australia. The 
basin simulation models route sub-basin flows through the river system, making 
allowance for diversions for irrigation and other consumptive demands, and for 
control structures such as dams. The main basin simulation model covers 
tributaries and the mainstream of the Mekong River down to Kratie. Simulation 
models were also set up to estimate irrigation demands for the Great Lake and 
Mekong Delta regions. 
A hydrodynamic model, based on ISIS software developed by HR Wallingford and 
Halcrow, is used to simulate the river system downstream of Kratie to the South 
China Sea. The hydrodynamic model represents the complex interactions caused 
by tidal influences, flow reversal in the Tonal Sap River and over-bank flow in the 
flood season with the varying inflows from upstream. A salinity intrusion model 
was also set up with the ISIS software using results of the hydrodynamic model.  
                                          
2 The WUP-A was led by Halcrow Group Ltd.  
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VIC: Variable Infiltration Capacity model 
VIC is a macro-scale (resolution of 10 km) hydrologic model that solves full water 
and energy balances, originally developed at the University of Washington (Liang 
et al. 1994 ). It is a semi-distributed grid-based hydrological model that 
parameterizes the dominant hydro meteorological processes taking place at the 
land surface - atmosphere interface. A mosaic representation of land surface 
cover, and sub grid parameterizations for infiltration and the spatial variability of 
precipitation, account for sub-grid scale heterogeneities in key hydrological 
processes.  
The model uses two soil layers and a vegetation layer with energy and moisture 
fluxes exchanged between the layers. Vegetation and soil characteristics 
associated with each grid cell are reflected in sets of vegetation and soil 
parameters.  Parameters for vegetation types are specified in a user defined 
library of vegetation classes (usually derived from standard, national classification 
schemes), while their distribution over the gridded land surface area is specified 
in a vegetation parameter file. Soil characteristics (e.g. sand and clay percents, 
bulk density) can be represented for a user-defined number of vertical soil layers 
- usually two or three, divided into a thin upper layer and a secondary set of 
layers that extend several meters into the soil column. 
VMod model 
The EIA VMod hydrological model is developed by Environmental Impact 
Assessment Centre of Finland Ltd (EIA Ltd.). The VMod model is a distributed 
physically based/conceptual hydrological model based on grid representation of 
the modelled catchment (resolution of 5 km). Hydrological processes in the 
catchment are simulated using simplified physically based formulations. The 
catchment is described in the model as a group of grid cells and water balance, 
runoff and leaching of nutrients are calculated separately for each grid cell. From 
the grid cells, runoff is collected to the catchment’s outflow point with a river net 
model, where calculation of lakes is included as well. The model can be used, for 
example, to inspect the effect of land-use changes to catchment hydrology. The 
model includes also a nutrient leaching and transport module that enables, for 
example, simulation of the effect of land-use changes to water quality.  
The model is based on rectangular grid, where each grid cell is individually 
computed and has an own set of parameters such as ground slope and aspect, 
vegetation type and soil type. These grid values are obtained from digital 
elevation model, land use data and soil type data. In each of the grid cells 
simulated hydrological process, include precipitation, snow hydrology, infiltration, 
evapotranspiration, seasonal vegetation development, soil water content, 
groundwater height, and flow into streams. Groundwater flow and stream flow 
are computed between grid cells. The soil has been divided into two layers and 
the layer depths can be defined freely. The water storage of both layers is divided 
into two differently behaving parts in field capacity water content. 
The floodplains downstream from Kratie are modelled with the EIA 3D model 
system. The model is fully three-dimensional finite difference model based on 
rectangular grid representation of the target area. The model system 
accommodates meteorological, hydrological, topographic, land use and 
infrastructure characteristics and produces 3D hydrodynamics and water quality 
as a result. The modelling platform includes data processing, model control, GIS, 
database control, model data products and visualization (Koponen, Kummu, and 
Sarkkula 2005; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007). The modelling work has been a joint effort 
of EIA Ltd., SYKE and TKK (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2006, 2007). 
5.1.  Modelling arenas and actors in those 
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We attempt here to identify the main actors and possible decision making arenas 
for each modelling effort (Table 6). There might be, however, other arenas as 
well not listed in the table. It needs to be mentioned as well that it was very 
difficult to assess within this study how much the modelling work has finally 
impacted on the decision making processes within these listed arenas. The 
comprehensive analysis of the issue would require much more work and the 
authors suggest this to be done in the future with carefully planned questioners 
and interviews targeting to the key persons from different Arenas and Actor 
groups.  
Two of the model applications have been developed within MRC, namely DSF and 
VMod. The Mike Basin application was a consultancy work for NT2 hydropower 
project and the fourth attempt is independent work under Washington University. 
The DSF modelling package is most widely used in various projects, such as IBFM 
(Integrated Basin Flow Management), BDP phase 1 and 2 (Basin Development 
Plan), and is the only basin-wide model package that has been officially approved 
by the countries.  
Table 6.  Actors and arenas of the Mekong basin-wide model attempts. 
Model Time-line Actors Arenas used in the decision making processes 
Mike 
Basin 
2004 - Consultant Norplan 
(consultant) 
- ADB  
The modelling work was done as a part of the NT2 
hydropower project CIA process. It also included the 
cumulative impacts of the basinwide future water 
resources related development plans. The study was 
finalised, however, only after the construction of the 
NT2 had basically started. Therefore, the influence for 
the decision makings related to NT2 project remains a 
bit questioned.  
The work is well documented and available freely in 
internet. Therefore, the work has been often cited in the 
academic articles being the first transparent and well 
documented CIA done in the Mekong Basin. However, 
the role in the decision making arenas is unclear.  
DSF 2001- There are several actors involved in 
DSF: 
- MRC management staff 
- WUP staff 
- MRC modelling team 
- National Mekong Committees 
(NMCs) 
- World Bank (funder) 
- Halcrow (consultant) 
The work started as a part of the WUP programme and 
is continued as a part of the IKMP under MRC.  
DSF is the only modelling effort that has been approved 
officially by the LMB countries and thus, the model has 
a special role in that sense on the decision making 
arenas such as ministries in the LMB countries.  
Further, the DSF results were presented in hydropower 
consultation in 2008, being one of the first attempts 
where the stake holders from various sectors were 
present related to the recent boom in hydropower 
construction.  
The DSF is not, however, transparently documented to 
the wider public. This would increase its value 
significantly.  
VIC 2002- The main actor has been the 
research team led by Prof. Jeffrey 
Richey at Washington University. 
The team has MoU with MRC with 
whom they have done collaboration.  
VIC has been mostly an academic work by Washington 
University and the main decision making arena for that 
has been the academic publications (see e.g. Costa-
Cabral et al. 2007). Through the recent signed MoU 
with MRC may change the role of the modelling work in 
the future.  
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The main actors are at the moment 
in basinwide modelling: 
- EIA Ltd. 
- Aalto University (former TKK) 
- SYKE 
Further, the following actors are 
involved in the process: 
- MRC management staff 
- WUP staff  
- MRC modelling team  
- NMCs 
- various trainees from the 
riparian countries  
- Government of Finland (main 
funder) 
The basinwide modelling work is part of the IKMP 
programme at MRC. The work is based on the former 
WUP-Fin project work and team.  
The arenas used in the decision making are both 
through MRC and academic publications (see e.g. 
Keskinen 2008; Kummu and Sarkkula 2008; Varis, 
Keskinen, and Kummu 2008). Further, the work has 
been presented in various workshops across the basin.  
The basinwide work is, however, very recent effort of 
the group and therefore, it has not yet been finalised 
neither therefore published.  
5.2.  Comparative case analysis  
We aim here to analyse and compare the modelling efforts in more detail, 
attempting to find answers to the issues such as:  
• Model purpose  
• Model structure  
• How adequately they represent biophysical processes  
• Model user groups  
• The form of presentation of simulation results  
• Model limitations and prospects for improvement 
• Transparency of model engine, model application, and presentation of 
model results 
• Future development of the models 
The comparison of the models is being done with brief summarising paragraphs 
and following tables (Table 7; Table 8; and Table 9). Detail comparison of the 
model results has not been undertaken due to the reasons explained in more 
details in Section 6.  
The main purposes of each model activity are presented in Table 7 together with 
the representation of the biophysical processes. All the models are used for 
assessing the impact of recent development activities. The VIC is further used to 
understand better the carbon fluxes in the Mekong basin.  
Mike Basin can be classified as water balance models while VIC and VMod are 
distributed hydrological models based on grid representation. In DSF two models 
are integrated together, where IQQM is model water allocation model while SWAT 
is semi-distributed physically based model based on sub-catchment 
representation.  
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Table 7.  Basin-wide models’ structure, purpose and representation of biophysical processes.  




Mike Basin model for the 
whole basin down to Kratie 
and Mike 11 model for the 
floodplains and Tonle Sap 
Lake.  
The modelling work was part of the 
NT2 hydropower plant CIA aiming to 
model the impact of NT2 on the basin 
wide hydrology.  
Mike Basin modelling package is 
rather a water balance model than 
hydrological model. The model is 
used for simulation of water 
allocation, reservoir operation, 
irrigation and other water uses. 
Therefore, the biophysical 
processes themselves are not well 
covered by the model. 
DSF DSF comprises a suite of 
models that make it 
possible to simulate major 
hydrological aspects of river 
basin behaviour. The 
following models are 
included: 
- SWAT hydrological 
model 
- IQQM basin 
management 
simulation model 
Further, the suite include 
ISIS 2D hydrodynamic 
model for the floodplains 
downstream from Kratie. 
The DSF was set-up to assist in 
meeting the requirements of the 
Mekong River Agreement (see 
Mekong River Commission 1995) in 
respect of water sharing, water quality 
and environmental flows (World Bank 
2004). 
The DSF aim has been mostly to 
provide estimation of development 
impacts on hydrology to support the 
BDP and IBFM processes. 
The original aim of the DSF was to 
contain containing information on the 
historical and existing biophysical 
resources and, when fully populated, 
socio-economic and environmental 
conditions, as well as predictions of 
how these may change in the future 
The SWAT hydrological model has 
good representation of the 
biophysical processes.  
However, the integration of the 
SWAT model results to IQQM basin 
management model has been 
challenging.  
VIC VIC distributed hydrological 
model with resolution of 
~10km for the whole basin.  
The primary aim of the modelling has 
been to provide a base for the 
understanding the carbon fluxes in 
the Mekong. The model has been 
used, however, increasingly to assess 
the development impacts on 
hydrology.  
The model is distributed 2D model 
and the representation of the 
biophysical processes is done well 
in the model.  
VMod VMod distributed 
hydrological model with 
resolution of 5km.  
The model is linked to EIA 
3D floodplain model from 
Kratie downstream.  
The main aim of the modelling is to 
assess the impacts of the recent 
development activities on the 
hydrology and sediment transport as 
a part of the IKMP programme at 
MRC.  
The model is distributed 2D model 
and the representation of the 
biophysical processes is done well 
in the model. 
 
The user groups of the models are presented in Table 8. Mike Basin and VIC have 
been used by rather limited groups of people of one or two organisations. The 
DSF is used widely by modelling team in MRC and NMCs (National Mekong 
Committees) and some line-agencies in the riparian countries. VMod has been 
used by WUP-Fin team, MRC modelling team, and training has been provided 
rather widely in NMCs, line-agencies and riparian universities.  
The model results are presented rather well in accessible sources. The DSF 
results, however, were for a long while and still partly unpublished. The BDP2 has 
brought more transparency to the sharing of model results and those are well 
available at the moment (Table 8).  
Each model has its own limitations. The limitations can be divided to two parts: a) 
limitations of a model engine itself; and b) limitations of the model application in 
the Mekong. Some of the limitations of both of these parts for each model activity 
are discussed in Table 8.  
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Table 8.  The users of the basin-wide models; how the model results are presented; and limitations 
of the models.  
Model By whom the model has been 
used 
How the results are presented Limitations of the model 
Mike 
Basin 
The Mike Basin model is widely 
used in various basins.  
The Mekong basin application has 
been used by the Norplan only 
within the consultation project.  
The results are well presented 
and documented in a transparent 
way. The main hydrological 
impacts for different time and 
spatial scales are clearly 
presented.  
The model is able to predict well 
the development impacts on 
water resources but it would be 
difficult to analyse e.g. landuse 
change or climate change impacts 
on hydrology with the model. 
However, it fits well for the 
purpose it was used.   
DSF The model suite has been 
developed under the Mekong 
River Commission by WUP-A, a 
sub-component for the Water 
Utilisation Programme. The model 
has been used by the modelling 
at MRCS and NMCs (National 
Mekong Committees).  
The MRC has not really 
presented the results of the DSF 
during BDP phase 1; neither 
IBFM in a comprehensive way 
that would have been open for the 
public. The World Bank, one of 
the main funders of DSF, has 
however published one report of 
the modelling attempt and its 
results (World Bank 2004). 
The situation has, however, got 
better through the BDP2 process 
where DSF results have been 
presented in various stake-holder 
consultations and the reports are 
available on-line (e.g. Mekong 
River Commission 2008b).  
The hydrological limitations are 
the ones reported by Adamson 
(2006), being that it has not been 
developed for predicting the 
hydropower impacts on hydrology 
and neither it is suitable for 
predicting the climate change 
impacts, both being the main 
concerns for the basin in the 
future.  
VIC The VIC model is being used in 
various basins such as Amazon 
Basin.  
The Mekong basin model 
application is used by Washington 
University and previous version of 
the model is in use within the SEA 
START group at Chulalongkorn 
University.  
The results have been presented 
well through peer-reviewed 
journal articles.  
The resolution of the Model is 
rather coarse (~10km) for more 
detailed modelling work in a 
tributary scale. The resolution is, 
nevertheless, enough for the 
basin wide study.  
VMod The model is being used mainly 
by EIA Ltd and Aalto University 
(former TKK) modellers. Further, 
the extensive training in the 
Mekong region has results some 
end users in Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand. Training has provided 
for the NMCs and various 
universities in the region.  
The final results for the basin-
wide simulations are not yet ready 
and thus not published.  
The previous results of the VMod 
applications in the Mekong 
tributaries are documented and 
presented in WUP-FIN reports 
that are available on-line at 
www.eia.fi/wup-fin.  
The model has been originally 
developed for the Nordic 
conditions. The model is, 
however, being modified to fit 
better to Mekong conditions and 
in tributary scale the model results 
are very good. The pilot results for 
the basin wide are promising as 
well. The final results are not yet, 
however, available.  
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Transparency of a model can be assessed in various ways. It can be assessed by 
estimating issues such as access to code, access to model, access to 
documentation (including assumptions, etc of the model application), and access 
to the model results. These different aspects of transparency are briefly discussed 
in Table 9. There are differences how transparent the models are. In most of the 
models the model engines are transparent and well documented. However, only 
in VIC all the four ‘components’ are published well in peer-reviewed journal 
articles. The DSF model has challenges in being transparent but the situation has 
got better within BDP2 process.  
Table 9.  Transparency and future development of the selected basin-wide models.  
Model Transparency of a model Could the transparency be 
improved?  




The model is not based on open-
source code but the model engine is 
rather transparent as it has been 
examined by various reviewers.  
The modelling attempt in the Mekong 
is being documented rather 
transparently. 
The model results are presented well 
in freely available report. Those are 
not, however, peer-reviewed by any 
independent reviewer.  
The model engine is not based 
on open-source code and thus, 
even though it has been 
reviewed the code behind the 
model is not very transparent.  
The model engine itself is under 
continuous development. The 
Mekong model application is not, 
however, being updated since 
2004.  
DSF Each of the model engines is rather 
transparent, although the models’ 
code is not open-source. The suite of 
models is not, however, that 
transparent as the documentation is 
not well accessible.  
The modelling work lacks of 
transparency as the documentation 
has not been publicly open and 
calibration neither validation results 
have not been well documented. 
This is, however, now changing 
thanks to BDP2 where well 
organised stake holders meetings 
are hold and documentation is 
available on-line. .  
There are various ways of 
improving the transparency of 
the modelling work. The main 
would be more open 
documentation and publication 
of the model calibration, 
validation and scenario results. 
Further, the Mekong 
application should be 
documented in details.  
There is currently on-going the 
development of the DSF by 
Halcrow within the IKMP 
(Integrated Knowledge and 
Management Programme) 
component 4. 
VIC The model is based on open-source 
code and the model has been 
reviewed by independent reviewers 
through various journal publications.  
The model results are also published 
in peer-reviewed journal articles.  
- The model engine is under 
continuous development by the 
Washington University. Also, the 
Mekong application is under 
continuous development and 
improvement.  
VMod The model is based on the open-
source code. The description of the 
model has been published in internet 
as all the model applications in the 
Mekong.  
The model results are not, however, 
yet public as only the pilot runs have 
been finished so far.  
Detail peer-reviewed journal 
article of the model engine and 
validation of the case studies 
would increase the 
transparency of the model.  
The model engine is under 
continuous development by the 
EIA Ltd. The Mekong application 
is under work by the joint effort of 
EIA Ltd., Aalto University (former 
TKK) and SYKE. 
Cross comparison of model results 
Comparison of model results can be carried out at two levels: at a general level to 
establish whether there is consistency between the results from different models 
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(regardless of type); and detailed cross-comparison of similar types of models to 
help establish the uncertainty / accuracy involved. At this stage, structured 
cross-comparison of results from different modelling projects in the Mekong has 
been limited.  Each model suite has been developed and used to answer different 
sets of questions, so direct comparison of results is difficult.  Differences result 
not only from differences in the modelling platform, but also from a mix of other 
issues, including underlying assumptions, input data and the way research 
questions are posed. Two examples are given below to illustrate the difficulties 
involved in cross-comparison of results: 
• Kummu and Sarkkula (2008) compared the results from three major 
cumulative impact assessments (CIA) on the impact of basin development 
on Tonle Sap Lake (Table 10).  All three predicted higher dry season water 
levels and lower flood peaks, but the magnitude of the resulting change in 
calculated dry season lake area varied from 6% to 30%. 
• Eastham et al. (2008) modelled hydrological impacts of climate change in 
the Mekong to 2030.  Using a water accounting methodology, and based 
on the assumption (from the A1B SRES scenario) of an average increase in 
rainfall of 0.2 m (13%) they predicted a 21% increase in overall flow in 
the river and an increase in probability of “extreme wet” flood events from 
5% to 76%.  In contrast, Hoanh et al. (2004) modelled hydrological 
impacts of climate change in the Mekong to 2039, using the SLURP model.  
Based on an assumption (from the A2 and B2 SRES scenarios) of a 
minimal change in overall precipitation but with different sub-basins 
varying from -6% to +6%, they predicted a decrease in average monthly 
flows of 7-11%, with a small increase (1%) in maximum flows, but large 
decrease in minimum flows. 
In each case, the underlying assumptions (about the degree and nature of basin 
development in the first example, and about climate scenarios in the second) 
were fundamentally different, so the variance in results is not necessarily due to 
inaccuracies or inconsistencies in the models.  However, it illustrates clearly the 
difficulties involved in comparison of model results, and the confusion that could 
potentially result for policy makers or planners attempting to use model results.  
These issues can only be addressed by very careful and transparent presentation 
and explanation of the assumptions and limitations inherent in the modelling 
process.   
However, both consistency and inconsistency can provide important information.  
In the Tonle Sap case above, the consistent projection of higher dry season and 
lower wet season lake levels resulting from upstream development is an 
important consideration for planning and management, regardless of the exact 
magnitude of the changes. In the case of differing projections for the impact of 
climate change on Mekong flows, the important message is that of uncertainty, 
and the need to factor uncertainty into planning. 
Detailed cross-comparison of results from different models analysing exactly the 
same problem, can help to establish the range of variation in results as an 
indicator of the accuracy / error of the models.  Direct comparison is only valid 
across a consistent category of models: it is possible, for example, to compare 
the results from ISIS, EIA 3D model, VRSAP and Mike11 (all hydrodynamic 
models); or to compare WEAP and IQQM; but we cannot try to compare ISIS with 
WEAP. Within a single category, the use of a range of models can provide an 
indication of the uncertainty involved: this is the approach used by the IPCC in 
assessing climate change, where a large number of climate models of different 
complexity were used to define an envelope of likely results (e.g. Randall et al. 
2007).   
It would be useful in the Mekong to establish a framework for a structured cross-
comparison of the major modelling suites, using a coherent set of questions and 
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assumptions; and a platform and mechanism for collating and comparing results.  
Various models could be applied with the same initial conditions for modelling the 
impacts of the same development scenarios.  This would provide a better 
understanding of both consistency and uncertainty, more reliable estimation of 
the range of impacts, and improved understanding of each of the models and 
their strengths.  It could also act as a catalyst for better collaboration, to allow 
more targeted application of specific models in their areas of greatest strength.  A 
future approach for using models as a part of IA process in the Mekong could be 
the establishment of a coordinated modelling cluster, following the example of the 
IPCC. 
Table 10.  Cross-comparison of results from three CIA studies regarding impacts of development on 
Tonle Sap Lake 
 MRC DSF 
(World Bank 2004) 
ADB - Nam Theun 2 
(ADB 2004) 
Adamson (2001) 
Assumptions and methods 
Increase in storage 49.5 km3 54.9 km3 22.7 km3 
Increase in irrigation +53% - - 
Other developments Increased domestic and 
industrial use, intra-basin 
diversions 
Increase domestic and 
industrial use 
- 
Method / model used DSF - Hydrological and 
hydrodynamic model  
MikeBasin - water balance 
and hydrodynamic model  
Statistical analysis 
Impact on Tonle Sap water levels 
Wet season -0.36 m -0.54 m NA 
Dry season +0.15 m +0.60 m +0.30 m 
Min area (change from 
observed)* 
2532 km2 (6%) 3107 km2 (30%) 2712 km2 (11%) 
Max area km2 (change 
from observed)* 
12,559 km2 (4%) 12,168 km2 (7%) NA 
    * estimated by Kummu and Sarkkula 2008. 
Broad implications of the models: gaps, challenges and future 
opportunities 
7.1. Major gaps in the Mekong modelling 
There has been very significant effort in developing models to assess the impacts 
of hydrological change in the Mekong, as indicated by the large number and 
variety of models listed in Table 4.  Adamson (2006) concluded that “this family 
of modelling systems: the MRC’s DSF, the VIC (Variable Infiltration Capacity) 
model, Mike Basin – Mike 11 and the WUP-Finn suite sums to an ensemble that 
embraces just about all of the needs of hydrological, resource and environmental 
studies within the Mekong region”, with the caveat that “more specialised sub-
regional simulation studies, such as those with regard to saline intrusion and 
water quality management in the Mekong Delta in Vietnam are obviously best 
dealt with by the specific systems developed at the national level”. 
There is obviously an argument to be made that sufficient effort has gone into 
building models, and that the issue now is to make best use of existing tools to 
provide thorough, balanced assessments.  There are, however, still areas in which 
models are lacking or inadequate. Four of such areas are listed and briefly 
discussed below; in all of the cases this is linked closely to paucity of data.  
Groundwater and its interaction with surface water. Groundwater and surface 
water are known to be very closely linked in the Mekong floodplain and delta, 
(CIAP 1999; Raksmey, Jinno, and Tsutsumi 2009), and there are many other 
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areas, such as the limestone provinces of central Laos, with major aquifer 
systems.  None of the major modelling suites currently operating for the 
Mekong has a working groundwater model.  Both MikeBasin and the WUP-FIN 
suite have the capability for such a component built in.  However, data on 
groundwater in the Mekong region are very sparse, and building and 
calibrating a groundwater model at regional scale for the Mekong would 
require a major research effort.  
Modelling the ecological and livelihood impacts of flow modification. Because 
of the complexity of ecological responses, this has generally been approached 
by concentrating on a single component, such as fish in the Tonle Sap (see 
for example Baran, Makin, and Baird 2003; Baran et al. 2004), and flooded 
forests in Tonle Sap (e.g. Kummu and Sarkkula 2008) and some studies 
assessing impacts in particular areas (e.g. Keskinen et al. 2005; Friend et al. 
2006).  MRC’s IBFM (Integrated Basin Flow Management) Program 
(MRCS/IBFM 2006)aimed to provide a coherent framework for assessing 
ecological and livelihood impacts along the Mekong mainstream, but has been 
discontinued.  International programs have developed methodologies for 
setting streamflow-based river ecosystem management targets (for example, 
ELOHA – Environmental Limits of Hydrological Alteration – Poff et al. 2010) 
but these have not yet been applied in the Mekong. 
Links between ecosystems and economy. In this case, it is the paucity of 
data, rather than lack of a modelling platform, that is of most concern.  
Ringler (2001) and Rowcroft (2005) made preliminary attempts to model the 
economic impacts of flow changes.  MRC-BDP2 is establishing a methodology 
and framework to assess economic, environmental and social impacts of 
basin-wide water development (MRCS/BDP2 2009b).  However, all these 
efforts are hampered by the lack of information on the economic valuation of 
ecosystems and ecosystem services. 
Optimisation of hydropower operation rules. This crucial part of modelling the 
hydropower impacts is not yet well covered, in our opinion, by any of the 
basin-wide modelling attempts. When modelling the impact of hydropower 
construction it is critical to get the dams’ operation rules correct to be able to 
rely on the simulation results of possible flow regime changes due to the dam 
operation. The majority of the dams are, most probably, operated to 
maximise the profit. This leads to the daily (electricity produced e.g. during 
day time), weekly (electricity produced only during weekdays) and seasonal 
(water is stored from wet-season to dry season) fluctuations. With the 
available optimisations models it is possible to predict rather well the 
seasonal fluctuations but daily and weekly operation rules are more difficult 
to include into the models as most of the optimisation models are based on 
monthly time step. Thus, more work is requires and also, preferably, better 
collaboration with the dam operators and power companies to get the actual 
operation rules into the models.  
7.2.  Discussion of general issues related to the modelling attempts 
The role of models in the impact assessment is double sided. The modelling is one 
of the few options available to look at the questions of future changes and 
impacts of human activity on water resources, as stated by Sarkkula et al. 
(2007). On the other hand, modelling can be seen as a mathematic toy of the 
modellers with full of assumptions and open questions. Nevertheless, modelling 
can be a useful tool as a part of IA work when done right with good ethics by 
using transparent and scientifically sound modelling tools.  
In summary, the modelling as a part of IA process has lots of possibilities as have 
been seen in recent years e.g. as a part of IPCC process. Such a large analysis 
with hundreds of parameters would be difficult to do without powerful 
mathematical models. On the other hand, there are challenges in the modelling, 
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particularly what comes to the reliability of the modelling results and 
disseminating the results to the decisions makers and wider public.  
The future approach for using the models as a part of IA process could follow the 
example of the IPCC as stated above. Various models could be applied with 
similar initial conditions for modelling the impacts of the same development 
scenarios. The modelling results could then be gathered together by the 
coordinator of the modelling cluster. As a result, there would be more reliable 
estimation for the range of impacts.  
When using a hydrological model for conducting a HIA, there are several key 
points that needed to be taken into account. Everything starts from the 
hydrology; the model needs to be able to model the hydrology in the conditions in 
question well. The model parameters are calibrated against the measured 
discharge data and validated against another time period.  
When selecting the model for HIA, it should be made clear from the beginning 
that the model is capable of modelling the impacts of the human activities that 
are included in the analysis, such as hydropower, irrigation, deforestation, and 
water diversion. Each of them needs special features from the model engine. For 
example simpler water balance model might be enough for modelling the impact 
of hydropower operation while 2D distributed hydrological model is needed to 
model the impact of land cover changes.  
Water quality, e.g. sediments, is the next step to be modelled after the 
hydrological impact. This should be thought through as well from the beginning of 
the modelling project. Some hydrological models are capable to take into account 
various water quality parameters as well. Thus, there would not be a need for 
new model if water quality wanted to be included in the analysis later on. 
Finally, equally important part of the modelling activities is the dissemination of 
the results. There is still much to do in this section, i.e. how to bring the 
information to the different actors and end users.  
7.3.  Challenges and opportunities in the Mekong modelling 
Until now probably the main challenge has been in the Mekong that only one 
model system has been used for the various large modelling attempts under MRC 
such as BDP, BDP2, IBFM, and IKMP. Further, the modelling work has not been 
reviewed properly according to the best knowledge of the author and thus is 
subject to inaccuracies. We identified five opportunities to improve in the Mekong 
modelling community as presented below.  
Model comparison: In order to increase the reliability of the results, it would be 
extremely useful to be able to do model comparison. There could be things to be 
learned from the IPCC process, as stated already above. In the IPCC various 
modelling results are brought together. This multiple model use would increase 
remarkably the reliability of the modelling results. Moreover, it would increase the 
collaboration between the different actors if done with open minds and 
transparent way. At the same time, however, the dissemination of the modelling 
work would be increasingly difficult as that should be coordinated well between 
the different model results.  
Opportunity 1: to conduct a model ensemble of multiple models aiming 
to increase the reliability of the impact assessment results. MRC could act 
as a coordinator in this and DSF could be one of the tools. Other tools 
could be e.g. VIC by Washington University and VMod by former WUP-FIN 
consortium. The same development scenarios would be used in each of 
the application. 
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Tailored modelling is stated to be the best approach for impact assessment. It 
would be recommendable that the modelling tool is selected to meet the needs, 
not to fit the problems on the model set-up. One model cannot do all and 
therefore a set of model need to be applied to meet the needs. All the basin wide 
models in the Mekong should be reviewed critically by keeping this in mind. 
Further, this would be one justification why it would be beneficial to have various 
models applied in the basin and not just one.  
Opportunity 2: to conduct a detail model comparison to look at each 
model attempt with recommendations for the future model system of set 
of models.  
Transparency of the model engine, scenario building and model results is 
important part of all the modelling activities. To many of the end users the model 
is like a black box and therefore it would be important to openly share the 
calibration and validation results of the model. The same applies to the 
development scenarios of the impact assessment procedure: it is highly important 
that the used scenarios and all the details in those, are independently reviewed, 
openly presented and disseminated.  
Opportunity 3: each basin wide modelling attempt should be reviewed 
carefully by independent reviewers. This could be done through e.g. 
scientific journal publications. Further, the development scenarios used for 
each modelling attempt could be coordinated and naturally well justified 
by the users.  
Communication between modellers, planners and decisions makers and other 
stake holders has been a challenge for a long time in the multidisciplinary work. 
Related to this, Nancarrow (2005) addresses some interesting issues on 
modelling, and particularly on the relationship between modellers and social 
scientists. She points out the differences in their overall approaches that are, in 
summary: modellers simply assume problem and start by defining and collecting 
data needed to solve it, while social scientists start by identifying the different 
stakeholders and how they see and define the problem. The modellers should pay 
more attention to the way of presenting the results in understandable way to 
different actors and end users.  
Opportunity 4: stakeholder consultations, such as the Hydropower 
consultation in September 2008 in Vientiane, could be organised more 
often to increase the interaction between the above mentioned actors. 
However, there is still lot to do in order to find the common language and 
ways to present the modelling results in an understandable way.  
Local knowledge building is crucially important part of the modelling project in 
the region and has been high on the agenda in the MRC and other modelling 
attempts. However, it is difficult to measure how well this work has been done.  
Opportunity 5: The past activities could be assessed and then new plans 
for the possibly more sustainable way of capacity building could be drawn 
up. One option for the more sustainable way of building the local capacity 
and knowledge would be to involve the regional universities and other 
research centres more actively in the IA process itself. Again, as stated 
already in Section III, the Mekong region universities could play a large 
role in the earlier proposed model ensemble.  
7.4.  Possible role of MRC in the modelling  
MRC has been one of the main organisations doing modelling in the Mekong 
Basin. At the same time, MRC is in a unique position in the Mekong by forming 
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intergovernmental body over the water resources issues. MRC is using one major 
model package, DSF, in its impact assessment work. The DSF has been approved 
by all the LMB countries and is used in various programmes under MRC.  
By using only one model, it is difficult to get an idea of the reliability of the 
results. This could be compared to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) work where 23 model results are used to estimate the climate 
change impacts (see e.g. Randall et al. 2007). The use of set of models with the 
same development scenarios would increase the reliability and level of confidence 
of the modelled HIA results. At the same time, however, the proper dissemination 
of the results would be even more crucial as it might be to some stakeholders 
confusing to have various modelling results. Thus, the results should be 
presented in coordinated way as IPCC has done.  
Therefore, one possible approach for such an organisation as MRC would be to act 
as a platform and coordinator for the set of modelling activities, still of course 
having their own modelling activities. The modelling work itself would be done in 
the independent research agencies, both in the region and internationally. For all 
the models same initial conditions and future development scenarios would be 
used. This could give more reliable and scientifically sound modelling results. 
The approach could involve more regional universities and build up capacity in 
broader context in the region if managed and done well. It might, on the other 
hand, increase the risk of whether the work will be done properly. At the same 
time, the approach would be more open and more transparent way of working 
than currently only the in-house modelling approach.  
Final remarks 
“All models are wrong; some models are useful”.  3 
Models are inherently simplifications of reality; they are thus always inaccurate at 
some level.  Conversely, numerical models are often technically very complex, so 
that for all but a few experts, they function as “black boxes” where there is little 
transparency in how output results are reached.  Combined with apparently 
contradictory results from different models, these factors can result in significant 
cynicism and distrust of models amongst some policy makers and planners: they 
can be seen as mathematical toys, full of assumptions and open questions.  On 
the other hand, amongst those who routinely use models and their results, there 
can be a tendency to regard the model results as representing the system, and to 
disregard or downplay the assumptions and inaccuracies involved. 
Models are an essential component of planning and managing change in the 
complex, inter-related water resource systems of the Mekong.  The increasing 
sophistication and diversity of available models provides a crucial toolbox for 
impact assessment, but they must be used in a context where the underlying 
assumptions and limitations of the models, input data and the resulting 
projections are clearly spelled out for users.  It is important that the modelling 
itself is done well and transparently, but transferring the results to decision 
makers and stake-holders in an understandable format is equally important, and 
often neglected.  
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resources modelling in the Mekong, concentrating on the modelling 
activities taken place at the MRC, namely DSF (decision support 
framework) and WUP-FIN. Also VIC model developed by Washington 
University and Mike Basin models are briefly discussed. Adamson address 
relevant points on the process of model selection, highlighting the 
importance that there will never be a single integrated modelling system 
but rather a family of custom-built models. He also discusses the challenge 
in the selection where there is always the trade-off between complexity, 
error and sensitivity on the one hand, and utility on the other. He argues 
that most of the models in the Mekong are “fit for purpose”. He also point 
out the importance of data for the modelling.  
Adamson gives a short summary of each modelling activity and provides a 
table where role, advantages and limitations of each model effort have 
been briefly presented. Adamson summarises the modelling actions in the 
Mekong as follows: “The family of modelling systems – the DSF, VIC, Mike 
Basin – Mike 11 and WUP-Fin suite – combines to provide an ensemble 
that embraces just about all the needs of hydrological, resource and 
environmental studies within the Mekong region.” However, he calls for 
more formal co-ordination and knowledge sharing arrangements.  
 
ADB. 2004. Cumulative impact analysis and Nam Theun 2 contributions: Final 
report. Prepared by NORPLAN and EcoLao for Asian Development Bank. 143 pp. 
This report presents the results of the CIA of the Mekong basin 
development activities, concentrating on hydropower. The study can be 
categorised as hydrological CIA (i.e. sectoral CIA). The work was 
undertaken by Norplan and EcoLao. They used Mike Basin and Mike 11 
models for the assessment. The report provides rather transparent and 
well documented CIA. The CIA conducted and results of that are analysed 
in more detail in the CIA part of the Tool reviews of PN67.  
 
Costa-Cabral, M.C., J.E. Richey, G. Goteti, D.P. Lettenmaier, C. Feldkötter, and A. 
Snidvongs. 2007. Landscape Structure and Use, Climate, and Water Movement in 
the Mekong River Basin. Hydrological Processes 22 (12):1731-1746. 
This article gives a brief overview on the VIC distributed hydrological 
model. The article addresses the relative roles of precipitation and soil 
moisture in influencing runoff variability in the Mekong River basin. The 
evidence found in this study for the influence of land cover type on soil 
moisture implies significant hydrologic consequences for large scale 
deforestation and expansion of agricultural land. 
 
MRCS/IKMP. 2008. MRC modelling requirements and tools analysis. MRC 
Information and Knowledge Management Programme (IKMP), Hydrological, 
Environmental and Socio-Economic Modelling Tools for the Lower Mekong Basin 
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Impact Assessment/ FINDS. Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS), 
Vientiane.  
This report aims at practical action plans related to the MRC programmes 
modelling needs. It focuses on what needs to be done and how can it be 
accomplished. The needs assessment is based on Programme documents 
and foreseeable tasks. The analysis covers both immediate and long-term 
needs. In this report especially the procedure by which the modelled 
"hydrologic changes will be used by experts to quantify the defined 
environmental, economic and social assessment indicators" is considered 
to need additional modelling support.  
 
MRCS/WUP-FIN. 2007. Final Report - Part 2: research findings and way forward. 
WUP-FIN Phase 2 - Hydrological, Environmental and Socio-Economic Modelling 
Tools for the Lower Mekong Basin Impact Assessment. Mekong River Commission 
and Finnish Environment Institute Consultancy Consortium, Vientiane, Lao PDR. 
126 pp. Available on-line at http://www.eia.fi/wup-fin/wup-fin2/publications.htm. 
This report is a product of an extensive collaboration of Finnish, 
international and riparian experts. The purpose of the report is to describe 
and justify the approaches and strategies applied within the project as well 
as to summarize and synthesize the main results and findings of the WUP-
FIN Project into general conclusions and recommendations. The report 
argues that without primary studies and data collection it is impossible to 
draw conclusions of process behaviour (nature, society) that is necessary 
to reliably assess the diverse impacts of different development plans.  
This report presents the main findings from all of the WUP-FIN activities 
and results: technical reports, working papers and publications that are 
available for studying the details of our field surveys, data analysis, model 
developments, socio-economic and policy analyses as well as impact 
assessment case studies. The report also brings the findings and 
recommendations into the discussion with experts, practitioners as well as 
with other stakeholders.  
 
MRCS/WUP-A. 2003. Working paper 13 - Knowledge Base and DSF Application 
Software. Water Utilisation Project Component A (WUP-A):  Development of Basin 
Modelling Package and Knowledge Base. Mekong River Commission, Phnom Penh. 
This report gives an overview on the MRC knowledge base and DSF 
application. The DSF consist of three different models: SWAT hydrological 
model, IQQM water resources system, and ISIS hydrodynamic model. The 
SWAT and IQQM are applied to the lower Mekong basin while the ISIS has 
been applied to the floodplains downstream from Kratie in Cambodia.  
 
Sarkkula, J., M. Keskinen, J. Koponen, M. Kummu, J. Nikula, O. Varis, and M. 
Virtanen. 2007. Mathematic modeling in integrated management of water 
resources: Magical tool, mathematical toy or something between? In 
Democratizing water governance in the Mekong, edited by L. Lebel, J. Dore, R. 
Daniel and Y. S. Koma. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press. 
This book chapter presents, drawing on examples from the Mekong 
Region, the ideas and suggestions on responding to changing user needs, 
model content and user interfaces as well as on increasing the linkages 
between modelling and other critical issues in water management. It is 
argued in the chapter that further work is needed on linking hydrological 
and environmental issues with social and economic activities to facilitate 
balanced modelling and impact assessment, and consequently, decision-
making. This will require, according to the authors, multi- and cross-
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disciplinary approach for both modelling and impact assessment, and 
better communication and interaction between modellers and non-
modellers. This, in turn, would help to produce more transparent and 
relevant information, and creates stronger scientific and social basis for 
impact assessment and management decisions is argued. 
Moreover, the chapter discusses the modelling activities in the Mekong 
driven by the following questions: What are the main questions in the 
Mekong Region that modellers are trying to answer? Why are these 
questions important? Is anybody coordinating the work or is the 
coordination needed? Why there are so many models? Is there something 
that the old models have not been able to answer, and if yes, why? 
Managers and planners don’t actually need new models that are even 
more elaborated, but rather a single model that is simple but accurate 
enough: how this could be achieved? 
Finally, the chapter provides a practical example of integrated modelling 
and impact assessment process through the application of the WUP-FIN 
models and analysis tools to the Tonle Sap system. The example also 
shows the need and justification of developing an advanced model system 
for this kind of complex hydrodynamic, environmental and social entity. 
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Abstract 
International donors have played an important role in shaping transboundary water 
governance in the Mekong for over half a century. However, formal governance 
practice and scholarship related to the Mekong has often overlooked the linkages 
between donor-driven, often regionally articulated programs, on the one hand, and 
nationally-defined policies and decision-making landscape, on the other. This missing 
linkage is often manifested in the non-adoption or non-application of donors’ 
development agendas at the national level as well as in the subversion of nationally-
defined policies and development goals at the regional level. This article highlights 
the complex bureaucratic landscape which exists in the Mekong and the important 
role played by national government bureaucracies in shaping the actual significance 
of international donors’ actions and desires. It thus highlights the need to link 
transboundary water governance with the national-level decision-making reality, and 
vice versa, if regional programs are supposed to be translated into national-level 
policy formulation processes. From a scholarly perspective, it highlights the issue of 
bureaucratic competition and fragmentation in government bureaucracy, and 
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questions academic approaches that tend to black-box the role of the state in 
transboundary water governance.  
 
Keywords: transboundary water governance, spatial linkages, territorial space, 
government bureaucracy, international donors, Mekong 
1. Introduction  
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), the notion of cross-sectoral 
coordination, has become a mantra in the discourse on water management 
paradigms despite major criticisms. These criticisms include critiques of the 
theoretical underpinnings of the IWRM concept, the emphasis on the need to 
integrate water management across sectors regardless of how key actors perceive 
this integration, and the plausibility of actually integrating all aspects of water 
resources management both institutionally and physically (e.g. Biswas 2004, Molle 
2006, Allan 2003). Despite these criticisms1, many donors have premised their 
support for the management of internationally shared (transboundary) waters in the 
developing world on the application of IWRM concepts.  
 
In the case of transboundary water, the need for integration is argued not only 
across sectors, but also across scales, from local to supra-national. This need for 
integration stems from the assumption that sustainable water resources 
development and management can only be achieved through better coordination of 
the increasingly complex and multiple use of water (Phillips et. al, 2006). In the 
current application of these principles, the political processes and power dynamics 
involved in state and inter-state decision making are often overlooked or over 
simplified and the complex decision-making processes in transboundary water 
governance tend to be reduced to merely technical, managerial issues.  
Together the assumptions on integration and the oversimplification of the cross-scale 
decision-making processes can result in a critical limitation of donors’ actual 
influence on transboundary water resources outcomes.  The history of water 
governance in the Lower Mekong Basin provides a case in point. There the role of 
international donors has been preeminent as evidenced in the formation of the 
Mekong Committee (MC) in 1957 and its later transformation into and operation as 
the Mekong River Commission (MRC) in 1995. Compared to other river basin 
institutions worldwide, the MRC is equipped with a comprehensive organizational 
structure to link regional and national development. Yet, the MRC has been unable to 
translate the outcomes of its regional programs into policy formulation at the 
national level. This appears to be due to a scalar disconnect between the regional 
and national-level decision-making processes. 
This scalar disconnect in decision-making processes in part results from a neglect of 
national interests (Hirsch and Jensen 2006). They describe how water management 




1 See also Shah et al. (2001) on the limits to leapfrogging with regard to donors’ 
attempt to transpose successful river basin management in the developing world. 
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measures at transboundary level could favor or disfavor countries’ development 
interests depending on their hydrological position among other factors. For instance, 
while Vietnam (as a downstream country) will benefit from water quality monitoring 
of the Mekong, Thailand (as an upstream country) will see this monitoring exercise 
merely as a threat that could impede their national water resources development 
plan. Vietnam’s Mekong Delta could also benefit from higher river flows in the dry 
season, while this would in all likelihood damage riparian forests around Cambodia’s 
Tonle Sap. However, it should not be concluded that these well-known upstream-
downstream interests reflect the only, or even defining, positions within each 
country.2 For example, within all four Lower Mekong Basing (LMB) countries, each 
Department of Irrigations’ interest to use physical infrastructure (dams and weirs) to 
regulate water flow for agriculture, and that of the energy sector to generate 
hydropower, conflict with Fishery Administrations’ view of such structures as 
impediments to fish migration. Thus, accurate and realistic reflection of what actually 
represent a country’s national interest, even if considered only at the formal 
government level, must also take into account complex domestic bureaucratic 
landscapes. 
The missing linkages between national-level bureaucracies and transboundary 
decision-making processes brings to light a gap in much current analysis of 
international water governance. Transboundary water governance has been studied 
and analyzed from a variety of disciplines ranging from international law (McCaffrey 
1997, Dellapenna 1994) to economics (Bhaduri and Barbier 2008), geography 
(Bakker 1999, Wolf et al. 2003) and institutions (Landovsky 2006, Raadgever et al. 
2008). However, one common thread in the majority of this work until recently has 
been the often implicit assumption, that the State is the sole or primary actor in 
international relations. This focus on state interaction does not explain how states 
decision making at transboundary level stems from, or reflect, (bureaucratic) power 
interplay at the national level, and vice versa, (see also how Browder 2000 looks at 
state interaction in terms of upstream-downstream relationship3), as it tends to 
overlook the scalar relationship and interaction (regional, national, sub-national, 
local). Political geographers have provided tools for considering scalar issues in 
transboundary water governance in the analysis of spatial scale and its social 
production (Swyngedouw 2003, Marston 2000). In particular, they have examined 
how particular scales become constituted and transformed in response to socio-
spatial dynamics and focused on processes and networks as a means of 
understanding the social production of scale. However, these tools have not yet been 
fully applied to provide insights on the issues described here, in particular the 




2 See also the way Hirsch and Jensen (2006) distinct national interest in 
transboundary water governance, as if such interest is derived from integration of 
state bureaucratic agencies at the national level. 
3 By focusing on upstream-downstream relationship Browder misses the greater 
picture of state interaction in transboundary water governance, and to a certain 
extent excludes the fact that regional cooperation can be achieved regardless of 
country’s hydraulic position (which is very much evidenced by the current 
hydropower development plan in the Mekong). 
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linkages between national-regional decision-making in transboundary water 
governance, how these linkages are shaped by the national-level decision-making 
reality and framework, and how these linkages influence the overall process of 
problem definition at both regional and national level.  
This article attempts to go beyond state-focused analyses of transboundary waters to 
include the role of international players and the implications of state level 
bureaucratic infighting. It investigates the prominent role played by international 
donors in designing the regional decision-making landscape within the Mekong River 
Commission (MRC) and compares it to the existing decision-making logic of formal 
national-level government institutions within the four countries of the Lower Mekong 
Basin. In doing so, it attempts to provide a better understanding of the role of the 
state in transboundary water governance by disaggregating the different elements of 
the state and bringing to light individual state’s multiple and sometimes conflicting 
interests. The results suggest that river basin institutions would be better positioned 
to represent people’s development aspirations, or better equipped to broaden what 
Molle (2005) argues as their ‘narrow path to influence’ when they are better 
connected to the decision-making reality at the national level.4  
We focus here on the development of complex relations in transboundary water 
governance practices, and thus do not limit our analysis of transboundary decision-
making processes to its formal/legal context only (in the form of formal agreement, 
legal documents and official reports). As part of our study we synthesize key actors’ 
positions and their diverse, sometimes conflicting perceptions of national-regional 
development linkages.  At regional level, these key actors consist of both 
international and riparian staff of the MRC Secretariat in Vientiane, officials of the 
National Mekong Committees (NMCs) from the four Lower Mekong Basin countries, 
and prominent international donors (such as the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, the Swedish International Development Agency/SIDA, and the Australian 
Agency for International Development/AusAid). The World Bank has long played an 
important role in shaping MRC program components, in particular through its Water 
Utilization Program (WUP) and, currently, through the Mekong IWRM program, in 
collaboration with ADB and AusAid. Similarly, SIDA can be considered as one of 
MRC’s major donors. Together with Danish International Development Agency 
(DANIDA), SIDA provides funding for MRC Basin Development Program and Fisheries 
Program.  
At the national level, we approached relevant sector ministries in each of the four 
countries. In the Lao PDR, we examined the structural problem of the formation of 
an inter-ministerial/cross-sectoral coordination body through our interviews with key 
actors from both the Water Resources Environment Administration (WREA) -the 
agency assigned with the coordination task- and the more established, prominent 




4 The critical hydropolitics perspective (Sneddon and Fox 2006) argues that 
transboundary water governance should not be monopolized by state actors, but 
should ensure the inclusion of aspirations and opinions of non-state actors living in 
the basin. Yet, critical hydropolitics literature seems to assume that centralized 
decision making in river basin institutions stems from the integration of state 
ministries and agencies at the national level (Miller and Hirsch 2003). 
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sector ministries such as the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the 
newly formed Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM). From these interviews, we 
learned that sector ministry’s ability to resist WREA’s coordination role is rooted in 
their sectoral decision-making authority, rather than in their bureaucratic 
establishment as such.5  In Cambodia, we focused our interviews on key actors from 
the Fishery Administration, taking into account the sector’s importance in the 
country’s water resources development as well as for the region’s capture fisheries 
resources.  
In Vietnam, we synthesize the implications of bureaucratic competition for 
transboundary decision making from our interviews with key actors from Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE) and Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) focusing on their overlapping bureaucratic domains. In 
Thailand we focused our interviews with key actors from the Electricity Generation 
Authority of Thailand (EGAT) and Royal Irrigation Department (RID). The former 
plays an important role in shaping the region’s waterscape with regard to 
hydropower development. The latter plays an important role in promoting the idea of 
inter-basin water transfer in the region, and to a certain extent in pointing to the 
need to formulate water allocation rules at transboundary level (Molle and Floch, 
2008). In addition, we also include opinions and insights of prominent civil society 
groups and non-governmental organizations in the region to strengthen our overall 
analysis. 
To demonstrate that the current scalar disconnect in transboundary water 
governance of the Mekong is partially rooted in the institutional discrepancy between 
regional and national decision-making landscape, we first highlight how 
organizational structure of the Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS) was 
designed towards the application of IWRM concept, how this design requires the 
establishment of a well-functioning inter-ministerial/cross-sectoral platform at 
national level, and how the MRC attempts to fulfill and fails to do so in section 2. In 
section 3, we show that the current institutional set-up to manage transboundary 
water resources at the regional level as reflected in the organizational structure of 
the MRCS and how this is duplicated into the National Mekong Committee Secretariat 
(NMCS) does not comply with the national-level decision-making landscape, reality, 
and the logic behind it. We argue that current failure to coordinate sector ministries’ 
development activities at the national level is rooted in the fact that such 
coordination is entangled with the issue of regulation, which involves reshaping of 
bureaucratic power relationship between the different ministries. In section 4, the 
current deadlock in transboundary water governance of the Mekong is then put into 
the context of these two scalar disconnects, both vertically (between MRC and 
national government bureaucracies) and horizontally (between different sector 
ministries at national level) to show that donors’ tendencies to impose their 
development idea into the MRC has not yielded to donors’ power to influence 
national-level decision-making processes. In the concluding section, we reflect on 




5 Unlike MEM, WREA has been less successful in developing its bureaucratic 
importance, despite the fact that WREA was formed only one year later after MEM. 
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lessons learned from transboundary water governance in the Mekong and their 
broader significance for river basin institutions worldwide.  
2. The Mekong River Commission and international donors’ interests in 
IWRM   
In this section, we illustrate the way the Mekong River Commission Secretariat 
(MRCS) organizational structure and activities are set up through program-based 
approach, derived primarily from international donors’ interests towards the 
application of IWRM concept.  We describe MRC’s strategy to address the issue of 
cross-sectoral coordination at national level through the shaping of the national 
consultation meetings as an embryo of inter-ministerial/cross-sectoral decision-
making platform and how it fails to do so.  
The formation of a river basin institution as a platform for regional cooperation in the 
Mekong dates back to 1957 with the establishment of the Mekong Committee (MC) 
under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
Pacific (UN-ESCAP). In 1995, following the signing of the Mekong Agreement, the MC 
was transformed into the Mekong River Commission (MRC).6 Like the MC, the MRC 
comprised of the governments of Lao PDR, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
Institutionally, the MRC is added with a policy-making body, the Council, which 
comprised of four members at the level of a minister from the four countries. Under 
the Council, there is the Joint Committee (JC) which acts as the operational decision-
making body at the MRC. JC members are comprised of director generals from the 
respective ministries. In addition, the MRC has its Secretariat (MRCS) as its 
technical, operational unit, which consists of different programs funded by different 
international donors and run by both international and riparian staff. Outside the 
organizational structure of the MRC, there is the National Mekong Committees 
(NMCs) that supposed to link MRC’s regional programs with sectoral ministries’ 
development plans and policies at the national level. Like the MRC, in its day-to-day 
operation, each NMC is equipped with a secretariat (NMCS) whose role is to discuss 
regional development plans with different/relevant sectoral ministries at the national 
level. At present, the NMCs have their secretariat located in their respective Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), with the exception of Lao PDR, 
where the Lao NMC has been recently incorporated into the Water Resources 
Environment Administration (WREA). 
The United States’s withdrawal from the MRC and shifted international development 
trend in water resources management towards sustainable development as raised by 
the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) and convened by 
the United Nations in 1983 result in MRC’s changing role as envisioned by its donors. 
Unlike before, the MRC relied primarily on European donors (such as the 
governments of Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
France), Australia and the World Bank for its program.7  These donors placed greater 




6 See Radosevich (1995) on negotiation process concerning this organizational 
transformation. 
7 Though diverse in their approach and mode of operations, these donors shared 
common characteristics in the way they perceived the MRC as their organizational 
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emphasis on the application of IWRM concept as the foundation of MRC’s 
organizational functioning, focusing on environmental aspect of development, rather 
than on the region’s development potential (in terms of irrigation, hydropower, 
navigation and flood protection).8  This focus on environment became evident from 
the inclusion of the concept of sustainable development in the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement and the formation of the Environmental Program (EP) as one of the 
MRC’s cross-cutting programs in 2001 (Jacobs 2002). The program included 
environmental monitoring and assessment, water quality studies, as well as studies 
on aquatic ecosystems. Besides, following the signing of the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement, hydropower program was abolished at the MRC and only reestablished 
and became active in 2007 with the channeling of funds from the Government of 
Finland and Japan. MRC’s re-involvement in hydropower development is driven 
primarily by the rapid speed of development in the sector (due to the increasing role 
played by the private sectors) (Middleton et al. 2009). At the same time, the 
Fisheries Program (FP), (especially capture fisheries research) received greater 
attention from international donors, in relation to its role in sustaining the river’s rich 
biodiversity and later with regard to its role in ensuring the region’s food security. 
Under the MRC IWRM application is focused on international donors’ effort to 
preserve the environment within the context of sustainable development. 
Donors’ changing perception towards development reshaped their strategies in 
promoting regional development and how they perceive MRC’s role in it (MRC Annual 
Report, 1996, 1995). In line with this change donors attempt to reshape MRC’s role 
from a development agent (to channel donor funds to the country) to become more 
of a regional body that promotes sustainable development and a regional knowledge 
centre that promotes information sharing and knowledge accumulation in the field of 
water resources management through the application of IWRM concept.9  
MRC’s changing role as envisioned by its donors is reflected in the MRCS/NMCS 
organizational structure. Following the formation of the MRC in 1995, international 
donors shifted their development focus from national projects implementation 
towards the establishment of regional research programs. This shift was evident with 




means to promote their idea of development in the region (notes from International 
Donor Meeting in Vientiane, 19 June 2009). 
8 During the Mekong Committee IWRM approach had been applied primarily in 
relation to proposed/planned basin-wide development (with regard to irrigation, 
hydropower, flood protection) (Mekong Committee Annual Report, 1961). Similarly, 
attention to social and environment impact of development was already given during 
the Mekong Committee era (see the report on economic and social aspects of lower 
Mekong development prepared by the Ford Foundation mission in 1962). However, 
these aspects received a much greater emphasis within the MRC. 
9 In practice, however, one could argue that MRC’s organizational perspective has 
not changed much apart from the fact that its development role is now taken over by 
national budgets and private companies. Nevertheless, with this projection in mind, 
donors’ effort is focused on strengthening the different programs at the MRC 
Secretariat, and less on how these programs can eventually be implemented at the 
national level. 
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the introduction of Basin Development Program (BDP), Environment Program (EP), 
Information and Knowledge Management Program (IKMP), and Integrated Capacity 
Building Program (ICBP) as MRC’s cross-cutting programs in 2000 (MRC Strategic 
Plan 2001). Prior to 2000, MRCS was comprised of different project activities 
(ranging from policy and planning, irrigation rehabilitation, watershed assessment, 
reservoir fisheries, flood forecast, to capacity building), funded by different 
international donors, formulated and implemented separately from each other.10 One 
major consequence of this transitional approach from ‘project’ to ‘program’ is the 
fact that development funds from donors are allocated primarily to support MRCS 
research programs focusing on regional water management issues, with sectoral 
ministries receiving only a small portion of the funds. 11 Unlike before, where the MC 
played an important role in ensuring development fund channeling to the country in 
the form of planning, studies, but most importantly also in the form of concrete 
project implementation, at present donors primarily channel their funds to MRCS 
programs with limited interest for projects at the country level12.  
With the transition from ‘project’ to ‘program’ approach, MRC activities are designed 
referring to the programmatic classification of its secretariat. As shown in figure 1, 
the MRC Secretariat (MRCS) comprised of different programs divided into four 
divisions: Environment, Planning, Technical Support, and Operations with each 
country’s representative positioned as a division head. Each program is led by a 
regional program coordinator (riparian staff) and a chief technical advisor 
(international staff). Similarly, the way NMCS’ role was designed to support MRCS 
work and act as its organizational links to consult and to a certain extent translate its 
program components into the national level, rather than to represent sector 
ministries’ development interests at the regional level NMCS is reflected in the 
duplication of NMCS organizational structure. The duplication is most apparent in the 
case of the Lao National Mekong Committee Secretariat (LNMCS) (figure 1). 
 




10 In practice, the transitional approach from project to program does not 
automatically result in integration of project activities within one program especially 
when funding for these projects came from different donors.    
11 Having said this, recently donors such as the World Bank have started to link 
regional studies with country-level project implementation in the Mekong Integrated 
Water Resources Management (M-IWRM) program. 
12 This does not mean, however, that donor could not channel their funds directly to 
the country through bilateral agreement as conditioned by the current political 
system in the region used to be absent in the past. 
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LNMCS  
Figure 1: Overview of MRCS and LNMCS organizational structure 
 
The way the National Mekong Committee Secretariat (NMCS) organizational role is 
designed to translate MRCS program activities to national ministries assumes that a 
well-functioning inter-ministerial/cross-sectoral decision-making platform does exist 
or could be set up at national level regardless of the political aspects in IWRM 
concept and how sectoral ministries actually perceive the need for integration in the 
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first place. International donors and MRCS staff expected the NMCS not only to 
link/consult MRC’s cross-cutting program components to relevant sectoral 
ministries13 during the national consultation meetings, but also intended to shape, by 
design or by default, the role of these meetings as an inter-ministerial decision-
making forum at national level. Unlike before when the national consultation 
meetings14 acted as a forum for NMCS staff to consult and discuss MRCS (sector-
based) project activities with particular sectoral ministry, at present, the 
programmatic classification of the MRCS requires NMCS staff to compile sectoral 
ministries’ development plans and coordinate their development activities if MRCS 
program activities are supposed to capture cross-sectoral development interests and 
linkages at national level. This requirement is most apparent with regard to MRCS 
cross-cutting programs. For instance, the formulation of basin development plan by 
the BDP requires participation and involvement from different sectoral ministries 
(with regard to irrigation, fisheries, hydropower, industry, trade, and planning). 
Similarly, EP’s component on river health monitoring requires cooperation with other 
sectoral ministries (such as the Ministry of Industry, Ministry of Energy and Mines, 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry) next to the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE).  
In practice, however, as donors’ current efforts are focused on designing MRCS 
program activities following the basic principles of IWRM concept regardless of 
sectoral ministries’ development interests, sectoral ministries fail to see how they 
can benefit from their relationship and interaction with the NMCs during the national 
consultation meetings.15 As mentioned by the National Mekong Committee 




13 This includes all existing sector ministries which have water-related development 
activities. The exact composition of these ministries varies in each country. In Lao 
PDR in particular, it includes Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry or MAF (particularly 
Department of Irrigation but not limited to it); Ministry of Energy and Mines (MEM); 
Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI); Water Resources Environment 
Administration (WREA); Ministry of Public Works (MPW) and Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MIT). In Vietnam, it includes Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment 
(MoNRE); Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD); Ministry of 
Industry and Trade (MIT); and Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). In 
Cambodia this includes Ministry of Environment (MoE); Ministry of Industry Mining 
and Energy (MIME); Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (MAFF); Ministry of 
Water Resources (MoWRAM); and Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI). In 
Thailand, it includes Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment or MoNRE (the 
Department of Water Resources in particular); Royal Irrigation Department (RID); 
Ministry of Energy; and Ministry of Public Works (MPW). 
14 The national consultation meetings as a forum to coordinate and link regional 
development initiatives with national-level development plans already existed back in 
1957 following the formation of the Mekong Committee during the same year. 
15 In general, MRCS program activities are focused on regional research which does 
not necessarily capture or include country’s development interest into it. The way the 
Fisheries Program focuses its research on capture fisheries, vis-à-vis country’s 
interest in aquaculture can be used as an example here. Similarly, study on multiple 
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Secretariat staff from Cambodia: “At present NMCS found it very difficult to arrange 
the national consultation meeting because the meeting could not give any tangible 
benefit to sector ministries” (interview with CNMCS staff, October 2009).  
 
Our interviewees at the MRCS and NMCSs as well as sectoral ministries consistently 
reported that in most cases, key decision-makers from sectoral ministries will not 
join the national consultation meeting. As stated by key informant from the MRCS: “ 
Sectoral ministries’ lack of interest to attend the national consultation meeting is 
made obvious by the fact that  they  send their least experienced and junior staff to 
one consultation meeting after the others, regardless of the meeting’s agenda” 
(interview with MRCS staff, September 2009). Though present at the meeting, these 
junior staff can hardly represent the position and development point of view of the 
sectoral ministries. As expressed by NMCS staff from Vietnam: “In some cases, these 
staff did not even know what the meeting is all about, even after elaborate 
explanation from NMCS/MRCS staff” (interview with VNMCS staff, June, 2009). 16 
Hence, in general, the consultation meeting will be led and dominated mainly by the 
national program coordinator (NMCS staff), with limited or no involvement from the 
sectoral ministries staff.  
In turn, the national program coordinator will arrange his/her country’s approval for 
MRCS program activities mainly through their personal relationship with key decision 
makers at the sector ministries, or directly with the representative in the Joint 
Committee, regardless of the points discussed during the national consultation 
meeting. In this context, one country’s approval of MRCS program seems to be 
rooted in whether or not the country can tolerate donors’ development agenda, 
rather than based on the motivation to translate and implement the program 
activities at the national level. A country would in most cases approve MRCS 
program activities as long as these activities do not threaten their national 
development interests. However, when the country realized that the activities could 
potentially disturb their national development objectives, they would then use the 
national consultation meeting as their means to halt the effort. This strategy is most 
apparent in the way LNMC and CNMC postponed national consultation meeting, and 
thus delayed MRC’s most recent effort on conducting Strategic Environment 
Assessment (SEA) for the 11 mainstream dams in the Mekong. 
3. National-level bureaucratic landscape as an integral part of 
transboundary water governance 
In this section we argue that the existing bureaucratic complexity at the national 
level, on the one hand, and the simplified donor-driven regional design of the MRCS, 
on the other, are the main factors hampering the National Mekong Committees’ 




benefits of paddy field as promoted by the Agriculture Irrigation and Forestry 
Program does not reflect country’s agricultural policy towards agricultural 
intensification and irrigation expansion. 
16 Hence, MRCS staff often referred them as meeting ‘decoration’ rather than 
meeting participants. 
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abilities to fulfill their coordination roles. The first part of the section discusses the 
fact that the designed role of the National Mekong Committees as MRC’s key linkage 
to sectoral ministries does not fit the existing bureaucratic logic and decision-making 
reality at the national level. After that we highlight the structural problem in the 
formation of inter-ministerial coordination body, illustrated by the bureaucratic 
challenges faced by the recently formed Water Resources Environment 
Administration (WREA) in fulfilling its coordination role vis-à-vis sector ministries’ 
interests to sustain their sectoral decision-making authority in Lao PDR. In the end of 
the section we discuss how bureaucratic competition and fragmentation shaped 
NMCs’ functioning and their organizational characteristics.   
 
3.1. National consultation meetings vis-à-vis national-level decision-making 
landscape and reality 
The way the MRC attempts to address the issue of cross-sectoral coordination in 
IWRM application through the reshaping of the role of the national consultation 
meetings does not coincide with the logic behind the current absence of sectoral 
integration at national level, and thus the fact that individual sectoral ministry’s 
development goal in the four LMB countries is rooted in their bureaucratic interests 
to sustain their sectoral decision-making authority rather than to transfer this 
authority to NMCs or any other government agencies assigned with the coordination 
task.  
As shown in figure 2, water resources management in the four LMB countries is 
hardly a domain of one particular ministry.  
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Figure 2: Overview of bureaucratic actors in water resources management in the four 
LMB countries. 
Source: Challenge Program for Water and Food workshop in Vientiane, 4-6 May 
2009.  
 
In theory, from the perspective of IWRM as a ‘neutral’ management concept (refer to 
donors’ report), this should not pose a problem to NMCs’ coordination efforts. In 
reality, however, the establishment of an inter-ministerial coordination body is often 
overlapped with the issue of regulation. The establishment of ministries for the 
natural/water resources and environment is frequently associated with the principle 
of setting up a governmental body in charge of regulation. Regulation is supposed to 
embody principles of fairness, environmental sustainability, and economic 
soundness. In principle, sector ministries and their activities associated with social 
and environmental impacts, should be regulated by an independent body. This task 
is generally entrusted (or is expected to be so in principle) to the ministry of 
natural/water resources and environment. Not surprisingly, this creates conflicts 
between ministries for natural/water resources and environment and sector 
ministries (see illustration in next section). Regulation obviously involves overall 
restructuring of the power relationships between the different sector ministries. In 
order to regulate sector ministries’ development plans, one needs a real authority as 
on how to regulate their role in water resources management in the first place. In 
this context, the authority to regulate becomes something that generates heavy 
bureaucratic infighting. The implication of such competition is that the coordination 
role of the NMCs, which come under ministries for natural/water resources and 
environment, is not well accepted things its frontier with regulation is unclear.  
Formally, sectoral ministries have representatives in the National Mekong 
Committees. In the case of Vietnam NMC, four (sectoral) ministries are 
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represented17. Yet, this formal membership did not automatically result in the 
VNMC’s ability to coordinate sector ministries development activities in accordance 
with the MRCS program as it lacks the authority to regulate. As expressed by NMC 
staff from Cambodia: “NMCs cannot (re)direct sector ministries’ development 
activities as their role is only to coordinate. Yet, it is very difficult to coordinate 
sector ministries’ development activities when they also lack decision-making 
authority at the inter-ministerial level” (interview with CNMC staff, October 2009).  
Similarly, the Joint Committee’s (JC) and the Council’s approval of MRCS program 
components does not mean that these components are in line with sector ministries’ 
development interests. Lacking the power to regulate, the JC and the Council hardly 
function as an inter-ministerial decision-making platform, despite the fact that 
(sector) ministries are formally represented within both the JC and the Council.   
Moreover, NMCs’ coordination role is challenged by bureaucratic competition between 
sectoral ministries, regardless of how these ministries view the coordination role of 
the NMCs.18 Bureaucratic competition19 between sector ministries takes place in 
terms of decision-making territory and access to development funds. The very idea 
of inter-ministerial coordination does not coincide with the general interest of 
government bureaucracy to sustain the status-quo, where each ministry’s decision-
making authority is defined based primarily on its sectoral role and where 
distribution of funds to each sector ministry has been prearranged nationally, as well 
as through each ministry’s relations with international donors.  
3.2. WREA formation and the structural impediment in establishing inter-
ministerial coordination bodies 
The issue of regulation as the structural problem in establishing inter-ministerial 
coordination bodies becomes most apparent in the way the Water Resources 
Environment Administration (WREA) struggles to fulfill its designed coordination role.  
Following the formation20 of WREA in 2007, the Lao National Mekong Committee 




17 These ministries are: Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI), Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment (MoNRE), Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MARD) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA). 
18 For Lao PDR in particular, ADB’s effort to form a national-level river basin 
organization through its Nam Ngum River Basin project has not yielded any result in 
terms of promoting an inter-ministerial decision-making platform. Until now, Lao PDR 
still does not have any river basin organization, though ADB is planning to fund the 
second phase of the project. 
19 Goldensohn (1994) defines this bureaucratic competition as sectoral egoism, in 
which each sector ministry concerns primarily with its own sectoral development 
perspective and goal and views cross-sectoral coordination as potential threat for 
their sectoral decision-making authority. 
20 WREA formation was primarily driven by both the ADB and the UN under the 
context of Governance and Public Administration Reform (GPAR) program (ref). With 
this merger the LNMC Secretariat staff was used to fill different vacant positions in 
WREA, and the Secretariat was left with only 5 staff. 
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(LNMC) was incorporated into its Department of Water Resources (DWR). 
Consequently, LNMC’s role to coordinate sector ministries’ involvement in relation to 
MRCS program shifted to WREA or to be precise, to the DWR. From the MRC’s point 
of view, WREA formation could potentially serve as inter-ministerial coordination 
body, and thus as its regional-national development linkages21. In practice, the 
formation of WREA did not automatically result in the establishment of an inter-
ministerial decision-making platform or better coordination on water resources 
management among sectoral ministries. Currently, WREA is struggling to define its 
role in water resources management, vis-à-vis sector ministries’ interest to retain 
their sectoral decision-making authority. Formally, the WREA role was to coordinate 
water resources management at a national level, through its interaction with sectoral 
ministries such as the Ministry of Energy and Mining (MEM) with regard to planning 
hydropower development, Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) with regard to the 
treatment of industrial waste, as well as with the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
(MAF) with regard to agricultural (including livestock and fishery) and irrigation 
development. In practice, none of these sector ministries has actual working 
relationships with the WREA apart from their involvement in meeting/discussion 
forums arranged by the WREA to formulate its water resources development policy22.  
Further, parallel to this formulation, the Department of Irrigation (DoI) under MAF is 
formulating its new irrigation sub-sector strategies as a means to protect itself from 
WREA’s potential domination. Like WREA’s water resources policy strategy, the 
irrigation sub-sector strategy23 adopts a broader approach to water resources 
management, not limited to irrigation. Likewise, planning of hydropower 
development and mining rests with MEM, with little influence of WREA.  
 
WREA’s inability to counteract sector ministries’ interests in sustaining their decision-
making authority became evident in the way WREA’s role in formally approving 
Environment Impact Assessment (EIA) submitted by sector ministries has been 
reduced to a merely a bureaucratic formality. With reference to the Environment Law 
of 1999 (which is now under revision), sector ministries are expected to conduct an 
EIA for their proposed and planned development activities. Prior to WREA formation, 
sector ministries were entitled to approve their own EIAs. With the formation of 
WREA, sector ministries are required to submit EIAs to WREA to be reviewed prior to 




21 In practice, the formation of WREA removed the confusion over which ministry 
should be included in the MRCS BDP program. 
22 This policy is scheduled to be finalized at the end 2010 and will clarify WREA’s role 
in water resources development vis-à-vis other sector ministries. The ongoing 
formulation process of WREA’s water resources development policy reflects WREA’s 
position with respect to other sector ministries that may be in question. 
23 With reference to this sub-sector strategy, the DoI would enhance its connection 
with other sector ministries (such as with the Ministry of Energy and Mining 
especially on multi-purpose reservoirs for hydropower and irrigation; the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade in creating markets for agriculture product; and the land 
management authority) as a strategy to improve irrigated agriculture and irrigation 
development in general. 
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their approval. In practice, however, WREA has the tendency to approve the EIAs 
reviewed by sector ministries regardless of quality. Following the submission of EIAs, 
WREA would arrange a meeting with relevant sector ministries to discuss them. Yet, 
in general, everyone seemed to have a common agreement and understanding that 
the EIA should be approved as soon as possible so that it would not delay the 
planned/proposed development. As said by a consultant involved in EIAs approval 
process: “Both WREA and sector ministries are obliged to do an EIA as it is part of 
the formal procedure to proceed with the proposed development. However, the way 
they conduct the EIA reveals how it has become a symbolic exercise to get the 
needed certificate to withdraw the money” (interview with EIA consultant, August 
2009).  
The present situation of granting approval to sub-standard EIAs24 reflects the 
interplay between WREA and sector ministries in their bureaucratic position and 
authority. Projects generate benefits to the bureaucracies in charge, and there is no 
reason why this would stop at the door of WREA. Sector ministries effectively accept 
WREA’s formal responsibility as long as this does not affect their sectoral 
development activities. Similarly, WREA accepts the need to approve sub-standard 
EIAs as long as it maintains its formal role in water resources management.  
This situation is not specific to Laos. Molle and Hoanh (2009) had described the 
bureaucratic struggle between MoNRE and MARD in Vietnam. Bureaucratic struggle 
around the establishment of river basin organizations is linked to the attempts by 
MoNRE to play some role in regulation and to have a say in planning of 
infrastructure. Similarly, in Thailand, the Royal Irrigation Department is at 
loggerheads with the MoNRE. These conflicts obviously have a bearing on the 
capacity of the NMCs to articulate and coordinate national policies and their link with 
the regional level.  
3.3. National Mekong Committees: A coordination body quasi sector 
ministry? 
Lacking power, the NMCs could use access to development funds as their means to 
ensure sector ministries’ compliance towards MRCS program. In practice, however, 
within the organizational context of MRC, the NMCs’ power to channel donor funds to 
sector ministries has been reduced significantly, following donors’ changing approach 
to channeling the funds to the MRCS, rather than to sector ministries in each 
country. In this context, NMCs’ decision-making authority remains marginal, limited 
to its role as a gatekeeper for sectoral projects which have to be made compatible 
with regional agreement.25 Hence, the NMCs are forced to find other alternative 
sources of funding, outside the organizational context of the MRC, to elicit sectoral 
ministries’ compliance. This strategy is rooted in the fact that within the government 




24 In some cases EIA for two different roads in two different provinces (not 
neighboring to each other) are written and formulated in exactly the same language, 
using the same wording. 
25 Apart from donor funds, NMCs received a small amount of budget from both the 
MRCS and governments of the LMB countries for its administrative expenses. Yet, 
this fund could hardly be used as a means of compensating its lack of authority. 
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bureaucracies, access to funding is often perceived as access to decision-making 
authority, and vice versa.26 Yet, to access such funds, the NMCs have to develop 
their role beyond their coordination task, with the risk of under prioritizing the task.  
For instance, LNMC received funding from the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) 
to develop a socio-economic atlas for Lao PDR. In addition, it was the executing 
agency for a World Bank funded study on possible water transfer across the Thai-Lao 
border. Quite surprisingly, LNMC did this study without any connection with the MRC, 
despite the study’s transboundary nature. The LNMC has also implemented an 
embankment protection project with the funding from the government of Belgium. 
Similarly, TNMC is involved in River Basin Organization project at national level, 
while both CNMC and VNMC are involved in different project negotiations between 
donors and sectoral ministries.  Furthermore, NMCs staff often received consultancy 
assignments from sectoral ministries, outside the context of MRC.  
In the end, operating as new bureaucratic bodies, it is no longer clear whose 
bureaucratic interest and development perspective the NMCs represent. For instance, 
in the case of MRC Basin Development Program (BDP), the TNMC’s position on 
hydropower development does not represent the interests of the Electricity 
Generation Authority of Thailand’s (EGAT), the main actor in the sector development. 
Similarly, operating as a coordination body without any power to regulate, NMCs’ 
positions on certain issue is confused by sector ministries’ different and sometimes 
conflicting interests. For example, in the case of MRC Strategic Environment 
Assessment (SEA) for 11 planned hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream, 
CNMC’s position was confused due to the antagonism between the Ministry of 
Industry Energy and Mines’ (MIME) interest in hydropower development and the 
Fisheries Administration’s concerns for fish migration.  
At the organizational level, NMCs’ characteristic as a new bureaucratic agency is also 
evident from the way they use their role in the overall recruitment process of MRCS 
riparian staff as a means to spread their line of patronage, and thus preserve and 
reproduce their bureaucratic existence27. Formally, NMCSs are responsible for the 
first selection process (short-listing the potential candidates) for any available 
position for riparian staff at the MRCS. In practice, this process of short-listing the 
potential candidates is not always conducted based on the candidates’ qualifications. 
Often, a candidate is shortlisted because s/he has good connection with NMCSs staff 
in charge of the selection process. As expressed by MRCS staff: “NMCs often reserve 
certain position for certain candidate they favor without putting much emphasis on 
quality control” (interview with MRCS staff, June 2009). In addition, it was reported 
by MRCS riparian staff: “We have to pay a certain amount of financial contribution to 
the NMCSs. NMCSs will use this contribution to support their operational functioning” 
(interview with MRCS riparian staff, August 2009).  
4. The power to fund and the fallacy of donors’ hegemonic tendencies  




26 At personal level, this bureaucratic logic to acquire access to funding as a means 
to ensure decision-making authority often reflects the practice of bureaucratic 
corruption (see also Suhardiman and Mollinga, 2010).  
27 See also Wade (1982) on the market of public office. 
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In this section, we argue that donors’ ability to provide funding to the MRCS does not 
necessarily result in the shaping of MRC organizational functioning in accordance to 
donors’ development idea/agenda. On the contrary, donors’ tendencies to impose 
their development agenda in the overall shaping of MRCS program component, on 
the one hand, and their inability to ensure the adoption and application of these 
agenda both at regional and national level, on the other, shows donors’ limited 
power to influence vis-à-vis their assumed powerful position as development funds 
provider. Firstly, we highlight donors’ hegemonic tendencies in the overall shaping of 
the MRCS program design as well as the Secretariat’s dependency towards donors’ 
funds. Secondly, we bring to light MRC’s marginal role in shaping transboundary 
water governance of the Mekong as a result of current scalar disconnect of and 
institutional discrepancy between regional and national-level decision-making 
processes and framework.   
Donors’ hegemonic tendencies in the overall shaping of the MRCS program 
component are reflected in the way certain aspects of transboundary water 
governance in the Mekong are distinguished as issues and non-issues based on 
donors’ development idea. This strategy is most apparent from the way the funding 
for hydropower development was halted (even after the formulation of the 1994 
hydropower master plan) when donors perceived it as a threat for the region’s 
biodiversity and livelihoods, and focused on capture fisheries research instead. In 
this context, but for a short period only, hydropower development became a non-
issue, as environment protection grew in prominence. Similarly, the overall content 
of the Basin Development Program (BDP) and Environment Program (EP) very much 
resembles donors’ development perspective on integrated water resources 
management, biodiversity, wetlands preservation and environmental monitoring as 
perceived by the majority of MRCS riparian staff. Though one could argue that the 
current format of the BDP is rather developmentalist (which in itself reflects 
countries’ resistance to donors’ environmental focus), the fact that the countries and 
the MRCS undertook the whole BDP exercise knowing that there was little chance 
that donors would agree on the same magnitude of development activities as 
proposed earlier in the 1970 Indicative Basin Plan, shows that this exercise remains 
rooted in donors’ commitment to have the MRC produce a basin development plan 
for the Mekong, rather than in the countries’ motivation and need.  
Donors’ hegemonic tendencies in the overall shaping of MRCS program are somehow 
justified by the MRC Secretariat’s dependency towards donor funds for its overall 
functioning. MRCS staff opted for a top-down approach, where development 
proposals were formulated by a limited number of people (mostly international staff 
and consultants), who were familiar with donors and their development frames. In 
this way, it is easier for them to secure funding primarily to be allocated to the 
Secretariat (mainly for regional research purposes), than when they have to 
approach each sectoral ministry in the four LMB countries to consult them about the 
proposal formulation in the first place. In the words of one of MRCS staff: “If each 
sector ministry would have to deliver its own development proposal at the country 
level, they would have come with very different development ideas. Similarly, each 
country would have come with a different set of development approaches due to 
their different development stages. In this context, the formulation of development 
proposals would have not been cost effective from the MRCS staff’s point of view” 
(interview with MRCS staff, July 2009).  
In practice, almost fifteen years after its formation, the MRC still lacks any basin 
development plan, as envisioned by its donors. MRCS program activities have limited 
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if no actual significance in influencing the overall water resources development 
direction at the country level.28 This limitation was consistently acknowledged by 
both international and riparian staff of the MRCS. As stated by one MRCS riparian 
staff: “There is no ownership from the countries towards concepts and programs 
introduced and proposed by donors as the program was designed without taking into 
account how the four countries will cope with it and whether (or not) the countries 
perceive it to be useful to adopt the idea” (interview with MRCS staff, April, 2009). 
This problem of lack of ownership is also acknowledged by MRCS international staff. 
As expressed by one of them: “Until today donors continued to pay the salaries of 
the field staff who monitor the water level along the river. Riparian countries refused 
to pay the staff salary because they perceive the data measurement as something 
that is requested by donors or the MRCS rather than something that is needed or 
demanded by the countries” (interview with MRCS staff, April, 2009).  
At the program level, the possibility for the development scenarios formulated by 
MRC Basin Development Program (BDP) to be used by sector ministries in the four 
countries depends highly on whether it could incorporate and synergize different 
sector ministries’ development perspectives. Further, it is unclear how countries see 
the role of MRC Integrated Knowledge Management Program (IKMP) in promoting 
knowledge sharing when data collection is driven primarily by donors’ development 
idea rather than focused on countries’ needs. As stated by an official from 
Department of Irrigation in Lao PDR: “We do not know why MRCS always asked 
sectoral ministries staff to collect all kind of data and for what purpose” (interview 
with official from Department of Irrigation in Lao PDR, September 2009). Similarly, it 
is unclear how MRC Environment Program (EP) components can be translated into 
sector ministries’ development activities, bearing in mind its highly technical and 
environment-focused character. As expressed by one MRCS staff: “Riparian staff and 
sector ministries could hardly understand how and why they should apply theoretical 
concept such as environmental flows in the Mekong. When donors and international 
consultants talked about the need to maintain a minimum flow in the Mekong 
mainstream, the countries questioned how this minimum flow can be measured in 
the first place” (interview with MRCS staff, June 2009). In addition, the question 
remains whether the Fisheries Program’s (FP) strategy to ensure sector ministries’ 
involvement in its program components (by including sector ministries’ development 
interests in aquaculture next to donors’ interest in capture fisheries research) can be 
considered as successful, bearing in mind that these two program components are 
running in parallel, rather than complimentary to each other.  
In recent years, the MRC’s role in shaping transboundary water governance in the 
Mekong became even more marginalized by the emerging importance of 
development banks, construction firms, and other private companies. For instance, 
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) introduced in 1992 the concept of Greater 




28 This is consistent with the findings of Dore and Lazarus (2009) who illustrate 
MRC’s marginal role by presenting cases in which countries evidently shaped 
transboundary water management in the Mekong through bilateral agreements 
outside the context of the MRC. 
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Mekong Sub-region (GMS) to move even beyond the basin level.29 Focusing on the 
need to establish sub-regional economic cooperation (generally through but not 
limited to infrastructure development) the initiative gained momentum during the 
late 1990s/early 2000s. The way the ADB GMS initiative sidelines the MRC’s role in 
transboundary water governance is most apparent from its current effort to 
formulate a regional power trade network, focusing on hydropower development in 
the region (RETA 6440). Based on the interconnectivity approach (that is, to connect 
power producer to consumer) the ADB’s regional power trade plan indirectly favors 
the construction of 11 planned hydropower dams on the Mekong mainstream as the 
most effective means, from an engineering point of view, to promote economic 
growth in the region, regardless of the outcomes of MRC Strategic Environment 
Assessment. Similarly, the emerging importance of private developers in the region 
does not leave MRC or its donors with much room to influence the actual shaping of 
transboundary waterscape (Middleton et al. 2009). Financially self-sufficient, these 
developers can collaborate with national governments to conduct all forms of 
development (hydropower, mining, industry) at the country level, regardless of 
whether or not such projects will have any transboundary effects to any specific 
country or to the region as a whole. As an example of the magnitude of this activity, 
there are now 110 hydropower dams planned, under license or under construction 
with private investment/single government partnership (MRC report 2009a), in 
contrast to the only 28 which have been notified under the auspices of the MRC (MRC 
report 2009b).  
Conclusions 
Our analysis of donors’ prominent role in shaping MRC’s agenda but yet their limited 
influence in transboundary water governance of the Mekong leads to two important 
findings related to IWRM and transboundary management of the Mekong. Firstly, the 
notion of cross-sectoral coordination embodied in the IWRM concept is entangled 
with the issue of regulation at national level. In essence, reshaping of the existing 
bureaucratic power structure would be required if IWRM were to be implemented as 
conceived. However, such restructuring is probably not often considered, as also 
evidenced in the case of the Mekong, where IWRM plans are formulated and 
implemented. Secondly, the current scalar disconnect between national and regional-
level decision-making processes sheds light on the overall logic of transboundary 
water governance in the Mekong. This logic is derived from the way international 
donors and country representatives sustain MRC organizational activities over time 
and preserve the existing institutional discrepancies between national and regional 
decision-making landscape.     
This article highlights the political aspects in integrated water resources management 
and sheds light on existing rules and mechanisms that structurally prevent the 
establishment of a well-functioning inter-ministerial decision-making platform at the 




29 We acknowledge the importance of ADB GMS program in shaping transboundary 
water governance in the Mekong. This article, however, does not include ADB GMS 
initiative into its overall analysis as the current scope and coverage of ADB GMS 
program requires an analysis of its own.    
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national level and its consequences for transboundary water governance. It shows 
the complex relationships between different sectoral ministries, rooted in their 
autonomy to define their own sectoral development plans. As a result, as such that 
coordination across ministries is hardly possible. Furthermore, it highlights the logical 
framework in bureaucratic decision-making processes and how this logic is shaped by 
existing bureaucratic mechanisms, very much ingrained in the interest to gain and 
sustain access to development funds as a means to acquire and sustain bureaucratic 
power (and vice versa), rather than on the need to integrate or coordinate per se.  
In a transboundary setting, the preservation of the missing spatial linkages between 
regional and national-level decision-making processes seems to be related to the 
interest to sustain the current status-quo at the MRC. This interest refers to 
countries’ strategic positioning towards MRC donors, on the one hand, and donors’ 
strategies to use MRC as what Miller and Hirsch call ‘a convenient vehicle for their 
grants and projects’ (Miller and Hirsch 2003), on the other. By tolerating donors’ 
tendencies to impose their development agenda and being aware of donors’ limited 
influence, countries ensure continuous funds channeling to the MRC without risking 
donors’ interference in national projects and programs. Similarly, donors ensure fund 
channeling to the MRC and the adoption of its development idea by the MRC without 
risking either their reputation in the international community or any open conflict 
with the countries, being aware of MRC disconnect from national decision-making 
processes. In this way, donors sustained the long-term role of the MRC as part of 
their envisioned regional decision-making landscape. At the same time, country 
representatives at the MRC sustain their bureaucratic existence within and outside 
the organizational context of the MRC. Focusing on their role as fund providers, 
donors have the tendency to either mix up or camouflage countries’ toleration as 
countries’ acceptance and justify their agenda regardless of whether or not it will fit 
into the existing national decision-making landscape. Similarly, focusing on the 
interest to sustain their bureaucratic existence, country representatives at the MRC 
tend to encourage fund channeling from donors to the MRC regardless of whether or 
not the program that comes with this fund is in line with countries’ development 
perspective. 
Theoretically, the MRC cannot have an agenda that is too different from or 
contradicts the agenda of country members given its formal role as an inter-
governmental body. If the MRC or its donors decide to go in a different direction this 
will result in a tension that will be passed on to the NMCs and make the 
disconnection between MRC’s and country’s development planning even more 
obvious and overtly conflictual. In practice, however, our study and others’ suggest 
that MRC and country members can proceed with their conflicting development plans 
and perpetuate the current missing spatial linkages between the national and 
regional-level decision-making landscape, without displaying this tension in public. 
The MRC focuses its regional research components on research, modeling, and 
impact assessment, regardless of whether or not the national governments want to 
incorporate the result of such work into their decision-making framework. Similarly, 
national governments focus on their development plans regardless of their potential 
transboundary effect, partially dismissing MRC’s role in it. The former is tolerated 
because it does some window dressing drawing on participatory and IWRM rhetoric. 
The latter can proceed because the MRC lacks power to direct transboundary water 
governance issue in the region.   
Current transboundary water governance of the Mekong brings into light the MRC’s 
isolated if not virtual existence. Furthermore, the fact that projects in terms of 
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planning, financing and construction have now largely moved out of the conventional 
donor mechanisms (mainly due to the growing importance of the private sectors) 
suggests a rather dim future for the MRC if it insists in remaining in the same 
organizational development path as it is now. As mentioned earlier, with the 
emerging importance of the private sector, countries no longer depend on 
international donors in order to proceed with their development plans. Consequently, 
MRC donors’ power to negotiate their development agenda in relation to their power 
to provide funds is diminished.   
This does not mean, however, that MRC does not have any potential role in 
transboundary water governance. For example, the issue of water diversion to the 
Isaan region in the Northeast Thailand (Molle and Floch 2008) and the proposed 11 
mainstream dams on the Mekong evidenced that there are still issues which sector 
ministries cannot do away with the MRC.  Hence, current discussions about MRC’s 
role and functioning pointing towards riparianization of its Secretariat should be 
perceived as an opportunity for the riparian nations to question, define and redefine 
MRC’s current role, in accordance with their interests and needs (however complex 
and fragmented these might be). Yet, we are aware of the difficulties to transform 
MRC’s organizational role and function, bearing in mind MRC’s current isolation from 
the wider decision-making networks at the national level, and their likely preference 
for the status quo. 
 
Last but not least, with reference to the principles of aid effectiveness as stated in 
the Paris Declaration (March 2005), experience from the Mekong shows us that the 
fact that donors’ development perceptions have changed over time does not 
necessarily mean that they can enforce either the direction of transboundary water 
governance or the development path of river basin institutions. Hence, donors’ 
access to development funds should not be used as a means to impose donors’ 
development agenda. Rather, donor funding efforts should be linked to the overall 
attempt to fine-tune donors’ development ideas with national development 
strategies, its institutions, and existing (bureaucratic) procedures. 
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Abstract   
This research paper focuses on Cambodia’s Tonle Sap area and its institutional 
setting. The Tonle Sap is, due to its unique flood pulse system and immense 
aquatic production, most likely the single most vulnerable area to the negative 
impacts of major water development plans in the Mekong Basin. Due to its 
remarkable fish production and role as a leveller of the Mekong floods, the 
importance of the Tonle Sap extends far beyond its own basin as well as the 
borders of Cambodia. This, in turn, makes the management of Tonle Sap very 
much a regional issue as well. At the same time the Tonle Sap basin itself is 
seeing increasing plans for development, particularly in terms of irrigation and 
agricultural development. These changes are, together with the existing 
challenges with fisheries management, likely to have an impact to the lake’s 
aquatic production as well. Tonle Sap and its management make therefore a 
particularly important case study both locally and regionally.  
This paper analyses the current institutional setting of water-related management 
and development of the Tonle Sap area, and seeks to recognise possibilities for 
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improvements through utilisation of different water allocation tools1. The paper 
first discusses the overall context as well as current management challenges in 
the Tonle Sap area, including the differing perspectives that the actors at the 
different levels have on Tonle Sap. Following that, the paper looks at how the 
current institutional setting for the area’s management has been developed 
during past 10 years or so. In particular, the study seeks to look at the actual 
driving forces for the differing plans for the management of the area, and to 
discuss why certain management initiatives have ultimately been more successful 
than others.  
Specific focus will be on the planning processes that have aimed at establishing a 
management organisation for the Tonle Sap area. Three most important such 
processes are the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) and its Secretariat, ADB’s 
Tonle Sap Initiative and related plans for the Tonle Sap Basin Management 
Organisation (TSBMO), and the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA).  
Tonle Sap: The heart of the Mekong 
The Tonle Sap Lake, the largest lake in the Mekong and Southeast Asia, lies in 
the central plains of Cambodia. The lake is connected to the Mekong River by the 
120 km long Tonle Sap River. The Tonle Sap ecosystem forms a particularly 
important economic, social and environmental resource for the entire Mekong 
Basin and for Cambodia in particular (see e.g. Bonheur 2001; Bonheur & Lane 
2002; Evans et al. 2004; Poole 2005; Keskinen 2006; Lamberts 2006; Keskinen 
et al. 2007; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007; Sithirith & Grundy-Warr 2007; Tonle Sap 
Biosphere Reserve Secretariat 2007). Well over one million people live in the lake 
and its floodplains, while up to half of Cambodia’s population is estimated to 
benefit directly or indirectly from the lake’s resources both in terms of livelihoods 
and food security (Bonheur 2001).  
 
                                          
 
1 Water allocation is within the PN67 project defined as “formal and informal decision 
processes (and non-decisions) that alter the physical distribution of water, and water-
related rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities”. 
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Figure 1. Tonle Sap Lake and floodplains together with areas reserved for private 
fishing lots (Map by Matti Kummu).   
The Tonle Sap Lake is known for its extraordinary flood pulse system with a 
remarkable but nevertheless relatively regular seasonal variation in the lake’s 
water volume and level (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2003, Lamberts 2006). During the rainy 
season part of the Mekong’s floodwaters flow to the lake, and the water depth in 
the lake rises from mere 1 meter even up to 10 meters. As a result, the lake’s 
surface area quadruples and extends the lake over vast floodplains consisting 
mainly of flooded forests, shrubs and rice fields (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2003). An 
exceptional and highly productive floodplain ecosystem has been formed, and the 
Tonle Sap is believed to be among the world’s most productive freshwater 
ecosystems (Rainboth 1996; Öjendal 2000; Lamberts 2001, 2006). However, 
there is currently very little information available on the actual ecosystem 
productivity of the Tonle Sap, and the available data is particularly ambiguous on 
fisheries and fish catches (Lamberts 2006). Due to these and other information 
gaps (for example on ethnicity and seasonal migration of people), reliable 
monitoring and analysis of on-going social and environmental changes and their 
impacts in the area is challenging. The situation has, however, been improving, 
as the Tonle Sap and its unique flood pulse system is getting more attention 
nationally, regionally and internationally.    
The socio-economic setting of the Tonle Sap area2 is as diverse and unique as its 
flood pulsing system. While people living in the lake and its floodplains have 
adapted to the huge seasonal variation of lake’s water level, they are also deeply 
dependent on the resources that lake and its floodplains provide, including fish as 
well as other aquatic animals and plants. The fisheries management of the Tonle 
Sap is, however, dominated by weak implementation of policies as well as unjust 
practices. When the strong seasonal variation of livelihood sources is combined 
with unequal access to natural resources and fishing areas and remarkable 
governance challenges, it is a little wonder that despite the relative richness of 
area’s natural resources, the Tonle Sap remains as one of Cambodia’s poorest 
areas (Keskinen et al. 2007; Starr 2008). 
Due to its unusual flood pulse system, immense aquatic production and people’s 
strong dependence on water-related natural resources, the Tonle Sap is among 
the most vulnerable areas to major changes in water quantity and quality of the 
Mekong River (see e.g. Kummu and Sarkkula 2008; Lamberts 2008; Keskinen et 
al. In press;). The current plans for water development in the basin –particularly 
in form of large-scale hydropower dams– are estimated to cause remarkable 
hydrological and ecological changes to the lake system. These changes will most 
probably impact negatively the immense fish production of the lake and have 
wide-reaching social and economic consequences, threatening particularly the 
livelihoods of the poorest groups (see e.g. MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007; Kummu & 
Sarkkula 2008, Keskinen et al. In press). In addition to potential upstream 
impacts, the Tonle Sap floodplains are also under pressure from more local 
developments, including plans for large-scale irrigation structures in the 
floodplain and the tributaries (see e.g. Evans et al. 2005; Keskinen et al. 2007).  
Differing perspectives for the Tonle Sap’s management  
Although being among the most vulnerable areas to changes in the Mekong’s 
water flow, the Tonle Sap has only recently got a proper attention in the 
                                          
 
2 Tonle Sap area is in this study defined to consist of the entire lake basin, with specific 
focus on the lake proper and its floodplains located between National Roads 5 and 6. The 
latter area includes parts of six Cambodian provinces, namely Kampong Chhnang, 
Kampong Thom, Pursat, Siem Reap, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey.  
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considerations about water development in the Mekong River Basin. Part of the 
explanation for this is that the existing management systems in the area are 
complex and partly overlapping (Mareth et al. 2001; Sokhem & Sunada 2006; 
Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat 2007). In addition, the number of actors 
working on the Tonle Sap is remarkable, with different actors having very 
differing views and interests on the area and its resources. As noted by one 
researcher well familiar with Tonle Sap: “Tonle Sap has become the most 
contested basin both in Cambodia and Mekong Region” and “At all levels the 
horizontal relationships [between different actors] and feedback mechanisms are 
weak”3. It is therefore no wonder that the Tonle Sap has been lacking a clear 
representative –and, hence, voice– in both national and regional discussions4.  
The institutional arrangements for the Tonle Sap’s management are also closely 
related to the perspectives –local, national, regional and global– that the area is 
looked at. While none of these perspectives is consistent but include different, 
often conflicting dimensions, each one of them also has a certain dimension that 
can be seen to be stronger than others. These are next discussed in more detail 
for the three perspectives that have so far been the most influential in shaping 
the management regimes in the area: National, Regional and International 
perspectives5.  
National perspective: Development and revenue generation 
For the Royal Government of Cambodia and its provincial line agencies, the Tonle 
Sap and its resources have for long been an important source of national 
revenue. As a result, the development of the area has been seen to focus first 
and foremost on resource exploitation (Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat 
2007). The fisheries of Tonle Sap generate remarkable income for the provincial 
and national budgets. Also other uses and resources –particularly agricultural 
development– are considered increasingly important.  
The Tonle Sap’s fish production has been significant already for centuries, 
creating foundation for local livelihoods and food security. It has been estimated 
that up to 82% of all animal protein consumption in Cambodia comes from fish 
and other aquatic animals: a proportion that is considerably higher than in other 
Lower Mekong countries or even in the most countries of the world (Hortle 2007). 
Due to large variety of fishing in Cambodia and the lack of systematic data 
gathering, it is difficult to establish reliable estimates on the actual fish production 
or even fish catches. Currently the estimates for the Tonle Sap’s annual fish catch 
are somewhere between 175’00 – 250’000 tons (Lieng and Van Zalinge 2001; 
Van Zalinge et al. 2000; Baran 2005).  
In addition to crucial nutritional value, fish is socially and economically very 
important to Cambodia. Establishing the total economic value of fish catches is 
difficult, and the exclusion of the subsistence fish catch from the monetary 
estimates is likely to lead underestimations (Van Zalinge et al. 2000). 
Nevertheless, the value of Cambodia’s annual inland fish production (290’000-
430’000 tons) at a landing site has been estimated to be between US$150 and 
US$200 million (Van Zalinge et al. 2000; FACT & EJF 2001). This value is 
                                          
 
3 Personal email correspondence (March 2010): a Cambodian researcher having a long-
term experience from the Tonle Sap 
4 This has also led to confusion and even misunderstandings about the characteristics of 
the lake and its resources. For example, the understanding of the lake’s unique flood pulse 
system and the drivers for its aquatic production is –despite their importance for millions 
of people– still vague.     
5 There naturally do exist also different forms of local management bodies related e.g. to 
use and management of water, fishing areas, and forests (see e.g. Evans et al. 2004; 
Middleton & Tola 2008). 
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estimated to increase in the processing and marketing chain to somewhere 
between US$250 to US$600 million (Van Zalienge et al. 2000; EIC 2007). In 
comparison, the total monetary gross value of paddy rice in Cambodia has been 
estimated to be between US$500-600 million (EIC 2007).  
Due to the remarkable economic importance of fish, the management of the 
Tonle Sap has at the national level traditionally been considered first and 
foremost as the management of fisheries. Consequently, for central and 
provincial governments, the Tonle Sap appears chiefly a space for exploitation 
and revenue generation – particularly through fisheries, but increasingly also 
through other resources such as agricultural land, forests and even oil6 (Evans et 
al. 2004; People’s Daily Online 2007; Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat 
2007).  
The institutional arrangements related to the Tonle Sap’s management have 
therefore been framed so that the Fisheries Administration under the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) has been the key governmental 
institution in the Tonle Sap. The Fisheries Administration has a remarkable control 
over the entire lake-floodplain area, and in the fishing lots7 in particular. At the 
same time there are naturally several other governmental institutes involved in 
the area, including the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (focusing on 
agriculture, forests), the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology (focusing 
on water-related development, including large-scale irrigation structures and 
dams), and the Ministry of Environment and the related Tonle Sap Biosphere 
Reserve Secretariat (focusing on biodiversity conservation).  
Regional perspective: Sustainable development  
The regional perspective for the Tonle Sap is influenced largely by the Mekong 
Agreement that was signed in 1995 by four Lower Mekong countries of Cambodia, 
Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (MRC 1995). The Agreement created the Mekong 
River Commission (MRC) that forms a space of engagement where the four 
member countries can coordinate their plans and uses of the river. The 
Agreement can thus see to provide a certain level of security for the downstream 
countries from uncontrolled and non-agreed development in the upper parts of 
the basin (excluding China that is not a MRC member).  
The Mekong Agreement has different meanings and implications for the member 
countries. In principle, the Agreement provides a guarantee for Vietnam that the 
delta will not be drained of fresh water during the dry season, while for Laos and 
Thailand it creates a forum to discuss and gain acceptance its own development 
plans related for instance to irrigation and hydropower development (Öjendal et 
al. 2002; Sithirith 2007). For Cambodia, the agreement basically secures 
sufficient amount of water and also ensures the sustainability of the Tonle Sap 
system. Indeed, the Agreement makes a special reference to the Tonle Sap and 
its exceptional flood pulse system, with Article 6 stating that the parties agree to 
cooperate “to enable the acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take 
                                          
 
6 Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen seems to consider both conservation and exploitation 
of the Tonle Sap important: while he has been concerned that the lake’s conservational 
status might constrain fishing and extraction of oil and mineral resources (People’s Daily 
Online 2007), he has also emphasised the need for integrated basin-wide approach that 
aims to preserve the lake’s ecosystem from the negative impacts caused by local and 
regional development (MRC 2007).   
7 The fishing lots are geographical concessions auctioned to the highest bidder for a certain 
period, usually two years. The lots include lake areas, rivers, ponds and inundated forest 
and are typically located in the most productive fishing areas. The owner of the fishing lot 
has an exclusive right to harvest fish from the lot, to sub-lease parts of the lots, and to 
keep everyone else out from the lot area.    
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place during the wet season” (MRC 1995: 8). The importance of the Tonle Sap 
and its unique flood pulse system has been noted also by other regional actors, 
including the Asian Development Bank and the Greater Mekong Subregion 
Program8 (ADB 2005a, 2006a, GMS Environment Operations Center n.d.).  
The Tonle Sap and its unique lake-floodplain ecosystem seem thus to be viewed 
regionally as an environmentally, socially, economically and culturally important 
area. Consequently, among the main aims of the MRC and other regional 
organisations such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is to promote 
sustainable development of the Tonle Sap area as well as to protect the lake-
floodplains system from the potential negative impacts caused by water 
development in the upper Mekong Basin. In practice, however, it remains unclear 
how the objectives stated in the Mekong Agreement will in reality be met and for 
instance what the “acceptable natural reverse flow of the Tonle Sap” mentioned 
in the agreement actually means. Such questions are particularly critical given 
the current hydropower boom in the region. 
When looking at the connection between the MRC and the Tonle Sap, it can be 
note that the Mekong Agreement places the Cambodia National Mekong 
Committee (CNMC) as the main institution in Cambodia to address the issues 
related to the Mekong River, including the Tonle Sap system. The CNMC is 
essentially a coordinating body between different ministries, aiming to coordinate 
the actions that the ministries and other actors have in relation to the 
management of the Mekong River, including the Tonle Sap9 (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 1999, CNMC n.d.). However, as the CNMC has to carry out its tasks 
with different and often conflicting priorities, values and perceptions posed by its 
highly sectoral member ministries, the CNMC has often complained about being 
by-passed or ignored (Sokhem & Sunada 2006). 
International perspective: Conservation   
The global perspective for the Tonle Sap resembles the regional one, emphasising 
the uniqueness of the Tonle Sap ecosystem and the need for its protection. There 
is currently also a substantial international research interest on the Tonle Sap due 
to its extraordinary flood pulse-dependent ecosystem and high aquatic 
production. Consequently, the Tonle Sap is at the global scale commonly 
considered as an iconic, unique area well worth conserving.  
Among the most important international organisations in the Tonle Sap is 
UNESCO that has recognised the Tonle Sap as a biodiversity hotspot area. The 
UNESCO designated the Tonle Sap Lake and its floodplain as a Biosphere Reserve 
in 1997, and persuaded the Government of Cambodia to increase its efforts in 
conserving the Tonle Sap’s exceptional biodiversity. Such a view is further 
strengthened by several international researchers and NGOs working in the area. 
This kind of international interest towards the Tonle Sap and its protection has 
                                          
 
8 At the same time it is interesting to note that the GMS Program (that is also a strong 
promoter of energy development, including hydropower) is not really focusing on the Tonle 
Sap –or indeed on any major water ecosystem in the region– in its environmental and 
conservation initiatives, despite the obvious threats that hydropower development causes 
to such ecosystems. The GMS Program’s Biodiversity Conservation Corridors Initiative, for 
example, has its only pilot site in Cambodia in Cardamom Mountains (ADB 2008). Indeed, 
it can be argued that the entire Mekong River and its ecosystems are almost completely 
lacking from the current focus of the GMS Program – even when the river is included in the 
very name of the program.  
9 As stated in Royal Government of Cambodia (1999: 2): “The CNMC shall have the 
mandates and responsibilities as follows: ... To cooperate, advice and monitor other units 
of the Ministries concerned, provinces and towns, for the implementation of all relevant 
decisions of the Royal Government relating to the Mekong River”” 
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also implications at the national level. The main institution responsible for 
biodiversity conservation in Cambodia is the Ministry of Environment that was set 
up in 1993. Due to its remarkable significance in terms of biodiversity 
conservation, the Tonle Sap area has become a major focus area for the Ministry. 
As a result, the conservation space of the Tonle Sap has become a kind of space 
of dependence for the Ministry, ensuring and institutionalising its presence in the 
area.  
The conservational focus on Tonle Sap was strengthened remarkably in 2001, 
when the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) and its Secretariat were formed by 
Royal Decree (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001). The decree gives the TSBR 
Secretariat the mandate to coordinate the protection and sustainable 
management of the Tonle Sap. While the TSBR Secretariat was established 
officially under the CNMC, in practice it has been closely affiliated with the 
Ministry of Environment, creating certain confusion about its actual role and 
mandate10.  
Different perspectives, differing management interests  
As demonstrated above, the Tonle Sap and its resources are looked rather 
differently at national, regional and international levels. These differing views also 
influence the ways that the different projects management institutions of the lake 
have been developed – and funded. The main challenge is that while both 
international and regional perspectives tend to emphasise the conservation of the 
Tonle Sap’s unique ecosystem, the national perspective is –quite naturally– 
focusing more on the commercial exploitation of its fisheries and other resources. 
The so-called conservation space is thus overlaid with the commercial space 
particularly in the fishing areas, but also for instance in agricultural areas. This 
creates competition and tensions between the two spaces, especially in areas 
where fishing and agricultural activities overlap with conservational areas.  
The overlaps between the Biosphere Reserve areas and commercial fishing lots 
produce also conflicts of interests among state agencies in both the floodplain and 
the lake proper (Bonheur and Lane 2002). Although the Tonle Sap Biosphere 
Reserve is basically applicable throughout the lake-floodplain area, in practice the 
Ministry of Environment has full authority only over the so-called conservational 
Core Areas11. The Core Areas are also partly overlapping with fishing lots that are 
under control of Fisheries Administration. Thus, the two most dominant spaces in 
the Tonle Sap –fisheries space and conservation space– are both spatially and 
institutionally contested12. This controversy over control of certain areas and 
spaces explains partly the current confusion and overlaps related to the 
management context of the Tonle Sap.  
Current management challenges in Tonle Sap 
The opportunities and threats that both local and regional development pose for 
Tonle Sap and its unique flood pulse system argue for a management system that 
would coordinate the development within the basin. Such coordination should 
ideally be based on a comprehensive assessment of the potential impacts that 
                                          
 
10 The Royal Decree establishing the TSBR gives the management of the TSBR Core Areas 
to the Ministry of Environment, while the buffer zone and a flexible transition zone is to be 
managed by line ministries, through the coordination of CNMC (Royal Government of 
Cambodia 2001).  
11 The Royal Decree divided the TSBR into three zones, namely the Core Areas, a Buffer 
Zone and a flexible Transition Zone (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001) 
12 The two spaces also have similar objectives for example in terms of protection of flooded 
forest areas.  
Page 123 of 852
PN67_2010_05 
Tonle Sap Lake and its management: The diversity of perspectives & institutions  




local and regional development plans are likely to have to the lake, its resources 
and people. Such an “integrated basin-wide approach” for the management and 
development of the Tonle Sap has recently been requested even by the 
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen (MRC 2007: 28). Such an approach is not, 
however, the reality, but the Tonle Sap’s current management context is both 
confusing and complex, with multiple actors working with partly overlapping and 
competing agendas. 
Great part of the complexity of Tonle Sap’s management is related to Cambodia’s 
broader challenges with governance. As noted by World Bank (2006: 131) 
Cambodia’s development challenges are “fundamentally about ‘governance’, that 
is, how the rules, institutions, and systems of the state operate and how the state 
relates to citizens, civil society and the private sector in terms of transparency 
and accountability”. Cambodia’s governance system suffers from both horizontal 
and vertical discontinuities, and water-related issues are handled under several 
ministries with their specific mandates, ambitions and policies. Also the 
functioning of vertical links between the central government, provincial and local 
authorities and villages is troublesome. An additional challenge is the aid 
dependency of Cambodia’s governance system, and the dominance of donors, 
development banks and international NGOs in shaping the government policies 
and introducing new approaches. Such dominance has also been well visible in 
the Tonle Sap area, including its different management initiatives.  
The management of the Tonle Sap is also characterised by multiple dimensions in 
several different aspects, raising questions whether such a system can in any 
reasonable way be managed comprehensively, at least by a single institution. 
Sokhem & Sunada (2006), for instance, have recognised the following 
institutional issues as impediments for the reform policies and effective basin 
governance in the Tonle Sap: weak governance and wide-spread corruption, 
absence of key law and its clarity, lack of law enforcement and weak judicial 
system, slow decentralization and de-concentration, and lack of clear property 
right in forestry, fisheries and land (Table 1).  
Table 1. Institutional impediments for effective basin governance in the Mekong 
and the Tonle Sap (Sokhem & Sunada 2006).    
 
The complexity of the Tonle Sap’s institutional setting has also been noted by Mok 
Mareth (Minister of Environment) and colleagues, who in 2001 stated that: “the 
multi-stakeholders nature and geographical magnitude of the Tonle Sap 
ecosystem is the primary reason of the current complex and often confused 
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institutional arrangement for the Tonle Sap Lake” (Mareth et al. 2001: 11). They 
concluded that “poor coordination has already resulted in data deficiency, lack of 
coherent policy, institutional conflicts, wasted money and unclear mandate”, and 
that the reasons for inefficient institutional arrangement include “the deficiency of 
human resources and capacity, lack of transparency, poor coordination, slow 
decentralization, shortage of financial resources, ineffective management of 
public expenditure and foreign aids” (Mareth et al. 2001: 12). As a possible 
solution to ease this complexity, they highlight the importance of government’s 
commitment to impose appropriate legal and institutional framework to ensure 
the successful management of the Tonle Sap.   
In the context of Tonle Sap, fisheries management forms a particularly 
challenging governance issue. Cambodia’s fisheries management is dominated by 
weak implementation of policies, corrupt and unjust practices as well as 
exclusions from access of the local communities (see e.g. Bonheur & Lane 2002; 
Ratner 2006; Salayo et al. 2006; Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve Secretariat 2007). 
The epitome of this is the operation of large-scale, commercial fisheries that is 
based on so-called fishing lot system that exclude most people from the most 
productive fishing areas during the most productive fishing season. This 
exceptional fishing lot system has created tensions between the local villagers 
and the fishing lot owners throughout Cambodia. The tensions were soaring at 
the turn of the millennium, when the villagers around the Tonle Sap started to 
protest more loudly against the excluding fishing lot system, the extended 
boundaries of lot areas, and government’s inability to respond to the conflict (see 
e.g. Degen et al. 2000; NGO Forum 2000; Bonheur 2002; Sina 2003; Keskinen et 
al. 2007).  
Responding to the accumulation of the fisheries conflict, the government 
proclaimed in 2001 radical and sudden change in country’s fisheries 
management. Half of the total area of the private fishing lots was changed to 
public fishing lots open for community fisheries13. Although this shift aimed to 
improve peoples’ food security and to ease the tensions between local people and 
fishing lot owners, the reform has also had its setbacks – many even think that 
the tensions just took different forms (Bonheur 2002; McKenney & Tola 2002; 
Ratner 2006; Keskinen et al. 2007). The main challenge with the community 
fisheries is that –although designed to support particularly the poor– they are in 
some cases actually excluding the very subsistence fishers, and instead providing 
a negotiation ground for medium and larger scale fishers as well as means to 
control the activities of the poorer fishers (Keskinen et al. 2007). 
In addition to fisheries, management of several other vital resources –most 
importantly forests and land– are having similar challenges with access and 
control (Evans et al. 2004; Le Billon 2007). In Tonle Sap, one of the most recent 
trends has been the emergence of large irrigation areas in different parts of the 
floodplains (Evans et al. 2005). Traditionally large parts of the floodplains have 
not been under clear ownership, but have been used more occasionally for 
different purposes. However, the drive for increased agricultural production 
together with improved accessibility of the Tonle Sap Area has led both private 
investors and other actors such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to increase 
their investment in the agricultural development of the Tonle Sap’s floodplains.  
The investments in agricultural development are materialising as a rapid 
expansion of irrigated agriculture and related structures that are in many cases 
undermining local customary rights for the floodplain areas and having a 
                                          
 
13 In the Tonle Sap Area, 53.4% of the lot areas prior to 2001 are still under private fishing 
lot system. In Battambang and Kampong Chhnang provinces –where many of the most 
productive fishing areas are located– this figure is over 70% (McKenney & Tola 2002).   
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potentially negative impact for fish production. There have also emerged clear 
institutional rivalries between different ministries and provincial line agencies 
about the process of agricultural development in the floodplains. In Kampong 
Thom province, for example, the provincial departments of agriculture and fishery 
are concerned about the problems related to private irrigation structures, and are 
demanding the removal of some of the new structures (Keskinen et al. 2007)14.  
Initiatives for organising Tonle Sap’s management 
Need for improved and better coordinated management of the Tonle Sap area has 
been recognised already for years (see e.g. ADB 2002, Mareth et al. 2001, 
Sokhem & Sunada 2006, MRC 2007, Niras 2008). Consequently, the Tonle Sap 
has seen several, partly overlapping initiatives to enhance the situation through 
establishment of a coordinating body or mechanism for the Tonle Sap. This 
chapter analyses three initiatives that we argue have been the most important 
ones. Such initiatives are the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) and its 
secretariat, the ADB-driven Tonle Sap Basin Management Organisation (TSBMO), 
and the Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA, nowadays called Tonle Sap Authority 
TSA).  
Two of these institutes –the TSBR Secretariat and the TSBA– exist, while the 
plans for the TSBMO were in essence halted in 2007 with the establishment of the 
TSBA (Figure 2). Despite the obvious differences in the planned mandate and 
scope of these institutes, common to all of them is the recognition that improved 
management requires better coordination between the various agencies working 
at different levels and sectors in the Tonle Sap.   
?
Planning of TSBMO
TSBR Secretariat, under CNMC
TSBA/TSA
 
Figure 2. Timeline of selected key events in the Tonle Sap, including the 
establishments of TSBR Secretariat and TSBA plus the approximate planning 
period of TSBMO.   
Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve and its Secretariat 
The Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve (TSBR) was established by Royal Decree in 
2001, and it is considered as the first major step forward in the establishment of 
environmental governance structure in the Tonle Sap (Sokhem & Sunada 2006). 
The impetus for the establishment of TSBR was closely linked to conservation of 
the Tonle Sap system, and therefore to the international perspective emphasising 
                                          
 
14 The agricultural development in the Tonle Sap floodplain has been slowed down since 
2007, after the Prime Minister Hun Sen noted in a speech that the lake is facing a serious 
threat of overexploitation, particularly in form of clearing of flooded forest for large-scale 
rice farming (MRC 2007).   
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the importance of Tonle Sap’s biodiversity15. The Royal Decree gives to the TSBR 
three complementary functions on conservation, development and logistics (Royal 
Government of Cambodia 2001): 
“a conservation function to contribute to the conservation of biological diversity, 
landscapes, and ecosystem, including genetic resources, plant, fishery and animal 
species, and to the restoration of the essential character of the environment and 
habitat of biodiversity; 
a development function to foster sustainable development of ecology, 
environment, economy, society, and culture; 
a logistic function to provide support for demonstration projects, environmental 
education and training, research and monitoring of environment related to the 
local, national and global issues of conservation and sustainable development” 
Institutional setting 
The Royal Decree established the TSBR Secretariat under the Cambodia National 
Mekong Committee in order to “coordinate and strengthen cooperation between 
ministries, agencies, local authorities and communities concerned for the 
protection and sustainable management of the Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve” 
(Royal Government of Cambodia 2001: 4). This has two interesting implications: 
Firstly, the TSBR Secretariat’s main role is defined to be to coordinate the 
cooperation between different actors working with the Tonle Sap, including 
sustainable development of the area. Secondly, the fact that the TSBR Secretariat 
operates under the CNMC forms a natural connection to the regional Mekong 
River Commission, and links the conservation and development of the Tonle Sap 
to water resources management in the entire Mekong River Basin.  
The TSBR Secretariat’s role and resources was further strengthened in 2002, 
when the ADB-, GEF- and UNDP-funded Tonle Sap Environmental Management 
Project (TSEMP) was started. The project was coordinated by the TSBR 
Secretariat, and it aimed to establish a coordination framework and information 
dissemination mechanisms for the Tonle Sap. The project had following 
objectives: “The Project will strengthen the TSBR Secretariat. It will create the 
capacity to address legal and coordination issues in the TSBR, rationalize the 
designation of the various protected areas in the TSBR, and formulate common 
policy objectives for managing the TSBR” (ADB 2002).  
The TSEMP also increased the ADB’s involvement in the Tonle Sap, leading 
eventually to the formulation of the ADB’s Tonle Sap Basin Strategy in 2003 and 
the plans for the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organisation (Chanrithy 2005). 
Overall, the ADB’s increased interest in the Tonle Sap has been significant also for 
the TSBR Secretariat, who has been involved in several ADB projects focusing not 
only on biodiversity conservation, but more broadly on the development of the 
Tonle Sap basin. Through the ADB-funded projects, the TSBR Secretariat have 
got increased amount of resources for its work, and was for example able to start 
publishing TSBR Bulletins as well as to establish a web-based Environmental 
Information Database for the Tonle Sap (http://www.tsbr-ed.org).     
In January 2007, the TSBR Secretariat published a policy paper describing the 
management challenges in the Tonle Sap area and providing its view on how to 
improve the situation. The paper emphasises the need for coordinated 
management and suggests a common framework for policy coordination. The 
framework would place the TSBR Secretariat into the center of the Tonle Sap’s 
                                          
 
15 As stated in the Royal Decree: “Recognizing the unique ecological, environmental, 
economical, social, and cultural significance of Tonle Sap Lake, a Tonle Sap Biosphere 
Reserve is hereby established in accordance with the statutory framework of the World 
Network of Biosphere Reserve” (Royal Government of Cambodia 2001: 2) 
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management, with the coordination mechanism consisting of the TSBR 
Committee as well as Technical Advisory Groups and Provincial Working Groups 
and Advocacy Forums (Whitington & Norin 2006; Tonle Sap Biosphere Reserve 
Secretariat 2007). Such a management mechanism was, however, never formed. 
The main reason for this is most likely the establishment of the TSBA during the 
same year that put the entire TRBR Secretariat into a new position.   
Tonle Sap Basin Management Organisation  
The Tonle Sap Basin Management Organisation (TSBMO, also called the Tonle Sap 
Basin Organisation TSBO), was essentially the brainchild of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB). In essence, the TSBMO was supposed to form a 
coordination body for the ADB’s Tonle Sap Initiative and the different projects 
under it, replacing the more diverse arrangement where different ministries and 
agencies are responsible for implementing different Tonle Sap-related projects. In 
this way, the ADB’s plans in the Tonle Sap can also be seen to represent a 
continuation of the ADB’s broader objective to establish River Basin Organisations 
(RBOs) throughout Asia (ADB 2001; Molle & Hoanh 2008)16.  
The plans for establishing the TSBMO are closely linked to the ADB’s Tonle Sap 
Initiative and related Tonle Sap Basin Strategy17. Tonle Sap Initiative was formed 
in October 2002 to establish “a partnership of organizations and people working 
to meet the poverty and environment challenges of the Tonle Sap” (ADB 2008). 
In July 2003, the ADB formulated the Tonle Sap Basin Strategy to support the 
ADB’s Country Strategy and Program. The strategy forms the basis for setting 
priorities and planning assistance in the basin, and is based on three 
underpinning principles: sustainable livelihoods, social justice, and a basin-wide 
approach. The strategy also describes the development objectives for the ADB in 
the Tonle Sap basin, namely to foster, promote, and facilitate pro-poor, 
sustainable economic growth, access to assets, and the management of natural 
resources and the environment (ADB 2005a). 
The ADB has implemented two technical assistance (TA) projects for Cambodian 
Government to establish Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization “to improve 
institutional and organizational arrangements for managing land, water and biotic 
resources in the Tonle Sap basin” (ADB 2005b). The final report of the second TA 
outlines the planned design for a basin organization, concluding that the 
organisation is proposed “to assist the Royal Cambodian Government to 
sustainably develop the Tonle Sap Basin’s economy and infrastructure, advising 
on: 1) formulation of water policy and strategy to manage, preserve, investigate, 
plan, and develop water and related natural resources, and 2) policy and strategy 
to conserve biological diversity and maintain, use and manage natural resources 
within the TSBR (ADB 2006b)” 
Institutional setting 
The ADB proposed a four-level, rather complicated administrative structure for 
the TSBMO. The structure would consist of the Tonle Sap Basin Coordination 
Committee (TSBCC) and two Secretariats, Sub-basin Committees, Provincial 
Water and Related Resource Committees and secretariats, and District Water and 
Related Resource Taskforces and secretariats (ADB 2006b). The proposed 
                                          
 
16 In its water policy, the ADB stresses that “To ensure effective IWRM, river basin 
organizations need to be established with monitoring and regulation from higher levels.” 
(ADB 2001: 18). 
17 When thinking of the ADB’s very active involvement in the Tonle Sap during the past 
years, it is interesting to note that the Tonle Sap Lake became part of the official strategy 
of the ADB for Cambodia only around 2000, and that the ADB’s involvement in the area 
really started as late as in 2002 along with the Tonle Sap Environmental Management 
project (Nuera 2005; Chanrithy 2005).  
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structure places –similarly to TSBR Secretariat– Cambodia National Mekong 
Committee on top of the organisational structure of the TSBO. The Coordination 
Committee would then serve as a major institution coordinating the actions of 
different partner organisations and sub-committees. In addition, large part of the 
actual responsibility for planning and implementation is at lower governance 
levels i.e. in the sub-basins, provinces, and districts (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Proposed structure of the ADB-planned Tonle Sap Basin Management 
Organisation (ADB 2005b).   
The latest newsletter of the ADB’s Tonle Sap Initiative, published back in May 
2006, focuses on the TSBMO and overall on Tonle Sap’s management, concluding 
that “After discussion of practicable options and the arguments for and against 
them, determinations were reached that the main vehicle for basin-wide 
management of the Tonle Sap should not be a new special purpose organization. 
Neither should it be the assignment of new authority to an existing institution. 
Instead it would be a committee, established through new legislation requiring 
that it exercise broad vision and accept formal obligations and mandates” (ADB 
2006b: 7). The newsletter goes on to highlight the importance of establishing the 
ADB-proposed management structure, declaring in a rather pompous manner 
that: “When it [the legislation to establish TSBCC] is finalized, adopted, and 
publicly announced, the [Cambodian] Government will have reached a turning 
point. From a start 5 years ago with a felt sense of incomplete response to 
evident threats to the Tonle Sap, the Government will have moved to professional 
identifications of needs in various areas, to an elaborated strategy for response, 
to an orderly plan of organization for addressing problems, and to having formal 
authorization in hand to act” (ADB 2006b: 14).  
The ADB’s plans for the establishment of the TSBMO were therefore well 
developed, and in 2006 the Technical Assistance Report of ADB’s Water 
Resources Management (Sector) Project included the establishment of the TSBMO 
as one of its three parts. This part was planned to run from November 2006 to 
April 2008, and it aimed at the establishment of the TSBCC within the Cambodia 
National Mekong Committee. The report describes the tasks of the TCBCC as to: 
1) provide coordinated water sector and related resources planning; 2) facilitate 
stakeholder and community participation; and 3) provide information on water 
sector and related resources (ADB 2006c).  
Page 129 of 852
PN67_2010_05 
Tonle Sap Lake and its management: The diversity of perspectives & institutions  




Overall, the ADB’s plans for a management institute for the Tonle Sap can thus 
be seen to have a focus on setting up a coordinating management organization, 
rather than a more powerful basin authority that would absorb the functions of 
different ministries and agencies (ADB 2006b; Sokhem & Sunada 2006). The 
TSBMO was envisaged to deal mostly with policy and planning –including the 
planning of ADB’s grants and loans for the area– as well as to serve as a 
discussion forum for ministries and local government agencies. According to 
ADB’s plans, most operating functions and day-to-day management issues would 
have thus remained with individual ministries and agencies concerned (Sokhem & 
Sunada 2006).  
Running into troubles... 
The ADB’s plans for Tonle Sap’s management were strongly influenced by the 
ADB’s policy on establishment of river basin organizations, building on well-
established ‘truths’, or best practices, on how these kinds of water resources 
management institutions should ideally be designed18. Consequently, in addition 
to building on existing institutional setting and on coordination between different 
actors, the ADB emphasised basin-wide view, community involvement, 
transparency and equitability in its approach. These all are ingredients that are 
considered important for successful water resources management (see e.g. GWP 
2000; Molle & Hoanh 2008; World Water Assessment Programme 2009).  
In one of its publications, the ADB describes its planning process in a following 
way (ADB 2006: 4): “the Tonle Sap Basin Strategy identified early the imperative 
to develop better institutional arrangements for basin management. It specified 
that natural resource management plans developed in partnership by 
communities and the Government would outline a transparent and equitable 
process of resource management over the next 10 years. The plans would 
incorporate community aspirations regarding natural resources and contain the 
necessary rules relating to their management. ... There would be regular 
reporting between the Government and communities on the extent to which the 
plans are being effective in achieving their objectives. In this way, there would be 
more accountability to communities to ensure that all efforts and investments are 
best placed to deliver on results.”  
While the above-mentioned principles of transparency, equitability and 
participation sound very good and agreeable, it can be asked whether they in 
reality can be achieved in a setting that is both complex and contested – and 
highly political19. Such a question becomes particularly important when 
considering the criticism towards the ADB and its plans in the Tonle Sap. Several 
authors have argued that the ADB’s theories and actual practises of the planning 
process are far apart, and as a result the process has actually been very much an 
ADB-driven top-down process, rather than a truly participatory and decentralised 
one (see e.g. FACT 2005a, FACT 2005b, Middleton & Tola 2008, Rosien 2006, 
Middleton n.d.)20. The ADB has also more generally been criticised for interfering 
                                          
 
18 Such a view is well visible in the presentation of a CNMC representative on TSBMO that 
states that “To ensure the sustainable development in the Tonle Sap Basin as well as to 
catch-up with the new world’ style of Basin Development and Management, there is a need 
to set up a proper Tonle Sap Basin Organization with adoption of IWRM to be used in the 
management instead of sectoral approach” (CNMC No Date).  
19 See also Molle (2008) and his discussion about nirvana concepts used in the water 
sector.  
20 Rosien (2006) also raises concerns about the overlaps between different organisations, 
most importantly between the proposed TSBMO and the existing TSBR Secretariat, 
concluding that “The overlaps and cross-cutting lines between the different bodies raise 
the question whether such complexity is likely to facilitate the goal of sustainable natural 
resource management or hinder it. The risk of organisational congestion increases in light 
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with the countries internal policies and imposing idealistic policies that are not 
properly connected to the existing institutional frameworks and policies (Nuera 
2005; Oehlers 2006; Molle & Hoanh 2008).    
Despite plenty of time and resources put into the planning of the TSBMO, the 
ADB’s plan for the establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Management 
Organization has since 2007 been in essence completely halted. The main reason 
for the halt has not been the criticism by the NGOs and researchers towards the 
ADB’s plans, nor the lack of future plans and funds (as illustrated by several 
ADB’s documents highlighting plans to continue with TSBMO, see e.g. ADB 
2006b; 2006c). Instead, the main reason is to be found from yet another process 
focusing on setting up a management organisation for the Tonle Sap; this time as 
a basin authority.  
Tonle Sap Basin Authority 
The Tonle Sap Basin Authority (TSBA) –currently called Tonle Sap Authority 
(TSA)– was established by a Royal Decree in September 2007 (Royal Government 
of Cambodia 2007a). The establishment of such an authority took many, even 
experts working on Tonle Sap, by surprise, as the establishment process didn’t 
include same kind of public engagement procedure as for instance the process for 
establishing the TSBMO. Instead, the TSBA was planned by a relatively small 
group of people with close linkages to the Cambodian government. As one 
international consultant working on the Tonle Sap noted: “The establishment of 
the TSBA was not a rational, open process, but a quick process that has led to 
complete confusion [about the Tonle Sap’s management]”21.  
The Royal Decree established the TSBA with following description: “An Authority 
is established for coordination of the management, conservation and 
development of the Tonle Sap Basin areas”. The proposed mandate of the TSBA is 
therefore almost exactly similar to that of the the TSBR Secretariat, raising 
questions about overlaps between the two institutions. While the past 
management activities in the Tonle Sap –such as the TSBR– have focused on the 
provinces surrounding the lake, the TSBA was planned to take a broader, basin-
wide approach. The jurisdiction of the Authority was planned to cover the entire 
catchment area of 11 different river basins, including areas within 10 provinces 
and the municipality of Phnom Penh22 (Starr 2008). All in all, this area makes up 
around 42 percent of Cambodia’s territory and is home to 4.4 million people, 
about a third of the country’s population (Starr 2008).  
According to the Royal Decree, the TSBA “Serves directly as headquarter of the 
Royal Government in TSI projects by conducting research, monitoring, and 
providing comments to the Royal Government of Cambodia” (Royal Government 
of Cambodia 2007a). Hence, although the TSBA was established without any 
involvement by the ADB, the Decree refers directly to the ADB-initiated Tonle Sap 
Initiative (TSI) and essentially moves the TSI activities –and resources– under 
the supervision of the TSBA.  
Establishing the TSBA 
When looking at the structure and mandate of the TSBA, it becomes clear that 
the Authority was planned to be an almost exact opposite to the proposed 
                                                                                                                       
 
of the fact that many of the agencies and units tend not to communicate very well with 
each other”. 
21 Personal comment (February 2009): an international consultant working on the Tonle 
Sap.   
22 Other sources say that the administrative areas of the TSBA would cover 15 provinces 
(The Cambodia Daily 2009). 
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TSBMO. The TSBA for example has much simpler –and more centralised– 
organisational structure (Figure 4). The authority also has considerable powers, 
including the possibility to sign agreements, protocols and contracts. The sub-
decree increases these powers future and gives remarkable power to Secretariat, 
including task to: “Communicate, cooperate and coordinate with relevant line 
ministries, institutions, local authorities, international organizations, national 
organizations, non-governmental organizations, and civil societies on all activities 
concerning the management, conservation and sustainable development of the 












                                          
 
23 The decision on the (original) composition of the TSBA highlights the political weight of 
the TSBA as well. According to the Decision (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007b), the 
composition of the TSBA consists of a Chairman (Senior Minister), six Vice Chairmen 
(including five Ministers) and 29 Members (including 10 Ministers, 4 Secretary Generals 
and 11 Governors from provinces surrounding Tonle Sap Lake and River). The TSBA 
Members also include the Secretary General of the CNMC as well as Ministers from all 
CNMC member ministries except Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation. 
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 Figure 4. The proposed organizational structure of the Tonle Sap Basin Authority, 
as described in the Sub-decree (Royal Government of Cambodia 2008).   
The TSBA was thus intended to be a completely new authority with considerable 
powers and a centralised organisational structure, and its objective seemed to be 
controlling rather than coordinating the Tonle Sap-related activities. In addition, 
the entire planning process for its establishment was done without proper 
stakeholder consultation. On the other hand the establishment of the TSBA was a 
government-driven and -owned process, with strong political support up to the 
highest levels of Cambodian government. The same cannot be said from the 
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From TSBA to TSA 
Although the Royal Decree established the TSBA already in September 2007, its 
actual mandate and structure are still (as of March 2010) unclear. Among the main 
reasons for this lack of clarity are the differing views that different political actors 
have on the Tonle Sap and on the role that TSBA should have on its management. 
Particularly the different ministries and provincial authorities seem to be unhappy 
about the remarkable powers that the Royal Decree and related sub-decrees 
originally gave to the TSBA.    
These conflicting interests and direct oppositions to the powerful role that the TSBA 
was envisioned to have became public in May 2009, when the Council of Ministers 
rejected a decree that would have defined more detailed scope for the TSBA, 
including its physical boundaries. According to The Cambodia Daily (2009), the 
reason for this was that the Council considered that “the Tonle Sap Basin Authority 
would have had an unreasonably expansive membership and mandate”. In August 
2009, the proposed mandate of the TSBA was criticized also by the Prime Minister 
Hun Sen. Such a criticism led rapidly to a complete re-structuring of the authority, 
including removal of several senior advisors. Also the name of the authority was 
shortened to Tonle Sap Authority (TSA).  
Overall, such changes have considerably reduced the planned mandate and 
geographical focus of the authority, and also moved the Authority closer to the 
Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology. Consequently, the TSA is currently 
focusing more clearly on the Tonle Sap Lake and floodplain area, and its role seems 
to be closer to kind of a governmental advisory body than a real implementing 
agency or authority.       
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TSBMO that was driven by an ‘outside actor’, namely the ADB. Consequently, the 
two processes provide an example of very different approaches for institution 
building: one based on general blueprints and driven by an external actor, and 
the other building more on strengthening the current political positions and driven 
endogenously by the actors close to the government (Molle & Hoanh 2008). 
Indeed, the establishment of the TSBA has been seen as Cambodian 
government’s response to the frustrations related to the ADB’s Tonle Sap 
Initiative, and more broadly to the weak outcomes of the number of projects 
implemented by different international actors in the Tonle Sap area. As noted by 
Dr Tao Seng Hour, the Chairman of the TSBA: “A lot of money has been spent [in 
the Tonle Sap] but we have not seen satisfactory results so far. Coordination 
must be improved. We [at the TSBA] are responsible for coordinating and 
evaluating these projects and reporting directly to the prime minister.” (Starr 
2008: 32). His views are supported by Hou Taing Eng, the then secretary-general 
of the TSBA: “We’ve had so many projects and programmes. But the people’s 
living conditions around the Tonle Sap are not yet well improved. ... The ADB 
recognised this was caused by a misunderstanding of cooperation among the 
people operating there.” (Starr 2008: 32). At the same the establishment of the 
TSBA is also considered to be very much politically motivated, with close linkages 
to the current power struggles within the government and the ruling party24. 25 
All in all, the establishment process of the TSBA points out how contested and 
political the management –and, essentially, control– of the Tonle Sap and its rich 
resources is. The absence of both the ADB –that through the 2000s has allocated 
significant amount of resources for the Tonle Sap– and the TSBR Secretariat –
that have so far been the main coordinating institution in the Tonle Sap– from the 
establishment process is a clear indicator for the competition over the area26. In 
addition, the strong mandate planned for the TSBA is exactly the opposite to the 
conclusions drawn by the ADB on the kind of organisation that would best suite 
the current needs in the Tonle Sap (ADB 2006b). While the most optimal form of 
coordination mechanism for the Tonle Sap is still under debate, it seems clear 
that the motivations behind establishing such a powerful and centralised authority 
were more related to the government’s will to increase its control over the Tonle 
Sap’s resources, rather than to really increase the coordination and balanced 
development of the area.     
Lessons learnt and ways forward  
What kind of lessons can we draw from the Tonle Sap’s institutional setting and 
its development over the past years? One lesson seems clear: while the 
establishment of the water resources management institutions is usually justified 
with practical, non-political issues such as improved coordination between 
different sectors, the reality is quite different. Existing institutions and their 
rivalries together with strong political interests and hidden agendas impact 
enormously on what kinds of institutions actually emerge and succeed. 
                                          
 
24 Personal comment (February 2009): a Cambodian researcher working on natural 
resources management. 
25 Personal email correspondence (March 2010): a Cambodian researcher having a long-
term experience from the Tonle Sap 
26 Such a conclusion was provided by several international and Cambodian researchers 
during the interviews in February 2009. See also The Cambodian Daily (2009).   
Page 134 of 852
PN67_2010_05 
Tonle Sap Lake and its management: The diversity of perspectives & institutions  








This has been well illustrated with the contradiction between the processes 
related to the establishment of the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization  
and that of the Tonle Sap Basin Authority. The ADB-led plans for establishment of 
the TSBMO built on a relatively open planning process as well as on commonly 
accepted –although contested27– views on good planning process such as 
participation and decentralized governance, transparency, coordination and 
basin-wide approach. Yet, it did not succeed. Instead, the institution ultimately 
established was the TSBA that had a non-participatory but strongly government-
supported planning process and whose proposed mandate is partly contradicting 
–rather than complementing and coordinating– those of the existing 
institutions28. The problems with the establishment process of the TSBA and its 
                                          
 
27 Indeed, it can be questioned how realistic the ADB’s plans and objectives –building 
largely on a general blueprint for river basin organizations–  for the TSBMO actually are 
and whether they in reality would have ever been met.   
28 Such a view is supported by a report written for the ADB on the TSBA (Niras 2008: vi): 
“TSBA may be perceived to infringe on the functions of ministries and other agencies. New 
coordinating bodies are frequently resisted by agencies that believe their functions are 
threatened. Unless it is very clear who is doing what, not only to TSBA but also to its 
partner agencies, their cooperation will be limited.”  
TSBA & Tonle Sap oil  
An additional question in the establishment of the TSBA is the role that the authority 
has for oil and gas exploration in the Tonle Sap area – and how such plans influenced 
the establishment of the Authority in the first place. A Cambodian researcher having 
a deep understanding of the process indicated that the original decision within the 
government to establish such an authority “happened at the time when the 
speculation about the rich oil and gas deposit in the Tonle Sap reached its highest 
point. Office of the Council of Ministers saw [the authority] as an important 
instrument to control the lucrative contracts if these natural oil and gas deposits 
were real economically feasible”25. 
Such a view are supported by the first news about the authority, published in 
October 2007. The news focused on the authority’s potential role in conducting 
studies and managing possible oil reserves in the lake area for interested investors 
(People’s Daily Online 2007, The Vietnam Journal 2007). The news also referred to 
Prime Minister Hun Sen, indicating that he has “expressed his opposition to the Tonle 
Sap Basin being designated a World Heritage Site, saying that fishing and extraction 
of oil and mineral resources might be constrained as a result of its protected status” 
(People’s Daily Online 2007).  
Such views from the top representatives of the government raise concerns about the 
actual motivations for establishing the TSBA, and also provide a rather conflicting 
message on whether the stated objectives of “management, conservation and 
development of the Tonle Sap Basin” (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007a) will in 
reality get equal emphasis in the actual operation of the authority.     
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ultimate transformation into TSA further highlight the highly political motivations 
and conflicting interests in setting up a management organisation for the area.    
At the same time it is obvious that any future discussions about the Tonle Sap 
should take into account that there now exist a completely new organisation for 
the management of the Tonle Sap, namely the Tonle Sap Authority. However, as 
the exact mandate of the authority still remain rather unclear, it is difficult to say 
what kind of role it will ultimately have. So far the authority has not really been 
able to reduce the confusion about the management in the Tonle Sap are, nor 
increased the cooperation between the different organisations29. As a result, the 
different organisations –CNMC, TRBR Secretariat, Fisheries Administration, 
MOWRAM and so forth– continue to pursue their own activities in the area, often 
with relatively strong –and contradictory– interests and mandates.  
Yet, it is equally evident that the Tonle Sap and its resources require better 
coordinated planning and development – and that any coordination mechanism or 
process must have the full support of the Cambodian government. If the Tonle 
Sap Authority will maintain the strong political mandate it was given by the Royal 
Decree, it still has a full potential to establish itself at the center of such a process 
– particularly given the young, skilled and well-connected staff that is currently 
working for the Authority. However, achieving such a process and position 
requires more transparency as well as closer collaboration and better defined 
division of responsibilities with different institutions –both national and 
international– working in the Tonle Sap. The authority could also benefit from the 
experiences that the TSBR Secretariat, CNMC and even TSBMO have brought. In 
addition, considering the management needs on the ground, the Tonle Sap’s 
management would obviously benefit from a setting that considers better the 
diverse needs at local levels. In facilitating such a process, for example multi-
stakeholder platforms (MSPs) could prove to be a very useful tool.   
Whether this kind of more open, collaborative process is actually possible is 
altogether a different story. The current discussions related to the Tonle Sap and 
the TSBA indicate that the political interests within Cambodian government 
towards the Tonle Sap are both remarkable and conflicting. These interests are 
likely to be dominating driving forces shaping the actual focus of the Tonle Sap’s 
management, most likely at the expense of more general needs for 
comprehensive management. Consequently, any real change for the Tonle Sap’s 
management will first and foremost be at the hands of Cambodian government 
and its different ministries and authorities.   
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Over the last decade, calls for good governance and more open, democratic 
planning processes have started to permeate the developing country water 
sector, with wider stakeholder participation in project selection, design and 
operation being prominent objectives in virtually all studies, policy 
recommendations and scholarly papers. This is in line with the observation that 
claims of high-quality governance pervade public-decision making rhetoric in the 
water sector. At the same time, contemporary analysis of  planning has started to 
focus on the role of actors, their interaction and patterns of communication, as 
well as the distribution of power and agency within society, thereby questioning 
more institutionally embedded approaches based on ideals of rational-
comprehensive planning. In this chapter, we reflect on the ways planning can 
play out vis-à-vis its theoretical foundations and the rhetoric espoused by major 
actors in water resources policy making in Thailand and the Mekong Region. We 
do so by reflecting on a state-led planning effort concerned with proposed 
massive water transfer schemes from the “water rich” Lao PDR or Mekong River 
to “water scarce” Northeast Thailand where the participatory reality has not 
matched the rhetoric. 
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Introduction 
Over the last decade, calls for good governance and open (and more democratic) 
planning processes have increasingly started to infiltrate the water sector, with 
public participation in project selection, design and operation appearing 
prominently in virtually all studies, policy recommendations and scholarly papers 
(e.g. Rogers and Hall, 2003). This is consistent with the observation that “the 
quality of governance pervades public-decision making relating to policy 
formulation, resources allocation, legislation, rule enforcement and adjudication, 
making it the most important single influence on the shape and pace of 
institutional change in the water sector” (Svendsen et al., 2005). Also, for the last 
twenty years or so, contemporary analysis of planning started to focus on the role 
of actors, their interaction and patterns of communication, as well as the 
distribution of power and agency within society, thereby challenging more 
traditional (but ironically, strongly modernist) approaches based on ideas of 
technocentric and rational-comprehensive planning. Concepts like accountability, 
transparency and legitimacy are now being talked about in the international water 
resources governance discourse with regularity. Mollinga (2008) maintains that 
the ascendancy of the theme of good governance has brought politics into the 
mainstream water resources development discourse “through the backdoor”. 
In this chapter we reflect on the ways real planning - understood here as the 
ways planning actually occurs within a particular social, economic, cultural and 
political context - plays out vis-à-vis both the theoretical backdrop against which 
it is designed, and the competing narratives adopted by actors in the water sector 
of Thailand. Our focus here is primarily on irrigation development, which 
constitutes the main focus of several ambitious water projects targeted at 
Northeast Thailand, with potential (and profound) socio-environmental impacts 
both within the immediate region and at a wider scale, the larger Mekong River 
Basin of which it is part. 
IWRM and Collaborative Planning: Framing the Discussion 
Within the water sector, the discourses on participation in planning and 
management of water resources are firmly embedded in the wider arguments for 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). According to one often cited 
definition (GWP, 2000), IWRM is “a process which promotes the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related resources, in order to 
maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner 
without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems”. USAID (2007), 
more recently, defined IWRM as “a participatory planning and implementation 
process, based on sound science that brings in stakeholders together to 
determine how to meet society’s long-term needs for water and coastal resources 
while maintaining essential ecological services and economic benefits”. This later 
definition establishes a clear link between the need for participatory approaches 
in planning and implementation of hydraulic infrastructure, while also stressing 
the need for broad involvement of stakeholders, which is uniformly recognized as 
a precondition for sustainable development. Some argue that “IWRM cannot be 
achieved without public participation” (Özerol and Newig, 2008), while others 
counter this view by pointing out that “participatory processes have been 
increasingly approached as technical, management solutions to what are basically 
political issues” (Gujit and Shah, 1998) and talk about a “new tyranny” of 
participation (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).  
Planners, donors and governments quickly made use of the catch-phrases 
resulting from an increased literature on IWRM processes and water governance, 
adopting a more participatory language in recommendations and planning 
documents, and calls for good governance feature in most (if not every) policy 
recommendation and planning document. For example, the Asian Development 
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Bank (2003) promoted (among other key requirements for an integrated 
approach to water resources management) “improved governance”, the Hague 
Ministerial Declaration (2000) called for “governing water wisely to ensure good 
governance, so that the involvement of the public and the interest of all 
stakeholders are included in the management of water resources”, and in 
Thailand, the current Tenth Economic and Social Development Plan (2007-2011) 
specifies that “the country should have quality environment and sustainable 
natural resources management under the good governance principle” (NESDB et 
al., 2008). 
Much of the changes that have taken place in the dominant paradigms to 
managing natural resources in general, and water more particularly, have been 
influenced by changes in planning theory. Natural Resource planning has long 
been based upon the rational-comprehensive model: scientifically-based and 
expert-driven, this model implicitly assumed consensus on a single objective, 
availability of all the data needed to support decisions and seemingly unlimited 
financial resources and time (Lachapelle et al. 2003). This approach has 
increasingly been criticised and successively altered and replaced, as the 
credibility of the rational planning model was widely debated and challenged (Lim 
1986, Lachapelle et al. 2003). Increasingly, planning theorists have started to 
debate methods and programs to encompass issues of discourse and 
inclusiveness (Fainstain, 2000). 
As early as the 1980s, Forester (1980) showed that relations of power are part of 
all planning exercises and argued that these power relations manifest itself in 
“unnecessary distorted communication”. While the modernist planning project 
allowed planners to provide ‘facts’, the more inclusive and communicative forms 
of planning now called on planners to work with contending parties and their 
competing claims (Saarikoski, 2002). Since then, scholars have constantly refined 
understandings of planning as a communicative enterprise. As Huxley (2000) 
summarized “the communicative planning literature rejects as unrealistic the idea 
of planning as technical and apolitical, and, indeed, technical and political 
neutrality are seen to be incapable of achieving planning’s reformative goals. 
Instead, planners and planning systems need to be responsive to differences, to 
be genuinely participatory, and to strive to create deliberative contexts, that, as 
far as possible, minimize inequalities of power and knowledge”. Mollinga (2008) 
argues that “the proposition that water resources management is an inherently 
political process is based on the idea that water control is at the heart of water 
resources management and should be conceived as a process of politically 
contested resource use.” (emphasis in original), while cautioning that water 
control cannot be reduced to its political nature. 
At the same time as theory started to embrace participatory or collaborative 
forms of planning, calls for more inclusive and democratic practice started to 
permeate water policy documents. It has been observed that within the Mekong 
Region there is a general call for participation, community/collaborative models of 
governance, and multi-stakeholder platforms or approaches focusing on 
negotiations (e.g. Dore, 2007; Molle, 2007). One clear example of the close link 
between the newly advocated modes of water resources planning was provided 
by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2006) which argued that 
“multi-stakeholder engagement processes” (MSEPs) provide a key mechanism for 
avoiding political conflict and that “one multi-stakeholder approach to water 
management is Integrated River Basin Management1”. 
IWRM and Planning Rhetoric in Thailand 
                                          1 River Basin Management “is a more traditional term which has recently broadened its meaning to encompass many of the same features and values which characterize IWRM” (Svendsen et al., 2005). 
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As a member of the United Nations, the government of Thailand has ratified the 
Johannesburg Plan for Implementation at the World Summit for Sustainable 
Development in 2002; by 2006 the national policy and planning developments of 
Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Board had been revised to 
be in agreement with the United Nation’s framework on Sustainable 
Development, including the Ninth (2000-2006) and Tenth National Economic and 
Social Development Plans (2007-2011); and both the Agenda 21 and Local 
Agenda 21 had been implemented between 1997 and 2006. All of these 
developments prominently featured participatory approaches to planning, 
development and management of natural resources. 
These wider changes are reflected in its approaches to managing water 
resources, with IWRM being the officially favoured water management paradigm 
of the country. The Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997 
to 2001) considered “to promote effective management, involving the 
collaboration of various different sectors of society, so as to achieve greater 
balance in ecosystem and environments” and elaborated that “opportunities will 
be provided for local people and organizations to play a greater role in natural 
resource and environmental conservation” (NESDB, 1996). The National Water 
Vision Statement for Thailand, released in 2001, concurred with the need for 
more participatory approaches in water management, and contained all parts of a 
progressive approach to water resources management. It reads “by the year 
2025, Thailand will have sufficient water of good quality for all users through 
efficient management and an organizational and legal system that will ensure 
equitable and sustainable use of water resources, with due consideration given to 
the quality of life and the participation of stakeholders” (Ti and Facon, 2001). The 
Ninth Economic and Social Development Plan argued that “the government will 
try to set up the institutional framework of water administration with users’ 
participation by transforming its strategy and operating style in order to give 
opportunity to stakeholders, especially local people, to participate in water 
resources management” (Sethaputra et al., 2001). In line with this trajectory of 
participatory rhetoric is the current Tenth National Economic and Social 
Development Plan for the years 2007-2011, which targets to build “strong 
communities with an inherent strategy to improve communities through increased 
participation, planning and knowledge management” (ITD, 2007). Equally the 
National Sustainable Development Strategy (NESDB et al., 2008) calls for 
“developing models and replicating all sectors’ integrated participatory water 
source management and rehabilitation”, and more generally aims “at developing 
Thailand to be a participatory society in development based on honesty, 
transparency and impartiality”. 
All of the above is evidence of attempts by policy makers and water management 
specialists to foster Integrated Water Resources Management approaches in 
Thailand, with a participatory rhetoric adopted in virtually all documents, 
guidelines and public speeches by a host of actors both within the country’s 
administration and beyond. The Asian Development Bank, for example, opined 
that “Thailand’s rich historical relationship with water has evolved in recent years 
into a dynamic program of integrated water resources management with 
participation of local stakeholders” and that, “Thailand has established itself as a 
leader in pioneering a participatory approach to water resources management in 
river basins” (ADB, 2004). Also, the quasi-non-governmental Thai Water 
Resources Association stated that “the integrated water resources management 
principle has been incorporated into the water resources management process of 
Thailand” (ESCAP, 2005). 
Participation is a very broad term capturing many meanings and interpretations 
(Heyd and Neef, 2004), stretching from passive participation to information 
sharing, to consultation and institutionalized participation. Collaboration, as 
advocated by planning scholars, of course, needs to substantially differ from 
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passive participation (with people being told what is happening), participation in 
information giving (with people participating by answering questions), and 
participation by consultation with people being consulted, while external agents 
define both the problems and solutions. Collaborative planning requires that 
problems are jointly defined, that solutions are broadly discussed and assessed, 
and that different types of knowledge are factored into the process of planning. 
Neef (2009) has argued that the concept of polycentric governance “provides a 
useful tool to understand many of the transformation processes within water 
governance regimes” by changing the responsibilities and capabilities of state and 
non-state actors, while shifting power and resources amongst these actors.  The 
focus on collaboration in contemporary planning theory, apart from mere rhetoric, 
probably results from a recognition that ‘participation’ has achieved buzzword 
status, and that it has increasingly been reduced to “a series of methodological 
packages and techniques”, while at the same time slowly losing its philosophical 
and ideological meaning (Leal, 2007). 
The Lao-Thai Water Transfer 
Setting the scene 
Planners concerned with agricultural development in Northeast Thailand have 
long been concerned with the possibilities to bring more water to a region that 
has been consistently portrayed as water scarce for the last half century of 
development intervention (Molle and Floch, 2008; Blake and Floch, 2009). This, 
perhaps, explains the tendency for politicians and state planners to be concerned 
with almost exclusively promoting irrigation development to augment existing 
supplies with water imported from outside the region ever since the early 
development phases of the region’s drainage basins2. Initially these water 
imports were designed to be sourced from the ambitious Pa Mong “multi-purpose” 
dam on the mainstream Mekong. However, as geo-political, socio-economic and 
environmental concerns slowly derailed that dam project, planners continued to 
work on other, no less ambitious plans to transfer water to the region. Briefly, 
these post-Pa Mong projects included (i) the “Green Isaan” project in the 1980s 
(Molle et al., 2009), (ii) the “Khong-Chi-Mun Irrigation Project” in the 1990s 
(Sneddon, 2003) and (iii) the “Water Grid” project in 2003 (Molle and Floch, 
2008). This brief chronology not only sets the background for this chapter, it also 
framed the historical setting that a planning team “scoping for options in joint 
Lao-Thai water management” entered. It is this particular initiative that we are 
concerned with in the following section. 
Visions to divert water from the lower sections of the Nam Ngum River in the Lao 
PDR to Thailand date back to at least 1994 when Sanyu consulting proposed to 
divert water from the lower section of the Nam Ngum River to Northeast Thailand 
(Southeast Asia Rivers Network, 2002), diverting water both to the Lam Pao 
Reservoir and the Nam Songkhram Basin. This initiative followed the early phases 
of the implementation of the Khong-Chi-Mun irrigation project, with a cascade of 
in-stream weirs along the main rivers of northeast Thailand implemented to 
capture runoff and utilize for agricultural production through large-scale pumping 
schemes. Importantly, while the implementation of the Khong-Chi-Mun project 
not only triggered popular protest within Thailand, it also was part of the reason 
the Interim Mekong Committee (the predecessor of today’s Mekong River 
Commission) was discontinued (Molle and Floch, 2008). In essence, with the 
former basin arrangements vesting veto rights with member countries to 
challenge mainstream abstractions of water resources (planned under the Khong-
Chi-Mun project), Thai water bureaucrats argued that a transfer from the Nam 
                                          2 For a more complete reference of the history of irrigation planning and development in Northeast  Thailand see for example: Chomchai, 1994; Sneddon, 2003; Floch et al. 2007, Molle and Floch, 2008; Molle et al., 2009 
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Ngum to northeast Thailand would be considered merely a tributary development, 
to be treated solely under bi-lateral negotiations. Sanyu (2004) later presented 
another version of this development option, which extended the 1994 study by 
including possible diversions from the other tributaries in the Lao PDR, including 
the Xe Bang Fai, all of which later became prominent parts of the Water Grid 
proposal. Significantly, it was the 2004 version of the water transfer plan that 
was re-discussed under the MWRAS study (described below). 
The Background 
In October 2004, the World Bank (WB) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
announced that they would undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 
possible long-term sustainable use of water resources in the Mekong River Basin, 
as a basis for preparing a Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy (MWRAS) 
(BIC, 2005). MWRAS aimed to provide guidelines on the management and 
utilization of water resources in the Mekong Basin, “ensuring that the principles of 
‘balanced development’ are incorporated into the water resources projects” 
(AMRC, 2007). In its inception phase, MWRAS focused on three target areas 
suitable for testing the proposed development activities, including the border 
section of the Mekong Basin between Lao PDR and Thailand. Seven criteria 
justified the selection of these target regions (WB and ADB, 2006), including: (1) 
economical and financial attractiveness, (2) potential to deliver multiple benefits 
while protecting key social and environmental values, (3) easy identification of 
trade-offs, (4) creating an environment to develop stronger governance 
institutions, (5) aggregate financial capabilities, (6) potential to build regional 
trust, and (7) being broadly endorsed by all stakeholders, NGOs and civil society.  
The same month that an MWRAS working paper was published, a consultant to 
the WB also prepared an inception report titled “Scoping for Options for Joint 
Water Resources Development and Management between Lao PDR and Thailand 
in the Mekong Basin” (Consultant Report, 2006). As this study detailed with 
regard to the overall MWRAS strategy “work in these three regions3, taken 
together, would stimulate a growing sense of cooperation, and that each country 
can receive benefits in a win-win perception because it generates economies of 
scale, builds regional trust, delivers multiple benefits and helps set up and 
strengthen governance institutions”. Also, the report explained that “these three 
regions have been brought forward by the countries, and also through the 
bottom-up planning process of the Basin Development Program (BDP) of the 
Mekong River Commission Secretariat (MRCS)”. Indeed, the MWRAS working 
paper summarized that “the Royal Thai Government has identified better water 
provision as its second highest national priority”, especially in Northeast Thailand.  
Planning for water diversions into Northeast Thailand had gained considerable 
momentum prior to the MWRAS. In 2003, the Royal Thai Government under 
then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, announced that the country was to 
engage in an ambitious megaproject to increase the area under irrigation in the 
country from 4.7 million ha by a further 16.5 million ha within five years, to 
enable farmers to cultivate and access water around the year. The largest 
beneficiary of that project was to be Northeast Thailand, the electoral stronghold 
of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai administration. In early 2004, however, the project 
came under increasing criticism (Molle and Floch, 2008): academics questioned 
its economic profitability and social and environmental activists predicted salinity 
and social equity problems would arise. Further, the massive amount of capital 
needed in realizing this vision triggered bureaucratic rivalries, as both the Royal 
Irrigation Department (under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives) and 
                                          3 The three sub-regional areas identified included (i) the sub-region shared by Thailand and Lao PDR along the Mekong River (ii) the 3S area shared by Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam, and (iii) the parts of the Mekong Delta shared by Viet Nam and Cambodia (WB and ADB, 2006) 
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the Department of Water Resources (under the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment) competed for overseeing the project with separate plans produced 
by each department (Samabuddhi, 2004). When in September 2006 a military 
coup ended the reign of the Thaksin government, the Water Grid plans were put 
to a temporary halt. Still, and importantly, it is this highly politicized planning 
environment situated between a surprise military coup and bureaucratic infighting 
that the appointed consultants engaged in studies to promote greater 
regionalisation in water sharing futures. 
The Rhetoric 
When the MWRAS consultancy team commenced work in 2006, it issued an 
inception report stating that the study would follow “a holistic, consultative and 
inclusive ‘sub-basin’ approach with a regional perspective and involve interactive 
phased processes” (Consultant Report, 2006). In more detail, the study team 
explained that the approach would: (i) take into consideration not only 
technical/engineering possibilities but socio-economic and environmental 
dimensions, (ii) reflect views of wider stakeholders through consultation and 
public meetings, and (iii) pay attention to upstream developments and possible 
impacts on the downstream basin. As such, the wording of the inception report 
borrowed from best practice of both contemporary planning theory (consultation, 
inclusive, interactive, public meetings) and the wider IWRM paradigms (multi-
disciplinary, upstream-downstream interactions). But the most critical aspect of 
the planning endeavour was the attempt to forward a notion of collaborative and 
participatory planning, including wider civil society in an attempt to adhere to a 
best-practice planning routine.  
The justifications forwarded in a second working paper by the consultancy team 
(Consultant Team, 2007a) summarized the rationale as a text-book case for 
large-scale water transfer: 
The rich volume of water is left untapped in Lao PDR while most of the 
tributary basins on the other bank of the Mekong, Northeast Thailand, suffer 
from water shortage every year during the dry season. Both Lao PDR, which is 
water rich, and NE Thailand, which is water-stressed, could realise benefits 
equally by the consorted [sic] efforts of formulation and implementation of 
joint development and management of water resources and water related 
activities in the tributaries of and the mainstream of the Mekong. 
The case for a transboundary diversion, thereby, was inscribed and set initially: 
the “water- scarce” and suffering Northeast Thailand was to receive water from 
“water rich” Lao PDR, thereby generating a supposed win-win situation. However, 
the benefits for the Lao PDR were not readily apparent and were mostly seen in 
terms of potential payments of resources royalties, and options to foster Foreign 
Direct Investment from neighbouring Thailand (including potentials for large-scale 
concession to the private sector for developing irrigated agriculture, such as bio-
fuel production). Equally in Thailand, benefits from such foreseen investments 
had earlier been contested when the Water Grid was initial proposed under the 
Thaksin administration, and did not feature prominently in the consultant’s 
report. While the study highlighted other possible options for joint-water 
development4, it is the water transfer that (maybe more than any other 
component) highlights the challenges of implementing IWRM principles within a 
historically contextualised planning environment. Of course, such an ambitious 
undertaking would require a considerable amount of additional infrastructure 
development to transfer, distribute and make use of water resources (Figure 1). 
                                          4 Importantly, this included options for irrigated agricultural development in the Vientiane Plain and the Khammouan-Xe Bangfai Plain in Lao PDR.  
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Figure 1: Option for Nam Ngum – NE Thailand Water Transfer  
(Source: Consultant Report, 2007a) 
The study team argued, that the positive impacts of this development option 
would include both flood mitigation in the Huay Luang and Huay Suai basins, as 
well as “assured dry season water supply for all residents for all purposes; 
especially for villages and farm households in Chi and Mun Basins” (Consultant 
Team, 2007a). In essence, this mirrored the political announcements made 
earlier by representatives of the Thai Government in advocating the water grid 
project (Molle and Floch, 2008). However, associated social and environmental 
costs were not discussed, even at the most basic level of estimates5. This neglect 
is, perhaps, explained by a prior study on the Nam Ngum Diversion (Sanyu 
Consultants Inc., 2004) which estimated total infrastructure costs at US$ 660 
million, or around 0.5 THB (Thai Baht) per cubic meter of transferred water, 
excluding potential resource royalties to the Government of Laos. Simultaneously 
with the Department of Water Resource’s planned cross-border water transfer 
project, RID have been compiling plans of their own to tap the waters of the 
Mekong bordering Loei Province and divert water via a series of reservoirs, 
tunnels, canals and other infrastructure into the Chi-Mun Basin and Nam 
Songkhram Basin (Thanopanuwat, 2008). Thanopanuwat (2008) stated that, 
“……the use of Mekong water will definitely be a powerful strategy in fighting 
against NE Thailand serious water shortage problem. It will serve the National 
Interest in every aspects” [sic]. 
                                          5 Apart from the initial guesstimates with regards to benefits to Laos, the Nam Ngum River Basin Integrated Water Resources Management Plan stated that “the proposal include the opportunity costs if the water could be used for irrigation or other purposes in Laos, the possible extensive flooding of the Vientiane Plain from the barrage, a barrier to fish passage from the Mekong to the Nam Ngum Basin rivers, water security to existing and future users, water royalties and impacts for existing and possibly new tourism development”  (WREA, 2009). Also, the report (p. 52) classified the risk of negative impacts from out of basin transfer as “High”, with potential “highly negative impacts” with regards to the environment, fisheries and flooding. Importantly, the report does not indicate one single category that would result in positive impacts. 
Page 151 of 852
PN67_2010_06 
Water Transfer Planning in Northeast Thailand: Rhetoric and Practice 




Public Scrutiny and Stakeholder Involvement 
In February 2007, the MWRAS team of consultants invited a narrow range of 
selected stakeholders to a meeting at the Charoen Thani Princess Hotel in Khon 
Kaen, Northeast Thailand. The audience was composed of a mix of government 
officials from various ministries and departments, some representatives from the 
nascent regional River Basin Committees 6(RBC), Thai academics, and a handful 
of NGO and civil society representatives (most notably from the International 
Union for Conservation of Nature and the Thailand Environment Institute), with 
the consultant team7 aiming to air their study recommendations against a 
‘critical’ audience. 
As might have been expected, the criticism that emerged within the discussion 
was manifold. A representative of the Khong8 RBC argued that the study should 
have been transparent in the first place, and that he failed to see any valuable 
benefits arising from the project. Another representative from the same river 
basin committee felt that only benefits were presented, and questioned whether 
anyone will be negatively impacted. Others asked the consultants to provide 
evidence of successful irrigation projects in Northeast Thailand. A representative 
of the Chi RBC indicated the amount of prior studies produced on this issue that 
were not factored in the consultants’ report. Representatives of IUCN pointed to 
possible impacts on regional wetlands-based livelihoods and other natural 
resources while also pointing to previous negative experiences arising from the 
semi-completed Khong-Chi-Mun project. One underlying question during the 
meeting was summarized by a member of the Khong RBC: “Do we ask the right 
question? Do they really need water more than other things?” (Consultant Team, 
2007b). However, while the responses of the invited participants were perhaps 
predictable within the Thai context of contested water resource projects, the 
consultation proceedings were interrupted by a group of NGO protesters who took 
the microphone, demanding their voices be heard, arguing that, “people be 
informed about the project” and to “cancel the water transfer between Thailand 
and Laos”, maintaining that “Thai farmers are getting poorer as a result of more 
big projects” (Protest Communiqué, 2007). It was apparent that the “public” 
stakeholder consultation had excluded large sectors of the Northeast Thai non-
state actors with definite interests in water resources planning and decision-
making processes. The views of Lao stakeholders’ were not considered either, nor 
was there recognition of the fact that such a public protest would be virtually 
untenable in Lao PDR. 
In the aftermath of the Khon Kaen stakeholder workshop the momentum of this 
particular episode in planning the Nam Ngum water diversion project, was lost, 
while the attention of the project portfolio resulting from the MWRAS shifted 
towards other potential support within the Mekong basin. At the same time, and 
within Thailand, the diversion of water from the Mekong or from neighbouring Lao 
PDR (of course) continued to rank high on the agenda, although serious questions 
remained as to what degree Laos was supporting the project plans. In June 2008, 
the then-newly elected Prime Minister Samak (widely seen as a proxy of deposed 
                                          6 The River Basin Committee (RBC) concept  is a product of the rhetorical adoption of IWRM principles at the national level that emerged from the formulation of a national water vision and policies following the formation of the Department of Water Resources in 2002. 7 Composed of Japanese private sector consultants, accompanied by Khon Kaen University academics engaged to prepared the Thai components under the study.  8 “Khong” refers to all the tributaries of the Mekong River lying in Northeast Thailand, excluding the Chi and Mun river basins, which arbitrarily forms one of 25 identified river basins lying within Thai territory and used to demarcate an imagined hydro-ecological unit. 
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PM Thaksin Shinawatra) announced his intention to invest in megaprojects, 
including water diversions (Ekachai, 2008). More recently, the project to siphon 
water from the Nam Ngum River won cabinet approval (Wipatayotin, 2008), 
although it is far from clear to what extent the Lao authorities are on-board with 
the plans. A senior Lao irrigation official who delivered a paper at a Food and 
Agriculture Organisation regional conference in Vietnam suggested that it may 
not be necessary or desirable to transfer water to Thailand out of tributaries, but 
instead sell a reserved share of its flow input to the Mekong to its neighbour, 
claiming this was a “holistic view” and in line with MRC’s multilateral agreement 
on use of Mekong flows (Pheddara, 2007).  Lately, under the present Thai 
government, both the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and the Department of 
Water Resources (DWR) are engaged in preparing new detailed proposals to 
import water either directly from Lao PDR or by drawing from potential increased 
dry season flows within the Mekong mainstream itself that are expected to result 
from hydropower generation upstream in Yunnan. However, the Thai and Lao 
riparian populations and civil society at large are being kept firmly in the dark 
about the justifications for and details of these plans or the chance to engage in 
meaningful dialogue about regional water futures. 
Water Resources Planning: Between Theory and Practice 
While it goes well beyond the scope of this chapter to scrutinize the plethora of 
claims associated with  water development plans of the complexity of such inter-
basin or cross-border water diversions, it is equally important to discuss how 
planning played out vis-à-vis the ideal set out in policy documents and the 
rhetoric of consultants’ reports. 
Collaborative planning embraces collective decision-making in ways that 
enhances more transparent and accountable forms of governance, allowing all 
participants to debate and interrogate others (Brand and Gaffkin, 2007). As such, 
communicative planning literature suggests that planners can foster distortion-
free communication and that such communication can result in a consensus 
based agreement (Huxley, 2000). This has been questioned by scholars, and 
Mouffe (1999) even argued that free and unconstrained public deliberation of all 
matters of common concern is conceptually impossible.  As Brand and Gaffkin 
(2007) explained “power differentials, a reality well recognized by many 
advocates of collaborative planning, cannot be dissolved through logical 
argumentation”. To be fair, this should not be mistaken with the fact that the 
pursuit of informing public deliberation could contribute to better decision-making 
in water resources planning. Yet, better planning relies mostly on addressing 
power inequalities, an issue that is hardly addressed in planning guides and policy 
documents as this would explicitly challenge current elites and entrenched power 
structures. 
Thailand’s recent water development history has been marked by events of public 
deliberation that turned out as mere public announcement forums (Sneddon, 
2003; Molle and Floch, 2008; Chang Noi, 2009), aiming to ‘educate’ an 
‘uninformed’ or ‘uneducated’ rural population about the merits of a particular 
investment. This is at odds with attempts to build what Novotny (1999) calls 
“socially robust knowledge”, or public participation that goes beyond state actors 
(and consultants engaged by them) defining both problems and solutions. 
Without specific recognition of power differentials in society, IWRM and its 
variants such as Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) are in danger of 
becoming no more than a managerial exercise, similar to some of the blueprint 
participatory processes in rural development (Neef, 2009) or be reduced to a 
“Nirvana” concept (Molle, 2008). 
The brief workshop in Khon Kaen outlined above, which was admittedly only to 
present intermediate project findings, provides a case in point. Trying to channel 
‘participation’ through the institutional framework of the Mekong River 
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Commission (and particularly its National Mekong Committees) ensured that the 
starting hypothesis (the problem definition) was in agreement with national goals 
guiding water policy in Northeast Thailand. This bias was augmented by the very 
definition (MRC, 2005) of stakeholders: internal stakeholders which are the 
governing bodies of the MRC and the principle line agencies of each member 
country and external stakeholders which constitute non-state bodies such as 
NGOs, implementing partners, civil society organizations, policy advocators, 
research groups, individual media, and other groups who have interest or stakes 
to gain or lose (Middleton, 2007). As the invitation list confirms, the consultants 
aimed to open up discussion to internal stakeholders, inviting members of the 
Thai National Mekong Committee, River Basin Committees and concerned line 
agencies, with only a few additional resources person invited (including the 
authors of this chapter). External stakeholders, importantly the extremely active 
wider Thai NGO community, were not invited. However, by opening up the 
discussion (both voluntarily and involuntarily), the planning team found itself 
confronted in a value discussion, that they had aimed to avoid. 
It was argued that MWRAS “turned a blind eye to more complex issues” including 
barriers to participation and decentralization of power, vested interests and 
competition within and between ministries, and regional politics (Middleton, 
2007). This is evident in the Inception Report prepared for the joint-water 
resources development which aimed to de-politicize the social history of water 
transfer planning in Northeast Thailand. This meant that at the time the 
consultant team’s offered its findings, “options” were only marginally part of the 
efforts, but discussions quickly surrounded the history and record of water 
resources development in the region, which had either been ignored or removed 
from sight.  
Adding to this is the recognition that parties in a dispute usually not only disagree 
over single knowledge claims, but also employ essentially different frameworks 
through which they select evidence and provide it with meaning and 
interpretation (Saarikoski, 2002). Within the available and highly heterogeneous 
existing knowledge base concerned with irrigation in Northeast Thailand, planners 
(by the setup of the project itself) favored conventional knowledge provided by 
state-actors, and as such violated one core principle associated with 
communicative planning: that for collaborative planning there are no privileged 
types of knowledge9 (Brand and Gaffkin, 2007). This, however, would have 
greatly improved both the quality of the generated plans and the deliberation at 
the workshop. 
Also, collaboration is often presented as the only valid stakeholder strategy to 
resolve differences. However, and particularly in the context of Northeast 
Thailand, this neglects that stakeholders and civil society organizations might 
have important other strategies available to open up political space and 
democratize planning. As Thai political scholar Somchai Phatharathananunth 
(2006) pointed out, “the importance of civil society for democratic development in 
Thailand is more pronounced because of the exclusionary nature of Thai 
democracy”. In addition, the author argued that “only through political 
mobilization can movements build their bargaining powers and force the state to 
recognize them as political forces unable to be ignored”. 
Of course, the above should not suggest that collaborative planning (at least in 
theory) does ignore the role of power in planning (see for example Healey, 2003). 
Dore (2007), for example, argued that power relationships embedded in the 
Mekong Region political context undoubtedly influence the extent that meaningful 
participation and negotiation is possible. However, there is evidence that powerful 
actors have increasingly co-opted the initial hypothesis and rhetoric, which now 
                                          9 Within Northeast Thailand, alternative forms of knowledge production have evolved over the last 20 years, including Thai Baan research. 
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more often than not masks business-as-usual approaches to planning. This 
confirms Edmunds and Wollenberg (2002) who argued that powerful groups often 
manipulate seemingly neutral terms that are quickly agreed to in meetings, but 
then use them in ways that meet their very own needs. At the same time, the 
politics at work are scarcely analyzed or discussed, as water resources planning 
documents are invariably given a technocentric veneer, thoroughly sanitized and 
de-politicized. 
Conclusion 
Official documents on IWRM principles and practices, both within Thailand and the 
Mekong Region more generally, often suggest that  there have been tangible 
shifts in planning and policy paradigms. However, there is a wide gap between 
the rhetoric adopted both in national and international mainstream publications 
advocating better planning practices and the real-politics of water resources 
planning in the Lower Mekong Basin (see also: Molle, 2007; Sneddon and Fox, 
2007). 
We have argued that at the same time as collaborative modes of planning are 
discursively mainstreamed, the initial assumptions are increasingly obliterated or 
universalised to mask complexity, as actual implementation more closely 
resembles business-as-usual practices. This suggests that there is a likelihood 
that the catchphrases of participatory planning, collaborative planning, dialogue 
and negotiation, which today take centre stage in international policy and 
planning recommendations, will witness a similar fate as other normative 
buzzwords and utopian (?) concepts that have pre-occupied development scholars 
and practitioners (such as “sustainable development” and “IWRM” itself).  
Flyvbjerg (2002) argued that the use of the communicative theory of Jürgen 
Habermas in planning is problematic because it hampers an understanding of how 
power shapes planning, and that – more generally – communicative planning fails 
to capture the role of power in planning. As evidenced in the case of the planning 
for the water transfer project under the Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy, deliberation was initially confined to “internal” stakeholders, which 
frustrated the participation of the wider (and active) Thai civil society. In turn, 
those excluded had to use alternative strategies to open up a limited political 
space in order to voice their concerns within the planning efforts. The struggle for 
simple rights to be heard in nominally the most democratic of the Lower Mekong 
Basin nations, let alone rights to water resources and participation in water 
control negotiations, come starkly into focus in this instance. 
Of course, the struggle and slow pace to move from passive participation to more 
substantial stakeholder involvement and collaborative planning is not confined to 
Northeast Thailand or the Mekong Basin. Wester and colleagues (2003) have 
made similar observations in Mexico and South Africa. Yet, Flyvbjerg’s (1998, 
2002) argument that Michael Foucault’s focus on “what is actually done”, offers a 
type of analytic planning theory that possibly provides better prospects than 
Habermas’ focus on “what should be done”. In the words of the author: “If the 
goal of planning theorists is to create societal change which is closer to 
Habermas’ ideal society – free from domination, more democratic, a stronger civil 
society – then the first task […] is to understand the realities of power” 
(Flyvbjerg, 2002). This is supported by Edmunds and Wollenberg (2002) who 
argued that negotiations, deliberation and participation will achieve more “if we 
are more open in discussing the politics at work”, and also confirms Leal (2007) 
who argues that “participation needs to be re-articulated within broader 
processes of social and political struggle”. Ultimately, the inherently political 
nature of water resources planning, management and control underpins all 
decisions and is hard to escape in the real world. 
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Abstract 
This article aims to introduce the concept of a People’s EIAs as a model for a 
more participatory and transparent EIA process that can be potentially used as an 
innovative consensus-building tool for water governance. Direct experiences of 
participatory action research implementing of a People’ EIA entitled Social Impact 
Assessment of Hua Na Irrigation project of Si Sa Ket Province in the Northeast 
region of Thailand by the author is presented in this article. The project had been 
carried out during January 2008-August 2009 and was funded by the Royal 
Irrigation Project. Based this project, a People’s EIA greatly facilitates water 
governance as it allows stakeholders to participate in all steps of the assessment 
including developing issues to be studied, data collection, analysis, rechecking 
and writing a report in a more accessible manner allowing all stakeholders to 
understand. People also participate in a consensus building on impacts, mitigation 
plans and measures, implementation of mitigation plans and measures, decision 
making and long term impact monitoring. Therefore, it is believed that a People’s 
EIA will be a good lesson learned as pressure mounts throughout the Mekong 
region for large infrastructure projects lessons can be learned from those which 
have experienced serious problems in recent years, and have sought ways to 
resolve them. 
Improvement of EIAs in Thailand   
Over the past 20 years, the widespread environmental destruction and social 
dislocation associated with many large-scale water infrastructure projects have 
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been the source of numerous conflicts in Thailand. A key point of controversy has 
been the lack of full, reliable and comprehensive assessments and analyses prior 
to project construction.1 In theory, EIAs should provide an accurate prediction 
and assessment of the impacts of proposed large-scale projects, to help 
determine whether they should proceed at all. Critics further argue that political 
influences on supposedly neutral science and expertise have yielded unbalanced 
research on environmental and social impacts.2 In Thailand, as in other countries, 
EIAs have often been depicted as an exercise in rationalising pre-determined 
outcomes, rather than providing independent and rigorous analysis upon which 
sound decisions should be made.  
In addition, underestimation of social and environmental costs and exclusion of 
local perspectives on anticipated benefits, costs and social consequences of 
projects, have led many local communities, NGOs and academics to mistrust and 
question the veracity of EIAs, case such as the mega project the Kong-Chi-Mun 
Inter-basin Diversion Scheme (KCM) that was approved in 1989 by the Thai 
government.3 The Council of Ministers of the Chatichai government passed a 
resolution to approve the construction of this project and asked the Department 
of Energy and Development Promotion (DEDP), under the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, to complete feasibility studies by 1992. The study that was later 
presented and suggested that it was technically feasible to irrigate 4.98 million rai 
(796,800 ha) in 15 provinces of Northeast Thailand, with construction being 
envisioned in three successive stages over a period of 42 years.4 The KCM was 
transferred to the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) under the bureaucratic 
reform in 2002. 
However, this huge project has been continuously debated and criticized overtime 
by NGOs and academics about its impacts and cost effectiveness that has never 
been assessed thorough EIAs. Further, contested understandings of the costs and 
benefits associated with large dam projects have resulted in social conflicts at 
multiple levels, displacing and dividing communities. A key point of controversy 
has been the lack of comprehensive environmental and social assessments prior 
to project implementation such as such as Rasi Salai weir project.5 Other 
example is the Pak Mun hydropower dam located near the KCM shows how entire 
communities lost their sources of livelihood and how the project has failed to 
secure people’s livelihoods and the environment.6 It has been said that if the full 
                                          
1 Parichat Sivaruk. 2002. EIA: State of Knowledge, Problems and Alternatives. 
Bangkok. Thailand Research Fund. 
2 Thongchai Panswad and Pranee Pantumsinchai. 2004. Improvement of EIA 
Process in Thailand. Last accessed Nov 06 
www.eeat.or.th/articles/ImprovementofEIA.pdf  
3 The idea of this project was to divert water from the Mekong mainstream to 
store up in the Chi and Mun river basins. By doing so, at least 18 irrigated 
projects (weirs and dams) could be continuously constructed. The project was 
planned for completion within 42 years and divided into three phases Chainarong 
Sretthachau, Kittima Nungern and Anna Olsson. Social Impacts of the Rasi Salai 
Dam, Thailand:Loss of Livelihood Security and Social Conflict. in 
http://www.searin.org/Th/RSD/rsd_wcd_e1.htm 
4 Philippe Floch, Molle François and Loiskandl Willibald . A Chronology of Irrigation 
Development in the Chi-Mun River Basin, Northeast Thailand, (Working Paper) in 
http://www.mpowernet.org/download_pubdoc.php?doc=3629 
5Sanan Choosakul et al., 2006. Community Rights Studies: Cased of Mun-Chi 
River Basins. Thailand Research Fund. 
6 Two EIA for Pak Mun were completed in 1982 and 1984.  However, the EIA 
related to a dam design entirely different to that which was built and at a location 
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costs and impacts of these projects were accounted for, neither these projects 
would have been built.7  Not only the large scale project, but also medium and 
small scale water projects have problems of lacking of an impact assessment as 
the later two require only an Initial Environmental Examination (IEE), which 
bypasses the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning.8 In sum impact 
assessments in Thailand rarely involve people in the assessment. Therefore, this 
limited space for local people and the public to articulate their concerns regarding 
impacts of huge water infrastructure projects, let alone frame the issues of 
importance calls for an urgent review of the EIA process. 
Thailand’s EIA legislation has been amended many times. Thailand was one of the 
first countries in Southeast Asia to legislate for a national EIAs process. Since its 
adoption in 1981, laws and regulations regarding EIAs have undergone numerous 
amendments, the most recent being the Enhancement and Conservation of the 
National Environment Quality Act enacted in 1992 (NEQA 1992). The Act includes 
provisions for specifying the type and size of projects that must submit the EIAs, 
as well as prescribing two separate EIA procedures depending on whether a 
project requires Cabinet approval or not.9  
Whilst the NEQA 1992 is an improvement on previous legislations on EIA 
procedures, it still faces a number of shortcomings. For examples, a number of 
                                                                                                                       
nearly one kilometre downstream. In the case of Rasi Salai dam, no EIA was ever 
conducted prior to its construction. A post-project EIA commissioned in 2002. 
7 Philippe Floch, Molle François and Loiskandl Willibald . A Chronology of Irrigation 
Development in the Chi-Mun River Basin, Northeast Thailand, (Working Paper) in 
http://www.mpowernet.org/download_pubdoc.php?doc=3629 
8 Unlike the Environmental Impact Assessment, an IEE do not need to be 
submitted to the Office of Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) for approval 
as stated in the National Environmental Quality Act 1992, Section 46-47. Projects 
or activities listed in the legislation including dams or reservoirs with a storage 
volume of 100 Mm³, or storage area of 15 km² or more that need to prepare EIA 
Reports (OEPP 1998). 
9 Thailand’s EIAs have incorporated many legislations is partly due to the 
movement for social reforms following the military coup d'état of the previous 
year, the government abolished the 1975 National Environmental Quality Act and 
replaced it with The first mandatory provision for EIAs, 1981 Under Sec 46 of the 
Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act (NEQA) 
1972 (2515) and later the improvement in The National Environmental Quality 
Act 1992 (2535), section 46-47 (Bantita Pitchyakorn 2006:65).9 The Environmental 
Impact Evaluation Bureau (EIEB) under Office of Natural Resources and Environmental 
Policy and Planning (ONREPP) is responsible for specifying the types of projects 
that require EIAs and undertaking the preliminary review of submitted EIAs and 
making recommendations to the Expert Review Committee who will make the 
final judgment. The EIEB is also responsible for monitoring the environmental 
performance of projects after the EIAs has been approved. Twenty two types of 
proposed projects or activities, ranging from oil refineries to medium sized hotels 
and condominiums must be mandatory to conduct EIAs.  
9 It is also required that all large-scale dams require cabinet approval, and an EIA 
must be submitted at the project feasibility stage and conducted by registered 
consultants in accordance with guidelines issued by the ONREPP. All large dams 
with a reservoir volume exceeding 100 million cubic metres or surface area of at 
least 15 square kilometres; or irrigated area of at least 80,000 rai (12,800 
hectares) must submit an EIASSS .For more information on procedures and 
institutional structure of EIASSS in Thailand, see: the ONREPP website 
<www.onep.go.th/EIASSs/ENGLISH/EIASSs_eng_index.htm>  
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small and medium-scale projects with potential social and environmental impacts 
are not required to undertake an EIA. There is also an insufficient emphasis on 
the social impact assessments in the EIA procedure. Moreover, the EIA is a 
government-controlled process. There are very limited avenues for genuine public 
participation throughout the entire EIA process – from its inception, when project 
developers scope and formulate the terms of reference, through to the report 
review process, undertaken by government agencies and government-appointed 
committees.  
Thailand has tried to improve EIA’s regislation by intregrating a concept of 
people’s participation. The Thai constitutions of B.E. 2540 (1997) and B.E. 2550 
(2007) added a concept of people’s participation in the protection of the 
environment, social, health culture and local livelihoods10. The right of access in 
information on EIAs by the affected people was prescribed in the constitutions.  
The constitution says that “a person shall have the right to participate in the 
decision making process of State officials in the performance of administrative 
functions that affect or may affect his or her rights and liberties, as provided by 
law”. This is confirmed later by the 2003 Royal Decree on Guidelines and 
Procedures on Good governance which states that the arranging of public hearing 
prior to the operation of the project must be made.11 The EIEB joined with World 
Bank to draft the “Guidelines on participation and Social Impact Assessment in 
Environmental Impact Assessment” in 2006. This guideline prescribed about 
principles of EIA, meaningful people’s participation in EIA such as principles of 
stakeholders’ participation, transparency, and accountability, and 
decentralization, local knowledge, mitigation measures to restore unintended 
consequences, health problem, and fair compensation and so on. In addition, the 
guideline states that public consultation also must be a critical part of the process 
and the views of local residents and other stakeholders should be included via 
surveys and public meetings so that their concerns can be addressed in the EIA 
report.12 So the people’s participation in Thailand’s EIA is required by law. 
Royal Irrigation Department and PEIAs 
The Royal Irrigation Department (RID) is one of government agencies responsible 
for irrigation development in Thailand13. This agency is responsible for 
construction of many kinds of irrigation projects and flood protection. They 
include a construction of run-off-river diversions of mall to medium and large 
scale irrigation schemes, an operation of mobile pumps wherever possible and 
needed and flood-protection projects, with the main objective to create schemes 
that would supply additional water for wet season agriculture. In the Northeast 
region, the RID firstly commenced its construction efforts in the northeast 
Thailand in 1939 with the construction of pilot irrigation tank projects and run-off-
river diversions which caused a major change with regards to water resources 
developments in the region in order to provide multipurpose water resource 
development for economic growth in the region. 14 The RID’s irrigation projects 
                                          
10 Office of Prime minister. The Public Hearing protocol 2006. (Black paper). 
11 Bantita Pitchyakorn. 2006.  Bantita IUCN. 2006. Mekong Region Water Resource 
Decision Making: National Policy and Legal Frameworks vis a vis World 
Commission on Dam Strategies Priorities. Bangkok. Chung Wicha Press. 
12 www.onep.go.th/EIA/ENGLISH/about_eieb/about_eieb.htm  
13 Mingsarn Kaosa-ard. 1997. Water resource management policy in Thailand. 
National Research Council. 
14 Philippe Floch, Molle François and Loiskandl Willibald cited in 
http://www.mpowernet.org/download_pubdoc.php?doc=3629 
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were less criticized as its utilization has been fruitful and impacts are not 
extensive.15  
However, after the RID was granted the former DEDP’s projects including the 
KCM, (the Hua Na weir is of the KCM projects), and other pumping stations 
operated in the Northeast region, the RID has been under pressure as these 
projects have long been criticized by local people, academics and NGOs with 
inefficiency in function. The RIDP has been pressured by many factors including a 
movement of the Assembly of the Poor (AoP)16 on redoing the EIAs with 
participatory manner to reassess of impacts of these projects on local livelihoods 
and ecology, a fair on financial compensation, a new approach of the EIA’s 
legislation and 2006 guidelines and the maximization of utilization of existing of 
irrigation projects under the KCM that were already contrasted. 
With all the mentioned pressures that the RID had, they started to find solutions 
how to resolve the conflicts by taking the most urgent project proposed by the 
AoP, the Hua Na weir to be assessed regarding environment, social and health 
impact assessment. RID and academics discussed how to start an assessment. 
Concept of participatory impact assessment, mentioned in the 2006 new EIA’s 
guidelines and offered by the AoP and academics were accepted by the RID as it 
was a consensus building tool for solving conflicts regarding EIAs. Details of a 
People’s EIAs (PEIAs) will be described in the later section after background of 
the Hua Na project is presented. 
Hua Na weir and its controversies 
The Hua Na weir is located on the Mun river. It is one of the projects under the 
KCM inter-basin water diversion scheme. The weir is a channel storage dam 
which is approximately 90 kilometres downstream of the Rasi Salai wier and 160 
kilometres upstream of the Pak Mun hydropower dam. Initially, the government 
claimed that Hua Na dam would be a 4-metre high rubber weir, which could be 
deflated during the wet season to minimise flooding. Instead, a 17-metre high 
concrete dam spanning over 200 metres with 14 gates was built, making it the 
largest dam in the KCM.17 
The Hua Na project was approved by the Thai government in 1989, the dam 
intended to provide irrigation to 61 communities in five districts in Si Sa Ket 
province.18 Since, the Hua Na project was approved; two main canals with the 
total length of all the canals of 88.85 kilometres were already completed in 2003. 
The 21 ditches were also built. About 10,000 households located along both 
canals have waited to utilize water. Expected irrigated areas of the Hau Na 
project are 77,000 rai.19  
                                          
15 Philippe Floch, Molle François and Loiskandl Willibald cited in 
http://www.mpowernet.org/download_pubdoc.php?doc=3629 
16 Assembly of the Poor was established in 1995 which became a highly influential 
force within four years. The AoP, supported by many NGOs and academics, 
claimed that the commissioning of the dam (through closure of the gates) had 
harmed their livelihoods as it had prevented migration of fish from the Mekong 
and had inundated their river bank gardens. The AoP used a variety of methods 
to pressurise successive Governments over a decade. 
17 Department of Energy and Development Promotion. 1996. Hua Na Weir 
Project. Bangkok. 
18 Department of Energy and Development Promotion. 1996. Hua Na Weir Project. 
Bangkok. 
19 Department of Development and Energy Promotion. 1996. Hua Na Weir Project. 
Bangkok. 
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Although the gates were installed in 2000, and over 2.1 billion baht was spent on 
the project, the Hua Na scheme has yet to be utilised because of opposition from 
local communities living near the river. 20 With the support of NGOs, local 
communities have successfully stopped the dam from being put into operation. A 
main point of contention is that a proper EIA was never conducted prior to 
construction. Initial Environment Assessment made by a consultant Company was 
unacceptable by EIEB and AoP as it was not properly done with an in-depth, 
comprehensive and participatory EIA.21. That EIA did not present the dependence 
of people on the Pha Boong Pha Taam, local name for wetlands which are very 
important resources for local livelihoods.22  
For the AoP, they also expressed their concerns about a problem of salinization of 
soil that may potentially spread throughout the region as it is estimated that 
there is 19.4 million rai23 (3.1 million ha) of land at risk of becoming saline in the 
region.24  The salinization is an endlessly critical issue for lots of debates among 
academics, government and NGOs regarding scepticism on how this problem will 
affect ecology and people’s livelihoods if irrigated areas are greatly expanded.25 
In addition, there is a criticism made by both NGOs and academics about an 
inefficiency of water development schemes that are provided in the region. A 
number of the proposed schemes (some completed, some planned) are on a very 
large-scale and include the ‘Accelerated Rural Development Programme’, the 
‘Greening Isan’ project, the ‘KCM’ and the ‘Water Grid’.  All are based on the 
questionable assumption (held by successive governments) that poverty in the 
Northeast region is drought induced and can be overcome through large-scale 
schemes26  
Further, this scheme has not only caused conflicts between the government and 
local communities but it has also been a source of tension between farmers 
awaiting their promised water and those who fear their livelihoods will be 
adversely affected by the dam. A great number of farmers (about 10,000 
households) are waiting for the benefits of irrigation that the government 
promised, and appear not to be concerned about an EIA, as long as they can get 
the water to begin irrigation. Currently when facing the water shortage during 
early rice cultivation, the pro group collectively proposed their needs to the 
village head and then the village head presented the list of farmers’ names who 
needed water for seedling to the Sub-district (Tambol) Administrative 
Organization (TAO) for help. The TAO coordinated further with Si Sa Ket Irrigation 
Project (SIP) to pump water at the pumping station directly from the Mun river to 
the existing canals. 27 
                                          
20 Assembly of the Poor. 2000. 16 Problems of the Assembly of the Poor. 
Bangkok. KangHun printing. (In Thai). 
21 Assembly of the Poor. 2000. 16 Problems of the Assembly of the Poor. 
Bangkok. KangHun printing. (In Thai). 
22 Sanan Choosakul et al., 2006. Community Rights Studies: Cased of Mun-Chi 
River Basins. Thailand Research Fund. 
23 1 hectare = 6.25 rai 
24Arunee Yuvanikhom in http://www.sri.cmu.ac.th/~environment/Download/050505.pd) 
25 Sanan Choosakul et al., 2006. Community Rights Studies: Cased of Mun-Chi 
River Basins. Thailand Research Fund. 
26 Philippe Floch, Molle François and Loiskandl Willibald cited in 
http://www.mpowernet.org/download_pubdoc.php?doc=3629 
27 Kanokwan Manorom, Surasom Krisanajutha and Noporn Chaungching. 2009.   
Social Impact Assessment of Hua Na Irrigation project of Si Sa Ket Province in the 
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Hence, local people are concerned that they will experience similar problems to 
that of communities affected by the Rasi Salai weir, located approximately 80 
kilometres upstream. Like Hua Na, the government claimed that Rasi Salai weir 
would be a rubber weir with minimal impacts, and no EIA was conducted prior to 
construction.28 Once the gates were closed in 1994, the nine metre high concrete 
weir created a reservoir stretching 120 kilometres which submerged more than 
8,000 hectares of surrounding wetlands, causing severe impacts on local 
communities.29 Moreover, the promised irrigation benefits never materialised, 
with the water too saline to be used for irrigation.30  
With the above argument, approximately, 7,000 villagers joined protests by dam-
affected communities in Rasi Salai weir and Pak Mun dam under the umbrella of 
the AoP to call on the government to address their concerns. With the support of 
NGOs, the AoP demanded that proposed that the PEIA was simply a mechanism 
for the Government to record the extent of their resource dependence. This 
mechanism included the need to conduct a full EIA using a participatory 
approach, establishment of a fair compensation scheme, a monitoring framework 
for all future possible impacts and appropriate solutions for any losses incurred – 
all of which must be addressed before the project begins operation. To help 
resolve the conflict and facilitate a decision on the future of the Hua Na weir, the 
RID has accepted an EIA, inclusive of the principles of the people’s EIA, should be 
conducted. In addition, the AoP and NGOs.31  
The PEIA experience at the Hua Na project 
The PEIAs at the Hua Na project was actually been started after the RID was 
granted a budget from the government in late 2007. This budget availability was 
a result of the force from the AoP’s who sent the proposals demanding on 
implementing the EIAs based on the amendment of the NEQA 1992 in the year 
1999 32 and later in 2001. In responding to the AoP, the government, the newly 
created Minister of Natural Resources and Environment appointed a Steering 
Committee on Monitoring the Participatory Impact Assessment (SCMPEIA) to 
monitor and supervise the process of conducting a full EIA in 2003. 33 With the 
                                                                                                                       
Northeast region of Thailand. Research project. Ubon Ratchathani University. 
Thailand. 
28 Although a feasibility study for the Hua Na project was conducted in 1992 by 
Asian Engineering Consultants Company and TEAM Consulting Engineering and 
Management Company, which tried to be passed off as an EIASSS, it was 
rejected because the EIASSS was not in accordance with guidelines and 
regulations prescribed by the NEQA 1992.  
29 http://www.searin.org/Th/RSD/rsd_wcd_e1.htm 
30 Sanan Choosakul et al., 2006. Community Rights Studies: Cased of Mun-Chi 
River Basins. Thailand Research Fund. 
31 Kanokwan Manorom, Surasom Krisanajutha and Noporn Chaungching. 2009.   
Social Impact Assessment of Hua Na Irrigation project of Si Sa Ket Province in the 
Northeast region of Thailand. Research project. Ubon Ratchathani University. 
Thailand. 
32 AoP offered 4 proposals to the government including The AoP sent petitions and 
declarations to the government demanding: 1) impediment of the project 
construction, 2) the implementation of an EIA in accordance with the amendment 
of the NEQA 1992 and 3) just compensation for the losses of local people.  
33 The SCMREPP was established comprising of NGOs, prospective affected 
villagers, neutral academics, involve line agencies, including staffs and experts 
from the RID, EIEB and ONREPP. The established SCMPEIA provides neutral space 
for involved stakeholders. The SCMPEIA plays a crucial role in advising, 
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force of the AoP’s movement supported by the New EIA legislation and the 1993 
Thai Constitute, the RID accepted to reassess with the compromise that this EIA 
of Hua Na would be an inclusive of the principles of the people’s EIA as mentioned 
earlier.  
In late 2007, the RID called for the meeting with all involved parties including 
affected people, beneficiary groups, NGOs, RID officials, and local interdisciplinary 
researchers from three universities who were selected by the RID to do the 
assessment.34  All parties especially constructively discussed the process of PEIAs 
as all believed and expected that PEIAs would be the best tool that could resolve 
the persistent conflict between the affected and beneficiary groups in relation to 
impact assessment and utilization of the project. For example, the affected group 
wanted to obtain very clear, solid and accurate information such as flooded areas, 
amount loss of wetlands while beneficiary group wanted to utilise Hua Na project.   
In addition, the academics offered the idea to local people that villagers both 
affected and beneficiary would be part of the assessment team in order to 
achieve the participatory EIAs. It was an agreement also that academics and 
research villagers (both from affected and beneficiary camps) would collect and 
analysis data. The discussion about whose villagers to be part of the team went 
on. Villagers proposed that villagers who would be researcher must be ones that 
had great interest and willingness to join the research team. They should possess 
leadership characters. They were able to help to shape guideline questions for 
interview, take short notes, ask questions and coordinate with other villagers and 
academics, to check data and to support academics in analyzing data. All these 
criteria for selection of the villagers were agreed and 21 villagers were selected 
from both groups to work with academics. 
Then, the processes of PEIAs were widely discussed by stakeholders to build a 
consensus on how people and publics participated through six steps, details of 
which are explained below. 
 
Step I: Agreed issues to be studied 
Step II: Data collection, analysis and rechecking 
Step III: Consensus building on impacts, mitigation plans and measures 
Step IV: Implementation of mitigation plans and measures 
Step V: Decision making  
Step VI: Long term impact monitoring 
 
Step I: Agreed issues to be studied 
Before starting the PEIAs, the RID called for the meeting among academics, 
NGOs and local people to discuss how the PEIAs should embark. Academics 
suggested that agreed issues by all stakeholders to be studied must be a starting 
point. Academics  helped the RID by facilitating a series of local-level workshops 
and focus group discussions on the agreed issues to be assessed with a diverse 
range of stakeholders including local officials, the project developer, and villagers 
(including those who agree and disagree with the project). The discussion about 
                                                                                                                       
commenting, suggesting the assessment team and later they are authorized to 
endorse the report before sending it to the ONREPP if the report complies with 
the guidelines and procedures prescribed by EIEB and ONREPP. They also propose 
the final agreed report to the National Environmental Committee and to the 
cabinet to approve the project. 
34 Local universities participated in PEIAs included Ubon Rathchathani University, 
Suranaree University and Khon Kean University. 
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the agreed issues to be studied traced back to Feasibility Studies (FS) made in 
1992 by the consultant company35 what critical issues that were left out from the 
study as the company tended to focus on the guideline prescribed by the ONREPP 
and how the critical issues would be added in the study.  
Affected people and NGOs presented that the FS pointed to a number of 
weaknesses in the EIA guidelines made by the ONREPP, in addressing the deep 
inter-linkages that exist among issues of land use, community rights and 
utilisation of natural resources such as fisheries and wetlands.36 For instance, the 
four issues – physical resources, ecological resources, human use values, and 
quality of life values – outlined in the guidelines, which must be assessed by all 
projects requiring EIAs, tend to be disconnected and rigid in its approach and 
analysis, without sufficient consideration of the diverse social, economic and 
cultural contexts in which projects are to be implemented.  
Therefore, affected people and NGOs suggested that the issues to be studied 
must cover all dimensions of people’s livelihoods such as degree of level of 
dependency on wetlands and vulnerability to change in wetlands, possible 
impacts in relation with flooding areas, compliant and anxiety regarding flooding 
and loss of livelihoods, compensation and mitigation plan, measures, 
implementation, social impact monitoring and etc. These issues were agreed upon 
by all parties as all perceived that those issues were very critical as they were key 
issues that provide data that all need to know for making decision about the 
project.  
These consent issues were presented to the SCMPEIA. The SCMPEIA accepted the 
them as they endeavoured to include diverse local perspectives and situations – 
farmers awaiting their promised irrigation benefits; local people whose lands 
(including those with and without land title) would be permanently submerged by 
the dam; and local people whose access to common resources, such as grazing 
land, seasonally flooded forests, and fisheries would be affected by the dam. The 
preliminary assessment and identification of different perspectives ensured that a 
more comprehensive and holistic list of issues and concerns were generated. 
These issues were then presented at a public forum, overseen by an independent 
advisory board, providing a space for stakeholders to participate in the decision 
over which issues required further study.  
Step 2: Data collection and analysis 
Academics proposed that besides household surveys, participatory action 
research, rapid rural appraisal and participatory rural appraisal were also 
employed for data collection as suggested by the 2006 EIAs’s guidelines. 
Research villagers agreed and were responsible to contact key villagers for focus 
group discussion and interviewed individual key informants with a support of 
academics. Questionnaire for a household survey was drafted and commented by 
research villagers and NGOs especially on critical issues of livelihood activities in 
relation to wetland resources, fishery, grazing land and pottery making. Then, 
academics discussed a way to analyze data with research villagers. Finally the 
team reached the conclusion that linking local knowledge to expert knowledge 
would be the best way to analyze data. As one research villagers who was 
member of the AoP said that  
                                          
35 This FS was revised this studies in 2001 but this report was rejected as it was 
unsatisfactory as it did not take into account all the important critical issues 
associated with local livelihoods and unclear social impact assessment.  
36 Assembly of the Poor. 2000. 16 Problems of the Assembly of the Poor. 
Bangkok. KangHun printing. (In Thai). 
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“when doing data analysis, we must realize about a significant problem which is 
how much clearly the Hua Na project will give impacts to us and how the project 
will give us benefits. Taking our knowledge into the analysis is the best way to 
do. These are the things that must be the heart of the analysis”.  
In addition, various techniques were used to incorporate local knowledge with so-
called “scientific knowledge”, such as the combining of community natural 
resource mapping with maps in project studies to help determine the extent of 
impact from inundation if the weir was to commission. To write the EIA’s report, 
academic drafted the report. The study team agreed that the PEIAs’report should 
be written in a way that it was more accessible by local people and the public. In 
the report, incorporation of local and scientific knowledge is encouraged.  
Step III: Consensus building on impacts, mitigation plans and measures 
Building consensus on impacts, mitigation plans and measures were also made 
during the assessment. For example, affected group was keen to discuss how the 
impacts would be based on their past experiences they faced serious flood in 
some years. At the same time, academics presented the simulation hydrological 
data.  Interdisciplinary team integrated all data. Social scientists fed data on 
livelihood’s pattern and local knowledge on hydrology, fishery, pattern of resource 
use and management into the database of the hydrologists. For example, flooded 
areas were very interesting to raise here as this issue was the most arguable one 
in the history of the Hua Na project which all parties including the AoP and RID 
really wanted to know changing upper flood limit in relation to changing different 
MSL (the study team simulated 6 levels of upper flooding limit starting from 
+112; +113; +114; +115; +116; and +117 MSL). 37 
They expected that this data would indicate what water level kept was the best 
for all farmer’s groups. Then hydrologist simulated flooding data and proposed 
that + 112 MSL was the best water level to be stored in the reservoir as it would 
not flood a large amount of forest, wetland and farming areas and there would be 
abundant water available in dry season. This simulation was done by 
incorporating local knowledge on flooding history that villagers had observed. The 
produced maps of the +112 MLS were given to the AoP and leaders of each 
groups and explained by hydrologist.  Villagers understood about the upper flood 
limit and areas where would be inundated. Finally the accepted +112 MSL was 
agreed and presented to the SCMPEIA and the RID by the study team. Both of 
them concurred with this proposal. 
In addition, the study team with the agreement from local people discussed how 
the Hua Na project would be managed to meet the need of all stakeholders at the 
same time this operation must correspond with ways in which other water 
projects located upstream (Rasi Salai weir) and downstream (Pak Mun Dam) of 
the Hua Na project operated. Basin management was then raised as the concept 
for the project management. As explained elsewhere that the Hua Na project is 
located in the middle part between the two dams, management of this project 
must be influenced by other existing projects in the basin, such as through 
changes in water flow. Therefore, stakeholders offered that a management of the 
Hua Na project had to consider the ways other dams or/and irrigation project are 
currently operated in order to avoid the adverse impacts of the flow and 
inundation within the same catchment.   
For the mitigation plan and measures, the AoP and NGOs offered idea of how 
PEIA would work for them if the Hua Na project was approved and commissioned. 
Both of them proposed the followings: 
                                          
37 Suranaree University. 2009. Environmental Impact Essessment of Hua Na 
Irrigation Project.   
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Affected people, people’s organizations, civil organizations (such as Sustainable 
Agriculture Organization or Wetland Organization working in the areas) and NGOs 
could propose major mitigation plans and measures that were relevant to the 
development projects that these people were now working on which were very 
successful in improving local people’s livelihoods for along time.  
People and NGOs must join the implementation of these plans with all involved 
government agencies. The engagement of people and NGOs would create sense 
of ownership and belongings of local people in the project developments and 
sustainably keep the mitigation plans and development activities. 
The government and academics supported people budget, training and update 
information on development.  
These proposals were acceptable by the SCMPEIA and the RID. Examples of these 
mitigation measures included community fund, organic agriculture, and 
community forestry and etc. 
Step IV: Implementation of mitigation plans and measures 
Many mitigation plans and measures proposed by people previously mentioned 
were agreed by the RID that they would be implemented by local people and their 
organizations supported by NGOs and academics. In the meeting with the 
SCMPEIA, there was an agreement that these mitigations would be started soon 
after compensation was completely made to the affected people.  
 
Step V: Decision making  
The stakeholders pointed out that the Hua Na’s PEIA must be used as a 
consensus building tool to convince a decision making bodies before deciding if 
the project was implemented. The RID was part of the SCMPEIA who always 
attended and advised the study team in all the meetings organized. Being part of 
the committee, the RID had learnt that the Hua Na project was not sustainably 
used if EIAs were not clearly undertaken through an open and participatory 
process. 
Based on the experience working in the Hua Na’s assessment, the final draft of 
the PEIA report was presented to all stakeholders before handling to the 
SCMPEIA. This platform provides all stakeholders to address their concerns and 
comments on critical results of the study.  Most importantly, this arena was the 
negotiating space of both the pro and the con groups to make a consensus 
building on water allocation and project management with regarding to seasonal 
changes, upper flood limit, compensation schemes and post monitoring of the 
agreed implementing programmes. The consensus building served as the 
springboard for decision making at the higher level. Then the study team 
incorporated and revised all the concerns, suggestions and recommendations 
given by stakeholders into the drafted report.  The revised version of the report 
was then submitted and later presented to the SCMPEIA and to the cabinet.  RID 
was confident that the initial decision made by them as the project owner and as 
part of the SCMPEIA, somehow would help to ensure that the cabinet would agree 
that the project should be approved and operated in a sustainable manner.   
Step VI: Long term impact monitoring 
The study team, SCMPEIA and stakeholders especially the NGOs discussed about 
long term impact monitoring of the Hua Na project. The stakeholders agreed that 
as this project was likely to be approved by the cabinet, the planed monitoring of 
the mitigation measures and the project management must be undertaken every 
3 years by independent group. The results of the monitoring must be reported to 
all stakeholders. 




The case of PEIA of the Hua Na project gives very good lessons to those who are 
involved with impact assessment and water governance.  The given PEIA case 
shows that PEIAs is not a mechanism to slow down project planning and 
implementing.  Rather, it is a useful tool to evaluate, in advance, the different 
problems, perspectives and interests by allowing grassroots people and wider 
publics to interactively participate in the EIA process. As pressure mounts 
throughout the region for large infrastructure projects lessons can be learned 
from those which have experienced serious problems in recent years, and have 
sought ways to resolve them. It is clear from the experience of the Hua Na and 
other large projects in Thailand that the value and legitimacy of the EIA process 
in assessing social and environmental impacts hinges on the adoption of methods 
that safeguard the participation of multiple voices and perspectives. Therefore, 
PIEAs are innovative tool that provide in-depth information for decision makers to 
achieve water governance as they provide consensus building on water 
management allowing a more participatory assessment, as defined by the 
legislation. It also tends to open wider opportunities for publics to articulate or 





Recommendations and conclusions 
The experience with the people’s EIA model in Hua Na, both highlights a number 
of weaknesses and complies with new approach of EIA in Thailand’s EIA 
procedure, and provides a means to facilitate genuine participation in the 
process. The PEIA model in Hua Na has, thus far, been positively received by a 
range of stakeholders including local people, NGOs and the project developer. 
Although the entire PEIAs may not be suitable for other countries in the Mekong 
Region, there are many parts of it that could be incorporated into similar 
approaches.  For example, if projects are to incorporate local (as well as 
government) perspectives participatory action research can be used to establish 
agreed issues to be studied before EIAs begin.  
In sum, PEIAs facilitate participation in the EIA process, by creating a space 
where local people can frame and articulate their needs, values, and priorities. 
PEIAs allow stakeholders to broaden the issues to be studied and resulted in more 
in-depth scoping.  The PEIAs focus on the issues identified by all stakeholders and 
on the links between the changing environment and people’s livelihoods. Public 
consultations involving all stakeholders, an active advisory board, frequent 
reporting, and participation in various stages of decision-making are key 
dimensions of the PIEAs. Therefore, a fundamental principle of the PEIAs is the 
inclusion of the different values and needs of diverse stakeholders from the 
PEIA’s inception, where potential impacts that need to be studied are identified. 
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This paper reviews contentious decision making around Pak Mun Dam, Thailand's 
most controversial dam, in operation since 1994. Following Pak Mun's approval in 
1989, debate and mobilization around its benefits and impacts accompanied the 
dam's construction and operation. The analysis covers a series of 14 decisions, 
beginning with decisions to design and propose a particular kind of dam (taken 
1960s–1988), and ending with a 2007 decision to delegate authority for Pak Mun's 
annual four-month opening to a provincial-level multi-stakeholder committee. 
Decision making since the early 1990s followed distinctive pathways which link 
robust processes such as framing, mobilization, repression, feedback (escalation), 
elite intervention, negotiation, and decision. These processes constitute political 
drivers in water allocation decision making. Although causally linked to each other, 
these drivers often required the presence of contingent events and processes to 
initiate them. Such events and processes included violence, media decisions to cover 
events, as well as events beyond the control of most actors (such as political 
instability in successive governments). The pathways and processes (drivers) model 
of decision making requires contextualization. Pak Mun analysis is set in the context 
of Thai democratization, accompanied by analysis of specific constraining institutions, 
such as power system planning, and state conflict management processes. 
2. Introduction  
Pak Mun Dam has been the subject of two decades of contentious decision making 
around its benefits and impacts. What lessons does the case offer about political 
drivers of success in decision making related to water allocation? 
The analysis presented here covers a series of 14 decisions, beginning with decisions 
to design and propose a particular kind of dam (taken 1960s–1988), and ending with 
a 2007 decision to delegate authority for Pak Mun's annual four-month opening to a 
provincial-level multi-stakeholder committee. 
The paper shows that decision making since the early 1990s followed distinctive 
patterns ("pathways") which link robust processes such as framing, mobilization, 
repression, feedback (escalation), elite intervention, negotiation, and decision. These 
processes constitute important political drivers in water allocation decision making.  
Although causally linked to each other, these drivers often required the presence of 
contingent events and processes to initiate them. Such events and processes 
included violence, media decisions to cover events, as well as events beyond the 
control of most actors (such as political instability in successive governments). 
The pathways and processes (drivers) model of decision making is set in the context 
of Thai democratization, accompanied by analysis of specific constraining institutions, 
such as power system planning, and state conflict management processes. 
The analysis draws on the author's Ph.D. thesis (Foran 2006) and on subsequent 
analysis (Foran 2007; Foran and Manorom 2009).  Based on literature reviewed for 
this project (Mansbridge 2009; Naurin 2007), the conceptualization of "deliberation" 
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as a social mechanism (driver) has been refined. The author has also identified 
additional relevant process and tools not in the PN67 inception report. 
 
2.1 Location 
Pak Mun Dam is located approximately 80 km downstream from the provincial centre 
of Ubon Ratchathani and 5.5 km upstream of the confluence of the Mun and the 
Mekong (see Figure 1). Constructed during 1990–94, the dam is 17m high, 300m 
wide, with eight radial gates that can be fully opened to release water. 
The Mun’s living aquatic resources are noted for their high biodiversity and 
contribution to subsistence and trade (Roberts 1993; Srettachau 2002). When the 
gates of Pak Mun were opened in 2001–02 for a year-long experiment, two studies 
counted more than 150 species of fish (Srettachau 2002; (Ubon Ratchatani 
University [UBU] 2002). Fishermen use a variety of gear, including hook and line, 
traps, nets, and beach-haul seines. Total catch has not been estimated for a number 
of reasons, including the large number of landing sites, subsistence consumption, 
andmost importantly for sustaining important fish populationslack of a long-term 
fisheries assessment program. A concrete fish ladder was installed in 1996 but its 
design does not allow significant upstream migration (Roberts 2001). Instead, in a 
2003 decision we explore below, EGAT was requested to fully open the dam’s gates 
during the annual wet season, nominally for four months beginning June. 
Villagers in the lower Mun River basin purse similar livelihood strategies. They are 
smallholder farmers who grow one main crop of rice during the May-October 
monsoon. Holdings are typically 5-7 ha, but soils near the dam are often poor. By 
Thai standards many households are income poor. Almost all households supplement 
their income by off-farm labour, with significant rates of seasonal and long-term out-
migration, especially among younger people (UBU, 2002). 
The degree to which local people derive benefit from living aquatic resources, 
especially wild fisheries, has been a topic of multiple rounds of dispute. Although 
marginalized in state-sponsored livelihood surveys, and difficult to quantify because 
diffuse, variable, and politicized, living aquatic resources make meaningful 
contributions to livelihoods (Srettachau, 2002; UBU, 2002; Foran, 2006, ch. 8). This 
is especially true for land-poor farmers. 
Because it is a “run-of-river” dam operated for power generation, Pak Mun cannot 
also be used to store significant amounts of water. Yet since the early 2000spartly 
as a result of populist development policythe state has expanded small pumped 
irrigation systems near and upstream from the dam.  
3. Focal water allocation issues 
The focal issue could be summarized as how to define and obtain a socially-optimum 
set of goods and services from the Mun river, focusing on goods such as hydropower, 
irrigation, and living aquatic resources.  
The reason for selection as a PN67 case study is that Pak Mun is a well-documented 
case consisting of both incremental and milestone-setting allocation decisions since 
the early 1980s.  
Page 177 of 852
PN67_2010_08 
Contentious decision making around Pak Mun Dam 
Tira Foran 









Figure 1 Lower Mun Basin and Pak Mun Dam 
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Source: Foran and Manorom (2009)
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3.1 Key decisions and initiatives 
Table 1 summarizes a number of key decisions and initiatives, each of which is 
discussed in more detail below.  
Table 1 Pak Mun Dam, key decisions and initiatives 
Date Decision or initiative 
1960s–1988 To design and propose a particular kind of dam  
1989 To approve Pak Mun Dam 
1991 To establish an MSP to handle dam opponents' claims (Niyom 
committee) 
1993 To set up an MSP to handle a broad range of dam impacts  
1993–94 To compensate for a wider set of  dam impacts (1993–Feb 1994)
  
1995 To compensate eligible households for loss of fisheries income 
during 3-yr construction period 
1997 To compensate eligible households for perpetual loss of fisheries 
income 
1998 To reverse the 1997 decision on fisheries compensation 
1999 Assembly of the Poor campaign for dam decommissioning 
1998 To allow World Commission on Dams to do a case study 
2001 To allow an experimental dam opening and multi-disciplinary 
studies 
2002 To open Pak Mun Dam four months a year 
2003 To provide a livelihood restoration package 
2007 To delegate annual opening  to provincial multi-stakeholder 
committee  
Sources: Foran (2006); Foran and Manorom (2009) 
3.2 Key actors 
State actors 
Major decisions by authorities were largely confined to the executive branch (not the 
legislature or judiciary) and taken at the national level. Within the executive branch, 
EGAT was the main project sponsor. Key decisions were made or ratified by Cabinet 
resolution.  
Occasionally, authority to negotiate with civil society actors was devolved to inter-
agency committees that met in Ubon Ratchathani province or in Bangkok. Aside from 
state-led decisions to propose, design, and approve the dam, all decisions in Table 1 
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were responses to claims presented by civil society actors. The importance of NGO 
and villager actors cannot be overstated. 
NGO and community-based actors: resistors and supporters 
Resistance against Pak Mun began in 1989–90 with informal networking among 
villagers who opposed the dam and the state’s process. To promote the project, the 
state worked through local authorities such as district and sub-district officers and 
village headmen. Prior to construction, they tried to elicit public support at meetings 
they summoned. The state’s paternalistic process and threats of repression failed to 
intimidate a few articulate and confident middle-aged women. They helped form a 
larger network and sought advice from a small civil liberties NGO in Ubon 
Ratchathani (Missingham 2003). Opposition spread to town people: first to vendors 
opposed to flooding of Kaeng Saphue, a large rapids and tourist attraction. Later it 
spread to a segment of the middle class in Ubon Ratchathani. 
In the earliest stages people seemed to be responding to lack of information and fear 
of widespread impacts. When it became understood that the run-of-river design 
chosen by EGAT would lead to a much smaller area inundated, and when EGAT 
undertook not to flood Kaeng Saphue, most of the opposition dissipated. The protest 
campaign narrowed to a core of villagers and alternative development NGOs.  
However, local people were among the first to raise the concern that Pak Mun dam 
would destroy wild fisheries harvests, after they witnessed blasting of the river bed 
during construction in 1991. By 1994, the Mun River Villagers Committee for 
Rehabilitation of Life and Community, a villagers’ organization representing some 
2,500 families from more than 50 villages had formed to press for compensation in 
terms of land and fisheries.  
By late 1995, villagers and NGOs campaigning against Pak Mun helped create the 
Assembly of the Poor (AOP), a national alliance to represent livelihood-insecure 
farmers and urban workers. Between 1995–2002, the AOP engaged in a number of 
direct actions (civil disobedience campaigns) around proposed or completed 
infrastructure projects, including Pak Mun. 
By 1994, led by village headmen and other local authorities, a network in support of 
Pak Mun dam also emerged. Lacking a broad change agenda, its primary objective 
was to dissuade villagers from joining anti-dam action. The Kamnan and Village 
Headmen's Group (KVHG) promised equal compensation to people, without need to 
protest. In 2008, Pak Mun’s fifteenth year of operations, pro- and anti-dam coalitions 
still existed. 
International actors 
In addition to its longstanding role articulating Thai post-WWII development policy, 
the World Bank has been a significant lender to Thai energy projects, though not 
always the majority financier. Associated with Bank project review are channels for 
foreign donor and transnational advocacy (Fox and Brown 1998). 
Knowledge brokers 
Environmental and social impacts of a large dam are topics where active debate 
over what constitutes “the facts” forms an important locus of contention 
itself. Not surprisingly, knowledge brokers (those with claims and resources to 
produce knowledge about a range of dam-related issues) also played important roles 
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at various points in episodes of contention. But as we shall see, far from rising above 
contention, knowledge produced by expert individuals and organizations was 
politicized. The case thus offers insights into the relations between politics and 
knowledge.  
3.3 Review of key decisions and initiatives 
Decisions to design and propose a particular kind of dam (1960s–1988) 
The hydropower potential of the lower Mun river was known in the late 1960s, as a 
result of investigations carried out by the French firm SOGREAH, which proposed a 
dam located at Kaeng Tana rapids upstream of the confluence of the Mun and the 
Mekong. EGAT began to re-examine the feasibility of a hydropower dam in the late 
1970s, and introduced Pak Mun into its least-cost power system expansion plan 
(Power Development Plan) in 1981 (Amornsakchai et al. 2000) [Table 3.1] 
A January 1982 EIA commissioned by EGAT (conducted by TEAM consulting 
engineers) was for a dam with a crest at 112m above mean sea level (a.m.s.l.). If 
located at Kaeng Tana rapids, 4000 households would have needed resettlement. 
This number appears to have been unacceptably high, in light of EGAT's unsuccessful 
experience proposing Nam Choan dam during 1980s, which allegedly would have 
impacted about 2000 Karen villagers in western Thailand (Foran 2006: 116). 
By 1985, EGAT had decided to approve a lower water retention level (108m a.m.s.l.) 
and relocated the dam site upstream to its current location at Ban Hua Haew village. 
This decision accommodates a 1983 decision by the government to turn the area 
around Kaeng Tana into a national park. Pak Mun's run-of-river, low-head design 
was the first proposed for a large dam in Thailand. The design is a response to 
hydrological conditions of the lower Mun the relatively low gradient of the river 
causes Mekong flood waters to back upstream into the Mun during the 
main (southwest) monsoon. By 1987, Pak Mun had re-appeared in EGAT’s Power 
Development Plan.  
Decision to approve Pak Mun Dam (1989) 
Pak Mun Dam was first approved by the Cabinet of PM Chatichai Choonhavan in April 
1989. The immediate political context in which the Chatichai regime emerged helps 
explain the general orientation of the executive branch towards infrastructure 
projects such as Pak Mun. Since the mid-1980s, the Thai economy had grown, 
following its shift from import-substitution to an export-oriented strategy (Bello, 
Cunningham, and Poh 1998; Phongpaichit and Baker 1995). 
EGAT presented the project to Cabinet a total of four times. Two of the four were for 
pro-forma approvals, while the other two involved substantive budget authorizations.  
Pro-Forma  
April 1989, for approval “in principle”  
February 1991, approval of construction  
Substantive  
May 1990, approval of budget  
September 1991, approval of increased budget  
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The Cabinet understood that the 136 MW Dam would double the installed generation 
capacity in the Northeast region, a region dependent on power imports, with peak 
demand growing at double digit rates. In addition to being part of a least-cost 
system expansion plan, Pak Mun had an expected internal rate of return of more 
than 18%, and would also produce irrigation and fisheries benefits (EGAT 1988; 
NESDB 1990).  
National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) approval was required 
before approval by the Budget Office. The development board submitted an 18-page, 
highly favourable memorandum in support of the project to Prime Minister Chatichai 
prior to the May 1990 approval (National Economic and Social Development Board 
[NESDB] 1990). Basic data were taken from EGAT (EGAT 1988). No sensitivity 
analyses are included in the report. The basis of NESDB's approval appears to have 
been EGAT’s 1988 Summary Report, which presented a high positive internal rate of 
return, as well as NESDB’s decision to authorize an environmental mitigation plan 
(NESDB 1990; EGAT 1988). 
The National Environmental Board is an inter-agency panel that could have played a 
more active role in Pak Mun Dam’s approval, but did not. Under environmental law at 
the time, the NEB received, and presumably reviewed, EGAT’s EIAs. Interestingly, it 
commented in the case of other dams proposed during the same period, such as 
Kaeng Krung dam, but not in the case of Pak Mun Dam (Siriyuvasak 1994). One 
possible reason is that Kaeng Krung attracted more intense opposition than Pak Mun 
at that time (Chaidet, interview 14/2/06).  
The National Energy Policy Office (NEPO) was another potential reviewer of proposed 
power stations. NEPO was formed in 1986, prior to Pak Mun Dam’s approval. It 
would later establish a reputation for itself as a more critical energy policy agency 
than NESDB (see Foran 2006: chapter 5). However Dr. Wanchai, a former NEPO 
analyst, stated that NEPO was not involved in reviewing options to Pak Mun 
(interview, 20/10/04). According to Dr. Wanchai, had demand-side management 
(DSM) alternatives been implemented more vigorously, Pak Mun Dam might not 
been approved, because of its high cost. Dr. Wanchai mentioned other proposed 
hydro-dams such as Mae Lama Luang that were in EGAT’s PDPs, but never built 
because energy conservation analysis suggested cheaper alternatives. Pak Mun was 
approved and construction began well before International Institute for Energy 
Conservation (an international technical NGO) released a DSM plan for Thailand in 
November 1991 (Foran 2006: ch. 5). 
Other branches of the state played a limited role in the early review of Pak Mun. 
Individual MPs in Ubon played a role in oppositional and support networks, but did so 
in their traditional capacity as individual patrons, as opposed to representatives of 
political parties with explicit policy positions regarding the dam. Among northeastern 
MPs, Pak Mun was almost universally popular. The proposed Kaeng Krung dam, by 
contrast, divided politicians over allegations southern MPs would gain from logging 
the inundated area (Siriyuvasak 1994: 34). In neither case did the legislature set 
up a hearing process to deliberate the projects prior to executive branch 
approval. 
Decision to establish an MSP to handle dam opponents' claims (Niyom committee, 
1991) 
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Construction at the dam site began in mid-1990, shortly after budget approval in 
May 1990. The Chatichai government set up a Committee for the Compensation of 
Land Rights and Properties and a Committee for Resettlement. The total number of 
affected households understood to be affected was 262 households, a number that 
deviated only slightly from the 243 households identified in the EIAs conducted in 
the 1980s.  
In 1990, after a year of sporadic demonstrations, the long rallies that would become 
emblematic of Pak Mun emerged. These multi-day and multi-week gatherings mark 
the intensification of protest. They reveal the development of collective action using 
tactics much more disruptive than an afternoon or a day protest. Initially, the 
transgressive1 nature of their tactics triggered strong defensive moves by dam 
supporters. When opponents staged a three-day sit-in outside provincial hall, they 
were met by pro-dam villagers organized Ubon MP Chaisiri, an MP in the Chatichai 
government.  
As construction got under way, notwithstanding police repression and harassment by 
project supporters, protests increased. Opponents continued to press for a halt to 
construction pending a more transparent process of inquiry and deliberation. 
A two-week rally that began in May 1991 near the construction site and ended up in 
Bangkok is worth reviewing on several counts. The interaction between villagers, 
bystanders (both opponents and supporters of the dam), and state agents took a 
form of a drama (unfolding in both time and space) that would repeat itself literally 
dozens of times over the next decade. The rally also lead to the first concessions the 
emergent movement won from the state.  
The rally began on 21 May 1991, three weeks after villagers formed Klum hak mae 
nam mun (Love the Mun River Group) with representatives from 20 villages in Khong 
Chiam and Phibun Mangsahan districts (Hubbel 1992: 67). The rally occurred three 
months after the NPKC coup ousted the Chatichai government and installed PM 
Anand Panyarachun. 
Villagers gathered to protest the demolition of a wooden spirit house they had 
erected at the construction site a year earlier. Such spirit houses are revered in Thai 
culture as guardians of place. Erecting the spirit house, wittingly or not, was an 
effective frame for collective action. It invoked spiritual guardianship of the river. 
When a foreign construction worker bulldozed the shrine to make way for 






1 A transgressive situation is one interpreted by contending parties as one of 
dynamic threat/opportunity, where parties view the political context as uncertain 
enough to demand innovative action/reaction (McAdam et al. 2001). 
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construction, it signalled a violation against which villagers could rally to defend and 
re-assert themselves.  
Some 800 villagers reinstated the shrine, and continued to demonstrate nearby for 
EGAT to release accurate information about areas that would be flooded. They 
demanded the government set up a four-part committee to review the information 
and other impacts (Nation 1991a). Four days later, police and army troops set up a 
roadblock to prevent additional supplies and people from reaching the 
demonstrators. Students who were rallying with them held a press conference in 
support of the villagers, and appealed to the Prime Minister to halt the construction 
pending an independent inquiry. Almost two weeks later, after being harassed at 
night by ten men throwing manure and stones, and firing shots, the demonstrators 
attempted to march towards the dam site, but were prevented from doing so by 
police (AOP 2002)2. They dispatched a delegation of 150 villagers to protest outside 
Government House in Bangkok, and six representatives were finally received by Dr. 
Niyom Visaithip, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office responsible for EGAT, on 4 
June 1991. 
Formation of MSP (Minister Niyom's committee) 
Dr. Niyom assented to demands to appoint a committee composed of four parties: 
government, villagers, academics, and EGAT. Disagreement immediately sparked 
over the mandate of the committee. Its official mandate was to oversee 
compensation and resettlement, to verify the number of families to be resettled, and 
to verify the accuracy of EGAT’s flood zone surveying. Villagers however wanted to 
committee to do much more: to examine the entire social and environmental impacts 
of the dam and recommend that Cabinet revoke approval if impacts exceeded a 
certain threshold.  
But what was that threshold? That was the crucial question facing Niyom as the 
nominal decision maker. EGAT claimed less than 300 households would be affected; 
opponents claimed more than 3,400 households would. Niyom declared that if the 
number of (verified) affected households exceeded 1000, the government would 
review Pak Mun (AOP Chronology, 4 June 1991). The cabinet gave Niyom’s 
committee less than two months to verify affected numbers (Usher 1991c).  
Reflections of a state decision maker 
Dr. Niyom later recalled the constraints he operated under (interview 21 October 
2004). The project had already been approved; it had already gone out for tender; 
the contractor had already begun construction. Opponents were already marching 
against it. They wanted him to guarantee that he would cancel the project if the 






2 See AOP 2002 (henceafter "AOP Chronology"), entry for 3 June 1991. 
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work of his committee led to that conclusion. He allowed six villagers to serve on one 
of the two committees he set up. They wanted more. 
The problem was that the various advocates, almost all of them, did not understand 
the complexity of the objective function. What they understood was what they 
wanted, which was one objective. They did not understand the set of constraints, or 
else set these constraints to zero. They could not compromise. Advocates opposing 
the dam had only one solution, which was that the dam must stop. EGAT had only 
one solution, that the dam must be built. The prior constraints were that the 
government had already signed off on the construction contract. Now, the 
government is an institution, not a group of individuals. When governments change, 
and new people enter office, the opponents think that they can exercise significant 
agency [to change policy]. We asked, first, whether it was possible legally to cancel 
the project? The answer was yes, if there was evidence of corruption. We thought 
there was, but did not have evidence. Second, politically, was it evident that it would 
create very severe losses? But [the project] was complex, it wasn't clearly obvious 
that it would be a disaster for the country . . . . If you ask whether the project 
should have been built, the answer is, "it's not worth it" (Niyom, 21/10/04). 
Dr. Niyom indicated that privately, that was how he felt at the time, but again 
referred to the "constraints" he felt he and the Anand government were under. “In 
the end, rationally, it was not possible to do anything,” he said. There are several 
points worth making about Dr. Niyom’s decision-making. First, his model of public 
decision-making, is the solving of a complex objective function based on a set of 
constraints. While the decision maker attempts to optimize, in practice in situations 
such as Pak Mun it is only possible to satisfice, because "the data are not sufficient 
and our knowledge is not sufficient."  
Next, when Dr. Niyom said that “rationally, it was not possible to do anything” he 
meant that it was not possible, given the model of positivist, rational, decision-
making that he operated with, to make the kind of non-incremental changes the 
opponents of the dam were hoping for. By implication, the best one could do was 
“muddle through,” the term Charles Lindblom famously used to describe and defend 
limited, as opposed to comprehensive, rational analysis (Lindblom 1959; Parsons 
1995)3.  
Third, Dr. Niyom’s account of his predicament displays a familiar justification, one 
based on economic burdens borne by the state: a contract was already signed, and 
construction had already begun. These were sunk costs with clear financial 
commitments, against which no clear evidence existed that the dam would bring a 
disaster upon the country. By implication, the costs of switching course on a project 
with such presence and momentum would be felt by the state in one symbolically 
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huge impact if it cancelled. On the other hand, the cost of providing additional 
compensation for disaffected villagers appeared to be less in magnitude and 
symbolically slighter. (Wodak and Meyer 2001)4 describes the standard 
argumentative device in Niyom’s justification as follows: “if a person, an institution 
or a country is burdened by specific problems, one should act in order to diminish 
[those] burdens,” which in this case were financial and symbolic.  
Dr. Niyom’s committee overran its original time frame and appears to have ended in 
dispute over due process (Traisawasdichai 1991). By mid-October 1991, while World 
Bank directors and representatives visited Ubon, Dr. Niyom was speaking out in 
public as a full-fledged advocate of the project, as was the Thai Finance Minister 
(Tangwisuttijit 1991). Meanwhile, some of his committee members were still going 
about their work. Did the efforts of the villagers then amount to little, or even 
backfire? 
That is certainly one reading of events. However his multi-stakeholder process 
produced at least one unanticipated result. The committee found that the total 
number of affected households was 903. This number included 655 newly-recognized 
households whose land would be flooded.  
The fact that different categories of affected households existed was a cause for 
significant confusion. At times, it seemed as if EGAT chose, in media releases, to 
discuss only the limited category of households with flooded structures (Table 2, Set 
1 below) leaving other parties to disclose the larger set of affected households. 
Niyom censured EGAT for not disclosing all its information from the onset of the 
project (AOP Chronology, 13 October 1991).  
To be sure, such an outcome was miniscule compared to the momentum of the 
project. Yet they are significant for our purposes because they are examples of 
policy-relevant concessions made by the state in response to discursive civil society 
actions. Had there been no independent review of the number of affected 
households, EGAT would not have unilaterally compensated any more than the 
number it originally identified.  
Table 2 Categories of households recognized for compensation of structures and 
fixed assets 
 
Set (1) Recognized in 1982–83 studies by Team Consulting Engineers 
Ltd. 
Number 
1.1 Affected by construction, Ban Hua Haew village 11 






4 (2001: 76) 
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1.2 Living below 108m a.m.s.l. 136 
1.3 Living 108–108.5m a.m.s.l. 96 
sub-total 243 
Set (2) Recognized in 1994 by civil society campaigns, 1990–94 
2.1 Affected by river bed blasting 227 
2.2 Agriculture land inundated 706 
2.3 Living above 108.5m a.m.s.l., chose to relocate 473 
sub-total 1406 
Total 1649 
Source: Amornsakchai et al, 2000, p58. Notes: Non-fisheries impacts only. 
‘Recognized’ refers to recognition of categories; numerical estimates vary. Original 
set (1) estimates ranged from 241–379. A total of 1821 households received 
compensation (Missingham, 2003, p72). 
Next, although substantive outcomes of Niyom’s four-party process did not amount 
to much, consider its indirect impacts. First, the committee gave substance to the 
notion of independent review. This was exactly what the dam opponents were calling 
for, when lobbying the World Bank in 1991 to reflect more critically on its role as a 
potential funder of the project. Second, villagers and other opponents developed the 
“extended shifting rally” as a form of contention they were able to use in many of 
their subsequent protests. Third, multi-stakeholder processes continued to be 
demanded by opponents. 
Initiative to set up an MSP to handle a broad range of dam impacts (1993) 
Background 
The new campaign for accountability began on 27 February 1993 when a hundred 
villagers activists, now in the name of the Khanakamakan chao-ban phuea fuenfu 
chiwit lae chumchon lum nam mun (Mun River Villagers Committee for Rehabilitation 
of Life and Community)  travelled to various villages along the left bank of the Mun, 
urging villagers to join their campaign for the government to sign a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU), which would commit it to take responsibility for important 
impacts from the dam. By March 2, activists had prepared a list of demands they 
wanted Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai’s government to consider in the MOU. 
The activists’ demands covered the known and likely impacts of the project, as 
framed by opponents:  
(1) Mapping and Surveying; Timely Notification. For EGAT to release maps and 
declare the precise location of the 108 meter AMSL elevation to the public and to 
affected people within 30 days;  
(2) Compensation. For EGAT to pay compensation for loss of fixed assets including 
land, structures, trees which have been flooded, as determined under (1), as well as 
the cost of resettlement;  
(3) Compensation. For affected households that need to resettle: for EGAT to build 
housing, and provide land including household plots and rice paddy or other cropland 
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in appropriate areas with water supply, close to the original location; if this is not 
possible EGAT is to pay compensation at fair value for land loss to flooding (but not 
to exceed 10 rai);  
(4) Fisheries. To establish a committee composed of villager representatives, the 
Department of Fisheries, academics nominated by villagers, and EGAT 
representatives, to study and survey impacts on fishing occupations during a period 
of project construction in the project area (from Kaeng Tana to Kaeng Saphue), to 
determine principles and methods of providing assistance and compensating affected 
individuals;  
(5) Schistosomiasis. In the event schistosomiasis infections occur after construction 
of the dam, for EGAT to pay for medical expenses as well as expenses in solving 
public health problems;  
(6) Dispute mediation. In event that parties to the memorandum are not satisfied 
with the value established for various losses under items (2) to (5), for the party 
disputing the value to refer the matter to a mediator and for the results of that 
mediation to be binding.  
(Abridged from: Working Group to Monitor Impacts of Pak Mun Dam 1993: 31–32)  
The call for unambiguous mapping and timely notification indicates that opponents 
were still not satisfied, almost three years after construction began, with their 
knowledge of the scope of direct flooding impacts, to say nothing of ecological 
impacts. 
Bargaining over impacts and appropriate conflict resolution process (Akhom 
committee) 
Negotiations over the draft memorandum of understanding finally began in Bangkok 
on 11 March 1993. This was after several days of pressure, including an emergency 
meeting of student organizations nationwide, teach-ins, and a three-day vigil on the 
streets outside Government House, maintained by a core group of 20 activist 
students. EGAT would not commit to opponents’ proposed language. It objected to a 
clause for disputes to be resolved by an independent mediator. Meetings and 
negotiations took place on three of the five following days. Then on 18 March, in a 
meeting lasted almost ten hours, government representatives adopted all clauses of 
the opponents’ proposal, with the exception of the clause on mediation. Protesters 
argued that this was the most important clause, since it was the mechanism by 
which they could hold EGAT and the government accountable. The state however 
refused to budge, claiming that EGAT's legal charter did not recognize mediation 
(WG-PMD 1993). 
The senior-most official signing the memorandum was MP Akhom Engchuan, Deputy 
Permanent Secretary for Political Affairs in the Office of the Prime Minister. It was 
also signed by Apichart Triisawatichai, Secretary to Sawit Phowihok, the Minister 
responsible for EGAT under the Chuan government (Niyom's successor).  
The 18 March 1993 agreement added language setting up a new four-party 
committee with various specific powers, including to advise agencies on the 
implementation of the agreement; to receive and assess peoples’ grievances; and to 
refer grievances to relevant agencies for action within a time frame specified by the 
committee (ibid., 70). 
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Despite the missing clause on mediation, the agreement was a tangible step forward 
toward holding the state accountable for the project. However, by the end of the 
second implementation meeting in late March, it was clear that EGAT and the 
villagers could not agree over the selection of an outside, permanent chairperson. 
The oppositional network criticized EGAT's nominees as having close ties to the 
utility. They also complained that EGAT’s rejection of their own nominees was 
unjustified. 
By the second meeting on March 30, Akhom had apparently secured the EGAT 
Governor’s agreement to the committee chair (AOP Chronology, 30 March 1993). 
Dam proponents raised other issues. A group of pro-dam villagers petitioned the 
committee, asking that they be permitted to join it. Minister Sawit advised Akhom 
that he favored nine kamnan (sub-district officers) to represent all villagers. 
Committee members from EGAT questioned the legitimacy of protestors’ 
representatives. 
Akhom, the temporary chairperson, declared at the end of the second meeting that 
he had reached the limit of his mandate, and referred the matter to Minister Sawit. 
Within a week, 1,000 protestors gathered in a traditional community spirit ceremony 
(bai si su khwan) to support their representatives (ibid., 6 April 1993). However 
within a month of the 18 March 1993 agreement, Minister Sawit dealt the dam 
opponents a stunning reversal of fortune when he flatly declined to continue the 
work of the committee, saying he had not “signed any agreement with anyone” 
(Buchita 1997)5. 
Notable parallels exist between the 1991 dam opponents' campaign for transparency 
and deliberation reviewed above, and their 1993 campaign to hold the state 
accountable for dam impacts (see discussion of MSPs in Section 4.4 below). 
Contentious interaction resulting in state decisions to compensate for a wider set of  
dam impacts (1993–Feb 1994) 
Missingham (2003: 85) argues that the 18 March 1993 agreement “came to nothing” 
because Sawit terminated it the following month. If we look more closely at the 
events that followed, however, we find that by October 1993, Minister Sawit had 
announced the formation of a committee headed by the Ubon Governor Maitree 
Naiyakul.  
Maitree’s committee set up sixteen sub-committees to handle various grievances. If 
the bad news for dam opponents was that there was no villager participation, the 
good news was that the government had devolved (or so it claimed) a good deal of 
responsibility for handling resettlement and compensation down to an appropriate 
level of government. Among the sub-committees formed were those tasked to assess 






5 p 62 
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impacts on households (by registering complaints), to calculate compensation, and 
to pay it. There was also, importantly, a sub-committee to survey and study impacts 
on fishers. 
By December 1993, the state had also apparently accepted demands for a process 
devolved down to a set of village-level committees, with villager participation, to 
process residents’ compensation claims. This was a vast improvement over a process 
marred by several years of widespread mistrust over EGAT’s information base. While 
a devolved process helped deliver just compensation, it was not sufficient as long as 
project opponents were unable to hold the state accountable for specific categories 
of impact.  
The state and protestors were particularly in dispute over land above 108m a.m.s.l.. 
EGAT initially claimed that it would pay only for earthworks to raise affected 
structures. Opponents objected that their homes would be surrounded by water, and 
after more demonstrations, prevailed in getting the state to pay the costs of moving 
and re-erecting those houses. It took another very risky series of direct actions to 
force the government to accede to this claim: in late 1993, villagers sporadically 
disrupted detonation work on the river bed. EGAT’s contractor responded by 
continuing the work, albeit covering up some of the blasting with netting. It told 
protestors if anyone was killed, EGAT was prepared to pay out compensation, which 
would not exceed 30,000 baht per person. The state finally acceded in February 
1994.  
To summarize the campaigns of 1993: by April, the state was initially successful in 
thwarting villagers’ goal of direct high-level participation in problem-solving (MP 
Akhom’s short-lived process). Protestors nonetheless campaigned to broaden the 
limited concessions offered. They achieved recognition of the need to take concrete 
steps to address agendas they consistently advanced. In this respect their collective 
action and their discursive framings had indeed influenced the state’s response, as 
measured by the Maitree process and its tacit acceptance of protestors’ frames for 
problem resolution. 
By February 1994, after staging more sit-in protests aimed at obstructing 
construction, anti-Dam villagers were able to negotiate agreements regarding 
remaining resettlement and land-based asset compensation cases to their 
satisfaction (Buchita 1997; Amornsakchai et al. 2000: 74). The government of PM 
Chuan Leekpai (first term) agreed to recognize a total of 1649 households (see Table 
2). These decisions reflect outcomes negotiated with anti-dam organizations, in the 
context of sustained political pressure.  
Decision to compensate for loss of fisheries income during 3-yr construction period 
(1995) 
Background: bargaining over fisheries compensation 
In early 1994, as the dam neared its June commissioning, dam opponents organized 
a new round of collective action emerged around a discourse to hold the state 
explicitly accountable for impacts on fisheries. Those impacts had been argued about 
since 1991, but were only beginning to be processed by Gov. Maitree's fisheries 
subcommittee two years later. In late 1993, dam opponents demanded that the 
state pay fisheries compensation of 105,000 baht [$US1400] per household, or 
35,000 baht for each year of the three-year construction (Buchita, 1997; Foran, 
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2006, p197). Dam opponents argued that this amount, approximately 100 baht/day, 
was a conservative estimate of the average daily value of a fishing household’s 
catch. 
In April 1994, there had not been a concrete offer regarding compensation from 
Governor Maitree’s fisheries sub-committee. To pressure the government, activist 
villagers staged another two-week long dry-season demonstration in Bangkok, 
calling for Minister Sawit to assume responsibility.  
Prime Minister Chuan declared that Bangkok-based officials had no authority to deal 
with their claims – Governor Maitree was handling them. Chuan did promise to 
request that Maitree’s committee meet again soon. However, at its next meeting on 
6 May 1994, Maitree’s committee expressed the view that acceding to the villagers 
would invite a never-ending series of compensation claims (Buchita 1997: 69.) By 
June 1994, however, Maitree’s committee proposed to pay fisheries compensation on 
a graduated basis. Fishermen living nearest the dam would get up to 90,000 baht, 
while those living in the most distant zone, around Kaeng Saphue upstream, would 
get only 15 baht.  
In October 1994, at the beginning of the post-monsoon dry season, these offers and 
the distributional tensions they embodied were the immediate context in which the 
Mun River Villagers’ Committee (MRVC), the organization at the centre of the 
oppositional network, launched a fresh campaign. Calling on the state to compensate 
for three years’ lost fisheries income was the centrepiece of this campaign. 
 
Marathon demonstration 
On 18 October 1994, about 2,000 villagers gathered at Ubon provincial hall to press 
their claims for the 105,000 baht compensation. In addition they demanded:  
▪ Ten rai [1.6 hectares] of land per household for landless fishermen [a minority of 
the demonstrators];  
▪ Changes to the “unjust” eligibility criteria for compensation;  
▪ Termination of the existing fisheries sub-committee in favour of a new committee 
half-comprised of their representatives, with a clear and decisive problem-solving 
mandate.  
(AOP Chronology, 14 October 1994) 
On the tenth day of their rally in the grounds of the Ubon provincial hall, villagers 
joined negotiations resulting in a lump-sum offer of 10,000 baht. The 500 protesters 
still demonstrating considered this amount unacceptably low, and announced a 
march to the dam almost 80 kilometres away. A plan had been formed by that time 
to demonstrate as close to the dam wall as possible. When the protesters finally 
reached the vicinity of the dam, they issued an ultimatum to the government to 
address their demands or otherwise face "decisive action." After waiting three days 
without any response, they walked a final eight kilometres into the dam site, cut 
through a barbed wire fence, and staged their demonstration right beside a final 
barricade EGAT had set up. The protesters settled in for a long demonstration, set up 
meeting spaces and a classroom for children, and began to work on marketable 
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handicrafts in their spare time (AOP Chronology, 12 December 1994; Missingham 
2003: 90). Several weeks later, a contingent of about 300 villagers seeking 
compensation over impacts from nearby Sirindhorn Dam (completed 1971) joined 
them.  
Elite intervention  
A variety of third parties sympathetic to anti-Dam villagers attempted to intervene in 
the conflict. Nine days after the rally began, a delegation from the Students 
Federation of Thailand met with the Prime Minister. They criticized Sawit, the EGAT 
Minister, for going overseas on holidays and not taking responsibility. They appealed 
for Prime Minister Chuan to take courage in resolving the problem. Chuan responded 
by summoning EGAT senior management to meet with him. He referred again to the 
Governor's problem-solving committee and chided unspecified “senior people” (phu 
yai) in EGAT for “not paying as much attention to the matter as they should” (AOP 
Chronology, 22 October 1994).  
Two weeks after the rally began, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice 
and Human Rights also intervened, responding to protesters’ appeals on the fairness 
of the “nine baht a day" compensation payment. Chairman Nipon Visithyuthasat 
noted the Committee’s prior site visit (in 1993) and recommendations submitted to 
the government. Nipon said he “did not understand what the government was doing 
in letting the problem drag on until today” (ibid., 28 October 1994). A few days later, 
the Committee criticized the state's compensation proposal, and undertook to submit 
its proposals directly to PM Chuan, bypassing Minister Sawit, whom it noted had 
declined several invitations to appear before it (ibid., 3 November 1994).  
Academics also intervened. On 1 December, during a well-attended seminar at 
Chulalongkorn University, a number of academics criticized the state's social and 
environmental impact assessments. AT that event Minister Sawit announced a "long-
term compensation fund” (ibid., 1 December 1994). Academics also met privately 
with Sawit to urge the formation of a new committee process with villager 
participation. 
Formation of MSP (Plodprasop committee) 
In late January 1995, the government announced the formation of a new Committee 
on Assistance and Occupational Development for Fisher-Farmers (CAODFF), in which 
villagers and academic representatives would also participate, to be managed by 
consensus. Dr. Plodprasop Surasawadi, Director of the Department of Fisheries 
(DOF), chaired the committee. By this time, Korn Tapparangsri, leader of Chart 
Pattana, one of Chuan’s coalition partners, had replaced Sawit as Minister 
responsible for EGAT.  
Almost eight weeks later, the new committee and the new Minister reached an 
agreement with villagers to pay 90,000 baht, almost all of the compensation 
originally demanded; and the rally dispersed. As part of this agreement, the Chuan 
government agreed that if the fisheries stocking program and fish ladder (completed 
in 1994) did not restore fisheries livelihoods, it would provide 10 rai of land (or cash 
equivalent) to eligible households. 
Analysis  
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On their side the protesters had sympathetic allies, tolerance of their non-violent 
protest, divided elites, and early concessions made by their opponents (see Foran 
2006: ch. 7). They also had large numbers and media interest, particularly at the 
beginning of rallies, counter-rallies, and other dramatic points in the 157-day 
protest, such as their occupation of the left side of the dam (Thai Rath 1994).   
The above factors weighed in their favour, sustaining mobilization, but were not 
sufficient to win a final compensation settlement of 90,000 baht. What appears to 
have tipped the scales in their balance was firstly PM Chuan’s replacement of Sawit 
(a fellow Democrat) by Korn. As the new Minister responsible for EGAT, Korn moved 
decisively in January to re-open secret negotiations with the Mun river 
demonstrators, bypassing Governor Nithisak’s committee altogether (Phuchatkan Rai 
Wan 1994). The press interpreted Korn’s more participatory style as an implicit 
challenge to the Democrats’ model of devolved conflict management (Krungthep 
Thurakit 1995).  
The second factor was Korn’s acceptance of activists’ demands for a new consensus-
based, multi-stakeholdercommittee. The new committee featured academics such as 
Somkiat Pongphaiboon and Dr. Bantorn Orndam, both seasoned social activists and 
articulate allies of villagers’ movements.  
A third factor securing a favourable fisheries settlement was action taken by Dr. 
Plodprasop Suraswadi. Plodprasop chaired the new negotiating committee91 approved 
by Minister Korn. As head of the Thai Department of Fisheries (1989–97) he found 
himself in conflict with EGAT in 1992, after a large industrial spill occurred upstream 
in the Chi river, resulting in large fish kills. DOF wanted EGAT to halt construction of 
Pak Mun Dam, so that fish from the Mekong could re-populate the Chi unimpeded 
(Roberts 1993: 122). While EGAT was building Pak Mun, Plodprasop spoke out 
“unequivocally” against the Dam and its fisheries impacts (ibid., 106).  
Plodprasop had made a brilliant career, obtaining a Ph.D. in Ecology at the University 
of Manitoba on a Thai government scholarship, subsequently returning to DOF and 
rising to head the agency at age 44. It is plausible that, as an ambitious civil servant, 
he wanted to deliver results for the Pak Mun villagers in order to further his own 
career. Plodprasop’s committee, the CAODFF, resolved after its first meeting to 
recommend a 90,000 baht compensation payment for eligible fishers.  
Plodprasop declared to waiting villagers, “I give you a gentleman’s promise that I will 
convey the results of this meeting to responsible parties, for them to have as much 
compassion to villagers as they’re able to.” He viewed this mission as requiring him 
to personally convey his committee’s resolutions to Korn, Chuan, and the EGAT 
Board (Wichian 1995b). In a television show several years later, referring to his role 
in negotiating the agreement that ended the 157-day protest, Plodprasop claimed 
that “Pak Mun got its generators running because of me” (EGAT 2001a). 
Decision to compensate for perpetual loss of fisheries (1997) 
In January 1997, the Assembly of the Poor (AOP), the national social movement 
organization that emerged in late 1995, organized a multi-issue, demonstration 
outside Government House.  
Fisheries livelihoods at Pak Mun constituted one of the key demands presented to PM 
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Chavalit Yongchaiyudh's government. Villagers claimed that despite the fish stocking 
program, they had been unable to sustain fish catches since the closure of the dam 
gates for hydropower. The fish ladder did not allow economically important fish to 
migrate.  
By April 1997, during what late became known as the 99-day demonstration, 
negotiations between AOP and government representatives had yielded a number of 
favorable agreements favorable to the AOP. Among these was an agreement to 
compensate eligible Mun river households for perpetual damage to fishery-dependent 
livelihoods. Chavalit’s administration agreed to provide 2.4 ha (15 rai) of land, or 
monetary equivalent at $US8750 per ha, for 3080 Pak Mun fisher households. 
Mobilizing and bargaining during the Chavalit government 
The immediate political context in which this rally took place included the unstable 
nature of Chavalit’s new coalition government, as well as grassroots activists' 
coalition building that had taken place during 1995–96. That had resulted in the 
emergence of the AOP, and its 50-issue set of specific grievances. Ranging from 
proposed and completed infrastructure projects to problems of access to 
land and forest, the AOP petition helped mobilized large demonstrations 
to pressure Chavalit's predecessor (PM Banharn) in early 1996. 
When the 1997 rally started, Chavalit's coalition government was popular with rural 
voters, but distrusted by urban elites, and still in the process of consolidating its 
power.  
Protesters worked very hard to create the best possible political context or balance of 
power in their favour. They consistently portrayed themselves as serious, dignified, 
loyal and, crucially, committed to settling in for a long time to demonstrate for their 
causes (cf. Tilly 1999). They also portrayed themselves as interesting to the public, 
both theatrically and intellectually. The protest encampment and street processions 
made use of paintings and sculpture; the protesters also staged performances that 
served to entertain both immediate and media audiences as well as to lampoon the 
government. Demonstrators displayed their intellectual interests when they opened a 
“school of politics,” inviting university lecturers and other public intellectuals to speak 
to them, as well as themselves preparing a contribution to the concurrent process to 
draft a new constitution (ibid, Ch 6).  
The Chavalit government for its part took pains to appear responsive. The Bangkok 
Metropolitan administration provided significant resources by way of potable water 
and toilet facilities; the central government also authorized buses to transport 
representatives and interested parties to negotiation sessions. It also established 
seven different negotiating committees to respond to diverse grievances presented 
by the Assembly. The first negotiations commenced two days after the 
demonstrators descended on Bangkok. Finally, the Dams negotiation group was able 
to secure as its committee chair Adisorn Piangket, a northeastern MP whom activists 
regarded as sympathetic to their cause (Missingham 2003: 164).  
On the other hand, a number of important factors weighed against any easy success 
at the negotiating table. First, demonstrators were frequently frustrated by the slow 
pace of the negotiations. This is not surprising, considering the large number of 
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accumulated grievances they came to Bangkok with. Even assuming agreement on 
problem definitions and solutions, negotiations in each case were hampered by the 
sheer mass of facts, numbers, names, and other details.  
Next, even though Prime Minister Chavalit provided high-level support, the AOP still 
faced significant institutional resistance to negotiation. For example, resistance from 
one irrigation official drafted to serve on the Dams committee involved questioning 
the very standing of villagers (and by extension the whole committee process) sitting 
across from him (Missingham 2003: 167). Finally, there were serious differences 
about what constituted the “real” status of fishing incomes following the construction 
of the Dam, and the Dam’s role relative to other variables in a putative income 
decline (Missingham, 165–67; Buchita, 75; see Chapter 8).  
Of 122 grievances/issues, Cabinet had taken action on 29 by the sixth week of the 
rally. Although some of these resolutions were not to the satisfaction of the AOP, the 
pace indicates a relatively high level of responsiveness compared to the previous 
Chuan administration. By 2 May 1997, when Assembly leaders declared the rally 
would disperse, they had negotiated the following commitments (Missingham, 169):  
▪ 15 rai of land (or monetary equivalent, at 35,000 baht/rai) for 3,080 Pak Mun fisher 
households (for occupation change after permanent fisheries loss) 
▪ Compensation for impacts from Sirindhorn Dam  
▪ Compensation for five other constructed dams  
▪ Cancellation of proposed Sayaburi Dam; review of four other proposed dams 
(including Kaeng Sua Ten)  
▪ Agreements for occupational illness compensation  
▪ Agreement for urban dwellers compensation  
▪ Cabinet resolution to form joint committee to continue addressing all remaining 
grievances  
The total amount of compensation approved for these items was an unprecedented 
4.66 billion baht. A good deal of participatory committee work subsequent to the 99-
day rally also appears to have led to problem closure (Missingham, 2003: 169). 
Chavalit’s administration was by far the most responsive of any government in 
modern Thai politics. 
Decision to reverse the 1997 Chavalit government resolutions regarding AOP 
demands (1998) 
After the Thai financial crisis and resignation of PM Chavalit in late 1997, the second 
Chuan Leekpai government decided to withdraw the concessions made by the 
previous Chavalit government for lost fisheries income.  
In April 1998, despite pressure from the AOP in the form of a large dry-season 
demonstration, Chuan’s cabinet resolved to not pay any compensation for past 
development projects, arguing that this would open a never-ending series of claims, 
and that the government was broke. Essentially, it refused to honour any of the 
commitments to the AOP made by the Chavalit government. These reversals meant 
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wider setbacksfor Thai highlanders who had won some rights to live in protected 
areas, for opponents of two other dams in the Northeast, and for villagers claiming 
compensation for Sirindhorn and Pak Mun dams (Missingham 2003). 
AOP campaign for dam decommissioning (1999–2000) 
In March 1999, the AOP launched a new campaign. It established a protest village 
occupying several hectares of a public park and river bank immediately adjacent to the 
Pak Mun Dam site. The Assembly announced it was abandoning its previous claim for 
permanent loss of fisheries income. After the Chuan II government refused to 
compensate, the Assembly demanded that the government decommission the dam in 
order to restore fisheries to the river.  
In May 2000, after more than a year of government inattention to their protest 
village campaign, the Assembly dramatically escalated its campaign. It launched a 
sit-in demonstration, disrupting access to the Pak Mun Dam powerhouse, as well as a 
simultaneous blockade of Rasi Salai, an upstream irrigation dam in Srisaket province. 
At Pak Mun, the protesters denied EGAT staff access to the powerhouse for a number 
of days. They later agreed to move aside a few meters so that access could continue. 
This dam blockade achieved what months of sit-in demonstrations outside 
Government House since 1994 could not: it conveyed to EGAT senior management 
that they needed to take much more active measures to resolve the conflict 
(Surapong, interview 20 August 2004). 
MSP (Neutral Committee) 
In June 2000, Chuan's cabinet established a bilateral ‘Neutral Committee to Solve 
Problems of the AOP.’ It was chaired by Bantorn Ondam, a former academic and 
respected social activist. Bantorn had previously served on the 1995 fisheries 
compensation negotiating committee chaired by Plodprasop Suraswadi. 
The Neutral Committee's findings were ‘overwhelmingly in support’ of the Assembly's 
positions on all disputed issues, which included land tenure, just compensation, and 
the need for further impact assessments at several large dams (Missingham 2003: 
207). For Pak Mun, the committee recommended a four-month experimental 
opening to restore fisheries migration (Neutral Committee to Solve Problems of 
the Assembly of the Poor, 2000). Chuan's government however chose to treat the 
committee's recommendations as non-binding advice.  
Decision to allow WCD to conduct a detailed study on Pak Mun Dam (1999–2000) 
The World Commission on Damsa multi-stakeholder process funded by a range of 
development and private-sector donorswas a sophisticated attempt to conduct a 
series of participatory studies about the performance of large dams worldwide.  
The WCD asked the governments of ten countries, including Thailand (Chuan II 
government), for permission to study the economic, environmental, and social 
impacts; the benefits, costs, distribution of these impacts; and the decision-making 
processes for these dams. WCD chose to study Pak Mun in part because its sponsors 
considered it an exemplary project. In June 1998, the World Bank's Operations 
Evaluation Department released a report saying Pak Mun’s resettlement program 
was ‘overly generous’ and denied the dam caused any decline in the fish population 
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in the Mun (World Bank 1998). On the other hand, members of WCD such as 
International Rivers Network had helped campaign against the dam. 
Thailand appears to have been the only WCD case study that proceeded while dam 
opponents staged protests, and these tensions required it to hold separate meetings 
with EGAT and with civil society. EGAT initially requested that the WCD defer its 
study until the conflict was resolved. A WCD commissioner and staff appealed for its 
cooperation, citing its overall timeframe limitations. It promised that the study would 
not be “judgmental” and that the knowledge generated would help guide 
governmental decision-making. After frankly expressing its desire that the study not 
further the demonstrators’ cause, EGAT agreed to proceed.  
The AOP also had concerns about the conduct of the study and initially wanted 
foreign experts to conduct it. Each side expressed concerns about consultants and 
specific research methods used but, with dedicated facilitation by WCD staff and 
consultants, did not abandon the process. WCD gave stakeholders several 
opportunities to help shape the report: in 1999, to comment on a paper outlining the 
scope of the study, and several times in 2000, as successive versions of the draft 
final report were issued. 
In March 2000, the WCD released a draft summary of its Pak Mun case study. The 
evaluation was critical. While the final report (November 2000) was considerably 
more nuanced, it conveyed the same basic evaluation: of its intended hydropower 
benefits, the Dam delivered only 21 MW actual dependable capacity vs. 75 MW 
planned. Its economic cost-benefit ratio, calculated from the larger power generation 
figure, had been overestimated. Furthermore, despite the installation of a fish pass, 
it had reduced the diversity and overall supply of fish to income-poor, labour-
exporting rural households (Amornsakchai et al. 2000a: Ch. 4). The report included 
dissenting reviews from the World Bank and EGAT, and responses to those reviews. 
It was a dense, multi-vocal compilation of knowledge. 
Unfortunately, despite its well-designed and well-intentioned deliberative process, 
the WCD Pak Mun study ended in acrimony. The Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
issued statements through its missions worldwide rejecting the findings of the WCD 
case study. In order to understand why the process ended this way, consider that in 
its response to the WCD report, EGAT steadfastly argued that: 
Decision to allow an experimental dam opening and multi-disciplinary studies (2001–
2002) 
In January 2001 the Thai Rak Thai party, led by Thaksin Shinawatra, toppled Chuan's 
Democrat party in national elections. In March, acting on campaign promises, PM 
Thaksin visited AOP protesters encamped outside Government House.  
His government quickly established a ‘Committee to Resolve Problems of the 
Assembly of the Poor’ led by Deputy PM Pongpol Adireksan, but the committee 
included no representatives or observers from AOP. 
In April 2001, Thaksin’s cabinet also accepted the recommendations originally made 
by the Bantorn committee under the previous government: it ordered EGAT to open 
all eight sluice gates of Pak Mun for four months, May-August, and for Ubon 
Ratchathani University (UBU) to conduct a multi-disciplinary study on the impacts of 
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opening the gates. 
Deputy PM Pongpol’s committee set up several sub-committees. The University study 
was to be submitted to a task force chaired by the University’s president. This group 
included representatives from the University, EGAT, and the AOP. It was supposed to 
report directly back to Pongpol’s committee.  
In addition, EGAT commissioned its own study, led by Thailand Institute of Scientific 
and Technological Research (TISTR et al, 2003). A notable component of this study 
consisted of questionnaires administered to 94 percent of the 6176 households that 
had received fisheries compensation.  
Villagers themselves, coordinated by Southeast Asia Rivers Network (a Thai NGO 
that campaigns against large dams), initiated the participatory Tai Baan research 
project to document all fish species caught by villagers, along with other evidence of 
ecological change in river condition (Srettachau, 2002; Friend et al. 2009). The new 
studies were attempts to generate different knowledge discourses from which to 
argue competing options: Should Pak Mun Dam open indefinitely, as opponents 
demanded? Should it stay closed to generate hydropower, as EGAT would prefer? 
Should it, as a compromise, open seasonally, and if so, during what months, and 
based on what evidence? 
By the end of the first four-month trial opening period, the AOP felt it had strong 
evidence that the opening had allowed fish migrations to occur. Some activists 
embarked on a long march to publicize the good news. In December 2001 the four-
month experiment was extended to one year after the trial dam opening task force 
accepted an argument from its AOP member that the study needed a full year to 
observe all seasonal effects. In June 2002, a few days before the one-year opening 
of the dam was to expire, EGAT offered to open Pak Mun Dam seasonally, July 
through October, ceding the option to generate hydropower from approximately 52 
percent of the river’s average annual flow. 
UBU findings 
UBU began presenting findings in September 2002. It reported that although 
households interviewed wanted irrigation water in the dry season, new river-pumped 
irrigation systems would have a minimal positive impact. Soils were poor, pumping 
costs were high, and farmers lacked capital inputs needed to grow high-value dry-
season crops.  
The University’s executive summary contained four options – maintaining the status 
quo; a five-month seasonal opening; an eight-month opening; and a year-round 
opening for five years. Crucially, UBU argued that for at least another five years, the 
dam’s chief benefit, improving electric power reliability in the lower Northeast, could 
be substituted by increasing electricity imports. Technical substitutes existed for 
goods provided by the dam, but none existed for improving the security of 
community-based livelihoods (UBU 2002). 
Different actors immediately interpreted this document in different ways, to argue 
their respective positions. Opponents of the dam – activists and a handful of media 
columnists – initially wary of the University, echoed its key argument. Others, 
including print and radio journalists, accused some of the researchers – in particular 
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the authors of the Executive Summary – of conspiring with the AOP. 
Decision to open Pak Mun dam four months a year (2002) 
In late September 2002 Deputy PM Pongpol’s committee recommended that Pak Mun 
should be operated under a four-month (July–October) seasonal opening policy. In 
October 2002 Thaksin’s cabinet passed a resolution in accordance with this 
recommendation.  
The AOP quickly denounced this decision, taken without benefit of public 
deliberation, and prior to final submission of the University’s government-
commissioned report. A vanguard of some fifty villagers descended to camp 
outside Government House in protest.  
Villagers and AOP advisors lobbied erstwhile allies, such as Deputy PM Chavalit. They 
also sought 1970s-era student activists such as Prime Minister’s Office Minister 
Chaturon Chaisaeng, and Minister for Natural Resources and Environment Prapat 
Panyachartrak. They also organized media-genic street dramas and seminars to 
criticize the decision (Foran 2006: 232). 
Although the situation resembled a stand-off with the state very much in control, 
during this time a number of elites intervened in the media on behalf of the Pak Mun 
protestors. Former Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun and public intellectual Prawase 
Wasi both spoke out in favour of governance reform. Anand cited recent events at 
Pak Mun as an example of poor accountability. The government promised a decision 
based on a university study, and then ignored that study (Khao Sod 2002b). Prawase 
urged thinking beyond opening or closing Pak Mun, towards small-scale alternative 
energy and distributed power generation (Phuchatkan Rai Wan 2002).  
MSP (Senate Committee on Public Participation) 
On 18 November 2002, on petition by the AOP and its allies, the Senate Committee 
on Public Participation held a hearing. EGAT Governor Sitthiporn Rathanopas 
conceded that EGAT could reliably supply the lower Northeast’s growing power needs 
by expanding transmission lines, hence hydropower from Pak Mun was not 
indispensable.  
Based on this admission Dr. Mongkhon Visetsuk, the incoming president of UBU, 
reversed his position. Mongkhon, although not a member of the UBU study team, 
had taken on a role as the official interpreter of its findings. He endorsed the four 
month seasonal opening as the best option. This position however put Mongkhon in 
dispute with less senior colleagues who served on the study. These academics now 
took on an advocacy role, and spoke in favor of a year-round opening, at seminars 
organized by the AOP. After the 18 November hearing, Mongkhon also decided to 
back a year-round opening for Pak Mun (Foran, 2006: 232–34).  
Thaksin's intervention: Televised MSP and opinion poll 
In December 2002, following unexpected harassment of demonstrators outside 
Government House, PM Thaksin intervened in the case. On 20 December, he chaired 
a three-hour problem-solving meeting with 30 AOP representatives. NGO advisors 
were not allowed to participate. UBU president Mongkhon appeared alongside his 
study team leaders and spoke in favor of a year-round, trial opening for five years. 
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Almost immediately after the roundtable, the Prime Minister ordered a special task 
force set up, reporting to Energy Minister Pongthep. The group included staff from 
the Ubon contingent of the armed forces, the National Statistics Office (NSO), and 
the Interior Ministry. Thaksin ordered the NSO to survey rural residents’ attitudes in 
the three districts of the lower Mun river. In addition to this late study, the Prime 
Minister asked officers in the Second Army and the Border Patrol Police, units with 
bases in Ubon, to report on local opinion regarding how Pak Mun Dam should be 
operated.  
NSO completed its work in only three days (24–26 December 2002), sampling 3,750 
adult household representatives from 150 villages. Only four percent stated that 
fishing was their primary ‘occupation’ (achip); less than seven percent stated it was 
their secondary occupation (National Statistics Office 2003a).The least disruptive and 
most favoured option was the four-month, seasonal opening. This was the same 
option the local authorities and EGAT had been promoting since June 2002.  
Several weeks after the poll, at the request of Pak Mun activists, NSO held a public 
meeting about its survey. Dam opponents argued that in the context of rural 
livelihoods, it would have been more accurate to ask villagers about their fishing 
activities, not if they regarded fishing as their ‘occupation.’ One villager asked: ‘Why 
didn't you gather information using wording such as “Pho Yai [grandfather], do you 
have children or grandchildren that fish?”’ This implied that the response to this 
question would have been different than to questions based on ‘achip’ (see Foran 
2006: ch. 8 for analysis). 
Decision to provide a livelihood restoration package (2003) 
In January 2003, several weeks after the NSO poll, the cabinet re-iterated its 
resolution to operate Pak Mun Dam with a four-month opening, while offering a 
package of limited support for fisheries dependent villagers. On 29 January 2003 
some five hundred villagers outside Government House were evicted by the Bangkok 
governor. As of 2008, the 14 January 2003 cabinet resolution still represents 
Thailand’s basic policy statement regarding the value of Pak Mun, and its future 
mode of operation. 
As part of the 2003 cabinet resolution, the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
announced an 807 million baht ($US20 million), five-year pumped-water project to 
expand existing stations and build new works. Investment focused on villages in the 
upstream vicinity of Pak Mun Dam, but would eventually extend almost 80km 
upstream towards the provincial centre. The ‘Pak Mun Irrigation Project’ was framed 
as a special development project and did not require a cost-benefit test. The project 
would build a constituency of local people interested in dam-induced high water 
levels. 
Pumped-water irrigation supplies river water to fields by large electric pumps 
mounted on floating platforms. First provided during the 1980s, about 70 such 
systems exist on the Mun River in Ubon Ratchathani. But as of 2003, the three lower 
Mun districts of Phibun Mangsahan, Khong Chiam, and Sirinthorn had only 16. Unlike 
gravity-fed irrigation, which is currently supplied without user charges in Thailand, 
farmers using pumped water had to pay up to $US2 per hour in 2002. 
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As part of the UBU study discussed above, a team from the Faculty of Agriculture 
studied farming practices in four districts in the lower Mun. They found that pumped 
water was used primarily at the end of the dry season to raise rice seedlings for the 
main rain-fed rice crop, and secondly to grow higher-value crops such as watermelon 
and chillies and stock fish ponds in the dry season. However in 2000-02, the average 
usage rate in the existing scheme was only 14 percent of the total projected irrigable 
area (UBU, 2002, page khor-6). Dam supporters argued that during the trial dam 
opening, water levels in the Mun were too low to operate the pumps, but UBU (2002) 
concluded that such problems could be solved with relatively minor retrofits. 
4. Case analysis of water allocation decision-making processes and tools 
4.1 Key contextual factors and arenas 
What are the important contextual factors and attributes relevant to the 
determination of pathways and outcomes of the decision-making? 
In a long-running case involving Thailand, context needs to be explored at several 
scales, including macro-historical contexts of meaning and structure, such as 20th 
century Thai democratization (see Foran 2006: ch. 4). We also need to consider 
durable institutions, such as power system planning, and state conflict management 
processes. 
Power system planning 
EGAT conceived of Pak Mun Dam as a solution to rising peak power demand in NE 
Thailand. Because of transmission line capacity constraints, planners regarded (and 
continue to regard) the Northeast and South regions as the most vulnerable to 
power reliability problems. The preferred solution is to build new sources of peaking 
power and locate them within (or as close as feasible) to each of these regions so as 
to minimize transmission losses.  
EGAT's Power Development Plan (PDP) emerges from a closed planning process that 
begins with a national load forecasting sub-committee and ends with approval by the 
Cabinet. The process has extremely limited civil society participation, no oversight by 
parliament, and limited participation by other stakeholders. Of all the agencies 
involved, EGAT plays a major role in shaping the details of what appears in the PDP, 
particularly plant size, fuel source, and location. These conditions prevailed in the 
1980s, at the time Pak Mun was identified as a potential addition to the Thai power 
system. They prevail today. The continuity surrounding the PDP process is 
remarkable considering the dynamism surrounding EGAT. The paradox is partly 
explained by the fact that most of the attention put on EGAT and the energy sector 
during the past decade has been couched in terms of the social costs and benefits of 
particular plants, and in terms of privatization. 
To their credit, EGAT and other agencies have given increasing attention to the 
concern of how to supply energy services in a manner that is cost-effective and 
environmentally sensitive. However EGAT's financial incentive structure still 
discourages more significant investment in energy conservation (Foran 2006: ch. 5). 
State-society relations around rural development in Thailand  
By the 1980s, the public sphere so vital to voicing opposition had distinctly increased 
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in Thailand. Yet the state’s predominant response to calls from civil society for a 
more deliberative process was notable for its aloofness. This combination of 
increased tolerance for speaking out, on the one hand, and institutional aloofness on 
the other, meant that Thai people had both cause and opportunity to articulate their 
grievances publicly. They did so more and more readily during the 1980s and 
especially the 1990s (Foran 2006: ch. 4).  
As in many other cases, Thai NGOs stepped in to help villagers publicize their 
grievances. NGO narrative work cast the problem in terms they had developed from 
work begun in the late 1960s (Foran 2006: ch. 4). We can identify two basic 
components: first, a “community culture” frame portrayed the village economy as 
inherently superior to dependent capitalist development (Phongpaichit and Baker 
1995: 387). By extension, it defended the need to protect the common natural 
resource base of local people against a resource-grabbing state. In the case of the 
Mun river, the key resources this framing defended were the most fertile farmland, 
wild-capture fisheries, and natural tourist attractions (Ladawan et al. 1993). 
Second, NGOs presented an injustice narrative. The state trampled over what 
activists saw as basic rights such as transparent information provision and 
participation in project planning. Opponents complained vocally about the state’s 
closed practices, its lack of reliable information, and at times, its arrogant handling 
of public meetings. They decried plans to resettle inundated farmers on land with 
less secure titles (ibid., 4). 
State conflict management processes  
What was the arena/s used in the decision-making processes? How was this defined, 
legitimised, accessed or created?  
Thailand has evolved ad hoc problem-solving committees for conflict management. 
Problem-solving committees are usually appointed by and report to the Prime 
Minister or the cabinet, as opposed to parliament. The main committee may establish 
more than one level of subcommittee, which increases the chances that project 
opponents, academics, and other stakeholders may directly participate and observe. 
However, it is typical for the main committee (with decision-making power) to 
include only civil servants and elected politicians. This kind of institutional 
arrangement has several weaknesses (discussed below in Section 4.4). 
Mediated space 
Professional news media 
Like other modern mass media, Thai news media focus on dramatic events on the 
one hand and routine elite politics on the other. Far more so than in Western 
democracies, however, Thai print media coverage privileges the government (as 
opposed to the parliamentary opposition). A news story typically consists of 
extended quotes of statements made by top political leaders (first and foremost), 
followed by quotes from opponents much further down the column. Local authorities 
and village reading stations (sala) tend to receive leading circulation newspapers like 
Thai Rath and Daily News (Foran 2006: 338). 
Media coverage of the entire Pak Mun conflict has not been systematically studied. 
However, throughout the controversy, the overwhelming impression is first that 
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coverage in the two main English-language broadsheets, Bangkok Post and Nation, 
has been sympathetic to activists. Second, large circulation papers such as Thai Rath 
and Daily News have given much less coverage than broadsheets (such as Matichon, 
Khrungtep Thurakit, Phuchatkan Rai Wan) and what coverage they provide is often 
negative (Foran 2006: 256; (Chalermsripinyorat 2004). 
Mediated spaces sought by contending actors 
In order to improve their legitimacy, generate mass media coverage, and reach their 
target constituency of elites, the anti-dam movement generated its own media. They 
wrote letters and press releases. They produced videos (AOP 2000b), organized 
seminars (Apaporn, interview 24/8/02), published rebuttals (e.g., Working Group to 
Monitor Impacts 1993) and position papers (Assembly of the Poor [AOP] 2000a).  
During the pre-operation period (1989-1994), most of EGAT’s pro-dam publicity was 
delivered in Ubon, in the form of leaflets, announcements delivered to villagers by 
local authorities, radio programs, and occasional television commercials (mostly on 
Channel 11, operate by the Department of Public Relations.  
After the AOP's disruptive occupation of the Pak Mun powerhouse in May 2000, EGAT 
began more combative public discourse. While continuing to invest in print and TV 
advertisements promoting the benefits of Pak Mun and the fishpass (e.g., on Channel 
11, run by the Thai Department of Public Relations), it began attacking dam 
opponents. Its published The Truth at Pak Mun Dam, a 79-page compilation of facts 
about the project, rebuttals to the WCD, interviews, and newspaper articles and 
columns articles compiled from Daily News, Naew Na, Thai Rath, and Thai Post, with 
a negative analysis of Thailand’s radical NGOs (EGAT 2000). 
4.2 How decisions were made: a pathways and mechanisms model 
Early decisions – to design, propose, and approve the dam – were made by elites in 
the executive branch following conventional (supply-oriented, least financial cost) 
power system planning practices. Such practices were of course grounded in 
conventional economic models prioritizing the need to provide electricity and 
irrigation to underwrite and boost economic growth. 
However, by 1989, the year PM Chatichai's cabinet approved Pak Mun, provincial 
citizens began to resist the state's notification and consultation process. They 
objected to its low levels of transparency about impacts and affected people, and 
downward accountability. EGAT and the Ministry of Interior drastically misread how 
Thai society had changed by the 1980s. Implementation practices were inadequate 
compared to peoples' expectations (Foran 2006: 176). 
As anti-dam mobilization emerged, state decision making took on a more reactive 
nature. On behalf of villagers struggling to secure livelihoods, advocates organized a 
series of collective actions. Dam opponents gained influence through disruptive and 
dramatic action, through appeals for transparency and justice, and by the production 
of local knowledge. These actions helped set decision agendas, and triggered helpful 
elite intervention.  
Anti-dam mobilization influenced important decisions around compensation, benefit 
sharing, and operations at Pak Mun. However, it also triggered reactive counter-
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mobilization and occasional violence. Unintended outcomes – such as sympathetic 
media coverage following episodes of violence – challenged elites. Elite decision 
makers occasionally reconsidered their options, and made concessions. Multi-
stakeholder discussion provided opportunities for dominant and oppositional framings 
to confront one another and for elites to experience first-hand the balance of 
contending interests.  
One effective way to understand decision making is to re-construct pathways – 
sequences of social mechanisms which lead causally to decisions of interest. Social 
mechanisms ("drivers") are robust processes of interaction: processes which are 
observed and inferred as occurring in a similar manner, regardless of specific micro-
political contexts. They require prior grounding in a conceptual framework. 
Conceptual framework  
Politics can be explored using a conceptual framework consisting of actors’ interests, 
prevalent discourses, and institutions (Foran 2006; Lichbach and Zuckerman 1997).  
Actors follow their interests; however these are discursively constructed and subject 
to change in the course of deliberation (Hajer 1995; Migdal 1997; van den Hoven 
2004). Institutions matter, because actors’ interests are constrained by their norms 
and routines. To avoid confusion it is best to define institutions more narrowly, as 
specific institutionalized practices (e.g., electricity planning or modes of public 
consultation) as opposed to more diffuse norms and values. The latter concepts are 
assigned to the category of discourse. I then conceived of institutions as sites where 
discourses are deployed. 
Both interests and discourses drive politics, but in a manner shaped by institutions. 
Interests, discourses, and institutions possess different capacities to act and 
susceptibilities to change (John 1998; Sayer 1992). For example, discourses (e.g., 
specific models of rural development) can shape individual decision makers' 
preferences. However, such models can be attacked for failing to resonate with an 
audience’s experience, its cultural beliefs, or empirical “facts”. Institutions reproduce 
legitimating practices, yet they can be disrupted if their rationality is challenged 
often enough and loudly enough by outside actors. Individuals can be threatened or 
persuaded to cooperate, but can also engage in collective action (e.g., advocacy 
networks and movements).  
In this framework, actors strategically use certain rhetorical forms (argumentation 
schemes and modes of attribution) as power resources. At the same time, the 
semantic field their rhetoric draws from necessarily shapes their cognition. Specific 
institutional routines also constrain action (Foran 2006: 238). 
Using pathways to situate decision events 
To study decision events it is helpful to identify pathways: causal sequences that 
lead to outcomes of interest (see Figure 2 below). Pathways are sequences of 
necessary and contingent social processes. “Necessary” means the action is inferable 
given the causal powers and liabilities of objects in the conceptual framework. 
“Contingent” means not deducible from the conceptual framework (Blaauw and 
Pritchard 2005; Mahoney 2000). 
In the simplest terms, Pak Mun’s trajectory can be viewed as a series of episodes 
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consisting of: {[framing disputes] . . . [mobilization] → [repression] . . . 
[negotiation]} (Figure 2), where the ellipsis (. . .) denotes a contingent 
relationship, and the arrow denotes a necessary relationship. 
Figure 2 lays out a broad cyclic pathway beginning with state indications of intent to 
develop Pak Mun Dam, followed by framing disputes, anti-dam mobilization, 
occasional counter-mobilization, conflict escalation, and either negotiation to resolve 
challengers’ demands, or rejection of negotiation.  
This pattern repeated itself at least four times between 1989 and 1994, when the 
dam was commissioned; and four times between 1994 and the decisive seasonal 
opening declaration in early 2003.  
Each italicized term in these pathways can be considered a social mechanism. 
Mechanisms (drivers) are robust processes: they possess similar basic causal 
properties across cases and contexts but produce different outcomes depending on 
the presence of other mechanisms, on sequencing in a series, and contingent events 
that initiate them (such as unanticipated violence). Hence rather than generalize 
about outcomes it is more useful to generalize about mechanisms, then look for 
recurring sequences of mechanisms.  
 
Figure 2 Pathways involving contention and advocacy around Pak Mun Dam 
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Notes: Feedback (G) can be triggered at any time, especially after mobilization 
escalates.  
4.3 Review of mechanisms (drivers)  
Rhetorical framing/counter-framing 
Framing/counter-framing refer to competitive rhetorical action, deployed to further a 
political objective. Framing/counter-framing occur throughout an episode of 
contention. Such discourse can range from terse speech acts (fragments of 
narratives) to the more elaborate knowledge claims in policy narratives and scientific 
reports.  
The term "rhetorical action" refers to the competitive, strategic, monologic use of 
language by actors to persuade audiences of preferred courses of action (Naurin 
2007). 
Pak Mun activists deployed a rhetoric of legitimacy in numbers, a welfarist argument 
of lost opportunity, a rhetoric of environmental restoration; and finally, when 
attacked by Thaksin’s administration as a minority, they resorted to a basic rhetoric 
of justice. Considering Thailand’s political and economic volatility and the changing 
series of antagonists they dealt with, these diverse rhetorics are hardly surprising. 
The strategically evolving rhetoric of social-movement actors nonetheless appealed 
to a common discursive frame. In contrast with the dominant model of state-led 
modernizing transformation, the AOP’s frame anchored to social justice, popular 
participation, and defence of natural resources as common property (Foran 2006: 
246). A recurrent demand activists made was for expert framing of disputed claims. 
Examples of framing by authorities include claims that: 
▪ The project had already been approved [or] construction has already started [or] 
the dam has already been built . . .  so therefore the project must proceed (Pak Mun, 
1991 onwards)  
▪ Dispute settlement powers have been devolved to appropriate authorities (Pak 
Mun, 1993–94) 
▪ EGAT has already paid out more than 989 million baht in compensation (Pak Mun, 
2000 onwards) 
▪ People want water, so only a wet-season opening is appropriate (Pak Mun, 2001 
onwards) 
(ibid, 326) 
Counter-framing is more aggressive framing. It justifies government stalling or 
inaction on activists’ demands, and may accompany other bargaining. A ubiquitous 
component of Thai counter-framing is to attribute negative traits to activists – e.g., 
as “people who can never get enough,” as troublemaking NGOs. In closed spaces of 
“final” decision making, such counter-framing disarms radical policy narratives.  
Mobilization 
Mobilization refers to innovative collective action on the part of a challenging 
group, as well as state or other elite actors, in response to perceptions of political 
threat or opportunity (McAdam 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001) (see Figure 3 
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Source: McAdam et al. (2001: 45). 
For a social movement to emerge it must draw on an existing organisational base – 
whether a formal organisation (e.g., the southern Churches in the U.S. civil rights 
movement) or informal networks (e.g., village women’s weaving circles, in the case 
of the anti-Pak Mun Dam movement5) – and “appropriate” it to disseminate new 
claims and mobilize (McAdam et al. 2001; Figure 3). People who participate in a 
movement must possess both a minimal degree of income security as well as 
social/spatial proximity to movement activities. Movements must also motivate 
people to join (see Foran 2006: 25–26).  
Snow et al. (Snow et al. 1986) emphasize the story-telling work that movement 
organizers strategically do in order to shift their cognitive constructions. Leaders 
must convince people that a social problem can be solved with joint action of a 
certain kind. Such frames are most effective when they align with the worldviews, 
causal beliefs, and life experiences of potential members. Goodwin and Jasper argue 
that moral and emotional dimensions can play an important role in recruiting people 
to join a movement, ranging from outrage over a particular event conveyed via the 
mass media to the esteem recruits may have for existing members (Goodwin and 
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Jasper 2003: 54). In local settings people reluctant to join might nonetheless do so 
out of the fear of ostracism (McAdam 1999: xxxv). 
What sustains collective action in the face of indifference or hostility from 
authorities? It may be benefits members of a challenger group get from everyday 
interaction with like-minded people, i.e., a sense of community (Meyer 2002). As 
well, it may be the creation of alternative social spaces or networks (Whittier 2002). 
Other scholars emphasize the work of political entrepreneurs, who continually 
promote their ideas as solutions to political events (Kingdon 2003). Writing about the 
AOP, Missingham (2003) gives much weight to the strength and efficacy of a 
democratic network in which NGOs played a key leadership function. However, these 
factors were not the only causes of sustained mobilization. 
Dramas of concession and denial 
Events in the Pak Mun case suggest that one important reason people kept on 
challenging the state’s handling of Pak Mun was that state agents persistently 
responded with a mixture of concession and denial.  
For example, concessions about due process made during Prime Minister Anand’s 
government in 1991 (Niyom committee; see Section 3.3.3) needed to be fought for 
again during the subsequent Chuan administration. PM Chuan’s government first 
granted these concessions in the form of a 1993 multi-stakeholder committee to 
review the scope and eligibility of compensation (Akhom committee; Section 3.3.4). 
Later it revoked the high-level multi-stakeholder process when senior decision-
makers perceived it as too threatening to established practices. Similarly, the 
Chavalit government resolved in 1997 to compensate for permanent loss of fisheries 
income. The second Chuan government overturned it in 1998. These tantalizing and 
frustrating dramas of concession and denial spurred opponents to keep struggling. 
Repression 
Repression can be defined as any deliberate action by authorities or bystanders that 
increases the difficulties of collective action. Such repression can range from severe 
violence (e.g., assassination campaigns aimed at movement leaders) to intimidation 
(state investigations of movement organisations) to “everyday” discursive repression 
(attacks on movements’ credibility conveyed in mass media). A striking theme in the 
social movement literature is the ubiquity of repression (Foran 2006: 26). 
Under what conditions do state elites switch between severe and “everyday” 
repression? In general, we would expect that as protest movements learn to restrain 
their demands or act within institutional parameters, state repression declines. Over 
time, many movement tactics lose their novelty: Thai authorities have learned to 
adapt, for example, to marathon sit-in demonstrations. Their incentives to do so are 
strong, because in so doing they regain control of the interpretive struggle. What 
they have not learned to repress are protest movements that use more 
sensationalistic tactics – such as hunger strikes or suicide attacks. These are more 
inherently disruptive because of the violence that is deployed and the sensationalistic 
appeal such events have for the media. 
Elite intervention 
The mobilization of elite technocrats and politicians to intervene in a contentious 
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case usually occurs after sustained mobilization and media coverage contribute to 
escalating an issue. Elites intervene to advance and – more commonly – to defend 
their interests (McAdam 1999), with a range of unexpected consequences. Not 
surprisingly such intervention is a common occurrence in contentious politics (Tarrow 
1998). The combination of elite intervention and counter-framing has the power to 
co-opt policy proposals from civil society. Such outcomes are likely without inclusive 
deliberation proximately timed before a final decision. 
Some important elite interventions exploit organizational ambiguities. All institutions 
are ambiguous in the sense that they allow room for discretion and rule-
interpretation. At EGAT, the combination between closed electricity planning 
processes and ambitious elites allowed Sithiporn Rathanopas to expand the DSM 
program in the early 1990s when it was under his control and later as EGAT 
Governor in 2002–03, to propose building new dams on the Salween river. 
Elite action may have an emergent logic. An elite actor may be tasked to handle a 
particular conflict, and end up doing more than anyone expected in light of the 
circumstances. The chair of the special fisheries compensation committee at Pak Mun 
(1994–95) is a notable example. Fisheries Director Plodprasop Suraswadi portrayed 
himself as someone who extended himself to negotiate on behalf of dam protestors, 
and more than five years later the agreements reached in his committee were cited 
by dam opponents to justify their campaigns.  
Conflict resolution mechanisms 
The fact that elites changed their positions during the course of engaging with each 
other and with grassroots dam opponents suggests that we need to identify 
mechanisms that capture interactions such as bargaining (in its different forms), and 
arguing. 
In a helpful typology, Naurin first distinguishes between whether common 
understanding is sought or not. If no, the interaction can be classified as 
"bargaining"; if yes, it can be regarded as "arguing." Second, the interaction can be 
analyzed as competitive, for example making a claim to a finite resource, or 
cooperative. 
Table 3 shows important theoretical commonalities between rhetorical action, 
integrative bargaining, and deliberation. In actual interactions these processes co-
occur. Foran's analysis of Pak Mun (2006) stresses the causal power of rhetoric: 
framing is a fine-scale driver in its own right. We can expect to find framing in all of 
the above procedures, in varying proportions. Using close textual analysis, some 
analysts attempt to distinguish moments of deliberative speech from moments of 
rhetorical action in actual dialogue events (Holzinger 2004). 
Bargaining 
In the Pak Mun case, initial mobilization such as a demonstration in front of a 
government office, could lead to short-term tactical bargaining. For example, in 
October 1994, after ten days of rallying in the grounds of the Ubon provincial hall, 
authorities offered to compensate 10,000 baht for loss of fisheries income caused by 
dam construction (see 3.3.6 above). 
Some bargaining could be even more limited, for example the offer to accept a 
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petition from a group of demonstrators and convey it to a senior official, in return for 
an agreement to disperse. 
However, more serious bargaining tended to require significant conflict escalation 
(Figure 2). Escalation could result from violence (planned or unplanned), a burst of 
media attention as protestors staged new actions, or elite intervention. Such 
intervention in turn could facilitate bargaining negotiations or more public debate 
(“arguing”). 
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Table 3 Analytical classification of conflict resolution procedures 







Rhetorical action  
Problem:  disagreement between 
actors caused by different 
viewpoints, discursive frames 
Goal: persuade other of one's 
preferred course of action 




Distributive bargaining  
Problem: disagreement caused 
by conflicting wants 
Goal: maximize preferences 
("wants"), at the cost of others if 
necessary 




Cooperative Deliberation  
 
Problem:  disagreement between 
actors caused by different 
viewpoints, discursive frames 
Goal: common and better 
understanding of right course of 
action 
Mode: dialogic, explore 




("consensus based negotiation") 
 
Problem: disagreement caused 
by conflicting wants 
Goal: maximize wants  
Mode: clarify wants, search for 
optimal compromise, trading via 
issue-linkage 
 
Source: adapted from Naurin 2007 
Discussing (arguing) 
By discussing I mean face-to-face reason-giving debates and exchanges, in contexts 
understood by participants to be of heightened importance cf. (Ryfe 2005). Defined 
this way, discussing is equivalent to what Naurin (2007) calls competitive and 
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cooperative 'arguing' in Table 3 above.6 
Public discussion has a performative aspect: it is an opportunity to make policy 
issues salient and to bring them to life before an audience. Such discussion is 
important because it allows rival actors to engage in an open policy contest, which at 
the same time is received by a diverse audience including media, decision makers, 
and civil society. The outcome of any given session is not necessarily a good 
indicator of how a “final” decision will be made. Private discussion among elites 
probably matters more. But such exchanges are important in the Thai institutional 
context because of their paucity. 
As the Pak Mun case shows, it is one of few opportunities for dominant and 
oppositional framings to confront one another, for elites to experience first-hand the 
balance of contending interests, and for actors to modify their preferences.  
Deliberation 
The literature on "deliberative democracy" celebrates the value of decision-finding 
practices that are inclusive, autonomous, equal, and reflective. Ryfe (2005) however 
argues that deliberation is a "difficult and relatively rare" form of communication. He 
cautions that even in OECD countries, historical, institutional, and cognitive obstacles 
impede setting-up and sustaining deliberative processes (i.e., cooperative 
discussion) involving ordinary citizens. Participants are expected to engage in 
sustained reflection and question taken-for-granted policy narratives; such 
expectations are often psychologically challenging. 
Tilly (2004) argues that we can analyse a social mechanism in terms of (1) 
processes/mechanisms that generate the mechanism of interest, and (2) 
processes/mechanisms that “constitute” (sustain) it. Using deliberation as an 
example, processes that help initiate deliberation include a context of high stakes 
and pressures for accountability (Ryfe 2005: 57). High stakes and accountability 
pressures matter more than ideal design (ibid., 63). Sustaining processes include:  
diverse stakeholder participation  
quality of leadership/facilitation  
procedural rules (e.g., civility, equality).  
Important as well to sustaining deliberation are motivational stories, which 
participants are told and tell themselves to motivate their continued participation. 






6 Naurin (2007: 561) notes that "arguing" instead of "discussing" is commonly used 
in the literature and traces this to the possible influence of the German word 
"argumentieren" used by Habermas to denote strategic rhetorical action.  
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Otherwise, participants may choose to exit talk-oriented deliberation in favour of 
direct political action (e.g., lobbying, legal action), or in favor of apathy (a 
particularly acute problem for public goods). 
4.4 Use of progressive processes and tools 
What progressive processes or tool/s have been used (or not used)? If progressive 
processes or tools were not used at all, what might have been the constraining 
factors or condition?  Would their use likely change the arena and outcome of 
decisions? 
Table 4 shows a number of social processes and techniques ("tools") of interest to 
PN67 as well as three other processes that are relevant to the Pak Mun case.  
 
Comprehensive options assessment (COA) 
By 1989, EGAT planners were exposed to integrated resource planning (IRP), which 
is one  form of COA (Foran 2006: ch. 5). EGAT's Demand-Side Management (DSM) 
Office, established in 1993, went on to plan and implement successful energy 
efficiency programs (Foran et al. 2006). 
In an IRP analysis, demand-side and supply-side options are given balanced 
treatment, with the objective of investing in the least-economic cost first. IRP can be 
done for energy and for water resources. Depending on the scale chosen, the 
integrated plan can be conducted at the national level, or at the level of a particular 
utility’s service area.  
Since IRP requires engineering and economic data, utilities typically perform it. IRP 
has not always been popular: during the 1990s, the belief that privatization makes 
detailed planning unnecessary prevailed. In the 2000s, the value of long-term public 
planning has been rediscovered. This comeback follows events such as market 
failures in the U.S. West coast electricity markets, as more recent momentum to 
lower GHG emissions. 
IRP can be designed as an integrated, participatory assessment, and in recent years 
a number of independent analysts have called for Thailand to initiate such a process 
(Decharut Sukkumnoed 2007). 
The main obstacle to IRP is institutional: the traditional rate-of-return financial 
incentive structure means that revenues and profits are tightly coupled to volume of 
energy sales. This gives electricity utilities little motivation – beyond public image – 
to invest in DSM or to conduct IRP. In North America many have been required to do 
so by strong regulators.  
Table 4 Use of social processes and tools in the Pak Mun case 
 
Process or Tool Relevant Applied Notable examples in Pak Mun Case / 
Comment 
PN67    
MSPs (platforms for Y Y Niyom committee (1991; after 
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campaign for transparency) 
Akhom committee (1993; after 
campaigns for accountability) 
Plodprasop committee (1995) 
Neutral Committee (2000) 
Senate Committee on Public 
Participation (2002) 






Y Y By UBU – intuitive qualitative 
scenarios offered comparing how 
opening the dam would affect 
livelihoods under different alternatives 
Water resource 
modeling 
Y Y By WCD to study hydropower benefits 
in detail (Annez 2000) 
Market based 
instruments 
N N  
CIA and SEA N N Relevant to basin-scale sustainability 
planning 
Other processes and 
tools 
   
Fisheries catch 
monitoring 
Y Y By Tai Baan project (Srettachau 2002) 




(part of WCD [2000] 
framework) 
Y N Highly relevant, but not applied in 
planning of dam. Power flow analysis 
by UBU (2002) confirmed that 
removing Pak Mun from the grid 




Y N Multi-criteria protocol was developed 
by IHA (International Hydropower 
Association 2006) but not well 
publicized. This effort has been 
revived in 2009. 
Source: analysis by author 
 
Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) 
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MSPs can be defined as organized processes designed to facilitate active and 
informed participation in particular policy issues. Defined broadly this way, MSP 
processes include both bargaining and discussion. Analysis of the Pak Mun case 
reveals at least five significant MSPs (see Table 4).  
Pathways leading to MSPs 
Pathways leading to MSPs were contentious, volatile, and tortuous (Figure 2). 
Notable parallels exist between the 1991 dam opponents' campaign for transparency 
and deliberation reviewed above, and their 1993 campaign to hold the state 
accountable for dam impacts. In both cases dam opponents pressed the state to 
establish MSPs (see Section 4.x above). In both cases a concerted demonstration 
that began in Ubon was forcefully repressed, ended up in Bangkok outside 
Government House, and eventually led to substantive negotiations (see Foran 2006: 
184–191). In both cases state elites initially allowed an MSP with decision making 
power to be established. Both MSPs included representatives of EGAT, the 
government, academics, and affected villagers. In both cases, direct and tangible 
outcomes of the committees’ work appeared slight, but indirect outcomes were 
significant.  
During the 1994 campaign for fisheries compensation and in subsequent the state 
learnt to tolerate and ignore protest actions, thus prolonging them. In these 
campaigns MSPs were established after conflict escalation had passed a threshold. 
Reflection on Pak Mun MSPs 
The use of MSPs around Pak Mun issues has not been studied at the level of speech-
acts. Nonetheless, we know enough about them to note several striking features. Pak 
Mun MSPs were organized in response to ongoing distributive conflicts which had not 
been resolved through other political mechanisms. Consequently, they took place in 
a context of political pressure and uncertainty. Many stakeholders participated with 
the understanding that the goal was to reach decisions.  
Second, the internal design and procedures of many MSPs were not ideal, when 
measured against norms such as equality and inclusiveness. The playing field was 
not level. Anti-dam villagers and their representatives resisted the participation of 
pro-dam villagers and their representatives. The MSPs discussed above were not 
designed to accommodate mass media or interested members of the public (e.g., 
limited or zero public notice).  
That most MSPs were convened in response to, and sometimes concurrently with, 
ongoing demonstrations means that they took place in the shadow of coercive 
power struggles. On further analysis of discourse, we would expect to find use of 
sanction (threats) or use of force (e.g., manipulation by lying) (cf. Mansbridge 
2009). 
Third, although Pak Mun MSPs were not explicitly organized to facilitate classic 
deliberation, it is possible to detect moments of deliberation. One possible example is 
the President of Ubon Ratchathani University, who dramatically reversed his pro-
government position on dam operations after participating in the Senate Committee 
MSP (Foran 2006: ch. 7). This challenges us to think about how, at the micro-level, 
to facilitate more deliberative moments during MSPs. 
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In short, Pak Mun MSPs operated in uncertain and unfavorable "external" political 
contexts. Their internal design frequently lapsed from prescriptions for desirable 
practice (cf. Dore 2007). And yet, as we have seen, they delivered both direct and – 
equally important – indirect outcomes. 
Use of scenarios  
Scenarios are stories (narratives) constructed to capture how the future might 
unfold. As noted above, UBU (2002) offered four options for operating Pak Mun Dam 
– maintaining the status quo (sluice gates closed to maximize power generation); a 
five-month seasonal opening; an eight-month opening; and a year-round opening for 
five years. 
The four forward-looking options were presented in the form of a qualitative 
narrative of 1636 words (English version). Although the word "scenario" is not used, 
this text can be considered as a set of expert-led, normative, decision support 
scenarios. The scenario text drew on the findings of studies of community social 
relations; local farming systems; fisheries incomes; fisheries catch per unit effort 
during the experimental dam opening; electric power flow analysis; and a 
stakeholder consultation organized with local leaders (village headmen and TAO 
members). However, the scenarios vary with respect to one variable (dam opening 
and its impacts) while other uncertain drivers are treated in less detail. 
The above scenarios comprised the final section of a 6900 word Executive Summary. 
The study team presented the Summary presented along with a set of supporting 
documents at a public consultation in Ubon in early September 2002, and published 
the final bound report in October.  
Impact of scenarios  
Scenarios succinctly captured a spectrum of strategies with respect to Pak Mun's 
future operations, and also discussed drivers such as state investment in integrated 
agriculture and irrigation. Arguably, they were an effective way to communicate the 
key findings of a long study. The fact that the UBU study itself was politicized (see 
3.3.10) does not invalidate the use of scenarios as a method of communication.  
Potential to improve water allocation decision making 
Do any of the progressive processes and tools we are examining have potentials in 
the place to improve water allocation and decision-making?  
Yes – see discussion above about pathways and importance of consensus building 
and deliberation. 
What does the place case study teach us regarding the necessary and/or contingent 
conditions for a relevant process or tool to be applied and make a difference? 
Analysis presented here shows how the decision to establish MSPs required prior 
mobilization and conflict escalation. The use of scenarios was a choice made by 
one knowledge broker (UBU), which entered the case on the recommendation of one 
MSP (the Neutral Committee). 
5. Recent decision-making 
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5.2 Decision to delegate annual opening to provincial multi-stakeholder 
committee (2007) 
Implementation of the dam’s four-month opening policy has been far from smooth 
(Foran and Manorom 2009). The January 2003 cabinet resolution was followed by a 
five-year period in which Pak Mun’s seasonal opening and closing was periodically 
disputed at the local level. Operating rules were not significantly elaborated. This 
pattern shattered in early 2007, under the military-appointed Surayud government. 
EGAT and its allies in the military intervened; the government reversed its operating 
policy. After renewed criticism it devolved detailed management responsibility to 
committees reporting to the provincial governor.  
In April 2007, six months into the military-appointed government of PM Surayud 
Chulanont, three thousand pro-dam villagers (mobilized by the KVHG) rallied at 
provincial hall to keep the gates closed, and thus to overturn the 2004 Thaksin 
cabinet resolution. As well, local leaders, allegedly with the backing of the National 
Security Council junta and EGAT, organized a survey of 8091 lower Mun households 
(Assembly of the Poor 2007; Sangsok 2007). Administered by village headmen and 
household heads, the survey asked for the name, identification number, and 
signature of each household member, and for a simple yes/no response to the 
question of whether EGAT should store water at 106-108 a.m.s.l., (i.e., normal 
operating levels for power generation). 
In late May 2007, on the recommendation of the Ministry of Energy, Surayud’s 
cabinet resolved to open Pak Mun in June. But shortly after this announcement, 
results of the survey were presented privately to cabinet, claiming overwhelming 
support for dam closure from 20,592 people (8091 households). On the basis of the 
unpublished survey, Surayud’s cabinet then reversed its earlier decision, and decided 
on 23 June 2007 to keep Pak Mun closed. This triggered another protest rally in 
Bangkok by the AOP. After pressure from NGOs, academics, and criticism in the 
broadsheet print media, the Surayud government finally resolved in July 2007 to 
delegate decision making about Pak Mun’s opening and closing to the provincial 
governor. 
What is the potential of the research in the place-based case in influencing any 
ongoing process of decision-making on water allocation issues? What may be the 
potential of the case in informing and influencing investment and/or development 
pathways of the place?  
The research should be of interest to Ubon Ratchathani University staff, and non-
academic actors open to reasoned argument about the project's history and future. 
However, it needs to be translated and published in Thai and disseminated. More 
than one version may be required to communicate with different audiences. 
6. Lessons and implications 
6.1 Lessons for analysts  
Actors and interactions  
Pak Mun offers important lessons about the necessity of mobilization by affected 
people. Anti-dam advocates influenced project implementation practices at Pak Mun 
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Dam by forming social change networks, gaining contingent recognition as new 
political actors. Through innovative and disruptive action, through claims for 
transparency and justice, through mass performances of worthiness, unity, and 
commitment, and through the production of local knowledge, they helped set 
agendas. They triggered elite intervention, as well as reactive counter-mobilization 
and occasional violence. The escalation of uncertainty from unintended outcomes 
challenged elites – aided by deliberative exchanges – to reconsider unfavourable 
decisions, to reconsider their preferences, and to make concessions. 
At the same time, a number of events made the anti-dam movement vulnerable to 
destabilizing action at the local and national levels. These include: the formation of 
competitive (pro-dam) organizations in the lower Mun basin; complex and intractable 
issues (such as multiple rounds of compensation); and the inability to take credit for 
championing the interests of vulnerable small farmers. Destabilizing interactions 
occurred particularly in the restricted media space of the post-financial and economic 
crisis years. Populist platforms put forward Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra and 
his by Thai Rak Thai party pre-empted the influence of the Assembly of the Poor, the 
main anti-Pak Mun Dam organization. 
Arenas: Ad hoc committees and the street 
Because "mobilization from below" – that is, relatively weak farmers and their allies 
confronting the state – was a key feature of this case, many arenas did not have a 
formal nature. As noted above, the Thai state makes regular use of ad hoc problem-
solving committees for conflict management. Problem-solving committees are 
usually appointed by and report to the Prime Minister or the cabinet, as opposed to 
parliament. This kind of institutional arrangement has several weaknesses: first, it 
turns decision-making about large projects into a series of "one-off" encounters. The 
need for a problem-solving committee depends on whether the executive branch 
acknowledges a problem exists, which often depends in turn upon the ability of civil 
society stakeholders to argue and protest that it does. 
Second, by its very nature, the "one-off" settlement appeals little to rules of law. 
Weak stakeholders must rely upon their own and their allies' skills and resources. In 
certain political situations, problem-solving committees indeed deliver benefits to 
vulnerable stakeholders. Benefits however are highly contingent on political 
circumstances: stakeholders must be able to stage long-running demonstrations to 
press their case, which is most favourably heard when governments need to 
maintain flagging popularity. Receiving benefits, however, also requires convergence 
on shared definitions of the problem and solution.  
To a certain degree, the four-month opening represents such convergence. Although 
the AOP officially continues to reject it, most of its membership has chosen to live 
with it. The complexity of issues that needed to be addressed for convergence on 
problem definition and solutions meant that it took a string of ad hoc committees 
(dating back to the Neutral Committee in 2000) to converge on the four-month 
opening. This is inefficient particularly with respect to future contingencies. 
Neither the Neutral Committee committee nor any of Pongpol’s committees specified 
the formal steps, procedures, and criteria by which key decisions would be made. 
Statements about decision-making were uniformly vague.  
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In 2002, the lack of a detailed decision-making timetable meant there was no 
institutional buffer for decision makers to resist pressure from all parties. Lack of a 
clear, stakeholder-accepted decision-making process led to tense lobbying for new 
“problem solving” committees.  
Why did dam critics acquiesce in letting the Thaksin process – which left decision-
making so firmly in the hands of the executive branch – proceed? After all, this 
coalition includes some of Thailand’s most politically sophisticated civil society 
analysts, such as the Campaign for Popular Democracy, and of course the AOP 
advisors themselves. to reflect on this question. Naruemon Thabchumpon, a scholar 
and activist with close ties to the AOP cited three possible reasons:  
(1) Power – lack of bargaining power with respect to Thaksin, who presided over the 
choice of committee design (notwithstanding personal ties between AOP advisors and 
Thaksin advisors);  
(2) Institutions – entrenched administrative norms regarding the (peak) committee 
as an “impartial highest body” for decision making, as opposed to a multi-
stakeholder forum;  
(3) Strategic expectations – activists believed that in any case, further mass 
demonstrations would be highly likely.  
(N. Thabchumpon, personal communication, 17/1/06) 
This explanation displays a pragmatic rationality. However, it is one shaped by 
contrasting storylines: (2) reflects the obstacles civil society reformists confronted as 
they faced taken-for-granted institutions (bureaucratic committee as final arbiter). 
By contrast, the storyline in (3) reflects low expectations from those committees, 
and ongoing need for street politics. Both frames are “institutionalized” in modern 
Thai political culture. 
Pathways  
Pak Mun as a long-running case has offered analysts have the luxury of looking for 
patterns and inferring pathways, understood as distinctive combinations of drivers.  
What becomes clear is, first, the sheer length of time it took to activists to achieve 
more just and enduring outcomes, and the emotional and economic hardship 
activists endured (Foran 2006). The contingency of decision events on drivers 
beyond the control of many actors also becomes clear. These included the use of 
violence by opponents; media coverage of activists' events (which, following 
conventions of news coverage, requires novelty); and the presence in government of 
cooperative or antagonistic elites.  
6.2 Implications, challenges and opportunities 
Pak Mun and Thai democratization 
Pak Mun is an important case in dam decision making, one that has mobilized large 
numbers of supporters and opponents, and contributed to the re-shaping of state–
society relations in Thailand. A dam planned and implemented with low transparency 
and accountability helped trigger an unfolding, emergent series of disputes. Disputes 
over Pak Mun helped democratize an authoritarian state. The movement against Pak 
Mun has helped socialize Thai society to tolerate, and participate in, vigorous street 
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demonstrations. It helped opened up new spaces for livelihood and environmental 
politics: on campuses, in the media, andwhen routine politics fails ordinary people, 
as it often does in Thailandon the street. 
Politics of knowledge 
Pak Mun offers sobering lessons about politics of knowledge. Sustained production of 
knowledge for dispute resolution (e.g., the WCD study) occurred relatively late in the 
case, and late in particular cycles of contention (Figure 2). This meant that 
knowledge production did not always contribute in a ‘rational’ way to informed 
negotiation. New knowledge could instead trigger reactive framing, as for example 
when Thaksin’s advisors disputed the findings of Ubon Ratchathani University (2002) 
and ordered an opinion poll. Concepts such as dependable capacity, occupation, 
fisher, and farmer were contested by laypeople and by experts using different 
methodologies. Contending research sponsors required simple conclusions on key 
issues such as the importance of wild-capture fisheries to local livelihoods. They 
ignored the nuances of smallholder livelihood strategies. With authority highly 
concentrated in the state’s executive branch, knowledge production was 
manipulated. The ‘politics of knowledge’ thus should not be abstracted from the 
politics of blame, threat, and other forms of contention present in a particular 
dispute (McAdam, et al, 2001; Foran, 2006: 6). 
Global and regional ramifications 
Analysts and advocates for affected peoplenot just in Thailand, but as a result of 
Pak Mun’s international prominencehave learnt to question all project studies from 
its inception-the fundamental need for the projectand extending to its ramifying 
impacts (World Commission on Dams, 2000). Civil society actors have learnt to 
mobilize, often in cross-scale coalitions, and to re-politicize knowledge and capture 
public arenas of deliberation by undertaking, compiling and publishing their own data 
and research.  
After twenty years of debate over Pak Mun, some infrastructure sponsors (such as 
World Bank) have learned to approach complex questions of livelihoods restoration 
with more humility. On the other hand, Thai water and hydropower developers such 
as EGAT, its subsidiaries, and associated civil engineering and consulting firms have 
been compelled to move to neighboring countries such as Lao PDR or 
Myanmar/Burma to build projects they continue to promote as preferred solutions to 
Thailand's needs.  
Far from disappearing under agricultural modernization, Pak Mun shows that 
dependence on wild-capture aquatic resources persists. This important finding from 
relatively ‘modern’ Thailand implies hydropower development will lead to even 
stronger negative impacts for small farmers elsewhere in the Mekong region. With 
national economic development as the over-riding priority, rural people face a spate 
of large new water proposals, wrapped in powerful discourses of modernization and 
poverty alleviation. 
Pathways to improved decision making? 
In practical terms, how might reformists encourage better decision making? 
Reforming water and energy governance challenges power interests and institutions, 
so advocates will encounter repressive counter-framing. Collective action will be met 
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with counter-mobilization, elite intervention, and rejection of substantive negotiation 
and discussion. Advocates of improved governance and sustainability could 
nonetheless promote particular combinations of processes. One idea is to promote 
processes that are scientifically credible, legitimate to different stakeholders, while 
savvy about the many faces of power. 
Further research needs 
By late 2009 we received reports that provincial-level management initiated in 2007 
was not delivering outcomes deemed significant to the AOP. In September 2009, the 
AOP held a rally to demand demanding that the government of PM Abhisit 
Vejchachiva fully open the dam gates, apparently based on new analysis of the 
dam's electricity generation costs. At the same time, the AOP acknowledged that the 
twenty-year old conflict had taken its toll on some leaders, who had withdrawn from 
the organization or switched their support to EGAT (Samnak Khao Prachatham 
2009). In 2010, under the government of PM Abhisit Vejjajiva, the affected peoples' 
search for livelihood restitution reverted to a national-level committee. 
Foran and Manorom (2009) argued that the success of any conflict management 
initiative at Pak Mun will hinge on stakeholders’ ability to agree on and formalize 
decision making processes. Otherwise, they argued, concessions such as the 
seasonal opening can be withdrawn. For any operational policy at Pak Mun to work, it 
also needs to be presented and run as an experiment aimed at delivering meaningful 
livelihood outcomes to supporters and opponents alike. If not, both factionswhich 
claim to represent poor farmerswill abandon it in favour of prior understandings. 
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Introduction 
The Nam Ngum River Basin (NNRB) is considered by many to be the most important 
river basin in Laos.  It contributes over 10% of the country’s total water flow into the 
Mekong River, accounts for 34% of Laos’ total dry season rice production, and 
supports the largest reservoir and oldest hydropower scheme, the Nam Ngum 1, in 
the country. There are more than nine hydropower projects planned in the basin with 
development and investment occurring from a number of different sources including 
the private sector and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).  
This study focuses on the Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project and the decision by a 
Chinese company, Sinohydro, to gain approval for political risk insurance from the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank Group. This 
chapter first discusses the key water-related development and management issues in 
the Nam Ngum River Basin, and then through a frame of China’s Going Global Strategy 
in search for natural resources aboard. We then explore the background and role of 
China’s leading engineering and construction company, Sinohydro, in hydropower 
development in Laos followed by its decision-making process and collaboration with 
MIGA.  In particular, ours research aims to dissect the actual driving force and 
decision-making process within Sinohydro that led the company to seek collaboration 
with MIGA on the Nam Ngum 5 project. We also aim to understand what implications 
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this decision has on future investments by the company in large hydropower projects 
in the Mekong Region. 
Hydropower Development in Laos 
Laos is a mountainous and land-linked country in the Mekong Region. The section of 
the Mekong River in Laos is 1900 kilometres long, one-third of the entire length of 
the River. Laos comprises of 202,000 square kilometres of the Mekong River basin, 
which is 25% of the total basin catchment, and 85% of the Lao territory. The 
Mekong’s tributaries in Laos contribute to 35% of the river’s annual flow. The 
population of Laos is estimated at 6.8 million with the majority of people living in 
lowland areas and along the river valley. Its economic sources are mainly from 
agriculture, logging, mining and hydropower. The estimated GDP in 2008 was $5.2 
billion and per capital income estimated at $765  (USUSPD 2009). 
The development agenda of the current Lao government has moved from a planned 
economy to market liberalization, following the call of “changing the battle field to a 
market place” (Watershed 2001). In the late 1980s, the World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
other bilateral donors pushed for the Government of Laos to use concessional loans, 
bilateral aid and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) contractual arrangements with the 
private sector to develop hydropower for domestic use and export. Due to Laos’ 
mountainous topography and vast water resources coupled with the rapid economic 
growth and hunger for energy by Thailand, the Government of Laos has committed 
itself to support countless hydropower projects.  Most of these projects have 
attracted numerous foreign investors. By the end of 2008, 10 hydropower projects 
with an installed capacity of 667 MW are operating, 8 projects with installed capacity 
of 2,530 MW are under construction, and over 60 projects are currently in the 
planning and feasibility stages. These projects are expected to generate over 
20,000MW (GOL/MEM 2009). All of these efforts have resulted in a strong 
prioritisation of hydropower development making Laos the “battery of the Southeast 
Asia”. 
Despite the prioritization of hydropower development reports indicate that the 
impacts from hydropower dam construction and operation have continued to 
contribute to poverty in rural communities who live around dam reservoirs and along 
rivers, through involuntary resettlement, food insecurity, insufficient clean water and 
loss of livelihoods (International Rivers 2003; Wong 2003; Lawrence and Campello 
2008).1 
The Nam Ngum River Basin 
The Nam Ngum River Basin (NNRB) is the fifth largest river basin in Laos.  The basin 
covers a large area in north-central Laos, cutting across the administrative borders 
of Vientiane Province, Vientiane Municipality, Xieng Khouang Province and small 
parts of Luang Prabang and Bolikhamxay Provinces.  In 2006, the Xaisomboon 
                                          
 
1 See Hirsch (1998) the Nam Ngum 1 Dam, which was the first dam to block the Nam Ngum River, an 
important fish migration route to and from the Mekong River. See Watson and Schouten (2001) and 
Middleton (2009) re the Nam Song Diversion Project and the Nam Leuk Dam and the impact to fisherman 
and local villages. See reports on the Nam Theun 2 project and the way in which better environmental and 
social safeguards have been implemented to move towards improving the way in which projects are 
developed in Laos. 
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Special Zone, which is also part of the NNRB, was dissolved, and most of its districts 
added to Vientiane Province (Lawrence et al, 2008). 
The NNRB is home to almost 10% of the Lao population including some of its poorest 
communities, mainly ethnic minorities in the middle and upper reaches of the basin.  
About 40% of the population reports annual rice shortages of four months or longer, 
and more than 65% lives below the poverty line.  The population is approximately 
70% ethnic Lao-Tai, 18% Hmong/Iu-Hmien, and 10% Khmu. 
The NNRB is rich in mineral resources, with 39 mines operating officially and a total 
of 6,000 square kilometres of approved mining concessions as of 2006 (Lawrence et 
al, 2008).  The largest of these mines is the Phu Bia Gold mine operated by Pan 
Australia Resources, which began production at the end of 2005 (Lawrence et al, 
2008). 
The NNRB is considered by many to be the most important river basin in Laos, 
contributing over 10% of the country’s total water flow into the Mekong River, 
accounting for 34% of Laos’ total dry season rice production, and supporting the 
largest reservoir and oldest hydropower scheme, Nam Ngum 1(completed in 1971) 
in the country. The Nam Ngum 2 Dam is under construction, and up to nine others 







Figure 1: Location of Nam Ngum River Basin in Lao PDR (Source: Nam Ngum River 
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Figure 2: Location of Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower 
Project within the Nam Ngum River  
Basin (Source: Lawrence et al 2008). 
The Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project 
The Nam Ngum 5 (NN5) Hydropower Project is a 
relatively small dam with an estimated 120 MW 
generating capacity. The dam is currently under 
construction in the NNR basin. The dam is 
located in the Nam Ting River, a tributary of the 
Nam Ngum River in Phoukhoum District, Luang 
Prabang province, upstream of the Nam Ngum 3 
and the Nam Ngum 2 and approximately 300 km 
north of Vientiane.  This 104.5 meter high dam 
would flood an area of nearly 15 square 
kilometres(Lao Consulting Group, 2009).The 
dam will mainly impact two villages: Ban Chim 
and Ban Xiangdet, located in the upstream and 
downstream respectively. 
Ban Chim Village is in Luang Prabang Province, Phoukhoum District about 35 km 
from Phoukhoum District Centre.  The village is located along the hillside above the 
Nam Sout valley at an elevation of 1,500 metres above sea level.  The village was 
founded in 2000 as one of the strategic development zones of Phoukhoum District.  
The village has 172 households and a total population of 1,333 people. Whilst the 
impacts from the project are not perceived to be at a large scale, the most tangible 
impact projected will be from flooding of the rice field with the possibility of blocking 
road access to the forest and grassland. At least two households will need to be 
resettled and many households will need to find new areas for cultivating rice or 
alternative livelihoods. Villagers will be impacted at different degrees, for instance, 
some villagers will face difficulty in fishing contributing to a loss of important protein 
sources whilst others will have difficulty in facilitating livestock to the grazing lands 
or access to the forest for non-timber forest products collection (Lao Consulting 
Group, 2009). 
Ban Xiangdet Village is located downstream of the dam site on the boundary of NN5 
hydropower project and Nam Ngum 3 (NN3) hydropower projects. This village is 
situated within the Nam Ngum 3 dam reservoir area and has been notified as one of 
the resettlement villages. Given that the NN3 project is not underway, Ban Xiangdet 
is currently being impacted in a couple of ways.  There has been a reduction in 
stream flow to the village, some pollution causing a deterioration of water quality 
leading to loss of fishery catches. Ban Xiangdet Village was not included in the NN5 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment, and the Livelihood Restoration Plan 
due to the fact that the village will be resettled once the NN3 project gets underway. 
Nevertheless, the Village Head has reported to the local government authority 
concerns about water pollution impacts from dam construction, and the NN5 
Hydropower Company has evaluated the situation and constructed a new water 
channel and possibly a water pump ((Nam Ngum 5 Power Company Ltd 2009). 
Figure 3: Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project Area  
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Source: Lao Consulting Group, 20092 
China’s Overseas Investments in the Mekong Region 
China is establishing itself as an economic powerhouse around the world. Its 
economic rise and consequent demand for a reliable and steady supply of 
inexpensive natural resources have led to a rapid increase in Chinese foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in Asia, Africa and Latin America. China’s Tenth Five-Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (2001-2005) set out a strategy for China 
to proactively make use of overseas natural resources. Since 2004, the country’s 
Going Global (or Going Out) Strategy specifically intends to meet its growing demand 
                                          
 
2 The notification of the water diversion channel and dam site is not in the actual 







channel and dam site 
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for natural resources, both regionally as well as globally, and spur outward 
investment by subsidising investment by Chinese companies in overseas natural 
resources acquisition. The strategy and its related initiatives include the 
promulgation of guidelines on outward FDI by countries and sectors, delegation of 
authority by the central government to certain provinces and municipalities and 
further relaxation of foreign exchange controls for outward investment (Rutherford et 
al, 2009). 
China’s relationship with the Mekong Region and in particular with Laos is dynamic 
and complex. Relations have never been so good.  Border issues are handled 
peacefully, eclipsed by economic interests.  The close proximity of the two countries 
eases trade flows as infrastructure improvements are connecting major regional 
cities and borders are open for business through international gates (Rutherford et 
al, 2009). Trade and investment are increasing among the two countries. 
In recent years, the Mekong Region countries have seen the partial withdrawal of 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), which have become hesitant to invest in environmentally 
and socially controversial mega-projects.  Furthermore, in recent years the IFIs have 
developed international standards 
and best practices for investment 
in projects with potentially large 
social and environmental impacts, 
such as hydropower.  These 
standards are often criticised by 
host governments as being 
onerous and cumbersome and it 
can take years for projects to get 
approved.  This has left an 
investment vacuum that has been 
gradually filled by largely Asian 
financiers, and has enabled ‘new 
financiers’ such as Chinese 
companies to take advantage of 
the favourable investment climate 
and abundance of natural 
resources of its immediate 
neighbours, including Laos 
(Rutherford et al, 2009). 
Who is the Sinohydro? 
The Sinohydro Corporation3, the 
largest hydropower dam building 
company in China, is developing 
and beginning to expand its 
operations via investment in numerous hydropower projects in Laos. Sinohydro is a 
key state enterprise in infrastructure construction in China with over 130,000 
employees (Sinohydro Corporation, 2009).  It operates directly under the State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC see Box), with a 
                                          
 
3 Sinohydro Corporation is the controlling company of its subsidiaries and holding companies, while 
Sinohydro Corporation Limited is one of the subsidiaries, which is responsible for all of the Sinohydro 
Corporation’s international business. 
Box: Who is SASAC? 
Under the State Council, the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) was formed to oversee 
and guide a total of 171 state enterprises. 
SASAC has three main functions and 
responsibilities. 1. Reform and 
corporatisation: it acts to guide and promote 
the reform and restructuring process of 
state-owned enterprises; to ensure the value 
of these state-owned assets keeps 
enhancing; and to improve the corporate 
governance and navigate the strategic 
adjustment of the state economic structure. 
2.  Personnel selection: SASAC can appoint 
and remove top executives of these 
enterprises, or grant rewards or inflict 
punishments based on their performance 
evaluation. 3. Legal administration: SASAC 
can draft laws and administrative regulations 
to regulate the management system of the 
supervised state-enterprises.  
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registered capital of 4,000 million yuan (USD580) and total assets of 52,200 million 
yuan (USD$7,680) (ibid).The main business of Sinohydro is hydropower and 
hydraulic construction, and the company has currently expanded to activities around 
investment, project financing, consultation services and transport infrastructure 
construction, such as roads and harbours.  The corporation currently has 17 wholly 
owned subsidiaries and 10 holding companies nationwide, and 33 overseas branch 
companies and representative offices in Asia, Africa, Europe and America. Its main 
overseas business focus is in Africa (56%) and Asia (43%) (Sinohydro, 2009a). The 
status of China’s structural reform of its power sector will enable a better 
understanding of the rationale behind its overseas investments. 
The Sinohydro Corporation was formerly called the China Water Resources & 
Hydropower Engineering Corporation (CWHEC), and established in 1988. It was 
under the supervision of the Ministry of Energy and Ministry of Water Resources until 
1993 and later transferred under the Ministry of Power and Industry and then under 
the National Electricity Corporation.  During that time, the corporation was a wholly 
state controlled enterprise entity, which colligated 19 units as members responsible 
for hydraulics and hydropower construction to development nationwide. 
The structural reform of China’s power sector, which started in the last two decades, 
aims to gradually transform state-owned electricity-related enterprises, such as 
Sinohydro, from a planned economy, where construction is based on government 
plans and staff are guaranteed with lifetime employment, towards a market-oriented 
and competitive international corporation under the supervision of SASAC in terms of 
assets, finance, and top personnel management.  
The formation of the Sinohydro Holdings Corporation is one of the key outcomes of 
the national energy sector reform and restructuring in the early 2000s. The aim of 
the re-organisation and re-assembly of its member bureaus was to build up the 
competitiveness of the corporation in the national and global market. Meanwhile it 
undertook the responsibility to corporatize the member organisations with modern 
business management systems and mechanisms to ensure they operate under the 
legal protection of the Company Act of 2002.4 
These reforms symbolised the transformation of wholly state controlled enterprises 
to a move towards the “state- controlled corporatisation” (Guo Fa 2002)). Sinohydro 
is no longer in a position to wait for government assignments, but has to seek and 
compete for infrastructure projects, in search for opportunities to diversify the 
business risks and explore the long-term investments in both the national and 
international markets. For instance, Sinohydro has engaged in various large-scale 
hydropower and highway constructions in both Africa and Asia since 2000, and has 
started to explore long-term ‘build, operate and transfer’ (BOT) investment 
arrangement in Laos and Cambodia since 2004. (Sinohydro, 2009a) 
Nevertheless, the control of the Chinese government over state enterprises, such as 
Sinohydro, has not loosened. A government document on Sinohydro Corporation 
Reform stated that the corporation is still managed by the central government and 
that all key leaders will be appointed by the central government; its asset and 
financial management will lie with the Ministry of Finance; and the supervisory panel 
from SASAC will be dispatched to monitor the preservation and increment of their 
assets (Guo Fa, 2002). 
                                          
 
4 http://eng.sinohydro.com/en/idems/History.asp 
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The reform and restructuring of state enterprises has enabled most enterprises, such 
as Sinohydro to gain several competitive advantages in overseas investment over 
average private enterprises. First of all, these state enterprises are mostly re-
assembled from various governmental construction departments and research 
institutions located nationwide, thus the powerful business networks and a batch of 
experienced human resources already exist. Therefore they are most likely to win the 
tender or to be assigned Chinese overseas aid infrastructure projects, especially road 
and hydropower projects. Secondly, they are the pioneers of China’s “Going Global” 
policy and with these favourable policies enterprises have more chances to obtain 
funding from different national development banks. Thirdly, they can approach 
decision-makers of host governments easily, as often their projects bring additional 
diplomatic value on top of the economic benefits, so their bargaining power for 
bearing the project costs with the host government is higher. Finally, these projects 
often present themselves as projects that will bring development and prosperity to 
the host countries, yet often ignore the mitigation measures and the negative 
impacts on the local people.  
Sinohydro’s foreign investments and related social issues 
With steps of state enterprise reform and restructuring, the Sinohydro Corporation 
registered its international business department as the Sinohydro Corporation 
Limited, a legal subsidiary entity that focuses on developing its international 
business. The corporation holds foreign business licenses from the government, 
assumes the management of all existing international construction projects of its 
member companies, and is exploring new international projects and investments. 
Sinohydro Corporation Limited has been involved in over 100 construction projects in 
more than 30 countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America, with contracts valued 
at 900 million USD(Sinohydro Corporation Limited 2009).  
Since the 1980s, Sinohydro has benefited from the government’s foreign aid 
projects. These projects have assisted the corporation in accumulating experience 
and developing overseas business relationships. The increase in Sinohydro’s member 
organisations moving to privately search for overseas construction businesses set off 
around 1997 when there was a downturn in hydropower construction in China due to 
the prioritisation of the limited national budget for the Three Gorges Dam 
construction. Many governmental hydraulics and hydroelectricity engineering 
institutions were unable to obtain domestic construction projects which forced them 
to seek construction opportunities aboard.  However, in order to make foreign 
business contracts or investments abroad, companies needed a foreign business 
license from the Ministry of Commerce, which again limited these organisations’ 
business. However, a way to manoeuvre around this issue was by cooperating with 
and obtaining contracts from other state enterprises such as the China International 
Water and Electric Corporation (CWE)5. Thus, the “window” for obtaining 
construction contracts became essentially important. As a result, Sinohydro’s 
member bureaus, in most construction projects, is merely as a sub-contractor that 
only has an obligation to finish contract requirements, but takes no responsibilities 
for the negative impacts to the people and local environment as a result of a projects 
development and implementation. 
                                          
 
5 CWE is one of the first few state-owned corporations approved by China State Council to undertake international contracting 
projects. Its activities focus in international contracting, foreign economic aid, international trading and manpower export. It is also 
one of the key state enterprises under the supervision of SASAC. http://www.cwe.com.cn/en/BriefIntroduction/BriefIntroduction.html 
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This situation changed in 2004 when Sinohydro tactically planned to expand its 
business scope to different fields, including road construction, port development, and 
mining, among others and to focus toward longer term investment projects namely 
Build, Operate and Transfer (BOT) projects. The first BOT projects are located in 
Southeast Asia; the Kamchay Dam in Cambodia in 2007 and NN5 Dam in Laos in 
2008, both of which are under construction. 
Sinohydro’s Investment in Laos 
The Sinohydro Corporation started investing in Laos in 1997 and the Nam Leuk Dam 
became its first project. The project was funded by the Asian Development Bank and 
Japanese government and contracted through CWE. Later through CWE, Sinohydro 
obtained construction contracts for the Nam Mang 3 Dam, Xeset 2 Dam and Nam Lik 
1-2 Dam.  According to International Rivers, the Nam Mang 3 project affected an 
estimated 15,000 people, including 2,700 people who had to be resettled from the 
reservoir area.  Today, the Nam Mang 3 is not in operation year round due to low 
water levels. To date Sinohydro has been involved in nine hydropower dams, of 
which six dam projects are only for construction, and the other three are BOT 
projects. In addition, to diversify the risk of investments in Laos, Sinohydro bought 
one cement factory and initiated a Potash Manufacturing Company (see Table 1). 
The expansion from hydropower construction to hydropower investments and a 
further diversification of investments will facilitate Sinohydro to accumulate long-
term revenues instead of short-term profits.  Moreover, the long-term working 
relationship between Sinohydro and Electricity duLaos (EDL) along with other 
relevant government agencies has already built a base for their long-term 
investment.  
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The Sinohydro Corporation in Laos has several different offices, which includes the 
representative office, the NN5 Power Company, Sinohydro Bureau Ten and Fifteen, 
the Cement Company and the Sinohydro Potash Mining Company. The representative 
office acts as a gateway of communication for potential foreign projects to 
headquarters and general monitoring of its subsidiary companies. The NN5 Power 
                                          
 
6 Nam Khan 2 and 3 Dam and 203 kV 230-kV power transmission line from Xiengkhouang to Luang 
Prabang city, was signed August 2009 in Beijing.  
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90778/90857/90861/6727902.html 
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Company is a joint venture company with EdL and its staff comprise of 
representatives from Sinohydro Corporation Limited (the Corporation’s International 
Department), Sinohydro Bureau Ten and from EdL. This office acts as the project 
owner of the NN5 Dam, and meanwhile seeks and prepares for other new projects 
including the Nam Ou Cascade Dam Development and Pak Lay Dam along the 
mainstream of the Mekong River. Sinohydro Bureaus Ten and Fifteen mostly conduct 
civil engineering and construction work. The Sinohydro Bureau Ten was sub-
contracted in the construction of the Nam Leuk Dam, Nam Mang 3 Dam, Xeset 2 
Dam and Nam Lik 1-2 Dam and now the NN5 Dam ((Sinohydro Bureau Ten 2009). 
The Sinohydro Bureau Fifteen is new in the region, and is currently involved together 
with Bureau Ten in the NN5 Dam construction. The two non-hydropower businesses, 
the cement factory and Potash Mining, are operated independently with staff from 
Sinohydro Corporation Limited. All these companies are at the same level under the 
umbrella of the Sinohydro Corporation (see Figure 4). They operate independently 
but are also closely connected.   
 
 
Figure 4: Sinohydro Corporation Organizational Diagram (Sinohydro Corporation 2009 a).  
 
Sinohydro’s Build, Invest and Operate (BOT) investment in the Nam Ngum 5 
Dam 
The responsibilities and risks for associated foreign investment, such as BOT 
hydropower projects, are much more complicated and diverse compared to simply 
dam construction projects. Sinohydro, with extensive experience in hydropower 
construction, has had to gain experience in hydropower investment and long-term 
development. Hence, their strategy in foreign investment is very cautious, beginning 
with smaller-scale hydropower investment that may have less negative impacts 
followed by larger-scale and more controversial hydropower development with more 
anticipated positive and negative impacts. Therefore, in Laos, Sinohydro strategically 
planned to start with the smaller projects such as theNN5Dam, and while continuing 
with the NN5 Dam construction and operation, they can expand to the more 
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controversial Nam Ou cascade of dams project and the Pak Lay project, which are 
much more extensive in terms of their size and environmental and social impacts.  
The NN5 Hydropower project was listed as one of the 20 shortlisted National 
Hydropower Projects that the Government of Lao plans to build. The pre-feasibility study 
of this project was conducted by Lahmeyer International (Germany) and Energy Equity 
Corporation LTD (Australia) in 1997 (Donsay Company Ltd 2007). After several meetings 
and negotiations with the Ministry of Planning and Investment, the MOU between 
Sinohydro and the Government of Laos was signed in March 16, 2004. Dongsay 
Company Ltd 7 was commissioned to carry out the Initial Environmental Examination 
(IEE) between May to June 2005. The detailed study for the Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), Social Impact Assessment (SIA), Environmental Management Plan 
(EMP) and Social Action Plan (SAP) was carried out after the IEE approval. The Water 
Resources and Environment Administration (WREA) approved these documents in June 
2008. The background information of the NN5 power project and project progress are 
shown in Tables 2 and 3. 
 
Table 2: NN5 Hydropower Project Background in brief 
Location  (Administrative) 
Approximately 300 km north of Vientiane  
Dam area: Phoukhoun District in Luang Prabang province 
Power house: Phoukout District in Xieng Khouang province 
(Watershed)  
Upstream of Nam Ting basin, sub-basin of the Nam Ngum river basin  
Dam area: Nam Phat, Nam Soud and Nam Ting River. 
Power house: Nam Ting River 
Construction feature 
 
Rollere Compacted Concrete Dam of 104m high and 258m long crest 
Headrace tunnel: 8.6 km and Penstock: 1.2 km 
Construction period 4 years, expected to completed in 2011 
Electricity generation Installed capacity of powerhouse is 120-Mega Watt (MW) 
Expected annual power generation is 507 GWh 
Dam reservoir Estimated Reservoir surface area is 15 km2 
Estimated gross reservoir storage is 314 Mm3 
Main stakeholders Developer: Sinohydro Corporation Ltd 85%, EdL 15% 
Financial: China EXIM Bank (Currently under negotiation) 
Contractor: Sinohydro Bureau 10 and Bureau 15  
Project Management Company: 
Proposed Political Risk Insurance Agency: MIGA (Approval not yet in place) 
S/EIA Consultant Company: Dongsay Company Ltd (disbanded) 
Consultant Company for Livelihood Restoration Plan: Lao Consultant Group Ltd and follow-
up implementation of LRP:  Earth Systems Lao 
Impacted community Ban Chim Village (upstream of dam site): Around170 households will be impacted Ban 
Xiangdet Village (downstream of dam site): A village impacted by the Nam Ngum 3 dam 
which will require resettlement. 
 
Source: NN5 Hydropower Project: Update of Environmental Impact Assessment, 
Dongsay Company Ltd, 2007; Livelihood Restoration Plan, LCG, 2009; and interviews 
with NN5 Company staff  
                                          
 
7Dongsay Company Ltd was a Lao local consultant firm for infrastructure construction. Its activities covered Environmental Social 
Impact studies and data collection, engineering (roads, water supply, sanitation) irrigation, land surveys, building and architecture 
consulting services. 
http://www.spraci.com/boards.php?task=show&id=94480&board=x0laos&username=&area=x0laos&ucode=&parea=x0laos 
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The NN5hydropower investment and development procedures are summarised into 
four phases: project negotiation and agreement, project research and disclosure, 
MIGA and external financing procedures and project construction. The four phases 
often overlap or are conducted concurrently. By doing so, it has enabled Sinohydro 
to move through the process faster, whilst having to bear various kinds of contingent 
risks. The Lao government approved construction of the project in June 2009, 
although preparation for construction preparation had already started as early as end 
of 2008. By August 2009, the construction of the project road, workers’ campsites 
and associated facilities were completed. The construction of the foundation for dam 
structure and excavations for water diversion channels are under way. However, the 
formation of the Social and Environmental Management Unit (SEMU), MIGA political 
insurance approval and NN5 financing have not yet been finalised.   
Table 3: NN5 Hydropower Project Approval Process 










2004 March 16, MOU signed April, Feasibility 
Studies8 started 
  
2005  April, IEE
2 started   






S/EIA, EMP, and 
SAP9 
January, started initial 
contact with MIGA for 
obtaining political risk 
insurance 
 
2007 April 11, CA and PPA 
signed10 
 
May, NN 5 Power 
Company established 
and SA11 signed  
August, Provincial 
EIA Workshop in 
Phoukhoun District 
January, Definitive 
application approved.  
 
Oct 24 to 26, MIGA visit 
to the NN5 project site 
 
2008 June 23, Environmental 
Certificates awarded by 
GOL 
March, National 









July, MIGA sponsored 




August 1, NN5 
stakeholder meeting 
(MIGA/The World Bank) 
 
November, China EXIM 
August 31, Sinohydro 
Ltd and Sinohydro 
Bureau 10 signed 
contract for dam site 
construction 
 
Sinohydro Ltd signed 
contract with Sinohydro 
Bureau 15 for power 
house construction 
                                          
 
8 Feasibility Studies were conducted by the Sinohydro No 14 Engineering Bureau. The dam investigation was conducted 
in 2004 and dam design took longer for adjustments until final official approval in September 2008.  
9 Initial Environmental Evaluation (IEE), Social Environmental Impact Assessment (S/EIA), Environmental Management 
Plan (EMP), and Social Action Plan (SAP) were all conducted by Dongsay Consultant Company Ltd and were submitted 
to WREA for approval in March 2008. The Environmental Certificate was awarded in June 2008. 
10 The Concession Agreement (CA) and Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) were signed with the Energy Promotion and 
Development Department and EdL respectably.  
11 The Shareholder Agreement (SA) was signed with EdL indicating that Sinohydro has 85% of the share and EdL has 
15% of the share. 
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Bank visit for review of 
due diligence  
2009 November, National 
Assembly approval 
 July – MIGA field visit  





Plan in final draft 
(unlikely to be formally 
finalised).  Earth 








Financing the Nam Ngum 5 
Hydropower Project 
The investment cost of the 
NN5 hydropower project is 
estimated at $200 million 
USD. This massive amount of 
investment cost requires 
strong and stable financial 
support and risk minimisation. 
Sinohydro originally 
approached the China Export 
and Import Bank (China Exim 
Bank) and ANZ. ANZ is an 
Equator Bank12and due to the 
vigorous social and 
environmental requirements, 
and implementation cost, 
Sinohydro decided to apply for 
financing from the China EXIM 
Bank.  
Sinohydro approached China 
EXIM Bank as the financing 
agency for a loan up to 70% 
of the total investment cost (approximately $140 million USD). Amid all the 
requirements for the loan, risk minimisation is the priority. China EXIM Bank could 
offer a lower interest rate and administrative fee provided that all the insurance 
guarantee certificates and assurance documents by the Lao government are 
approved and submitted before the loan is released. Apart from all normal business 
risk insurances, the political risk insurance has become one of the required insurance 
formalities for long-term investment projects by the China EXIM Bank. China EXIM 
Bank officials carried out a due diligence visit to the NN5 project site in November 
2008. The Bank has informally agreed to provide funding provided the submission of 
                                          
 
12 The Equator Banks are those that have endorsed the Equator Principles, which is a financial industry 
benchmark for determining, assessing and managing social and environmental risks in project financing. 
See www.equator-principles.com. 
Box: China EXIM Bank’s Environmental Guidelines 
The China EXIM Bank has recently started to become 
more aware of the risks of overseas infrastructure 
projects and its reputation. In August 2007, the 
Bank issued “Guidelines for Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessments of the China Export and 
Import Bank’s Loan Projects". These guidelines 
require the borrower to carryout an environmental 
and social impact assessment and uphold the host 
government’s policy and standards, respect local 
people’s rights to land and resources and properly 
handle any resettlement problems, and openly 
consult the public for projects that will have serious 
negative environmental impacts (China EXIM Bank 
2007). However, this policy is neither displayed on 
the China EXIM Bank website, nor known by its 
lender. The announcement could only be accessed 
from a few international NGOs’ websites(Peter 
Bosshard 2008) and(Chan-Fishel 2008). 
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all required documents. Currently, the China EXIM Bank, Sinohydro and MIGA are 
discussing further detailed contracts regarding the terms of responsibility, insurance 
coverage and other relevant issues. As of early 2010, funding has not yet been 
secured because Sinohydro has not received approval from MIGA. Currently 
Sinohydro is using its own finances to fund the project construction and 
development, a much riskier mode of operation but one that enables the corporation 
to move forward whilst manoeuvring through the approvals process.  
 
Potential opportunities for improving the environment and social aspects of the Nam 
Ngum 5 Project 
Political risk refers to the risk of a strategic, financial, or personnel loss of a company 
due to nonmarket factors such as macroeconomic and social policies, such as fiscal, 
monetary, trade, investment, industrial, income, labour, and developmental; or 
events related to political instability, for instance, terrorism, riots, coups, civil war, 
and insurrection(Kennedy 1988). NN5 is a 25-year BOT hydropower project. Within 
the 25 years, the revenues generated approximately in the first ten years will be 
used for loan repayment while only the revenue generated for the remaining 15 
years will belong to the NN5 Company Ltd, a joint venture between Sinohydro and 
EdL. Thus, the investment is exposed to unknown and uncoverable political risks. 
The Lao government offers this investment opportunity for economics and politics. 
Economically, the project will increase electricity supply in the northern part of Laos 
for investments and development such as mining, and income generation for the Lao 
government through taxation and 15% of company’s shares. Politically, the area is 
well known for ethnic insurgents and the floodplain may be used to tighten the space 
for any ethnic insurgents. The project is located in a very isolated mountain range, 
which shares a border with a politically sensitive zone, and some of the impacted 
villages are ethnic minorities who have historical conflicts with the current 
government. Along with the anticipated high investment returns are the looming 
political risks, which Sinohydro is cautious about. Since the project started, the 
company has had to employ several soldiers to guard the project’s entrance, the 
worker’s camp and along the road construction.  
The selection of political risk 
insurance agencies is an 
important task and an 
evaluation and decision was 
made by Sinohydro in the 
early stages of the project. 
There are two options 
available for the company, 
the Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
and the China Export & 
Credit Insurance Corporation 
(Sinosure). The former is an 
international agency dealing 
particularly with political risk 
of foreign investment for the 
last 20 years, and the latter 
is a Chinese national 
enterprise with its main focus on international trade related insurances operating 
since early 2000. The comparison of these entities is shown in Table 4. 
Box: Who is MIGA? 
MIGA is a member of the World Bank Group that 
aims to promote foreign direct investment through 
providing political risk insurance (guarantees) to 
investors and lenders, and helps the emerging 
economies to attract private investments (MIGA 
2000). MIGA was created in 1988 in Washington 
DC, USA, with registered capital of 1 billion US 
Dollar. Its 2008 annual report stated that MIGA 
has issued nearly 20 billion US Dollar of 
guarantees for investment in 100 countries during 
past two decades. It currently guarantees the Nam 
Theun 2 Dam in Laos, and has guaranteed over 
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In 2005, MIGA representatives travelled globally to present its credential with 
potential clients. In China, MIGA met with a number of state enterprises including 
Sinohydro. After the initial meeting with MIGA in Beijing, Sinohydro Corporation 
Limited weighed the pros and cons for choosing MIGA over Sinosure. The company 
also discussed its current overseas business activities and subsequent international 
criticism on the impacts of their project investments, which they believed might be 
subjected to reputational risk. 
 
To date, Sinohydro has only signed two 
BOT hydropower projects: the Kamchay 
Dam in Cambodia and the NN5 Dam in 
Laos. The Kamchay Dam is guaranteed 
by Sinosure providing an opportunity for 
the company to determine whether MIGA 
could be a potentially viable option for 
the NN5 Dam. Compared with most 
hydropower projects, the NN5 
Hydropower Project is small and with 
limited negative impacts. The company 
felt that MIGA support for this project 
could be considered as a trial, to see 
whether MIGA could help the company 
learn and explore how international 
standards could be applied to its 
investments. In early 2006, Sinohydro 
began preparing the preliminary 
application and have continued 
negotiating procedures for approval with 
MIGA as recent as early 2010. If this 
project is approved, it will be the first 
project for a Chinese company to use 
MIGA’s insurance guarantee services.  
In October 2007 MIGA approved a new 
Environmental and Social Safeguards 
Policy. However, given that the NN5 
application process was started prior to 
the approval of the new policy, MIGA 
continues to apply the old policy.  This 
policy requires its clients to abide to its 
‘issue-specific’ policy. Therefore, for the 
NN5 Dam project to be successful, 
MIGA’s Involuntary Resettlement Policy, 
Dam Safety Policy, and Indigenous 
People Policy must be applied. The 
Involuntary Resettlement policy 
addresses the livelihood losses of the impacted community, which requires a 
livelihood restoration plan that could sustain and improve the livelihood. The 
impacted community is classified by MIGA as indigenous groups, i.e., Hmong, Khmu, 
and Lao-Loum, and thus informed consultation on mitigation measures is needed. 
The project also needs to consider whether or not to incorporate the impacted 
indigenous people in the project preparation and implementation and to address 
their special needs in the livelihood restoration plan and other relevant documents. 
Box: What is Sinosure? 
Sinosure is the only Chinese official 
import -- export credit insurance agency. 
It has played a crucial political role in 
supporting the Chinese international trade 
growth, foreign investment in China and 
Chinese investment aboard on raw 
materials and infrastructure construction, 
by providing risks guarantee services. 
Sinosure is a state insurance enterprise 
within the Ministry of Finance, which 
oversees its capital and cash flow. It grew 
out of the Export Credit Insurance 
Departments of the People's Insurance 
Company of China (PICC) and China EXIM 
Bank in late 2001. It operates as a central 
government policy implementer to provide 
support to companies engaging in 
overseas business and investment. The 
business partnership between Sinosure 
and Sinohydro in overseas construction 
business has existed for decades, mainly 
on risk guarantee of import and export of 
construction machineries. Sinosure 
initiated its investment risk guarantee in 
2005 and Sinohydro’s Kamchay 
Hydropower BOT project in Cambodia is 
presumably the first long-term foreign 
infrastructure investment project 
approved. By the end of 2007, Sinosure 
has guaranteed about 32 investment 
projects (Sinosure, 2007).  
(Sinosure 2007) 
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The Dam Safety Policy will also be applied and the dam design is required to be 
reviewed by independent experts.  
Compare to the Lao National Policy on environmental and social sustainability of the 
Hydropower Sector issued in June 2005, MIGA’s policies are more responsible to 
follow up the actual effort of mitigation activities. This National Policy is based on 
activities of a World Bank funded project – Nam Theun 2 hydropower development. 
It merely described few key issues that hydropower developers need to considered, 
such as environmental assessment, project affected people, information disclosure. 
The policy language used is weak and vague with no enforcement action.  
 
Table 4: Comparison between Sinosure and MIGA13 
 SINOSURE MIGA 
Nature  The only policy-oriented Chinese 
insurance company that 
specialises in export credit 
insurance. 
Member of the World Bank Group that 
provides non-commercial guarantees 
(insurance) for investments made in 
developing countries. 
Mission To protect Chinese companies 
from commercial and political 
risks in export and overseas 
investments, improve the 
competitiveness of Chinese 
companies in international 
markets, and render them strong 
support in their overseas 
expansion.14 
To promote foreign direct investment into 
developing countries to help support economic 
growth, reduce poverty, and improve people's lives. 
Establishment  2001  1988 
Service 
coverage 
Short, medium and long-term 
export credit insurance, 
investment insurance, bond and 
guarantee, credit rating service 
and debt collection.  
The investment insurance covers 
risks of:  
• Expropriation  
• Restriction on transfer and conversion 
• War damage 
• Inability to operate due to war  
• Breach of undertaking 
MIGA’s guarantees protect investors 
against the risks of:  
• Transfer restriction (including inconvertibility) 
• Expropriation 
• War and civil disturbance 
• Breach of contract 
Eligible 
applicants 
Enterprises and financial 
institutions that are registered 
and have their principal place of 
business in mainland China only. 
Investments must be made in a 
developing country that is a member of 
MIGA, and it must be a new, cross-
border investment, or investments 
                                          
 
13 The information pertaining to the difference in costs between Sinosure and MIGA is not available in the 
public domain. 
14 Corporate Culture, Sinosure Annual Repot 2003, p17.access Jan 20, 2009 
http://www.sinosure.com.cn/sinosure/english/pdf/chart.pdf 
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Financial institutions that provide 
financing for overseas 
investments by the enterprises 
with the above criteria.15 
associated with the expansion, 
modernisation, or financial restructuring 
of existing projects, and acquisitions 
involving privatisation of state 
enterprises. Investments should 
contribute to host country development 
objectives and be financially, 




• Equity insurance policy  
• Shareholder loan policy  
• Financial institutions loan policy 
• Other policies from central government 
• Policy on Disclosure of Information, 
• Policy and Performance Safeguards on Social 
and Environmental Sustainability.  
• Policy on Anti-corruption and Anti-fraud.17 
Other 
services  
• Risk management  
• Information service 
• Technical assistance 
• Information service  
• Dispute mediation program18 
 
 
Factors driving Sinohydro towards more responsible hydropower development 
Under China’s Going Global Strategy, China has made laudable efforts to develop 
policies and guidelines to govern overseas investment.  While this is still a nascent 
process, it has great potential for addressing and mitigating potential conflicts over 
investments in sensitive projects such as hydropower dams. However, many 
challenges remain, as demonstrated by the guidelines for Chinese overseas 
investments in silviculture operations(Rutherford, Lazarus et al. 2008), which stipulate 
that Chinese companies should adhere to the laws of the countries in which they 
operate. In the case of countries in the Mekong Region, these laws are widely 
recognised as being poorly implemented. Sinohydro’s decision to cooperate with 
MIGA over Sinosure symbolises a new move for Chinese overseas investment. There 
are two main reasons for this decision.  
The first reason is that Sinohydro wants to improve the company’s performance, and 
enhance its image and competitiveness in the international business environment by 
learning and using methodologies on how to incorporate internationally recognised 
standards into project development and financing. Many of Sinohydro’s projects, 
though they were merely responsible for project construction, have been heavily 
criticised through the international media for its lack of responsibility towards 
environmental impacts and impacts on local communities. As Sinohydro moves 
towards long-term investment management, the pressure to change and to improve 
its image and competiveness become even more crucial, and the company needs to 
know whether this cooperation could upgrade their performance and image through 
following the guidance and assistance provided by MIGA. 
The second reason is that most Lao people are living on subsistence livelihoods, that 
is, relying on natural resources for food and income. Hydropower development and 
                                          
 
15 http://www.sinosure.com.cn/sinosure/english/products_introduction01.htm 
16 Investment Guarantee Guide, MIGA, http://www.miga.org/documents/IGG06+pa.pdf 
17 http://www.miga.org/policies/index_sv.cfm 
18 http://www.miga.org/about/index_sv.cfm?stid=1588 
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operation is widely recognised as bringing significant impacts to the environment and 
consequently impacting local communities.  Further, the NN5 Dam is located in 
apolitically sensitive area of the country. MIGA has twenty years of work experience 
on political risk insurance and has developed a series of guidelines and safeguards to 
avoid, mitigate and monitor the political risks. It currently guarantees the Nam 
Theun 2 Hydropower Project in Laos. The World Bank, the umbrella organisation of 
MIGA, has significant economic and political influence in its member countries, 
including Laos. When political disputes occur, the World Bank will use its influence to 
pressure the government to solve issues or play an arbitration role between the 
government and corporation, thus helping to restore the political stability.  
The Decision-making Process for the Sinohydro-MIGA partnership 
In 2006, Sinohydro and MIGA embarked on a partnership after Sinohydro submitted 
an initially preliminary application for the NN5 Project. It was followed by a process 
involving the submission of a formal application, which included the Social and 
Environmental Impact Assessment, Environmental Management Plan and Social 
Action Plan in 2007. After the revision of the project documents MIGA classified the 
NN5 hydropower project as a Category A project19 that triggers a minimum 
disclosure period of 60 days. The project documents were disclosed on November 21, 
2007 on the MIGA website20(MIGA 2007 a). Up until February 2010, MIGA officials 
have carried out four due diligence visits to the project area -- October 2007, July 
2008, July 2009, and February 2010. During the first visit to the NN5 project site, 
MIGA officials met with Provincial and District government officials and visited the 
Ban Chim village. During their July 2009 visit, MIGA visited the Ban Chim Village and 
dam construction site. Based on their disclosure policy, MIGA sponsored a public 
workshop to discuss the development of the NN5 hydropower development in August 
2008.MIGA later contracted the Lao Consulting Group Ltd, as an independent 
consulting firm to conduct a Livelihood Restoration Plan for the impacted village – 
Ban Chim.  
The decision making process between Sinohydro and MIGA mainly concerns two 
areas, namely the terms of reference on the business contracts, and the social and 
environmental concerns of MIGA – the key area of prevention and mitigation of 
political risk.  The detailed discussion on the terms of reference, responsibility and 
cost of insurance coverage of MIGA’s political insurance guarantee contract is 
ongoing between MIGA, Sinohydro and the China EXIM Bank. It is expected that the 
MIGA Board of Directors will discuss about the case and make a decision sometime in 
2010 but that depends on the findings from MIGA’s most recent field visit in 
February 2010. Sinohydro is highly confident that MIGA will approve the project as 
they have conducted a series of activities based on MIGA’s recommendation. 
The social aspects of the project have been deemed the most difficult to mitigate. 
Whilst the impacts are not great in comparison to many other projects, e.g. the Nam 
Theun 2 project in central Laos, MIGA has found it difficult to see a reasonable plan 
for mitigation. The Livelihood Restoration Plan, sponsored by MIGA is a requirement 
of the Lao government in order to achieve final approval by the National Assembly 
                                          
 
19 MIGA’s Category A Project refers to a Project with “potential significant adverse social or environmental 
impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented.” 
20 This project application was submitted before October 1st, 2007. Therefore the project is considered under 
MIGA’s former Environmental and Social Safeguards Policy and former Disclosure Policy.  This information 
was stated in MIGA’s website: http://www.miga.org/news/index_sv.cfm?stid=1506&aid=1640 
Page 248 of 852
PN67_2010_09 
Improving hydropower development?  The Case of the Nam Ngum 5 Hydropower Project in Lao PDR 




for construction. It is also is an important document for MIGA to gain its own Board 
approval, and to monitor the livelihood recovery and restoration of the impacted 
community in the future. However, the final draft plan has only re-identified and 
updated the potential livelihood loss of the impacted village – Ban Chim, from the 
previous Social Impact Assessment. The Plan did not provide any concrete 
implementation recommendations as was never fully finalised. As a result, Sinohydro 
separately contracted another Lao-based consulting firm to determine ways to 
implement the Livelihood Plan. MIGA is pleased with the new contract and Sinohydro 
is funding the costs directly as opposed to seeking assistance from MIGA.  
Transparency is one of the concerns and requests of MIGA. After MIGA’s July 2009 
visit, Sinohydro created a webpage that provides updated project relevant 
information to the public (http://eng.sinohydro.com/en/idems/nprofile.asp). This 
includes brief information about the NN5 project, the EIA, EMP, SAP reports and 
certificates, the social and environmental obligation, monthly reports on 
environmental and social issues and activities, the introduction of the environmental 
and social management teams and consultants, and some photos that show the 
workshop and site visit by outsiders. Despite the disclosure of such information, its 
creditability is still doubtful for instance; the approval document of the Environmental 
Obligations on the company for the NN5 Hydropower Project is actually an official document 
that gives comments for amendment of the document. The actual document has not 
been placed on the web although MIGA has directly confirmed that the project was 
approved by the Lao National Assembly in November 2009.  
Nevertheless, Sinohydro has conducted a series of activities to prepare for the 
compensation of impacted communities. These activities include an updated baseline 
survey and health check of Ban Chim village, establishment of the Environmental 
and Social Management Office (ESMO), and recruitment of a local well-known 
environmental consultant company – Earth System Laos – as the project’s local 
environmental and social consultant in the ESMO team (NN5 Monthly Report, 2009). 
In addition, an in-depth survey for compensation of flooded rice fields has been 
carried out, which claims a smaller flooded area.  
How MIGA’s partnership with Sinohydro has influenced the company’s 
efforts to address corporate social responsibility 
MIGA’s global promotion trip to China in 2006 demonstrated to Sinohydro their 
unique strengths as part of the World Bank Group. MIGA has over twenty years of 
work experience on political insurance guarantees and throughout this time, they 
have developed international standards for social and environmental issues to avoid, 
mitigate or compensate adverse impacts on workers, communities and the 
environment. MIGA’s influence in the countries in which they operate is strong and 
MIGA has placed a role in dispute negotiation through the World Bank. These kinds 
of attributes are of significant interest to Sinohydro. The cooperation between 
Sinohydro and MIGA seems a good prospect that Chinese state enterprises are 
moving towards in terms of adhering to international environmental and social 
standards. Yet, how will this partnership influence Sinohydro’s corporate social 
responsibility in overseas investment and MIGA’s future cooperation with Chinese 
state enterprise? 
The negotiations among Sinohydro, the China EXIM Bank and MIGA are in the final 
stage, and all parties are confident in partnership success. This process has been 
considered special in terms of its time allocated to learning for Sinohydro and MIGA. 
In many countries that MIGA operates, deals are made fairly quickly and the 
organisation has done its due diligence.  However, in this case there has been a long 
lead-time enabling MIGA to work closely with Sinohydro in the preparation and move 
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towards Board approval. Whilst the process has not been easy, MIGA does see this 
as beneficial to Sinohydro whereby increasing the learning within the company. From 
Sinohydro Ltd, this process has enabled them to explore how to work with an 
international organization and to learn about internationally recognized 
Environmental and Social safeguards. With this partnership, Sinohydro could elevate 
its international image. MIGA, on the other hand, has learnt more about the way in 
which Chinese state enterprises think and operate, especially on their social and 
environmental standards.  
MIGA, through its due diligence visits, has shown their concerns on the social 
impacts of the dam impacted village Ban Chim. The Social Action Plan made by 
Dongsay Consultant Company Ltd is clearly insufficient to mitigate the impacts. 
According to its policy, MIGA requires its clients to undertake additional assessments 
when existing documents do not meet the requirements of its Performance 
Standards.  
The Livelihood Restoration Plan (LRP) provided MIGA and Sinohydro a detailed 
baseline survey of Ban Chim village, and a comprehensive impact analysis of 
villagers based on the flooding level given by the NN5 Company. It revealed much 
bigger impacts compared to the original Social Impact Assessment. For instance, the 
SIA estimated 55 hectares of rice fields would be inundated, while the LRP 
calculated43 hectares of irrigated lowland and 69 hectares of rain-fed lowland will be 
lost. The fishery issue was not mentioned in the SIA but was reported in the LRP as a 
vital adverse impact to the majority of villagers who fish for consumption and for 
generating valued at249.10 million Laotian kip ($29,306 USD) (Lao Consuting Group 
2009). However, instead of providing a livelihood restoration plan, this LRP merely 
provides few options to be considered, for instance, modern grazing of livestock, 
promoting of handicraft, and exploring alternative crops, Thus, it weakened its 
legitimacy in the decision-making process, and could not be used as feasible 
guidance for the Lao government and MIGA’s future monitoring.  
In addition, MIGA’s performance standards clearly mention that its clients need to 
develop an action plan that reflects the results of consultation with adverse impacted 
communities on social and environmental risks. The action plan needs to address the 
necessary actions for mitigation, prioritize them with an implementation timeline, 
disclose the actions to the affected communities and illustrate the mechanism for 
external reporting of actions (MIGA 2007 b). As of end of 2009, these documents 
have, so far, not yet complied with the MIGA’s policy. As a result, in MIGA’s July 
2009 visit, the social impact experts listed a series of comments for improvement; it 
is hoped that through these improvements the project could meet the standard of 
MIGA’s policy.  
The initial plan of Sinohydro to sign the contract with MIGA was in February 2009. 
But, as of early 2010, the NN5 Project proposal has not been put forward for 
approval. This is due to the lack of sufficient legal documents for MIGA’s Board 
approval as well as insufficient action to address livelihood restoration of the 
impacted community. MIGA has not seen this delay as problematic but more of a 
learning process that has been beneficial for the company and MIGA. However, the 
loan from China EXIM Bank has not yet released for the project due the fact that 
Sinohydro has not yet signed a contract with MIGA. Therefore, from the Sinohydro 
side, the delay by MIGA may be seen as problematic as they have to pay for the 
current costs of the project themselves. Whilst these negotiations are taking place, 
the construction of the project has halfway towards completing construction and 
aims to finish by 2011.  
At this stage, MIGA’s leverage in terms of holding the NN5 Company accountable for 
the project’s social and environmental responsibility is much higher given the 
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eventual need by Sinohydro for insurance. TheNN5 company staff have carried out a 
series of activities following the comments by MIGA’s social and environmental team. 
The practice of “learning-by–doing” has gradually built up the company’s capacity, 
but this is still far below MIGA’s requirements and it is believed that there will be 
difficulties in meeting future challenges.  As a response, the company hired a well-
known foreign consultant firm to address the environmental impacts and local 
livelihood restoration. 
Upon project approval, MIGA’s ability to ensure an upholding of its safeguard policy 
and the company’s ability to follow-through in the longer are, however, uncertain 
due to several factors. The first is the need for continuous attention, commitment 
and effort by the company to address the project’s social and environmental impacts 
and livelihood restoration activities of impacted communities. The second is the 
human resources capacity needed as most of the Sinohydro staff has expertise in 
hydrological, civil engineering or business. Addressing social issues (such as 
grievances, conflict and sustainable livelihoods strategies) and environmental 
protection is a new areas requiring more time to truly understand the impacts and 
put in place a sound restoration plan. The third is MIGA’s monitoring mechanism. It 
is a complicated scenario for MIGA staff, who are based in Washington DC, to be able 
to follow the day-to-day activities of the project. It is already clear that whilst the 
MIGA staffs have been providing support during their visits, three to four day annual 
due diligence visits is clearly insufficient to ensure the project has upheld MIGA’s 
standards. This is partially why Sinohydro has sought a local consulting firm to assist 
it to move the project further along and assist their thinking in terms of the 
livelihood restoration plan. 
Conclusion 
Understanding the motivation behind Sinohydro to partner with MIGA for a political 
risk guaranteed can never fully be understood.  However, Sinohydro, like many other 
state enterprises undergoing national sectoral restructuring along with the 
governments “Going Global” policy, is striving to improve its international image and 
to increase its competitiveness in the international market. In this day and age these 
are major efforts needed that require innovative thinking and repackaging of projects 
to ensure there is no reputational risk to the company and to be internationally 
competitive. The collaboration with MIGA has not been easy nor has can it be seen in 
black or white.  Whilst MIGA has strived to provide high-quality interventions to uplift 
and improve the project preparation and implementation by Sinohydro, there have 
been some limitations given MIGA’s distance from the project team and site along 
with the complicated nature in working with a first-time company that is seeking its 
partnership.  For Sinohydro, they do benefit from MIGA’s standards and whilst high 
quality, the company may not have received the day-to-day advice that it requires 
and that may not have been part of the original agreement between the two entities.  
However, the on-the-job learning that MIGA has provided to Sinohydro has yielded 
an increase in capacity among the Sinohydro staff and a greater understanding of 
international practices along with the ability to work with staff from an international 
organization.  
Perhaps in future, as Sinohydro embarks on larger and more complex projects, they 
will be able to weigh the pros and cons of partnering with domestic or international 
organisations so as to improve their project preparation and implementation.  
The process between MIGA and Sinohydro is coming to an end in terms of the future 
being near for MIGA board approval.  This is of course subject to MIGA feeling that 
enough progress has been made and that they are secure in their thinking to submit 
the project for approval. Sinohydro is in desperate need of a loan from the China 
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EXIM Bank, and MIGA’s approval is the crucial missing element for loan release. 
Consequently, MIGA’s comments on the efforts to date to address the social and 
environmental improvement plans have been effectively implemented is near. Upon 
approval and implementation of these plans, the challenge will lie in whether MIGA 
can continue to hold the company to its international standards and for Sinohydro to 
continue to fulfil its obligations in addressing the social and environmental issues of 
the project  
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Environmental flows (E-Flows) are broadly defined as the provision of water for 
freshwater dependent ecosystems to maintain their integrity, productivity, services and 
benefits – particularly in cases when such ecosystems are subject to flow regulation and 
competition from multiple water users. Simply stated, E-Flows could be thought of as 
“ecological water demand” that should be regarded as a legitimate water use sector, just 
as the industrial or agricultural water use sectors are. Negotiating water flows is an 
essential part of river basin management in the Mekong Region, but has hitherto not 
been well articulated or recognized by water sector policy makers or planners.  
Implementing Environmental Flows requires establishing water flow regimes, which 
recognise ecosystem needs whilst trying to satisfy social, economic, and cultural 
dimensions. 
Although there is a considerable amount of information, knowledge and experience 
behind the E-Flows concept, national and international environmental policies rarely take 
E-Flows into account. Only a few countries such as Australia, South Africa and the United 
Kingdom have integrated the concept into water management policy and practice. For 
most countries in Asia, the E-Flows concept is in its infancy and local approaches have 
yet to be applied. 
The approach explored in Thailand for the first time has been developed based on the 
conviction that E-Flows does not only consider the importance of river flows from a 
physical or ecological perspective, but also relates to the socio-political side of the 
equation. The role that people play both as beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem 
and at the same time, modifiers of the ecosystem are key to understanding E-Flows, 
“flow is the key driver of the system.” (IUCN, 2005).   The interdisciplinary 
Environmental Flows work in the Songkhram River Basin was a preliminary attempt at 
integrating aspects of an Environmental Flows approach into a systematic attempt to 
better understand the relationships between hydrological flows, floodplain ecology and 
people’s dependency on the floodplain and its services. The study emerged from a 
growing concern amongst many actors that river basins in Thailand are not being well 
managed and the core ecosystem services and functions they provide are gradually 
being degraded and diminished.  
 
The findings and conclusions from the field assessments include: 
 
• The lower reaches of the Nam Songkhram River is still a functional floodplain 
system, indicated by the wide diversity of aquatic fauna still present and a broad 
range of habitats, both aquatic and terrestrial. Further up the river system the 
period of annual flooding decreases and human disturbances increase, with a 
corresponding decrease in aquatic biodiversity and productivity. This type of 
floodplain river system dependent on prolonged annual flooding and inter-
connectedness with the mainstream Mekong is now unique in Thailand and thus 
has high conservation value. 
• The study confirmed and strengthened the understanding of the close relationship 
between the mainstream Mekong river and the lower Nam Songkhram River 
Basin (LSRB), in terms of both ecology and hydrology, in particular the role of 
extensive seasonal flooding arising from a notable backwater and occasional 
backflow effect on to the LSRB floodplain. Comparisons with the Tonle Sap and 
Great Lake hydrology are valid and worthy of further research, as both systems 
are representative of “flood pulse” river systems that underpins the biodiversity 
and productivity of each system.  
• Because of the primary influence of the Mekong mainstream on LSRB flood 
timing, duration and extent (as highlighted in WUP-FIN models), any attempt to 
control flooding by building flow control infrastructure on the Lower Songkhram 
River or main tributaries like the Nam Oon, is likely to be futile and 
counterproductive, creating new and undesirable environmental impacts, which 
so far have not been taken into account in project proposals. 
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• The LSRB floodplain is in the latter stages of an ecological transformation from 
being dominated by natural vegetation and diverse wetland habitats, to a more 
simplified ecosystem with fewer habitats, less biodiversity and enhanced 
anthropogenic disturbance. This is principally as a result of removal of natural 
vegetation and conversion to agricultural land, in particular paddy fields and 
latterly, industrial tree crops such as eucalyptus plantations. The ecological 
impacts of this transformation are not well studied, but anecdotal evidence from 
local resource users and some empirical evidence collected during the study 
suggests that they have deep-reaching implications in terms of biodiversity loss 
and reduced aquatic productivity. The loss of ecosystem functions and services 
appear to be having serious negative impacts on fishery productivity and local 
livelihoods through food and income security declines. 
 
The work of the Nam Songkhram Basin E-Flows study continually stressed the cross-
sectoral and inter-disciplinary linkages at the core of the process and underpinned the 
effort. It helped cement and broaden understanding amongst the team members and 
allowed them to talk more  confidently about issues outside their core discipline when 
communicating with interested observers, according to participant’s feedback. Simply 
put, they began to appreciate the wider linkages between flow, ecosystem and 
livelihoods towards the end of the process, which were not immediately apparent from 
the start. An increased knowledge and understanding of the river floodplain system and 
how hydrological flows affect it, is a key output of the E-Flows process. An unexpected 
output was the realization that there are several other analogous “flows” occurring on 
and around the floodplain, beyond the simply hydrological flows which consumed most of 
the team’s attention. These include the flow of natural resources on and off the 
floodplain and the flow of people in and out of communities, which it was felt by some 
team members are equally deserving of further attention in future studies.  
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Section 1: Environmental Flows and the Mekong Region 
 
Introduction and Background of Study 
 
Negotiating water flows between different user groups is an essential part of river basin 
management in the Mekong Region, including the rivers of Thailand.  To help navigate 
these negotiations, an important tool has emerged internationally: the concept of 
environmental flows, or E-Flows. This refers to water provided within a river, wetland or 
coastal zone to maintain ecosystems and their benefits in the context of competing 
water uses. Simply put, the E-Flows concept tries to find a better balance between 
ecological and economic considerations in water planning. It brings to bear the idea of 
“ecological water demand,” which should be regarded as a legitimate water-use sector, 
on par with industry and agriculture.  
 
A number of international institutions are increasingly advocating the inclusion of E-
Flows principles and approaches in river basin management and flow negotiations 
worldwide. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has been 
particularly active for a number of years in promoting E-Flows approaches in its own and 
partners’ work and projects in Asia and elsewhere. In 2003, IUCN published a book titled 
“Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows”1, which introduces readers to 
Environmental Flows principles and offers practical advice for implementation of 
approaches based on examples from across the world. First published in English, “Flow” 
has now been translated into the main riparian languages of the Mekong River Basin, 
namely Burmese, Chinese, Khmer, Lao, Thai and Vietnamese.2 
 
In 2006, IUCN developed a sub-programme on E-Flows to complement the Integrated 
Basin Flow Management (IBFM) programme led by the Mekong River Commission (MRC), 
which is focused on the Mekong mainstream.  The IUCN’s interdisciplinary sub-
programme was developed in partnership with the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI) and aimed to apply appropriate e-flows methodologies to the tributaries 
and river basins within the Mekong Region.  
 
Regionally, in Vietnam there was an initiative to adopt an E-Flows approach as part of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) goals in the Huong river Basin in 
central Vietnam, under the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment. In 2003-04 
an initial E-Flows assessment was conducted in partnership between the Thua Thien Hue 
Provincial People’s Committee, the Huong River Projects Management Board, IWMI, 
IUCN and Water and Nature Initiative (WANI) as a case study. It illustrated the 
successes and challenges of E-Flows implementation in Vietnam, and more generally of 
translating internationally tested tools into the local context3.      
 
As for Thailand, E-Flows are a relatively new concept and are still at an early stage of 
recognition and application. Water management and river basin management have 
traditionally been the preserve of a relatively small sub-set of state actors, concentrated 
primarily within a limited number of key agencies. These water planners and decision-
makers have mostly come from disciplines aligned to positivist or ‘hard’ science, 
dominated by engineers who have a tendency for partitioning knowledge about the 
resource into convenient reductionist or mechanistic modes of thinking. Therefore, this 
                                          
1 Dyson, M., Bergkamp, G., Scanlon, J. (eds). (2003) Flow - The Essentials of 
Environmental Flows. IUCN, Gland, Switzerland and Cambridge, UK.xiv + 132 pp. – 2nd 
edition 
2 Copy of translations in Chinese, Burmese, Thai, Lao, Khmer and Vietnamese are 
available on the www.waterandnature.org  
3 A copy of the final report of the Huong River E-flows assessment can be downloaded 
at: www.iucn.org/places/vietnam 
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has tended to ignore more relativist, systematic, holistic and pluralistic modes of 
thinking or paradigms when considering water and river basin management. The 
predominant existing approaches to river basin management also discount the role and 
impacts of political patronage and interference on decision-making with regards to 
infrastructural development. E-Flows demands of practitioners new ways of 
conceptualizing aquatic ecosystems and associated natural resources, which inherently 
recognize the complexity and inter-dependence of socio-natural systems, adhere to the 
precautionary principle and allow multi-disciplinary approaches to research, which 
maximize cross-disciplinary linkages and participatory interaction by stakeholders. 
 
In Thailand, the perception of all types of floods as a “natural disaster” with detrimental 
impacts has increased state-led efforts to control floods through building infrastructure. 
The report shows that in Songkhram measures have been promoted to control seasonal 
floods, but because of a poor understanding of the nature of the hydrological relationship  
between the Mekong mainstream and the Nam Songkhram, the upstream flood 
protection infrastructure developments appears not to have any impact on floods in the 
downstream floodplain.  By modifying the flows, the entire flood plain system is 
threatened. Furthermore, the floodplain provides multiple benefits for the people living in 
the basin. By modifying the flow the ecology of the floodplain will change and local 
people depending on the resources generated from the floodplain will be impacted. 
 
The E-flows project was implemented in 2006 – 2007 in the Songkhram River Basin 
situated in the Northeastern part of Thailand, with the specific objective of trying to 
make explicit the links between ecosystems, livelihoods and flows.  The work combined 
field assessments and multi stakeholder dialogues to identify ways and means of 
introducing an Environmental Flows perspective to the management of the Songkhram 
River Basin and its water resources.   
 
The approach applied in Thailand has been developed based on the conviction that E-
Flows does not only consider the importance of river flows from a physical or ecological 
perspective, but also relates to the socio-political side of the equation. The role that 
people play both as beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem and at the same time, 
modifiers of the ecosystem are key to understanding E-Flows, It has been stated that 
“flow is the key driver of the system” (IUCN, 2005) when referring to the pivotal role 
that river flows play in regulating nearly all aspects of riverine ecosystem productivity 
and health. The interdisciplinary Environmental Flows work in the Songkhram River 
Basin is a first step in providing data and practical tools for river basin and water 
managers at national, regional and local levels to apply similar approaches for better 
outcomes.   
 
What are Environmental Flows? 
 
Water flows have cultural, ecological, economic, political and social dimensions. The 
subject of “Environmental flows” or “E-Flows” covers all of these dimensions as a means 
of increasing our understanding about the relationships between humans and aquatic 
environments. In most river basins the natural flows have been modified to some extent, 
to meet the needs of human settlements, irrigators, flood controllers or energy 
generators. Proponents of E-flows acknowledge these different uses, but argue that 
ecosystems are another valid user, and that ecosystem and livelihood services must also 
be valued and included in negotiations about water use and basin management. The 
justification for adopting an E-Flows approach is partly justified by the Agenda 21 
agreement, which Thailand has signed up to implementing4.       
 
Ideally, E-Flows negotiations listen to a range of world views and respect the knowledge 
derived from a number of disciplines. Perspectives from disciplines as diverse as 
                                          
4 Source: http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/countr/thai/inst.htm 
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engineering, law, aquatic ecology, economics, hydrology, land management, political 
science, sociology and geography are all relevant to the application of E-Flows. The local 
ecological knowledge and perspectives of riparian people is also vital to be taken into 
account by those charged with planning water resources development, especially in 
developing countries. 
 
Box 1 What are E-Flows 
“Environmental flows means enough water is left in our rivers, which is managed to 
ensure downstream environmental, social and economic benefits. Yet pioneering efforts 
in South Africa, Australia and the United States have shown that the process to establish 
them, especially when part of an integrated management approach, poses great 
challenges.” 
 
Achim Steiner, Director General of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature 






“Flow” (p.17) defines an Environmental Flow as “….the water regime provided within a 
river, wetland, or coastal zone to maintain ecosystems and their benefits where there 
are competing water uses and where flows are regulated.” This report will broadly 
adhere to this definition, although recognizing that the degree of regulation in Southeast 
Asian rivers is highly variable, with some rivers still having a near-natural flow regime, 
but could still benefit from application of an E-flows approach to management. 
 
The main goal of Environmental Flows is to provide a flow regime that is sufficient in 
terms of quantity, quality and timing for sustaining the health of the river and other 
aquatic ecosystems. The level of health at which the river is sustained is, however, a 
societal judgement that will vary from country to country and region to region. What the 
appropriate environmental flow is for a particular river will thus depend on the values for 
which the river system is to be managed. Those values will determine the decisions 
about how to balance environmental, economic and social aspirations and the uses of the 
river’s waters.  
 
It is important that E-Flows considerations should extend beyond oversimplified concepts 
of minimum flows and should instead be regarded as a flow regime, with a range of flow 
variables such as magnitude, frequency, duration, timing and rate of change of flow. It 
should be stressed that E-flows are not natural flows, minimum flows or average flows, 
but are an integral part of the modern management of a river basin in which the value of 
functioning ecosystems is appreciated. It requires a desire to learn and engage in 
negotiations among and between stakeholders to bridge the different interests that 
compete for use of water. Using “Multi Stakeholder Platforms” (MSPs) or Dialogues are 
one way to provide space for learning and new insights for negotiations (for a Mekong 
example, see IUCN et al. 2007).  
 
A range of tools and techniques are available for determining E-Flows requirements, 
from reconnaissance level hydrology-based studies to intermediate or comprehensive 
assessments which take into consideration biophysical, political, sociological, economical 
aspects of a range of management scenarios and flow regimes. A number of key 
components, or factors for success, need to be emphasized for E-Flows to move forward 
from conceptual plans to reality. These include the active participation of community 
representatives, water authorities, scientists and managers; development of legislation 
on sustainable resource use; and a shift towards sustainable wetland use.   
 
 
Page 264 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin  





Box 2 E-flows are critical to ecosystem health 
“Rivers and other aquatic ecosystems need water and other inputs like debris and 
sediment to stay healthy and provide benefits to people. Environmental flows are a 
critical contributor to the health of these ecosystems. Depriving a river or a groundwater 
system of these flows not only damages the entire aquatic ecosystem, it also threatens 
the people and communities who depend on it.” p. 18, “Flows”, Dyson et al, 2003. 
Box ends 
 
In recent years, Environmental Flows information and knowledge exchange has started 
to expand, as more practical experience cases become available and interest grows 
worldwide, evident from such events as the International Riversymposium 2007 in 
Brisbane (http://riversymposium.com/index.php?page=symposium2007) and the 
resulting Brisbane Declaration5 and the formation of an Environmental Flows Network 
(www.environmentalflows.net) in 2006 with a website and newsletter.  
 
Water Resources in the Mekong 
 
At 4,800 kilometres, the Mekong River is easily the longest river in Southeast Asia. It is 
the world’s eighth largest river in terms of water volume and twelfth longest. The 
Mekong river basin (watershed or catchment) covers an area of 795,000km2, which 
represents a small percentage of the territory of China (Tibet and Yunnan), about 4 per 
cent of Burma, 97 per cent of Lao PDR, 36 per cent of Thailand, 86 per cent of Cambodia 
and 20 per cent of Vietnam. 
 
Different actors have different geopolitical conceptualisations of the Region. When people 
speak of “the Mekong”, they may mean the river, the river basin or the region. In 2006 
IUCN, the Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), IWMI, and M-POWER (Mekong Program 
on Water Environment and Resilience facilitated a Mekong Region Waters Dialogue 
inviting some 160 people representing a range of state and non-state institutions. The 
“…dialogue initiative defines its scope as the Mekong Region, which encompasses the 
territory, ecosystems, peoples, economies and politics of Cambodia, the Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam, Yunnan and Guangxi provinces of China an area of 2.6 
million km2 which is home to a rapidly growing population of about 300 million people. In 
addition to the Mekong River basin, the region includes other major basins such as the 
Irrawaddy, Salween, Chao Phraya and Red Rivers. ADB refers to this as a ‘growth area’ 
and, with its partners, prefers to use the name Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). 
 
One of the key social challenges for the region is for diverse actors to negotiate a 
reasonable and equitable utilisation of water (Mingsarn Kaosa-ard and Dore 2003).  
 
All six countries of the Mekong Region share the Mekong River and its aquatic resources. 
The “Lower Mekong” is a term sometimes invoked to mean the entirety of the four 
downstream countries – Thailand, Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam. At other times the 
“Lower Mekong” is used in a more limited sense, to refer only to the parts of the Mekong 
River Basin in the sovereign territory of those same four countries. This present project 
has focused on the Nam Songkhram River Basin, a significant tributary of the Mekong 
                                          
5  The Brisbane Declaration was announced at the end of the 10th International Riversymposium and 
Environmental Flows Conference, calling on governments, development banks, donors, river basin 
organizations, water and energy associations, multilateral and bilateral institutions, community-based 
organizations, research institutions and the private sector across the world to commit to a range of actions for 
restoring and maintaining environmental flows (see http://waterplanning.org.au/related-research/the-
brisbane-declaration-on-environmental-flows).   
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River located wholly in Thailand and of importance in terms of wetlands-based 
livelihoods.  
 
Box 3 Holistic view of river systems 
  
“Historically, water has been managed from a supply perspective with an emphasis on 
maximizing short-term economic growth from the use of water. Little thought has been 
given to the health of the resource itself and there is poor understanding of the 
implications of overuse or declining river health. Water resource managers are now 
trying to come to terms with the need to take a more holistic view of the river system. 
They increasingly understand that one needs to take care of aquatic ecosystems and the 
resources they provide for long-term economic viability” (In: Dyson et al, 2003).  
Box ends 
 
E-Flows is a relatively new concept in Thailand and is still at an early stage of recognition 
and potential application. Water management and river basin management have 
traditionally been the preserve of a relatively small subset of state actors, concentrated 
primarily within a limited number of key agencies. These water planners and decision-
makers have mostly come from disciplines aligned to positivist or ‘hard’ science, 
dominated by hydrologists and engineers who have a tendency for partitioning 
knowledge about the resource into convenient reductionist or mechanistic modes of 
thinking. Therefore, the existing situation has tended to undervalue more relativist, 
systematic, holistic and pluralistic modes of thinking or paradigms when considering 
water and river basin management.  
 
One of the key challenges for the Mekong countries is how to develop and improve the 
economic conditions and livelihoods of people, whilst maintaining the biodiversity and 
ecological health of the Mekong Basin.  To begin to address this question, one first must 
ask if the value of natural capital (biodiversity and ecosystem health) are fully 
appreciated or accounted for by decision-makers and are they (planners and decision 
makers) fully aware of the number of people that are dependent on healthy riverine 
ecosystems for their livelihoods and well-being?  
 
A number of attempts are being made by various institutions to better represent and 
articulate the values of the different water uses within the Mekong Basin, including an 
Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) project in three phases recently implemented 
by the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which describes IBFM as “a set of multi-
disciplinary activities enabling a scientific assessment of the impacts of possible future 
changes in flow on the environmental, social and economic beneficial uses of the river.”6 
IBFM aims to provide information and knowledge to decision makers about the predicted 
costs and benefits of water resources development in the Mekong Basin in relation to 
river flow regimes.  
 
IBFM ran in three phases between 2004 to 2008, before being halted by MRC and 
donors. The third phase of IBFM ran from 2006-08 and built on the earlier  knowledge 
base to focus on research that reduces the uncertainties of the predictions, as well as 
plans to hold stakeholder consultation on the consequences of flow change in the 
mainstream. Specific outputs of the research included designing an adaptable “Mekong 
Method” for flow assessment and enhanced capacity of riparian staff to undertake IBFM 
activities. It was envisaged that the IBFM outputs would be used by riparian 
governments to consider the various development scenarios and make optimal decisions 
about water resources development that take into account the interests of the various 
stakeholders (Guttman, 2006).   
 
                                          
6 Quoted from: IUCN, TEI, IWMI and M-POWER, 2007. P. 44. Ibid. 
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It was against this general background and regional context that it was decided among 
interested actors in the Lower Mekong Basin to trial an E-Flows approach on the Nam 
Songkhram River (a tributary of the Mekong) in northeast Thailand. With the Lower 
Songkhram River Basin (LSRB) already a designated “demonstration site” for Thailand 
within the Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Programme (MWBP)7 and the national 
recognition of the LSRB as a wetland of “International Significance” in 1999 by the Office 
of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP), a good opportunity 
was presented to apply an E-Flows approach to the Nam Songkhram Basin. With growing 
interest for flows-type approaches in the Lower Mekong Basin and policy changes in 
Thailand that emphasized public participation and decentralisation of decision-making in 
natural resources management, the time seemed appropriate around 2005 to bring the 




This study emerged as part of ongoing multi-stakeholder efforts to develop and 
strengthen integrated planning processes in the Mekong Region in general, and the 
Lower Nam Songkhram specifically, through the Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity 
Conservation and Sustainable Use Programme (MWBP).. The approach explored in 
Thailand for the first time has been developed based on the conviction that E-Flows does 
not only consider the importance of river flows from a bio-physical or ecological 
perspective, but also relates to the socio-political side of the equation. The role that 
people play both as beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem and at the same time, 
modifiers of the ecosystem are key to understanding E-Flows.    
 
The interdisciplinary Environmental Flows work in the Songkhram River Basin is a 
preliminary step towards providing basic data and practical tools for river basin and 
water managers at national, regional and local levels to apply similar approaches for 
better outcomes.   
 
The report is divided into five sections, which cover the various aspects of the theoretical 
and practical elements of the Nam Songkhram E-Flows Assessment process, from its first 
conceptualization to the completion of the Stakeholders’ Dialogue Meeting and the 
preliminary conclusions and recommendations to emerge from the process.  
 
Section One sets the scene and helps the reader conceptualise what Environmental 
Flows are in general terms (and what they are not) in the Mekong region. It sets out the 
background and context of why it was considered beneficial to locate Thailand’s first in-
depth E-Flows study within the Nam Songkhram Basin. It gives an idea of the wider 
context and events leading up to the Nam Songkhram E-Flows study and looks at other 
similar or complimentary studies conducted in the wider Mekong region. 
 
Section Two focuses primarily on the particular setting of the Nam Songkhram Basin 
and gives a general description of the basin and a more specific description of salient 
biophysical features and the geopolitical context that underlies any efforts to introduce 
more sustainable development pathways into the management of wetland resources.  
 
Section Three guides the reader through the general approach and specific 
methodology used by the E-Flows field study team to understand the Basin. It lays out 
the approach, objectives, methodology and background as well as outputs to the study 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin specifically.  
 
Section Four presents the results from the wet and dry season field study, according to 
the findings submitted by each individual member of the multi-disciplinary team. Each 
                                          
7 MWBP was a joint programme between IUCN, MRC and UNDP. 
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disciplinary section is the primary work of the author indicated, but has been edited for 
language, clarity and consistency.  
 
Section Five presents the results of the Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue Meeting and 
perspectives of various discipline specialists to introduce the E-flows approach to a wider 
audience of Nam Songkhram Basin actors and share the key Findings from the pilot E-
Flows assessment, while listening to feedback from key basin stakeholders.  
 
Section Six This section includes the future development scenarios adopted for 
consideration at a Scenario Workshop held soon after the fieldwork. It presents a 
summary of the technical process the disciplinary specialists participated in to conduct 
an Environmental Flows Assessment for each scenario and study site based on the 
findings from the field research and wider knowledge of baseline flow regimes. 
 
Section Seven provides the lessons, conclusions and preliminary recommendations that 
resulted from the Nam Songkhram Basin E-Flows study.  
 
Section Eight is the Bibliography.   
 
Section Nine lists the annexes (with their respective website links) that provide more 
details on various aspects of the study as well as maps, figures and additional technical 
data, tables and illustrative material that are related to the main text of the report. 
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Section 2. Introduction to the Nam Songkhram Basin  
 
The 495 km long Nam Songkhram River of northeast Thailand, rises on the forested 
slopes of the Phu Phan hill range and rapidly descends from the uplands to a broad 
floodplain surrounded by low alluvial terraces which have mostly been converted from 
forest to agricultural use. The Songkhram River Basin covers a total area of 13,126 km2 
and incorporates parts of four provinces (Udon Thani, Sakhon Nakhon, Nong Khai and 
Nakhon Phanom), with a population of about 1.45 million (Blake, 2006). Over the lower 
300 km or so of the river’s course, it gently traverses some of the most significant 
wetland habitats in Northeast Thailand (a region more commonly referred to as “Isaan”), 
before entering the Mekong River in Tha Utaen District of Nakhon Phanom Province, 
opposite Lao PDR.  
 
The Lower Songkhram River Basin (LSRB) forms a complex mosaic of wetland habitats, 
both seasonal and permanent; riverine, palustrine and lacustrine; natural and artificial; 
which in recent years have started to be recognized for their significance in terms of 
biodiversity and contribution to maintaining local livelihoods. The Office of Environmental 
Policy and Planning responsible for wetlands designation nationally in Thailand, has 
declared the Lower Songkhram River Basin a wetlands of “international significance” 
(OEPP, 1999), yet despite this recognition has not given it any formal or legal protection. 
However, there is one discrete wetland site (Bung Khong Long lake) on the northern 
edge of the Nam Songkhram Basin which has been granted Ramsar Site status and is 
currently the subject of a World Wildlife Fund conservation project8. Wetlands habitats 
account for 54 % of the total surface area of the Nam Songkhram Basin (Sombutputorn, 
1998) and even higher than this in the LSRB. Of particular importance is the role and 
function of annual flooding regimes to the locally abundant paa bung paa thaam9 or 
seasonally inundated forest ecosystem, which is extensively utilized by local people and 
traditionally formed a vital part of the local economy.  
 
Compared to other parts of Isaan, the Nam Songkhram Basin is subject to relatively 
heavy and dependable seasonal rains, ranging from 1,300 – 2,900 mm per annum in 
different parts of the basin, over 90 % of which falls in the six month wet season from 
May to October (Blake, 2006). This pattern leads to a distinct peak in run-off during 
August and September each year, when rivers and streams in the upper basin swell and 
frequently flood their banks causing localized flooding. As the swollen tributaries merge 
and reach the broad, flat floodplain in the lower basin, there is a distinct backwater 
effect caused by the influence of the Mekong River’s level which hinders the drainage of 
the Songkhram River and contributes to widespread flooding each year.  
 
In some years, when the Mekong River’s level is particularly high, there will even be a 
reverse flow occurring with rich, silt-laden waters from the Mekong flowing back up the 
Songkhram River for many kilometres. In the average year, the flooding in the LSRB will 
cover an area of nearly 1,000 km2, but in an exceptional year (i.e. a 1-in-50-year flood), 
the area inundated could be up to twice as much as this (Khon Kaen University, 1997). 
The flat topography means that a rise or fall in wet season water levels of just 10 
centimetres can massively alter the land area under inundation. 
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin is noted for its abundant and biodiverse capture fishery and 
associated living aquatic resources. One recent estimate of fishery production for the 
entire basin, calculated that the annual catch was in the order of 34,000 tons annually 
(Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008), while up to 187 fish species have been identified from 




9 Paa bung paa thaam is the colloquial Lao-Isaan term for seasonally flooded forest, comprised of a mixture of 
low trees, thorny shrubs and bamboo clumps, which was at one time found in the lower floodplains of Isaan’s 
largest rivers, draining eastward to the Mekong. 
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the Nam Songkhram Basin during various studies in the past. Being an open riverine 
system intimately linked to the Mekong River mainstream in terms of ecology and 
hydrology, fish catches are highly variable both seasonally and inter-annually, with peak 
catches tending to coincide with the flood recession period in September to 
October/November. The fish biodiversity also varies from season to season with various 
studies based on both local knowledge (Tai Baan Research Network of the Lower Nam 
Songkhram Basin, 2006a and 2006b) and more scientific approaches pointing out the 
fundamental importance of the “flood pulse” (Junk and Wantzen, 2004; Lamberts and 
Bonheur, 2006) on abundance and variety of fish present in lowland tropical rivers, such 
as the Nam Songkhram (see Box: The flood pulse). In addition to fish and fishing, local 
communities depend on harvesting a massive array of other wetlands-derived organisms 
for their livelihoods, many of which are thought to be closely associated with energy and 
nutrient cycles dependent on the annual flood pulse phenomenon.  
 
Box 4 The Flood Pulse  
Central to any understanding of the natural flow regime and the floodplain ecosystem of 
large tropical rivers is an appreciation of the “flood pulse concept”. Ecosystems that 
experience fluctuations between terrestrial and aquatic conditions are called pulsing 
ecosystems, and can be described in terms of the flood pulse concept (Junk 1997). 
Junk’s flood pulse concept has been widely accepted as describing the highly productive 
floodplain environments and the ecology of pulsing systems. The flood water integrates 
the terrestrial vegetation into the aquatic phase of the ecosystem. This interaction 
between the terrestrial and aquatic phases is the driving force of ecosystem productivity.  
 
This concept, mostly familiar to fishery scientists and riverine ecologists, is used to 
explain the annual natural cycle of flooding and drought found in rivers such as the 
Mekong/Tonle Sap ecosystem and the Nam Songkhram, which helps to create and 
maintain diverse and productive habitats on the floodplain.  
 
Flood pulses in rivers and lakes can be described by a number of characteristics that are 
important from the ecosystem productivity point of view. The list of flood pulse 
parameters are analysed by Welcomme & Halls (2004) and adapted to the Mekong and 
Tonle Sap by Lamberts and Bonheur (2007). The list of characteristics is as follows:  
 
• flood duration 
• amplitude  
• flood volume 
• timing 
• rapidity of the water level change  
• continuity  
• smoothness 
 
Both the flooding and drought periods are important for maintaining the characteristics 
of the floodplain ecosystem, which undergoes dynamic and complex physical, biological 
and chemical processes during each part of the cycle. The processes are determined by 
the characteristics of the flood pulse, including the timing, duration, height, extent, 
continuity of flooding, number of peaks and speed at which the flood water covers the 
land surface. Many floodplain organisms, aquatic and terrestrial, have adapted to the 
flood pulse phenomenon and may be dependent on it for their survival. Altering or even 
halting the natural flood pulse can lead to drops in productivity and biodiversity. 
 
Lamberts and Bonheur (2007) present a detailed description of the Tonle Sap flood pulse 
parameters susceptible to anthropogenic flow alterations in the Mekong, and discuss the 
possible impacts of these alterations on ecosystem productivity. This could be applied to 
Songkhram floodplain, acknowledging the slightly different ecosystem and floodplain 
characteristics (see more details in “hydrology” in Sec 4).  
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At the same time as extensively harvesting local natural wetlands products, local people 
are also dependent on agriculture for part of their livelihoods, including rice-based 
farming systems, livestock, cash crops, and increasingly, industrial tree plantations. The 
LSRB has been a site of in-migration for several decades by intra-regional households to 
exploit available land and wetland resources, made available by favourable state 
development policy and the subsequent expansion of the agricultural frontier into upland 
and lowland zones alike (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006). There has been 
considerable out-migration from the area, mostly of young, economically-active people 
to urban areas within Thailand, but also overseas, which illustrates the complexity of the 
region both ecologically and socially. One detailed socio-economic study of a LSRB 
village found that about 61 % of households derived their main income from off-farm 
sources and that the amounts earned from remittances were nearly three times greater 
than local agricultural earnings, with their uncertain nature and associated risks 
(Promphakping, 2002). 
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin as a whole is too large and diverse to adequately describe 
and characterize in a report of this nature, which by necessity, must focus on limited and 
salient parts of most relevance. For a detailed description of the Lower Nam Songkhram 
River Basin, the reader is encouraged to refer to a “Situation Analysis” prepared for the 
MWBP (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006) (please see Annex 1 on the Nam Songkhram 
River Basin for more details. Further site-specific details are given in section 4 under 
each specialist’s contribution). 
 
Section 3: Environmental Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
 
This section primarily lays out the approach, objectives and background to the study in 
the Nam Songkhram Basin specifically. Later sections consider the findings of the field 
study and subsequent ways in which those findings were used. 
 
Approach and Objectives 
 
A key goal of the Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use 
Programme (MWBP) was to develop and strengthen integrated planning processes in the 
Lower Songkhram River Basin. This was to dovetail with efforts being taken at the 
national level to promote E-Flows amongst water planners and policy makers.  From the 
early stages of the Nam Songkhram E-Flows process, it was considered desirable, if not 
essential, for the E-Flows study to be as non-prescriptive as possible. This meant that it 
would aim to be flexible and adaptive to the local situation and not follow a single 
methodology developed elsewhere (see Tharme, 2003 for an analysis of the wide range 
of environmental flow methodologies developed worldwide). Rather, it would be guided 
by a generalist approach that would follow certain guiding principles that would meet the 




• Participation and inclusiveness. The process would strive to include a 
representative range of basin actors and stakeholders at various stages of the 
process, especially in terms of feedback during the planning and findings stages.  
 
• Multi-disciplinarity. The study should ensure that the core E-Flows Team 
selected to conduct the field study would be representative of a range of 
disciplines that are strongly correlated to flows, ecosystems and livelihoods. The 
size and number of disciplines represented was ultimately a pragmatic decision to 
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balance logistical and financial considerations with the more academic 
considerations. Six core disciplines were chosen.  
 
• Cross-disciplinarity. As well as representing a range of disciplines, it was 
decided early that the E-Flows Team would strive to work closely together both in 
the field and afterwards to mutually analyse findings. This was aimed at fostering 
an active exchange of skills and knowledge, so that each expert would benefit 
from the knowledge and experience of the others. And the end product would 
thus be more holistic.   
 
• Complementarity. The E-Flows study should be aware of other projects and 
activities in the Lower Mekong Basin, such as MRC’s IBFM work and Huong River 
Basin work. The study should also share results with these other initiatives, partly 
through the regional work of MWBP and IUCN-WANI. 
 
• Replicability and cost effectiveness. The approach would aim wherever 
possible to use local specialists to conduct the intermediate E-Flows assessments 
in order to maximize benefits to stakeholders, strengthen skills and utilize local 
knowledge. It would also be important to keep costs down to a reasonable level, 
so that such an approach is replicable by other institutions in Thailand and the 
wider Mekong Basin in the future.  
 
• Relevance. The study should provide a present day snapshot of the Nam 
Songkhram Basin at representative sites for the benefit of others involved in 
basin management and for making predictive statements about potential future 
scenarios. For this to happen, the field study was timed to record the extremes of 
flow for the Nam Songkhram – i.e. peak flows in late August for the wet season 
and minimum flows in early March for the dry season. This timing was crucial for 
the specialists, only some of whom were initially familiar with the Nam 





• Improve understanding of Nam Songkhram ecosystems and livelihoods, for the 
benefit of basin planning and policy-making at different levels. 
 
• Improve understanding of E-Flows concepts and the importance of managing 
flows to ensure downstream ecological, economic and socio-cultural benefits. 
 
• Build local technical and institutional capacity to apply concepts and integrate E-
Flows principles into basin management plans. 
 
• Initiate stakeholder dialogue across the four provinces of the Songkhram Basin to 
consider implications for the environment and society of possible future 
development scenarios for the basin (and beyond). 
 
• Understand ecosystem roles in people’s livelihoods, especially seasonally flooded 
forests, by establishing the present-day relationships between flow regime, 
ecology and human-level dependencies. 
 
• Develop an appropriate set of tools and methodologies that can potentially be 
applied to other Thai river basins for those interested in applying E-Flows 
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Initially, the entire concept of E-Flows was new to the MWBP staff and partners involved 
in the study. The process therefore emphasized three main aspects to the approach and 
methodology employed. In sum, these were 1) awareness raising and education; 2) field 
assessments; and 3) scenario-building and multi-stakeholder dialogue workshops. This 
process is explained in more detail below (see also Annex 2 Activity timeline). 
 
The first part of the methodology involved raising awareness and education about E-
Flows, including sharing and discussing related information to staff and partners, and 
wide stakeholder consultation and scoping. The process also included translating the 
book “Flow: the essentials of environmental flows” into Thai and sending the MWBP co-
manager and key partners to events such as the Southeast Asia Water Forum in Bali in 
August 2005 to contribute to an E-Flows dialogue. A review of published documents 
related to the “flows” theme in the Nam Songkhram Basin was conducted and distributed 
to the E-Flows Team as background and reference material.  
 
The second effort involved the collection of field data from representative sites in the 
Basin, using an Intermediate E-Flows Assessment (IFA) approach (see Table 1). This 
process integrated a range of specialists in a cross-disciplinary study. The assessment 
was designed to use a mixture of local and international expertise across a range of 
institutes and offering insights from social and natural sciences. Perhaps most 
significantly, the field studies were timed to coincide with the extremes of flow condition, 
with the first wet season study in late August and early September 2006 and the second 
dry season held in March 2007. This arrangement allowed the E-Flows Team to visualize 
and experience firsthand the flood pulse phenomenon from a relatively short period in 
the field and relate what was happening in the bio-physical and socio-economic-cultural 
spheres at these critical times of the year.  
 
The E-Flows Team was expected to work closely together for a total of eight days (two 
days per site and a day at either end for planning and summing up, respectively) during 
the wet and dry season field visits. This gave the team an opportunity for detailed inter-
disciplinary exchange, contributing towards the goals of capacity building and holistic 
understanding of processes. During the dry season visit, the team stayed overnight in 
the villages to facilitate closer interaction with village stakeholders. Further details of 
each discipline’s general methodology and approach can be found in the reports 
submitted by each specialist (Section 4). 
 
Finally, the approach included two workshops: one a scenario-building exercise and the 
other a multi-stakeholder meeting (see sections 5 and 6). The scenario-building process 
involved using field findings and expert opinion (based on knowledge and experience of 
specialists in the IFA Team) to make broad predictive summaries about likely impacts on 
flow, ecosystems and livelihoods that would result from the outcomes of a range of 
possible scenarios. The methodology employed at the scenario-based workshop was 
primarily based on a semi-quantitative approach recommended by the E-Flows Team 
Leader, Rebecca Tharme, which is described. Finally, the outcomes of this exercise were 
used to inform the proceedings of a multi-stakeholder meeting at the end of the process 
that brought in a wide range of Nam Songkhram Basin actors, including officials from the 
state agencies charged with the task of developing water resources at a basin or 
provincial level. This approach allowed a diverse cross-section of basin stakeholders, 
representing different constituencies, to interact and discuss potential development 
trajectories and ways to improve the water-resources planning process at the basin 
level.  
 
The above three points summarise the broad methodology employed in the study, but in 
reality the process was considerably more complex. It involved an iterative process of 
negotiation and compromise between the parties involved to produce a workable and 
acceptable methodology and approach that was appropriate to the local context and 
team members as a whole. Again, a key goal of the research was to be holistic and to 
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build capacity while exchanging knowledge between disciplinary specialists. Therefore a 
condition of each specialist’s approach was to explain and justify the methodology they 
were using to other team members on a daily basis. This approach helped to break down 
some of the disciplinary barriers and foster a better appreciation of commonalities across 
spheres of social and environmental knowledge. The process may have slowed the 
research of each specialist at times, but it also helped them question the basis and value 
of their own assumptions and approaches in light of others’ observations.   
 
It was recognized early in the process that to be effective, the approach would have to 
be relatively simple, replicable, affordable and understandable to stakeholders. (That 
also implied that the language used should be relatively free of jargon.) This was 
especially important in a bilingual exercise, in which English was not the first language of 
the majority of the team. Indeed, English was a real challenge for several members of 
the team even for everyday usage. For this reason, and in order to encourage inter-
disciplinary exchange, it was decided to avoid the use of complex terminology, jargon or 
acronyms wherever possible, rather than to introduce a whole new disciplinary 
terminology.  
 
The actual process of defining the research framework and methodology of the Nam 
Songkhram Basin E-Flows assessment was guided as much by pragmatism as it was by 
any formal methodology in existence. The study had tight restrictions on time and 
budget, so these constrained the limits of what could be achieved. Six key desirable 
disciplines were selected: fisheries, aquatic ecology, land use and agriculture, hydrology 
and geomorphology, and socio-economics.  Then specialists in each of these disciplines 
were recruited from institutes within the northeast region. In the case of hydrology, a 
specialist was selected through collaboration with the MRC’s WUP-FIN (??) hydrological 
modeling component of the Mekong River Basin. The E-Flows Team was able to call upon 
staff from the Thai Department of Water Resources to assist with making detailed 
measurements of flow and other conditions at each site. It was agreed that the 
assessment level best suited to the resources available for the Nam Songkhram E-Flows 
study would be described as an “Intermediate E-Flows Assessment”, which would give a 
medium level of confidence and resolution of the findings (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Levels of Environmental Flows Assessments (EFA) - implications 



















Medium / High Full EFA 
(Source: Tharme, 2007. E-Flows Scenarios Workshop, Udon Thani) 
 
While it was agreed that an understanding of the hydrological condition and 
characteristics of the river was important, the overall emphasis of the study was to be 
placed on comprehending the ecological and social links involving the floodplain 
wetlands. This was to be based on both direct empirical observations and secondary data 
available from a variety of sources. However, it was stressed from the outset that an 
understanding of the “flood pulse” concept and key hydrological events would be 
important for the team. These included such factors as the magnitude, duration, timing, 




Site selection was based primarily on time considerations. There was approximately one 
week available for each of the dry and wet season field studies. To maximize this narrow 
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window it was considered feasible to cover just three representative sites, with two days 
per site for field observation and measurements. Three sites were chosen that were 




Site 1. Middle Songkhram Basin  
Ban Kham Chi, Fao Rai District (Nong Khai Province) (Grid Reference - 48Q 032 9940 - 
UTM 198 2740) 
 
This site is situated in the middle reaches of the Nam Songkhram River, about 10 km 
downstream from water gates and a concrete weir-like structure built in 2004. These 
structures have modified river flow. Remnant patches of riparian forest are situated on 
the floodplain among extensive cleared areas and some permanent water bodies. On 
elevated alluvial terraces either side of the floodplain, rain-fed agricultural land is 
cultivated with rice, various cash crops, rubber and eucalyptus plantations. Ban Kham 
Chi village is located about 1 km from the river on the east bank. 
 
Site 2. Lower Songkhram Basin  
Ban Tha Bor, Sri Songkhram District (Nakhon Phanom) (Grid Reference - 48Q 041 8225 
- UTM 195 1951).  
 
This site is one of the best-known villages in the region for productive fisheries, with a 
fish-processing cottage industry using local and imported fish. It is located around 5 km 
from Sri Songkhram District town in the centre of one of the broadest areas of the Nam 
Songkhram floodplain. It features a wide variety of wetland habitats, including seasonal 
and permanent water bodies and an extensive area of seasonally flooded forest that has 
been progressively cleared for rice fields and eucalyptus plantations. The village of Ban 
Tha Bor is on a slightly raised levee of the Nam Songkhram and becomes an island 
during flooding, with water stretching many kilometers in all directions. Near to Ban Tha 
Bor is a former area of public land known as Tung Mon, which was claimed by an 
agribusiness company and has been used for intensive tomato and sweet corn cultivation 
for about two decades. 
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Figure 1.  Location of the study sites. 
 
Site 3. Tributary river in Lower Songkhram Basin  
Nam Oon River floodplain to the north of Ban Na Pho Noi, Na Waa District (Nakhon 
Phanom) (Grid Reference: 48Q 040 9676 - UTM 194 0404) 
 
Nam Oon is the second largest sub-basin of Nam Songkhram, covering an area of 
356,570 ha. It features a broad floodplain with areas of remnant seasonally flooded 
forest, but much land has been cleared for agriculture in the last two decades. There has 
also been much recent disturbance of the site by ditch and dyke construction for 
irrigation in the lower floodplain. Some natural floodplain wetland habitats remain, 
including ox-bow lakes, channels and riverine sandbars with distinctive vegetative 
communities. River hydrology has been radically altered by an upstream large storage 
reservoir and irrigation scheme. The village is situated on elevated land about 1 km 
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Box 5 The principle outputs for the E-Flows process 
 
Stakeholder consultations.  These were a series of formal and informal meetings 
with various institutional partners that were held early in the process and during 
implementation to initially assess interest and opinion on conducting an E-Flows 
study in the Nam Songkhram Basin and to help guide the approach. This led to an 
active exchange of information and strengthening of understanding about E-Flows, 
while identifying potential project partners and participants in the E-Flows 
assessment. 
 
Field assessments. These were planned to take place during the periods of 
maximum rainy season flow (Aug/Sept) and minimum dry season flow (March), using 
a multi-disciplinary team of specialists from a range of local and regional institutes. 
The majority of specialists were Thai. 
 
Scenario-based workshop.  This was held in early May 2007, after the results of 
the field assessments had been completed. It was designed to strengthen 
understanding amongst the E-Flows Team about the cross-disciplinary relevance of 
the findings and to consider a range of possible future development scenarios. 
 
Multi-stakeholder meeting. This was conducted in late May 2007 to bring together 
for dialogue some of the key actors (state and non-state) concerned with water and 
natural resources management in the four provinces of the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
Informed by specialist findings from the E-Flows field assessment and the scenarios 
workshop, the emphasis of the meeting was on constructive dialogue to explore 
better development outcomes.  
 
Awareness-raising. The E-Flows project component of WANI produced a limited set 
of posters and brochures in Thai and English languages to distribute to project 
partners and local institutions to raise awareness of the concept and practice of E-
Flows, guided by the case study example of Nam Songkhram Basin. 
 
Report of findings. This is a compilation of findings and lessons from the 
implementation of the entire Nam Songkhram E-Flows process produced for the 
benefit of  stakeholders, donors and others interested in implementing E-Flows 
         
 





Section 4:  Field Study Findings 
 
After the completion of the field investigations in both the wet and dry seasons in 2006, the 
disciplinary specialists submitted reports, which are summarized here.  
 
The six disciplines covered in the study were 1) hydrology, 2) fisheries and aquatic 
resources 3) land use and agriculture 4) vegetation and 5) socio-economic aspects. 
Fisheries and aquatic resources are combined in the second part of this section. Each part 
provides an introduction and a summary of the main findings with some discussion. (The 
study background, methodology and other relevant details are provided in Annex 3 Field 
Study Details related to Sec 4.) 
 
1. Hydrology 




The E-Flows study was linked to work providing data and information from a wider WUP-FIN 
project on hydrological modelling and socio-economic surveys in various parts of the Lower 
Mekong Basin. This involved cooperation between MRCS, the Thailand National Mekong 
Committee (TNMC). This study of the Nam Songkhram also included cooperation with 
several Thai state agencies10.  
 
Of great importance to this study were the relationship between the basin and the Mekong 
River mainstream, and especially the phenomenon of the reverse flow of Mekong waters 
upstream into the Nam Songkhram and the subsequent inundation of an ecologically and 
socio-economically important floodplain. Related to this are findings of the importance of 
the “flood pulse,” or the relationship between terrestrial and aquatic environments in a 
dynamic system of low and high water periods. The Nam Songkhram ecosystem is well 
described by the flood pulse concept, where the annual monsoon floods, following the 
Mekong mainstream water level, sustain the productivity of the basin (see Box xx the flood 
pulse).  
 
Dominance of Mekong mainstream on floodplain water levels 
 
An important hydrological process in the basin is the reverse flow of the Nam Songkhram 
River during high flows of the mainstream Mekong River. The effect of the Mekong water 
level and reverse flow up the Nam Songkhram were studied with the EIA 3D model. In the 
model simulations, the Mekong water level had a large effect on the extent and depth of the 
flood in the lower Nam Songkhram basin (please see hydrology section in Annex 3 for 
modeling figures, maps and other details). 
 
The study noted that one of the main outcomes from the Mekong River’s influence was a 
pronounced backwater effect; reverse flows also occurred, where the Mekong waters flow 
into the Nam Songkhram basin. These occurred in the simulations nearly every year to 
some extent. During the largest reverse flow events, water from the Mekong flowed as far 
upstream as the large floodplain of the lower Nam Songkhram. The reverse flow lasted on 
                                          
10 All WUP-FIN reports and other project information can be uploaded from their website address: 
 www.eia.fi/wup-fin 




average for 4-9 days, the largest volume occurring during the early period of rising floods 
i.e. most commonly in July. 
  
The water level in the floodplain is thus regulated by the water level in the Mekong 
mainstream; the water level in the Mekong mainstream plotted against water level in the 
floodplain transects closely track each other. Consequently, any development in the 
upstream Nam Songkhram River would not significantly impact on the water levels in the 
Songkhram floodplains (see also Sec 6 Scenarios that decribes the situation related to 




The main hydrology findings address two major phenomenon: the Mekong mainstream flood 
levels and the basin flood pulse. The water level in the floodplain is fully controlled by the 
water level in the Mekong mainstream. Therefore, upstream flood protection does not 
appear to have significant impact on flood in the floodplain. Moreover, the annual flood 
pulse is the dominant feature of the hydrology in the Mekong basin. The flood pulse 
(terrestrial and aquatic phases) of the Nam Songkhram River is extremely important for the 
productivity of all the aquatic ecosystems in the basin as it sustains the floodplain 
ecosystem and the fisheries that local communities depend upon. 
  
 





Of the more than 30 major river systems in Thailand, the Nam 
Songkhram is one of the 
best known for its impressive wild capture fisheries in the river and its tributaries as well as 
its extensive seasonally inundated wetlands. Freshwater fisheries in Thailand generally do 
not have a long history of detailed and systematic data collection by state agencies and 
large gaps remain in the knowledge base (Coates, 2002). The Nam Songkhram river is 
something of an exception in this regard, however, given the importance of its inland 
fisheries to local communities, not only as a means to access common-pool resources for 
livelihood benefits, but also in representing a traditional way of life and the cultural identity 
of the people in the river basin. Hortle and Suntornratana (2008) reported that more than 
60% of households are involved in the capture fishery to some degree, while more than 
40% of village headmen indicated that capture fisheries were important in their villages as a 
source of food and income.  
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin-Mekong connectivity 
 
The close connection between the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands with the Mekong 
mainstream allows bi-directional migration of fish and other aquatic organisms, ensuring 
completion of life cycles and a high aquatic biodiversity (Suntornratana et al, 2002). 
Although migratory behaviour will vary from species to species, all are likely influenced to 
some degree by the hydrological flow regimes of both rivers. Local fishers report that the 
start of the upstream migration coincides with the early period of the wet season, while the 
main downstream migration occurs at the end of the wet season when water levels are 
receding. Adult fish and juveniles that have benefited from the rich feeding grounds of the 
inundated floodplain move off the floodplain towards the mainstream river and perennial 
water sources. As a result of this, the latter part of the wet season tends to be the period of 




greatest fishery production and activity (for more details please see Annex 3 on Fisheries 
and Aquatic Resources). 
 
The degree of flow connectivity between the Mekong mainstream and the Lower Nam 
Songkhram Basin floodplain system has contributed towards the level of fish biodiversity 
found in the area. Surveys conducted by Thailand’s Department of Fisheries found that 
there are at least 188 species representing 30 families found in the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
Average standing crop recorded by one study was 90.8 kg/ha ± 60.1 kg/ha (Yingcharoen 
and Virapat, 1998), while a later baseline fisheries study estimated catches in the lower part 
of the Nam Songkhram Basin could be over 34,000 tonnes per annum and mean yield per 
unit area to be 78.9 kh/ha (Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008). 
  
There are more than a hundred species of fish in the Nam Songkhram Basin that display 
distinctive life cycles, which depend on a range of habitat types for completion. While some 
species are highly sensitive to environmental changes, others are more tolerant and 
adaptable to change. However, both migratory and local resident species require healthy 
ecosystems and flow patterns to survive and reproduce. The range of available habitats for 
fish can provide a good indicator of the overall health of a riverine ecosystem, such as that 




1. Overall the lower part of Songkhram river is still a functional floodplain system, as 
indicated by a diverse fish fauna and presence of a variety of other aquatic animals. 
The natural seasonal flood greatly expands the aquatic habitat area in the wet 
season allowing fish access to abundant food sources, while remnant flooded forest 
habitat  helps to decrease competition and predation of young fish. It has also been 
mentioned in some studies that young fish prefer to live not too far from the main 
riverine channels (Suntornratana et al, 2002; Hortle and Suntornratana), therefore, 
fertile flooded bamboo forest that is scattered along the Nam Songkhram riverbanks 
in the middle and lower reaches is a critical habitat for fisheries production.  
2. The Songkhram River is still regarded as a productive floodplain area for aquatic 
resources including fisheries production. Information gathered during discussions 
with the local inhabitants/communities and also information extracted from various 
studies indicate that fisheries is still an important sector of the rural economy, 
especially in the lower parts of the river system. Many local communities still depend 
on fishing and fish processing activities for food and income. Despite external 
economic forces leading to habitat degradation and changes in landuse, the overall 
fisheries productivity has remained relatively good, probably as a result of the 
continued annual flood cycle. From the fisheries perspective, it is essential to 
maintain the natural flood and flow patterns which help maintain aquatic biodiversity 
and bioproductivity in the system. 
3. While the present situation in the Songkhram River Basin shows rapid degradation of 
important inundated wetland habitats, especially the decline of bamboo dominated 
seasonally flooded forest noted at Sites 1 and 3. This has almost certainly affected 
the stocks and abundance of fish fauna, especially certain Mekong fish species. Many 
fish species dependent on seasonally flooded forest may become locally extinct as 
they lose access to important spawning and feeding ground areas.  
4. From field observations, the environmental condition of the lower mainstream 
Songkhram indicated that the flow regime still remained in a relatively natural 
condition compared to the Nam Oon, where flows were regulated by operation of the 
upstream Nam Oon Dam. There were daily fluctuations of water level in the Nam 
Oon during the dry season study when the dam is operated for dry season irrigation. 




This unnatural flow pattern may generate impacts on many fish species and also 
affect the triggering of seasonal fish movements for reproduction. In addition, the 
water released from the Nam Oon reservoir downstream is clear water and thus has 
a high capacity to erode and carry sediment, which subsequently results in a high 
turbidity, reduction in light penetration and loss of critical marginal habitat for fish 
fauna. However, during the peak flood period in the wet season, both the Songkhram 
and Nam Oon become part of a common river and floodplain system, largely 
unaffected by upstream developments. 
5. Changing natural flow regimes and cumulative effects of obstacles may cause 
migration or fish movement delay. The impacts will be both during migratory species 
migration upstream for reproduction and the downstream migratory period. Fish 
moving upstream to spawn will have limited energy supplies as they are heavy with 
eggs and will not be feeding heavily. Therefore, migration delay due to encountering 
obstacles or unnatural flow changes will affect the fish’s physiology and reduce its 
ability to reproduce. Downstream migration for young fishes may also be delayed 
and may affect them reaching fertile nursing ground habitat. Certain structures, like 
the Nong Gaa Weir, Ban Dung District, will be total physical barriers to upstream fish 
migration in all but flood conditions. This structure, located just upstream of Site 1 is 
likely to have had impacts not just on longitudinal migrations up and downstream, 
but also lateral migrations on to and off the floodplain, due to the construction of 
raised embankments running for several kilometers upstream of the dam structure 
itself. These will likely have fundamentally changed the aquatic ecology and species 
diversity of this stretch of the river due to habitat simplification and degradation. 
6. The E-Flows approach has mostly focused on determining the present status of river-
floodplain system and the linkages between different sectors, especially the 
ecological and social aspects. For a fishery specialist, this approach can help support 
a better analysis and appreciation of the complex relationships between the aquatic 
ecosystems and their diverse use by humans for fisheries and other sectors. 
 
 





The land use and agriculture assessment study was broadly aimed at identifying critical land 
and water use patterns and assess the degree to which communities depend on floodplain 
water resources for their agricultural activities. The majority of people in the Nam 
Songkhram River Basin are presently involved in rice cultivation to some degree, although 
for communities near the floodplain, rice cultivation has always been a risky activity in the 
rainy season due to seasonal floods; most effort was traditionally concentrated on 
cultivating alluvial terraces, where flooding was less of a threat to harvests. Both anecdotal 
and written evidence show that up until thirty years or so ago most villagers in the Lower 
Nam Songkhram River Basin depended on limited subsistence agriculture, with a heavy 
reliance on exchange and barter of wild wetlands products to secure rice and have only 
recently turned to commercial agriculture as a means of livelihood (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006).  
 
As the region opened up and villagers entered the market economy, people gradually 
cleared forests for planting cash crops such as cassava, sugar cane and jute, especially on 
upland soils. Recently many villagers have switched to several new activities such as 
eucalyptus and para-rubber plantations, to partially replace rice cultivation and annual cash 
crops. This was apparent in nearly all villages in the parts of the Nam Songkhram Basin 




visited by the E-Flows team. The fieldwork was able to ascertain the current agricultural 
situation of the Nam Songkhram River Basin and identify the main soil types of the 
agricultural areas.  
 
Overview of the study sites 
 
Site 1) Upper part of the Songkhram River Basin, Baan Kham Chi, Udom-porn 
Sub-District, Fao Rai District, Nongkhai Province. Udom-porn Sub-district has 13 villages. 
Much of the agriculture is rainfed and the majority of the farmers are rice growers. 
 
Site 2) Lower Part of the Songkhram River Basin near Ban Tha Bor, Tha Bor Songkhram 
Sub-district, Sri Songkhram District, Nakon Phanom Province. The majority of the farmers in 
Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-district are primarily rice growers, while orchards and cash crops 
are relatively scarce due to the local lowland topography and risk of flood inundation. 
 
Site 3) Lower reaches of the Nam Oon River, Ban Na Pho Noi, Pon Sawang Sub-District, Sri 
Songkhram District, Nakon Phanom Province. In 2005, rainfed rice fields predominated in 
this sub-district, covering an area of 2,150 ha or 86.52%, involving 956 out of the total 
1,052 families practicing rice cultivation. In the last few years, observations show that both 
eucalyptus and rubber are expanding in the sub-district, apparently due to perceived good 
prices. (For more details on methodology and the study sites please see Annex 3 on Land 
use and Agriculture). 
 
Land use changes in the Nam Songkhram river basin between the rainy and dry seasons 
(2006-2007) 
 
The Songkhram River Basin land use utilization is similar to other areas of Northeast 
Thailand where new cash crops are replacing traditional cash crops (like cassava and 
sugarcane) grown since the push for export-led agro-industry expansion started in the 
1960’s, leading to massive deforestation across the region. The study of land utilization 
changes effects on the local economy, environment and society, from the site survey and 
local interviews, may be broadly classified as follows (for more details See land use changes 
section in Annex 3): 
  
1.  Wetland changes from seasonally inundated forest to dry season irrigated rice  
The site visits in August/September 2006 and March 2007 including both bio-physical 
survey work and villager interviews found that the degree of wetland alteration was most 
severe at Site 1, followed by Site 3, with Site 2 (Ban Tha Bor) showing least alteration. At 
both sites 1 and 3 , the team witnessed active and on-going forest clearance and conversion 
to eucalyptus plantations (Site 1) or paddy fields (Site 3) during the 2006-07 dry season. At 
the same time, there is serious degradation apparent at all sites, but Site 2 still has some 
significant areas of seasonally inundated forest remaining bordering the Songkhram River 
on both banks and alongside Huay Sing stream. 
 
The bamboo-dominated seasonally inundated forest which is the commonest natural 
wetland vegetation type found in the Nam Songkhram River Basin is being cleared at 
present in order to open land for dry season rice cultivation, chiefly as a result of the these 
key factors: 1. High prices of rice in 2006/07 especially demand from Vietnam and China; 
higher yields from the dry season crop compared to the west season crop; increased 
availability of tractors in the village has eased conversion of seasonally flooded forest to 
paddy land with bunds; policy inducements and perverse subsidies such as indirect funding 
from various state agency sources to support the conversion of seasonally flooded forest 
into paddy fields, in-line with central government policy and large budgets with local Sub-




District Administration Organisations (TAO) to implement irrigated rice projects and 
encourage flooded forest conversion to agriculture  
 
2. Soil erosion along the Songkhram riverbanks caused by encroachment and 
destruction of seasonally flooded forest  
The majority of farmers pointed to deforestation of seasonally flooded forest as a cause in 
recent years for the drying up of the river and collapse of its riverbanks. Higher 
encroachment, agricultural conversion and over-utilization is leading to a dearth of mature 
bamboo plants in this area.   
 
3. Protection and conservation of the bamboo forest in the Nam Songkram river 
basin wetlands 
Site 2 has introduced more wetland protection and conservation measures than the other 
two sites, through the efforts of local villagers and supporting organizations – such  as 
demarcating and classifying the wetland conservation areas (e.g. flooded forest bordering 
Huay Sing) – that may have helped to reduce conversion of land to agriculture in recent 
years.  
 
Ongoing changes in agricultural land use  
 
The Nam Songkhram river basin has been undergoing two major changes: change from 
upland cash crops to other uses and the alteration of upland and lowland fields into 
eucalyptus forest.  
 
In the early 1980s, agricultural land utilization was almost all cassava and sugarcane 
cultivation on the upper terrace soils of the Songkhram Basin. But both these crops have 
seen a general decline in relative profitability and productivity over the last few decades. 
Presently, large areas of former cash crop land are being converted to eucalyptus 
plantations, especially at Site 1, but also at Site 2 to a lesser extent (See more details in the 
next section on.  At Site 3, para rubber trees predominate over eucalyptus as there is more 
upland terraces available. By 2005-2006, most families were growing eucalyptus trees on 
their land and some farmers have converted over 50% of their land holding, including paddy 
fields, into eucalyptus plantation which poses uncertainties for food security in these villages 
in the future. 
 
Vegetable cultivation in dry season or cash crops after rice harvest 
 
It was found that at Site 2 near Ban Tha Bor, around 7-8 households were involved in the 
cultivation of dry season intensive watermelon and vegetables, while at Site 3 there was 
some limited maize and vegetable cultivation near the Nam Oon river. By contrast, at Site 1 
there was only limited cropping with the exception of some small scale growing by farm 
ponds and one elderly farmer growing sweet potato on the Nam Songkhram riverbanks.  
 
Problems of saline soil 
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin is underlain with extensive salt deposits, which in some places 
rise to near the surface and may be exploited commercially, such as in parts of Ban Dung 
District, Udon Thani and Wanon Niwat District, Sakhon Nakhon. Locally, saline soil or 
underground water sources is a problem at many locations throughout the basin. The 
survey team found that underground rock salt had risen to the surface forming patches of 
surface crust of salt at Site 3 (Ban Na Pho Noi), near to the Nong Paen Reservoir, but was 
limited to a small area. This may be related to rises in water table caused by the reservoir, 
bringing salt to the surface through capillary action. 





Migration of agricultural labor  
 
There is active labor migration to urban areas such as Bangkok, Rayong, Chonburi, Phuket, 
and also abroad (e.g. Singapore), particularly by teenagers and young adults in all three 
study sites. This encourages switches from small to larger tractors for ploughing or from rice 
to eucalyptus plantations, for instance. This in turn decreases the need for local labor and 
further out-migration occurs in a vicious cycle. People who return from living in the city tend 
to want quick profits and easy returns on money and labor invested, with little time for soil 
and water conservation techniques or care for the natural environment. However, initiatives 
like the Tai Baan Research that was carried out in Ban Tha Bor (Site 2) and other villages in 
Sri Songkhram District, show that there is still interest in protecting natural resources and 
maintaining or reviving traditional livelihood practices and patterns amongst many village 
residents (Tai Baan Research Network of the Lower Songkhram River Basin, 2005). 
 
Conclusion: Agricultural land usage priorities in the Songkhram River Basin 
 
The land use priorities of farmers in the Songkhram River Basin have changed over time, 
predominantly in response to wider socio-economic changes. Currently farmers are 
switching attention from farming not only raised terrace lands, but transforming the 
floodplain areas previously considered common property land of little agricultural value. 
These areas were formerly chiefly used for fishing, gathering NTFPs and livestock grazing, 
while paddy fields were mostly found on elevated lands above the regular flood level. But as 
population pressure has increased and land prices have risen, people have cleared more 
floodplain land and practiced “naa siang” (literally means “risky rice cultivation”). This 
practice has been encouraged by government policy, which granted cash compensation to 
villagers who lost crops to flooding, even when the causes were totally natural, by declaring 
the floods as “natural disasters”.  
 
Other policies which have encouraged the conversion and massive clearance of seasonally 
flooded forest to rice fields, has been the strong emphasis placed by many state agencies 
on irrigated dry season rice cultivation with generous subsidies given for irrigation 
infrastructure construction, the land reform policies of ALRO and long standing 
misclassification of floodplain forests as “vacant wasteland” or “degraded scrubland” and 
general lack of recognition of the value of natural wetlands by nearly all state agencies. In 
recent years, these policies have been compounded by the growth in power and influence of 
the pulp and paper industry, which has helped encourage villagers to plant eucalyptus on 
both upland and floodplain lands. Additionally, promotion of rubber growing in the upper 
Northeast by state agencies has led to wide adoption of rubber by a majority of farmers in 
some wetland marginal villages (e.g. Ban Kham Chi) in a relatively short period of time. 
 
4. Vegetation  
Pattaraporn Waleetorncheepsawat  
 
Introduction 
The seasonally flooded forest (paa boong paa thaam) has been previously identified as 
having most value and significance to local livelihoods, partly due to the variety of useful 
flora found within it and partly due to the role it plays as a source of fish and aquatic 
products in the flood season and during the flood recession (Blake and Pitakethepsombut, 
2006; Khonchantet, 2007). In a ten village socio-economic study of seasonally flooded 
forest community use, Khonchantet (2007) estimated that the average contribution of 
wetland products to villager’s income was 38,403 Baht/household/year of which 3.54 %, 




18.16 %, 4.21 % and 19.11 % were made up of wild vegetables, edible mushrooms, 
bamboo shoots and livestock fodder components respectively. However, it is recognized that 
the seasonally flooded forest is in a much degraded state both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.  
 
This report, combining wet and dry season data, tries to illuminate the past and present 
status of the floodplain vegetation  to identify some of the linkages between plants and 
other disciplines, in particular hydrology and landuse. It also considers briefly the impacts 
that some of the gross ecological changes might have had on the health of the overall 
ecosystem, including threats from introduced alien species, flow regime changes and land 




The principle vegetational habitat features of the three field sites were as follows:  
Site 1: Ban Kham Chi floodplain transect line (one km long) exhibited a floodplain 
covered by patches of bamboo-dominated seasonally inundated forest (paa boong 
paa thaam), agricultural land (rice fields and some sugar cane), young (< 5 years) 
eucalyptus plantations and the Nam Songkhram river channel with steep banks on 
which grow a mixture of remnant trees and annual herbs and grasses visible in dry 
season only.  
Site 2: Ban Tha Bor floodplain transect line (5 kms long) included mostly bamboo-
dominated seasonally inundated forest, some agricultural land (paddy fields), 
eucalyptus plantations and the Songkham river channel, plus two backwater 
channels namely Huay Sing and Wang Wai which are natural features but made into 
permanent water courses by small dams being built across the outlets.  
Site 3: Ban Naa Pho Noi floodplain transect line (3.9 kms long) included a mix of 
seasonally flooded forest (bamboo and dense scrub forest), newly converted 
agricultural land (irrigated and non-irrigated rice fields), young (< 3 years) 
eucalyptus plantations and the Nam Oon river, plus two semi-natural floodplain 




The Nam Songkhram river floodplain’s native vegetation cover would appear to be 
represented by plant communities that normally grow rapidly in the dry season, followed by 
a period of slower growth during the wet season flood period in a successional pattern of 
growth. When the wet season arrives some plant growth activities will stop temporarily or 
some members of the community will die-off, as they cannot tolerate the prolonged flooding 
period. An exception to this general pattern is the ubiquitous flood-tolerant bamboo 
(Bambusa spp.), which grows rapidly when the rainy season starts with shoots out-pacing 
the rising flood water to present greenery year round, even when the floodplain is under 4 – 
5 metres depth of water. This remarkable trait of the bamboo plants to both tolerate floods 
and still send up edible and nutritious shoots well into the dry season, has helped them to 
being an important component of local livelihoods. Then, as the water level subsides at the 
start of the dry season the same plant community with some new pioneer members will 
reinitiate growth. This pattern is called a cyclical succession. The cycle begins with a pioneer 
phase of seed germination and then moves through several stages sequentially before 
finally returning to the original state. So, part of the community is impermanent or annual 
and the rest are flood hardy perennial species that can tolerate up to five months 




submersion with no ill effects (Utit, 2001). As a result of this successional pattern and 
habitat diversity, the ecosystem exhibits high plant diversity, structural complexity and 
resilience. 
 
5. Socio-economic aspects  




The vibrant and complex socio-economic patterns seen in lowland parts of the Songkhram 
River Basin have largely depended in the past on wild fishery production and use of natural 
resources from inundated floodplains. Natural flow regimes and abundant natural resources 
ensured livelihood security and contributed to the cultural values of riverine communities in 
the region. The communities to a significant extent adapted their livelihoods to the 
floodplain environment and many traditional resource utilization patterns reflected the 
natural flow patterns and ecosystem of the Nam Songkhram River. The natural wealth of 
the riverine floodplain was one of the most important factors that attracted people to live in 
the region. As the agricultural frontier expanded and the area was opened up to improved 
communications and new development opportunities, people from other provinces of 
Northeast Thailand moved into wetlands communities to exploit the locally abundant 
resources.  
 
Adaptation and willingness to change according to external factors has always been a 
feature of Northeastern Thai communities. Various periods of natural resource usage pattern 
were noted by Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006), who suggested there were three main 
eras identifiable in the Nam Songkhram Basin, namely an Era of Trade in Freshwater Fish, 
Logging Concessions and Commercial Charcoal Burning (1957-1977); an Era of Agricultural 
Development and Expansion of Agribusiness (1977-1997); and an Era of Industrial Tree 
Plantation Expansion (1997 onwards). Moreover, in the past decade or so, usage of the 
natural resources by communities has started to fundamentally change, influenced by many 
drivers including commodification of nearly all natural resources, labor out-migration, rural 
development and state policies.  
 
Socio-economic changes in the community and changes in floodplain resources 
The study revealed that socio-economic aspects of the Nam Songkhram River Basin rural 
society were formerly characterized by a largely subsistence-based local economy that 
started to be commoditized in the 1960’s.  
  
Over the past 25 years, a number of changes related to degradation of floodplain resources 
were observed or reported to the researchers. First, there was massive forest clearance in 
the village peripheries, both on the floodplain and on upland terraces. The rate of removal 
of logs and tree stumps from the riverbanks and surrounding floodplain, which had 
previously provided varied habitat for fish, increased as the price of hardwood increased. 
 
Second, dry season rice growing has rapidly expanded, primarily into floodplain areas. This 
has been happening in conjunction with construction of water infrastructure on the 
floodplain. The justification given for building these water resources was to store water for 
dry season rice growing, although we found many not able to fulfill this function. Although 
these water sources are frequently under-utilized, plans to build more water resources by 
both local and central government agencies abound. These plans are usually driven by 
claims of drought and water shortage for dry season rice farmers. 
 




Third, the economy of the three communities over the past three decades has been 
primarily dependent on external income sources and factors. Out-migration is found to be 
common across the three communities, reversing the earlier trend of in-migration. Mobility 
and consumption patterns in rural villages now more closely reflect the wider socio-
economic patterns of urban Thailand than in years gone by. 
 
It should be noted that the growing importance of the external economy and out-migration 
in these villages has likely eased some pressure on the floodplain resources, i.e. fish and 
non-timber forest products (NTFP’s). However, from our observations the use of floodplain 
resources still remains high, partly due to the fact that fish and NTFP’s have been further 
commoditised. These resources are not only used to satisfy basic household food needs, but 
have increasingly become a source of income for many households. This coupled with a 
growing demand for wild products by urban markets and an almost complete switch to a 
cash economy, has intensified use of floodplain resources.  
 
Fourth, is the widespread presence of agribusiness in the Lower Songkhram River Basin and 
its occupation of vast areas of floodplain land. In Ban Tha Bor, villagers reported that the 
SunTech Company Ltd dishonestly obtained former publically-owned wetlands by conspiring 
with local state officials. Later, the company approached the villagers and offered them a 
sum of money in exchange for the land rights. The majority of villagers accepted this offer, 
although official documentation of this land had not yet been undertaken. Similar cases 
have occurred in Ban Na Pho and Ban Don Daeng, Sri Songkhram District (close to Site 2). 
Villages reported the heavy use of pesticides and chemical fertilizer, as well as constant 
conflicts between villagers and the company about land ownership and right of access, for 
example to fish or raise livestock on the floodplain. 
 
Invasion of a new tree species: Eucalyptus  
Increasingly villagers have chosen agricultural activities, techniques or crops with low labor 
requirements, including non-food cash crops such as eucalyptus and rubber plantations. The 
changes in socio-economic conditions hasmeant that labor for agricultural work became 
scarce over time. At the same time, remittances from outside often do not meet a family’s 
financial needs and agricultural activities continue, especially for rice cultivation.  
 
The expansion of eucalyptus cultivation in all three villages has been quite a recent 
phenomenon, although it has actually been promoted locally for more than two decades. 
The promotion of this alien species tree crop has been controversial, especially the issue of 
environmental impacts. Eucalyptus has been widely adopted for the specific reason that it 
can tolerate flooding better than most other crops and so is considered suitable for growing 
on the Songkhram floodplain. Moreover, growing eucalyptus requires minimal labor input 
after planting. In the 2007 dry season study, we observed vast areas in Ban Na Pho had 
recently been cleared since the recession of the last flood. According to one study in Ban 
Tha Bor, more than 40 percent of the households grow eucalyptus, with plantations on the 




Land and property rights  
 
Beginning from the broad topic of floodplain resources (forest, land, water, fishery, etc.) 
governance, one of the primary considerations is the property rights regimes and their 
evolution over time. In the recent past wetland forests, floodplain land and the river itself 
were considered as open access resources by local people. The abundance of these 
resources and their mostly subsistence-level use meant that limitations on resource use was 




considered unnecessary. Scarcity and over-harvesting of these resources were not an issue 
in the minds of villagers. Although there were cultural practices constraining some use of 
natural resources, as mentioned earlier, these were mainly to protect social cohesion, rather 
than the natural resources.  
 
Changes in the property right regimes governing the use of floodplain resources have been 
primarily driven by socio-economic changes. First, in Ban Kham Chi migration into the 
village during the 1960s resulted in a growing scarcity of upper terrace land and wild natural 
resources such as timber trees and wildlife. Consequently, occupation of land gradually 
expanded downslope onto riverine floodplains, held by local (formal) leaders – previous 
village headman and kamnan (Sub-District chiefs).  
 
Similar processes also occurred in Ban Tha Bor and Ban Naa Pho, but an agribusiness 
company advanced the privatization of land in the case of the former. Although the process 
of land documentation for floodplain land claims has not yet been officially completed, the 
trend of common land privatization has continued. Agribusiness companies hold vast tracts 
of land, while villagers claim rights on smaller plots of surrounding lands, with disputes 
common.  
  
It should be noted here that in the LSRB, the state has widely issued Sor Por Kor documents 
to villagers. This was justified principally as an attempt to solve the problem of ‘having no 
farmland to earn a living’ but in the case of the Nam Songkhram floodplain, ironically, most 
plots were left unused for agriculture until recently because of annual flooding rendering 
them unsuitable for wet season rice. At the same time, lack of irrigation infrastructure and 
extension support left them unsuitable for dry season rice, despite several failed attempts.  
Additionally, the state has over the past few years introduced a compensation scheme for 
farmers who are affected by natural disasters. Flooding is regarded as a “natural disaster” 
(utokapai) no matter its actual causes, but in order to claim compensation the villagers 
must grow rice on the floodplain land they own, despite knowing the high probability that 
the crop will be damaged or destroyed by flood. The privatization of land is closely 
associated with the depletion of floodplain resources, especially the clearance of land to 




a) Community institutions 
   
In general, there is scarce evidence for an active role by community institutions pertaining 
to floodplain resources. Beliefs in supernatural forces related to floodplain resources used to 
exist but have evidently weakened or virtually disappeared. In Ban Kham Chi, the villagers 
reported that there was a belief in a local guardian spirit known as Ta Poo of Kham Chi 
(ancestral spirit of a natural spring on a Songkhram tributary which gave the village its 
name). This belief stipulated that the use of natural resources, especially fish, must be 
conducted in a particular way. However, the belief in Ta Poo of Kham Chi has declined with 
the former spirit house for Ta Poo being moved from its old site by the stream to a new site 
located near the village, apparently for convenience’s sake.  
 
Ban Tha Bor temple has played a lead role in demarcating and managing a ‘sanctuary 
compound’ (khet apai than), – an area prohibiting all forms of killing and hunting. This 
includes a protected area located in the main channel of the Nam Songkhram River in front 
of the temple prohibiting all fishing. A semi-protected ‘Community Forest’ area is located 
along the Huay Sing stream of Ban Tha Bor which villagers co-manage and have recently 




started some reforestation activity. But these areas are relatively small compared with the 
overall size of the critical floodplain area. 
 
One important institutional aspect involves the rules and regulations of the community 
pertaining to water bodies. It was noted that the implementation and actions of these 
institutions varies considerably. The actions of each community to limit use of the river, 
especially control of the use of different types of fishing gear was generally unclear. More 
manifest were regulations concerned with natural swamps, reservoirs and other types of 
small waterbody connected to the main river. These water sources are located on the 
floodplain and will be inundated during floods.  
 
b) State agencies and local government 
 
Actions of state agencies may either limit or encourage use of floodplain resources. 
Government agencies concerned with floodplain resources include the former Department of 
Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP), Department of Land Development, Royal 
Irrigation Department (RID), Department of Land Registration, Tambon Administrative 
Organization (TAO) and Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO). These state agencies 
tend to implement projects – mostly related to water infrastructure – using their own 
budget and expertise usually engaging in minimal consultation with local people, except for 
local government agencies.  
 
c) Community Organization and Environmental Associations 
 
There are several kinds of community organizations existing in the villages. These 
organizations were both initiated and funded by state and non-state organizations. There 
are farmer associations, occupational groups, women’s groups, credit groups (e.g. One 
Million Baht Village Fund scheme of the Thaksin government), child care groups, etc. 
However, none of these play a direct role related to governing the use of floodplain 
resources. An exception might be a community organization in Ban Tha Bor, where an NGO 
is presently working with the villagers. The community organizations are managing 
community forestry, village (temple) sanctuaries, and coordinating with NGO’s (and state 
agencies), in studying floodplain resources and initiating activities that may lead to the wise 
use of floodplain resources. 
  
Resource user groups  
 
The socio-economic analysis from both the wet and dry seasons suggests that floodplain 
resources have become less important as the economy of these communities has been 
gradually oriented towards the outside market. However, the following resources still remain 
relatively important to certain groups, which will be discussed below. 
 
a) Fishers  
 
Fishing is far more important to local livelihoods in Ban Tha Bor than the other two villages. 
This is primarily due to the bio-physical location of the village being located in ‘the heart’ of 
the floodplain – where the floodplain extends to its widest point in the LSRB; Although 
people have been increasingly earning a living from employment outside the village in 
recent decades, fishing continues to play an important role for the household economy of 
many families. By comparison fishing in the other two villages is far less important and has 
declined as a main form of livelihood and tends to be regarded as a ‘supplementary’ activity 
for most villagers. 
 




b) Non-timber forest product (NTFP) collectors 
 
Villagers of the three villages identified several NTFP’s available in the floodplain that are 
frequently gathered. Villagers use these resources for domestic consumption mostly, with 
few households in the three villages reported earning income from NTFP’s. Bamboo shoots 
and several kinds of wild vegetables were ranked highly, usually second only to fish. It was 
noted that older villagers firmly preferred the taste of wild vegetables and natural foods to 
the less fresh and “pesticide laced” cultivated vegetables found in the markets.    
  
c) Rice farmers 
 
Most of the villagers in three villages are part-time rice farmers, although not all of them 
grow rice on the floodplain. Over the past two decades, the state has heavily promoted dry 
season rice farming. This has occurred alongside widespread construction of water 
infrastructure, especially the construction of weirs, reservoirs, embankments and dredging 
of streams and channels by the state agencies. The modification of the floodplain has 
affected the floodplain natural resources.  
 
d) Eucalyptus growers 
The factors driving eucalyptus plantation rapid spread across the Basin have been briefly 
discussed above. Eucalyptus cultivation in the three villages has been primarily driven by 
the demands of the pulp and paper industry, through local agents, including state officials. 
The strategy of the pulp and paper industry is slightly different from intensive cash crop 
agribusinesses in that it does not seek to obtain land and grow the trees on its own land. 
Instead, the businesses involved aim to promote small farmers to produce raw material for 
supplying the industry, thus reducing risks and overhead costs associated with land 
acquisition. The rapidly growing number of farmers growing eucalyptus means a stable 




Agro-industry appeared in the LSRB about three decades ago, by obtaining large plots of 
land on the floodplain from local villagers that had formerly been public land. The industry 
initially concentrated on growing intensive vegetable crops (e.g. tomato, sweetcorn) for 
supplying factories for export from their own farms, but later also promoted the growing of 
the same crops by local farmers. Agribusiness at one time was a significant source of 
employment for local labor in Sri Songkhram District, as the farm, processing factory and 
contract farming were creating jobs about 15 years ago when the business peaked. Due to a 
mix of financial irregularities involving land acquisition, political interference, non-
performing loans and poor competitiveness against foreign producers and macro-economic 
changes, the agro-industry has declined considerably in the last decade. 
 
e) Cattle and buffalo raisers 
Cattle and water buffalo are commonly found in all three villages and traditionally formed an 
important part of the local economy. The raising of buffalo and cattle has long been 
dependent on the open access floodplain forests and scrub/grasslands for animal grazing 
and forage resources. During the past few years with the promotion of dry season rice 
growing and expansion of eucalyptus plantations, grazing animals on former public land has 
faced increasing difficulties as the common access lands are privatized and fenced off. This 
has increased conflicts at the village level between livestock owners and crop growers, 
especially if the animals damage the crops where they once were able to freely graze. 
  
Conclusions: Re-negotiating for the future 





Changes in socio-economics of the three villages and the Nam Songkhram Basin in general 
are quite evident. These changes evidently affect the ecological regime of the river and 
floodplain. The future of the remaining paa bung paa thaam or floodplain forest is not good, 
due to many pressures.  
 
Meanwhile, as resources have declined, local communities have gained higher mobility, 
higher consumption patterns and no longer rely on natural resources to the same degree as 
in the past People in the Songkhram Basin earn their living more and more from distant 
locations (out-migration), but in the meantime others increase exploitation of the resources 
of the floodplain through unsustainable usage patterns, in order to meet increased demands 
from local and distant markets. In the short run there may be growing affluence of the 
communities, more infrastructure construction, higher consumption patterns and a higher 
standard of living. But on the other hand, we also can forecast the continued erosion or 
even total collapse of the ecological regime.   
 
The expansion of eucalyptus has resulted in the widespread loss of paa bung paa thaam 
(seasonally flooded forest) - replacing diverse native plant species by a single alien species 
in a fragile environment has as yet unknown long term consequences.  
 
“Environmental Flows” into floodplain communities include consumer goods, money, 
information, novel (labor-saving) technologies such as new crop types, pesticides, 
insecticides, etc. Flows out from the communities and the floodplains include human labor, 
natural wetland products (fish, bamboo shoots, mushrooms, etc.), cash crops (e.g. rice, 
eucalyptus, etc) and soil nutrients (both by erosion and within the crop itself).  
 
The future we portray here is under continual negotiation between several stakeholders with 
interests in the Nam Songkram Basin. But some stakeholders hold stronger leverage than 
others i.e., those who are supported by dominant state agencies and the market in 
particular. Indeed, the depletion of environmental resources may temporarily increase the 
affluence of the population in the Songkhram Basin as a result of perverse subsidies 
distorting the market, even as the larger share of natural capital or wealth of the area is 
transferred to the brokers of the state (e.g. construction companies or officials), agro-
industry, the pulp and paper industry, etc. More importantly, the riverine environment  in its 
entirety has hitherto been regarded as a ‘resource’ to be exploited in order to achieve 
notions of prosperity, but never counted as a legitimate ‘stakeholder’ or partner in itself, 
that requires certain minimum levels or/and types of flows to maintain it. The livelihoods 
and socio-economic health of the population of the Nam Songkhram River in the long run is 
in jeopardy, unless new paradigms of development are adopted.  








One of the principal components of the E-Flows study was a scenario-building workshop in 
May 2006. The Scenarios Workshop was held with the purpose of bringing together the 
Intermediate E-Flows Assessment Team following the wet and dry season field studies to 
discuss their findings in relation to a number of potential “development scenarios” for the 
Nam Songkhram Basin. For example, there are numerous plans to build dams in the 
tributaries and upper reaches of the mainstream Nam Songkhram, which are claimed by the 
agencies promoting them to be able to "solve" flooding downstream.  
The workshop provided a valuable chance to reflect on the main lessons from the field study 
and use them to consider alternative scenarios and assess what might potentially happen at 
each site on the basis of enhanced knowledge about flow changes and hydraulics. Three 
scenarios were selected for the workshop with reference to past development trends and 
socio-political considerations at national, regional and local levels. It was anticipated that 
the findings and conclusions of this workshop could be used to inform and influence the 
outcome of the Multi-Stakeholder Meeting that followed the scenario workshop. Additionally, 
on the last day of the workshop, a limited number of participants from various state 
agencies were invited to observe the proceedings and listen to preliminary findings, as a 
way of exposing to stakeholder scrutiny the E-Flows approach and methodology.  
 
Future Scenarios Examined 
 
Following discussions between the Nam Songkhram E-Flows Technical Working Group 
(TWG) members and various project partners, it was decided to take forward four possible 
scenarios for consideration at the Scenarios Workshop held in Udon Thani in May 2006.  
(The fourth was ultimately not considered due to time constraints.)  
 
These were justified by taking into account several considerations: 1) the general context of 
the Nam Songkhram Basin, derived from background information and implementation of the 
MWBP Demonstration Site for last 3 + years; 2) reference to long-proposed major 
infrastructural projects by key water resources management stakeholders; and 3) what, if 
any, non-infrastructural project options could be considered as alternative ways forward for 
sustainable management of basin, natural resources and water resources, coinciding with 
general flows considerations. 
 
With these criteria in mind, the following scenarios were conceived as potential development 
pathways that might be applied by water resources planners and decision-makers: 
 
1. Nam Songkhram Dam 
2. Water Grid plan 
3. Business as usual 
4. Alternative development paradigm 
 
These scenarios and their implications are summarized below (please see more details in 
Annex 4 Scenarios).  
 
Summary of Development Scenarios: Implications for Hydrology and Ecology 
 
Scenario 1: Nam Songkhram Dam (plus Nam Oon Watergate) 
 
Major hydrological impacts:  





• Blocking of flow near river mouth 
• Creation of large shallow reservoir stretching back nearly 200 kms upstream 
• Some impact on stopping Mekong water flow and sediment backflow in rainy season 
 
Major ecological impacts: 
 
• Impact on fish migration patterns (up and downstream) 
• Stillwater reservoir – change from riverine conditions and loss of flood pulse – 
change in Water Quality 
• Loss of floodplain vegetation (paa boong paa thaam) to reservoir – possible WQ 
problems as it rots 
• Change in aquatic faunal/floral community and productivity 
• Possible mobilisation of salt layer underneath and raising to surface 
• Irrigation impacts on fragile, low fertility, salinisation prone land 
• cf impacts of Khong-Chi-Mun Project watergates 
 
Major sociological impacts: 
 
• Would potentially require relocation of several (upto 7) villages  
• Would lose much productive agricultural land on floodplain (mostly naa prang) 
• Loss of fish and other aquatic resources 
• Loss of seasonally flooded forest common property resources 
• Potential public health risks 
 
NB: for Nam Oon Project: Ecological – hydrological impacts – similar to Nam Songkhram 
Project on smaller scale. WUP-FIN data indicates that flooding prevention is not possible by 
damming. 
 
Scenario 2:  Water Grid development scenario 
 
Major hydrological impacts:  
 
• Mainstream and tributaries further split into discrete sections by dams/weirs, 
blocking natural flows 
• Abstraction of water for irrigation in dry season, from some localised stretches, with 
possible drying up of river channel. 
• Other stretches may have extra flows (above natural), when little demand for 
irrigation or return flows from low efficiency parts 
• Extra 65 cumecs pumped into system from Laotian river water transfers, causing 
overall higher dry season river flows in lower reaches.  
 
Major ecological impacts: 
 
• Change in flow patterns upsetting fish migration patterns and possible key events in 
fish lifecycles and migratory cues 
• Loss of shallow water areas, important for some fish 
• Greater erosion in dry season, causing higher sediment load and increase in 
turbidity. Loss of primary productivity. New conditions favors some species.  
• More irrigation and intensive agriculture causing decrease in water quality, impacting 
sensitive fish and aquatic organisms. 
• Increased soil and water salinisation. Possible risk of long-term land degradation and 
eventual abandonment. 




• Risk of pollution events from misuse of pesticides, under increased intensive 
agriculture 
• Where over-abstraction occurs (especially tributaries), less flow impacts sensitive 
species. 
 
Major sociological impacts: 
 
• More water competition for irrigation, may lead to increase inter-village and intra-
village conflicts, as has happened in many other basins in Thailand 
• Fundamental change in traditional agricultural practices to more high investment, 
high risk systems, will inevitably mean many farming families “fall by the wayside”. 
• A likely consolidation of farms by bigger, wealthier landowners and agribusiness 
interests. Decreased farm ownership and greater tenant or wage labor, for some 
seasonal operations. 
• Move from rice and food crops to monocrop plantation forestry and non-food crops 
e.g. bio-fuels or cash crops. 
 
Scenario 3: Business as Usual scenario 
 
Main hydrological impacts: 
 
• Slightly more storage capacity in tributaries, may delay onset of flows/ looding early 
in rainy season, but not greatly as all shallow reservoirs. The greatest impact will be 
in a dry year when reservoirs are unable to fill up quickly. 
• Greater pumped irrigation schemes in mainstream and tributaries may cause 
decrease in dry season flows. 
• More on-floodplain structures and infrastructure will alter local flow and flood 
patterns. Some increase in local flooding, esp. where more embankments are built, 
hindering flood recession drainage. 
 
Main ecological impacts: 
 
• Increased fragmentation of tributary reaches, negatively impacting fish migration 
patterns and cutting off critical habitat at critical times of year (note all tributaries 
are now dammed in their lower reaches, apart from Nam Oon) 
• Almost total loss of on-floodplain natural vegetation and flooded forest, causing loss 
of terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity and breakdown in many critical food chains 
• Less nutrient recycling through flooded forest, so overall loss of productivity to 
system 
• Increased use of agri-chemicals, causing decline in water quality, esp. in dry season 
and first flushes of year. 
• Rise in localised soil and water salinisation. Land abandonment in longer term. 
• Greater bank erosion, turbidity and sedimentation locally. Songkhram may become 
shallower as pools fill up with sediment. 
 
Main sociological impacts: 
 
• As aquatic and terrestrial habitats are degraded and simplified, and biodiversity lost, 
local people are less able to rely on natural resources for livelihood (food and 
income), and must buy more food. 
• Greater production of dry season rice – labor implications 
 
Conclusions  





While the overall workshop methodological process employed proved quite challenging to 
implement in practice, it was perhaps not surprising that no hard and fast conclusions could 
be drawn across the board of disciplines. There were certain constraints apparent such as 
time and specialists’ familiarity with the technical terminology and complex concepts they 
were required to comprehend, digest with relation to their own discipline and analyse in a 
semi-abstract way. In the final analysis it was found that specialists were unable to 
complete the Ecology-Social Matrix tables according to original expectations. The Workshop 
did allow an interesting dialogue to develop between specialists about future outcomes 
under different scenarios. 
 
A significant and interesting conclusion from the hydrology component was the finding that 
any attempt at regulation of the Nam Oon in its lower reaches (Scenario 2) would have a 
very limited impact on flood levels; according to the model, a complete absence of 
discharge from the Nam Songkhram river would lead to just a 10 cm decrease in the flood 
peak in the rainy season and just a small delay in flood arrival. This is a function of the 
over-riding influence of the Mekong mainstream water levels, and thus any attempt at 
upstream regulation of the Nam Songkhram or tributaries will have a negligible impact on 
flood control. The hydrology study findings (as explained earlier in Sec 4) demonstrate that 
no matter how much run-off of the Nam Songkhram River is held back in its upstream 
reservoirs, the water levels on the floodplain would not be significantly affected as they are 
primarily controlled by the hydrology of the Mekong mainstream. 
 
This finding alone would tend to offer strong evidence counter to the “flood protection” 
justification for building water management infrastructure (including the RID Nam Oon 
Watergates project and Nam Songkhram Project of Scenario 1). However, the additional 
reality is these projects could be pushed ahead on the basis of supposed benefits for 
irrigation.  
 
If this occurred Sites 2 and 3 would be essentially altered irrevocably, as they would be 
transformed from their present variable habitat riverine floodplain state to a permanently 
inundated lacustrine (reservoir) state with little habitat diversity, and consequently, less 
aquatic biodiversity or productivity. For Site 1, it was not clear how far upstream of the Nam 
Songkhram Dam’s reservoir it would lie, but the Team felt it would be influenced to an 
extent and see fundamental changes in social and environmental parameters, although 
quantifying them was more difficult. While the Intermediate EFA and Scenario Workshop 
were not designed to be an Environmental Impact Investigation or Social Impact 
Investigation studies, when delving into the combinations and permutations, both 
temporally and spatially, that a number of plausible development scenarios presents, then it 
rapidly becomes apparent that the level of investigation and consideration should be deeper 
than the relatively narrow time frame of the Scenario Workshop. What became apparent 
was the complexity of the relationship between hydrology and each discipline studied, would 
require more in-field and secondary data analysis for the team to build up a strong 
understanding of the implications of the fundamental changes that would result under each 
of the proposed scenarios. 
 
From the perspective of fisheries, a view was expressed that both habitat degradation and 
simplification were likely to be bad for fishery productivity and biodiversity, reducing was at 
the present time a rich and diverse fishery by Thai standards. Similarly, any alteration of 
flows was bound to be negative to a high proportion of local fish species, many of which rely 
on flow triggers to complete their life cycles at egg, juvenile and adult stages. The notion 
that a reservoir fishery created could replace the rich and diverse river floodplain fishery 
that presently exists, especially for Sites 2 and 3, was also believed to be false, based on 




the experience of numerous other reservoir fisheries in Thailand, irrespective of the water 
quality problems that may accumulate both from agricultural activity around the reservoir 
and natural processes of biomass decay.  Vegetation and land use are intimately linked 
when considering the scenarios. Each development scenario tended to stress irrigated 
agriculture over any need to conserve natural vegetation and as was witnessed during the 
dry season field visit to the sites, the rate of clearance of flooded forest was rapid and on-
going. The general consensus for Sites 1 and 3 was that seasonally flooded forest was 
probably doomed, whether by the Business-as-Usual or the Nam Songkhram Dam route, 
but at Site 2 (Ban Tha Bor), there was a slight hope of villagers being able to protect some 
limited areas of public land under flooded forest, on the assumption that the Nam 
Songkhram Dam is not built. The main ongoing threat here (as with Site 1) was the growing 
popularity of eucalyptus plantations, which were having impacts on other livelihood sectors, 
including livestock grazing, fisheries and rice cultivation, and identified as having potential 
to cause intra-community conflict in future. 
 
While the social links to the various livelihood activities dependent on floodplain resources 
were strong, ultimately it was felt by the respective specialist that there were stronger 
socio-economic and political drivers at work than the bio-physical driver of flow changes, 
that had in the past and would in the future be the more significant influence on local 
communities’ choices and outcome. Hydrological flow, was just seen as one of several 
“flows” occurring in and around the communities studied, with the flow of people 
(migration) being a primary one to consider. Another general issue that emerged during this 
exercise for the socio-economist was the observation that there were differences between 
what he understood to be potential positive and negative impacts arising from the Scenarios 
and what villagers’ understood. Thus, there was a tendency for confusion as to whether he 
should be presenting the villagers’ as local stakeholders reported views and opinions, or his 
own interpretation of future changes. 
 
Overall, the Scenarios Workshop was not as decisive as some may have anticipated in 
coming to firm conclusions about future environmental and social outcomes brought about 
by flow changes, which as discussed may have been a result of unrealistic expectations 
placed on it and the emphasis placed by the E-Flows Team Leader on quantitative data, 
before there was sufficient understanding of the methodology and expectations of the 
exercise. While this was unfortunate, it did not imply that the exercise was not useful for 
raising capacity and exposing the entire team to a new way of looking at the complexity of 
“Flows”.   
 




The E-flows approach applied in Thailand was developed based on the notion that E-Flows 
does not only consider the importance of river flows from a physical or ecological 
perspective, but also encompasses socio-political factors. The role that people play both as 
beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem and at the same time, modifiers of the 
ecosystem are key to understanding E-Flows. The process of the E-flows assessment 
indicated that the stakeholders linked to the Nam Songkhram Basin are manifold including, 
people living along the river and their extended families working as migrants in other parts 
of the country.  
 
The different stakeholders represent different geopolitical conceptualisations of the Basin. 
The participants represented different positions in relation to water allocation or restrictions 
(in terms of flood prevention). Thus, the appropriate environmental flow for the Songkhram 




river depends on the values for which the river system is to be managed. Those values will 
determine the decisions about how to balance environmental, economic and social 
aspirations and the uses of the river’s waters.  
 
The key component of the E-flow approach is to facilitate a negotiation between the 
different stakeholders on the reasonable and equitable utilisation of water in the Songkhram 
Basin. The multistakeholder meeting was a first attempt to initiate a dialogue between civil 
society, government officials and disciplinary specialists and community members on the 
roles and functions of the Nam Songkhram River by critically reviewing the outcomes of the 
technical assessments in the E-flows project.  
 
This was in acknowledgement of the fact that although the Songkhram Basin spans four 
provinces, it is not at present managed as one complete unit, but rather split into six sub-
basins with little coordination between these sub-units. Thus there remains a lack of a basin 
overview amongst key stakeholders about the nature and challenges of the Nam Songkhram 
Basin. 
 
The interdisciplinary Environmental Flows work in the Songkhram River Basin was a first 
step in providing data and practical tools for river basin and water managers at national and 
local levels to apply similar approaches for better outcomes (see Annex 5 Multistakeholder 
Meeting).  
 
Objectives of the Multi-stakeholder Meeting 
 
1. To explore the implications of the findings of the environmental flows assessments in 
relation to possible development scenarios and other key research conducted on 
ecosystem and livelihoods in the Songkhram River Basin; 
2. To discuss ways of utilizing the knowledge gained during the study to ensure 
sustainable resources management for the Songkhram River Basin and exchanging 
stakeholder perspectives;  
3. To explore options for advancing and building-upon the E-Flows work as a legitimate 
multi-stakeholder approach to basin management, both within the Nam Songkhram 
Basin and others in Thailand. 
The key findings from the Pilot Environmental Flows Assessment (see Sec 4) were presented 
in the context of the political discourse viewing the Nam Songkhram Basin as a flood 
affected area, and often portrayed as a “natural disaster”.  The findings of the pilot E-Flows 
assessment cast a different perspective about the functions and value of floods to the 
ecosystem.  
 
Beyond E-flows: Development suggestions for the Nam Songkhram River Basin  
 
Environmental flows, especially given the frequently voiced suggestions for improved 
“conservation,” could form an important component of the environmental education and 
awareness-raising perceived as necessary for integrated management of the Nam 
Songkhram river basin. Table 2 provides development suggestions from the workshop that, 
although going well beyond environmental flows, constitutes the larger Nam Songkhram 










Table 2 Compilation of suggestions for realistic and appropriate development in the Nam 
Songkhram River Basin 
 
Aspect Development issues 
1. Occupations 
and quality of life 
 
• Network of organic farmers 
• Support dry season cultivation 
• Build food security 
• Improve animal husbandry 
• Study customary livelihoods and culture in the 
Songkhram Basin and link to alternative occupations  
• Networks to support eco-tourism 
2. Improving land 
use planning and 
land tenure   
• Systematic land use zoning  
• Improve urban planning with community and local 
administrative organization participation  




resource use  
• Conserve fish pools and areas of high biodiversity 
• Energy security  
• Build model villages for natural resources management 
following the self-sufficiency economy approach 
• Grow local rice varieties; restore seasonally flooded 
forest tree species 
• Build conservation awareness in people 
• Conserve headwaters, middle reaches, and lower 
reaches 
• Create zones for forest and public land 
• Develop environmental studies curriculum for in-school 
and continuing education 
• Provide knowledge in soil conservation and soil quality 
improvement 
4. Water system 
management 
Apply environmental flows studies to more areas 
• Develop small system irrigation methods, with 
participatory community management 
• Coordinate international cooperation; link Mekong 
work with Nam Songkhram Basin work 
• Stress the “people and water” coexistence 
approach as promoted by H.M. Queen Sirikit 
• Improve systems for flood watch/preparedness & 




• Improve standards for aquatic animal food processing  
• Avoid using large scale fishing gear considered 
destructive (e.g. kad (barrier net), ouan lun, ouan lak 
(beach seine) 
• Real efforts at law enforcement  
• Control caged fish culture and ensure appropriate 




• Proper management of garbage 
• Treatment of polluted water at source  
• Campaign to reduce chemicals  
• Conservation volunteers to survey water quality 
7. Administration • Establish provincial level working group with realistic role 




Aspect Development issues 
and management and functions, as well as local level working groups to 
support 
• Determine a basin development master plan  
• Transform it into provincial action plans  
• Coordinate data and information technology  
• Provide data on state policy and for large projects; allow 
community to participate in impact assessment  
• Let the local administrative organizations serve as 
integrators of relevant plans and implement them 
together with communities 
• Let people learn about E-Flows through many channels  
• Coordinated planning and integrated budgeting between 
central and local government + communities 
• Community learns about relevant legal instruments and 
advocates for local government statutes  
• Build private sector participation to support 
implementation plan and to participate in working 
group/s  
• Raise awareness for administrators / civil servants at all 
levels 
• Exercise joint oversight over basin development budgets 
 
 
Conclusions of the Meeting 
 
The multi-stakeholder meeting was an important opportunity to present findings of the 
environmental flows assessment study. Many of the study’s key findings appear to have 
been recognized and acknowledged by the participants. The workshop provided important 
critical feedback to the study team in terms of designing further environmental flows studies 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
 
The meeting also showed how a range of Nam Songkhram Basin stakeholders already 
perceive the implications of future development scenarios. Although there was no consensus 
on how desirable it is to intensify dry season cultivation, there was important consensus 
about the ad hoc nature of agriculture and land use change in the Basin, and the resulting 
ecological degradation. 
 
The continued integrity of the floodplain ecosystem is in doubt. It is clear from participants’ 
discussion that not only is integrated water resources management needed, but also land 
use zoning with a review of land tenure policies is urgently required.  
In terms of steps forward, it will be important to monitor the establishment of any new 
Basin level management organizations and to continue working as closely as possible with 
key actors in support of broadly defined environmental flows approaches. 
 
Additional key outcomes: 
 
1. The agreement to establish of an inter-provincial joint committee for the Songkhram 
River basin was spearheaded by the e-flows work. 
2. A new methodology for E-flows was developed in Thailand to fit the local context in 
the Songkhram 
3. Pioneered interdisciplinary work for River Basin management in Thailand 
4. Songkhram River proposed as a potential RAMSAR site by the Thai government. 




5. Showcasing the importance of recognizing local people’s knowledge in Songkhram 
River Basin management 
 
Section 7: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin E-Flows study was a preliminary and innovative attempt at 
integrating aspects of an Environmental Flows approach into a systematic process to better 
understand the relationships between hydrological flows, floodplain ecology and societal 
dependency on the floodplain and its services. The study emerged from a growing concern 
amongst many observers that river basins in Thailand are being rather poorly managed and 
the core ecosystem services and functions they provide are gradually being degraded and 
diminished.  
 
A vision was set out to trial E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram Basin at the 2nd Southeast Asia 
Water Forum in 2005 by two local stakeholders, when they made a presentation to gathered 
delegates on the theme: “Environmental Flows – Ecosystem and Livelihoods – the 
Impossible Dream?” Rattaphon Pitakethepsombut, the MWBP Demonstration Site Co-
Manager and Sansonthi Boonyothayan, the chief of Nakhon Phanom Provincial Agriculture 
and Cooperatives Office, made a case that because of ongoing participatory action research 
being undertaken by local people (Tai Baan Research) and a desire by provincial 
government offices to develop more sustainable agriculture, the time was right for an E-
Flows initiative in the Nam Songkhram Basin that might build on knowledge accumulated 
and networks already established between state and non-state actors (IUCN, 2005). 
 
At the same time there was a general consensus of opinion amongst some key actors in the 
water management and conservation field regionally, that there was a good opportunity to 
build on the work being conducted and partner networks being established by MWBP in the 
Thai Demonstration Site by trialing an E-Flows approach in the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
These institutions included the WANI of IUCN, IWMI and the MRC’s Water Utilization 
Program and Environment Program, which was involved in its own Integrated Basin Flow 
Management (IBFM) study between 2004-08 and regarded an E-Flows study on the Nam 
Songkhram as being complimentary. 
 
The decision to actually conduct an E-Flows study process was assisted by a positive local 
response from a series of consultation workshops and meetings held during late 2005 and 
early 2006, which explained some of the main principles of E-Flows to interested Basin 
stakeholders and garnered opinion. In view of Thai government policy to implement 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) principles in national water resources 
management and moves to establish Riverbasin Organisations (RBOs) in 25 river basins 
nationwide, the opportunity to trial an E-Flows approach in the Nam Songkhram Basin was 
seen as a valuable one and supported by all key Basin stakeholders consulted including the 
Thai National Mekong Committee (TNMC), the Department of Water Resources (DWR), the 
National Environmental Policy and Planning Office (ONEP), the provincial Natural Resources 
and Environment offices, the Department of Fisheries and key academics from the main 
regional university campuses.  
 
Subsequently a multi-disciplinary study team was assembled to conduct rapid field 
assessments of the river basin at the two seasonal extremes of flow. The methodology 
adopted was a variation on an Intermediate Environmental Flows Assessment approach, 
with a strong socio-economic focus and particular attention being placed on the role of 
seasonally-flooded forest to livelihoods. Having exchanged observations both in and out of 
the field, they were later required to consolidate their findings, and provide feedback, to 




interested external parties at various workshops, as a means to widen the understanding of 
E-Flows approaches and their implications to river basin management. 
 
While the approach adopted was based mostly upon the hydrological profile of the three 
selected sites, it required team members to adopt cross-disciplinary thinking with active 
exchange of knowledge and field technique taking place between specialists, which 
contributed to a capacity building objective of the study. Although the study was conducted 
in a bi-lingual atmosphere, the team were introduced to many unfamiliar English language 
concepts and terms related to E-Flows, which was understandably confusing at times for 
some team members,. Of benefit to all team members was a greater understanding of the 
key importance and sub-components of the annual hydrological cycle or “flood pulse” that 
underpins ecological diversity and productivity. These key events in the cycle were isolated 
and analysed at the Scenario Workshop and studied in relation to each discipline for their 
ecological and social significance. For example, the timing, duration and height of floods 
were analysed in depth, while new terms such as dry season low flows, “freshes”, small in-
channel floods, inter-annual flood events entered the vocabulary of the team for the first 
time and related to individual disciplines. Although no final quantitative conclusions about 
flow requirements were forthcoming from the Scenario Workshop exercise, as this would 
require further study and inter-disciplinary exchange, it could be considered a success from 
an awareness raising and capacity building perspective, and team members left with a new 
appreciation of the role and function of flows for regulating ecosystems. 
 
This above observation relates to a general conclusion that can be drawn from the 
Songkhram E-Flows study in general, namely that for a first exercise such as this, it may be 
unrealistic to gather too much quantitative data beyond the hard data provided by 
hydrological field assessments and some relatively crude fishery or botanical numerical 
data. Certainly for the landuse / agriculture and socio-economic specialist, it was only 
possible to collect limited quantitative data. This reflected not only time constraints at any 
one site, but also the nature of the disciplines themselves which tend towards a more 
holistic and contextual approach, where qualitative and contextual field observations make 
far more sense than reductionist or positivist approaches to data collection. This 
quantitative / qualitative question was actually a source of some contention and confusion 
within the team about best approaches to fieldwork, with the E-Flows specialist tending to 
align with the quantitative school of thought, while other team members had trouble 
adjusting to this style of work. In the end, a compromise approach was found and there was 
learning on all sides of the debate, but it is an issue that should be considered carefully in 
any other E-Flows study of this nature. A later analysis of the Songkhram E-Flows approach 
by one of the Team members concluded that it displayed concurrent elements of a scientific 
concept and a stakeholder dialogue approach, which could be construed as a strength or 
weakness, depending on one’s predominant worldview and expectations (SLU, 2007). 
 
A general conclusion that can be drawn from the Nam Songkhram E-Flows study is that 
preliminary studies should be strongly process-oriented, rather than results-oriented and 
close attention should be paid to the contextual (and contested) nature of “facts” as often 
uncritically presented in other study reports the team viewed. Such data should often be 
treated with caution, until a consensus agreement has been reached. To raise a basic 
example, is the disagreement over something as simple as the length of the Nam 
Songkhram River itself, which can be found in various reports quoted as anywhere between 
420 kms and 495 kms long. Even the “hard sciences”, such as hydrology and aquatic 
ecology, were often found to be lacking and controversial in the data they presented, 
especially that drawn from earlier studies which were presented as being unassailable 
“facts”, by their author/s, but on close examination were found to be based on flimsy 
assumptions or extrapolation from other sites. This might be related to the apparent 




absence of modern flow monitoring equipment at the key mid-basin flow monitoring station 
at Ban Tha Kok Daeng, on which much hydrological data for the Nam Songkhram Basin is 
based. Another example, would be the apparent absence of empirical hydrological, 
ecological or social data for a major new dam project built at Ban Nong Gaa by the 
Department of Water Resources (key basin water managers, planners and decision-makers 
over water allocation and policy), despite its obvious impact on flows and ecology, raising 
many questions about the basis for and legitimacy with which water infrastructure projects 
in Thailand are planned, designed, built, operated and (in the case of Ban Nong Gaa dam), 
rapidly abandoned by the state by transferring responsibility to local people who were 
unprepared or unwilling to take on such an onerous role.   
 
A main objective of this study was to “understand ecosystem roles in people’s livelihoods, 
especially seasonally flooded forests, by establishing the present day relationships between 
flow regime, ecology and human-level dependencies”. Indeed, the E-Flows team spent 
much time focusing on the role and importance of the paa boong paa thaam to local 
livelihoods and saw the multiple links with flow regimes, ecology and local socio-economics, 
but were cognizant of the rapid decline in both quantity and quality of the remaining forest 
resources. Indeed the team witnessed first-hand the on-going conversion of the seasonally 
flooded forests from common pool, multi-benefit property regime to privatized agricultural 
land (rice and eucalyptus mostly) in the period between the wet and dry season visits. The 
socio-economist, reflecting the views of some villagers met, has speculated in his report 
that the seasonally flooded forest on the Nam Songkhram Basin may be destined to almost 
total destruction and predicts “ecological regime collapse”, given the power of external 
forces that have no vested interest in conserving natural resources and pursue short-term 
financial accumulation goals. This view reflects the wider institutional failure of the state to 
adequately recognize and protect important wetlands, beyond mere rhetoric in distant 
Bangkok from isolated government departments, while unhelpful policies and perverse 
economic subsidies to dominant stakeholders to destroy ecosystems remain in place. 
  
In Thailand, little distinction has been made in the past between natural, cyclical and benign 
flooding and unpredictable, often semi-manmade and destructive flood events, with nearly 
all flooding being portrayed in terms of “natural disasters” by the state and mainstream 
media, no matter what the underlying nature or cause of the floods may be. The present 
report shows that measures implemented by state agencies to control floods in the 
Songkhram Basin appear not to have any mitigating effect on flood occurrences in the 
downstream floodplain, but in many cases actually aggravate local flooding.  By modifying 
the flows and floods, the entire floodplain ecosystem maybe threatened with disintegration 
and simplification. The E-Flows study helped highlight the importance of the annual flood 
event to key basin stakeholders at the Dialogue Workshop held in May 2007, most of whom 
would have been more familiar with hearing about floods as a “natural disaster”. Although, 
the following quote may slightly exaggerate the degree to which the E-Flows study has 
altered public perceptions, it does indicate that there was useful engagement with key 
stakeholders to address some of the basic misconceptions surrounding floods and flooding.  
 
“The E-flows project has succeeded in convincing the public sector to realize that flooding is 
“profit” rather than “problem”. Now the word “disaster” is out-of-fashion in the Songkhram 
River Basin. To ensure sustainable development of the Basin we are now working on 
establishing a joint committee and management plan for the Basin”.  
 
Khun Sansonthi Boonyothayan, Chief of Provincial Agriculture and Cooperatives Office, 
Nakhon Phanom 
 




The work of the Nam Songkhram Basin E-Flows study attempted to continually stress the 
inter-disciplinary linkages at the core of the process and underpinned the effort. It helped 
cement and broaden understanding amongst the team members and allowed them to more 
confidently talk about issues outside their core discipline when communicating with 
interested observers, according to the team members’ feedback. Simply put, they began to 
see the wider linkages between flow, ecosystem and livelihoods towards the end of the 
process, which were not immediately apparent from the start. An increased knowledge and 
appreciation of the river floodplain system and how hydrological flows affect it, is a key 
output of the E-Flows process. An unexpected output was the realization that there are 
several other analagous “flows” occurring on and around the floodplain, beyond the watery 
flows, which consumed most of the team’s attention. These include the flow of natural 
resources on and off the floodplain and the flow of people in and out of communities, which 
it was felt are equally deserving of further attention in a truly holistic study. Now a question 
remains of whether this learning amongst a small sub-section of basin stakeholders can be 
communicated to others across a wider cross-section of society and in particular reach more 
senior basin planners and decision-makers, who in the short-term will largely decide the 
fate of the river and its resources. 
 
The Nam Songkhram River floodplains show the typical characteristics of a productive “flood 
pulse” river system, with natural seasonal flows and floods being the key drivers behind the 
rich productivity and biodiversity found there. The influence and inter-connectedness of the 
Mekong mainstream hydrology and ecology are additional factors that have ensured a 
highly productive fishery in the past. However, there are growing signs that the diversity 
and productivity are starting to  rapidly decline and local stakeholders are reacting in 
different ways to the environmental changes they experience. Many blame population 
growth, over-fishing and use of destructive fishing gears as the principle causes, while far 
less attention has been paid to ecological changes brought about by flow and land use 
changes over time. Lamberts and Bonheur (2006) have pointed out the apparent dichotomy 
that while flood pulse river systems are very resilient to natural inter-annual variations in 
flooding, they are at the same time sensitive to changes in the flow regime brought about 
by anthropogenic disturbances to the flow regime. It is likely that ecological decline is 
precipitated by a number of local and external factors that may lead to negative impacts on 
local livelihoods and well-being. 
 
Below are two simplified examples of some linkages identified between disciplines, that can 
be related to the Nam Songkhram floodplain ecosystem and are indicative of the benefits of 
an E-Flows approach to learning.   
 
Conceptual diagram of Lower Songkhram River Basin wetlands relationships with Mekong 














Vegetation Fish and Fisheries 
Social 
Fish eat fruits, flowers, leaves 
and seeds of many flooded forest 
plant species. 
Plants act as spawning substrate 
and nursing refuge for many fish 
 
 
Provides common property resource 
and vital foodbank for local people.  
Up to 191 species of aquatic and 
terrestrial plant may be used by local 
people, of which 131 are edible. Plays 
vital socio-cultural role in local 
   
Fish, frogs, aquatic insects, crabs, 
and many other edible aquatic 
products consumed and sold by 
villagers.  























Hydrology Agriculture / Landuse 
More conversion to agriculture leads to 
greater soil erosion and more rapid 
channel sedimentation.  
Crop types and agricultural intensity are 
other determinants of erosion and 
sedimentation rates. 
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Flow rate partly determines degree of 
bank erosion and channel morphology. 
Altered hydrology from u/s dams, can 
alter d/s geomorphology through 
sediment capture in dams/reservoirs. 
 
Altered landuse changes rate of evapo-
transpiration, runoff and other aspects of 
basin hydrology. 
Trend towards fast-growing industrial 
monocrop species with high water 
requirements could lower groundwater 






















Mekong River system – 
seasonal interchange of 
water, sediments, nutrients 
and aquatic organisms 
Bi-directional seasonal  fish  
migration – longitudinal and 
lateral movements 
Upper Songkhram 
Basin – Water, 
sediment, nutrients 
and aquatic organisms 
 
Multiple wetland products 
harvested – aquatic & terrestrial 
– income & subsistence – 
common pool resources 
Multiple ecosystem functions & 
services of benefit to local and distant 
communities e.g. flood storage & d/s 
flow regulation 
Water for agriculture, 
domestic consumption and 
industrial uses Cultural, spiritual & 















While the Nam Songkhram Basin E-Flows study was clearly of apparent benefit to the 
people who directly participated in it at various levels of engagement, it should be 
stressed that this first exercise should be regarded as only the start of a process. It was 
not intended to provide clear, definitive answers about the way forward for diverse river 
basin stakeholders, such as minimum flow levels or precise instructions or blueprints for 
basin management. Rather it was designed more to provide a set of pointers for  
planners and decision-makers about new and innovative ways to engage in river basin 
planning from an inter-disciplinary and holistic perspective that recognizes multiple uses 
and the complexity of the environmental and social relationships within the basin. At the 
same time, it flagged up areas of immediate environmental concerns and potential future 
issues that were evient from the fieldwork. The challenge now for interested parties is 
how to build on this preliminary knowledge base and utilise it wisely in future 
development decisions in the Nam Songkhram Basin, while adapting or even replicating 
a similar approach in other river basins in Thailand and elsewhere in the Lower Mekong 
Basin countries. A provisional agreement by participants to establish an inter-provincial 
joint committee for the Nam Songkhram Basin was a positive outcome of the E-Flows 
Multi-stakeholder dialogue meeting in May 2007, but needs political will and effort to 
bring to fruition. 
 
A single E-Flows study is not an end in itself, but a valuable means to an end or 
“stepping stone”, and this study in the Nam Songkhram Basin should be regarded as the 
first step to a much more complex and extended process of reversing a long decline in 
ecosystem health. Identifying and including all stakeholders in decision-making 
processes, promoting equity while negotiating “rights and responsibilities” for each 
stakeholder group, should be ongoing goals in ensuring river basin management includes 





• The Nam Songkhram E-Flows approach and methodologies adopted was shown to 
be a practical way of integrating diverse disciplines and creating an understanding 
of linkages greater than the constituent sum of the parts. Thus, there is much to 
be said for other Mekong sub-basins adopting and adapting a similar approach to 
holistic river basin management, where understanding flow, ecosystems and 
livelihoods guide and inform the practitioners.  
• It would appear that the Lower Songkhram River Basin’s wetlands ecosystem is 
still relatively healthy compared to other river basins in Northeast Thailand, 
indicated in part by the level of fish biodiversity recorded. This special status 
should be recognized by all stakeholders and concerted efforts should be put in 
place to conserve the habitats and hydrological conditions that permit this wide 
biodiversity. These include unimpeded access between the Mekong mainstream 
and LSRB floodplain, recognition and maintenance of the natural flood pulse and 
strict conservation of seasonally flooded forest habitat. It could also include 
consideration of removal of certain un- or under-utilised water infrastructure, 
including dams and weirs, and restoration of natural flow regimes. At the 
moment, remaining areas of seasonally flooded forest are still being cleared 
wholesale for expansion of rice fields and eucalyptus plantations. Tough measures 
are required to save the last remaining patches, which need to be jointly 
catalogued and closely monitored by community representatives and state-
appointed officials from a variety of agencies. 
• It is clear that there are serious challenges to sustainable water resources 
management in the Nam Songkhram Basin, some of which have been highlighted 
in the E-Flows study findings. An appropriate next step would be the 
establishment of a multi-stakeholder Nam Songkhram Basin Committee, (of the 
sort proposed at the May 2007 meeting), to review carefully the E-Flows process 
and results to produce a clear set of priorities for Nam Songkhram Basin 




development, that recognized its multi-functionality and wide services it provides. 
The Scenario Workshop findings in particular highlight some of the risks and 
outcomes of following particular development pathways and could be used as a 
starting guideline. 
• It is apparent at present that the state-appointed River Basin Organisations 
(RBO’s), currently under the Department of Water Resources are not functioning 
independently, smoothly or efficiently, and do not fully represent the interests of 
the Nam Songkhram Basin as a single ecological unit or the diverse interests of 
the people that draw their livelihoods from the floodplain ecosystem. Thus there 
is a need to independently review the entire justification, structure and working 
practice of the six   sub-basin committees presently established in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin and fundamentally reform them, if necessary creating a future 
single Nam Songkhram Basin Organisation within the DWR framework. 
• A major issue highlighted by the field study, particularly in relation to landuse and 
social considerations was the rapid conversion of floodplain habitat to eucalyptus 
plantation, mostly being undertaken by smallholders in the belief that it would 
provide short-term economic benefits. Most of those interviewed had little 
understanding of the risks involved, either economically (e.g. price fluctuations) 
or ecologically (e.g. soil and water degradation) but were driven by profit and 
labour considerations.. A recommendation that should be implemented with some 
haste is for academic or other qualified research institutions to conduct in-depth 
studies on the socio-economic and ecological relationships and impacts of 
eucalyptus plantations in the Nam Songkhram wetlands, with a moratorium on 
further planting until the results are published, deferring to the Precautionary 
Principle. 
• Where there is large water infrastructure constructed on the floodplain that 
obviously impact river flows e.g. Nong Gaa “Weir” (read: dam) structure in Ban 
Dung District, Udon Thani Province and some of the larger tributary dams and 
weirs, a detailed impact assessment is carried out for each project. These 
assessments, following the E-Flows inter-disciplinary model should look at 
upstream and downstream environmental and social impacts and evaluate the 
structure’s contribution to the local economy set against estimated costs i.e. a 
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis. Where costs outweigh benefits, 
consideration should be given to dam decommissioning and flow and habitat 
restoration for future ecological benefits. 
• It has to be recognized that the basic principles and methods advocated by E-
Flows approaches are still not widely known or understood. Thus there should be 
a concerted public relations and education campaign about E-Flows in schools, 
universities, relevant government agencies, etc. with sufficient funding to allow a 
long and sustained process of integrating E-Flows principles into a wide subset of 
scalar levels from the community level up to the Basin level. This would require 
basic acceptance and support of E-Flows approaches with more than rhetoric at 
the national level, before any major progress could be made in this regard.  
• Further research needs to be conducted on the relationship between the 
mainstream Mekong hydrology and that of the LSRB, with detailed modeling 
conducted on the effects of upstream developments in the Mekong Basin, both on 
the mainstream river and tributaries in Lao PDR. Of particular concern are the 
Yunnan dams (built and planned) and dams planned or under construction in Lao 
PDR. Of immediate concern are the hydrological changes from the Nam Theun-
Kading Basin caused by Nam Theun 2 (completed in 2009), Theun-Hinboun 
(existing and planned expansion project) and Nam Theun 1 (under construction) 
hydropower projects which are expected to fundamentally alter the wet season 
flood extent of the Nam Songkhram Basin.  
• The study’s main findings and recommendations should be translated into Thai 
(and possibly other riparian languages of LMB) and the Thai version of the book 
“Flow. The essentials of environmental flows” widely disseminated to key basin 
stakeholders as a companion reader. 
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The description that follows here is a synthesis of available material, drawn from a 
number of sources, which gives an overview of the main points and characteristics 




The Songkhram Basin’s climate is dominated by the monsoon cycle, which includes a 
Southwest monsoon (humid-hot) from March to October and a Northeast monsoon 
(dry-cool) from November to February. The dry season stretches from early 
November to early April, while rains may fall from late April to late October. During 
the rainy season precipitation may be frequently heavy, with high temperatures and 
humidity and prolonged cloud cover. However, there are occasional periods of 
drought in the “rainy season” which may stress rain-fed crops in some years, if over 
20 days. Annual rainfall varies remarkably between the drier south and west of the 
Basin (e.g. Waritchaphum District – 1,254 mm) and the wetter north and east of the 
Basin (e.g. Bung Kan District1 – 2,943 mm). Early rainfall events in April and May are 
usually associated with heavy thunderstorms, which may be associated with strong 
winds that occasionally do structural damage to buildings and topple trees. Rainfall 
generally peaks in June or July, but occasional late tropical depressions or even 
typhoons from the South China Sea, may dump several hundred millimeters of rain 
on the basin in only a few days during the August to October period (see Fig 1.1). 
The provinces of Nong Khai, Nakhon Phanom and Sakhon Nakhon are in fact 
amongst the wettest in Northeast Thailand, with annual rainfall higher than that of 
most of Central and Northern Thailand and have previously been identified as the 
least prone provinces to meteorological drought, hydrological drought and physical 
drought (Mongkolsawat et al, 2000). 
 
During the early part of the dry season from November to December humidity falls 
while evapo-transpiration rates rise. Minimum nighttime temperatures may fall as 
low as 10–12 0C in December or January, but rise to 30 – 32 0C in March to April 
period. Minimum daytime temperatures rarely fall below 22 0C at the coolest time of 
year with northerly winds, but frequently rise to 40 0C + at the peak of the hot 
season, before the southwest monsoon rains bring relief from the heat. The dry 
season very occasionally experiences some light rainfall events, not amounting to 
more than 5 – 10 % of the entire annual precipitation. Overall, relative humidity is 
higher in the Nam Songkhram Basin than in provinces lying to the south and west, 
averaging 85 – 88 % from June to September, thus favouring more semi-moist or 
dry evergreen forest types and specific vegetation associations not prevalent 
elsewhere in Northeast Thailand (Blake, 2006). 
 
                                          
1 While the District administrative centre of Bung Kan District, lies just outside the 
Songhkram Basin, much of the district lies within the northern fringe of the Basin 
and experiences very heavy rainfall for several months of the rainy season. 
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FIG 1.1: Average monthly precipitation at three stations in or near the Songkhram 
River Basin. Bung Khan District lies in the northern part of the basin, while 
Waritchaphum District is in the drier southern sector (Source: Sarkkula et al, 2005) 
 
Geomorphic setting 
The lowland landscape of the LSRB is comprised of a number of distinctive features, 
dominated by a broad floodplain, which starts to widen out some 250–300 km 
upstream from the Mekong confluence. The floodplain is characterized by a gentle 
gradient of approximately 1:30,000 and an elevation of 140–150 m amsl (above 
mean sea level). The river has formed large meanders, some of which over time 
have become oxbow lakes separated from the mainstream, and is bounded by river 
levees where village settlements are frequently located. Bordering the floodplain are 
low and middle terraces, often converted to paddy fields or other agricultural uses. 
Further away towards the hill ranges are high terraces, which may or may not be 
forested. The dominant land use of the basin is rain-fed paddy land, accounting for 
about 39% of the total area, with smaller areas of upland field crops and forested 
land, mostly degraded with the exception of the Phu Phan National Park and a few 
small fragmented areas, dominated by dry dipterocarp and some moist evergreen 
forest stands. There appears to be high soil erosion at many locations due to opening 
of forest lands and agricultural practices which do not encourage soil conservation, 
while lakes, rivers and streams appear to be suffering from accelerated 
sedimentation (based on anecdotal evidence of riverine pool progressive shallowing).  
 
The geology of the Nam Songkhram Basin is composed of bedrock originating from 
the Mesozoic and Cenozoic eras. The LSRB forms part of a larger geological plateau 
formation known as the Sakhon Nakhon Basin, bounded by the hard sandstone 
capped Phu Phan hill range (up to 675 m high) to the south, and a series of low 
sandstone, shale and conglomerate hills (lower and middle Khorat series rocks) to 
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the north and east, marking the watershed between the Nam Songkhram tributaries 
and the much shorter Mekong mainstream tributaries. Most of the floodplain and 
surrounding terraces are derived from the Maha Sarakham formation of the upper 
Khorat series, composed of a mixture of salt, shale and weathered sandstone. 
Formerly known as “the Salt Formation”, it contains considerable quantities of 
evaporates in the form of rock salt, halite, gypsum and potassium minerals, including 
potash (Mongkolsawat, 1988). The presence of salt bearing rocks and soils in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin, has a significant bearing on both its agricultural potential 
and the industrial exploitation of mineral resources, both at present and in the 
future, which may affect wetland productivity and biodiversity.  
Hydrology and Flooding Regime 
The annual rainfall pattern and local geography causes a highly seasonal hydrological 
cycle of flood and drought, which are a regular and dependable part of the LSRB’s 
natural environment. Water levels in the Songkhram River closely follow the annual 
precipitation pattern, with a rise in water levels occurring after the first heavy rains 
in late April or early May (see Fig1.2). Through May and June the river levels rise 
steadily and this period is known as the “nam daeng”, due to run-off from 
agricultural land, causing the river to take on a red-brown appearance due to the 
heavy suspended solid load. This period also coincides with the main upstream 
migration of fish out of the Mekong mainstream. In July, the river normally breaks its 
banks in several places, spreading water onto the floodplain and allowing many 
species of fish to spawn in the seasonally flooded forest. If rainfall continues the 
water will continue to rise, reaching a peak around late August or early September, 
after which the water will normally start to subside. There may be several lower sub-
peaks before and after the main flood peak, and water will normally stay on the 
floodplain for 3–4 months, although there is much inter-annual variation. In a large 
and prolonged flood year, the water will not recede off the floodplain and into the 
Songkhram main river channel until mid to late October, although floodwater will 
remain in low-lying areas and pockets for much longer. The mainstream barely flows 
along most of its length from January to early April, with at least a hundredfold 
difference between average dry season flows and the peak flow months of August 
and September. The seasonally flooded forest does not totally dry out until about 
January, and even then there are numerous wetland lacustrine and palustrine 
features and habitats, where water remains in backswamps until the next rainy 
season. 
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Fig. 1.2 Satellite images of the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin showing the 
extremes in surface water area between dry and wet seasons  
 
Box 1.1. The Seasonally Flooded Forest (paa boong-paa thaam) 
Paa boong paa thaam (PB-PT) is a type of seasonally flooded freshwater swamp 
forest ecosystem, unique to Northeast Thailand river floodplains and some Mekong 
tributary rivers of Lao PDR. Forest researchers and government agencies in Thailand 
have largely ignored it because of its perceived low value and few ecological studies 
have ever been published about this ecosystem. What information does exist is 
mostly limited to socio-cultural studies drawing on the rich body of local knowledge 
surrounding PB-PT, and published in Thai language (e.g. Tai Baan Research at 
Songkhram and some earlier studies from the Mun Basin). Officially it has long been 
classified as “vacant wasteland” or at best, “severely degraded forest”. A local 
academic researcher has likened it to “the womb of the river, the kidneys of the 
land.” 
 
The vegetation of the PB-PT is tolerant to prolonged periods of flooding during the 
rainy season for periods ranging from two to five months. When not inundated it 
forms a complex mix of habitat and vegetation types, dominated by thorny mixed 
shrub and bamboo forest (Bambusa sp. is a highly successful pioneer grass species 
in the disturbed floodplain areas), interspersed with some larger remnant hardwood 
trees; damp, grassy hollows; permanent waterbodies; and more open, stunted 
vegetation areas. It mostly lies in a band of one to two kilometres width parallel with 
the main river channels, occupying the lower parts of the floodplain behind the levee, 
often within wide meanders. Whereas the levee is mostly composed of coarser sandy 
material, the PB-PT lies on soils made up of fine alluvial silts and clays, but generally 
has a low organic matter and is not as fertile as popularly believed.  
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Just four or five decades ago, anecdotal evidence indicates the PB-PT was still a 
healthy forest ecosystem with large trees and a wide array of wildlife present. Due to 
state granting of logging concessions to remove valuable timber trees, followed by 
extensive charcoal production in floodplain kilns, the forest was rapidly cleared. 
There followed in the 1980’s and 90’s a period of rampant land grabbing and 
conversion to agriculture, by both private commercial interests and local villagers, 
which still continues today. The PB-PT has thus been under intense external pressure 
for many years and is now much fragmented and degraded over most of its former 
range, with only small patches of near-original forest. Despite this decline, remaining 
pockets still contain a wide range of plant and aquatic animal biodiversity, which is 
utilised by local people for food, subsistence and income purposes. Of particular 
importance to villagers are the abundant fishery, bamboo shoots, mushrooms, edible 
vegetables and a vast array of medicinal herbs. These wetland products tend to 
proportionately benefit the poorer and vulnerable groups more, as they are mostly 
open access, common resources which require little investment to harvest and 
utilise. Fish however, are not always open-access resources and have been 
increasingly commercialised as a resource through use of larger fishing gears and 
auction of concessions. 




Flooding in the LSRB is a function of not only within-basin precipitation, but also 
ambient river levels of the mainstream Mekong River, which profoundly influence the 
level of floodwaters and flow pattern of the lower Nam Songkhram River for several 
hundred kilometers upstream from the Mekong-Nam Songkhram confluence. The 
latter resembles in many ways, albeit on a much smaller scale, the well-known 
hydrodynamic phenomenon that occurs annually on the Tonle Sap Lake of Cambodia 
(Sverdrup-Jensen, 2002).  
 
There is both a backwater effect (i.e. Mekong levels prevent Nam Songkhram river 
out-drainage and water backs up) and an occasional reverse flow effect at play, 
where Mekong water and sediments flow back on to the Nam Songkhram floodplain, 
which determine the height, duration and extent of flooding in the LSRB (Sarkkula et 
al, 2006). While the backwater effect is felt each year, the reverse flow phenomenon 
is less predictable and has been recorded only 10 out of 23 years, although some 
years it may happen twice or even three times according to an irrigation project 
impact mitigation study (Khon Kaen University, 1997). In 1978 the backflow lasted 
for four days (15-18 August) and an estimated 243.9 MCM of water flowed back 
upstream on to the Nam Songkhram floodplain (Khon Kaen University, 1997). The 
MRC/WUP-FIN project under the Mekong River Commission’s Environment 
Programme has been undertaking hydrological modeling work in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin and have constructed a computer model showing the hydrological, 
hydrodynamic and water quality changes in the Nam Songkhram Basin during the 
course of a year (Sarkkula et al, 2005). This tool allows predictions and scenarios to 
be tested under simulated conditions. 
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Fig. 1.2 Average monthly flows at Ban Tha Kok Daeng, Sega District, Nong Khai province, showing 
minimum, average and maximum discharges recorded. (Source: MRC/WUP=FIN, 2005) 
 
Overview of wetland biodiversity 
 
The LSRB is denoted as being a wetland ecosystem of wide habitat diversity and 
complexity, largely governed by the annual flood pulse, where water inundates the 
floodplain for three to five months each year following a long dry season and allows 
shifts in dominant biological communities from terrestrial to aquatic and back again 
according to season. The wetlands are perhaps best recognised for their impressive 
fish biodiversity, which has been relatively well studied compared to other taxa and 
recorded by fishery specialists over the last twenty years. 
 
Key Biodiversity Values 
Site description The Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin encompasses a 
broad range of wetland habitat types associated with a 
functional floodplain ecosystem, linked to the Mekong River. 
Annual extensive flooding phenomena is dependent on in-
basin precipitation and a backwater effect from the Mekong 
which in some years shows a marked backflow. The river 
supports a remarkably productive capture fishery, which 
peaks each year during the flood recession period, 
supporting the livelihoods of numerous families locally. The 
site is notable for holding one of the last extensive areas of 




The floodplain wetland site supports several rare and 
threatened fish species, including five species on the IUCN 
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Red List; numerous semi-aquatic reptiles and amphibians; 
plus is an important resting and feeding site for migratory 
birds on the East Asian Flyway. The area is generally poorly 
studied for most major taxa and data is sparse. 
Main Habitats 
 
Seasonally inundated riverine forest, dominated by bamboo 
(Bambusa sp.) stands and mixed species low scrub (see Box 
1.1) 
Marshes and swamps 
Ox-bow lakes and cut-off channels 
Mainstream river channel and pools 
Seasonal streams 
Artificial reservoirs and lakes 
Rice fields 
Seasonally flooded grasslands 
Mammals Data deficient. A live trapping survey a decade ago found 
eight species of mammals in five families, including the 
common tree shrew (Tupaia glis) and variable squirrel 
(Callorciurius finlaysonii) (Khon Kaen University, 1997).  
Presently, most species of mammals formerly present, with 
the exception of some bats, rats and other rodents, would 
appear to be very rare or absent in the lowland forest, 
probably due to hunting pressure and habitat loss. 
Anecdotal reports of Asiatic jackal (Canis aureus) by 
villagers. 
Birds Cumulative total of 102 species recorded to date, including 
72 species in a rapid assessment for MWBP in March 2006. 
Some rare species found and the floodplains are thought to 
be an important staging post on the “East Asian Flyway” 
migratory route for birds. 
Reptiles Data deficient. One survey conducted for MWBP identified 
the presence of 40 species from direct observation and 
villager interviews. Most of the species are recognized to 
have wide ranges in the Indochinese subregion of mainland 
Southeast Asia. Two of them are endemics for the Lower 
Songkram River Basin Basin and adjacent waters, namely 
the snake species Enhydris chanardi and Homalopsis 
nigriventralis. Four species deserve the status of 
“vulnerable”, including the snail-eating turtle (Malayemys 
subtrijuga), the common softshell (Amyda cartilagenia), the 
Yellow monitor (Varanus nebulosus) and the water monitor 
(Varanus salvator). 
Amphibians Data deficient. One survey conducted for MWBP reported the 
presence of 16 species, most of which can be classified as 
common species in Thailand. A few species of narrow-
mouthed frogs found (e.g. Calluella sp. and Glyphoglossus 
sp.) could be regarded as “near threatened” (NT) in their 
range. 
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Fish At least 187 species have been identified during past 
Department of Fisheries surveys. These include the IUCN 
Red Listed ‘critically endangered’ giant Mekong catfish 
(Panagasianodon gigas), also recognized as a MWBP 
‘flagship species’ and the world’s second smallest fish 
species (Boraras micros) found in still waters. Local 
participatory research in the Lower River Basin recognized 
124 species, of which 57 species were considered to be 
migrants from the Mekong mainstream and nine exotic 
species were present. 
Invertebrates Data deficient. Research for MWBP recorded 19 species of 
Odonata from 10 sites in March 2006. Local people report 
the presence of 10 species of mollusc, three species of 
shrimp and four species of crab from the LSRB wetlands 
complex. 
Plants No systematic and comprehensive biodiversity studies on 
plants appeared to have been undertaken in the LSRB, with 
the exception of Beung Khong Long. However, 
Sombutputorn (1998) reported the occurrence of 138 plant 
species associated with wetlands, including agricultural crop 
species and non-native introduced species. Local 
participatory research has identified a total of 191 native 
species of plants with beneficial uses found in the seasonally 
inundated forest of just four floodplain communities. A rapid 
survey for MWBP in March 2006, found at least 111 species 
of plants across nine wetland sites. 
Fungi In-depth participatory research by villagers in four LSRB 
villages over a year, revealed that 17 species of fungi are 
harvested from the paa boong paa thaam for consumption 
or sale (Tai Baan Research Network of Lower Nam 




The Nam Songkhram Basin has a long history of human presence, with rich 
archaeological evidence of Bronze Age settlements at Ban Chiang in Udon Thani 
province close to the river’s upper reaches. The area, until relatively recently covered 
in dense forest and scattered villages, would have been hard to access and fully 
subdue by central authorities for many centuries, although taxes were collected on 
an ad hoc basis by Lao and Siamese vassal states in the 19th century. Local 
communities must have relied heavily on natural resources for subsistence and 
would have been mostly outside the mainstream cash economy of Siam (later to 
become Thailand) until the middle of the twentieth century. What trade was carried 
out was mostly for barter or exchange. This occurred within the Nam Songkhram 
Basin, such as the barter of processed fish products from villages next to the 
mainstream river with villages further upstream that had rice surpluses or produced 
salt by rudimentary methods, essential in the preservation of fish. The changes from 
a predominantly barter to a predominantly cash economy can be roughly traced by a 
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brief consideration of changes in vegetation cover and land use that have occurred 
over the last half century or so. A detailed account of pre-modern village socio-
economy and culture in Northeast Thailand and other regions can be found in 
Nartsupha (1984). 
Historical description of vegetation cover in Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin 
 
At the end of the Second World War it is likely that much of the riparian wetland 
forest and wetland habitats of the LSRB were largely intact and little disturbed by 
gross anthropomorphic impacts. Villages were small and scattered along levees or on 
middle and upper terraces along the side of the floodplain. Population density was 
much lower than the present day and villagers livelihoods were mostly based on 
subsistence modes, relying on a system of bartering surpluses of fish and other 
aquatic products for rice and salt, due to the inherent risks in rice production along 
the floodplain. As a result, there was little need to clear the seasonally flooded 
forest, as it provided plentiful food, fuel, medicine and building material in a largely 
non-monetised economy. From elderly villagers’ anecdotal descriptions the floodplain 
forest was dense, tall in places and continuous with abundant game and wildlife 
including large ungulates, primates, large cats, elephants and crocodiles. The only 
exception to this vegetation community was the outer edges of the floodplain, which 
gave way to more stunted shrub forest and broad seasonally-flooded grasslands. On 
the terraces above the floodplain were dry or semi-moist evergreen forest, mixed 
deciduous forest and dry dipterocarp forests which also provided rich habitat for 
wildlife.  
The decline and destruction of the Northeast’s forests closely follows Thailand’s 
development trajectory over the past five decades since the release of the first of 
nine five-year National Economic and Social Development Plans in 1961 (Bello et al, 
1998). Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006), borrowing from a Thai language report of 
a “Seminar to Propose a Natural Resources Management and Environmental Plan by 
Lower Nam Songkhram Basin Communities” propose three distinct periods in natural 
habitat conversion and associated natural resources decline: 
  
• Era of trade in freshwater fish; logging concessions and commercial charcoal 
burning (1957 – 1977) 
• Era of agricultural development and expansion of agribusiness (1977 – 1997) 
• Era of industrial tree plantation expansion (1997 onwards) 
 
These three eras suggest a step-wise process of systematic clearance of natural 
vegetation cover. First, companies were granted forest concessions to clear forests of 
large and valuable timber species for local use and export. This was followed by 
clearance of less valuable and secondary forest by local businessmen and villagers 
for charcoal production, using large kilns located in the flooded forest. As forests 
were denuded and road access improved, there was a steady inflow of migrants from 
other parts of Isaan, to take advantage of the relatively plentiful natural resources 
(especially fish) and land available, thereby increasing pressure on remaining forest 
areas.  
 
In the late 1970s and 1980s there was a massive encroachment of former public 
lands (much of it degraded forest but classified as “vacant wasteland”) by 
agribusiness companies with state connections and approval that converted the land 
they obtained to vast intensive cash crop “prairies” of up to 1,000 ha. Regular 
bulldozing of recovering vegetation and heavy use of chemical pesticides and 
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herbicides ensured that these areas remain largely bare soil even years after 
cultivation has ceased (see Fig. 4 satellite image of the lower Nam Oon floodplain.). 
Some land belonging to agribusiness companies was used for fast-growing pulpwood 
plantations (e.g. Eucalyptus sp. and Acacia spp.) which displaced seasonally flooded 
forest.  
 
As population levels increased in LSRB by natural growth and in-migration, and 
mechanization and intensification of agriculture adopted by villagers, pressure on 
remaining forests increased for both rice floodplain and upland terraces for cash 
crops and rice. The forest became progressively fragmented and degraded. This was 
followed by state policies such as “Assets to Capital”, funds to build irrigation 
schemes, compensation for crop loss due to flooding, and promotion of fast-growing 
trees such as rubber and eucalypts that increased forest erosion and loss while 
forcing villagers out of subsistence economy into cash economy.  
 
Most land was claimed, bought and sold on the floodplain, even in the absence of 
land title documents, often by outside investors. Remnant patches of seasonally 
flooded forest, mostly occupying Agricultural Land Reform Office areas, faced the 
bulldozer. The final forest frontier of Northeast Thailand has been almost fully 
converted to agricultural land or monocrop plantations during the past decade. 
Land reform and resource degradation 
 
It has not only been private business interests that have gradually encroached on 
the paa boong paa thaam wetland habitats of the LSRB. The Agricultural Land 
Reform Office (ALRO), a state agency originally established in 1975 with the main 
purpose to redistribute large land holdings to the landless poor, has also been 
instrumental in land conversion and loss of commons. While ALRO has never 
successfully accomplished its mandate, it has frequently been implicated in large 
land scandals involving politicians and wealthy business interests (Bello et al, 1998). 
In the Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin, the Nakhon Phanom provincial ALRO has 
jurisdiction over at least 45,000 rai (7,200 ha) of floodplain land, originally 
designated as “degraded forest” or “vacant wasteland” (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 
2006), but actually comprised most of the land area formerly occupied by the 
biologically diverse paa boong paa thaam. Once land was declared ALRO 
administered, it was usually cleared of vegetation and allocated to eligible local 
families at the rate of 18 rai (approx. 3 ha) per household, with a land document 
issued that allowed the land to be inherited, but forbade the selling of the land plot 
or use as loan collateral. Following distribution to local households, other state 
agencies would often come in to the area and construct public infrastructure, such as 
roads, weirs and dams for irrigation. Hence, as the land was not considered by the 
state to have any intrinsic value as a forest or wetland, the main policy thrust was to 
convert it to agricultural land, principally for dry season rice cultivation. Ironically, 
within a few years much of the ALRO land allocated for irrigated rice cultivation had 
been abandoned, often due to withdrawal of state subsidies, the failure of the water 
delivery system and the regeneration of flooded forest vegetation. An early dominant 
colonizer, which seemed to thrive in the new conditions was the bamboo species 
(Bambusa sp.), and various edible and medicinal plants, popular with villagers. 
  
From about 1980 onwards, as the nation concentrated on building up its status as a 
leading exporter of agricultural produce, including rice, cassava, sugar cane and jute 
sourced from the agricultural frontiers of Northeast Thailand, the rate of forest 
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clearance increased. Between 1961 and 1985, the overall forest cover in Northeast 
Thailand reportedly declined from 42 % to 14 % and the remaining large forest 
pockets were mostly confined to upland National Parks (Vitayakorn, 1993). However, 
there is evidence to suggest that some of the most rapid clearance and wholesale 
conversion of the LSRB floodplain land came at a slightly later stage than other parts 
of upland Isaan, as indicated by the table below. 
 
TABLE 1.1. Land Use Changes across 739 km2 of floodplain land in the Lower Nam 
Songkhram River Basin between 1989 and 1998 (Source: Chutiratanaphan and 
Patanakanok, 2001) 
Land Use Types 1989 1998 Land use 











Disturbed bamboo forest 
Idle land 


























  9.60 
12.12 















+   2.26 
+ 14.02 
-  35.33 
-  71.30 
-  47.13 
    - 
+ 21.16 
-  38.69 
+110.73 
            TOTAL 738.80 100.0 738.80 100.0  
 
Table 1.1 shows that land use categories of “forest”, “disturbed forest” and “bamboo 
forest” (this latter category is assumed to closely correlate with seasonally inundated 
forest) have declined by a total of 35 %, 71 % and 47 % respectively over a mere 
nine-year period. At the same time, marsh and swamp areas (i.e. natural wetlands) 
have declined by nearly 39 %. Looking at the other categories, maximum growth 
over the same time period was seen in “water resources” (i.e. artificial reservoirs), 
which increased by 111 % to almost 50 km2, urban land went up by 57 %, followed 
by “idle land” increasing by 21 %. This latter category attests to the high rate of 
abandonment of agricultural land by both local villagers and agribusiness interests, 
following conversion from forest or wetland, which is still a predominant feature of 
the LSRB. Interestingly, while the sharp increase in water resources appears to be 
closely correlated with declines in forest and natural wetland resources, there has 
not been a corresponding increase in productive paddy land as a result of more 
irrigation sources available. Yet, the most common justification for construction of 
water storage reservoirs given by state agencies responsible (like the Royal 
Irrigation Department (RID) and the Accelerated Rural Development Office) has been 
provision of water for “agricultural use” in the dry season. The increase in “field 
crops” of 14 % is likely attributed to non-irrigated cash crops such as sugar cane and 
cassava grown on upper alluvial terraces and to a lesser extent, some irrigated high 
value crops (such as tomatoes and sweet corn).  
Main threats to the Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands 
 
It is recognised that the natural resources have changed greatly in the last few 
decades and a number of factors have been identified which pose threats to the 
health and integrity of the Nam Songkhram River Basin wetlands, and by implication, 
the livelihoods of the people that rely on them. Specifically, these include: 
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1. Large-scale water infrastructure developments built on the Nam Songkhram 
mainstream or larger tributaries which fundamentally alter hydrological 
patterns 
 
2. Inappropriate and poorly planned infrastructure built on floodplains (incl. 
roads, embankments and flood protection measures) which may alter 
drainage patterns and connectivity to key habitats for fish and other aquatic 
organisms 
 
3. Sensitive seasonally flooded forest degradation and conversion to agricultural 
land, often in response to central policies or local development schemes, 
which fail to take into account the value of the intact ecosystem. 
 
4. Expansion of monocrop industrial tree plantations (e.g. eucalyptus and para 
rubber) which cause land degradation, nutrient export and may disturb the 
local underground water balance. 
 
5. Expansion of salt, potash or other mineral extraction activities, which can 
cause negative impacts on soil and water resources.  
 
6. The introduction and spread of invasive alien species (IAS), such as catclaw 
mimosa (Mimosa pigra), Nile tilapia (Oreochromis nilotica), and the golden 
apple snail (Pomacea canaliculata). 
 
7. In-basin population growth and urbanisation leading to increasing conflicts 
over water resources (quantity and quality), which are not being adequately 
addressed at present. 
 
8. Changes in water flows, sediment and nutrient levels as a result of upstream 
changes in the Mekong mainstream affecting the annual flow patterns and 
floods in the lower Nam Songkhram Basin, due to their closely inter-
connected hydrology. 
Water Management and Institutional Analysis 
 
Water resources planning, provision and management has traditionally been 
regarded as the responsibility of a large number of government agencies, 
unsurprisingly with much overlap, inter-departmental communications problems and 
questionable results. In 2002 there was a major departmental and ministerial 
rearrangement which saw the formation of a Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MoNRE). The Department of Water Resources (DWR) was formed 
below the MoNRE, with nationwide responsibility for water resources policy, planning, 
management and conservation, in line with Thailand’s 1997 Constitution and 
National Water Policy of October 2000 (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006). One of 
the goals of DWR was to apply Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), 
which was regarded as, “one of the perfect tools that should be applied in order to 
minimize the obnoxious problems.” (www.dgr.go.th/tor/image.pdf/IWRMinTHAILAND.pdf).  
 
This apparent panacea approach was to be extended to 25 river basins identified 
nationwide, including the three river basins covering the Northeast Region – the Mun 
Basin, the Chi Basin and a nebulous “Mekong Basin Area 2”. This latter area was 
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more a collection of sub-basins draining into the Mekong River in the Northeast 
between Loei Province in the northwest and Amnat Charoen Province in the 
southeast, including the Nam Songkhram Basin, as the largest individual river basin 
lying within the larger entity (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006). Each of the 25 
national river basin areas were required to form a River Basin Organisation (RBO) or 
Committee, which would in theory provide a structure of representation and 
participation from village level up through sub-district, district, provincial and 
national levels, to assist state goals of water management. Despite high expectations 
and large budgets dedicated to these RBO’s, it is apparent from their first few years 
of operation that they have not fulfilled the mandate accorded them for complex 
reasons, often related to political interference and a reluctance of state agencies to 
break away from top-down governance patterns (Chantawong, 2006). 
 
However, rather than treat the Nam Songkhram Basin as a single river basin, 
deserving unified and holistic treatment as one might expect under an IWRM 
approach, it was further sub-divided into six smaller “sub-basins”, which on paper at 
least, seem rather arbitrary. They are listed below with surface areas given in 
parentheses: 
 
• Huay Khong     (71,288 ha) 
• Huay Hee     (74,819 ha) 
• Nam Yam     (174,023 ha) 
• Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin  (308,527 ha) 
• Upper Nam Songkhram River Basin  (328,573 ha) 
• Nam Oon     (356,570 ha) 
 
For a detailed listing of formal and informal institutions concerned with water and 
wetlands management in Thailand, please refer to Table 13 of the Situation Analysis 
for the LSRB (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006). To add further confusion and 
opportunity for overlap of duties and roles, agricultural water provision and 
management (the main interest of state agencies in the Nam Songkhram Basin) falls 
under the responsibility of two government departments, lying in different ministries 
that could be construed as being competitors for the same prize (Molle and Floch, 
2007). In the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, the Royal Irrigation 
Department (RID) commands great influence and receives over 50 % of MoAC 
annual budgets, while in the MoNRE, the Department of Water Resources fulfills a 
broader remit than RID, but also participates in projects to provide water to farmers 
and rural voters. In a policy speech delivered in 2004, a former Minister of Natural 
Resources and Environment argued that having overlapping responsibilities by two 
ministries was “hindering” water resources management in Thailand and 
recommended they be brought under one ministry (MoNRE, 2004). 
 
In addition to water for agriculture, other legitimate water uses recognized by the 
state are domestic use, industrial use and fishery use, with some recognition in 
recent years now extended to wetlands, although understanding of the definition of 
wetlands varies widely from agency to agency and individual to individual. However, 
these other water uses are considered insignificant in terms of their water 
requirements, both at present and in the future, compared to the supposed needs of 
agriculture, in particular the demand for dry season irrigation. Any problem analysis 
of the Nam Songkhram Basin by state institutions will always identify “flood and 
drought” as the two greatest obstacles to development that can be principally 
overcome invariably by infrastructural interventions, according to conventional 
wisdom (Blake, 2006). As a result vast resources are channeled towards fighting 
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against the twin “evils” of flood and drought, even in river basins where these 
phenomena are no more than natural manifestations of the “flood pulse”. According 
to data obtained from a Dept. of Water Resources document showing plans for 
“Integrated Water Resources Management” by state investment for 2006-09 for the 
25 Basins of Thailand, Basin 2 (Mekong) would receive 18,046 million baht, of which 
13,510 million baht was budgeted to solve the “water shortage problem”, 2,128 
million baht was budgeted to solve the “flooding problem” and the remainder was for 
management and pollution control issues. 
 
Naturally, in addition to the state agencies involved in water management there are 
a number of non-state stakeholders, at various scalar levels, from non-formal village 
level institutions to a range of civil society groups and non-government organizations 
that are described in the LSRB Situation Analysis (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 
2006). This report also gives an analysis of the history, concepts and practice of 
decentralization, local decision-making, land access and ownership rights as they 
applied to wetlands management issues. In particular the roles and issues 
surrounding land reform and agribusiness spread are discussed in some detail.  
 
Finally, no description of water management issues would be complete without a 
brief reference to the Nam Songkhram Project, a massive irrigation project conceived 
and promoted by the now-defunct Department of Energy Promotion and 
Development (DEDP), which was previously one of the major state actors in water 
resources development through the 1980’s and 90’s. Planned as an adjunct 
component of the even larger Khong-Chi-Mun megaproject or Water Grid variant 
(see Molle and Floch, 2007), the Nam Songkhram Project would have built a dam 
near the mouth of the Nam Songkhram River to create a large, shallow reservoir of 
about 255 km2, drowning out the majority of the floodplain and inundating seven 
villages. Water from the reservoir would have been raised using electric pumps and 
irrigation canals to surrounding farmland (the planned irrigation area was 90,400 
ha), where rice and cash crops would be grown. It took over a decade of feasibility 
studies, social and environmental impact assessments and mitigation plans, before 
the Nam Songkhram Project was finally shelved by the Thai cabinet as being too 
costly and having unacceptably high environmental impacts (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006).  
 
The project also attracted controversy due to spirited objections from local 
communities, NGO’s and some academics, who felt that there was insufficient public 
participation, local views were ignored and the official documents downplayed the 
likely impacts resulting from the project (Lohmann, 1998). Despite this apparent 
national level rejection, the Nam Songkhram Project is still very much alive in the 
minds of some state officials and politicians, and has been actively promoted by the 
RID in recent years. This promotion often comes to the fore during or just after 
natural floods, such as those that occurred in August 2005, when the then Prime 
Minster travelled to the area and announced that he personally would recommend 
the construction of the “Watergates” at the mouth of the Nam Songkhram to solve 
the problem of flooding, described as a “natural disaster” (Blake, 2006). However, as 
some commentators have noted, floods and flood “disaster” management in the 
Mekong region have a strong political element and whether benign or destructive, 
floods play an important role in the environment, livelihood and culture of the region 
(Manuta et al., 2006; Lebel and Sinh, 2007). In the Lower Nam Songkhram River 
Basin in particular, flooding is a natural phenomenon that occurs annually and is a 
defining characteristic of the local landscape and society, as well as being a prime 
source of both aquatic and terrestrial productivity. 
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Timeline of activities for Songkhram E-Flows 2005-2007 
DATE EVENT LOCATION PARTICIPATING 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Late 2004 - 
Early 2005 
MWBP partner dialogue about testing E-Flows approaches 
in the Mekong Basin, with Nam Songkhram identified as a 
suitable sub-basin  
Various IUCN, MRCS, MWBP 
staff, WUP-FIN/MRC, 
TNMC, IWMI 
31 Aug 2005 “Environmental Flows – Ecosystems and Livelihoods – The 
Impossible Dream?” presentation to E-Flows audience at 
SE Asian Water Forum 
Bali, Indonesia IUCN-WANI, MWBP, 
IWMI  
04 Nov 2005 Preliminary partner discussion & planning meeting, to 
prioritise Nam Songkhram E-Flows work  
Chulalongkorn 
University, Bangkok 
Chula Uni, IUCN-WANI, 
MWBP, WUP-FIN/MRC, 
IWMI, M-POWER, KKU  
26 Jan 2006 Half day internal planning meeting Udon Thani IUCN & MWBP staff 
10 Feb 2006 Songkhram E-Flows consultation and planning meeting for 
key stakeholders. 
Hydrological modeling session by WUP-FIN. 
Udon Thani Fishery 
Station 
MRCS (WUP-FIN, Fish 
Prog), TNMC, DoF, DWR, 
RID, KKU, IUCN-WANI, 
MWBP, TEI 
10 Mar 2006 “Flow Fair” – poster presentations by E-Flows partners of 
existing projects in Songkhram Basin, consultation and 
priority planning for next steps 
Udon Thani MRCS (WUP-FIN, Fish 
Prog), TNMC, DoF, DWR, 
KKU, IUCN-WANI, MWBP, 
NPA&CO 
09 May 2006 E-Flows orientation and planning meeting for key 
partners. Intro to E-Flows concepts & approaches by 
Rebecca Tharme (IWMI). Scoping options. Climate 
modeling by START-Chula Uni. Next steps presented. 
Udon Thani MRCS (WUP-FIN, Fish 
Prog), START-Chula, 
IWMI, IUCN-WANI, DWR, 
MWBP, NPA&CO  
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DATE EVENT LOCATION PARTICIPATING 
STAKEHOLDERS 
Jun-Jul 2006 E-Flows team formation and production of “starter 
document” (key materials) 
 MWBP coordinating team 
26 Aug – 03 Sep 
2006 
Wet season intermediate E-Flows assessment fieldwork Songkhram Basin 
sites 
E-Flows Team & 
observers 
21 Nov 2006 E-Flows Team review of wet season findings, methodology 
review and planning meeting for dry season fieldwork 
ONEP, Bangkok E-Flows Team, MWBP, 
IUCN-WANI 
Dec 2006 Distribution of wet season findings report internally  E-Flows Team and 
partners 
1-9 Mar 2007 Dry season intermediate E-flows assessment fieldwork Songkhram Basin 
sites 
E-Flows Team and 
observers 
26-27 Mar 2007 E-Flows summary presentation to MWBP Final Seminar. Vientiane, Lao PDR Key MWBP partners and 
invited stakeholders from 
across LMB 
6-9 May 2007 E-Flows Scenarios Workshop Udon Thani E-Flows Team and 
observers 
20-21 May 2007 Multi-stakeholder Dialogue meeting (MSP) for key actors 
(state and non-state) from 4 Provinces and central govt 
agencies to be briefed about E-Flows approach and main 
findings, and plan ways forward.  
Udon Thani E-Flows Team, 
participants from various 
organizations (state and 
non-state) 
May-Jun 2007 Compilation of Songkhram E-Flows findings from wet and 
dry season field studies into one database and report 
preparation 
 IUCN-WANI & MWBP 
Sep 2007 Rattaphon Pitakthepsombut attends and makes 
presentation at International River Symposium, on Nam 
Songkhram E-Flows project 
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3.1 Hydrology 
Juha Sarkkula, Noora Veijalainen, Matti Kummu, Hannu Lauri, Jorma Koponen 
 
This section is a summary extract from a report completed by the authors for the E-Flow Scenario 
Workshop in May 2007, Udon Thani. It should be noted that this work formed part of a wider MRC 
Water Utilization Program WUP-FIN2 project that involved hydrological modelling and socio-economic 
survey work in various parts of the Lower Mekong Basin, with cooperation between MRCS, the TNMC, 
Finnish Environment Institute, Helsinki University of Technology and several other state agencies for 




Figure 3.1.1.  Model coverage areas in the Nam Songkhram watershed.  
 
Methodology 
                                          
1 All WUP-FIN reports and other project information can be uploaded from the following website address: 
 www.eia.fi/wup-fin 
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The main modelling tools used were the VMod and EIA 3D hydrodynamic model. The VMod, a 
distributed hydrological model application, covered the entire Nam Songkhram watershed. The EIA 3D 
model application covered the Lower Songkhram river basin floodplains and the confluence of the 
Songkhram River and the Mekong River (Fig 3.1). The VMod and EIA 3D models were developed by 
Environmental Impact Assessment Centre of Finland Ltd (EIA Ltd) The VMod model is a distributed 
physically based/conceptual hydrological model based on grid representation of the modelled 
catchment (MRC/WUP-FIN, 2006b). Hydrological processes in the catchment are simulated using 
simplified physically based formulations. The model can be used, for example, to simulate the impacts 
of climate change on the catchment hydrology.  The EIA 3D model is a 3-dimensional hydrodynamic 
model that computes water level and water flow in the modelled area (MRC/WUP-FIN, 2006a). The 
model has been set up for the lower part of the Songkhram River Basin and its floodplain, for 
simulating water levels, currents, and inundation of the floodplain.  
 
A time series (TS) of water level in the floodplain was earlier studied in five locations (Fig 3.2). The 
water levels, according to the simulations, were quite similar in each of the locations as can be seen in 
Fig 3.2 where the baseline simulation water levels in each point are presented during year 1980.  
 
Present-day hydrological regime for each site 
 
This section presents the hydrological regime for each of the three study sites (see Fig 3.3 for site 
locations). Because sites 2 and 3 are located on the floodplain, we can only present the complete 
hydrological analysis for site 1, which is situated on the Nam Songkhram mainstream. However, the 
following remarks can to be made for sites 2 and 3: 
 
- Hydrological modelling was not possible, as these floodplain sites are inundated part of the year 
- Mekong mainstream influence on these sites is extremely important during the flood season 
- Local impacts are more important during the dry season  
 
The flood extent during 17th of September 2000 and location of sites 2 and 3 are presented in Fig 3.3. 
 
Site 1: Ban Cham Chi 
 
The study site is situated on the main stream of the Nam Songkhram. Because there is no 
measurement station at this site, the hydrological results presented here are based on VMod 
hydrological simulation results. The variation of the monthly discharge is presented in Figure XX1. 
From the illustration, it can be noted that the maximum and minimum flows vary considerably from 
year to year.  
 
Analysis of the hydraulic characteristics of each site 
 
The channel profiles for each cross-section with dry and wet year discharge and water level illustrated 
are presented above in the previous section. The ADCP was used to calculate the discharges during the 
field trips, in wet and dry seasons.  
 




Dry season: between 0 and 1 m3/s 
Wet season: 133 m3/s 
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Site 2 Dry season: 3.5 m3/s 
Wet season: 482 m3/s 
Site 3 Dry season: 7 m3/s 
Wet season: 85 m3/s 
 
Compare major hydraulic features across sites 
 
Comparing Site 1 with Sites 2 and 3 shows great differences because the latter two are inundated for 
part of the year and become part of the floodplain. Site 1 also has a floodplain but it is not impacted by 
the Mekong back-water effect as are Sites 2 and 3. Thus the hydrological and hydraulic factors differ 
between these sites.  Sites 2 and 3 are rather similar to each other during the wet season, but during 
the dry season the Nam Oon dam releases more water than the natural discharge would be. Thus, the 
discharge and flow velocities are unnatural along the Nam Oon and Site 3, consistent with the presence 
of a large irrigation dam upstream.   
 
The hydrological characteristics for the average year are presented in Figure 3. ?? 
The modelled discharges for study sites 1 and 3 are presented in Figure 2. Site 2 is located in the 
floodplain, and thus it was not possible to model discharges for the wet season. The water levels for 





Page 335 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 3: Field Study Details related to Sec 4 
 
 
Figure 3.1.2.  Model coverage areas in the Nam Songkhram watershed.  
 
Figure 3.1.3.  Water level in five locations in the floodplain during baseline simulation for year 1980.  
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Figure 3.1.5.  Flood depth on 20/09/2001 (top) and reverse flow during its maximum extent in 1997. 
Red is water from the Mekong, blue is water from the Nam Songkhram and its tributaries.  
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Figure 3.1.6.  Water level in the Mekong mainstream plotted against water level in TS Point3.  
 
 
Figure 3.1.7. Flood pulse parameters (adapted from Lamberts and Bonheur 2007)  
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Figure 3.1.8. Schematic overview of the Nam Songkhram floodplain (not to scale). 
 
 







































































































































































































Figure 3.1.9. The peak discharge varies significantly between the years as can be seen.  
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Figure 3.1.13.  Monthly average discharge in study Site 1.  
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Figure 1.1.14.  Hydrological characteristics in a hydrograph for Site 1. 
 
Figure 3.1.15.  Example of the three year hydrograph for Site 1. 
 
Complete hydrological analysis 
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The complete hydrological analysis follows: (Or the following ought to be chucked into an annex? It’s 
awfully cluttered.) 
Inter-annual floods  
- 1:2 years 331 m3/s 
- 1:5 years 415 m3/s 
Intra-annual floods 
Overtop floodplain peaks: Discharge over 100 m3/s 
- number of peaks 2.1 /year 
- duration 2.7 months 
- start mid July 
- end mid October 
- peak September 
Small in-channel flood: Discharge over 30 m3/s (Q90) but less than 100 m3/s 
- number of peaks 1.1 /year 
- occurring mainly in June 
Freshes 
- number of peaks 0.9 /year 
- occurring May - June 
Low flows 
- Wet season: Discharge between 30 (Q90) and 60 m3/s (Q75) 
- Dry season: Discharge between 1 m3/s and 2 m3/s 
 
3.2 Fisheries & Aquatic Resources  
Ubonrattana Suntornratana 
Methodology 
The methodology adopted for the fisheries component followed a standard Department of Fisheries 
survey procedure applied for a 2-day rapid assessment per site. The assessment used three basic 
methods, namely: 
 
• Species sampling using fixed gillnets. These were conducted in both floodplain water bodies and 
the mainstream river. Gillnets were fixed overnight and species caught were identified, counted 
and measured for length the next morning. While gillnets are a selective method which do not 
allow sampling of deepwater or bottom-dwelling species and are size selective depending on 
mesh width, they do give a rapid indication of fish diversity and relative distribution in the study 
area. This can be considered a versatile and cost-effective sampling technique. 
• Interviews with local fishers. These were done with the aid of a species checklist and photo 
flipchart guide2, with each species checked for occurrence in five major habitat types: 1) 
                                          
2 This flipchart includes photos of 197 fish spp. from the Mekong River by the Department of Fisheries  
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mainstream river; 2) tributary streams; 3) back swamps (or oxbow lakes); 4) inundated 
floodplains; and 5) paddy fields. This obtained basic biological and ecological knowledge of each 
fish species, such as information about migratory behaviour. 
• Observations of local fishing activities at each station. These included direct interviews with 
local villagers about their methods, household catch production and the general fisheries 
situation. Sometimes individuals would be interviewed. At other times a group discussion would 
be facilitated. 
 
Samples of fish from each site were identified following the Mekong Fish Database of MRC (2003); 
Rainboth (1996); Kottelat (2001); Vidthayanon (2004). 
 
Background to habitats, ecosystem and fish in the Nam Sogkhram River Basin 
 
1. Habitats and fisheries ecology 
The Nam Songkhram River ecosystem consists of various habitats of both channel and non-channel 
types including an extensive seasonally inundated zone. Where the riverbank or floodplain have high 
vegetation cover and diverse aquatic habitat features, fish fauna diversity tends to be high. Alternating 
periods of high flow and low flow, with longitudinal and lateral flow across a broad floodplain, initiate 
cycles of nutrient dispersal and uptake in the aquatic and terrestrial organism food webs. Additionally, 
flow regime events are a known environmental cue for triggering fish migrations and reproduction 
(Baran, 2006). For many fish species that utilize more than one habitat type to complete their lifecycle, 
connectivity between habitats is essential.   
In terms of habitat type, biodiversity and faunal and floral distribution, the Songkhram Basin 
ecosystem is highly diverse.  Following criteria taken from various river ecological studies, the Nam 
Songkhram River would be classified as a river-floodplain system controlled by an annual flood cycle 
which could be zoned by habitat functioning into at least 4 majors types, namely:   
In-stream habitats of rivers and streams, including permanent and seasonal channel types of water 
bodies. Their physical characteristics and flow patterns are an important functional system for 
hydrological connection of various habitats in the Nam Songkhram river-floodplain system. River 
channels contribute water, nutrients and other inputs to the local habitat and the floodplain system. 
This hydrological function maintains fertility in the river system, providing accessibility of fish 
movement between various habitats and supporting spawning and nursing grounds for many fish 
species. Moreover, this accessibility is particularly important for supporting stock exchange between 
the Nam Songkhram River and the other inter-connected river systems of the Lower Mekong Basin. 
The rich environment of the main Nam Songkhram channel not only allows the movement of local 
resident species but also the passage of many migratory Mekong species at both adult and juvenile 
stages. Some adult fishes have been reported to migrate for spawning, whereas many fingerlings of 
both shark catfish (Pangasiidae) and minnows and carp (Cyprinidae) species are reported to migrate 
for nursing and feeding on fertile inundated floodplain of the lower Nam Songkhram (Ratanachotmanee 
and Suntornratana, 2002; Suntornratana et al., 2002; Suntornratana et al. 2007; Boonyaratpalin et al. 
2002).  
As well as providing accessibility for upstream migration, the river/stream habitats also function as a 
downstream migratory route during the flood recession period. Empirical evidence clearly shows a peak 
downstream migration during fast receding flows at the end of the wet season in October/November. A 
survey undertaken in 2002 by the DOF studied fish stocks using stationary bagnet and stream barrage 
sampling methods. The effort was able to collect and identify 149 species, including so-called black and 
white fish species3, representing native and non-native species migrating back from the floodplain into 
the Nam Songkhram and Mekong rivers (Boonyaratapalin et al, 2002), 
                                          
3 ‘Black’ and ‘white’ species of fish refer to rather broad distinctions made between fish that migrate 
relatively short distances to complete their lifecycle and are often present in the same wetlands area 
during all stages of their lifecycle (the ‘black’ species) and those fish which migrate long distances, and 
spawn far from the places they live for most of the year (the ‘white’ species). 
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The mainstream Nam Songkhram and its major tributaries are permanent water bodies that contribute 
to floods on adjacent floodplains when water levels rise and water is pushed over the riverbanks during 
the rainy season. This phenomenon in the Nam Songkhram is influenced by backwater (or even 
backflows) from the Mekong mainstream. This causes flooding over large areas of land from the middle 
stretches down to the lower parts of the basin providing increased fisheries habitat area for several 
months each year. After the floods, these river/stream channels become important dry-season refuge 
habitat during the dry season, maintaining fish stock and diversity as water levels and flow decline. In 
addition, there are also many small streams from sub-catchments that contribute to seasonal water 
flows and also act as important habitat refuges for some aquatic organisms that are adapted to cope 
with alternating periods of flood and drought.  
Margins and pools are slow flowing water areas and habitats in the main river/stream channels. 
During the time of high flows and strong currents, juvenile fish and many small species, plus certain 
other aquatic organisms, are unable to cope with fast flowing conditions and rest in margins and pools. 
These also act as resting areas for fish moving or migrating upstream, helping them maintain their 
energy for swimming against the current. This is especially important for fish migrating upstream for 
reproduction, as the long distances they must swim may cause fatigue and decreased spawning 
success if energy stores (usually fatty deposits) are depleted. 
 
During low water levels in the extended dry season, some downstream areas of the river/stream 
channel become slightly deeper pools. These areas then become habitats for fish to spend the dry 
season. This habitat is called a “dry season refuge habitat,” critical for adult and juvenile fish to survive 
until flows pick up again in late April and May.  
Inundated floodplain areas adjacent to river and streams. These essential fisheries habitats are 
seasonally inundated when flow overtops the river banks and cover the lowland floodplain of the Nam 
Songkhram Basin. Sediment and nutrients that are carried down by currents meet low flows on the 
floodplain and start to settle out, to be utilized by phytoplankton and aquatic vegetation to start a food 
chain for many living organisms. With high natural food productivity, many temporary floodplain 
species of the Cyprinidae and other families enjoy high success rates of spawning and larval survival. 
Therefore, this area is considered a crucial component of their life cycles as it provides extensive 
reproduction and nursing habitats. 
These inundated areas can be divided into two major sub-categories, namely bamboo-dominated 
flooded forest and flooded grassland which includes lowland paddy. These two areas are important for 
fisheries production. Flooded forest with bushes and shrubs is important habitat for many young fish as 
a nursing ground where young fish can hide from predators and are relatively safe from fishing gears. 
Paddy fields are an important spawning ground for many black fish species such as walking catfish 
(Clarias spp), climbing perch (Anabas testudineus), and butter catfish (Ompok bimaculatus). 
Recent studies using Remote Sensing and Geographic Information System (GIS) techniques to classify 
important fisheries habitats in the lower part of the basin have determined that the extensive wetlands 
form more than 40 percent of the total area in the wet season (Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008). This 
area also included all fisheries habitats of both channel and non-channel type, all permanent water 
bodies and floodplain including lowland paddy field that contribute to fisheries production  
Backswamps and permanent stillwater bodies which are scattered around the floodplain zone. 
The data for this type of habitat varies considerably between studies/surveys. Whatever the total area 
actually is, this habitat performs an important fishing ground function for local people in the dry season 
and is also a dry season refuge habitat for fish fauna. During visits to all three sites, swamps which 
had been flooded during the peak flood period in August – September, had become important fishing 
grounds in March, such as Huay Sing and Huay Bor in Ban Tha Bor; and Kud Dho in Ban Na Pho Noi.  
Besides being important dry season refuge habitats to maintain aquatic life during long dry periods, 
these backsawmps are important as spawning and nursing habitats for various black fish species and 
some species not requiring strong flows to activate development of their reproductive organs. Families 
that are known to spawn in backswamp habitats include Anabantidae, Nandidae and Channidae. During 
the dry season there is estimated to be around 4 percent total area of river/stream and many discrete 
permanent stillwater bodies which are considered to be the main dry season refuge areas in the LSRB. 
2. Fish life cycles in the Nam Songkhram  
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Fish life cycles are dynamic and require different habitats to support their behaviour at different stages 
of their life cycles. The Nam Songkhram river system, as a sub-basin of the Mekong, forms a complex 
ecosystem containing various river-floodplain habitats which should be considered not only in terms of 
local importance, but also their role as supporting the life cycle of many Mekong fish species. 
Earlier studies have highlighted the presence of a high diversity of fish species including many Mekong 
species (Yingcharen and Virapat, 1998; Boonyaratpalin et al., 2003). This clearly shows the 
dependence of many Mekong fishes on the Nam Songkhram River for feeding, reproduction and/or 
nursing. At the same time, many local resident species also move between river/stream and 
permanent backswamps to the floodplain for feeding, reproduction and/or nursing. A simple diagram of 
fish life-cycles can be divided into four stages and at each stage, most species require a different 
habitat type to satisfy physiological needs and to maintain stock. 
1. Adult fish – once mature, most species require suitable habitat type for reproductive 
activities. This behaviour is normally related to their physiology. Many cyprinids have buoyant eggs 
that require a strong flow to drift downstream in the river channel until hatching out as larvae. 
Apparently, stocks of adult fish in the Nam Songkhram River can be separated into two main groups, 
namely resident species and a migratory group of Mekong species.  
2. Larvae and juvenile - this stage occurs after hatching up until the early stages of adult 
morphological development. Most larvae drift downstream before hatching in a suitable pool and/or 
slow flowing area or on inundated floodplain as the young fish are incapable of swimming against the 
current. This young stage prefers flow and also in the nursing ground habitat where they can hide from 
predators. 
3. Fingerlings - are juvenile fish that have not yet developed reproductive organs. They can 
not swim against strong currents and also require suitable habitat to hide from predators. The 
seasonally flooded forest with thick undergrowth provides safety to juvenile fish from both fishers nets 
and predators. Many species spend this nursing stage on floodplains until the end of the flooding 
period. Downstream migration then occurs during the flood recession period as water drains the 
floodplain area into streams, rivers and backswamps. 
4. Adult and fingerling stage - Local resident stock will mostly spend the dry season in dry 
reason refuge areas (e.g. riverine pools, oxbow lakes, backswamps, reservoirs, etc) coping with poor 
water quality conditions and low flows. Both adult and fingerlings will feed and develop to become 
broodfish in the next flooding season. The remaining stock are important sources of food and income 
for local villagers to catch through the dry season. Other long distance migratory fish spend the dry 
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Apparently, some species will inhabit the same habitat for the whole of their life-cycle, but there are 
many more fish species that require more than one type of habitat to complete their life cycle. Mature, 
adult fish need the right kind of habitat for reproduction, while larvae and juvenile stages are more 
sensitive to flow changes. Surviving the long drought is essential to maintain natural stocks, which 
needs water of the right depth and quality. Therefore, all these habitats are in a state of seasonally 
dynamic hydrological and ecological flux within the Nam Songkhram Basin, which has helped to 
positively maintain a rich variety of fish species in the past and added to the productivity of the aquatic 
ecosystem.   
3. Fish diversity and species composition 
Diversity, when referring to both the variety of living organisms and habitats, can be a function of 
various ecological scales from macro to micro. There are two issues related to variety and variability to 
address, therefore, diversity can be used as an indicator to monitor ecological status and possibly 
predict the direction of change for the ecosystem, including a river-floodplain ecosystem like the Nam 
Songkhram. One major finding of the fisheries component is that it clearly shows a high diversity of 
freshwater fish present in the Nam Songkhram Basin and this indicates a complex-ecosystem that 
support living aquatic organisms including species of amphibian, crustacean, reptile, birds and many 
invertebrates. 
Data gathered, under a medium-level assessment process, from sampling and observation at study 
sites in the wet and dry season showed a high diversity of fish fauna. A total 81 Species/Taxa belong 
to 22 Families within 11 Orders (Annex 5) were identified. Major orders represented were 
Cypriniformes, Siluriformes and Perciformes contained 48.2%, 22.2% and 13.6% of species 
respectively. And additional data from the survey using a Species Checklist during the first trip in the 
wet season, provided a total 139 Species of 30 Families within 12 Orders occurring in various habitat 
types of the river-floodplain system. High diversity of fish have been reported from various earlier 
surveys (Table 3.2.1) and when compared with other river systems in the Mekong Basin in the East 
and Northeast region of Thailand, this clearly shows a healthy functioning aquatic ecosystem in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin that serves to support a high diversity of fish fauna.  
A list of species from the species checklist, sampling and observation of actual fisher’s catches at each 
survey site, has been summarized to show species diversity in Table 3.2.2. Among the three sites, the 
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Figure 3.2.1. Fish migratory behaviour and links between various habitat types 
observed to complete their life-cycle  
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lower part of the Songkhram Basin than in the upper part. At Ban Tha Bor station (Site 2), in the lower 
Songkhram, there was high diversity present which could be attributed to environmental factors such 
as an extensive floodplain area containing various habitat types, including inundated flooded forest 
(some of which is relatively healthy), backswamps, flooded grassland and lowland paddy that function 







Table 3.2.1. Summary of diversity from E-Flow survey and previous studies in the LSRB 
Item Other studies E-Flow assessment for both 
























Species/    
33 Families  
110 Species/      
27 Families 
193 
Species/      
33 Families 
81 Species/22 families from 
sampling and field 
observation 
139 Species/30 Families 
included survey  on species 
checklist 
This area also is closer to the Mekong confluence (approximately 70 kms) which might influence the 
common occurrence of various Mekong species. A survey reported in Suntornratana et al (2002) found 
that 125 Mekong species were present in the river near Ban Tha Bor in fisher’s catches. Some 
information was also obtained concerning the seasonal migration of the Giant Mekong Catfish 
(Pangasianodon gigas), an important and rare “flagship” species that can indicate environmental 
integrity, which enters the floodplain system around this Ban Tha Bor almost every year (please refer 
to Annex 11 for more details).  
 
Table 3.2.2 Fish diversity from catch sampling and checklist identification in three villages from both 
wet and dry season surveys 
River Nam Songkhram Nam Oon 
Station Ban Kham Chi 2. Ban Tha Bor 3. Ban Na Pho Noi 
Survey approach Checkli Samples / Checkli Samples / Checkli Samples / 
                                          
4 The Department of Fisheries, Thailand conducted a survey using a Stationary Trawl Net and Stream 
Barrage to sample species in the lower Songkhram river, reported in Boonyaratpalin et al., 2002.  
5 The Assessment of Mekong Capture Fisheries Component under the support from Fisheries Program 
of Mekong River Commission and the Department of Fisheries, Thailand conducted survey to monitor 
catch in four villages in the lower part of the Songkhram Basin (unpublished data)  
6 The survey conducted to gather samples and specimens was in 1996 -1997 and additional 
information of was updated in 2006, but remains unpublished. 
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70/20 38/12 109/27 68/21 63/21 32/14 
Orders 7 6 10 11 8 7 
Alien species  /    
% of total 
 0/0  2/2.9  0/0 
 
Additionally, information from local fishers provided during site visits indicated that some species have 
become locally extinct, especially large fish species within the riverine catfish families (i.e. Pangasiidae, 
Sisoridae and Siluridae) likely due to the degradation and areal reduction of flooded forest habitat in 
the Nam Songkhram Basin, but also from catch pressure, especially by use of large-scale and illegal 
fishing gears that are harmful to fisheries resources and habitats.   
Species composition can be inferred from the species list by site. This study took catch samples and 
direct observation during study sites visits to simply visualize present stock in the LSRB. At all three 
sites, as shown in Figure 2, Cyprinidae was the major family represented forming around 47.4, 40.6 
and 50.0 % of species per site respectively. This is in-line with commonly found species composition in 
freshwater/river ecosystems elsewhere in Thailand. Overall, 62 species from a total of 139 species 
were Cyprinidae, with more than 90 % of them commonly occurring in the Nam Songkhram river-
floodplain system. This group of species comprises a significant amount of the total fishery production, 
yet still requires adequate flow in the river/stream channel and a fertile floodplain habitat to ensure 
successful reproduction and nursing conditions. 
 
4. Natural fish stocks 
The natural stock of fish fauna in the Nam Songkhram River Basin can be divided into two basic 
groups, namely localized species (“black”) and long-distance migratory fish species (“white”) from the 
Mekong mainstream. Both these stocks are influenced by environmental factors and ecological patterns 
of the Mekong-Songkhram river systems. In this study, groups of fishes have been categorized by 
conditions that are related to ecological aspects in order to visualize stock patterns in the Nam 
Songkhram and assess possible impacts resulting from any future changes of the river-floodplain 
ecosystem.  
The present fisheries ecology situation in the Nam Songkhram Basin in terms of the condition of the 
floodplain system is still relatively healthy, with little evidence of alien species being common in 
catches. There were only two exotic species found during site visits, namely tilapia (O. niloticus) and 
common carp (C. carpio). These alien species escape from aquaculture systems that are common in 
the Songkhram, especially cage culture of tilapia along the river’s lower reaches. Interestingly, there 
was no evidence of exotic species taken from samples and field observations at the Nam Oon station, 
although this does not preclude their presence.  
 
5.Fisheries status and possible impacts to fisheries sector from flow regime changes  
Fisheries is one of several important livelihood sectors in the Nam Songkhram River Basin, but unlike 
agriculture has tended to be undervalued in the past. Local communities have developed a floodplain 
dependent culture where the inhabitants have learnt how to live with and to successfully utilize 
resources in the wetland areas, especially fish and living aquatic resources. The Nam Songkhram Basin 
is recognized as a highly productive area, which produces during and after every flooding cycle a huge 
amount of aquatic production from the river-floodplain system supplying food and income to local 
people.  
Fisheries production comes from various habitats on the Nam Songkhram river-floodplain ecosystem, 
for which local villagers have developed and modified specific fishing gears and activities to trap and 
catch fish and other aquatic animals. It is known that there are at least 79 gear types used to catch 
fish in the Lower Songkhram River Basin (Tai Baan Research Network of the Lower Songkhram River 
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Basin, 2005), but about 10 types of gear are most commonly used, especially the ubiquitous cast net 
and gillnets. 
A reported 60 percent plus of households in the LSRB own these two major gears, whereas the large 
gear like fixed bagnets are owned by only around 4 percent of sampled households (Hortle and 
Suntornratana, 2008). During both wet and dry season site visits, gillnets were being used widely at all 
three stations and the majority of villagers were thought to be fishing mostly for their own household 
consumption. Villagers who fish primarily for income were mostly limited to Ban Tha Bor, where boats 
are much bigger than the other two villages and evidence of large gears is seen under houses and 
stationed in the river or floodplain habitats.  
Fishing activities in the Songkhram wetlands occur all year round, but there are definite seasons when 
activity peaks, according to key migratory periods. In the main channel of the Songkhram River and 
major tributaries like the Nam Oon, it becomes difficult during the wet season to operate many gears 
because of the flow and depth. Local fishers claim they catch less in the main channel during highwater 
conditions and mostly the catch consists of big riverine species which are migrating upstream. 
Therefore, inundated areas on the floodplain become an important alternative fishing habitat during 
high flow in river/stream. Catches peak at two periods for fishers, namely the beginning of the wet 
season when upstream migration of fish begins in the main channel and at the flood recession period 
when fish are moving off the flooplain.  
 
Large gears like the stationary bagnet (dtong) and stream barrage net (gat-dton) are mostly used 
during flood recession periods and intercept fish migrating off the floodplain and back in to the main 
channel. Beach seines (mong kwat) are mostly found to operate during the dry season and in the early 
wet season principally in the mainstream Songkhram and backswamp areas. The team observed one in 
use at Huay Sing near Ban Tha Bor in the dry season study and noted that there was considerable 
disagreement amongst local people about their use, with some villagers wanting them banned while 
other villagers (the beneficiaries) arguing that they are not destructive compared to other methods 
found. All these big gear are thought to be a cause of pressure on stocks of adult and juvenile fish that 
are negative for future stock recruitment and fishery management.   
 




The assessment included two field visits to the study sites in the wet and dry seasons. At each site the 
specialist took soil samples from cultivated areas, especially rice fields, for later analysis of chemical 
and physical properties; interviewed key informants such as village headmen and local leaders (at least 
5 people in each area); as well as desk research on agricultural information, to access soil series and 
land use maps in the Songkhram River Basin (from various governmental agencies), especially in the 
respective sub-districts of the study sites. The main aim of this assessment was to find out the current 
agricultural situation, soil types of the three survey sites and where possible, relate these to 
considerations of flow and ecosystems.  
Overview of sites 
Site 1) Upper part of the Songkhram River Basin, Baan Kham Chi, Udom-porn 
Sub-District, Fao Rai District, Nongkhai Province. 
 
The soil nutrients at Site 1 would appear to be of relatively low fertility compared with the level of soil 
nutrients in the lower two sites. Observations and local interviews revealed that agriculture and land 
use at the three sites has changed emphasis between the years 2000 and 2006 from upland cash 
crops, such as sugarcane and cassava, to growing para-rubber and eucalyptus over significant areas. 
While paddy fields are still the main land use and interest of villagers, there are signs that there is a 
switch of focus by farmers from wet season rainfed to dry season irrigated rice cultivation. Eucalyptus 
plantations are gradually replacing paddy fields at Site 1 and Site 2 and are expanding continuously 
both in upland and lowland/floodplain areas. Livestock numbers, such as cattle and buffalo, have 
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tended to increase in the short term in some villages, although there has been a long-term decline in 
economic importance over the last thirty years.  
The average rice farming yield in the sub-district was about 2,700 kg/ha. It was noted that land use for 
other cash crops, such as sugar cane and cassava were relatively insignificant compared to rice 
cultivation; while monocrop tree plantations such as eucalyptus and rubber accounted for 1,504 and 
342 ha respectively, with most of the eucalyptus area found in Ban Kham Chi, as shown in Figure 1, 
Annex 37.  
It was found from personal interviews with community leaders that large numbers of villagers are 
investing in monocrop tree plantations, mainly due to the perceived financial benefits. Villagers 
traditionally raised large livestock (buffalo and cattle), on common grazing land, but these areas are 
declining fast as land is converted to monocrop tree plantations and it can be assumed that numbers 
will decrease in future. While secondary data suggested there were 70 families involved in fishing in 
Ban Kham Chi, according to an interview with the village headman there is actually only one family 
that primarily earns its livelihood from fishing. In the past, villagers depended far more on the river 
and floodplain fishery for livelihoods than at present. According to records from 2000, it was found that 
cassava and sugarcane were more widely cultivated than at present, but their popularity has declined 
in favour of conversion to rubber and eucalyptus plantations. The latter are being planted on floodplain 
areas right up to the edge of the Songkhram River, with large swathes of land being converted during 
the dry season site visit. In the rainy season (Sept 2006), eucalyptus plantations near the Dong Mor 
Tong bridge (Site 1) were inundated by floodwaters, but had clearly suffered no ill effects when the 
team revisited in March 2007, attesting to this tree species’ resilience to floods. Similarly, eucalyptus 
can also survive severe drought and forest fire. 
 
Site 2) Lower Part of the Songkhram River Basin near Ban Tha Bor, Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-district, 
Sri Songkhram District, Nakon Phanom Province.  
 
The total area of the Sub-district is 5,364 ha, which is divided into 3,368 ha of cultivated land and non-
agricultural land of 1,996 ha or 37.21%, which is mostly classified as back swamp, bamboo forest and 
seasonally inundated areas. Data from 2005 showed that rice fields were most common and made up 
76.03% or 2,561 ha, with 835 families (out of 869 families) involved in this activity. Average rice yield 
was about 2,300 kg/ha.  
 
Of a total of 869 families in the seven villages of Tha Bor Songkhram Sub-district, 360 families are 
reportedly involved in fisheries8. A few families have dug fish ponds with support from a royally-
initiated project and there are several small fish processing facilities (mostly producing sour fermented 
fish or pla som from non-local cultured fish) in Ban Tha Bor. Cassava cultivation has sharply declined in 
recent years due to lower demand, while there has been rapid growth in household-level eucalytpus 
plantations at the same time. Villagers have planted eucalyptus on floodplain land right up to the edge 
of the riverbank and lakes, apparently motivated by the returns available from selling cut stems to 
agents of the pulp and paper industry, who regularly visit villages looking for raw material. A lack of 
household labor, high local labor prices and desire to show ownership of land by planting trees, as well 
as the species’ hardy characteristics are other likely motivating factors encouraging the adoption of 
eucalyptus.  
 
Site 3) Lower reaches of the Nam Oon River, Ban Na Pho Noi, Pon Sawang Sub-District, Sri Songkhram 
District, Nakon Phanom Province (see Fig XX) 
 
                                          
7 Note this data should be treated with caution due to the apparently high figure for eucalyptus 
plantation in Ban Kham Chi compared to other villages 
8 Ed’s Note: This figure would seem to be on the low side, as most families can be observed to 
participate in capture fisheries, at least on a seasonal or part-time basis. Other recent studies of the 
LSRB have suggested participation rates in the fishery of 80 – 93 % on a part-time basis (e.g. Hortle 
and Suntornratana, 2008) 
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Overall area of Pon Sawang sub-district is 2,931 ha, with a cultivated area of 2,484 ha, and a non-
agricultural area of 446 ha or 15.23 %. Average rice yield was about 2,300 kg/ha. Other forms of 
arable land use such as sugarcane and cassava cultivation were very low. Recent observations show 
that both eucalyptus and rubber are expanding in the sub-district, apparently due to perceived good 
prices. Interviews with villagers in Ban Na Pho indicated that there are around 100 families involved in 
fisheries, at least part-time livelihoods, but other activities provided their main livelihood. In 2000, the 
secondary data showed that cassava was widely cultivated, as shown in Figure 5, Annex 3, but it has 
declined rapidly in the past few years, to be replaced by industrial tree crops. It was found that as the 
younger generation have migrated out the village to big cities and abroad for work opportunities, 
families are less likely to plant crops which have intensive labor requirements. The same factor also 
applies to rice cultivation, but rather than abandoning it altogether, farmers have adapted by using 
direct seed broadcasting, instead of the traditional and more labor-intensive transplanting technique. 
 
 
Figure 3.3.1. Land use on the lower Nam Oon floodplain (Site 3) in the dry season – e.g. showing 
permanent river, oxbow lakes, backswamps, seasonally flooded forest, artificial lakes, seasonally 
flooded agricultural land, intensively irrigated land, abandoned blocks, etc.  
 
Land use changes in the Nam Songkhram river basin between the rainy and dry seasons (2006-2007) 
 
1.  Wetland changes from seasonally inundated forest to dry season irrigated rice  
The bamboo-dominated seasonally inundated forest is being cleared at present in order to open land 
for dry season rice cultivation, chiefly as a result of the following main factors:    
 
1.  High prices of rice in 2006/07. In particular glutinous rice fetched good market prices 
buoyed by high demand from Vietnam and China during the “Year of the Pig”9. Some glutinous rice 
varieties (e.g. RD 6) reached 120-130 baht/12 kg (or meun), compared to 110 baht/12 kg for jasmine 
rice.  
2.  The dry season rice crop generally gives higher yields than the wet season crop, and is not 
prone to flood damage. On average, the improved rice variety known as “Lao daek” yields 
approximately 400-600 kg/rai in the Nam Songkram river basin but can attain yields up to 700-1,000 
                                          










flooded forest habitat 
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kg/rai in the first year following forest removal and land clearance, before soils start to lose their 
fertility in subsequent years. Particularly in the floodplain area of Site 3, some farmers with cultivated 
paddy fields claimed to be able to produce a dry season rice crop of 1,000 kg/rai. These high initial 
yields attract other farmers to clear more land and expand the agricultural frontier to its local limits. 
  3. The ease of conversion of seasonally flooded forest to paddy land with bunds has become 
more rapid and simple since the increased availability of powerful tractors within the village. The costs 
in early 2007 for using a tractor for clearance work was about 1,000 baht/rai for brush and bamboo 
clearance; 2,500 baht/rai for total clearance of all large trees, stumps and remaining vegetation; and 
4,000 – 4,500 baht/rai for full clearance and creation of paddy fields with bunds, ready to cultivate.  
   4.  Policy inducements and perverse subsidies. There has been indirect funding available from 
various state agency sources to support the conversion of seasonally flooded forest into paddy fields, 
in-line with central government policy. In particular, projects initiated under the Thaksin Shinawatra 
government such as the “Assets to Capital” project, One Million Baht per Village Fund” and “Farmer 
Loan Restructuring Fund” have all served to encourage the conversion of remaining natural forest land 
to agricultural purposes over the last five years. Large budgets have been provided by several 
provincial level departments and the local Sub-District Administration Organisations (TAO) to 
implement irrigated rice projects, which further encourage flooded forest conversion to agriculture. 
Furthermore, a policy of offering compensation for farmers for rice crops lost to flooding in commonly 
flooded areas (by declaring a natural flood event a “natural disaster”) has further encouraged forest 
clearance for paddy fields (see Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b).  
  
The sustainability of dry season rice in the medium to longer term is in question, due not only to the 
fluctuating prices of rice and declining yields mentioned, but also the rising input prices for farmers, 
especially fuel, fertiliser and most importantly, labor, which is now the most critical factor influencing 
farmer’s decision-making over landuse. As out-migration from the village has continued apace there is 
gradually less labor available to help with tasks such as field preparation, ploughing and harvest, 
increasing the workload of an aging farming population. 
 
2. Soil erosion along the Songkhram riverbanks caused by encroachment and destruction of 
seasonally flooded forest  
 
It was found that at Site 3 there was relatively more active soil erosion occurring along the main 
channel of the Nam Oon than at Site 1 and 210. The majority of farmers pointed to deforestation of 
seasonally flooded forest as a cause in recent years for the drying up of the river and collapse of its 
riverbanks. The majority of farmers remarked that deforestation of seasonally flooded forest had 
caused the Songkhram River to run dryer in recent years and its riverbank to collapse. Anecdotal 
reports suggest that the Nam Songkhram River is gradually becoming wider but shallower over time, 
due to frequent bank collapses and sedimentation. According to the survey observations in 2006-2007, 
extensive bamboo stands had become scarce. In 1977-1979 the bamboo forest flowered en masse and 
the mature plants died-off, after which a new generation of bamboo clumps grew up. 
 
3. Protection and conservation of the bamboo forest in the Nam Songkram river basin 
wetlands 
It was found that Site 2 has introduced more wetland protection and conservation measures than the 
other two sites, through the efforts of local villagers and supporting organisations. Such measures as 
demarcating and classifying the wetland conservation areas (e.g. flooded forest bordering Huay Sing) 
may have helped to reduce conversion of land to agriculture in recent years. At Site 2, public water 
resources are clearly identified to protect against encroachment, but the previously public land on and 
near Tung Mon has nearly all been claimed by private interests now (agribusiness and local people), 
allowing little space for conservation activities. 
                                          
10 The main factor causing bank erosion and increased level of turbidity during the dry season in the 
Nam Oon, is likely to be the increased flow levels and flow fluctuations caused by the upstream release 
of waters from the Nam Oon Dam and irrigation scheme. 
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Ongoing changes in agricultural land utilization 
 
The change from upland cash crops to other uses 
Agricultural land utilization in the early 1980s was almost entirely devoted to cassava and sugarcane 
cultivation on the upper terrace soils of the Songkhram Basin. Both these cash crops have seen a 
general decline in relative profitability and productivity over the last few decades. Currently, there are 
only one or two families left in each village near Ban Kham Chi which still cultivate sugarcane, mostly 
those farmers with plenty of land available (e.g. over 100 rai) who can afford to diversify crops. By 
contrast, with cassava cultivation it seems to be only small-scale farmers with little land available that 
still cultivate it. Nowadays there is a trend to growing less cassava due to the fact that yield per rai has 
declined to only 1-2 tons/rai compared to around 4-5 tons/rai in the past, mostly because of 
decreasing soil fertility and poor land management. Presently, large areas of former cash crop land are 
being converted to eucalyptus plantations, especially at Site 1, but also at Site 2 to a lesser extent. 
Each family grows around 10-20 rai of eucalyptus on average. At Site 3, para rubber trees 
predominate over eucalyptus as there is more upland terraces available. 
  
The alteration of upland and lowland fields into eucalyptus forest  
Small-scale eucalyptus cultivation in the Songkhram Basin started in 1987 with a pilot project 
promoting tree cultivation on “unused” arable land by supplying just 5-10 eucalyptus seedlings per 
household from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. Six years later in 1993-1994, eucalyptus 
trees started to be cultivated on a larger scale from 6-10 rai/household and by 2005-2006, most 
families were growing eucalyptus trees on their land, encouraged by neighbour’s stories of easy profits 
with little labor input. Some farmers have converted over 50 % of their land holding, including paddy 
fields, into eucalyptus plantation which does not bode well for future food security in the villages 
concerned. 
 
In villages such as Ban Kham Chi in the upper Basin, nearly all households have land devoted to 
eucalyptus plantations, and the survey team witnessed many households actively propagating 
eucalyptus seedlings for future planting. Amongst the main reasons given for the popularity amongst 
villagers for eucalyptus plantation are: 
 
1)  Convenience of sale. It is unnecessary for villagers to search for a market to sell eucalyptus since 
middlemen will directly approach growers and offer to cut and remove the timber at an inclusive price. 
If the villager cuts the trees and sells directly to a buyer they will receive around 1000 baht/ton in 
2007. The recommended planting rate is approximately 300-400 seedlings/rai.  
 
2)  A perceived high financial return from eucalyptus. On average, the yield from a plantation is 
around 10-15 tons/rai after planting for only three or four years which gives a return of about 10,000-
15,000 baht/rai. A second and third harvest is possible for little extra investment, apart from pruning 
branches, although these yields will be less than the first. Compared with other crops, eucalyptus 
requires less on-going cash costs after the initial investment and the economics appear attractive to 
farmers.  
 
3) Decentralization of technology for eucalyptus seedling propagation to the household level. 
Previously, eucalyptus seedlings were only available from government or large private nurseries, but in 
the past few years, private companies interested in promoting eucalyptus plantations have 
disseminated the technology to villagers at the local level, so central nurseries have been much 
downsized. Villagers grow seedlings for their own needs and sell commercially to others, at a price of 
around 1 baht/plant. This is providing some households with a supplementary income source.  
 
4) Flood and drought tolerance. Due to uncertainties about flood levels from year to year, there is a 
high element of risk to wet season rice cultivation on the floodplain. This risk factor with rice has 
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encouraged farmers to switch to eucalyptus, which can tolerate flooding periods of up to three months, 
once the trees are over one year old. During the flooding period, pink or light violet leaves may be 
seen on the trees, which is a symptom of phosphorus deficiency in deoxygenated conditions. However, 
they quickly recover in the dry season and tolerate long periods of no rainfall, using groundwater to 
quite a depth sub-surface.  
 
5) Declining rice yields. As cultivation practices have changed (e.g. switch from seedling 
transplanting to direct seeding, less manual weeding, larger fields) encouraged by labor shortages 
from out-migration and rising price of hired labor, so yields have tended to fall. This in turn has 
encouraged farmers to switch to eucalyptus on the former paddies, and some households are now 
being obliged to buy rice instead of growing it themselves. However, because of the long period 
between harvests of eucalyptus, this means the money to buy rice must generally come from off-farm 
sources, further encouraging labor migration.  
 
Although eucalyptus plantations have become commonplace, generating a new source of income for 
villagers, some people the survey team spoke with expressed  concerns relating to the environmental 
impacts of this trend. Some of the impacts mentioned, included: 
 
• Eucalyptus plantations near water sources may cause a decrease in fish productivity, noted by 
fishermen, thought to be caused by the release of oils from fallen leaves being released into 
streams, swamps and ponds, which fish detect and avoid. However, the fish decline may also 
stem from the change of growing rice from transplanting to direct seeding which requires use of 
more pesticides to be effective. In particularly, farmers will commonly use a herbicide with the 
name, “red pill” or “red dog” (the local name for the broad spectrum herbicide 2-4 D), which 
has a bad smell. Some farmers who need to reduce costs of ploughing will buy the herbicide in 
liquid form to spray on grass and weeds before cultivating rice. Some prefer to spray on the 
paddy bunds to get rid of grass or destroy insect habitats. Consequently, when rain falls, it will 
carry this chemical or other pesticides into water resources, which may be detrimental to 
aquatic life. 
 
• Villagers who plant eucalyptus trees near paddy fields, especially in sandy or laterite soils, have 
observed declining rice yields apparently from 50 – 150 kg/rai. This might be caused by the 
decomposition of eucalyptus leaves causing release of toxic organic substances or it might be 
from nutrient and water competition from the deep eucalyptus roots. On areas with heavy or 
clay soils, apparently the effects on rice yields are less noticeable. 
 
• Eucalyptus planted next to sugarcane plantation will depress yields, in particular with trees over 
5 years old which have a higher shading impact and will compete with the sugarcane for soil 
nutrients and water. 
 
• Elderly people remarked that large-scale eucalyptus plantations lead to less rainfall compared to 
natural forest or para-rubber plantations. They believe this may be related to greater moisture 
levels and cooler temperatures found under natural forest or para-rubber plantations compared 
to eucalyptus plantations. Some farmers note that eucalyptus consumes more water than other 
plants and may cause surrounding areas to become dryer. It was noticed that when cutting 
down the 3-5 year-old eucalyptus trees, there is plentiful water released from their stems 
particularly in swampy or low-lying land.  
Vegetable cultivation in dry season or cash crops after rice harvest 
It was found that at Site 2 near Ban Tha Bor, around 7-8 households were involved in the cultivation of 
dry season intensive watermelon and vegetables, while at Site 3 there was some limited maize and 
vegetable cultivation near the Nam Oon river. By contrast, at Site 1 there were notably few vegetables 
cultivated by villagers, with the exception of some small scale growing of vegetables by farm ponds 
and one elderly farmer growing sweet potato on the Nam Songkhram riverbanks. The farmers in Ban 
Kham Chi were only growing a few vegetables for home consumption, while the majority of villagers 
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now rely on the outside market for their needs, with pick-up trucks from outside the village selling a 
variety of vegetables on a daily basis. This illustrates a rapid decline in self-reliance of many villages, 
which was once considered a defining feature of Northeast Thailand (e.g. Nartsupha, 1984). 
 
Problems of saline soil 
The Nam Songkhram Basin is underlain with extensive salt deposits, which in some places rise to near 
the surface and may be exploited commercially, such as in parts of Ban Dung District, Udon Thani and 
Wanon Niwat District, Sakhon Nakhon. Locally, saline soil or underground water sources is a problem 
at many locations throughout the basin. The survey team found that underground rock salt had risen 
to the surface forming patches of surface crust of salt at Site 3 (Ban Na Pho Noi), near to the Nong 
Paen Reservoir, but was limited to a small area. This may be related to rises in water table caused by 
the reservoir, bringing salt to the surface through capillary action. 
 
Migration of agricultural labor from land utilization changes 
There is active labor migration to urban areas such as Bangkok, Rayong, Chonburi, Phuket, and also 
abroad (e.g. Singapore), particularly by teenagers and young adults in all three villages. Within the 
village mainly old people tend to remain, along with children and some adults who still tend farmland, 
mind children or work locally as laborers. This pattern was most noticeable in Ban Kham Chi of the 
three sites visited and is both a result of and leads to further land use changes. For example, as labor 
moves out of the village, there are fewer people to tend the fields and farmers look to labor saving 
crops or technologies. This encourages switches from small to larger tractors for ploughing or from rice 
to eucalyptus plantations, for instance. This in turn decreases the need for local labor and further out-
migration occurs in a vicious cycle. People who return from living in the city tend to want quick profits 
and easy returns on money and labor invested, with little time for soil and water conservation 
techniques or care for the natural environment. However, initiatives like the Tai Baan Research that 
was carried out in Ban Tha Bor (Site 2) and other villages in Sri Songkhram District, show that there is 
still interest in protecting natural resources and maintaining or reviving traditional livelihood practices 
and patterns amongst many village residents (Tai Baan Research Network of the Lower Songkhram 
River Basin, 2005). 
Agricultural land usage priorities in the Songkhram River Basin 
The land use priorities of farmers in the Songkhram River Basin have changed over time, 
predominantly in response to wider socio-economic changes. Currently farmers are switching attention 
from farming not only raised terrace lands, but transforming the floodplain areas previously considered 
common property land of little agricultural value. These areas were formerly chiefly used for fishing, 
gathering NTFPs and livestock grazing, while paddy fields were mostly found on elevated lands above 
the regular flood level. But as population pressure has increased and land prices have risen, people 
have cleared more floodplain land and practiced “naa siang” (literally means “risky rice cultivation”). 
This practice has been encouraged by government policy which granted cash compensation to villagers 
who lost crops to flooding, even when the causes were totally natural, by declaring the floods as 
“natural disasters”.  
 
Other policies which have encouraged the conversion and massive clearance of seasonally flooded 
forest to rice fields, has been the strong emphasis placed by many state agencies on irrigated dry 
season rice cultivation with generous subsidies given for irrigation infrastructure construction, the land 
reform policies of ALRO and long standing misclassification of floodplain forests as “vacant wasteland” 
or “degraded scrubland” and general lack of recognition of the value of natural wetlands by nearly all 
state agencies. In recent years, these policies have been compounded by the growth in power and 
influence of the pulp and paper industry, which has helped encourage villagers to plant eucalyptus on 
both upland and floodplain lands. Additionally, promotion of rubber growing in the upper Northeast by 
state agencies has led to wide adoption of rubber by a majority of farmers in some wetland marginal 
villages (e.g. Ban Kham Chi) in a relatively short period of time. 
 
3.4 Vegetation component 
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Pattaraporn Waleetorncheepsawat  
 
Introduction 
For the vegetation component of the E-Flows study, given the known importance of the seasonally 
flooded forest from a biodiversity and livelihoods perspective (Tai Baan Research Network of Lower 
Songkhram Basin, 2005; Blake and Pitakethepsombut, 2006), it was a good opportunity to look at the 
present situation regarding floodplain vegetation at several representative sites and relate this to past 
and present trends of habitat and vegetation change. It draws not only on direct empirical 
observations, but also refers to secondary data, in particular the local ecological knowledge of the Tai 
Baan Research conducted by riparian communities. In particular, it attempts to identify key plant 
communities and species that have importance in terms of socio-economic and cultural reasons, and 
the extent to which they are dependent on natural flow regimes. 
The detailed findings of the Tai Baan Research were particularly useful for reference, as there have 
been few formal, scientific studies of floodplain vegetation conducted on the Nam Songkhram 
floodplain, highlighting the importance that more holistic and situated studies such as Tai Baan 
Research can play in furthering knowledge of wetland ecosystems. This research catalogued 191 
species of plant with beneficial uses from the LSRB floodplain wetlands and identified 28 distinct 
habitats or sub-ecosystems, a system of classification far more detailed than conventional scientific 
attempts at classification of Mekong wetland habitats have so far managed.  The Tai Baan Research 
sub-divided the overall wetlands ecosystem into four separate sub-categories namely: 
• Upper floodplain habitats 
• Lower floodplain habitats 
• Flat lowland habitats, incl. permanent and temporary water bodies 
• Riverine habitats 
The seasonally flooded forest (paa boong paa thaam) has been previously identified as having most 
value and significance to local livelihoods, partly due to the variety of useful flora found within it and 
partly due to the role it plays as a source of fish and aquatic products in the flood season and during 
the flood recession (Blake and Pitakethepsombut, 2006; Khonchantet, 2007). In a ten village socio-
economic study of seasonally flooded forest community use, Khonchantet (2007) estimated that the 
average contribution of wetland products to villager’s income was 38,403 Baht/household/year of 
which 3.54 %, 18.16 %, 4.21 % and 19.11 % were made up of wild vegetables, edible mushrooms, 
bamboo shoots and livestock fodder components respectively. However, it is recognized that the 
seasonally flooded forest is in a much degraded state both quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
This report, combining wet and dry season data, tries to illuminate the past and present status of the 
floodplain vegetation  to identify some of the linkages between plants and other disciplines, in 
particular hydrology and landuse. It also considers briefly the impacts that some of the gross ecological 
changes might have had on the health of the overall ecosystem, including threats from introduced alien 
species, flow regime changes and land use changes. Lastly, it presents one or two recommendations 
for further study in the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
 
Methodology 
The methodology incorporated two principle tools for field data collection. 
1. Forest ecology observation: Walk survey along each site’s transect lines and visual scanning of 
vegetation in the floodplain area were used for plant community sampling. 
2. Socio-economic data collection: Using three variables namely direct observation, in-depth 
individual interviews and informal group discussions with local informants to determine both 
direct and indirect utilization of the floodplain plant resources. 
In addition, the vegetation specialist referred to the knowledge of other team members in building up a 
composite picture of plant species and vegetation community importance with relation to the wider 
ecosystem and socio-economics at the sites. Unfamiliar plant specimens collected were checked with 
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villagers for local names, while a few sample specimens were taken back to Mahasarakham University 
for later scientific identification. This study was only interested in flowering plants, plus some mosses 
and ferns, and did not bother with algae or phytoplankton. 
Results and Discussion 
Plant Communities  
The Nam Songkhram river floodplain’s native vegetation cover would appear to be represented by 
plant communities that normally grow rapidly in the dry season, followed by a period of slower growth 
during the wet season flood period in a successional pattern of growth. When the wet season arrives 
some plant growth activities will stop temporarily or some members of the community will die-off, as 
they cannot tolerate the prolonged flooding period. An exception to this general pattern is the 
ubiquitous flood-tolerant bamboo (Bambusa spp.), which grows rapidly when the rainy season starts 
with shoots out-pacing the rising flood water to present greenery year round, even when the floodplain 
is under 4 – 5 metres depth of water. This remarkable trait of the bamboo plants to both tolerate 
floods and still send up edible and nutritious shoots well into the dry season, has helped them to being 
an important component of local livelihoods. Then, as the water level subsides at the start of the dry 
season the same plant community with some new pioneer members will reinitiate growth. This pattern 
is called a cyclical succession. The cycle begins with a pioneer phase of seed germination and then 
moves through several stages sequentially before finally returning to the original state. So, part of the 
community is impermanent or annual and the rest are flood hardy perennial species that can tolerate 
up to five months submersion with no ill effects (Utit, 2001). As a result of this successional pattern 
and habitat diversity, the ecosystem exhibits high plant diversity, structural complexity and resilience. 
Plants in the seasonally inundated forest grow under conditions of water excess for part of the year 
through the wet season. Many plants show flood tolerant characteristics and structures. The 
structures; root, stem and leave, largely consisted of spongy tissue (aerenchymatous tissue). A few 
plants produce the erect roots that exposed form underwater, the root system can obtain oxygen in an 
otherwise anaerobic substrate (pneumatophores). Also, there are dense aerial roots in some plants 
that grown downward from the  branches to the ground. Some have spines on the stem and use 
biochemical adaptation to produce alcohol dehydrogenase enzyme, in order to resist a water excess 
situation during periods of prolonged flooding. (Kramer, 1983; Vickery, 1984). In short, plants have 
adapted and evolved through natural selection to cope with and thrive in the climatic and hydrological 
extremes of the flood pulse phenomenon, seen in different parts of their life cycle. 
As all three of the floodplain sites studied are influenced by river flow in similar ways, they exhibit 
some common landscape features which are associated with tropical riverine floodplain ecosystems 
such as the Lower Mekong Basin. These features or habitats are known by local names such as Kud, 
Nong, Lerng, Wang and Horm; and have significance for local livelihood strategies (Tai Baan Research 
Network of Lower Songkhram Basin, 2005a). When considering the main topographical characteristics 
of the floodplain area, it was found that there were three distinct zones: upper floodplain, lower 
floodplain and alluvial terrace area. The plant communities tend to be distinctive in each area. A 
list of local and scientific names of plants identified during the dry season study are given in Annex 8. 
 
Plant community in the upper floodplain area 
This area was located along the two sides of the main river channel and spreads out as a green ribbon 
of vegetation parallel with the river. The width of this belt depends largely on how far soil type, fertility 
and moisture influence from the main river extends. Agricultural activities by villagers have influenced 
the extent of remaining forest and only remnant patches of secondary forest are evident nowadays.         
 
The lowest lying areas closest to the river will tend to flood first, with water normally rising slowly and 
predictably in July and August to cover large swathes of floodplain. Large areas of floodplain where the 
soils are marginal and infertile take on the appearance of a green meadow after the flood recession 
and may be classified as a “herb zone in open land”. The vegetation types found in this area are 
mainly herb species such as: Pak Bor (unknown species), Praya Mutti (Grangea maderaspatana (L.) 
Poir.), Pak Pongpod (Polygonum tomentosum Willd.), plus some sedges and grasses. These groups of 
plant appear only in the dry season, post-flood recession. They try to complete their life cycle in the 
dry season period by rapidly maturing and producing abundant flowers and fruits. They leave 
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reproductive parts in the alluvial soil which survive the wet season, when mature plants are largely 
absent. Flooding plays an important role in seed dispersal and destroys remaining non-flood tolerant 
plants. The seeds are able to survive tough conditions lying dormant in soils and geminate the 
following dry season. Another vegetation group present in the same zone are various aquatic plants 
such as Sarai-hangkaroke (Hydrilla verticillata), Deplee Nam (Potamogeton malaianus) and sarai fai 
(Chara sp.). By contrast, if this area is a more infertile, sandy and shallow soil zone, the vegetation will 
tend to consist of more open ground dominated by sedges, grasses and a reduced group of aquatic 
plants. These areas, such as Tung Mon near Ban Tha Bor (Site 2) are important grazing areas for large 
livestock.             
Next, moving towards the edge of the floodplain is a “strongly embraceable shrub community” 
such as spiny shrubs, scandent shrubs and densely crowded root shrubs, mixed with climbers. Each 
plant competes with members of the same species and other species to occupy limited space by 
spreading roots and stem on vertical and horizontal planes. If the floodplain has strong flows across it 
erosion may occur at certain sites, but at the same time there will be sediment deposition occurring at 
others. When the period of highest water levels are reached, this plant community will become 
completely inundated and shed its leaves. Hence, these vegetation types have adapted to periods of 
prolonged water stress. Such community adaptation is important for its own and the wider ecosystem’s 
health, especially for providing habitat to aquatic animals for spawning, nursing juveniles, food source, 
etc. Vegetation in this zone includes Nam Kajang (unknown species), Nam Geow Gai (unknown 
species), Krai Hangnak (unknown species), Krai Kinak (unknown species), E Nod Nam (Ficus 
heterophylla L.f.), Ben Nam (Combretum trifoliatum Vent.), Nam Kae (Plecospermum andamanicum 
Kimg ex Hook.f.), Kreua Hoi Pla (Phyllanthus taxodiifolius Beille), etc. Most of them flower and fruit 
under non-water stress conditions in the late dry season (i.e. March-April).  
In recent decades, these communities in the LSRB, have decreased in extent and become degraded 
due to logging, charcoal making, agricultural conversion and are either now cultivated or are mixed 
with large stands of flood-tolerant Bambusa spp. (Pai kasa), a pioneer species.     
Beyond the strongly embraceable shrub community towards the edge of the floodplain is an area 
dominated by tree and climber vegetation. Mainly members consist of various size water stress 
tolerant trees and climbers. When the highest water level period peaks, some of them are immersed 
for several days or weeks. Some big trees forming canopies are able to tolerate partial submergance 
such as Saeng (Xanthophyllum lanceatum (Miq.) J.J.Sm), Hwa (Syzygium cumini (L.) Skeels), Hae 
(unknown species), Jiknam (unknown species), Madan (Garcinia schomburgkiana Pierre), Kumnam 
(unknown species), Kasin (Schoutenia ovata Korth.) and Krabao (Hydnocarpus anthelminthica Pierre); 
also immature or small tree species such as Hu ling (Hymenocardia wallichii Tul.) and others may be 
immersed for up to several months. To survive, some climbers rapidly climb to the top of large tree 
canopies that act as supports.           
It was observed that several plants use flow as a seed dispersal mechanism. Therefore, before the wet 
season Jiknam (unknown species), Maseaw nam (unknown species), Peuai nam (Terminaria 
cambodiana Gagnep), Ma dan (Garcinia schomburgkiana Pierre), Kratum nam (Mitragyra diversifolia 
(Wall. ex. G.Don) Havil.) will flower and fruit abundantly enough to survive an extended flooding 
period and provide food for various animals such as fishes, birds and insects. The downstream flow will 
help distribute fruits or seeds far away from the parent tree to allow them to germinate in a suitable 
new area during the next dry season.  
To respire during flooding, some trees and climbers produce aerial roots on their stems such as Fai 
Nam (unknown species) and Ling-ngo (Byttneria echinata Wall. ex Kurz.). Some species, Madan 
(Garcinia schomburgkiana Pierre) and Ben nam (Combretum trifoliatum Vent.) can produce 
pneumatophores. Wiry-stemmed climbers are common such as Kreua Plok Chang (Ventilago sp.). 
Epiphytes include Orchids, Dtang (unknown species), and Plu (unknown species). Additionally, various 
members of the Zingiber group, grasses and sedges were also found.     
  
A tree and climber vegetation story dominates the mainstream banks, and also along the banks of 
backwaters, oxbow lakes and ponds. A Ban Tha Bor floodplain oxbow lake, Kud Huay Sing, has had its 
level artificially raised by the construction of a weir near its outlet with the Songkhram River, causing 
the herb zone in open land and the strongly embraceable shrub community to be permanently 
flooded, along with some areas of the tree and climber vegetations zone. There is evidence of many 
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woody plants dying back in this area, although this may be aggravated by salts rising to the surface in 
the artificially elevated watertable. 
 
Plant Community in the Lower Floodplain  
Because of slight differences in slope and elevation, it may be observed that there are two separate 
levels of floodplain apparent; especially around the edges of floodplain water bodies such as ponds, 
swamps, oxbow lakes, streams, etc. These areas experience prolonged flooding for many months, and 
become dry season refuges and habitats of numerous aquatic animals, such as fish, amphibians, 
mollusks, crabs, leeches, insects, water snakes, etc. Mainly the vegetation community consists of 
various aquatic plants. There are four levels of dominant aquatic plant types, namely 
• marginal plants such as Pue (Actinoscirpus grossus (L.f.) Goetgh. & D.A. Simpson), Lai 
(unknown species), Toop Ruesri (unknown species);  
•  rooted emergent plants such as Bua Sai (Nymphaea lotus L.), Bua Luang (Nelummbo 
nucifera Gaertn.), Krajab Sikhow (Trapa natans var. pumula Nakano), Paengpuay Nam 
(Ludwigia adscendens (L.) Hara), Talapat  Ruesie (unknown species), Paktop Thai 
(unknown species); 
•  floating plants such as Jok (Pistia stratiotes L.), Jok Hunu (Salvinia cucullata Roxb. ex 
Bory), Paktop Chawa (Eichhornia crassipes (Mart.) Solms-Laub.);  
• submerged plants such as Salai Hangkarok (Hydrilla verticillata Presl.), Salai Khownieow 
(unknown species), Pobpeb (unknown species), Sarai Yaa (unknown species). 
 
Every year fluctuating flood levels affects the river ecosystem with respect to changing aquatic animal 
abundance and aquatic plant populations. Especially with floating plants such as Jok (Pistia stratiotes 
L.), Jok Huunuu (Salvinia cucullata Roxb. ex Bory), Paktop Chawa (Eichhornia crassipes (Mart.) Solms-
Laub.), flow can flush such plants out from backwaters into the main river. Thus, there tends to be 
little floating plant accumulation like in other river systems, which would cause the water sources to 
become shallower. Thus, if there were no regular overtopping floodplain floods each year, marginal 
plants would tend to become the dominant plant group due to progressive shallowing of backwater 
features. The water area would be reduced, followed by the strongly embraceable shrub community 
gradually occupying the margins. Eventually, this area would become a floodplain area without 
significant permanent water features and many kinds of aquatic organisms would be lost from the 
ecosystem. 
 
3.5 Socio-Economic Study 
Dr Buapan Promphakping 
 
Methodology  
An important aspect of the Intermediate E-flows Assessment was that the study team comprised 
specialists from different disciplines, resulting in the combined methodological approach to the 
assessment being quite complex. Part of the socio-economist’s role was to try and understand the 
other disciplinary approaches and “add value” to them by looking for socio-economically relevant data 
within their work. In theory, the team planned that each member should share not only the data 
obtained, but also justification of the methodology employed to obtain the data. In practice though, the 
limited time available made full participation in all the other’s approaches a challenge. 
It was presumed that the villagers of the selected villages would be the main users of the riparian 
resources, but often there could be other outside groups who utilize that section of river or resources. 
However, the assumption was sufficiently valid to allow analysis of socio-economic change, linking 
floodplain resources, various stakeholders and resource use aspects of the wetlands in question. 
Additionally, the dry season study allowed a more thorough exploration of linkages between socio-
economic aspects and biological aspects within the given ecological setting.  
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In the wet season, socio-economic data was primarily obtained through interviews with local leaders. 
In the dry season by comparison, the teams decided to employ a range of methods and tools that are 
commonly used in participatory field studies, i.e. group interviews, focus group discussions, historic 
time-line, transect walk and institutional analysis. These tools or methods were usually used in 
combination during evening village meetings. It shall be noted here that Venn diagrams which was 
originally planned to be used for institutional analysis, was found to present difficulties in application. 
 
Assessment  
Socio-economic changes in the community and changes in floodplain resources 
The study of three communities revealed that socio-economic aspects of the Nam Songkhram River 
Basin rural society were formerly characterized by a largely subsistence-based local economy that 
started to be commoditized in the 1960’s. The economy of Ban Kam Chi (Site 1) several decades ago 
was largely dominated by NTFP harvesting, upland cash crop cultivation (including kenaf, sugar cane, 
cassava) combined with subsistence rice production.  
The majority of local people are in-migrants from other provinces of the Northeast, who were enticed 
by the prospects of cheap and available forest land to grow cash crops. When the uplands were fully 
claimed, new migrants extended their land holdings into the floodplain lands, with the assistance of 
local leaders of the time. However, as these lands were flooded annually for several months and were 
seen as having poor prospects for cash crops, the lands were mostly saved from total clearance and 
remained as secondary forest, useful for common pool resource fishing, hunting and gathering 
activities.  
Ban Tha Bor (Site 2) was formerly dominated by a ‘fishing-based economy’ (Wallipadom, 1998) and 
was considered an important centre for fish product trading due to a seasonal abundance of fish 
locally, which allowed the majority of population in Ban Tha Bor to make a significant part of their 
living from fishing or fish processing. All the surrounding villages of the Lower Songkhram River Basin 
ate fish on a daily basis (often three times daily) and fish and aquatic resources formed (and still form 
for many households) the bulk of protein consumption. Ban Na Pho (Site 3) could be considered more 
of a “subsistence community”, where households formerly mostly depended on a mix of fishing, NTFP 
extraction, upland cash crop growing and subsistence rice growing for their livelihoods. 
Over the past 25 years, a number of changes related to degradation of floodplain resources were 
observed or reported to the researchers. First, there was massive forest clearance in the village 
peripheries, both on the floodplain and on upland terraces. Ban Kam Chi villagers reported that a 
private company obtained a logging concession from the state during the second half of 1970s. Big 
hardwood trees were cut and removed from the village within a period of only two to three years. In 
Ban Na Pho the villagers said that there had been no concessions given to private companies, but the 
villagers themselves cut valuable timber trees along Nam Oon river banks and floated them down to 
sell to sawmills or local businessmen at Sri Songkhram township. The rate of removal of logs and tree 
stumps from the riverbanks and surrounding floodplain, which had previously provided varied habitat 
for fish, increased as the price of hardwood increased. 
Second, dry season rice growing has rapidly expanded, primarily into floodplain areas. This has been 
happening in conjunction with construction of water infrastructure on the floodplain. In Ban Kham Chi 
an earthen dam was built in the 1980s at the mouth of Huay Chi, a small natural stream flowing into 
the Songkhram River, to provide gravity-fed irrigation to a small area (< 50 rai) of land downstream. 
Different types of water sources were found in Ban Tha Bor and Ban Na Pho, all of which were located 
on floodplain areas. In the rainy season these water storage bodies are inundated by floodwaters. The 
justification given for building these water resources was to store water for dry season rice growing, 
although we found many not able to fulfill this function. Although these water sources are frequently 
under-utilized, plans to build more water resources by both local and central government agencies 
abound. These plans are usually driven by claims of drought and water shortage for dry season rice 
farmers. 
Third, the economy of the three communities over the past three decades has been primarily 
dependent on external income sources and factors. Out-migration is found to be common across the 
three communities, reversing the earlier trend of in-migration. In Ban Kham Chi the leaders reported 
that more than 200 people currently work outside the village as laborers, representing almost fifty 
percent of the village population. Every week or two, several pick-up trucks ferry people, food and 
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necessities from the village to and from industrial towns in central Thailand. On the return trip to the 
village, the pick-up truck owner will bring remittances from the workers to their families. Significant 
numbers of workers from Ban Na Pho and Ban Tha Bor migrated overseas in the last 30 years (e.g. 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Taiwan, Brunei), stimulating the local economy in the form of houses, 
vehicles and consumer items, but precipitating wider socio-economic changes. Mobility and 
consumption patterns in rural villages now more closely reflect the wider socio-economic patterns of 
urban Thailand than in years gone by. 
 
It should be noted that the growing importance of the external economy and out-migration in these 
villages has likely eased some pressure on the floodplain resources, i.e. fish and non-timber forest 
products (NTFP’s). However, from our observations the use of floodplain resources still remains high, 
partly due to the fact that fish and NTFP’s have been further commoditised. These resources are not 
only used to satisfy basic household food needs, but have increasingly become a source of income for 
many households. This coupled with a growing demand for wild products by urban markets and an 
almost complete switch to a cash economy, has intensified use of floodplain resources. This includes 
the issue of land tenure, which will be discussed further. 
Fourth, is the widespread presence of agribusiness in the Lower Songkhram River Basin and its 
occupation of vast areas of floodplain land. In Ban Tha Bor, villagers reported that the SunTech 
Company Ltd dishonestly obtained former publically-owned wetlands by conspiring with local state 
officials. Later, the company approached the villagers and offered them a sum of money in exchange 
for the land rights. The majority of villagers accepted this offer, although official documentation of this 
land had not yet been undertaken.  
In Ban Na Pho, villagers were also approached and were offered similar kinds of benefits, although in 
their case the villagers did not accept the offer of the company. The company completely cleared the 
lands it had acquired to grow intensive vegetable crops to supply a factory located in Ban Don Daeng, 
Sri Songkhram District (close to Site 2). For a while in the late 1980s and early 1990s, many local 
villagers were employed in the factory or in the plantations growing tomatoes or sweetcorn for tinning. 
They reported the heavy use of pesticides and chemical fertilizer, as well as constant conflicts between 
villagers and the company about land ownership and right of access, for example to fish or raise 
livestock on the floodplain. 
Given that the land obtained by SunTech is located in the heart of the LSRB floodplains, clearing the 
land for growing intensive crops has inevitably created detrimental impacts on floodplain resources. 
Although the cultivation activities of the company have steadily declined in the past ten years 
(apparently due to poor competitiveness in tinned tomatoes for export), until the reported 2007 
abandonment of plantations and all production staff laid-off. Neverthess, the land still remains under 
the control of Sun Tech Company, despite it currently lying idle for agriculture. The company’s long-
term intentions for the land are uncertain, but local villagers are suspicious it has plans to capitalize on 
its extensive assets, possibly by demanding state compensation for lost land, should a large reservoir 
be built on the Nam Oon or Nam Songkhram floodplain, as currently proposed by the Royal Irrigation 
Department.  
 
Invasion of a new tree species: Eucalyptus  
The changes in socio-economic conditions described above meant that labor for agricultural work in the 
local community became scarce over time. At the same time, remittances from outside often do not 
meet a family’s financial needs and agricultural activities continue, especially for rice cultivation. 
Increasingly villagers have chosen agricultural activities, techniques or crops with low labor 
requirements, including non-food cash crops such as eucalyptus and rubber plantations. 
The boom of eucalyptus cultivation in all three villages has been quite a recent phenomenon, although 
it has actually been promoted locally for more than two decades. The promotion of this alien species 
tree crop has been controversial, especially the issue of environmental impacts. In Ban Kam Chi, 
villagers learnt about the economic prospects of eucalyptus from an early adopter who made a sum of 
money higher than other legally crops grown previously. Eucalyptus cultivation has been promoted by 
both state agencies and the pulp and paper industry, with one major mill being located near Khon 
Kaen, but logs also being sent to central Thailand mills for processing.  
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The price of eucalyptus varies, but in mid-2007 was in the region of 900 to 1,100 baht per tonne (i.e. 
approx $25 - $30/tonne). Furthermore, eucalyptus has been widely adopted for the specific reason 
that it can tolerate flooding better than most other crops and so is considered suitable for growing on 
the Songkhram floodplain. Moreover, growing eucalyptus requires minimal labor input after planting. In 
the 2007 dry season study, we observed vast areas in Ban Na Pho had recently been cleared since the 
recession of the last flood. According to one study in Ban Tha Bor, more than 40 percent of the 
households grow eucalyptus, with plantations on the floodplain (Srisuno, 2006).  
 
Institutional dimensions11 
a) Land and property rights  
Beginning from the broad topic of floodplain resources (forest, land, water, fishery, etc.) governance, 
one of the primary considerations is property rights regimes and their evolution over time. In the 
recent past wetland forests, floodplain land and the river itself were considered as open access 
resources by local people. The abundance of these resources and their mostly subsistence-level use 
meant that limitations on resource use was considered unnecessary. Scarcity and over-harvesting of 
these resources were not an issue in the minds of villagers. Although there were cultural practices 
constraining some use of natural resources, as mentioned earlier, these were mainly to protect social 
cohesion, rather than the natural resources.  
Changes in the property right regimes governing the use of floodplain resources have been primarily 
driven by socio-economic changes. First, in Ban Kham Chi migration into the village during the 1960s 
resulted in a growing scarcity of upper terrace land and wild natural resources such as timber trees and 
wildlife. Consequently, occupation of land gradually expanded downslope onto riverine floodplains. This 
was done through local (formal) leaders – previous village headman and kamnan (Sub-District chiefs). 
Reasoning that villagers had insufficient land for cultivation, the lands were allotted to households that 
conspired with the leaders. Then portions of lands were sold to new migrants, without formal or legal 
documentation. Later on, land officials were called on to endorse the property rights of some of these 
people by issuing temporary land documents named Sor Por Kor12. This appeared to be an attempt at 
avoiding later problems that may have arisen from denying land rights that had been given by local 
leaders.  
Similar processes also occurred in Ban Tha Bor and Ban Naa Pho, but the privatization of land was 
advanced by an agribusiness company in the case of the former village. As mentioned above, the 
agribusiness company conspiring with local authorities, issued land documents to households in Ban 
Tha Bor. Households were not aware that they ever officially “owned” a particular piece or pieces of 
land on the floodplain, yet were persuaded by company agents in collusion with local officials into 
signing a document to transfer the land to the company in exchange for some money. Villagers of Ban 
Naa Pho turned down a similar offer, apparently for the reason that the price offered by the company 
seemed too low in their view. Although the process of land documentation for floodplain land claims 
has not yet been officially completed, the trend of common land privatization has continued. 
Agribusiness companies hold vast tracts of land, while villagers claim rights on smaller plots of 
surrounding lands, with disputes common.  
It should be noted here that in the LSRB, the state has widely issued Sor Por Kor documents to 
villagers. This was justified principally as an attempt to solve the problem of ‘having no farmland to 
earn a living’ – banha mai mee teedin tee tam gin – but in the case of the Nam Songkhram floodplain, 
ironically, most plots were left unused for agriculture until recently because of annual flooding 
rendering them unsuitable for wet season rice. At the same time, lack of irrigation infrastructure and 
extension support left them unsuitable for dry season rice, despite several failed attempts.  
Additionally, the state has over the past few years introduced a compensation scheme for farmers who 
are affected by natural disasters. Flooding is regarded as a “natural disaster” (utokapai) no matter its 
actual causes, but in order to claim compensation the villagers must grow rice on the floodplain land 
they own, despite knowing the high probability that the crop will be damaged or destroyed by flood. 
The compensation is based on the area of land they use for growing rice; hence the greater area 
                                          
11 A summary of the institutional analysis is given in Annex 7. 
12 Sor Por Kor is a category of land document issued in lands administered under the Office of 
Agricultural Land Reform (ALRO), under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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reported as cultivated, the more compensation can be claimed. Claims to land rights by villagers has 
also been stimulated by the current state policy of ‘turning property into financial capital’. The state 
stipulated that Sor Por Kor land title would be acceptable documents for guaranteeing loans from state 
and commercial banks, reversing past loan condition practices. This policy has encouraged people to 
clear naturally vegetated floodplain land. Villagers in all three villages told us that the floodplains have 
been subject to rapid occupation since the policy was announced, leaving very little common land left 
unclaimed. The privatization of land is closely associated with the depletion of floodplain resources, 
especially the clearance of land to grow eucalyptus, as described above. 
 
b) Community institutions   
In general, there is scarce evidence for an active role by community institutions pertaining to floodplain 
resources. From interviews, beliefs in supernatural forces related to floodplain resources used to exist 
but have evidently weakened or virtually disappeared. In Ban Kham Chi, the villagers reported that 
there was a belief in a local guardian spirit known as Ta Poo of Kham Chi (ancestral spirit of a natural 
spring on a Songkhram tributary which gave the village its name). This belief stipulated that the use of 
natural resources, especially fish, must be conducted in a particular way. Villagers said that anyone 
who killed a pla faa (a freshwater turtle) would die. Some years ago a villager killed a crocodile and as 
a consequence almost ten persons in the village later died, according to local beliefs. This village has a 
strict control of migrants from outside into the village for the reason that new migrants may find it 
hard to comply with local beliefs. However, the belief in Ta Poo of Kham Chi has declined with the 
former spirit house for Ta Poo being moved from its old site by the stream to a new site located near 
the village, apparently for convenience-sake.  
In Ban Tha Bor, the temple has played a lead role in demarcating and managing a ‘sanctuary 
compound’ (khet apai than), – an area prohibiting all forms of killing and hunting. This includes a 
protected area located in the main channel of the Nam Songkhram River in front of the temple 
prohibiting all fishing. A semi-protected ‘Community Forest’ area is located along the Huay Sing stream 
of Ban Tha Bor which villagers co-manage and have recently started some reforestation activity. But 
these areas are relatively small compared with the overall size of the critical floodplain area. 
One important institutional aspect involves the rules and regulations of the community pertaining to 
water bodies. It was noted that the implementation and actions of these institutions varies 
considerably. Most villagers expressed a view that the main channel of the river is regarded as being 
open access to all, thus limiting the community on placing fishing restrictions. However, for Ban Tha 
Bor and nearby villages, the main river channel has been divided into unmarked sections, each under 
the guardianship of a particular village. The actions of each community to limit use of the river, 
especially control of the use of different types of fishing gear was generally unclear. More manifest 
were regulations concerned with natural swamps, reservoirs and other types of small waterbody 
connected to the main river. These water sources are located on the floodplain and will be inundated 
during floods. In Ban Tha Bor, villagers reported that the right to fish in some of these water resources 
will be auctioned off in a bidding process to a private concession for a certain period of the year (during 
flood recession and the early dry season), and income from these concessions will be used for public 
projects of the village, such as small infrastructure projects or a fund for emergency repairs.  
 
c) State agencies and local government 
Actions of state agencies may either limit or encourage use of floodplain resources. From a focus group 
discussion in Ban Naa Pho, the government agencies concerned with floodplain resources include the 
former Department of Energy Development and Promotion (DEDP), Department of Land Development, 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID), Department of Land Registration, Tambon Administrative 
Organization (TAO) and Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO). These state agencies tend to 
implement projects using their own budget and expertise usually engaging in minimal consultation with 
local people, except for local government agencies. Most of the projects of the state agencies are 
related to water infrastructure development, particularly irrigation. These currently include a plan by 
the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) to build dam barriers near the confluence of the Nam Oon and 
Nam Songkhram rivers, which would flood significant areas of floodplain land affecting sites 2 and 3. 
While villagers are still unclear which areas of land will be flooded, some have given cautious support 
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to the Nam Oon project on advice of village leaders. Villagers also ranked the importance of these 
agencies according to their role in water infrastructure construction.  
 
d) Community Organization and Environmental Associations 
There are several kinds of community organizations existing in the villages. These organizations were 
both initiated and funded by state and non-state organizations. There are farmer associations, 
occupational groups, women’s groups, credit groups (e.g. One Million Baht Village Fund scheme of the 
Thaksin government), child care groups, etc. However, none of these play a direct role related to 
governing the use of floodplain resources. An exception might be a community organization in Ban Tha 
Bor, where an NGO is presently working with the villagers. The community organizations are managing 
community forestry, village (temple) sanctuaries, and coordinating with NGO’s (and state agencies), in 
studying floodplain resources and initiating activities that may lead to the wise use of floodplain 
resources. 
One interesting point of information to emerge from a focus group discussion in Ban Naa Pho was that 
an environmental association had been formed. From the report of one participant, the group was 
formed based on the TAO structure. Volunteers working for the association recruit from the members 
of the TAO. But the role of this association is somewhat suspicious; this association might be used to 
mobilize people to support the dam construction that is currently planned for construction near the 
mouth of Nam Oon, but would create a reservoir backing up far along the floodplain past Ban Pho Noi. 
Another local association is the Natural Resources Conservation Club of the Songkhram River Basin, 
whose Chairman is the village headman of Ban Pak Oon (nearby Ban Tha Bor).  
  
Resource user groups  
The socio-economic analysis from both the wet and dry seasons suggests that floodplain resources 
have become less important as the economy of these communities has been gradually oriented 
towards the outside market. However, these resources still remain relatively important to certain 
groups, which will be discussed below. 
 
a) Fisheries 
Fishing is far more important to local livelihoods in Ban Tha Bor than the other two villages. This is 
primarily due to the bio-physical location of the village; a) Ban Tha Bor is located in ‘the heart’ of the 
floodplain – where the floodplain extends to its widest point in the LSRB; and b) there are relatively 
fewer options for agriculture due to lack of raised terraces nearby. This wetland location has meant 
that fish have always been abundant and local people have long been highly dependent on fishing and 
fish processing for a living. Although people have been increasingly earning a living from employment 
outside the village in recent decades, fishing continues to play an important role for the household 
economy of many families. One leader of the village told us that over eighty percent of the households 
in Ban Tha Bor still go fishing, but the extent to which fishing contributes to the total household 
economy has declined. By comparison fishing in the other two villages is far less important and has 
declined as a main form of livelihood and tends to be regarded as a ‘supplementary’ activity for most 
villagers. 
 
In Ban Kham Chi, the ‘master’ (praan or sian) of fishing is a man from a relatively well-off household. 
The household owns a grocery shop, primarily run by his wife. The household has only one sibling 
(adopted) age 30 years old who primarily takes responsiblity for agricultural work in the household. In 
contrast, a poor household interviewed in Ban Kham Chi, earned a living from out-migration to 
Bangkok as construction workers. Upon the birth of a son in the city, the family returned home to the 
village and attempted to earn their living locally, including fishing and rice farming. However, due to a 
scarcity of fish and lack of fishing skills, it was very difficult for this household to sustain a reasonable 
standard of living, they claimed. The young husband despite suffering from poor health, now plans to 
migrate out the village again in search of work. 
 
In Ban Tha Bor where fishing is of greater importance than other two sites, the stakeholders in fishing 
seem to be divided according to the fishing gears they use. In observing a fishing operation using a 
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beach seine net in Huay Sing and subsequent discussions with local leaders, villagers expressed their 
concern about the depletion of fish caused by the improper use of fishing gears. Wealthier fishers tend 
to own big (often illegal) fishing gears and can catch large amounts of fish in certain seasons, whereas 
poorer fishers tend to own small fishing gears, and can catch only relatively small quantities of fish for 
subsistence. Using big fishing gear does not only deplete fish stocks, but may also destroy fish habitats 
(such as the removal of logs, branches of trees in the water for beach seine operations). The depletion 
of fish stocks will particularly cause negative impacts on small fishing households whose household 
economy is often more dependent on fishing than wealthier fisher households who often have the 
financial security to have diversified into other economic activities. 
 
b) Non-timber forest product (NTFP) collectors 
Villagers of the three villages identified several NTFP’s available in the floodplain that are frequently 
gathered. Bamboo shoots and several kinds of wild vegetables were ranked highly, usually second only 
to fish. Villagers use these resources for domestic consumption mostly, with few households in the 
three villages reported earning income from NTFP’s. However, collection of these resources requires 
labor and the availability of NTFP’s varies greatly according to season. As discussed earlier, the cash 
economy has come to dominate the community economy, therefore villagers will give priority to labor 
activities that can earn cash in hand more than activities with less certainty about a return. Moreover, 
wild vegetables and fish are widely available in local markets. Most bamboo shoots and wild vegetable 
collectors are women. From the focus group discussion, although women reported that occasionally 
they collect NTFP’s from the floodplain, it appears that household dependence on these resources has 
declined over time. Two main reasons for this are, as stated above, that they prefer to undertake 
activities that can earn cash and alternative fresh foods are available in local markets or even sold by 
traders to the village from the back of pick-up trucks. However, it was noted that older villagers firmly 
preferred the taste of wild vegetables and natural foods to the less fresh and “pesticide laced” 
cultivated vegetables found in the markets.    
  
c) Rice farmers 
Most of the villagers in three villages are part-time rice farmers, although not all of them grow rice on 
the floodplain. In Ban Kham Chi a portion of households own land in the upper terrace land (i.e. not 
flooded), but have long utilized lowland areas for limited rice cultivation. Some households take the 
risk of growing rice as flood levels each year are unpredictable. In years that floods are limited or brief 
their rice crop will be secure, while the upland rice crop may suffer from insufficient rainfall. By 
contrast, in years that floods are high, rice crops on the floodplain will be inundated and damaged / 
destroyed, while the upland crop will be secure. In the past occupation of land to grow rice and other 
crops on the floodplain was minimal, compared with the vast areas of floodplain forest land 
undisturbed by villagers. In Ban Tha Bor where almost the whole surrounding land surface is inundated 
each rainy season for a few months (leaving the village as a virtual island), villagers relied on fish 
products to exchange with rice, whether in the form of barter exchange or through cash sales.  
Over the past two decades, dry season rice farming has been heavily promoted by the state. This has 
occurred alongside widespread construction of water infrastructure, especially the construction of 
weirs, reservoirs, embankments and dredging of streams and channels by the state agencies. The 
justification for this construction was primarily given as supplying water for rice growers in the dry 
season. Many of these structures were observed as discrete waterbodies on the floodplain in the dry 
season study, whereas during the wet season they were inundated and became part of a massive 
shallow lake. Clearly, the modification of the floodplain has affected the floodplain natural resources. 
National agricultural development policy stimulated villagers to clear floodplain forests to grow rice. 
However, dry season rice cultivation has not expanded to the same extent as the proliferation of water 
storage structures, chiefly because of the flat topography of the area which dictates that a small dam 
will create a large reservoir. In Ban Kham Chi, a weir built from about twenty years ago has obstructed 
a small stream connected to the Songkram River to create a reservoir. But less than ten households 
were reported growing dry rice in 2006/07, planting an area less than that lost to the reservoir. A 
growing number of households were found to be growing dry season rice in Ban Tha Bor and Ban Naa 
Pho, partly encouraged by a good market price for glutinous rice in the past year. In fact we observed 
from the dry season study that in Ban Naa Pho only one family used water for growing rice from the 
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reservoir built by the Department of Land Development over the past few years, while the entire fields 
adjacent to the water source were left idle, probably due to the costs of pumping water to the fields. 
Village irrigation projects are always subsidized by one state agency or another and frequently last only 
as long as the input subsidy lasts. 
Despite this, building water infrastructure remains the top priority of the local government, particularly 
the Tambon Administrative Organization (TAO). In talking with the Chairman of the TAO at Ban Na 
Pho, he told the team that people in the vicinity are demanding the TAO to build more water 
infrastructure for rice growing. The plan of TAO to build new water infrastructure includes constructing 
a weir on the Nam Oon main channel. From a focus group discussion in Ban Naa Pho, the views of 
villagers about water infrastructure construction were consistent with that of the TAO Chairman. 
Pressure and demand for building water infrastructure is high, despite the poor management and 
usage of existing structures and as long as central policies do not change, it is expected that this will 
remain the case in the future. 
It should be noted here that there was in the past a traditional system of dry season rice cultivation 
(naa saeng) adopted by local people in the LSRB. Rice growing followed the flood recession by planting 
along floodplain channels and streams, which did not require irrigation infrastructure as natural 
moisture was utilised. In Ban Tha Bor we also observed an adaptation of this system of rice growing 
during the dry season study. Villagers grew naa saeng on a narrow strip at the edge of the Huay Sing 
reservoir. Where villagers themselves had built a reservoir (using state funds), it was found that the 
water management efficiency was better than those systems built by external state agencies 
(Prompakping et al, 2005). It was also found that there is an alarming number of abandoned water 
management infrastructure scattered around the LSRB, with little accountability for the failure.  
 
d) Eucalyptus growers 
The factors driving eucalyptus plantation rapid spread across the Basin have been briefly discussed 
above, but just a few further points should be mentioned from a stakeholder perspective. Eucalyptus 
cultivation in the three villages has been primarily driven by the demands of the pulp and paper 
industry, through local agents, including state officials. The strategy of the pulp and paper industry is 
slightly different from intensive cash crop agribusinesses in the LSRB in the past in that it does not 
seek to obtain land and grow the trees on its own land. Instead, the businesses involved aim to 
promote small farmers to produce raw material for supplying the industry, thus reducing risks and 
overhead costs associated with land acquisition. The rapidly growing number of farmers growing 
eucalyptus means a stable source of supply to the factories for several years to come, plus a lower 
price of raw material. Villagers constrained by labor shortages and looking for a low maintenance crop 
with a seemingly strong demand and attractive price, have been lured to invest their land, time and 
money in planting eucalyptus seedlings costing less than one baht per seedling. A parallel cottage 
business has sprung up in some villages (e.g. Ban Kham Chi) propagating and nursing eucalyptus 
seedlings to meet the local demand, with households involved claiming they could earn quite 
reasonable supplementary income from eucalyptus seedling sales. The popularity of eucalyptus was 
such that in Ban Tha Bor, a forest temple had grubbed out mixed species native trees planted through 
MWBP assistance the year before and planted eucalyptus seedlings in their place, while in Ban Kham 
Chi villagers were ripping out bamboo clumps behind their houses to plant eucalyptus stands. 
 
e) Agro-industry 
Agro-industry appeared in the LSRB about three decades ago, by obtaining large plots of land on the 
floodplain from local villagers that had formerly been public land. The industry initially concentrated on 
growing intensive vegetable crops (e.g. tomato, sweetcorn) for supplying factories for export from 
their own farms, but later also promoted the growing of the same crops by local farmers. Agribusiness 
at one time was a significant source of employment for local labor in Sri Songkhram District, as the 
farm, processing factory and contract farming were creating jobs about 15 years ago when the 
business peaked. Villagers recounted how initial dreams of a better life working in the tomato 
processing factory or company plantations subsequently vanished as the company started laying 
people off en masse. Meanwhile, local farmers who tried growing tomatoes under contract to Sun Tech 
company often found the price offered was not sufficient to cover their investments and many made 
losses or were cheated by middlemen over payments. 
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Due to a mix of financial irregularities involving land acquisition, political interference, non-performing 
loans and poor competitiveness against foreign producers and macro-economic changes, the agro-
industry has declined considerably in the last decade, until now the former tomato processing factory 
and intensive plantations near Ban Tha Bor have closed down entirely. The fact remains though that 
this one agribusiness company holds vast plots of land on the Nam Songkhram and Nam Oon 
floodplains and would still appear to be active in pushing for water infrastructure projects that would 
provide it with compensation for lost land, thus recapitalizing its loans from various banks.  
 
f) Cattle and buffalo raisers 
Cattle and water buffalo are commonly found in all three villages and traditionally formed an important 
part of the local economy. The raising of buffalo and cattle has long been dependent on the open 
access floodplain forests and scrub/grasslands for animal grazing and forage resources. As a result of 
the plentiful common land available for grazing, local villagers made a significant part of their living 
from livestock and were able to raise large herds in the past. In the dry season the animals would 
graze on the floodplain, but during the flood season animals would be moved to higher land around the 
village or on elevated alluvial terrace “islands” called “Don” above the water level. During the past few 
years with the promotion of dry season rice growing and expansion of eucalyptus plantations, grazing 
animals on former public land has faced increasing difficulties as the common access lands are 
privatized and fenced off. This has increased conflicts at the village level between livestock owners and 
crop growers, especially if the animals damage the crops where they once were able to freely graze. 
The onus is on the livestock owner to keep their animals out of plantations and in Ban Tha Bor, some 
villagers have been obliged to lower their herd size considerably or even give up raising livestock, 
because of the problems and disputes arising.  
 
 
Conclusions: Re-negotiating for the future 
Changes in socio-economics of the three villages and the Nam Songkhram Basin in general are quite 
evident. These changes evidently affect the ecological regime of the river and floodplain. One thing 
which is clear to the villagers, from focus group discussions and multiple interviews, that the future of 
the remaining paa bung paa thaam or floodplain forest is not bright, due to many pressures. Some 
even believe that no tracts of wetland forests in the Songkram River will remain in the future. This 
scenario is not impossible, especially considering that the stakeholders using floodplain resources have 
extended beyond the local people living in the Nam Songkhram Basin, to include distant agribusiness 
and the pulp industry, with little vested interest in conserving resources beyond its own narrow needs.  
 
Meanwhile, as resources have declined, local communities have gained higher mobility, higher 
consumption patterns and no longer rely on natural resources to the same degree as in the past were 
prominent findings from the study. People in the Songkhram Basin earn their living more and more 
from distant locations (out-migration), but in the meantime others increase exploitation of the 
resources of the floodplain through unsustainable usage patterns, in order to meet increased demands 
from local and distant markets. In the short run there may be growing affluence of the communities, 
more infrastructure construction, higher consumption patterns and a higher standard of living. But on 
the other hand, we also can forecast the continued erosion or even total collapse of the ecological 
regime.   
The expansion of eucalyptus has resulted in the widespread loss of paa bung paa thaam (seasonally 
flooded forest). The apparently devastating impacts on floodplain resources was described by one 
member of the study team as a ‘war on ecological systems’; by replacing diverse native plant species 
by a single alien species in a fragile environment with as yet unknown long term consequences. This 
type of ‘war’ is caused by fundamental changes in national and regional socio-economics, plus altering 
values of human society; where convenience, mobility and mass consumption have became key 
desires of rural communities, as well as urban society.  
This suggests that the concept of ‘environmental flows’ is rather complex. Hence, the concept of 
“Environmental Flows” should perhaps not only be viewed from an eco-hydrological perspective, but 
from a wider angle of looking at other types of flows across boundaries or systems. Flows into 
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floodplain communities include consumer goods, money, information, novel (labor-saving) technologies 
such as new crop types, pesticides, insecticides, etc. Flows out from the communities and the 
floodplains include human labor, natural wetland products (fish, bamboo shoots, mushrooms, etc.), 
cash crops (e.g. rice, eucalyptus, etc) and soil nutrients (both by erosion and within the crop itself). In 
fact, the first stages of the ecocidal war occurred about forty years ago when logging concessions were 
given to private companies and old, valuable hardwood trees were removed. The bamboo-dominated 
paa boong paa thaam is not a pristine, original forest type, but is a sign of a degraded ecosystem in a 
recovery phase. But the advent of eucalyptus plantations will have far more severe impacts on 
floodplain ecology as biodiversity of the floodplain vegetation is narrowed to a single dominant type of 
plant, nutrients are stripped from the soils and food webs are broken. 
The future we portray here is under continual negotiation between several stakeholders with interests 
in the Nam Songkram Basin. But as discussed, some stakeholders hold stronger leverage than others 
i.e., those who are supported by dominant state agencies and the market in particular. Indeed, the 
depletion of environmental resources may temporarily increase the affluence of the population in the 
Songkhram Basin as a result of perverse subsidies distorting the market, even as the larger share of 
natural capital or wealth of the area is transferred to the brokers of the state (e.g. construction 
companies or officials), agro-industry, the pulp and paper industry, etc. More importantly, the riverine 
environment  in its entirety has hitherto been regarded as a ‘resource’ to be exploited in order to 
achieve notions of prosperity, but never counted as a legitimate ‘stakeholder’ or partner in itself, that 
requires certain minimum levels or/and types of flows to maintain it. The livelihoods and socio-
economic health of the population of the Nam Songkhram River in the long run is in jeopardy, unless 
new paradigms of development are adopted. It is therefore necessary to re-negotiate power relations 
and natural resource use regimes for the ‘common future’ of all stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.5.1. Profile diagram of ecotone of plant community in upper flood plain area and higher terrace areas 
(a) the end of plant community in flood plain area  
(b) ecotone; small trees, e.g Micocos tomentosa, Hymenocardia wallichii, Phyllanthus polyphyllus  
© Dipterocarp stand; Dipterocarpus alatus (d) substand; e.g. Canarium subulatum, Aporosa villosa, Careya sphaerica 
(e) Dipterocarp stand; Dipterocarpus obtusifolius (f) plant community in higher area 
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Plant Community in the lower alluvial terrace area 
The alluvial terrace area is usually found as a continuum from the floodplain plant community that is 
the furthest away from the main river channel. For example, in the Ban Kham Chi site next to a 
Bambusa sp. zone mixed with tree and climber vegetations zone is an area of typical lower terrace 
vegetation. Since land has been highly developed and altered by a community link road which acts as a 
significant barrier to water flow during floods between the floodplain forest and lower terrace 
vegetation.  
 
Terraced land also was found on the island (Don Awm Gaew) that is encircled by Huay Sing stream at 
Ban Tha Bor. At Ban Tha Bor site there are many scattered areas of elevated terraces bordering the 
floodplain zone. On the island, a higher area vegetation zone is found in the centre that is located 
further away from the water source and slightly above the water table. 
 
During high floodwater levels in the wet season, the zone might be flooded temporarily for a period of 
a couple days to a week. Almost all of the natural vegetation consists of either Dipterocarp species or 
other economically valuable tree species. The stands tend to be dominated by uniform deciduous trees, 
such as Yang Na (Dipterocarpus alatus Roxb.) and Yang Heang (unknown species) and a groundcover 
of herbs and grasses in some areas. The occurrence of climbers such as Pi Puan (Uvaria pierrei Finet & 
Gagnep) and Khreua Khueang (unknown species) was also noted.  
  
In terms of aquatic animal abundance, the zone is less valuable for villagers during the dry season, but 
it represents a zone of high value for villagers in terms of collecting terrestrial edible plants, edible 
insects, wild mushrooms, resin and honey.      
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Figure 3.5.2 Profile diagram of plant community in lower floodplain area e.g. near an oxbow lake 
(a) herb zone in open land  (b,e, and g)  strongly embraceable shrub community 
(c,h) small trees; e.g. Hymenocardia wallichii, Phyllanthus reticulates (d) tree and climber vegetation 
(f) oxbow lake; aquatic plant zone   
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Useful plants found in seasonally inundated forest 
Many plants are commonly utilized in the seasonally inundated forest for a variety of purposes 
including fuelwood, agricultural tools, house construction, weaving, material dyes, fishing gear, fodder 
for livestock, medicine, spiritual/religious ceremonies and the most significant category is edible plants. 
According to observations by the survey team, the most common group who collect edible plants from 
the seasonally inundated forest are women (especially fishermen’s wives), followed by men and 
children. They primarily collect the plants for consumption, but occasionally for sale also. Some plants 
are used frequently, so they have been transplanted to home vegetable gardens for cultivation. The 
main period for collecting wild plants is the dry season, but the beginning and end of the rainy season 
as water levels rise and fall are also important periods. Bamboo shoots can be collected nearly all year, 
with the exception of January to April, when growth slows or stops altogether. The edible plant Kai 
Hangnak (unknown species) can be collected year round. Fodder for livestock is mainly grasses and 
some herbs. The villagers also collect many edible species of mushroom in the seasonally inundated 
forest, including Hed Peung Tam (unknown species) and Hed Khone (unknown species).  
There are several floodplain areas alongside the Songkhram river which have extensive stands of a 
bamboo species (Pai Kasa). It is a resilient and successful competitor for available space and soil 
nutrients and can withstand heavy disturbance.  Pai Kasa became the dominant over-story vegetation 
species across many areas following forest clearance, providing a useful and nutritious wetland product 
for villagers. Twenty years ago land was opened for rice cultivation but the early attempts were often 
unsuccessful, leading to abandonment and allowing Pai Kasa to naturally occupy the de-vegetated 
land. If the plant community succession was allowed to proceed naturally without human activity on a 
certain floodplain area, it might need over 20 years to recover before returning to a mature and high 
complexity stage. Recently, clearance of the bamboo forest for eucalyptus plantations by farmers has 
occurred in Ban Kham Chi and Na Pho Noi sites when we visited in the dry season. So, natural 
succession with multiple disturbances is becoming an increasingly common occurrence, even though 
the flood regime is basically unchanged for many decades. For the Ban Naa Pho Noi site, its 
hydrological regime has been modified by the upstream Nam Oon storage dam and irrigation project, 
causing increased downstream erosion, altered flow patterns and a possible decreased likelihood of 
prolonged flooding in the dry season, due to water being held back in the reservoir. It is uncertain 
what impact that this change in flows has had on the floodplain plant communities. 
Conclusions 
All three study sites show marked changes of vegetation habitats from the natural state. Their present 
state is much degraded and altered from how it might have appeared forty or fifty years ago. From 
interviews with local people and from what is already known about the Songkhram Basin, five decades 
ago the area was covered with extensive lowland, semi-moist evergreen forest and dry dipterocarp 
forest extending down to the margins of the seasonally inundated area of floodplain (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006). There has been widespread removal of vegetation cover and conversion of 
natural habitat to agricultural uses across the Nam Songkhram Basin. Although estimates vary, there is 
thought to be no more than 10 – 12 % natural forest cover remaining in the entire LSRB, most of 
which remains in a heavily degraded state. Particularly hard hit has been the once extensive seasonally 
flooded forests, now limited to a few discrete patches in a heavily degraded state. A Khon Kaen 
University study comparing satellite and aerial photograph data between 2001 and 2005, found that 
the area of seasonally flooded forest declined from 91.58 km2 to 69.24 km2 respectively (Homcheun, 
2007, unpublished data). This same study found that the area of paa boong paa thaam that could be 
considered “healthy” was just 10.3 % or 7.12 km2 of the total area remaining in 2005. As our study 
suggests, the area and quality has continued to decline since then. 
From field observations and previous experience of floodplain environments in Northeast Thailand, it 
was found that plant species, communities and habitat are intimately linked to local people’s livelihood 
patterns and thus present a strong social linkage. At the same time, it was observed that some native 
plant and fish species have closely linkages, through such pathways as provision of habitat, food and 
shelter to fish, especially during times of flooding. Thus, it could be surmised that anything which 
reduces the health of the native plant communities and habitats, will automatically have a negative 
impact on both aquatic fauna that relies on them and the people who depend on the fish and/or plants, 
for either all or part of their livelihoods. 
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There were some interesting characteristics noted, such as groups of similar tree types occurring in the 
higher land of the area study. Water could also affect the seed dispersal mechanism and pattern of 
plant species. This can be seen from the uniform cluster of flora that occurs in units comprising many 
species. The vegetation which grow at study sites have not only adapted themselves to the harsh 
environment in the wet season, but are also able to cope with the effects of water stress in the dry 
season. For satisfactory seed dispersal mechanism within this type of habitat, the flora mostly flowered 
or produced fruits during the rainy season. Although plants in the study sites grow with excess water in 
the wet season, during flooding they are under water stress. Many plants have adaptations to survive 
and be able to pass a month or more under water such as producing aerial roots or prop roots; 
elaborate fruit or seed parts to allow easier water dispersal; while some flora are light weight so they 
float easier. 
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Table 3.5.1  Showing favoured periods for collecting certain species of edible plants 
and mushrooms at the study sites through the year 
  
Items Month 
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. 
1. Edible plant: Saeng (ยอดแส), 
Pak Bor (ผักบอ ), Ben 
Nam (ยอดเบ็นน้ํา ), 
Huling (ผลหูลิง ), Pak 
Som (ผักสม ), Pak Khom 
(ผักขม ) 






       
1.1 Kai Hangnak 
(ไครหางนาค ) 








+ + + + + + + + + + + + 
2. Aquatic edible  plant; 
Pak Bung (ผักบุง ) 
Buabok (บัวบก ) Young 
shoot of water hyacinth 
flower 
(ดอก ออนของ ผักตบช
วา) Bual uang (หัวบัว ) 
Paengpuay (แพงพวย) Bua Sai 
(บัวสาย ) Buabaa 
(บัวบา )  






+        




+ +    
3. Bamboo shoot 
(หนอไม ) 






     




+ +  + +       
Symbol meaning:   + + +   Regularly collected 
   + + Medium amount collected 
   + Insignificant amount collected 
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Figure 1 Generalised profile diagram of plant community in flood plain area 
(a) herb zone in open land  (b)  strongly embraceable shrub community 
(c) small tree; Hymenocardia wallichii , Phyllanthus reticulates 
(d) aerial root tree and stilt root tree; e.g. Mallotus thorelii , Garcinia schomburgkiana 
(e) tree and climber vegetation 











Page 376 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 4: Scenarios Workshop 
 
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 4: Scenarios Workshop 
 
Introduction 
One of the principal components of the E-Flows study was a scenario-building 
workshop in May 2006. The Scenarios Workshop was held with the purpose of 
bringing together the Intermediate E-Flows Assessment Team following the wet and 
dry season field studies to discuss their findings in relation to a number of potential 
development scenarios for the Nam Songkhram Basin. The workshop provided a 
valuable chance to reflect on the main lessons from the field study and use them to 
consider alternative scenarios and assess what might potentially happen at each site 
on the basis of enhanced knowledge about flow changes and hydraulics. Three 
scenarios were selected for the workshop with reference to past development trends 
and socio-political considerations at national, regional and local levels. It was 
anticipated that the findings and conclusions of this workshop could be used to 
inform and influence the outcome of the Multi-Stakeholder Meeting that followed the 
scenario workshop (see section ??). Additionally, on the last day of the workshop, a 
limited number of participants from various state agencies were invited to observe 
the proceedings and listen to preliminary findings, as a way of exposing to 
stakeholder scrutiny the E-Flows approach and methodology.  
Future Scenarios Examined 
Following discussions between the Nam Songkhram E-Flows Technical Working 
Group (TWG) members and various project partners, it was decided to take forward 
four possible scenarios for consideration at the Scenarios Workshop held in Udon 
Thani in May 2006.  (The fourth was ultimately not considered due to time 
constraints.) These were justified by taking into account several considerations: 1) 
the general context of the Nam Songkhram Basin, derived from background 
information and implementation of the MWBP Demonstration Site for last 3 + years; 
2) reference to long-proposed major infrastructural projects by key water resources 
management stakeholders; and 3) what, if any, non-infrastructural project options 
could be considered as alternative ways forward for sustainable management of 
basin, natural resources and water resources, coinciding with general flows 
considerations. 
With these criteria in mind, the following scenarios were conceived as potential 
development pathways that might be applied by water resources planners and 
decision-makers: 
 
1. Nam Songkhram Dam 
2. Water Grid plan 
3. Business as usual 
4. Alternative development paradigm 
 
These scenarios are discussed here in brief. 
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Nam Songkhram Dam (plus Nam Oon Watergate) 
This scenario is one of the longest-standing development projects proposed for the 
Nam Songkhram Basin. It dates back to an early comprehensive development plan 
for the Basin put forward by NEDECO (Netherlands-based consulting firm), who were 
working for the Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower 
Mekong Basin, forerunner to the Mekong River Commission (MRC). The Pre-
Feasibility Study of the Nam Songkhram Basin Irrigation and Flood Control 
Development (NEDECO, 1983) main report, in consideration of a large dam or water 
“regulator” built just upstream from the Mekong confluence, concluded that:  
 
“The construction of a regulator near the mouth of the Nam Songkhram to create a 
storage reservoir in the floodplain appears to be the most economical way of 
providing irrigation water in the Nam Songkhram basin. Such a reservoir can 
ultimately irrigate nearly all irrigable land in the basin. Neither upstream reservoirs 
nor the regulator are feasible for flood control. The proposed regulator is for the 
purpose of irrigation only…...” 
 
The Nam Songkhram Basin Project proposed by NEDECO was never adopted, but the 
idea of a regulator dam, with upstream reservoir and a series of irrigation pumping 
stations around the periphery was later adopted by the Department of Energy 
Development and Promotion (DEDP) as one component of its grandiose Northeast 
Thailand-wide Khong-Chi-Mun (K-C-M) Project. A plan was drawn up to build a 15m 
high, 130 m wide dam with five gates about 8 km upstream from the Mekong 
confluence at Ban Na Phiang, Tha Utaen District. The dam would create a 255 km2 
reservoir, with the capacity to store 420 MCM water at a max storage height of 147.5 
m asl, which theoretically could irrigate a total of 394,500 rai (i.e. 63,120 ha) of 
farmland using electric pumping stations and canals. In 1995, the entire Nam 
Songkhram Project (which also included related dams to be constructed on the Nam 
Oon and Nam Gam rivers) was estimated to cost about $US 400 million. Land for the 
headworks was purchased and the project was strongly backed at the time by local 
and national politicians.  
The project attracted strong resistance from local villagers who would be impacted 
and environmental NGOs, while academics at public hearings disputed the findings of 
the EIA which was rejected on several occasions by the National Environment Board 
(NEB). Eventually, in March 2002, the Cabinet passed a resolution agreeing with the 
findings of the NEB that the project would have unacceptably high impacts and the 
benefits did not justify the costs (Blake and Pitakhepsmbut, 2006a).  Despite the 
apparently unequivocal rejection of the project by the government and the later 
dissolution of DEDP during a bureaucratic reorganisation in 2002, responsibility for 
the Nam Songkhram Project was shifted to the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), 
under the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (MoAC) for possible future 
implementation.  
The Nam Songkhram Project, under RID, has subsequently been proposed in the 
long-term Basin Development Plan for the 2007 – 2027 period and was listed as 
being 22nd in terms of priority for development with construction scheduled to begin 
within 15 years time at a budget of 1,364 million baht (Department of Water 
Resources, 2006). At 20th priority place in the same list and scheduled to begin in 
2011, is the so-called Nam Oon Watergates Project at a budget of 250 million baht. 
Also under the aegis of RID, both of these infrastructure projects received a boost in 
2005 during the height of the annual flood in late August, when the former Prime 
Page 378 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 4: Scenarios Workshop 
 
Minister Thaksin Shinawatra took a helicopter ride over the Lower Songhkram Basin 
and declared it a “natural disaster”. He promised to a gathered crowd in Sri 
Songkhram District that he would use some of the government’s 400 billion baht 
water resources management budget to solve the flooding problem and provide 
water for farmers to use in the dry season, and recommended spending 1.3 billion 
baht on building the Nam Songkhram Project and Nam Oon Watergates Project.  
In March 2006, a government organized public hearing was held in Sri Songkhram 
District town to announce the Nam Oon Watergates Project, which was described as 
a multi-purpose “irrigation and flood prevention project” by RID provincial officials. 
The technical details of the project are summarised below.  
 
Nam Oon Water Gates1 
 
Site Location: Sri Songkhram Sub-District, Sri Songkhram District, 
Nakhon Phanom Province 
Coordinates: 48 QVE 197 – 481 
Map series: 5844 III 
Watershed area above 
project site:  
3,502.00 km2 












Average annual flow at 
project site:  
2,303,297,898 m3/year 
Type of Water Drainage 
Structure: 
Size: 
Number:   
Weir overflow height:
  
Water drainage by Q 
Design: 
Water pipes on right bank:
Slide Gate 




Number according to suitability 
Number according to suitability 
                                          
1 Source of data was an internal document issued by the Nakhon Phanom Provincial Irrigation Project 
Office in August 2004, titled: “Summary document to propose to Agriculture and Cooperatives 
Commission in their survey mission to Nakhon Phanom Province on 6 August, 2004. Nam Oon Water 
Drainage Gates Construction Project and Nong Sang Dredging Project, Sri Songkhram District, Nakhon 
Phanom Province”. 
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Water pipes on left bank:
  
Storage volume at full 
operating height: 
Approx. 50,000,000 m3 
Area of agricultural land to 
be irrigated: 
Rainy season – about 60,000 rai  
Dry season – about 28,000 rai 
Construction costs: About 250 million baht2 
  
Hence, while an unstable political situation and change of government in September 
2006 made it seem unlikely that the Nam Songkhram Project would go ahead in the 
short to medium term (i.e. < 5 years), there has been a recent movement to push 
forward the Nam Oon Water Gates Project on the largest tributary of the Nam 
Songkhram, which itself is a river already impacted by a large upstream dam and 
irrigation project (RID’s Nam Oon Irrigation Project in Sakhon Nakhon Province) and 
has a regulated dry season flow pattern. The site for the proposed Nam Oon 
Watergates project is about one kilometre from the Nam Oon – Songkhram 
confluence, where the floodplain is very wide and flat, so any reservoir created would 
tend to be shallow and cover a large surface area. 
The design would necessitate the use of bunds to contain the water and the loss of a 
lot of valuable floodplain land, seasonally flooded forest, various wetland features 
(natural and artificial) and a large area of dry season rice fields cultivated by 
villagers. Additionally, much of the area to the west of the Nam Oon river, is 
nominally owned by a large agribusiness venture, which formerly used the land for 
intensive tomato cultivation, but has been abandoned for several years now. The 
plantation area has largely been recolonised by Mimosa pigra, an invasive alien 
species with limited natural vegetation regrowth. Just downstream of the proposed 
dam site is a biologically rich remnant patch of seasonally flooded forest that is a 
known feeding ground of the critically endangered giant Mekong catfish and other 
important fish species, which would be sensitive to nearby large developments (see 
Annex 9). 
Water Grid development scenario 
The so-called “Water Grid” is an ambitious nationwide project which envisages 
providing irrigation to 97 million rai of land by the year 2027, from the present “30 
million rai” (Molle and Floch, 2007). It was launched in 2003 by the Thaksin 
Shinawatra government and estimated to cost $US 5 billion as part of a massive 
programme of implementing so-called “mega-projects”. It has its roots in grand 
projects to “Green Isaan” or irrigate massive swathes of the “poor and arid” 
Northeast, dating back to the US interventions of the 1960s and planning for the Pa 
Mong Hydroelectric Project on the Mekong mainstream which eventually led to the 
Khong-Chi-Mun Project, under the DEDP (see Scenario 1 above). However, unlike K-
C-M Project which planned to pump water out of the mainstream Mekong, a key 
feature of the Water Grid Project is the inclusion of trans-basin water diversions from 
Thailand’s neighbours, including Burma, Cambodia and Lao PDR.  
                                          
2 This cost estimate has since been revised upwards to 300 million baht, according to a figure given at a 
Public Hearing for the Nam Oon Water Gates Project in Sri Songkhram District on 29 March, 2006 
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In Northeast Thailand’s case, there have been several plans on the drawing board for 
transferral of “excessive and wasted” water resources from Lao PDR to the “arid and 
poor” Isaan, namely from the Nam Ngum, Xe Bang Fai and Xe Bang Hiang Basins 
and then under/over the Mekong River into contiguous provinces of the Northeast. 
These plans are being primarily promoted by the DWR, but with strong explicit and 
implicit backing from certain senior political figures over the past five years (Molle 
and Floch, 2007). According to a presentation given by a project proponent at the 
Research and Development Institute, KKU in February 2005 (see graph above), 
which argued that the Water Grid “seems to be the only option” for solving poverty 
in NE Thailand, the project would be accomplished through the following steps: 
1. Distribute water by pipes, canals, etc. from sources to required areas. 
2. Promote farmers to grow high value crops and manage water distribution through: 
• Farmer Capacity Strengthening 
• Seeds, bionic farming and irrigation techniques  
• Formation of farmer organization for O&M of lateral pipes (Main pipes 
by private sector) and for dealing with SPV 
• Meter and charge for delivering water  
• Provision of start up fund 
• Link with other government programs: World Kitchen, OTOP, SME, 
Village fund, etc. 
• Agricultural extension by aggressive on farm visits 
3.  Create private company (SPV like) for local & international marketing   
• Contract Farming  
• Brand name building 
• Cooperation with other countries 
In the case of the Nam Songkhram Basin, the plan involves transfer of water from 
Nam Ngum, under or over the Mekong to a new storage dam on Huay Luang stream 
in Nong Khai and Udon Thani, and then pumped trans-basin into the Songkhram 
Basin via Ban Dung District at a rate of 65 cumecs, as illustrated in the map below. 
The water would then be distributed across the Songhram Basin in a series of canals 
and pipes to where it was required. It will also be noted that there is a plan to 
further transfer out of the Nam Songkhram Basin to the neigbouring Nam Gam 












Page 381 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 4: Scenarios Workshop 
 
 
Plate 4.1. Map of proposed transboundary and inter-basin water transfers that would 



















The above scenario inevitably assumes a massive expansion in irrigation 
infrastructure across the Songkhram Basin and adoption of irrigated agriculture, 
despite evidence to the contrary that the former will guarantee the latter. This point 
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is well illustrated by the situation at the nearby Nam Oon Irrigation Project, where 
despite massive investment in infrastructure and plentiful, good quality and free 
supplies of freshwater, there is still relatively low adoption and significant levels of 
out-migration present in the irrigated area. Hence, the Water Grid assumes that not 
only will people return to farm the land, but earnings from agriculture will be 
superior to that available in the non-agricultural sector. It says little or nothing 
concerning the potential environmental impacts of such a scheme, with the only 
obstacles to its development in the RDI presentation mentioned above being:  
 
• “Transferring water from water rich areas can be a sensitive issue, and 
• Difficulty in coordination among bureaucratic units” 
 
 
“Business as Usual” scenario 
This scenario assumed that there will be no major irrigation developments in the 
Songkhram Basin in the next 20 years, but there will be a continuation of the general 
development trends of the past 30 years or so, which have led to the rather “messy” 
situation seen today. To summarise, this period roughly coincides with the clearance 
of the formerly vast primary and secondary forests in the LSRB, by a mixture of 
logging concessions, commercial charcoal production and massive in-migration from 
other Northeast provinces and subsequent conversion of land to agriculture. Since, 
the mid-late 1970s, there have been a number of clearly discernible trends and 
phenomenon occurring in the LSRB, as outlined below: 
 
• The gradual introduction and adoption by local people of agricultural 
technological innovations which allowed a parallel expansion and 
intensification of cultivation, e.g. tractors, irrigation pumps, chemical 
fertilisers, pesticides, etc. 
• The opening up of domestic and foreign markets with concurrent 
improvements in communication infrastructure and central policies allowing 
market penetration and commodification in rural areas. 
• Massive investment in irrigation infrastructure, both gravity-fed irrigation e.g. 
Nam Oon RID Irrigation Project in Sakhon Nakhon, and pumped (diesel and 
electric) irrigation projects under RID, ARD, DEDP from newly-created shallow 
reservoirs and mainstem rivers. Often dams, reservoirs, weirs, etc., were built 
with no accompanying water delivery system, as increase in storage capacity 
was the primary agency goal. At the same time, there was much agency 
overlap of duties and poor inter-agency coordination. 
• A parallel process of central govt. financial subsidies to agribusiness to locate 
in the LSRB, which was identified as having under-utilised land, fertile soils 
and high potential for agricultural intensification under modern management 
methods (e.g. NEDECO, 1983). A systematic process of acquisition of 
floodplain land, previously under local ownership (non-titled) or 
common/public land utilised for grazing livestock and harvesting 
NTFPs/hunting/fishing by villagers, occurred over a fifteen year period or so. 
An estimated 60,000 rai was obtained by agribusiness along the LSRB 
(Watershed, 1999), and despite a considerable decline in operations since, 
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the agribusinesses legacy is still strongly felt in the LSRB and very much a 
factor in future development scenarios. 
• About ten years ago, a policy of expansion of rubber tree cultivation across 
the upper Northeastern provinces was pursued by the government. This was 
both to replace cassava and sugar cane, and to bolster production from 
Southern provinces, due to strong overseas demand. At first, expansion was 
relatively slow but in the last few years there has been a boom in rubber 
plantations, both by local people and outside investors who have bought up 
land in many areas. While some of the plantations are on former cash 
cropped land, much of the expansion has been at the expense of local forests, 
which have rapidly dwindled in the last three years (personal observations; 
2004-07 from land, air and satellite data). 
• In the last few years, there has been a rapid expansion of eucalyptus 
plantations, mostly by local people, on floodplain land throughout the basin. 
The trend is rapid and would seem to be accelerated by a perceived high price 
for eucalyptus wood (stimulated by demand from both pulp and paper 
manufacturers and the charcoal industry) and the extension of nursery 
technology to the household level. The trees grow very quickly and need little 
or no maintenance. Furthermore, they are highly resistant to drought, floods 
and fire, making eucalyptus an “indestructible crop”. 
• A massive programme of dam, weir, watergate construction and river 
canalisation took place in the Upper Basin from 1998 onwards, mostly under 
the control of the Acclerated Rural Development Office (ARD). Although ARD 
became defunct in 2002, its construction programme was mostly passed on to 
DWR which continued it on, building medium-size dams for “irrigation and 
flood control” on the Songkhram mainstream in Ban Dung District, Udon 
Thani province and upstream between 2002-04. These structures have been 
passed on to “the people” on completion and are now lying abandoned to all 
intents and purposes.  
• As both a consequence of inappropriate development (like the weirs/dams 
described above) and the expansion of a salt mining industry in the middle 
and upper Songkhram Basin (especially the districts of Ban Dung, Wanon 
Niwat, Ban Muang and So Phisai), there has been an increasing problem of 
both land and water salinisation. The land salinisation problem is highly 
visible near the production areas (as is land subsidence in places) and in 
certain select areas away from mining activities e.g. downstream of dams and 
reservoirs where the water table has been artificially raised. Certain tributary 
streams and the mainstream Songkhram suffer from a rise in salinity at the 
start of the rainy season, before it is diluted out by heavy rainfall. There are 
plans underway to permit potash mining in the Songkhram Basin, as 
considerable deposits are known to exist. 
• Local authorities, at both provincial and sub-district levels, are requesting and 
obtaining bigger budgets for the construction of river embankments, 
purportedly to protect against erosion and floods. While they may have some 
impact for the former goal, they would appear in most cases to be ineffective 
in achieving the latter goal and may actually exacerbate it locally.    
• There has been a gradual intensification in fishing methods and concurrent 
abandonment of traditional fishing methods and gears. This has been going 
on for the past 40 years or so, since the introduction of monofilament nylon 
netting and commercialisation of the subsistence fishery. While forest 
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destruction and ecosystem degradation are thought by some to be the most 
significant factors behind fishery decline, it must be acknowledged that there 
is widespread use of locally destructive fishing methods, including poisoning 
and electro-fishing, plus a range of illegal fishing gears, including stationary 
trawl nets (dtawng), gad and fine-meshed seine nets (uan tap taling).    
All of the above factors, and others not mentioned, have played a significant role in 
the decline of biodiversity, system productivity, habitat degradation and loss and 
general changes in natural resources, over the past few decades. The rate of change 
of land use in the recent past suggests that the LSRB has been one of the last 
frontiers of Northeast Thailand to change from largely native vegetation and 
habitats, to agriculture and human-disturbed habitats. The rapid decline in forest and 
natural wetland habitats (e.g. “marsh and swamp”) and concomitant increase in 
residential land, idle land (i.e. abandoned agricultural land like that of Suntech Group 
Ltd’s plantations near Ban Tha Bor) and jump in “Water Resources” (mainly shallow 
reservoirs) are noteworthy. 
Although there appears to be an alarming decrease in forest and wetland resources 
over a relatively short time period, the data it indicates for forest cover in the LSRB 
does not tally with official figures for forest cover, which are compiled by the former 
Department of Forestry3. While officially, forest cover is supposed to be just 3.6 % in 
the Lower Songkhram Basin (see Table 4.1 below), analysis of actual forest cover 
from satellite images suggests it is nearer 12.1, which in a smaller representative 
sample of area of LSRB, indicated a forest area of 13.5 % of the total land area in 
1998. This contradiction between actual and official data helps explain why the 
seasonally flooded forest has long been officially classified as “wasteland” or “scrub 
forest” at best, and thus has not been subject to any state protection or coordinated 
management. However, differences between theoretical forest cover and actual 
forest cover are not exclusive to the Lower Basin, but are a common feature of all 
sub-basins. Table 4.1 also gives interesting data on the respective watershed areas 
and annual run-off of each sub-basin, which illustrates the relative arbitrary nature 
of the divisions and the rather surprising figure for run-off for the Lower Songkhram 
Basin, as if it is a separate entity, not connected to all the other sub-basins. The total 
figures at the bottom of each column in Table 4.1 were calculated by the author and 
were never indicated in the original document, leading to a conclusion that the Nam 
Songkhram Basin as a complete entity or geographical unit, is currently overlooked 
by basin planners and policy makers. 
 
Table 4.1: Nam Songkhram Basin Forestry Cover and Run-Off 
 
Sub-basin Total Area 
(rai) 
Official forest & 
watershed area 







                                          
3 The Department of Forestry has now been split, with some sections remaining in 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives and some i.e. National Parks, Wildlife 
and Plants being absorbed into the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment as 
a new department. At the provincial level, conservation of forests and natural 
resources (including wetlands) is overseen by the Provincial Office of Natural 
Resources and Environment. 
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Huay Khong 445,551 187,733 11,742 362 








1,928,293 96,465 233,728 750 
Nam Yam 1,087,645 40,662 148,963 1,310 
Nam Oon 2,228,561 419,764 586,308 2,500 
TOTAL  8,211,252 1,273,120 1,115,982 7,977 
TOTAL (ha) 1,313,800 203,699 178,557  
Km2 13,138 2,037 1,786  
% 100 15.5 13.6  
(Source: Report complied by 5 private consultancy companies, contracted to make a 
“Participatory Water Resources Plan for Mekong River Basin, Area 3 (Northeast 
Thailand”), submitted to: Office of Water Resources Policy & Planning, Dept. of Water 
Resources). Data refers to six DWR designated Sub-basins located within the overall 
Nam Songkhram Basin, which itself comes under the Mekong River Basin, Area 3, 
one of 25 “river basin” areas nationally.  
 
In the past two or three years there has been a marked continuation of the trend 
noted in Table 4.1, with further encroachment of lowland seasonally flooded forest 
and upland secondary forest types for both rice fields and rubber or eucalyptus 
plantations, with an acceleration of the bush clearance happening in the 2006-07 dry 
season. If the present trend continues unabated, it is questionable if any paa boong 
paa thaam will remain in a few years time. In the meantime, the area of dry season 
rice (naa prang) has grown by about 250 % in two years according to Sri Songkhram 
District Agriculture Office data and the competition for water resources, as well as 
progressively scarcer wetland biological resources is increasing. As there is now little 
natural forest left, apart from odd pockets of sacred or community forest, then the 
“Business-as-Usual” scenario assumes that there will be greater demand at the local 
level for small water resources development, whether on-farm or by local authorities, 
especially the Tambon Administration Organisations (TAOs). Whilst this process of 
decentralisation following the 1997 “People’s Constitution” (now annulled) brought 
hope of more enlightened natural resource management, the reality has proved 
more complex and in need of detailed examination to see where the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats actually lie. In summary, this scenario makes 
the assumption that the trends highlighted above will continue largely unabated, 
with the only constraints being socio-economical and bio-physical depletion of 
resources.  
 
 “Alternative Development Paradigm” scenario 
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This last scenario takes a different perspective than the three scenarios presented 
above. It implicitly recognises that the development paradigm taken to date, 
exemplified under the “Business as Usual” Scenario, has not proven successful, 
sustainable or beneficial, either to the environment or to local communities, while 
the two first scenarios, if implemented would very unlikely meet the ambitious goals 
set based on past experience of smaller projects, while creating a whole new set of 
environmental and social problems formerly absent, which would be extremely 
expensive to rectify, while possibly causing permanent loss of valuable wetland 
habitats, biodiversity and services. Thus, it is likely that if basin stakeholders were 
offered informed choices outlining alternative development scenarios based on the 
core principles of equity, sustainability, participation and decentralization 
(WCD, 2000), then outcomes would be more beneficial to all and sustainable than 
presently is the case. This section merely lays down some potential ideas for 
discussion and elaboration in the Workshop itself, rather than being a comprehensive 
framework. 
If the premise is accepted that the present development paradigm has externalized, 
or at best, not fully accounted for many social and environmental costs, then a 
search for a better, more holistic and sustainable paradigm can begin. One where 
“people really matter”, changes to the ecosystem are made with caution (i.e. the 
“precautionary principle”4) and sustainable development is seen as a gradual process 
where changes cannot be forced and takes into account social, cultural, spiritual, 
ecological and economical differences at the local level (i.e. a grassroots, bottom-up 
approach). It also endorses the need to focus on policies and institutions which 
enable sustainable development, especially in the key areas of agriculture and water 
resources management.  
In the past, it is recognised that most development of water infrastructure has been 
supply-driven, rather than demand-driven, leading to the construction of many 
inappropriately designed and sited weirs, dams, reservoirs, etc. At the same time, 
most support for agriculture has focused on increasing productivity at all costs, 
tending to lead to a narrowing of crop types and varieties, dependence on export-led 
crops with fluctuating prices, heavy use of agri-chemicals, unsustainable use of water 
resources, and rapid expansion of the agricultural frontier into sensitive wetland 
habitats. This has led to the typical boom-and-bust cycle of farming seen in 
Northeast Thailand and furthered the breakdown of rural society, triggered out-
migration and degradation of the environment, that has been recorded elsewhere 
(see Bello et al, 1998 for a comprehensive account).    
A key starting point for an alternative development paradigm would be the formation 
of a truly representative body or institution to oversee Basin development, which 
goes beyond the rather centrally-driven, narrow-focused, poorly-managed and 
geographically-limiting RBO’s, under DWR. While these RBO’s provide a good 
potential basis for improved water resources management, in the case of the 
Songkhram River Basin it does not appear to be meeting its mandate and one of the 
main reasons for this is the arbitrary division of the whole basin into six sub-basins. 
This not only leads to confusion (as they report to the much larger Mekong Basin 
RBO, rather than coordinate development activities amongst themselves locally), but 
also means there is no overall Basin institution that can manage this 13,000 + km2 
ecological unit across 4 provinces with an estimated population of 1.45 million people 
                                          
4 The “Precautionary Principle” states that if a public action or policy may cause severe or irreversible 
harm it should not be carried out, despite the absence of full scientific certainty that harm would ensue. 
The burden of proof thus falls on those who would take the action. 
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(Blake, 2006). Hence, the merits of working towards forming a Nam Songkhram 
Basin Management Authority (or similar body) with comprehensive representation 
from state and non-state actors, should be a primary goal of any alternative 
development scenario. This “Nam Songkhram BMA” would have a broad mandate 
and remit of responsibility, beyond solely water management issues, to include all 
natural resources management and environment-related issues of relevance to the 
basin with adequate long term funding and support from all parties to become 
established as a permanent body. 
Having established a “Nam Songkhram BMA” with genuine participation of and 
acceptance by diverse stakeholders, the possibilities for putting forward holistic and 
multi-sectoral policies and plans, which build on and enable existing state policies 
(e.g. “The Sufficiency Economy” ideas and practices; or the King’s Integrated 
Farming theory) and put them into practice locally. The cooperation and coordination 
of a wide range of government agencies is essential, especially the locally 
empowered TAO’s and some provincial line agencies e.g. Dept of Agricultural 
Extension, Land Development Department, RID, ALRO and DoF. Some potential 
concepts in various fields, but are in fact usually quite cross-cutting in practice are 




• Promotion of sustainable and/or organic farming practices 
• IPM training 
• Soil conservation training 
• Reform of extension service to be more responsive to farmer needs and 
geographically comprehensive 
• Promoting on-farm water management solutions 
• Careful monitoring of intensive farming practices, for both environmental and 
human health impacts 
• Removal of perverse subsidies on destructive practices (e.g. fast-growing 
monocrop trees) or based on false-assumptions (e.g. flood as “natural 
disaster”) 
• More money spent on wetlands-based agricultural research 
• Policy changed on agribusiness promotion and reform of sector in Songkhram 
Basin 
• ALRO reformed to recognise role and importance of wetlands, and to allow 
conservation of natural habitats to qualify for bank loans  
• Conservation-friendly subsidies promoted in govt. schemes 
• Greater emphasis and budget devoted to the role and functions of large 




• Greater budgets available for capture fisheries management and research 
• Decrease in subsidies for intensive cage culture of fish, esp. tilapia 
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• Greater attention paid to impacts of environmental impacts of exotic fish 
species on native stocks of fish and ecology 
• Genuine promotion of fishery co-management at all levels, and move towards 
community-led co-management as a more sustainable and positive way 
forward 
• Reduction in role of Dept of Fisheries from that of “policeman and enforcer” to 
one of “fishery advisor and enabler” to increase local cooperation and 
community relations. 
• Assist in community-led efforts for fishery rehabilitation, beyond the rather 
narrow (at present) system of fish conservation zones (FCZs). This could 
include such ground-breaking moves (in Thailand at least) as dam or weir 
removal and flooded forest protection zones. 
 
Natural Resources and Wetlands Management 
While this category spans all the others, there are certain issues that are more 
urgent, which would mostly fall under the theoretical remit of the Provincial NR & E 
offices at present, but are not being practiced for various reasons. These include: 
 
• Detailed GIS resource mapping across the Basin, with information freely 
available in the public sphere 
• Research into the role and functions of the Songkhram wetlands and more 
effort being made to ascertain the links with the Mekong hydrology and 
ecology 
• Greater efforts to communicate importance of Nam Songkhram Basin to local, 
national and regional constituents 
• Taking forward of efforts to declare LSRB a Ramsar Site Wetlands of 
International Importance and coordinate management action plans 
accordingly 
• A moratorium on further large-scale water resources development projects 
(adopting the precautionary principle), and studies initiated into impacts of 
existing dams, weirs, watergates, etc. Where necessary provide 
advice/funding on removal of ineffective or redundant structures. 
• Closely monitor any new developments in Nam Songkhram Basin which might 
negatively impact on wetlands health, bearing in mind that 54 % of Basin can 
be classified as a “wetland” in broadest definition (Sombutputorn, 1998). 
• Degraded agribusiness lands and other degraded lands restored to health 
• Assistance given to communities and schools to practice regular 
environmental monitoring (esp. water quality), as a way to maximise 




• Close environmental monitoring of existing industrial facilities and making 
recommendations where necessary to relevant govt. agencies for action e.g. 
in event of persistent pollution problems or breaches of licence agreement 
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• Inquiry initiated into environmental impacts of salt mining, with aim of 
improving management practices and understanding environmental limits and 
thresholds, to inform any future expansion by industry. 
• Ensuring that any future industrial development is in keeping with status of 
Songkhram wetlands (i.e. potential Ramsar Site) and uses best practice in its 
processes, that minimise pollution and follow “polluter pays principle”.  
   
Urban Development 
 Carefully monitor and assess the impacts of increased urbanisation and 
demographic growth trends on the health of the Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands, 
with research findings being shared with relevant national and regional bodies. 
• Close watch on urban pollution of watercourses, and help (both financial and 
advice) extended to communities or institutions to use biological filtration 
methods to treat water before release into environment.  
 
The above scenarios were submitted to participants in advance of the Workshop for 
consideration and were intended not as rigid scenarios, but rather were aimed to act 
as stimulants to discussion and invite further elaboration or adaptation, according to 
the specialist’s opinion.  
 
Summary of Development Scenario Implications to Hydrology and Ecology 
 
Scenario1: Nam Songkhram Dam (plus Nam Oon Watergate) 
 
Major hydrological impacts:  
 
• Blocking of flow near river mouth 
• Creation of large shallow reservoir stretching back nearly 200 kms upstream 
• Some impact on stopping Mekong water flow and sediment backflow in rainy 
season 
 
Major ecological impacts: 
 
• Impact on fish migration patterns (up and downstream) 
• Stillwater reservoir – change from riverine conditions and loss of floodpulse – 
change in Water Quality 
• Loss of floodplain vegetation (paa boong paa thaam) to reservoir – possible 
WQ problems as it rots 
• Change in aquatic faunal/floral community and productivity 
• Possible mobilisation of salt layer underneath and raising to surface 
• Irrigation impacts on fragile, low fertility, salinisation prone land 
• cf impacts of Khong-Chi-Mun Project watergates 
 
Major sociological impacts: 
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• Would require relocation of several villages (7?) 
• Would lose much productive agricultural land on floodplain (naa prang) 
• Loss of fish and other aquatic resources 
• Loss of flooded forest common property resources 
• Potential public health risks 
 
NB: for Nam Oon Project: Ecological – hydrological impacts – similar to Nam 
Songkhram Project on smaller scale. WUP-FIN data indicates that flooding prevention 
is not possible by damming. 
 
Scenario 2:  Water Grid development scenario 
 
Major hydrological impacts:  
 
• Mainstream and tributaries further split into discrete sections by dams/weirs, 
blocking natural flows 
• Abstraction of water for irrigation in dry season, from some localised 
stretches, with possible drying up of river channel. 
• Other stretches may have extra flows (above natural), when little demand for 
irrigation or return flows from low efficiency parts 
• Extra 65 cumecs pumped into system, causing overall higher dry season flows 
in lower reaches??  
 
Major ecological impacts: 
 
• Change in flow patterns upsetting fish migration patterns and possible key 
events in fish lifecycles and migratory cues 
• Loss of shallow water areas, important for some fish 
• Greater erosion in dry season, causing higher sediment load and increase in 
turbidity. Loss of primary productivity. New conditions favours some species.  
• More irrigation and intensive agriculture causing decrease in water quality, 
impacting sensitive fish and aquatic organisms. 
• Increased soil and water salinisation. Possible risk of long-term land 
degradation and eventual abandonment. 
• Risk of pollution events from misuse of pesticides, under increased intensive 
agriculture 
• Where over-abstraction occurs (especially tributaries), less flow impacts 
sensitive species. 
 
Major sociological impacts: 
 
• More water competition for irrigation, may lead to increase inter-village and 
intra-village conflicts, as has happened in many other basins in Thailand 
Page 391 of 852
PN67_2010_10 
E-Flows in the Nam Songkhram River Basin 
David JH Blake et al 
Annex 4: Scenarios Workshop 
 
• Fundamental change in traditional agricultural practices to more high 
investment, high risk systems, will inevitably mean many farming families 
“fall by the wayside”. 
• A likely consolidation of farms by bigger, wealthier landowners and 
agribusiness interests. Decreased farm ownership and greater tenant or wage 
labor, for some seasonal operations. 
• Move from rice and food crops to monocrop plantation forestry and non-food 
crops e.g. bio-fuels or cash crops. 
 
Scenario 3: Business as Usual scenario 
 
Main hydrological impacts: 
 
• Slightly more storage capacity in tributaries, may delay onset of flows / 
flooding early in rainy season, but not greatly as all shallow reservoirs. Will be 
greatest impact in dry year, if reservoirs do not fill up quickly. 
• Greater pumped irrigation schemes in mainstream and tributaries may cause 
decrease in dry season flows. 
• More on-floodplain structures and infrastructure will alter local flow and flood 
patterns. Some increase in local flooding, esp. where more embankments are 
built, hindering flood recession drainage. 
 
Main ecological impacts: 
 
• Increased fragmentation of tributary reaches, negatively impacting fish 
migration patterns and cutting off critical habitat at critical times of year (note 
all tributaries are now dammed in their lower reaches, apart from Nam Oon) 
• Almost total loss of on-floodplain natural vegetation and flooded forest, 
causing loss of terrestrial and aquatic biodiversity and breakdown in many 
critical food chains 
• Less nutrient recycling through flooded forest, so overall loss of productivity 
to system 
• Increased use of agri-chemicals, causing decline in water quality, esp. in dry 
season and first flushes of year. 
• Rise in localised soil and water salinisation. Land abandonment in longer 
term. 
• Greater bank erosion, turbidity and sedimentation locally. Songkhram may 
become shallower as pools fill up with sediment. 
 
Main sociological impacts: 
 
• As aquatic and terrestrial habitats are degraded and simplified, and 
biodiversity lost, local people are less able to rely on natural resources for 
livelihood (food and income), and must buy more food. 
• Greater production of dry season rice – labor implications 
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Conclusions from the workshop 
While the overall workshop methodological process employed proved quite 
challenging to implement in practice, it was perhaps not surprising that no hard and 
fast conclusions could be drawn across the board of disciplines. There were certain 
constraints apparent such as time and specialists’ familiarity with the technical 
terminology and complex concepts they were required to comprehend, digest with 
relation to their own discipline and analyse in a semi-abstract way. In the final 
analysis it was found that specialists were unable to complete the Ecology-Social 
Matrix tables according to original expectations. The Workshop did allow though an 
interesting dialogue to develop between specialists about future outcomes under 
different scenarios. 
A significant and interesting conclusion from the hydrology component was the 
finding that any attempt at regulation of the Nam Oon in its lower reaches (Scenario 
2) would have a very limited impact on flood levels and that according to the model, 
a complete absence of discharge from the Nam Songkhram river would lead to just a 
10 cm decrease in the flood peak in the rainy season and just a small delay in flood 
arrival (see Annex 10). This is a function of the over-riding influence of the Mekong 
mainstream water levels, and thus any attempt at upstream regulation of the Nam 
Songkhram or tributaries will have a negligible impact on flood control.  
While this finding alone would tend to offer strong evidence counter to the “flood 
protection” justification for building water management infrastructure (including the 
RID Nam Oon Watergates project and Nam Songkhram Project of Scenario 1), the 
reality is that these projects may be pushed ahead just on the basis of their 
supposed benefits for irrigation. If this occurred Sites 2 and 3 would be essentially 
altered irrevocably, as they would be transformed from their present variable habitat 
riverine floodplain state to a permanently inundated lacustrine (reservoir) state with 
little habitat diversity, and consequently, less aquatic biodiversity or productivity. For 
Site 1, it was not clear how far upstream of the Nam Songkhram Dam’s reservoir it 
would lie, but the Team felt it would be influenced to an extent and see fundamental 
changes in social and environmental parameters, although quantifying them was 
more difficult. While the Intermediate EFA and Scenario Workshop were not designed 
to be an Environmental Impact Investigation or Social Impact Investigation studies, 
when delving into the combinations and permutations, both temporally and spatially, 
that a number of plausible development scenarios presents, then it rapidly becomes 
apparent that the level of investigation and consideration should be deeper than the 
relatively narrow time frame of the Scenario Workshop. What became apparent was 
the complexity of the relationship between hydrology and each discipline studied, 
would require more in-field and secondary data analysis for the team to build up a 
strong understanding of the implications of the fundamental changes that would 
result under each of the proposed scenarios. 
From the perspective of fisheries, a view was expressed that both habitat 
degradation and simplification were likely to be bad for fishery productivity and 
biodiversity, reducing was at the present time a rich and diverse fishery by Thai 
standards. Similarly, any alteration of flows was bound to be negative to a high 
proportion of local fish species, many of which rely on flow triggers to complete their 
life cycles at egg, juvenile and adult stages. The notion that a reservoir fishery 
created could replace the rich and diverse river floodplain fishery that presently 
exists, especially for Sites 2 and 3, was also believed to be false, based on the 
experience of numerous other reservoir fisheries in Thailand, irrespective of the 
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water quality problems that may accumulate both from agricultural activity around 
the reservoir and natural processes of biomass decay.  Vegetation and land use are 
intimately linked when considering the scenarios. Each development scenario tended 
to stress irrigated agriculture over any need to conserve natural vegetation and as 
was witnessed during the dry season field visit to the sites, the rate of clearance of 
flooded forest was rapid and on-going. The general consensus for Sites 1 and 3 was 
that seasonally flooded forest was probably doomed, whether by the Business-as-
Usual or the Nam Songkhram Dam route, but at Site 2 (Ban Tha Bor), there was a 
slight hope of villagers being able to protect some limited areas of public land under 
flooded forest, on the assumption that the Nam Songkhram Dam is not built. The 
main ongoing threat here (as with Site 1) was the growing popularity of eucalyptus 
plantations, which were having impacts on other livelihood sectors, including 
livestock grazing, fisheries and rice cultivation, and identified as having potential to 
cause intra-community conflict in future. 
While the social links to the various livelihood activities dependent on floodplain 
resources were strong, ultimately it was felt by the respective specialist that there 
were stronger socio-economic and political drivers at work than the bio-physical 
driver of flow changes, that had in the past and would in the future be the more 
significant influence on local communities’ choices and outcome. Hydrological flow, 
was just seen as one of several “flows” occurring in and around the communities 
studied, with the flow of people (migration) being a primary one to consider. Another 
general issue that emerged during this exercise for the socio-economist was the 
observation that there were differences between what he understood to be potential 
positive and negative impacts arising from the Scenarios and what villagers’ 
understood. Thus, there was a tendency for confusion as to whether he should be 
presenting the villagers’ as local stakeholders reported views and opinions, or his 
own interpretation of future changes. 
Overall, the Scenarios Workshop was not as decisive as some may have anticipated 
in coming to firm conclusions about future environmental and social outcomes 
brought about by flow changes, which as discussed may have been a result of 
unrealistic expectations placed on it and the emphasis placed by the E-Flows Team 
Leader on quantitative data, before there was sufficient understanding of the 
methodology and expectations of the exercise. While this was unfortunate, it did not 
imply that the exercise was not useful for raising capacity and exposing the entire 
team to a new way of looking at the complexity of “Flows”.   
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Introduction 
The E-flows approach applied in Thailand was developed based on the notion that E-
Flows does not only consider the importance of river flows from a physical or 
ecological perspective, but also encompasses socio-political factors. The role that 
people play both as beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem and at the same 
time, modifiers of the ecosystem are key to understanding E-Flows. The process of 
the E-flows assessment indicated that the stakeholders linked to the Songkrham 
Basin are multifold including, people living along the river and their extended families 
working as migrants in other parts of the country.  
The different stakeholders represent different geopolitical conceptualisations of the 
Basin. The participants represented different positions in relation to water allocation 
or restrictions (in erms of flood prevention). Thus, the appropriate environmental 
flow is for the Songkhram river depend on the values for which the river system is to 
be managed. Those values will determine the decisions about how to balance 
environmental, economic and social aspirations and the uses of the river’s waters.  
The key component of the E-flow approach is to facilitate a negotiation between the 
different stakeholders on the reasonable and equitable utilisation of water in the 
Songkhram Basin. The multistakeholder workshop was a first attempt at a meeting 
between civil society, government officials and academia and community members 
on the roles and functions of the Songkhram River by critically reviewing the 
outcomes of the technical assessments in the the E-flows project.  
This was in acknowledgement of the fact that although the Songkhram Basin spans 
four provinces, it is not at present managed as one complete unit, but rather split 
into six sub-basins with little coordination between these sub-units. Thus there 
remains a lack of a basin overview amongst key stakeholders about the nature and 
challenges of the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
The interdisciplinary Environmental Flows work in the Songkhram River Basin was a 
first step in providing data and practical tools for river basin and water managers at 
national and local levels to apply similar approaches for better outcomes.  
Objectives 
1. To explore the implications of the findings of the environmental flows 
assessments in relation to possible development scenarios and other key 
research conducted on ecosystem and livelihoods in the Songkhram River 
Basin; 
2. To discuss ways of utilising the knowledge gained during the study to ensure 
sustainable resources management for the Songkhram River Basin and 
exchanging stakeholder perspectives;  
3. To explore options for advancing and building-upon the E-Flows work as a 
legitimate multi-stakeholder approach to basin management, both within the 
Nam Songkhram Basin and others in Thailand. 
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A senior representative from Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy 
and Planning (ONEP) greeted the participants and opened the Workshop with the 
following remarks: 
“The Songkhram River Basin is unique and of great importance to the ecosystem 
(broadly defined) and to the economy, society, and culture. Its wetland is created by 
nature. The water connects all living things: plants, animals and human altogether. 
In the flood season, when water from Mekong River flows back into the Songkhram 
basin, almost one hundred thousand hectares of the basin are flooded. During this 
time, floods that spread across the floodplain bring aquatic animals and various kinds 
of fish into the area, bringing balance and fertility to the area. During the flood 
season, many species of fish use the Basin and its flooded forest areas to feed, 
reproduce, and reside . . . Mekong River Commission data estimate that villages 
catch more than twenty thousand tonnes of fish per year.   
“The wet season is best for villagers to catch fish, while the land is used for farming 
rice when water levels decline. As well, natural vegetation in the seasonally flooded 
forest is a source of food, herbal medicine, wood for building and repairing homes. . . 
. . These things are natural capital, which we sometimes overlook or destroy. There 
is also immensely valuable biodiversity, which may have already been lost through 
lack of awareness or understanding, or else with good intentions but lack of thorough 
study. . . . 
“The challenge is how can these limited and declining natural resources be managed 
and how knowledge and participatory management can be effectively applied.  A 
continuous stream of research, experiment, learning, and sharing of knowledge and 
experience is required.  
“The Workshop, therefore, creates an important opportunity for representatives of 
the four provinces the Songkhram River flows through, to look at the Basin as a 
whole and to use knowledge from the study in joint decision making, by using 
principles of wise and sustainable use.” 
Introduction to Environmental Flows 
Participants from the Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Office, Nakhon 
Phanom enquired whether the concept is mainly about water. The presenters agreed, 
saying that environmental flows work in the Songkhram uses water as the central 
issue, as it links to vegetation, animals, land use and a variety of activities. 
Following the presentation of key findings from the pilot EFA, the Workshop 







Figure 1 An Interpretation of Environmental Flows for the Nam Songkhram River 
Basin 
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Areas with much competition
Fertile Areas
Areas that have been altered
Flooded Areas
Environmental flows: 
Water than must remain in rivers and wetlands both in terms of necessary
Quantity and quality to maintain balance of ecosystem and its productivity
Studies in many dimensions: 
Land Use / Botany / Water system / Fish and Fisheries / Economy / Society




Note: areas with competition refer to areas experiencing conflicting claims, e.g, 
between wetland areas traditionally recognized as common property, vs. recognized 
by the state as private once reclaimed for beneficial use. See Blake and 
Pitakthepsombat (2006: 63). 
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Figure 2 Strategic Issues for the Songkhram River Basin  
 







Campaign to spread 
environmental studies
Wetland conservation in a manner that 
supports community livelihoods
Raise awareness with 
managers at all levels




Develop tools related 




Community and local government 
participation
Songkhram Basin Strategic Issues
 
 
Plenary discussion between participants and study team experts  
In this session the Environmental Flows Assessment Study team took turns 
answering questions from participants. 
 
Question: Is environmental flows a new tool or an innovation for more 
integrated water management?  
 
Answer (by hydrologist): E-Flows is not a blueprint in fixing and managing water 
in a completely integrated way.  In fact, it is an attempt to study and understand the 
condition of ecosystems in headwater areas, middle reaches and lower reaches using 
connections involving the dynamics of water (water quantity, movement and 
quality).  These studies can lead to more effective project design and planning.  
 
Question: What should be done in order to ensure an appropriate quantity of 
water?  
 
Answer: (by hydrologist): Important considerations are first, increasing water 
storage by improving reservoirs, weir and dikes, through projects with limited 
ecological damage, and which have no conflict with local people over resource use. 
Appropriate methods to improve small-scale water resources include dredging up 
ditches, canals and swamps.  
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When diverting water, it is necessary to consider the distance, the cost, and all 
dimensions of impacts. This should be done in a process that meets civil society 
approval.  
A civil society representative from Sakhon Nakhon gave further suggestions for 
water management: first, upper basin areas must be included in sustainable water 
management. Next, environmental flows studies must be conducted with appropriate 
understanding of local forest and vegetation conditions, and consideration of 
appropriate weir and dike design.  
 
Question: How can civil society participate in botanical studies? 
 
Answer (by botanist): Our studies show how vegetation growing around the 
riverbank is connected to local livelihoods.  These vegetations are for example: 
bamboo species, pak som, pak khom, pak boong (Ipomoea aquatica), krai hang naak 
(Phyllanthus taxodiifolius), and kradon (Barringtonia acutangula).  [*add other Latin 
names if known] 
The plants are used by local people and contribute to local self-sufficiency.  These 
plants are dependent on annual floods inundating the area for periods of time. If 
wetland areas are turned into reservoirs, such plants will not survive. If wetland 
areas are dried out, the plants will not survive and not be able to spread their seeds 
and germinate. This shows the importance of the flood cycle to sustain the unique 
floodplain ecosystem. 
Question: What causes changes in the ecosystem, such as the 
disappearance of fish habitat and fish species? 
 
Answer (by fisheries specialist): Fish that remain in backwaters during the dry 
season will breed during the next season.  However, if productive backswamps are 
auctioned off for harvest, all big and small fish will be caught.  Dredging projects will 
cause fish to die out. Some species of local fish have disappeared because the 
environment in the basin has changed.  Schools of big fish are harder to find.   
In low flow periods it can be easier to catch fish, leading to more exploitation.  Fresh 
fish caught are sufficient for consumption, but not enough to preserve as pla som1  
and therefore extra fish have to be imported from outside the basin [to satisfy 
demand]. 
Additionally, seasonally flooded forests have been cleared for eucalyptus plantations 
to supply the pulp and paper industry.  Eucalyptus has impacts on fish habitat as it 
has been observed that fish rarely inhabit areas where eucalyptus grows.   
 
Comment from a Sakhon Nakon civil society participant: The E-Flows study as 
presented has not been conducted in depth.  Aspects of civil society participation, 
policies affecting the ecosystem (proposed by the state, business and politicians) 
have not been explored.   
 
                                          
1 Pla som are whole fish preserved by fermentation using garlic and rice, and 
regarded as a local delicacy.  
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The study has also not done any economic valuation. For example, when flooded 
forest areas are converted to eucalyptus, it is possible to value the latter. However, 
what is the value of the former? Without environmental valuation, the study is not so 
different from Tai Baan Research.  These missing components are relevant to how 
knowledge gathered can be used in decision making and planning.  
 
Answers (by socio-economist and civil society participant): We deliberately 
avoided the trap of valuing the ecosystem by reference to market prices.  It is 
necessary to take a long term perspective and to think in terms of total economic 
value. The business sector is supporting growing eucalyptus which causes two major 
outcomes: farmers are increasingly motivated by cash income, while demanding 
government compensation when flood damage occurs.  Policies that support rubber 




A civil society representative: Water management should observe lessons from 
local knowledge and invest in irrigation systems and small reservoirs that are of net 
benefit.  In the upper Songkhram Basin there are big water diversion projects under 
way.  Studies and policy recommendations should be presented to the public. 
 
A university lecturer involved with the study team: E-Flows studies still lack 
historical depth, such as the development of civilization in the Basin.  People 
traditionally caught fish for consumption and they could adapt their livelihoods to the 
local environment.  The natural fertility brought Tai Krua people to migrate to the 
area and settle down permanently.  Farmers grow double-crop rice for selling.  Now 
there is widespread purchases of items like tractors and water pumps which destroy 
traditional livelihoods. 
 
Plenary: Summary remarks by study team experts 
The environmental flows expert stated that E-Flows studies have given stakeholders 
in the Basin a better understanding about the floodplain ecosystem and the condition 
of natural resources.   
The fisheries expert said that traditional fishing practices are suited to local ways of 
life. A government fisheries expert however added a strong concern that the practice 
of auctioning harvest rights to wetland bodies was illegal and very destructive. Better 
fisheries management was needed.  The hydrologist noted that upstream Mekong 
River projects may not change downstream flow volumes, but some of these projects 
– e.g., the MRC’s “high development” scenario – will affect sediment dynamics and 
fisheries productivity.  
The land use expert affirmed that communities have learnt how changing conditions 
affect production and this could lead to a way to develop tools conforming to local 
government planning. The social scientist stated that the environmental flows pilot 
study raises three issues of relevance to the provincial governors. First, in light of 
the study findings, can decision makers re-evaluate their development priorities?  
Second, can existing policy processes and mechanisms be improved?  Finally, the 
environmental flows approach is valuable not as a source of final conclusions to be 
presented to decision-making, but as an input to multi-stakeholder meeting.  
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Contrasting development scenarios 
The presentation of key findings and plenary session discussion was followed by a 
two-hour small group discussion based on two contrasting development scenarios for 
the Songkhram River Basin.  Prior to the 21 May Workshop, a discussion paper (see 
Section 4) had been compiled and distributed featuring four alternative development 
scenarios. The scenarios in that paper were based on: 
 
1. Generally known issues and trends in the Songkhram Basin, from background 
information and implementation of MWBP Demonstration Site project 2004–
07; 
2. Projects long-proposed by key water stakeholders, which periodically emerge 
as being favourable options, and have been raised in the last two years for 
possible future implementation; 
3. Non-mega project options which could be put forward as alternative 
sustainable development pathways.  
 
During the small group meeting, participants were asked to discuss two scenarios:  
 
(1) Business as Usual and (2) New Dams.  
 
“Business as Usual” was defined as extrapolation of current socio-economic and 
development trends. The New Dams scenario could include any projects proposed or 
already underway in the Basin which participants were aware of.  
 
In the lower Basin, two important projects that have been proposed are: the Nam 
Songkhram Dam on the mainstream, and a five-meter high weir with slide gates on 
the Nam Oon tributary.  
 
The Nam Songkhram was first proposed in the early 1980s. After local opposition 
(including by some groups present at the 21 May Workshop) it was rejected in 2002 
by the Cabinet under former PM Thaksin Shinawatra. However, it was raised again 
by PM Thaksin during a wet season visit to the Basin in late 2005 (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b).  
 
The smaller Nam Oon Water Gate was the subject of a public hearing in March 2006. 
Some observers regard the Nam Oon project as more attractive to the current 
military- appointed administration. 
 
For each scenario, groups were asked to discuss the current situation, including 
problems in different dimensions, and to offer clear approaches to solve or mitigate 
those problems. 
  
Scenario 1 – Business as Usual 
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From the small group discussion, a composite picture of agricultural 
commercialization, land ownership concentration, and stress on wetland ecosystems 
emerged. 
 
More people from outside the community have entered, use local resources and 
occupy land. Patterns in agriculture, production and fishing have changed. 
Government policy supports rubber growing and turning natural assets, including 
common property, into capital. The labor-intensive practice of growing rice 
transplanted rice changing to broadcast rice seed will continue. Migration to take up 
off-farm employment will continue, along with changes in values and livelihoods. 
Lack of systematic land use zoning and control will continue.  
 
In ten years time, participants expected natural resources, including common 
property resources to be degraded through land use change and intrusion. The 
population will derive income from wage labor (administrative work and manual 
labor). Urban areas will increase in density. Land will be bought by capitalists (nai 
toon) with higher competition for land as a resource. Farmers will increasingly turn 
to rubber and eucalyptus plantations. 
 
In terms of water resources, participants expected more reservoirs, weir, dikes and 
dams will be constructed and developed, promoted by government policy.  River 
mouths will be more polluted. Water quality will be worse.  Water from outside the 
community will be used instead.  Wild capture fish and natural food will vanish, as 
illegal fishing continues.  Instead, fish will be increasingly cultured not caught. Paa 
boong paa thaam will deteriorate.  Pollution and conflicts will occur in communities.  
 
Participants expressed concern about villagers’ lack of knowledge about changing 
ecosystems and the changing context. At the same time, they were concerned that 
local government representatives focus too much on solutions involving new 
infrastructure projects. (Such projects offer opportunities for construction contractors 
to bid on the work and can be lucrative.) 
 In terms of prevention and mitigation, solutions offered were as follows:  
 
1. Summarize lessons learnt, including those from relevant government sectors;  
2. Develop strong networks and communities in supporting preservation; 
3. Support shared values in preserving one’s locality (for both people inside and 
outside the community) and the uniqueness of Nam Songkhram Basin; 
4. Preserve and restore paa boong paa thaam and maintain publically owned 
land; 
5. Preserve local fishing practices and fish processing methods which have long 
been a part of community culture; 
6. Maintain water quality and quantity in line with natural ecological conditions; 
7. Raise awareness amongst young people and integrate conservation lessons 
into all levels of education. 
 
Scenario 2 – Songkhram Dam and Nam Oon water gate  
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Under this scenario, the overall composite picture was very similar to that of 
Business as Usual, except that more rapid ecological degradation was expected to 
occur.  
Specifically, fish migration was expected to be blocked. Reduction of biodiversity was 
expected due to loss of floodplain areas. Water quality was expected to deteriorate, 
for example with increasing soil salinization and biological oxygen demand. 
Traditional livelihoods in the floodplain would change: wild capture fishing and 
livestock grazing on common land would decline. Social conflicts were expected to 
increase.  
A number of benefits were considered possible. For example, fish more tolerant of 
still water might take the place of migratory fishes. Some farmers might be better 
able to grow a dry season rice crop, especially in areas serviced by dams. However, 
along with such intensification, some participants expected increasing perceptions of 
drought by farmers in the future. That is, the more farmers come to rely on dry 
season irrigation, the more they will perceive any shortage of it as a “drought.” 
In terms of prevention and mitigation, solutions offered were as follows:  
 
1. Make all information and policies regarding dam and reservoir projects more 
transparent; 
2. Study the impacts and link them to social learning; 
3. Develop small irrigation projects where communities take part in 
management; 
4. Set systematic water management plans, including cooperation with DWR and 
other relevant departments; 
5. At the local level, village water committees should continuously follow-up on 
and resolve problems. 
6.  
Plenary session: Visioning a more sustainable future for the Basin 
Within the next 10 years, Workshop participants expect continued impacts of 
modernization and agrarian transition. Livelihoods of communities in the Basin will 
change, land will be consolidated by capitalists (nai thun), wetland forests and 
environmental quality will deteriorate. There will be more economic competition, 
conflict, and inequity in society. 
In a plenary session, groups were invited to present their sustainable development 
visions for the Basin. One vision that captured the imagination of the participants 
was that the Basin could be an amazing place with a world-class reputation as a 
desirable destination. Such a vision might have:  
 
A temporary freshwater inland lake of more than 500,000 rai in the wet season filled 
with tasty, native fish. These would be caught by sustainable methods. There will be 
opportunities to learn about the livelihood of basin communities, with access to 
learning centers for study of nature and culture. Villagers preserve their local 
environment and traditional values. A small-scale irrigation network exists that is 
jointly managed by communities. A strong civil society exists and state agencies 
accept the lessons of past development mistakes. 
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Participants were invited to individually brainstorm and write down key measures or 
development approaches they thought appropriate and realistic. Not surprisingly, 
when viewed together, not all suggestions offered appear to present a coherent 
vision. Some participants for instance suggested continued support for dry season 
rice cultivation, which implies increased agricultural intensification, while on the 
other hand, several suggestions were made to “conserve” natural habitats and 
customary livelihoods, implying a de-intensification of agriculture for floodplain 
ecosystem restoration. 
In terms of governance, suggestions made include integrated planning at the basin 
scale down to the local level, including strengthening the role and capacity of local 
governments to integrate or adapt central policies. 
It is clear from the discussion and written suggestions that environmental flows 
approaches were accepted by the participants as having a role to play in integrated 
basin management. Participants recognized that an environmental flows approach 
was an improved method of water management, and they suggested more channels 
and venues for people to learn about environmental flows.  
 
Improved management of the Songkhram River Basin 
Following the scenario activity and discussion, IUCN representative Mr. Tawatchai 
Rattanasorn presented a draft proposal to establish a “four province [inter-
provincial] working group” to Workshop participants. The working group would seek 
to deliver more integrated river basin management. 
Some participants considered a new organization at this level was not yet needed, 
but rather felt that this kind of work should begin at the district level. Others 
disagreed, saying that for Nakhon Panom, the most downstream province, problems 
were acute and that Nakhon Panom was ready to take a leadership role in 
conservation and wetland management. Others suggested that at present, a 
provincial level administrative structure is more clear and efficient than an inter-
provincial structure. 
No conclusion was reached on the issue of whether the new organization should be 
initially established at the provincial level (one for each province) or the inter-
provincial level. The issue will be discussed at a final workshop on 26–27 June 2007. 
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I Summary 
The Nam Songkhram Basin in Northeast Thailand has a history of natural resources 
contestation and environmental degradation stretching back over five decades, which 
has to a significant extent revolved around water management policy and practice. It 
has been a site of multi-stakeholder conflict and local resistance that has 
transcended the geographical limits of the Basin to involve diverse actors, interests 
and discourses at the national, regional and international level. Integral to the far-
reaching social and environmental transformations that have occurred over this time 
has been a fundamental shift from predominantly common property to private 
property regimes which, it is argued, has had complex consequences on the way that 
various actors regard and manage the Basin and its resource base. While certain 
state agencies still work towards enabling large-scale irrigation projects, some 
involving trans-basin and trans-national water transfer schemes; other agencies 
(state and non-state organizations) nominally seek to protect parts of the lower 
basin wetlands as a conservation area of international standing (e.g. proposals for it 
to become a Ramsar Site) and yet others call for less top-down official and state-
backed projects, but more empowerment and recognition of local communities’ 
resource management practices. This report examines the complex background to 
natural resources management and water governance in the Nam Songkhram Basin, 
before training the analytical lens on a number of key case studies to illustrate the 
conflicting worldviews and approaches to development. Some of the main drivers 
underpinning water resources management decision-making, along with the web of 
consequences stemming from them are examined, especially with regards to 
wetlands ecosystems.  
II  Location 
Overview 
The Nam Songkhram Basin occupies an area of 13,128 km2 and is the second largest 
basin in Thailand’s Northeast region, known as Isaan, behind the much larger Chi-
Mun Basin (117,000 km2) (see Box 1). It is situated in the far northeast corner of 
Isaan in an area bounded to the south by the Phu Phan hill range that divides the 
Nam Songkhram Basin from the Khorat Plateau and to the north and east by low 
sandstone hills beyond which lie the broad arch of the Mekong mainstream and Lao 
PDR beyond. The Nam Songkhram River, rises at an altitude of about 400 masl along 
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the western slopes of the Phu Phan range and flows approximately 495 kms1 to enter 
the Mekong River in Tha Utaen District of Nakhon Phanom Province. The Nam 
Songkhram River is characterized over most of its course by gentle gradients, slow 
flows and a meandering channel, with the lower 250 kms or so flowing across a 
broad riverine floodplain wetland landscape, mostly lying 140 – 150 masl. The 
floodplain exhibits a range of topographical features and habitats - some natural, 
some artificial. 
The Nam Songkhram Basin encompasses parts of four provinces, namely Sakhon 
Nakhon, Udon Thani, Nong Khai and Nakhon Phanom, having a population thought to 
be around 1.45 million2 (Blake, 2006). The Nam Songkhram River has several 
significant tributaries, with the Nam Oon and Nam Yam rivers entering from the 
south and Huay Khong, Nam Hee and Nam Mao rivers entering from the north of the 
basin. Regarding climate, the Nam Songkhram Basin occupies one of the wettest 
parts of the Northeast, a region that has long been popularly typified as the driest 
and poorest in Thailand, often with little qualification or intra-regional differentiation.  
The northern parts of the basin receives far more precipitation than the southern 
parts, with an approximate gradient running from south to north, from about 1,200 
mm/annum in the Phu Phan hills rain shadow (e.g. Warit Chaphum and Sawang 
Daendin Districts of Sakhon Nakhon Province) up to 2,900 mm/annum in Bung Kan 
District, Nong Khai Province bordering the Mekong. It should also be noted that as 
well as variation in rainfall across the Basin, there is also significant inter-annual 
variations in rainfall are experienced in Northeast Thailand. This marked variation in 
annual rainfall is of significance to the ecology, hydrology and agricultural potential 
of different parts of the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
The bio-physical landscape of the Nam Songkhram Basin varies from thickly forested 
hill slopes of the Phu Phan range to wide, open lowland floodplains and diverse  
wetland habitats of the Lower Songkhram River Basin (LSRB). In between there are 
                                          
1 Different references may give different estimations for the Nam Songkhram’s 
length, which is indicative of inerent uncertainty over many basic geographical 
statistics within the Basin. However, based on my own analysis during a July 2007 
canoe descent of the river and general understanding, this is the best estimate I can 
find. 
2 Another estimate by Hortle and Suntornratana (2008) puts the Basin’s year 2000 
population at 1,940,572 persons, but it is unclear whether this is an estimate of the 
population of districts that lie all or partly within the Basin’s limits or an estimate of 
population entirely within the Songkhram River Basin.  
Box 1: Nam Songkhram Basin - Facts at a Glance 
 
Total Basin area      13,128 km2  
Total river length      495 km 
Altitude at source      Approx. 400 m asl 
Altitude at confluence with Mekong   Approx. 135 m asl 
 
Mean annual flow     300 m3/s 
Total annual run-off     7,977 MCM 
Area of permanent surface water (in LSRB)   116 km2 
Area of annual flooding (mean for LSRB)   960 km2 
 
Average mean precipitation in Basin   1,200 – 2,900 mm  
Annual evaporation rates     1,558 – 2,054 mm 
Min/Max Temperature range   4 0C – 42 0C 
90 % of annual rainfall occurs between May – October; with a dry, cool season extending 
from November – February. March – April are marked by high temperatures and evapo-
transipiration with occasional intense thunderstorms and strong winds. 
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a range of different landscapes, most showing strong anthropomorphic influence 
resulting from almost complete agricultural conversion of the original forest cover 
over the last five decades or so. Although estimates vary, it is thought that 
remaining forest covers only 12-15 % of the total land area much of it heavily 
degraded (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006); with a growing proportion of the total 
cover now converted to industrial monocrop plantation forest, rather than natural 
vegetation habitats. Much of the original forest has been fragmented into small 
pockets, which in many cases are continually being lost to agricultural conversion, 
both on the upland, terraced areas where rubber and cash crops predominate and 
the lowland floodplains where paddy and eucalyptus plantations predominate. One 
study estimated that 54 % of the entire Nam Songkhram Basin could be classified as 
“wetlands” according to the Ramsar definition, of which the main category by far was 
wet rice fields (38%) (Sombutputorn, 1998).  
In the LSRB, the floodplains and surrounding low-lying alluvial terraces are 
dominated by wetlands habitats in an advanced state of conversion to agricultural 
uses and the agricultural frontier is near to reaching its terminal limit. Hortle and 
Suntornratana (2008) calculated that 88.7 % of the LSRB can be classified as 
wetlands habitats. One GIS-based study across 739 km2 of LSRB between 1989 to 
1998 found that various forest categories had declined between 35 – 71 %, while 
Box 2. Seasonally flooded forest habitat (paa boong paa thaam) 
 
The Lower Nam Songkhram Basin is one of the last sites in Thailand still retaining some 
seasonally flooded forests, even though it is much degraded and reduced in size from just a 
few decades ago. Known to local people as “paa boong paa thaam”, these forest areas are 
actually a complex of wetland habitats, containing a range of vegetation types and landscape 
features that are in a state of flux between terrestrial and aquatic environments, depending 
on the season. In the peak rainy season they may be inundated by up to five metres of 
water, with only the tops of fast growing bamboo species and larger trees and shrubs 
emerging from the surface; while in the dry season the soils may dessicate and plants may 
shed foliage for 3-5 months. Hence, the natural vegetation has evolved and adapted to cope 
with hydrological and climatalogical extremes. They are sites of rich and varied biodiversity, 
both plant and animal, aquatic and terrestrial, and as such are important locations for local 
people to harvest a wide array of common pool resources and benefit from numerous 
ecosystem services these wetlands provide. They have been metaphorically compared with 
“kidneys” or as “wombs of the landscape”, in reference to their water cleansing and 
productive properties respectively, and due to their largely open access nature could be 
viewed as social security for a large segment of the local population who can gain food and 
income from these wetland habitats with very little investment required. Increasingly 
though, as these habitats have come under pressure from local and external threats which 
have seen the vast majority turned into rice fields, eucalyptus plantations or privatized by 
agribusiness companies for intensive cash crops, local villagers have tried to conserve and 
protect some of the last remaining pockets, partly by introducing new rules and regulations 
governing their exploitation. Despite this, local conflicts for land and natural resources 
abound and up to 2007, many small pockets of paa boong paa thaam were still being 
cleared and burned for expansion of the agricultural frontier.  
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“water resources” (mostly referring to reservoirs) had increased by 111 % in terms 
of surface area (Chutiratanaphan and Patanakanok, 2001). Surprisingly, “idle land” 
increased by 21 % during the same period, but field crops and paddy increased by 
only 14 % and 2 % respectively, suggesting that the water resource increase had 
not been well utilized for agricultural purposes. The most recent remote sensing 
assessment of the ecologically important seasonally-flooded forest (locally known as 
paa boong paa thaam – see Box 2) estimated that in 2005 only about 73 km2 
remained in scattered pockets along the lower river floodplain (Suwanwerakamtorn 
et al, 2007). 
The floodplain wetlands today form a mosaic of paddy fields, disturbed scrub and 
bamboo forest, small patches of fertile evergreen forest, eucalyptus plantations, 
open grassy plains, marshes and swamps, reservoirs and other water bodies, human 
settlements all intersected by a large number of water courses. This distinction 
between terrestrial and aquatic landscapes becomes blurred in the wet season 
between July and October, when large swathes of the entire LSRB are inundated 
under a shallow lake and the human settlements are left stranded on small 
peninsulas and islands just above the waterline. In the average year, 96,000 ha or 
31 % of the entire LSRB are inundated, while in a 1 in 50 year flood about 60 % 
would be flooded. Seasonal inundation and flooding are an integral part of the Nam 
Songkhram’s water landscape or perhaps more accurately “waterscape”, following 
(Swyngedouw 1999).   For more detailed description of the geography and ecology 
of the Nam Songkhram Basin, refer to Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a and Blake, 
2006. 
A Flood Pulse system 
An understanding of the hydrological regime and its relationship with other parts of 
the ecosystem is crucial to gaining an understanding of the development potential 
and constraints of the region. The Nam Songkhram River is subject to a pronounced 
seasonal variation in flows, closely mirroring the rainfall pattern, with minimum dry 
season discharge approximately less than 1% of wet season maximums. The 
average monthly discharge at Ban Tha Kok Daeng (approx 150 kms from Mekong 
confluence) is over 800 m3/s in Aug-Sept, decreasing to less than 20 m3/s for the 
entire January to April period (MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2005). Minimum flow discharge at 
Ban Kok Daeng is between 0.5 m3/s – 2.0 m3/s at the tail end of the dry season. 
Water levels between the seasonal minimum and maximum may change by 12-14 m 
in height, with riverbanks overtopped and the floodplain inundated for 2-4 months. 
This impressive seasonal variation in flows found in certain tropical rivers is 
sometimes referred to as the “flood pulse” concept (see Junk et al., 1989; Junk and 
Wantzen, 2004) and is considered the underlying basis of the biological productivity 
in the Mekong Basin’s floodplains (e.g. MRCS/WUP-FIN, 2007). The flood pulse 
concept refers not only to the hydrological event of flooding, but incorporates the 
dynamic process of exchange of water, nutrients and organisms between the river 
and its connected floodplain (Lamberts and Bonheur, 2007). 
In the lower hundred and twenty kilometres or so of the Nam Songkhram’s course 
during the wet season there may be a pronounced backwater effect and occasionally, 
a backflow effect with water from the Mekong River flowing upstream and spilling on 
to the floodplain, similar to the phenomenon experienced by the Tonle Sap River and 
Great Lake of Cambodia (e.g. Lamberts and Bonheur, 2007). Recent studies 
conducted for the MRC’s Water Utilization Programme by MRCS/WUP-FIN (2007a and 
2007b) have confirmed earlier views (e.g. NEDECO/TEAM, 1983) that, “The Mekong 
water level is the main factor defining the flood behavior in [the] lower Songkhram 
River and the impact of local upstream flood control on flooding would be negligible.” 
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Hence, the study of bio-physical inter-relationships between the Nam Songkhram 
and Mekong rivers is fundamental to further understanding the dynamics of each 
basin. If the two rivers are closely inter-dependent for ecological functions and 
services as hypothesized, then what happens to one will likely affect the ecological 
health of the other to some degree. In other words, degradation of one river system 
will impact on the ecosystem services provided by the other’s wetlands, including 
provisioning services (e.g. food and water); regulating services (e.g. regulation of 
floods, drought and pollution); supporting services (e.g. nutrient recycling and soil 
formation); and cultural services (e.g. recreational, spiritual and religious benefits) 
(Millenium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005).  
Comparisons with the Tonle Sap system, Cambodia 
Several observers have made comparisons between the Lower Nam Songkhram 
River Basin and the Tonle Sap system in Cambodia, the validity of which are briefly 
examined here. For example, Blake (2006) noted that, “Flooding in the LSRB is a 
function of both in-basin precipitation and ambient river levels of the mainstream 
Mekong River. The latter in many ways of a micro-version of well-known 
hydrodynamic phenomenon that occurs annually on the Tonle Sap and Great Lake in 
Cambodia.” He pointed out that there is both a backwater effect and an occasional 
reverse flow influencing the frequency, height, duration and extent of flooding in the 
LSRB floodplain. The MRC/WUP-FIN (2005) study using computational modeling 
confirmed that a backflow effect occurs to some extent nearly every year and in 
some years may occur four or five times, with July being the most common month 
for reverse flow to occur. During large reverse flow events such as July 1997, the 
mainstream Mekong water will reach the floodplain over a wide area upstream of Sri 
Songkhram township (67 kms from river mouth), inevitably carrying with it 
sediments and nutrients from the Mekong. According to Khon Kaen University 
(1997), in 1978 the backflow lasted for four days (15 – 18 August) and an estimated 
243.9 MCM of water flowed back into the Nam Songkhram channel from the Mekong, 
due to the height differential between the two river levels. Blake (2006) compared 
the wet season maximum and dry season minimum water surface areas between the 
lower Nam Songkhram and Tonle Sap systems, and found that the ratio between the 
two was proportionately greater in the former, as shown in Table 1 below. 
Apart from the hydrological similarities there are other parallels to be drawn between 
the two Mekong sub-basins. As mentioned earlier, they are both flood-pulsed 
ecosystems with intimate linkages between the productivity of the ecosystem and 
the flow of the mainstream Mekong (see Lamberts and Koponen, 2008). While it is 
unlikely that most of the water contributing to the Nam Songkhram flood pulse has 
originated from the Mekong River, as estimated to occur in Tonle Sap Lake by 
MRC/WUP-FIN’s (2006) models, there are still close eco-hydrological linkages 
between the two, including regular passive and active exchange of biological 
organisms. As several studies have pointed out, much of the Lower Nam 
Songkhram’s fisheries are based on migrations of fish from the mainstream Mekong 
(e.g. Suntornratana et al, 2002; Tai Baan Research Network of Lower Songkhram 
Basin, 2005b; Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008).  
Clearly both locations have a high proportion of the local population who rely directly 
or indirectly on the ecosystem services provided by the wetlands. The productive and 
biodiverse fisheries are probably at the forefront of the provisioning services and 
while it is estimated that 80 – 93 % of households fish part-time in the LSRB and the 
estimated mean household catch is 207 kg/year (Hortle and Suntornratana, 2008), 
the figures in the Tonle Sap fishery are proportionately higher, befitting its much 
grander scale and greater productivity. Hortle (2007) citing a study from Ahmed et 
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al, (1998), reported that fishing communes in the eight provinces surrounding Tonle 
Sap caught on average about 83 kg/ha/year and 99 % of surveyed households were 
involved in family-scale fishing. 
 
Table 1. Comparison of dry and wet season water surface areas and ratio between 
these two extremes for Lower Nam Songkhram Basin and Tonle Sap Lakes. 
 
Parameter 
Lower Nam Songkhram 
Basin, Thailand (km2) 
Tonle Sap Lake, 
Cambodia (km2) 
Dry season surface water area 116 2,500 
Wet season surface water area 960 15,000 
Ratio of dry : wet season areas 1 : 8.3 1 : 6 
(Source: Blake, 2006) 
 
Other similarities are the presence of a fringing riparian forest rich in biodiversity at 
both locations, referred as a seasonally-flooded forest in the LSRB and gallery forest 
(e.g. Kummu & Sarkulla, 2008), which are both threatened by local over-exploitation 
and external environmental causes, including changes in hydrological regime. As 
Kummu and Sarkulla (2008:185) stated: “Relatively small rises in the dry season 
lake water level would permanently inundate disproportionately large areas of 
floodplain, rendering it inaccessible to floodplain vegetation and eroding the 
productivity basis of the ecosystem.” By the same token, relatively small changes in 
wet season flood levels, will greatly reduce accessible aquatic habitat for fish and 
living aquatic resources at both locations. 
Both floodplain ecosystems are highly sensitive to changes in the Mekong’s 
hydrology, especially alterations to flows and sediment regimes caused by upstream 
hydropower developments. While narratives surrounding droughts and floods as the 
main problems have dominated mainstream development thinking for decades, there 
is now more recognition of the importance of natural hydrological regimes for 
maintaining ecosystem productivity in the Mekong Basin which underlies livelihoods 
for hundreds of thousands of households in the Lower Mekong countries. 
III Focal Water Allocation Issue/s of the Place 
The Nam Songkhram Basin has played a peripheral, but important, role in the water 
management planning, practice and conflict that has characterized Northeast 
Thailand’s development discourse over the past four decades. It is recognized by 
some as a site of rich fisheries, fertile wetlands, surviving local resources-based 
livelihoods and has been portrayed as the “last undammed river in Thailand” (e.g. 
Breukers, 1998:27; Sasaki et al., 2007), while others may associate it as a place 
where a major dam project was halted by the combined resistance struggle of civil 
society, academics and local people in the late 1990s (e.g. Lohmann, 1998). Being 
relatively remote and distant from the main centres of population and power in 
Thailand has acted both in favour and against it in terms of the degree to which 
mainstream development initiatives have transformed the landscape. On the one 
hand, there are no large conurbations within the Basin or immediately surrounding it 
demanding large volumes of water for domestic or industrial use, while on the other 
hand its remoteness and apparent “underdevelopment” has encouraged a popular 
view with some that it is a fertile, wilderness area crying out for agricultural 
development and intensification (Watershed, 1996). Its position as a site of rich 
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natural resources (wetlands and forest) and an agricultural frontier with plentiful and 
cheaply available land contributed to it becoming a favoured site for in-migration, a 
factor which led to increasing demands by state agencies, international development 
agencies and many of the incomers themselves for irrigation services, based largely 
on the popular pan-Isaan notion of seasonal water scarcity being the principle cause 
of poverty.  
The Songkhram Basin can be characterized as being typical of other Mekong sub-
basins in some respects (in terms of local livelihoods, geographical context and 
state-led development approach applied), while in other ways in could be considered 
as being quite unique (in terms of the prominence of wetland ecosystems, degree of 
connectivity with the Mekong mainstream and resistance of local people to the 
dominant development paradigm which led to the derailment of a major irrigation 
infrastructure project a decade ago). These examples hint at the complex nature of 
the ecosystem and livelihood relationships, which do not easily fit into simple 
descriptive summaries, but vary spatially, temporally and according to the 
epistemological approach one cares to adopt.  
In this section, the author focuses on a few key water-allocation case studies and 
examines the salient details of each in a broadbrush approach, placing it in the wider 
context of the Songkhram Basin. By describing the key initiatives and decisions 
related to water allocation in each case study, it may assist the reader in relating the 
Songkhram Basin’s development trajectory to other processes and events occurring 
further afield in neighbouring countries under varying governance regimes. In 
particular, the section is interested in exploring how the decisions were made and 
who were the key actors or agents? The degree to which these actors represent or 
reflect the local population’s interests or aspirations will also be considered. 
Case 1: Nam Songkhram Project & Nam Oon Watergates Project 
(irrigation/flood control) 
Simply called the “Nam Songkhram Project”, this state-led project was an ambitious 
wide-reaching irrigation scheme that sought to transform the physical landscape of 
much of the lower Songkhram River Basin (see Box 3). Although its ideological roots 
stretch back to the even more ambitious water management schemes proposed by 
the US in the late 1950s and 1960s for the Lower Mekong Basin, especially that part 
of the Basin lying in Northeast Thailand (see Breukers, 1998; Sneddon, 2003;  Floch 
et al, 2007; Molle and Floch, 2008). Grandiose schemes involving building a cascade 
of dams along the mainstream Mekong for the purpose of providing hydropower and 
diverting irrigation water to the “impoverished Northeast” were proposed, using such 
American precedents as the Colorado and Tennessee River Basins as models (Molle 
et al, 2009).  
Studies carried out by the US Bureau of Reclamation (USBR) through the auspices of 
the Mekong Committee were central to this vision,that was apparently eagerly 
adopted by the government of Thailand of the time and the majority of 
administrations ever since (Floch et al., 2007).  
The Nam Songkhram Project was adopted in parallel with the much larger Khong-
Chi-Mun Project by the young Department for Energy Development and Promotion 
(DEDP), under the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE). It had 
evolved out of earlier plans for a large irrigation project on the Nam Songkhram 
floodplain, designed by a pair of consultancy companies employed in the early 1980s 
by the Interim Committee for Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong 
Basin, financed by the Royal Netherlands Government (NEDECO / TEAM, 1983). 
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Like the earlier army planned and implemented “Green Isaan Project” (see Floch et 
al, 2007), the Khong-Chi-Mun Project and the Nam Songkhram Project were all 
based on the assumption that the main “problems” holding back agricultural 
development and causing poverty in the Northeast were annual drought and floods, 
with the main “solution” being construction of large-scale water infrastructure 
projects to tame the unruly rivers and deliver water to farmers’ fields everywhere 
(Breukers, 1998; Blake, 2006; Blake et al, 2009). A narrative based on chronic water 
scarcity was central to providing a meta-justification by the state for these projects, 
similar to that provided in other Asian countries, such as the case of Kutch District, 
Gujarat Province, India studied by Mehta (2001). Another central tenet to the 
dominant scarcity narrative is that water run-off that flows unchecked in rivers (into 
the Mekong or the sea) and not impounded in reservoirs is somehow wasted and lost 
for benefit of the nation. Hence, a key figure frequently quoted by state agencies as 
if it is a direct indicator of development itself, is the storage volume. Hence, it was 
stated in the 1997 Environmental Mitigation Plan for the Nam Songkhram Project 
prepared by Khon Kaen University that the storage volume of large and medium 
irrigation reservoir projects in the Nam Songkhram Basin was 568 million cubic 
metres (MCM) theoretically irrigating 274,200 rai (43,872 ha) (p.2-5), an amount 
that was considered insufficient by DEDP to meet irrigation demands. 
Once adopted by DEDP for implementation with a planned budget in 1995 of 10 
billion baht ($400 million), the Nam Songkhram Project slowly moved forward, 
subject to a series of studies mandatory under law, including the newly-introduced 
1992 Environment Law, which required large infrastructure projects to conduct 
Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs). The first EIA for the Nam Songkhram 
Project was carried out in 1993 by consultant firms AEC, PALCON and Sir William 
Box 3. Nam Songkhram Project – key details 
 
Type of Project:   multi-purpose irrigation and flood control 
Dam type:   water regulator constructed on lower Nam Songkhram, 5 kms from 
Mekong confluence 
Dam specifications:   15 m high concrete structure, 350 m wide, 5 liftable water 
gates (double leaf gates - based on similar design used for Khong-Chi-Mun Project) 
Annual discharge at dam site:  8,681 MCM/year 
Reservoir area:    255 km2 
Storage volume:    350 MCM (at 139.5 masl max water level) 
Planned irrigated area (in two phases):   565,000 rai  (90,400 ha) 
No. of electric pumping stations to be built:   47 
Expected construction cost (in 1997):   10,366 million baht (US$ 414.64 
million) 
Note that subsequent phases building several more dams on tributaries would add 
a further 351,600 rai (56,256 ha) of irrigated land costing 6,164 million baht (US4 
246.56 million). It was envisaged that this entire project would be paid for out of 
the national budget with an EIRR of 15.24 %. 
(Source: Khon Kaen University, 1997) 
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Halcrow and Partners from Britain, who were also employed on the Khong-Chi-Mun 
Project. However, this EIA was subsequently rejected by the National Environment 
Board (NEB) in 1994 as apparently it had just been copied from an earlier EIA 
submitted for the Khong-Chi-Mun Project according to Breukers, 1998.   
The NEB recommended that the project scale down the height of the dam to create a 
smaller reservoir that would only store water within the Nam Songkhram’s channel 
and provide “water for consumption only” (Breukers, 1998:28). This reduction in 
dam height would seriously compromise its storage capacity for irrigation purposes, 
an obstacle which did not apparently concern the developers who pressed on 
regardless with the project. DEDP subsequently hired a team from Khon Kaen 
University to carry out new EIA and environmental mitigation plans, which despite 
numerous flaws and inherent weaknesses in this type of report, did include results 
from a detailed study on the impacts of the project on the seasonally flooded forest 
or paa boong paa thaam (Khon Kaen University, 1996)3. However, DEDP did not 
ingratiate itself with civil society organizations that had started to become interested 
in the plight of local communities and the environment of the lower Nam Songkhram 
Basin, following a spate of expensive and damaging projects during the late 1980s 
and early 90s, the most notorious of which was the Pak Mun Project in Ubon 
Ratchatani Province (e.g. Foran and Manorom, 2009).  Breukers (1998:28) went 
further in stating DEDP “…has made little effort to accept advice, critique or 
alternative ideas from local people, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
NEB or academics.” 
Theatres of Power 
During the mid-1990s the Thai NGO, the Project for Ecological Recovery (PER) had 
begun working with local communities, building a network of concerned stakeholders 
and collecting data about wetlands-based livelihoods in the planned inundation area 
of the Nam Songkhram Project. Some of their findings were published in Thai 
language media and English language publications such as Watershed, produced by 
PER’s sister organization, the Bangkok-based Towards Ecological Recovery and 
Regional Alliances (TERRA), often using interviews from local resource users (e.g. 
Watershed 1996 and 1999). These articles tended to stress the underlying 
dichotomies and inconsistencies between the positivist, universal and scientific 
claims to legitimacy presented by the state agencies responsible plus their hired 
consultants and the more contextual, situated and local knowledge garnered from 
resource users in communities locally. Thus, reading the views for example of Mr 
Sinsamout Pakprom, a 66 year old fisherman and past headman of Ban Pak Yam at 
the confluence of the Nam Songkhram and Nam Yam (Watershed, 1999), it becomes 
apparent that the principle problems facing local villagers is not one of water scarcity 
for agriculture or flooding, but issues of resource degradation, flooded forest 
clearance, overfishing, agricultural intensification, land disputes with agribusiness 
and lastly, concerns related to the construction of the Nam Songkhram Project dam 
itself.   
In late 1997, PER organized a public seminar about the Nam Songkhram Project, 
inviting a mix of stakeholders including local people, representatives of the EIA team, 
                                          
3 This detailed report by Khon Kaen University lecturers on paa boong paa thaam 
was possibly the first study of its kind in Thailand to specifically consider this poorly 
recognized and threatened wetland habitat for an EIA. While it contained some 
methodological flaws and was bound by rather narrow Terms of Reference no doubt, 
it did manage to highlight the close dependence of local communities on this habitat 
and its significant livelihood value.  
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NEB staff, academics, local and national NGOs, the technical consultant and head of 
planning from DEDP (Breukers, 1998). The seminar took place at Chulalongkhorn 
University in Bangkok, a venue that would seem infinitely more familiar and 
comfortable to the academics and engineers of the state and consultancy institutions 
than it would to villagers from Nakhon Phanom or Sakon Nakhon. Lohmann (1998) 
described the proceedings in terms of a play or carefully scripted “charade”, where 
the participants (actors) were supposed to act along to a neatly scripted plot in 
which the “experts” (DEDP officials and academic consultants) imparted knowledge 
about the project to placid listeners who were expected to ask a few technical 
questions and negotiate terms for compensation or minor mitigation, but not 
question the underlying rationale for the project itself. As the day wore on and the 
questions became more probing exposing numerous inconsistencies and factual 
errors, the charade turned to farce as the project developers could no longer keep up 
the pretence that the project was beneficial to local people, as DEDP had always 
claimed. A local teacher called Ekachai Khasawong from the Nam Songkhram Basin 
summed up the feelings of many participants by suggesting that the Nam 
Songkhram Project had “momentum but no rationale”, according to Lohmann 
(1998).  Lohmann concluded with the opinion that, “Vested interests, including 
political parties, quarrying interests and bureaucracies were the main parties 
pressing for construction.” 
Despite this “theatrical” meeting and gathering local and national opposition, DEDP 
pressed on with plans to dam the Nam Songkhram, even purchasing land at the 
headworks for a price reported as US$1.2 million (Breukers, 1998).  The Khon Kaen 
University team completed their EIA and Environmental Mitigation Plan for DEDP 
which was duly passed on to the NEB for approval. However, following the Asian 
economic crash of 1997 and increasing fiscal saving by the government compared to 
the heady economic boom days of the early 1990s, it was becoming both harder to 
internally justify large-scale infrastructure projects and the political winds of fortune 
were starting to wane for DEDP and certain other Nam Songkhram Project 
proponents. Political indecision over the merits of dam building and increased civil 
society opposition led to long delays and calls for extra studies, inevitably resulting in 
rising costs. Local alliances between villagers, academics and NGOs were becoming 
stronger and a local group called the “Nam Songkhram Basin Conservation and 
Rehabilitation Club” was formed with one of its objectives to cancel the Nam 
Songkhram Project (Breukers, 1998; Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). This 
network joined the increasingly vocal Assembly of the Poor in 1997, a nationwide 
people’s movement which campaigned for social and environmental justice and 
recompense for those affected by state-led projects (Breukers, 1998; Missingham, 
2003).  
Following the change of government in January 2001, the new Thai Rak Thai 
majority government started implementing a series of sweeping bureaucratic reforms 
which led to the disbandment of the DEDP and the former MoSTE, which was 
replaced with the Ministry of National Resources and Environment (MoNRE). Under 
Thaksin Shinawatra’s “CEO style” leadership, the leading party set about replacing 
the old bureaucratic polity with new “more efficient business[like] methods” of 
governance (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). Ministries control over policy making 
was diminished through extensive bureaucratic reorganization and new advisory 
bodies were set up. More responsibility and budget was ceded to both the new Sub-
District or Tambon Administration Organizations (TAO) and handpicked provincial 
governors to manage local development projects than ever before, in an apparent 
move towards decentralization. Certain state agencies started showing interest in the 
Lower Nam Songkhram Basin as somewhere other than a site of agricultural 
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intensification and large-scale irrigation development. For example, the Department 
of Environmental Quality Promotion (DEQP) under MoNRE began to work with local 
communities which had earlier opposed the Nam Songkhram Project and assist Ban 
Dong San with seasonally flooded forest conservation of the contentious Tung Pan 
Kan floodplain area (see Guayjaroen, 2001), which would have been permanently 
flooded under the storage reservoir for the Project. Similarly, the Office of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) proposed the Lower Nam 
Songkhram River Basin (LSRB) as a suitable site for the Thai Demonstration Site of 
the four nation Mekong Wetlands Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable Use 
Programme (MWBP) which evolved out of a long consultation and planning process 
between 1996 – 2004 prior to actual implementation. 
You can’t keep a good dam down 
Following years of indecision, local opposition and the dissolution of DEDP, the Nam 
Songkhram Project was eventually rejected by the Thai Cabinet in March 2002, in a 
resolution that agreed with the earlier findings of the NEB which found that the 
project carried unacceptably high environmental impacts and was not justified on 
economic grounds (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). However, the Nam 
Songkhram Project did not disappear entirely but merely was put to rest for a few 
years under the care of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), which had inherited 
the plans of the Khong-Chi-Mun Project and its sibling projects from DEDP. In August 
2005 at the height of the rainy season, the Nam Songkhram Project made an 
unexpected return to the negotiating table during a flying visit by Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra and other senior politicians to see the flooding across the LSRB, 
which was described by politicians and press as a “natural disaster”. He proposed at 
a public meeting in Sri Songkhram District that the construction of a water regulating 
dam at the mouth of the Nam Songkhram and a further one on the nearby Nam Oon 
tributary would help ease flooding and encouraged concerned agencies to set to work 
immediately (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). This plan tallied perfectly with the 
vast sums of money being set aside for implementing the Thaksin government’s 
water infrastructure projects to tackle water problems in Northeast Thailand, 
including the trans-national and pan-regional “Water Grid” project (e.g. Samabuddhi, 
2005; Floch et al, 2007). Molle (2007:12) quoting a September 2003 news article in 
The Nation reported that the Thaksin administration announced it would “help turn 
Thailand into an agricultural powerhouse” by spending US$ 5 billion on bringing 
irrigation to nearly all un-irrigated areas of the country, especially the Northeast.  
While the Nam Songkhram Project does not appear to have moved forward much 
since 2005, the smaller Nam Oon Project to build liftable watergates and construct a 
50 MCM storage reservoir upstream flooding a large area of seasonally flooded 
forest, paddy fields used by villagers for dry season cultivation and abandoned 
plantations belonging to Sun Tech Group. This project, also managed by the RID has 
seen considerable activity from state officials in local communities to build up a 
support base, and surveying lands both upstream and downstream, presumably as 
part of a feasibility study. The project is estimated by RID to cost 300 million baht 
and would irrigate 28,000 rai (4,480 ha) in the dry season and 60,000 rai (9,600 ha) 
in the wet season by pumped irrigation. However, it is unclear if this includes the full 
cost of the irrigation system and all associated compensation costs for lost land. 
Locally opinion seems to be mixed on the merits of this project, with much doubt and 
uncertainty apparent amongst villagers about who would benefit and who would lose. 
The author attended a so-called “public hearing” for the project organized by RID 
and attended by local headmen and state officials in Sri Songkhram District on 29 
March, 2006, but it was apparent that very little public information was available 
about the project despite an apparently advanced status of planning.  
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Since then the political fortunes of Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party have irrevocably 
changed after a tumultuous few years and many of the politicians associated with the 
Water Grid project have been barred from politics for five years, including local 
powerful figures that had shown support for both the Nam Songkhram and Nam Oon 
projects. However, following the December 2008 appointment of the Democrat 
Party’s Abhisit Vejajiva as Prime Minister, one of the principle architects of the Water 
Grid Project and leader of the Peua Paen Din (For the Motherland) Party, Suwit 
Khunkitti was appointed Minister for Natural Resources and Environment (The 
Nation, 21 December 2008). This position gives him control over the DWR and a 
strong likelihood that the Water Grid and its sibling water infrastructure projects will 
be revived and pushed forward. Thus it would not be surprising to see a return of the 
Nam Songkhram Project or a similar incarnation integrally linked to the Water Grid 
project and its vision of piping water from Laos or the Mekong mainstream into the 
“parched” heartlands of Isaan.  
Case 2: Sun Tech Group Company Ltd and allied companies (agribusiness) 
Agribusiness promotion and development has long been a core component of central 
government’s vision for Northeast Thailand, even as agriculture’s share of GDP has 
gradually dwindled (Bello et al, 1998; ADB, 2001). It fitted neatly into the state’s 
plans, expressed in successive National Economic and Social Development Plans 
since the mid-1970s to commodify and intensify agriculture as a means to bring rural 
inhabitants out of poverty and boost export earnings from agricultural products. An 
integral part of this vision was expanding irrigation infrastructure, promoting use of 
agrichemicals and biotechnology and moving farmers away from subsistence 
agriculture to market-oriented production methods. While the 4th NESDP (1977-
1981) saw agro-industries grow rapidly, especially canned fish, pineapple and 
tomato products, the 6th NESDP (1987-1991) promoted the integration of farming 
and processing to capture higher value-added exports, which included encouraging 
Box 4. Agribusiness Promotion in Nam Songkhram Basin 
The origins of the Thai tomato processing industry can be traced back to efforts by the 
“Royal Projects” initiative to alleviate poverty and provide employment in poor areas of 
the North and Northeast, as well as state efforts to counter the growing threat of 
communist insurgency in the same isolated parts during the 1970s and 80s.  A Royal 
Projects processing factory was established in Sakhon Nakhon Province in 1980. From 
the late 1980s onwards, further factors encouraged the growth of the industry including 
a growing domestic demand for tomato paste, recognition of the potential to tap export 
markets, generous financial incentives available from the Board of Investment (BOI) to 
promote the industry, especially in Northeast Thailand, and lastly new opportunities 
opening up to engage local smallholders in contract farming arrangements due to wider 
socio-economic changes occurring. As a result the industry expanded rapidly and as 
result by 1995-96 there were 16 tomato processing factories in Thailand, eight of which 
were in the Northeast, accounting for 70 % of total Thai production. At least two of these 
factories were located in the lower Nam Songkhram Basin, including the Sun Tech Group 
Public Company Ltd factory in Sri Songkhram District, Nakhon Phanom Province. The 
other company was called the Northeast Agricultural Investment Company (NAICO) 
which was part owned by the New Zealand holding company Brierley Investments 
Limited (BIL) in the mid-1990s, until it collapsed in the wake of the 1997 Asian economic 
crisis (Source: Pritchard and Burch, 2003). 
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firms to use the contact farming model of production (Sriboonchitta and 
Wiboonponse, 2008). Sriboonchitta and Wiboonpongse (2008) (citing Glover, 1992), 
stated that “Compared to other Asian countries by early 1990 Thailand probably had 
the most extensive experience with contract farming and the widest range of crops”. 
They mention a “Four Sector Co-operation Plan to develop agriculture and agro-
industry”, which in theory expected agro-industry, farmers, financial institutions 
(particularly the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC)) and government agencies to work together for improvement of production 
systems to reduce price risk and market uncertainty, with farmers required to 
improve their technical knowledge and increase production efficiency. 
Against this policy background, agribusiness started locating in the LSRB from 1978 
onwards, with the formation of the Tawan Farm company, which engaged in contract 
farming and using its own plantations to grow sunflowers and other intensive export 
Box 5. Sun Tech Group Public Company Limited 
Described as “the largest Thai producer of canned tomatoes in the mid-1990s”, Sun Tech 
Group was established as a fruit and vegetable processing company (Pritchard and Burch, 
2003:220). Apparently, it was one of 12 subsidiaries of the massive NTS Group, a Thai-
owned conglomerate which is said to have interests in food, scrap metal, steel production, 
video rental, entertainment, real estate and retailing. Sun Tech Group after quick initial 
growth was hit by a slump in export sales of tinned tomatoes in 1992-93, which almost 
brought it to the brink of collapse. However, by diversifying into new areas it survived, 
but the tomato processing side of the business in Nakhon Phanom suffered and 
experienced annual losses until the economic crisis hit in mid-1997. The parent company 
NTS Steel Group is owned by the Horungruang family, the senior member of which 
following the Asian economic crisis became “….the second largest individual debtor in 
Thailand, with debts totaling more than $2.1 billion (US)” (Pritchard and Burch, 
2003:221). By May 1999 the company’s shares ceased trading on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) and in April 2001 was forced to submit a restructuring plan to creditors to 
avoid de-listing. According to Pritchard and Burch (2003:221) “Although technically 
bankrupt, at the time of writing the Sun Tech Group continues to operate, and still 
produces canned tomatoes for sale to western supermarkets.”  During 2004 to late 2006, 
the company continued processing a limited amount of tomatoes from its factory sourced 
from its own plantations and under contract from local farmers, but in early 2007 it 
ceased production and the factory was closed, laying off the last remaining staff (personal 
observations). However, according to a web report, Sun Tech Group Public Company Ltd 
changed its name to Apex Development Public Company Limited in April 2007 following a 
court ruling and is now listed on the SET and trading normally again, primarily involved in 
real estate development in the Eastern Seaboard. It remains to be seen what will happen 
to the factory and land assets in Sri Songkhram District.  
(Sources: Pritchard and Burch, 2003; http://www.apexpcl.com/ir/index.html; personal 
observations) 
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crops (Guayjaroen, 2001). The next company to establish itself in the LSRB was 
called Ut-sahagam Kaset Isaan (Isaan Agro-industry Company) on the Nam 
Songkhram floodplain of Segaa District, Nong Khai Province. This company moved 
into intensive dairy farming, sweetcorn and tomato processing, using both its own 
plantations and contract farming for raw material supply. Then followed the Sun Tech 
Group Company Ltd in 1988, by owners who had previously been involved in the 
scrap metal processing trade in Chonburi Province (see Box 4 and Box 5).   
Backed up by state development policy, cheap credit and generous financial 
subsidies, for instance allowing the tax-free import of Taiwanese machinery for 
tomato processing factory in Sri Songkhram, Sun Tech Groups factory boomed for a 
while in the early 1990s (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). It employed hundreds 
of local villagers, both working in the factory and on the company plantations, as 
well as buying tomatoes from farmers in surrounding districts under contract. From 
initially concentrating on tinned tomatoes, pineapple and sweetcorn, Sun Tech also 
decided to diversify into eucalyptus plantations on land acquired further upstream in 
Agad Amnuay District of Sakhon Nakhon Province, and set up a sister company 
called Asia Tech to expand the plantation business from the Nam Songkhram Basin 
into Indochina (Watershed, 1996). Asia Tech Group Ltd. had plans of carpeting the 
floodplain of the Nam Songkhram and neighbouring parts of Lao PDR with Eucalyptus 
camaludensis and Acacia mangium plantations and then bringing the wood back to 
Thailand for processing in a pulp and paper mill it would build. This vision was 
thwarted by the collapse of the baht following the Asian economic crash, leaving Sun 
Tech and Asia Tech with massive dollar denominated debts. Much of the collateral for 
its rapid expansion programme into Indochina, including plans for industrial estates 
in Viet Nam, was based on the its extensive land holdings in the LSRB, valued at 
20,000 baht/rai according to one local source (personal communication, Laothai 
Nilnuan, May 2008). By my estimates, Sun Tech Group and its associated companies 
held at least 12,000 rai (1,920 ha) of land at its peak, which at 20,000 baht/rai 
would be worth 240 million baht. Thus, it was apparent that the growth of 
agribusiness in the LSRB was about far more than just agricultural production alone. 
The floodplain land used by Sun Tech for had been obtained by an ingenious mix of 
methods, both legal and illegal but all rather devious. For example, the 7,000 rai of 
land Sun Tech acquired on Tung Mon floodplain in Sri Songkhram District was 
previously classified by the state as “tee rok wang plao” (wasteland) and “tee 
satarana prayote” (public land) (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). Located within 
a large meander of the Nam Songkhram, it was covered with part seasonally flooded 
forest (paa boong paa thaam) and part open scrubby grasslands and drained by 
several streams. Each rainy season, the entire area was inundated for two to three 
months and would become an important fishery, including being a known feeding 
ground for the IUCN Red-listed fish species, the Giant Mekong Catfish (pla beug). 
While villagers living in the four surrounding villages extensively utilized the land for 
livestock grazing, subsistence cultivation of rice and vegetables, fishing and 
harvesting of a wide variety of wetlands products (i.e. common pool resources) 
(Blake, 2008). Nobody held formal land ownership documents, but a complex 
informal de facto ownership rights system and communal management of CPR 
resources existed.  
Using a complex web of agents, compliant local officials and aspects of state 
bureaucracy to win over the cooperation of village headmen from the surrounding 
communities, Sun Tech company was able to buy up all the land at Tung Mon over 
the course of a year or two, and then convert their claim into de jure land title 
documentation. The sums paid for the land was anywhere between as little as 150 
baht/rai (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b) up to a maximum of 1,000 baht/rai 
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(i.e. US$ 37.5 – 250 / ha4). Some villagers reportedly did not actually know how 
much land they used on Tung Mon and could not understand the documents they 
were asked to sign or thumbprint, but went along with the process on the advice of 
the headman and believing that if they didn’t surrender their rights, they may not 
get anything in return (personal communication with villagers in Ban Tha Bor and 
Ban Don Daeng on several occasions). In Ban Tha Kong, a small village on the banks 
of the Nam Songkhram which had missed out on state-provided electrification due to 
its size, managed to request the company to provide mains electricity in return for 
giving up their community rights to Tung Mon (Blake, 2008). Sun Tech similarly 
acquired another large plot of several thousand rai on the Nam Oon floodplain to the 
west of Sri Songkhram township. Altogether, one report suggests that agribusiness 
companies may own up to 60,000 rai (9,600 ha) of land in the LSRB (Watershed, 
1999). 
Once the company had ensured ownership of the land, it set about bulldozing flat 
and burning the native vegetation, leveling the surface, then splitting the land into 
400 rai (64 ha) blocks with access roads between them. The land was encircled by 
fencing to complete the commons enclosure. Cultivation methods for such a large 
scale plantation were equally big, expensive and intensive. Aerial spraying of 
pesticides was used, until the light aircraft crashed one day near Ban Khae (personal 
communication with ex-Sun Tech employee; 3 April, 2007). After that the company 
reverted to tractor-mounted spraying on a regular basis. Soil had to be prepared 
using dolomite, as it naturally was acidic. Liberal quantities of agrichemicals had to 
be applied to the crops to ensure standardization, minimise pest damage and high 
productivity. Tomato seedlings were planted in January, after the soil had dried out 
sufficiently and harvesting took place in late February and March. Irrigation was 
achieved by pumping water from the river via a system of pipes and using ridge and 
furrow flood irrigation. To assist drainage and avoid waterlogging, a network of sub-
soil pipes was laid. It was only possible to grow one crop a year due to the flood 
prone nature of the site, which was a distinct agro-ecological limitation to production 
known prior to acquisition5.  
Inevitably conflicts arose between the plantation managers and local villagers from 
time to time. First there was some resentment that people had been unfairly evicted 
from former communal land and those that had claimed ownership were given paltry 
compensation for their land. Secondly, there was the issue of loss and restriction of 
access to former common grazing land and loss of CPR, formerly benefitting just 
about all households. There are some 600 households in the four villages 
surrounding Tung Mon (Blake, 2008) and formerly people from villages further afield 
would also come to utilize the rich wetland resources found there at certain times of 
year. When people tried to take their buffalo or cattle onto the land to graze before 
or after the tomato cultivation season, they were often met with threats and abuse 
by company staff. Due to the loss of available grazing, some villagers had to sell off 
or reduce their herd size, thus hurting their long-term livelihood prospects. Thirdly, 
villagers still tried to utilize wetland resources and fish both within the company 
perimeter and around the edge, but reported that due to the use of pesticides there 
were occasional pollution events, with fish kills occurring in Huay Sing stream and 
other small watercourses, which are considered common property by villagers. Thus, 
                                          
4 Up until devaluation in July 1997, $US 1 was roughly equivalent to 25 Thai baht. 
5 The NEDECO/TEAM (1983) feasibility study had proposed poldering large parts of 
the floodplain with Dutch-style dykes to exclude seasonal floodwaters and allow rainy 
season production. 
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there was an environmental and human health hazard aspect to Sun Tech’s practices 
that was never examined by the authorities, as far as the author can ascertain. This 
may still be of concern today, when one observes that the abandoned plantations 
have not revegetated as might be expected, but retain a look of contaminated land 
and soil. 
 As previously mentioned, Sun Tech and its sister company Asia Tech, were also 
involved in the planting and promotion of fast growing pulp trees on part of 3,000 rai 
(480 ha) of public land it had acquired in Agad Amnuay District upstream from Sri 
Songkhram, using equally suspect methods (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). 
But unlike Tung Mon which was shared by several villages, Tung Pan Kan was 
principally the common property resource of a single village, Ban Dong San. After 
the company started bulldozing the seasonally flooded forest and planting eucalyptus 
and A. mangium seedlings and excluding villagers from their traditional fishing, 
hunting, foraging and subsistence dry season rice growing territory, the villagers 
started to exercise resistance and assert their legal rights. Helped by the Thai NGO 
Project for Ecological Recovery (PER), local academics and lawyers, community 
leaders in Ban Dong San at first petitioned local government offices, but when it was 
suspected that state officials had been complicit in altering the status of the public 
land to private land status, the villagers were obliged to seek redress through the 
court system (Guayjaroen, 2001). Even though it took six years and a lot of effort, 
the villagers were eventually victorious in their battle and the Sakon Nakhon 
Provincial court ordered the company return the land on Tung Pan Kan to the village 
as public use land in 1996. Of relevance perhaps in the court’s decision was the fact 
The company felled much of the eucalyptus plantations over the next two years, but 
many trees on the flood prone land had simply failed to grow and were engulfed by 
paa boong paa thaam, which shows remarkable resilience to disturbance and can 
recover quickly under certain conditions. In 2004-05, the villagers of Ban Dong San 
decided to convert about 2,400 rai of Tung Pan Kan to irrigated dry season rice 
cultivation and divide up the land into 20 rai blocks for each family (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). The remaining 2,000 rai of land was to be retained as 
community forest, and this conservation project was subsequently the subject of 
assistance by the Dept of Environmental Quality Promotion. 
Despite the total failure of Sun Tech and Asia Tech’s agribusiness ventures on the 
Nam Songkhram floodplain, and reports of vast unserviced debts, the company and 
its successor Apex Development PCL have somehow managed to avoid bankruptcy 
and liquidation of assets. This suggests that it has some powerful connections that 
have helped to avoid its demise and allowed it to carry on trading, albeit under 
another name. The question remains, therefore, what will the company do with its 
extensive land holdings in the LSRB, which are now sitting idle to all intents and 
purposes? In mid-2007, there was evidence that some ex-agribusiness farmed land 
Box 6: Choosing the right tree crop for the “problematic” floods 
“The Songkhram River has a problem with flooding in the rainy season. Other crops or 
trees cannot be grown on the lands…….My objective was to experiment with eucalyptus, 
because I had an idea that eucalyptus could grow in areas where other crops could not 
grow. My idea was to change the flooded areas to forest by planting eucalyptus.” (Source: 
Interview with Paiboon Nititawan, President of Asia Tech Group. Watershed, 1996).  
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was being sold off near Ban Tha Rae village in Agad Amnuay District, Sakhon Nakhon 
by the Bangkok Commercial Asset Management Co Ltd6 suggesting it had been 
seized by the state. However, it was unclear if this was land formerly belonging to 
Sun Tech Group or not. Given that the company still has land it purchased cheaply 
on the floodplain at several locations, all of which have been repeatedly slated as 
potential sites for inundation by state-owned irrigation reservoirs, then it would not 
be beyond the realms of possibility that it could be holding out in the hope of a large 
irrigation projects to proceed and therefore recoup some of its losses from 
compensation payments. In conclusion, it could be said that while Sun Tech is down 
and has failed in its heavily subsidized bid to turn the Nam Songkhram floodplains 
into a major site of export-led intensive agriculture, it is definitely not out of the 
picture. It would seem that there is still much at stake for failed agribusiness giants, 
in terms of cashing in valuable land assets and turning loss into profit.  
Case 3: Upper Songkhram Project (irrigation & flood control) 
This case study is briefer than the other two for the simple reason that there is less 
information in the public domain concerning the history, implementation and 
outcomes of this Project. What is known is mostly based on the author’s personal 
observations made during several visits to the area between 2005 – 2007, 
conversations with a few stakeholders and some limited information contained in a 
single 1997 Thai language report dating from the time that the project was under the 
control of the now-defunct Accelerated Rural Development Office (ARD). The details 
of the two main dam projects planned under this project are given in Table 2 below. 
These two projects were the largest water infrastructure components of a larger rural 
development project implemented by the ARD in the so-called Upper Songkhram 
Basin, encompassing parts of Udon Thani and Sakhon Nakhon provinces, of which 
the Nam Songkhram River forms the provincial boundary. The core idea of this 
“Upper Nam Songkhram Project” was to boost local incomes and raising agricultural 
productivity through construction of irrigation schemes across the region. Some 
would be traditional water storage and gravity-fed irrigation, while others would be 
pumped irrigation, along the lines of the systems promoted by DEDP. The Ban Muang 
and Ban Nong Gaa “weirs” as they were euphemistically termed, were to be the 
lowest water control structures in the overall plan, allowing for a combined irrigated 
area of 48,000 rai (7,680 ha) in the wet season and 9,600 rai (1,536 ha) in the dry 
season. They were called “weirs”, but in actual fact were concrete dam structures 
with liftable watergates similar to the design for the Nam Songkhram and Nam Oon 
Projects in Case 1, and would theoretically have a combined water storage capacity 
and surface area of 15 MCM and 6.6 km2 respectively. This would inevitable require 
the flooding of land on the floodplain to create the reservoirs, causing inevitable loss 
and damage to valuable wetland habitats extensively used by local communities for 
livelihoods. The cost in US dollars at a pre-crash 1997 exchange rate of 25 baht / 
                                          
6 It is unclear if this finance company is part or wholly state owned at present, or 
how they came to be the owners/executors responsible for this large land plot, 
extending to almost 5,000 rai (800 ha). The company’s website may be found at 
http://www.bam.co.th/bam/corporate/index.php?. According to a short article in the 
Bangkok Post dated February 2, 2007, Bangkok Commercial Asset Management 
(BAM) is state owned and was “first set up by the central bank’s Financial 
Institutions Institutional Development Fund to oversee the liquidation of the defunct 
Bangkok Bank of Commerce”. It anticipated that it may in future be listed on the 
Stock Exchange of Thailand (Source: http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-
158749696.html)  
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US$ would have been US$ 9.8 for Ban Muang system and US$ 23.76 for Ban Nong 
Gaa system.  
 
Table 2. Details of two irrigation schemes planned for the middle Nam Songkhram 
River. 
 
PROJECT NAME Ban Muang Weir Ban Nong Gaa 
Weir 
PROJECT LOCATION Ban Muang Moo 1, 
Ban Muang Sub-
district, Ban Dung 
District, Udon Thani   
Ban Nong Gaa, 
Ban Jan Sub-
district, Ban Dung 
District, Udon 
Thani 
Catchment area (km2) 1,654 2,286 
Average Annual run-off (MCM) 800.49 1,093.70 
Water storage capacity (MCM) 4.00  11.00 
Area of storage reservoir (km2) 1.8 4.80 
No. of gates 5 6 
Height of dam (metres) 3 3 
Irrigation potential – rainy 
season 






Estimated 1997 cost of 
construction (Million Baht) 
245 594 
Area of land actually irrigated 
(2007 observations by author) 
0 0 
(Source: adapted from Accelerated Rural Development, 1997, cited in Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006a) 
For one reason or another, ARD was slow to implement these projects in the late 
1990s and during the 2002 bureaucratic reorganization by the Thaksin regime, ARD 
went the same way as DEDP and was dissolved. Its portfolio of water management 
projects was passed on to the newly formed Department of Water Resources (DWR) 
who wasted no time in implementing these two dam projects. DWR first built Ban 
Muang “weir” in 2003 and later completed Ban Nong Gaa “weir” in late 2004.  
The author visited both project sites in January 2005 and returned on several 
subsequent occasions over the next two years (including during the Environmental 
Flows Intermediate Assessment fieldwork), culminating in a canoe trip along the 
entire river reach above and below the dams in July 2007 (Blake, 2007). It was 
apparent that both dams were causing considerable negative environmental impacts; 
including total blockage of water flows in the dry season; obstructing the upstream 
and downstream migration of fish and other aquatic organisms; loss of extensive 
riparian vegetation and wetland habitats; aggravated flooding locally; induced soil 
salinisation; altered channel morphology causing increased bank erosion and 
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sedimentation (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). No EIA had been conducted 
prior to the dams being built and there appeared to be no feasibility study prepared 
by DWR (Blake et al, 2009). The most noteworthy observation was that there was 
not a single household or rai of land benefitting from irrigation as a result of the two 
dams, in either the wet or dry seasons during site visits in 2005-07. Local people 
interviewed seemed to have very little idea about the supposed purpose or 
beneficiaries of the project and no staff were stationed at the dams to monitor or 
maintain them. Both structures were already showing signs of wear and poor 
construction technique within two years of completion. So if the dams were not built 
for irrigation purposes, what were they built for and had the main objectives of the 
dams change?  
I posed these questions to a senior official from the DWR’s Area 3 office in Udon 
Thani that is responsible for the dams, during a Nam Songkhram E-Flows meeting in 
May 2006 that brought together a number of stakeholders from various agencies. He 
claimed that the two dams were built for flood control, but when I pointed out that 
they were patently not achieving this goal but may well be exacerbating flooding 
locally, he changed his mind and claimed that they were in fact for local domestic 
consumption. When I also pointed out that the dams were not being used for this 
purpose either, he eventually claimed (I suspect tongue-in-cheek) that they were 
“for local people to bathe in”. This wonderful piece of farce was reminiscent of 
Lohmann’s (1997) description of the unfolding “drama of development” at a seminar 
for the Nam Songkhram Project (see Case 1). It seems that for some powerful 
actors, who might be termed as “hydro-hegemons”7 (see Zeitoun and Warner, 
2005), water resources infrastructure development is always justified, no matter 
what the cost.    
At the local level, it was apparent that the nearby communities were not only 
suffering the multiple impacts created by the two dams, but they also had now been 
saddled with the “ownership” of them. Signs erected by DWR near the rusting and 
defunct dam structures announced that “The Department of Water Resources Area 3 
Office hands over this weir to the people of Ban Jan Sub-district for the public benefit 
and to help maintain”. Hence, presumably this also implied that they were also 
responsible for the costs of maintenance and the DWR would not be responsible for 
the impacts or risks arising from their construction.  
Apart from obvious signs of soil salinisation occurring around the Ban Muang 
structure, there was also rapid soil erosion occurring around and behind the concrete 
dam during rainy season flow conditions causing loss of agricultural land and 
weakening the entire dam structure, creating a potential hazard. In the rainy season 
during flood conditions, both structures became totally inundated and inoperable.  
 
IV  Arenas 
Research question 
Q/ What were the arenas used in the decision-making processes? How was this 
defined, legitimized, accessed or created? 
                                          
7 Hydro-hegemony, notes Zeitoun and Warner (2005), is achieved through water 
resource control strategies such as resource capture, integration and containment at 
the river basin level by more powerful actors within a weak institutional context, 
using an array of tactics including knowledge construction. DEDP, DWR and RID 
would fit the description of hydro-hegemons well. 
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The arenas used in the water resources decision-making processes have changed 
and evolved over time, partly in response to larger transformations in governance 
and policy making at the national level, but also reflecting growing local awareness 
and mechanisms for involvement at the sub-basin level. In the case of the Nam 
Songkhram Project, a slow but gradual process towards more inclusive, informed 
and transparent water governance can be detected. From its first definite incarnation 
as a large, multi-dammed, complex engineering, water infrastructure project 
envisaged in the NEDECO/TEAM (1983) report, the Nam Songkhram Project evolved 
over the next two decades of socio-political change in Thailand to include 
progressively more actors and stakeholders in the negotiation process. It started as 
a highly techno-centric process, that involved Dutch and Thai consultants making 
plans for submission to the Thai and Netherlands governments through the auspices 
of the Mekong Committee. Local consultation was not evident in the report and it 
was very much assumed beneficiaries of development assistance were passive 
participants in the process. To the consultants, the problems of water governance 
were clear – scarcity or drought in the dry season and floods in the wet season. The 
local people were rice farmers first and foremost, who it was assumed would want 
irrigation in the dry season and flood control in the wet season, to boost their 
agricultural production as recognized by Breukers (1998). While this superficial 
analysis of the problems and solutions has essentially remained static in the main 
water provisioning bureaucracies of the country, the wider societal understanding of 
water needs in relation to socio-economic, cultural and environmental considerations 
has changed considerably.  
Hence, civil society groups at the international, national and local / grassroots levels 
have been able to open up space and challenge some of the dominant myths 
surrounding not only water governance in the Nam Songkhram Basin, but also 
questioning facets of the rationale of development itself. Thus, Lohmann (1998) in 
his political ecology-type analysis of the NGO-organized seminar in December 1997 
to consider the provisional conclusions of the state’s EIA studies, likened it to a 
“multiple theatre of power in which development unfolds”. The participants were 
“actors” in every sense of the word argued Lohmann and were expected to play 
strictly defined roles, which in the event exposed some rather shakey underpinnings 
to the project’s chief justifications and assumptions. This seminar involving multiple 
stakeholders might be classed a Multiple Stakeholder Platform (MSP) broaching 
Tracks 3 and 4, according to Dore’s (2007:213) examples, was itself attributable to 
the space opened up by the Thai civil society movement during the years following 
Black May of 1992 (see Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). The timing of this seminar is 
significant in that it came soon after the so-called “People’s Constitution” of 1997 
had been ratified by the Chavalit Yongchaiyuth government, which for the first time 
placed far higher emphasis that previous constitutions on such notions as human 
rights, gender equality, and rights to form groups, associations, unions, cooperatives 
and private organizations. Furthermore, it allowed for the decentralization of powers 
and decision-making to local bodies and greater participation in the management of 
natural resources for local communities (e.g. Article 46, 56 and 79) (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b). Thus, while the Nam Songkhram Project seminar did not 
persuade the developers to drop their project or even alter it radically, it is argued 
that this MSP-like 1997 event did apply subtle pressure on state agencies to be more 
transparent with information and it certainly empowered civil society actors and 
observers that their approach of challenging positivist, scientific-based knowledge 
with more relativist, locally-situated and holistic knowledge was justified through 
exposing multiple flaws in the former. 
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Since that time, the political will and economic justification for the Nam Songkhram 
Project faded, while the opposing environmental and socio-cultural case against 
strengthened in the late 1990s and early part of the millennium. At the same time, 
sweeping bureaucratic reform in 2002 creating new environmentally-focused 
departments such as ONEP and DEQP in the Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment and changes to several other key ministries, plus dissolution of the 
DEDP ensured that the Nam Songkhram Project was of low priority by the time the 
Cabinet cancelled it in 2003. Around the same time, new initiatives were starting in 
the Nam Songkhram Basin, such as the MWBP8 project in the LSRB based in Sri 
Songkhram District. This project was seen by some actors as a timely and viable 
alternative approach to the narrow-focused Nam Songkhram Project and worked as 
an effective bridge between the various stakeholders. Thus, state and non-state 
actors participated in a wide variety of activities and platforms initiated by MWBP, a 
few of which are discussed in more detail in the Process and Tool Reviews. MWBP 
redefined the problems and solutions to the local situation, through wide 
participation, consultation, use of innovative tools and most importantly, following an 
ecosystem-based approach to development.  
However, as noted earlier, the Nam Songkhram Project did not disappear entirely 
and made a re-appearance in 2006, following political pressure applied by both local 
powerful interests and expressed publically by the populist Prime Minister, in line 
with his party’s mega-project visions for Northeast Thailand. Even after his ouster, 
the Project was still being gently pushed by various interests in the bureaucracy (in 
particular RID) and private business spheres, who would benefit financially from its 
implementation. In the short term, it seems that the same vested interests have in 
the meantime backed the smaller and cheaper option of the Nam Oon Watergates 
Project for more rapid implementation, seeing potentially less local opposition and 
legal obstacles standing in the way of the project, such as carrying out an EIA or SIA 
or full cost-benefit analysis. At the same time, local consultation and participation in 
project planning has been far from ideal, raising serious doubts about the outcome of 
this 300 million baht (US$ 8.6 million) project, should it proceed.   
For the second Sun Tech Group agribusiness case, it would seem that the arenas 
used for the decision-making process were largely top-down and non-participatory 
throughout the tenure of the company’s regime. Using government policy specifically 
endorsing the expansion of agribusiness in Northeast Thailand to take advantage of 
generous subsidies and financial incentives, the company was able to establish itself 
in the LSRB, which it believed offered fertile soils and a benign climate for export-
oriented cash crops. The state and financial institutions provided cheap credit and 
tax breaks to also set up a processing factory, which incidentally also included the 
construction of an adjacent dam and water storage reservoir, flooding lands formerly 
used by the communities of Ban Don Daeng and Ban Kaa. No compensation was 
given to impacted local people for their lost livelihood opportunities. Through 
exploitation of weak land laws and taking advantage of both a powerful network of 
state officials to help facilitate common land acquisition and local ignorance of 
                                          
8 The MWBP was a five-year (2004 - 2009), US$30 million initiative, of which only 
Phase A (2004-2006) was completed. The Programme was jointly managed by IUCN 
(the World Conservation Union), the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), in partnership with government and 
nongovernmental actors in the four countries in which it operated: Thailand, 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam; http://www.mekongwetlands.org 
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constitutional rights, Sun Tech were able to buy up large areas of floodplain wetlands 
at cheap prices, formerly rich in common pool resources. Once the land had been 
converted to official land title documents, they were then able to finance expansion 
to new resource frontiers in Lao PDR and Viet Nam, by lodging the land title as 
collateral for bank loans. The land was valued far above its purchase price, thus 
allowing the company great financial leverage for new speculative business.  
However, Sun Tech Group executives were not adequately prepared for big 
fluctuations in the global demand for their core product of processed tinned tomatoes 
or the relatively high costs of production on the problematic, floodprone soils of the 
LSRB. Pritchard and Burch (2003) charted Sun Tech’s waxing and waning fortunes, 
along with other agribusiness actors involved in the processed tomato industry in 
Northeast Thailand, documenting how even after the Asian Economic Crash of 1997 
and the technical bankruptcy of Sun Tech, they still managed to somehow keep 
operating and trading, albeit in a much reduced manner. This phenomenon and their 
continued presence in the LSRB, even after eventual cessation of tomato cultivation 
and processing activities and a change of company name, hints at their powerful and 
protected nature. It would not be correct to say that Sun Tech had it all their own 
way, as evidenced by the case of Tung Pan Kan and the struggle between the 
company and villagers of Ban Dong San (Guayjaroen, 2001). Here the community 
took their loss of land rights and common property resources to the courts, after 
failing to get adequate redress to their complaints from provincial authorities and 
eventually won the case. Thus, the law courts could be viewed as another valid arena 
or decision-making forum over water and natural resource rights, although it should 
be noted that it is still relatively rare in Thailand for communities to take the formal 
legal route, as in this instance. 
In Case 3, the two dams built as part of the former ARD’s Upper Songkhram Project 
provide a little-studied example of what can happen when little or no participation of 
local stakeholders is carried out in project planning and implementation. As far as 
the author can ascertain, local communities were treated as passive recipients by 
both ARD and DWR throughout the planning and construction process. On 
completion, the dam structures were presented to the local people by the state 
(without specifying exactly which group were primary beneficiaries) and DWR 
withdrew from the area, leaving no staff to look after and maintain the 
infrastructure, let alone deliver irrigation or any other theoretical benefits. Hardly 
surprisingly, given the circumstances under which the dams were built with 
apparently few (or no?) feasibility studies conducted prior to construction and little 
(or no?) local / civil society participation during or after construction, the quality of 
construction was poor and the dams are already falling into disrepair. Additionally, 
multiple and serious environmental impacts are becoming apparent in the areas 
upstream and downstream of the dams, which perhaps could have been avoided or 
mitigated, had an EIA or Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) been carried out 
in the planning stages. 
As it stands, the dams or “weirs” as these structures were optimistically termed by 
the developers, stand as silent monuments in the waterscape to an all-too-common 
failure of development in Thailand where problems are misunderstood, solutions are 
misapplied, decisions are made unaccountably and lessons are rarely learned. Local 
villagers near Ban Muang the author talked to during the 14 day canoe descent of 
the Nam Songkhram River mentioned earlier, asked when they were going to get an 
irrigation system they could use, while surveying acres of dead and dying riparian 
forest killed by the dam’s permanently raised water table and quite possibly, the 
underlying salt layer’s rise (Blake, 2007). This project seemed to lack any underlying 
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purpose and deserves further study whether they might be good candidates for dam 
removal and ecological restoration. 
Integrated Water Resources Management and Water Planning  
Up until this point, no mention has been made of the much-vaunted adoption of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) principles by the Thai government 
and the establishment of river basin organizations or committees (RBCs) in the 25 
main river basins identified nationwide9, and what this has implied to the case of the 
Nam Songkhram Basin specifically. Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006a:75)) give a 
broad overview of the structure of the RBC’s and some of the experiences locally of 
implementation. One of the immediate principle problems that can be identified is 
that the Nam Songkhram Basin does not have a distinct and separate RBC of its 
own, but is split into six rather arbitrary sub-basin units which report to the supra-
RBC unit termed as “Mekong Basin Area 02”, that includes a plethora of smaller sub-
basin units strung out along the provinces of Northeast Thailand bordering the 
Mekong from Loei in the northwest to Amnat Charoen in the southeast. A consortium 
of five private consultancy companies10 were hired by the DWR to conduct 
workshops for RBC working group members in each sub-basin during 2004-05 in 
order to compile sub-basin water resources development plans that would inform a 
Master Plan for the development and management of water resources in the entire 
Mekong Basin Area 0211. This Master Plan would be submitted to the National Water 
Resources Committee (NWRC) and MoNRE for final vetting and approval before 
proposed work under the plan could commence, in theory.  
In practice, it is uncertain how the process proceeded, as little recorded information 
about it seems to have leaked into the public sphere. From my own conversations 
with people from civil society who were involved in the consultation workshops, they 
were less than impressed by the level of participation and transparency surrounding 
the process. One sub-district committee member from Sri Songkhram District who 
had long been involved in local conservation activities commented, “It’ a waste of 
time going to the meetings as they just want to build more big projects. They don’t 
want to listen to my opinion or think about natural resources conservation.” (quoted 
in Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a:78). Other participants painted a similar 
                                          
9 For a summary of the rationale for this policy, its main objectives and scope of 
work, refer to the document entitled “Integrated Water Resources Management in 
Thailand” jointly prepared by the Department of Water Resources and Department of 
Groundwater Resources under the MoNRE, found at:   
http://www.dgr.go.th/tor/image/pdf/IWRMinTHAILAND.pdf 
10 The companies contracted were: Sanyu Consultants (Thailand) Ltd, Macro 
Consultants Ltd, Tesco Ltd, Thai DCI Ltd, and Southeast Asia Technology (Seatec) 
Ltd. (Source: Department of Water Resources, 2004) 
11 According to a spreadsheet obtained showing planned expenditure for each of 25 
River Basins between 2006-09, the total budget allotted to Mekong Area 02 was 
approximately 18 billion baht, with 8.9 billion baht of this provided to RID for 
infrastructure investment in “solving the water shortage problem” i.e. new irrigation 
systems (Department of Water Resources Department, 2005) 
Box 7: Thailand’s National Water Vision 
By the year 2025, Thailand will have sufficient water of good quality for all users 
through an efficient management, organizational and legal system that would 
ensure equitable and sustainable utilization of its water resources with due 
consideration on the quality of life and participation of all stakeholders.  
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picture of a fixed agenda and top-down approach where state agencies brought 
along projects they had already designed to the table seeking approval from the RBC 
sub-basin committee which was heavily weighted in favour of state representatives. 
It was presented as being a case of merely prioritizing a pre-decided shopping list of 
projects, rather than any true desire to put IWRM principles into practice. Thus, 
hegemonic institutions like RID and DWR are able to ensure their projects are near 
the top of the list and projects like the Nam Songkhram Project do not disappear off 
the negotiating table, but remain an option dependent more on central budget 
approval than local need.  
 
Molle (2007:24) in his Mekong regionwide assessment of irrigation and water policies 
identified the evolution of “proto-RBOs” in Thailand from their roots and concluded 
that even after several years of implementation they would “remain paper 
organizations with limited power and a consultative role rather than strong 
participants in arenas of negotiation and decision-making”. While this may be true 
for some RBCs and they may seem more like rubber stamping committees for pre-
determined state-led water infrastructure projects, the strong political backing given 
to these organizations during the Thai Rak Thai government and the strong lip 
service given to IWRM principles by DWR, could suggest that they will return to new 
prominence after the last few years of political uncertainty and inactivity for RBCs. 
This might depend on whether the Democrat-led government seeks to “reward”12 
the Isaan people through water resources development projects or not. 
Not to be outdone, the MRC in association with the Thai National Mekong Committee 
(TNMC) (which itself is a sub-unit of the DWR) has been working on creating a Basin 
Development Plan (BDP) with the objectives of making a sustainable water resources 
development plan in each sub-basin area identified, using input from a “wide variety 
of stakeholders” in a “participatory, joint decision-making process” (TNMC, 2004, 
cited in Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). The Nam Songkram Basin falls under 
area coded SA-3T which covers the eight provinces of upper Northeast Thailand and 
means there is considerable overlap and non-alignment with the 25 RBC plans of the 
DWR mentioned above. According to Thai National Mekong Committee (2004:6), 290 
irrigation projects covering a total area of 267,000 ha were identified for potential 
development in SA-3T, which will inevitably include some of the more controversial 
projects. Interestingly, this TNMC report does identify the Nam Songkhram Project 
as having potential issues of a “trans-boundary nature” to consider before 
implementation should proceed (Thai National Mekong Committee, 2004:15) and 
considers some of the more important cross-sectoral and cross-cutting issues 
relevant to water management in the Mekong Basin. However, it remains to be 
resolved how the MRC/TNMC Basin Development Plan ties in with the RBC Master 
Plans prepared by DWR consultants and how closely the two processes are 
coordinated into a single vision or plan of action.  
V Case Analysis of water allocation decision-making processes and tools 
Research Questions 
Q/ What are the important contextual factors and attributes relevant to the 
determination of pathways and outcomes of the decision-making? 
                                          
12 See Bangkok Post 18 December 2008, “One ring to unite them all, pledges 
Abhisit”.  
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Q/ what can we learn about water allocation decision-making processes and arenas 
used, particularly about actors, interactions, pathways and outcomes? And how 
power comes into play at crucial nodes or events? 
Q/ What progressive processes or tool/s have been used? If they were not used, 
what might have been the constraining factors or condition? Would their use likely 
change the arena and outcome of decisions? 
Q/ Do any of the progressive processes and tools examined have potential to 
improve water allocation and decision-making? 
Q/ What does the place case study teach us about the necessary and/or 
contingent conditions for a relevant process/tool to be applied and make a 
difference? 
Q/ What is the potential of the research in the place-based case in influencing 
ongoing process of decision-making on water allocation issues? 
Q/ What may be the potential of the case/s in informing and influencing investment 
and/or development pathways of the place?  
“In the current era, struggles over the KCM project, Rasi Salai and other nodes of 
conflict are largely about maintaining the set of relations among Thai political agents 
and development agencies that confer the KCM project is power effects and capacity 
to reach across scales. Scale and power are thus intimately related within complex 
environmental conflicts, and tracing their linkages through an array of actors and 
across a variety of scales, the approach associated with actor-network 
methodologies, can reveal a great deal about how power and scale are co-created.” 
Sneddon (2003). 
Historical roots of natural resources conflict 
When considering the development trends and types of water management project 
that have been favoured by the state in the Nam Songkhram Basin, it is often helpful 
to look back at historical factors that may have predisposed one mode of 
development over another. Floch et al. (2007) chronicled the historical progression 
of water resources management in the Mun-Chi Basin since what they termed as the 
“Pre-Exploitation period (up to 1939)” that refers to the period prior to state 
sponsored irrigation schemes. They identify three main definable periods in the 
development of water resources in Isaan’s largest river basin, namely: “The Early 
Years (1939-1960): Experimenting with Irrigation”, the “Rise of Storage (1960-
1978): Cold War Engineering”; and “Diversifying Irrigation Development (1978-
2005). As there appears to be little data available concerning the Nam Songkhram 
Basin, I will limit my observations to historical factors of relevance to water 
resources management in the period after the ratification of Thailand’s first National 
Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) in 1961, which roughly coincides 
with the period of modern developmentalism in Thailand.  
To get a sense of some of the historical factors that have shaped water resources 
governance in the Nam Songkhram Basin, the reader is referred to Annex 2, giving a 
brief chronology of significant events. During the 1960s and much of the 70s, much 
of the Nam Songkhram Basin was a theatre of ideological conflict and armed 
insurrection, chiefly between communist forces and those of the US-backed state-
military complex. It is no coincidence that the young Marxist poet and historian Jit 
Phumisak was killed in 1966 while supporting villager rights in the Phu Phan hill 
range of Sakhon Nakhon and the Communist Party in Thailand formed its first base 
in the same upland forests nearby to the location where the popular local politician 
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Khrong Chandawong13 was executed in 1961 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005). By 
the same token, it is also unlikely to be coincidental that the slopes of Phu Phan were 
chosen for a royal palace and much store was spent on developing the rural 
infrastructure of the more remote parts of the Nam Songkhram Basin, as direct 
means to counteract the perceived threat posed by communism spreading in the 
region. Roads, bridges, schools, health centres and irrigation schemes were built not 
only for the sake of “development”, but as a means to win over the hearts and minds 
of the people from left-wing ideological tendencies.  
In the words of Baker and Phongpaichit (2005:180), “The alignment of army, palace 
and business concluded by Sarit under US patronage in 1957-58 benefitted all 
parties. The US secured a base. The monarchy revived. The generals enjoyed power 
and profit. Business boomed. But these gains did not come without costs, and 
without releasing new social forces.”   
US military bases were established in Nakhon Phanom and Udon Thani to expedite 
the Indochina War, “friendship highways” were built between strategic cities and the 
newly-formed American funded Accelerated Rural Development Office (ARD) built 
two thirds of the feeder roads for the growing network in the Northeast (Bello et al, 
1998). Forests were cleared, cash crops were planted, natural resources became 
commodities, the countryside was linked with the cities and people became far more 
mobile in the headlong rush to develop. 
It could be argued that the relationship between the bureaucracy, monarchy, 
business and military has remained as the principle most powerful institutions 
shaping decisions over water and natural resources management in large parts of 
the Nam Songkhram Basin, with civil society or people’s movements only having 
agency in relatively localised areas overall during the past decade or so. While the 
balance between these powers has shifted constantly and the phenomenon of 
“money politics” has become a prominent force shaping decisions at all levels from 
national down to local level, essentially real decision-making power over major water 
infrastructure projects has remained concentrated in the hands of relatively few at 
the top. This is not to imply that local stakeholders cannot influence decisions made 
over individual projects, as they clearly can in the case of delays to and the 2002 
cancellation of the Nam Songkhram Project and return of Tung Pan Kan to the 
villagers of Ban Dong San, but it does imply that the state is still reluctant to let 
resource users have a significant say in large projects, such as the two dams with no 
purpose across the middle Songkhram and the Water Grid project which is being 
planned away from public scrutiny, driven largely by political ambitions and 
opportunities for personal enrichment. 
To further understand the dominant role that the irrigation sector has played in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin, at the expense of other water users, one only need look at 
the largest irrigation system constructed in the Basin to date – the Lam Nam Oon 
Irrigation Project in Sakhon Nakhon. It was constructed between 1967 to 1981, 
although operations actually began in May 1974 (Royal Irrigation Department, 
2003), it was clearly a very slow process in getting the system fully “operational”.  
The Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project was part financed by the Thai government and 
                                          
13 Khrong Chandawong and fellow social activist, Thongpan Suthimat were executed 
by military firing squad in a paddy field next to a disused, ex-Seri Thai airfield in 
Sawang Dindaen Dsitrict, Sakhon Nakhon province  on the direct orders of Prime 
Minister Sarit Thanarat on 31 May, 1961, having both spent the previous five years 
in jail (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2005:174). 
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USAID, which according to the Royal Irrigation Department (2003) supported two 
development projects in the 32,000 ha command area: 
• 1978 – 1985  Integrated Rural Development Project involving cooperation of 
eight departments in four ministries with the objective of increasing 
agricultural production yields leading to higher living standards 
• 1987 - 1991 Promotion of an Agro-Industrial Project with the objective of 
encouraging permanent cooperation between farmers and the private sector. 
Contract farming was the favoured model. 
The latter project was considered a great success, according to an USAID evaluation 
in 1993-94 (Dolinsky, 1995). According to their statistics, agricultural output 
expanded nearly 25 fold and households participating in contract farming grew from 
171 families in 1985 to 4,000 in 1993. The number of agribusiness firms operating 
grew from three in 1985 and peaked at nine in 1991, before declining to eight in 
1993, with production centred on vegetables and tomatoes for processing (some 
being sent to Sun Tech’s Sri Songkhram factory) and flower seeds for export. The 
USAID report believed that prospects for growth of agribusiness were favourable 
because, “the quality of Lam Nam Oon’s water delivery is a magnet for 
agribusinesses, the farmers now have technological expertise, and the local 
environment is pro-business.” The study estimated that small farmer incomes had 
nearly quadrupled between 1986 and 1993 and that women and landless farmers 
benefitted too, through increased employment opportunities. The only real concerns 
Box 8. Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project, Sakhon Nakhon Province 
 
Agency responsible:  Royal Irrigation Department (RID) 
Project type:   storage dam and reservoir, with gravity-fed irrigation scheme 
Project objective:   irrigation and flood control 
Construction period:  1967 - 1981 
Head works 
Drainage area:  1,100 km2 
Reservoir Area:  85 km2 
Retention level:  185 masl 
Reservoir storage capacity: 520 MCM  
Dam height:  29.5 m 
Irrigation system 
Total command area:   200,800 rai (32,128 ha) 
Total irrigable area:   185,800 rai (29,728 ha) 
Rainy season irrigated area:  200,800 rai (32,128 ha) 
Dry season irrigated area:   10,000 – 26,000 rai (1,600 – 4,160 ha)  
Water supply consumed in dry season:   70 – 100 MCM 
No. of households with land in command area:  20,551 h/h 
Annual O & M budget:   43.211 – 60.863 million baht 
(Source: Royal Irrigation Department, 2003) 
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expressed were about the liberal use of pesticides and the public sector’s tendency 
for “social service orientation” rather than “a more business oriented one” (Dolinsky, 
1995). 
Since 1991 the Lam Nam Oon project has been fully funded and under the 
administration of the Royal Irrigation Department, who state that the main 
objectives are (Royal Irrigation Department, 2003): 
• Store water and distribute to cultivated land 
• Solve the problem of water shortage either in dry season or in drought 
• Alleviate flood disaster in the Nam Oon Basin, Huai Pla Hang Basin and lower 
Songkhram River. 
It would appear that the objectives of the earlier USAID supported project 
component which stressed villager livelihoods and agribusiness promotion and RID’s 
present objectives which are of a hydrological control nature do not correspond. 
Water storage and distribution while solving “floods and droughts” still are the 
primary goals and these are firmly the remit of a highly centralized state 
bureaucracy with little apparent accountability to its main constituents, the farmers 
themselves. Hence, it was not surprising for me to observe parts of the command 
area in the 2007 dry season and see very little of the available irrigable land being 
utilized for agriculture, despite apparently plentiful and free water14. This situation 
was confirmed by Thierry Facon of FAO who has previously conducted training for 
RID at the Lam Nam Oon project and noted that dry season cropping is only 5 - 10 
% which is below potential water availability and that the system exhibits “results 
typical of systems in Thailand: poor control and service.” (Thierry Facon, email to 
LaoFAB web board, posted 25 December 2008). 
As for local or water users participation in the management and decision-making 
process, this would appear to be still lacking at Lam Nam Oon, as well as most other 
state-owned and operated irrigation systems. Although Water User’s Groups and 
Associations have supposedly been created at Lam Nam Oon, their role and 
importance in the overall scheme of things would appear to be minor (Royal 
Irrigation Department, 2003). From a case study based in northern Thailand, Neef 
(2008) found that despite new rhetoric espousing more inclusive and participatory 
approaches to water management, local experiences were quite different with even 
some recentralization of water governance responsibilities. He concluded that “State-
driven participatory processes tend to remain episodic and ceremonial and have not 
(yet) gone beyond the informative and consultative stage.” Similarly, Molle and Floch 
(2008) observed a similar disregard for participatory and transparency principles in 
their examination of the decision making process used for the so-called “Water Grid” 
project, both from DWR and RID who were both putting forward draft proposals for 
similar pan-Isaan irrigation projects during the Thaksin regime. This view would 
correspond with my own impressions of state-led water governance in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin and the dominance of these two hegemonic state agencies over 
decision-making.  
But even more illuminating, beyond the RID’s (and DWR’s) pre-occupation with 
“solving” droughts and floods, is the fact that so few farmers utilize the abundant 
and free water from what had been classed in 1990 the “Outstanding Irrigation 
Project in all of Thailand” (Skogerboe and Merkley, 1996) and  portrayed as a 
resounding success story by Dolinsky (1995). If drought and lack of access to water 
                                          
14 In Thailand, irrigation water from RID controlled projects is ostensibly provided to 
farmers for no charge, with capital costs and O & M costs being met by the state as a 
public subsidy. 
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are the principle problems facing Isaan farmers and holding back agricultural 
development, as the dominant state-led narrative has long maintained, then why do 
relatively few farmers take advantage of the heavily subsidized irrigation 
opportunities presented by Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project and what does this imply 
for the chances of success of future irrigation projects? While this paper does not 
seek to answer this question directly, the implications of Lam Nam Oon’s apparent 
failure to become a sustainable project after 40 years of investment by foreign and 
state institutions, inform and influence many arguments put forward in this paper 
about where power over water resources allocation still lies. To a certain extent, this 
also links well with the unanswered question about why RID still continues to push 
for the Nam Songkhram Project and its smaller sub-project, the Nam Oon 
Watergates Project, while Sun Tech Group and its successor seem to be miraculously 
protected from free market forces to continue to operate in business long after 
effective bankruptcy and continue to hold rights over vast swathes of floodplain 
wetlands.  
Actors and Institutions 
Thus far the report has mainly unpacked the roles and interplay of the major actors 
of relevance to the case studies considered. Some actors have been more prominent 
than others and there has been two main discernible trends witnessed over the last 
50 year period: 
 
1. An increasing diversity in the influence of and roles played by state agencies 
over time, especially since the far reaching bureaucratic reorganisation of 
2002, with several key players being absorbed into other institutions (e.g. 
ARD and DEDP) and several new institutions entering into the arena of water 
resources decision making (e.g. DWR, ONEP and DEQP). At the same time, 
certain other key agencies such as RID and the Fishery Department appear to 
have been largely immune to serious change during the last few decades. The 
goals and remit of these various water related agencies are quite different 
and the opportunities for integrating their work at the Basin level are still 
surprisingly few. 
2. An increasing role and influence of civil society and peoples organizations 
(e.g. PER, TERRA, Nam Songkhram Basin Conservation and Rehabilitation 
Club) often working in close cooperation and stemming largely from a 
response to the ecological and livelihood threats posed by the Nam 
Songkhram Project (Case 1) and agribusiness expansion (Case 2) in the 
LSRB.  
There is also clearly a growing realization that water resources management is far 
more complex than just a matter of supplying water for irrigated agriculture and 
meeting other demand from domestic consumption and limited industry. The needs 
of other water users such as fishers, wetland harvesters and rainfed landholders (the 
vast majority) have not been adequately recognised in the past, and therefore their 
voices have not been heard. There was neither the mechanisms nor the political will 
to seek more broad-based representation from a wide constituency of water 
consumers. The environment and ecosystems were also very much fringe concepts, 
with little money or interest shown in them by most state agencies until recently. 
This pattern has started to change in the last 5-10 years, with projects like the 
MWBP helping to raise the profile of multi-stakeholders, promote participation in 
wetlands management from national to local levels and trial new and innovative tools 
and processes. At the same time, academic and research interest in the biologically 
diverse and productive wetlands ecosystems has burgeoned in recent years, with 
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several regional and national educational institutions getting involved in projects in 
the LSRB. A selection of the key actors and institutions involved in water 
management aspects across the Nam Songkhram Basin are presented in the table 
3below. For a more exhaustive list of state institutions, the reader is referred to 
Table 13 (p. 70) in Blake and Pitakthepsombut (2006a). 
  
Table 3. Main actors and institutions relevant and active in aspects of water 
management of Nam Songkhram Basin. 
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hunting Zone / 
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Wetlands policy & planning 
(Ramsar Convention). 
National state partner 
agency for MWBP 
Water resources 
management & planning 
(host for Thai National 
Mekong Committee). 
Multiple dam & dredging 
projects 
Manage & conserve 
wetlands within protected 
areas. Regulate the use of 
national parks and protect 
wildlife habitats. 
 
Promote & enhance 
environmental awareness 
& education, working with 
local groups 
Prevent & control pollution 
of all forms from all 
sources  
Manage & conserve fishery 
areas. Enhance fishery 
productivity and promote 
aquaculture. Conduct 
research. 
Develop water resources 
and manage supply for 
various purposes. Holder 
of Nam Songkhram 
Irrigation Project. 
Maintain & protect rivers 
for use as transportation 
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• Agricultural Land Reform 
Office (ALRO) 




































































Ensure adequate water 





Develop soil and water 
resources to increase 
productivity. 
Developing water 
resources locally. Ensuring 





initiated projects or on 
military owned lands.  
Original implementer of 
Nam Songkhram Project. 
Promoting electric pumped 
irrigation projects. 
Developing water 
resources in the upper 
basin 
Local state  
• Provincial Offices of 




• Provincial Agriculture and 
Cooperatives Offices 





















Oversee & coordinate 
provincial natural 
resources & environmental 
strategies, incl wetlands  
Developing and promoting 
sustainable agriculture 
systems 
Local natural resources 
management and water 
resources development 
Academic / Research 
• Khon Kaen University 


















2004 – 2007 
 
EIA preparation for Nam 
Songkhram Project in late-
90s. Various bio-physical 
and socio-economic 
research projects since. 
Cooperation with MWBP. 
Water quality testing in 
Page 436 of 852
PN67_2010_11 
Nam Songkhram Basin, NE Thailand: Place & Arena Study  
David J.H. Blake 
Postgraduate Researcher, School of Development Studies, University of East Anglia 
 33 
• Mahasarakham University 
(Walai Rukavej Botanical 
Research Institute) 
 
• Mahidol University 
(Environmental Science 
Faculty) 
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research and training for 
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Multi-disciplinary wetlands 
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Implementing MWBP – 
raising awareness of 
wetlands management 
issues. Trialing novel 
approaches to wetlands 
research and 
management, through 
working with broad cross-
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advocacy for local 
communities. Building 
resource user networks 
Grassroots 











• Songkhram Basin 
Network for Ecological 
































Local people’s movement, 
raising local awareness of 
state-led and agribusiness 
development projects  
Resource users network, 
started under MWBP in 4 
key villages, linked into 
national Tai Baan Research 
Network.  Local Ecological 
Research and wetlands 
conservation activities 
Continuation of activities 
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• Nakhon Phanom 
Environmental 
Conservation Club (NECC)  
LSRB  
? 
Local civil society group 
working to promote 
environmental awareness 
and eco-tourism in Nakhon 
Phanom Province. Partner 
with MWBP 
Business 
• Sun Tech Group Public 
Company Ltd  
 


















1988 – 2007 
 
 






Agribusiness activities – 
large scale, intensive 
agriculture; agro-
processing and contract 
farming.  
Agribusiness activities – 
large scale, intensive 
agriculture; agro-
processing and contract 
farming.  
Extraction and simple 
processing of salt, using 
boiling and evaporation 
ponds 
 
Discourse and narratives 
“According to the two major problems [which] annually occur in this area, flooding 
for 2 – 3 months in the rainy season and lack of water in the dry season, farmers 
have to capture water during flooding for utilizing in dry season.” (Source: 
Chutiratanaphan and Patanakanok, 2001) 
The author would argue that state and popular discourses have consistently 
portrayed the regular, seasonally occurring drought and floods (i.e. the flood pulse) 
in the Nam Songkhram Basin as “natural disasters”, downplaying both the human-
induced dimensions or the relative and contextual elements associated with these 
loaded terms.  Both terms have been closely associated as being causative agents of 
poverty and the belief created by dominant “hydro-hegemons” that they can be 
controlled or even eliminated by human engineering interventions in the hydrological 
cycle are evident in state produced reports (e.g. Khon Kaen University, 1997; Royal 
Irrigation Department, 2003; Department of Water Resources, 2004). Lebel et al, 
(2005) has claimed that the Thai state has frequently manipulated or manufactured 
narratives of water “crises” (whether floods or droughts) to create space that allows 
the opportunity to introduce new water infrastructure projects to help stave off the 
flood or drought “disaster”. This tallies well with the “manufacture of popular 
perceptions of scarcity” notion in Gujarat state of India, referred to by Mehta (2001). 
It also perpetuates the environmental myths embodied in the justifications given for 
large state-led water infrastructure projects (such as Nam Songkhram Project or the 
Water Grid) to turn a poor, parched Isaan into a rich, irrigated, fertile region that are 
described by Molle and Floch (2008) as “desert bloom syndrome”. They argue that 
political ambitions, nationalistic hubris and popular modernization narratives tend to 
overpower more objective analysis of social and bio-physical constraints to such 
projects.  
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Table 4. Contrasting narratives of water governance and their main proponents 
found in the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
 Main lines of argument Main proponents 
Orthodox or 
dominant narratives 
• Floods and droughts are the 
main water resources problems 
or “crises” and should be 
considered “natural disasters” 
• Floods and droughts can be 
solved by using engineering 
solutions to intervene in the 
hydrological cycle 
• People are poor because they 
have insufficient irrigation water 
• Most rural people are rice 
farmers 
• Fisheries are declining due to 
overpopulation, overfishing and 
damaging fishing practices by 
local people 
• Local people lack scientific 
knowledge about natural 
resources management and 
therefore are unable to 
adequately manage the 
environment without state 
intervention 
• ADB; WB; DEDP; RID; 




• Most state agencies 
 
 
• Most state agencies 
 
• Most state agencies 
• Dept of Fisheries and 
other state agencies 
 
 
• Most state agencies 
Alternative or counter 
narratives 
• Floods and droughts are part of a 
natural seasonal cycle and 
should not be considered 
“problems”, but normal events 
• Top-down, engineering solutions 
do not solve the problems, but 
create new problems of their 
own 
• People are poor not because of 
lack of water supply, irrigation or 
drought, but because of a range 
of complex inter-connected 
social, economic and political 
factors 
• Most local people engage in a 
range of livelihood activities, 
including farming, fishing and 
utilization of forest and wetland 
resources 
• Fisheries are declining due to 
environmental degradation and 
commercialization of fisheries 
• Local people possess a wealth of 
• NGOs and civil society 
organizations 
 
• NGOs and civil society 
organizations 
 
• NGOs, civil society 
organizations and 
some state agencies 
 
 
• NGOs, civil society 
organizations and 
some state agencies 
 
• NGOs, civil society 
organizations and 
elements within MRC 
& DoF 
• NGOs, civil society 
organizations and 
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local knowledge which is more 
relevant to natural resources 
management than scientific 
knowledge 
some state agencies 
 
 
Table 4 above shows not only that there are strongly contrasting narratives relating 
to water resources management and development, but that different forms of 
knowledge are keenly contested. At its most simple, these dichotomous groupings 
can be portrayed as “local knowledge” versus “scientific knowledge” with each side 
claiming legitimacy for its claims to “truth”. In reality the claims and counter-claims 
are not always as black and white as this, and there is much middle ground in 
between the extremes. However, reading the popular English and Thai language 
press it would sometimes be hard to believe and dominant narratives are endlessly 
repeated. It is not uncommon to read news or commentary articles which repeat the 
popular environmental myth of Isaan as a “dry and infertile region” (e.g. 
Prateepchaikul, 2003). 
Similar debates between contested claims over local and scientific knowledge have 
been made concerning the subject of Mekong fisheries by various observers in recent 
years (e.g. Hirsch, 2004; Sneddon, 2007). While I do not wish to repeat these 
complex debates over competing fisheries knowledge in detail, despite their 
importance to the wider Mekong water governance debate, suffice to say that they 
exist too in the Nam Songkhram Basin and were very much part of the rationale 
behind much of the Tai Baan Research Network’s15 research focus. While some might 
like to paint local knowledge and scientific knowledge as two ends of a spectrum and 
there is very little common ground in the middle, they are in fact not that dissimilar 
and “conventional” fishery scientists in the Mekong region had seen the benefits of 
and been using local knowledge since before the advent of the Tai Baan Research 
Network. For example, the MRC Fishery Programme had been accessing local 
fisheries knowledge for information concerning fish life cycles and ecology, 
particularly in relation to migrations and spawning sites, since 1997 (Valbo-
Jorgensen and Poulsen, 2000). However, the debate was not just about the 
production and validity of different forms of knowledge, but also about ownership of 
that knowledge. This point relates directly to the “politics of fisheries knowledge” 
implicitly recognized and teased apart in the papers by Hirsch (2003) and Sneddon 
(2007).     
Hence, when IUCN in preparation for the MWBP Demonstration Site project started 
engaging with local state agencies, NGOs and communities in Nakhon Phanom 
around 2002-03, they found there was a strong desire for local resource users to 
conduct their own research into local livelihood-environment linkages. Villagers that 
had been involved in providing information to previous research, whether for EIA 
studies, MRC fisheries programme or academic research complained that the data 
they provided was always taken away and never fed back to the community. Hence, 
they were suspicious about how the information might be used to justify large 
projects which did not benefit them or destroyed local resources and were reticent 
                                          
15 Tai Baan Research (or in Thai language ngan wijai tai baan) literally means 
“villager research”, and refers to a local initiative to empower riverine-based 
communities to research, record and share the results of their own research on local 
livelihoods and ecology. While the concept started in Northeast Thailand, it has since 
spread to other regions of the country and Cambodia as well, adapting to local socio-
cultural conditions at the same time.  
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about joining new research efforts. At the same time, certain provincial and district 
state agencies looking for new roles following bureaucratic restructuring and ways of 
engaging with the newly empowered TAO’s with responsibility for management of 
local natural resources, saw potential opportunities in supporting novel grassroots 
research methods. Added to this was the apparent success of Tai Baan Research in 
providing sound data on fisheries and natural resource-based livelihoods at Pak Mun 
and Rasi Salai on the River Mun in southern Isaan and a burgeoning interest in 
indigenous knowledge nationally. Out of this background, emerged the Tai Baan 
Research Network in the LSRB which was essentially active during the lifetime of the 
MWBP presence in Sri Songkhram District i.e. 2003 – mid 2007 (see Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b; Scurrah, in press). 
The main appeal of Tai Baan Research is that it not only puts the local resource users 
in control of the research process and allows them to decide on the design and topics 
of the research focus, but it also keeps the results of the research in the hands of the 
local people, thus ensuring ownership and legitimacy in the eyes of local people. 
Outsiders participated in the research, but as facilitators termed as “research 
assistants” (Scurrah, in prep). As such it helped all parties to better understand the 
local society-nature links by experiential learning and in theory, should allow for 
more informed decision-making over natural resources management both at the 
local and higher levels.  It held the promise of participatory action research which 
could give voice to wetland users’ concerns at previously inaccessible fora and 
reduce opportunities for environmental conflict by improved knowledge of the local 
natural resources base and livelihoods. The two reports published and feedback 
workshops organized for interested persons and external stakeholders to learn about 
the research were well received and there was evidence the findings were widely 
respected amongst local, provincial and national state agencies (Blake and 
Pitakthepsombut, 2006b) 
Apart from Tai Baan Research, a number of other innovative tools and processes 
were trialled in the LSRB during the last decade or so (see Table 5), mostly under 
the umbrella guidance and funding provided by MWBP, with the exception of the last 
item, which was an exchange seminar funded by the Department of Environmental 
Quality Promotion (under MoNRE) and attended by a broad range of LSRB 
stakeholders from the state and non-state sectors in April 2004 (DEQP). The title of 
the seminar was “The Nam Songkhram Communities Way of Life. Seminar to 
Propose a Natural Resources and Environmental Management Plan by the 
Communities of the Lower Nam Songkram Basin”. Local resource users from about 
30 communities played the key role in explaining their hopes and concerns related to 
natural resources and local livelihoods. A report was published (in Thai) and widely 
disseminated. It is significant in that it proposed a vision of natural resources 
management, including water, that was significantly different from the dominant 
hegemonic state agencies’ vision, embodied by such projects as Nam Songkhram 
Project and the Water Grid. It emphasized local planning and management initiatives 
at the community level and rejected large pan-basin projects, adopting the 
subsidiarity principle. However, all indications are that this document was not widely 
adopted as a point of reference and the lessons contained within not acted upon.  
 
Table 5. A selection of some of the main innovative tools and processes trialed in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin in last few years, mostly related to wetlands management 
goals. 
Some innovative 
Tools/Processes observed in 
Key features References 
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Nam Songkhram Basin 
Tai Baan Research • Participatory action 
research 
• Situated research 
with high local 
ownership 




• Good acceptance of 
results from state 
agencies 
• Empowers local 
community 
Thai Baan Research 





2006a and 2006b 
Scurrah, 2009 
E-Flows study • Multi- and trans-
disciplinary approach 
to research 
• Involved wide 
stakeholder 
consultation pre- and 
post fieldwork 
• Targeted at 
understanding 
ecosystem-livelihood 




at end of process 
Dyson et al, 2003 
Blake et al, 
forthcoming 
WIAM biodiversity studies • Multi-scalar approach 
to wetlands research 
• Identifies key wetland 
sites of importance 
• Rapid appraisal 
techniques of 
biodiversity  








monitoring and result 
sharing 
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conservation 
network, still active 
today 
State-civil society seminar on 
natural resources management 





VI Current status of the decision-making process and its trajectory 
“Farmers’ inaccessibility to the irrigation system is a major cause of poverty. The 
integrated irrigation scheme would be a key measure to eradicate it”. Comments 
made by Somkid Jatusripitak to journalists, following a meeting with senior 
agricultural officials including Agriculture and Cooperatives Minister Somsak 
Thepsutin and deputy Minister Newin Chidchob on 9 January, 2004 in preparation for 
launching the Water Grid Project (Source: Samabuddhi, 2004) 
Water Grid Project and recent developments 
Since September 2006 and the ouster of Prime Minister of Thaksin Shinawatra, the 
political administration of Thailand has been marked by much instability and 
uncertainty. After a period of military rule up to elections in late December 2007, the 
country was turned over to a democratically elected government under Samak 
Sundaravej as leader of the People’s Power Party which continued to have close 
associations with the Shinawatra dynasty. Thus it was no surprise that just several 
days after his appointment in February 2008 as Prime Minister, Samak announced 
the resurrection of several mega-projects started under the Thai Rak Thai 
government, including the controversial Water Grid Project (Winwong, 2008). The 
Water Grid Project includes eight water diversion projects from river basins in 
neighbouring countries with an estimated cost of 500 billion baht ($14.97 billion). 
Apparently, the Thai cabinet approved the first two of these schemes in July 2008, 
including the proposed diversion from Lao PDR’s Nam Ngum River to the Chi-Mun 
Basin in Northeast Thailand via Nong Khai and Udon Thani provinces (Winwong, 
2008). For an in-depth description of the Water Grid’s chequered history and 
background, the reader is directed to the Ambio paper by Molle and Floch (2008). 
Here I will just concentrate on the aspects that pertain to the Nam Songkhram Basin. 
The Water Grid project, if it proceeds, opens up the possibility that some of the 
water diverted from Lao PDR or the Mekong mainstream may be transferred from a 
reservoir proposed for the  Huay Luang River in Udon Thani to the Nam Songkhram 
Basin as has been proposed in an early draft of the Water Grid Project seen by the 
author (Anon, 2005). The map below prepared by Sanyu Consultants (Thailand) 
indicates that 65 m3/s would be transferred (presumably in the dry season) into the 
Middle Nam Songkhram Basin for irrigation purposes. There are other transfer lines 
on the map indicating plans to move water from the Upper Songkhram to the Nam 
Yam tributary basin, water from the Nam Yam to the Nam Oon tributary basin and 
water from the Nam Oon to the Nam Gam basin via Nong Han lake in Sakhon 
Nakhon Province. Such inter-basin transfers would require massive engineering 
works at great cost and much social and environmental impacts. All the areas 
proposed for water transfer are known areas of high soil salinity. No feasibility study 
or cost-benefit analysis has been seen and it is unclear if any of these plans have 
been released into the public realm yet. 
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Figure XX. Map showing elements of proposed Water Grid Trans-basin transfer 
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The Water Grid project proposes to move water between basins and locations by 
means of a network of pipes, maintaining that these are more efficient than canals 
and less environmentally and socially disruptive, as they require less land. The 
Murray-Darling Basin in Australia is often quoted as a model to follow by Water Grid 
proponents, such as the Khon Kaen politician and past Minister for Natural Resources 
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and Environment and Deputy Prime Minster during the Thaksin regime, Suvit 
Khunkitti. In December 2008 he was reappointed to the position of Minister of 
Natural Resources and Environment in the Democrat coalition government (The 
Nation, 2008). If the Water Grid Project proceeded, it would inevitably entail the 
expansion of irrigated agriculture across the Nam Songkhram Basin, despite the lack 
of evidence that there is any real demand for such amongst ordinary villagers and 
even less willingness to pay for water (as evidenced by the case of Lam Nam Oon). 
Furthermore, a key goal of the Water Grid’s rationale (apart from the usual 
platitudes to reduce water shortage problems and poverty) is to promote 
agribusiness and in particular, contract farming, using agricultural extension 
methods described as “aggressive on-farm visits” (see Box 9 below).  It would seem 
that the possibility of the Water Grid Project becoming another massive public 
subsidy programme to provide cheap water and opportunities for corporate 









Box 9. Steps to accomplishing poverty eradication in Northeast Thailand by the Water 
Grid Project, according to proponents (Source: Powerpoint presentation given at 
Research and Development Institute, Khon Kaen University, February 23, 2005)   
 
1. Distribute water by pipes, canals, etc. from sources to required areas. 
2. Promote farmers to grow high value crops and manage water distribution 
through: 
a) Farmer Capacity Strengthening 
b) Seeds, bionic farming and irrigation techniques  
c) Formation of farmer organization for O&M of lateral pipes (Main pipes by 
private sector) and for dealing with SPV 
d) Meter and charge for delivering water  
e) Provision of start up fund 
f) Link with other government programs: World Kitchen, OTOP, SME, Village 
fund, etc. 
g) Agricultural extension by aggressive on farm visits 
3. Create private company (SPV like) for local & international marketing   
a. Contract Farming 
b.  Brand name building 
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While the probability of the Nam Songkhram Project in its original form proceeding in 
the near future do not seem likely, there would appear to be concerted moves by the 
RID in cooperation with local business and political interests to move forward the 
smaller Nam Oon Watergates Project. There would appear to be some support too 
from local TAO’s, although their support may be fickle if it is not perceived that they 
will get a reasonable share of the construction contract benefits available from such 
a large project or the possibility that local voters may be divided as to the perceived 
benefits. Hence, this project should be watched for signs of being resurrected by 
local civil society groups concerned about potential social and environmental impacts 
to a sensitive part of the Nam Songkhram floodplain. Interestingly, a hydrological 
survey carried out by WUP-FIN of the MRC as part of the MWBP E-Flows study found 
that any floodgates built at the proposed point would have negligible benefits for 
flood control, because of the overriding influence of the Mekong mainstream on Nam 
Songkhram flood levels (Blake, 2009). 
Another project that has been discussed in the press from time-to-time and amongst 
government officials during various meetings the author has attended in Northeast 
Thailand, is the possibility of digging large on-floodplain lakes with bunds around 
them to capture floodwater during the rainy season and utilize it for agriculture in 
the dry season. This method of “flood control” has gained uncritical support, as it is a 
water resources technology recommended by HM The King for holding floodwater in 
artificial ponds (termed “Monkey Cheeks Project” or “Kaem Ling”) to be built along 
the Chao Phraya delta either side of Bangkok16. However, it seems like certain 
government agencies want to apply this method in river basins all over the country, 
even in the absence of a large conurbation, such as the Nam Songkhram Basin, 
which must surely bring into question the economic rationale of such a project. 
Added to which, the floodplain sites proposed for the Kaem Ling on the LSRB 
coincide with some of the last remaining areas of seasonally flooded forest (paa 
boong paa thaam) and are still important sites used for the gathering of multiple 
wetlands products, livestock grazing and dry season rice cultivation, all of which 
would be lost by such a development. 
Other water resources developments that could have a profound impact on the LSRB 
are those planned for the Mekong mainstream and tributaries in other countries, 
especially Lao PDR. There are presently several large hydropower dams under 
construction on the mainstream in Yunnan, China, and many more under 
construction upstream on various Mekong tributaries in China and Lao PDR (e.g. 
Dore et al, 2007; International Rivers, 2008). These could negatively impact the 
Nam Songkhram Basin through three main pathways:  
• Alterations to the mainstream hydrology changing the flood pulse 
characteristics in the linked Nam Songkhram system, thus altering the 
aquatic-terrestrial ecosystem balance 
• Alterations to the geomorphology of the Mekong mainstream and changing 
the sediment-nutrient load of the river, having knock-on effects to the nature 
and fertility of the linked Nam Songkhram floodplain system. 
• Alterations to the aquatic productivity of the Mekong mainstream through 
multiple impact pathways, reducing the migration of fish and other aquatic 
organisms into the Nam Songkhram system and harming the aquatic ecology 
and dependent livelihoods in both systems. 
 
                                          
16 A description of the fundamental principles of this project can be viewed at: 
http://ie.youtube.com/watch?v=ZNVR31_qCsY 
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Blake (2008b) in his chapter on the Nam Theun 1 hydropower project planned for 
the large tributary not far upstream from the Nam Songkhram confluence with the 
Mekong noted that the Nam Theun 1 dam is expected to lead to a decrease in wet 
season flows of 8 %, according to project documents. It is argued that even a small 
decreased in flows like this could have a disproportionately large impact on the area 
of floodplain inundated in the wet season due to the flat nature of the landscape, 
which would have significant knock-on effects on aquatic productivity in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin where communities are so heavily dependent on the fish catches 
off the floodplain at the end of the rainy season. Similarly, increases in dry season 
flows caused by upstream developments like the Nam Theun 1 dam or dams in 
China, will have predictable negative impacts on riparian vegetation and bankside 
agriculture that is dependent on naturally low dry season water levels. It should also 
be noted that villagers in the LSRB have been noticing unseasonal fluctuations in 
water level for several years, a phenomenon for which they could find no natural 
explanation and suspect upstream dam developments to be the cause (Tai Baan 
Research Network of Lower Songkhram Basin, 2005) 
Agricultural development trajectories  
Despite all the public and private investment sunk into agricultural development, 
especially irrigation and intensification of farming systems through the agribusiness 
model (see Case 2 and section on Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project for example), it is 
instructive that farming in the Nam Songkhram Basin is still relatively unchanged 
and relying on essentially traditional patterns of farming i.e. smallholder using low 
external input systems. There are exceptions of course, but for the majority of 
households, farming occupies a limited and declining part of their livelihood 
strategies. This observation is not necessarily backed up by official state studies 
which still tend to categorise rural people through biased surveys which encourage 
enumerators them to put “rice farmers” down, rather than the more complex multi-
component livelihoods that dominate in reality (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a). 
Increased mobility and better opportunities for income elsewhere have led to labour 
constraints and changing age structures in rural communities towards older people 
being left on the land, have taken their toll on farming in the Nam Songkhram Basin 
as elsewhere in Northeast Thailand. Rigg (2003:232) has pointed out the paucity of 
studies investigating the non-farm elements of the “agrarian” economy, even though 
it is relatively well recognized that diversification and risk minimization are common 
strategies of the rural population in Southeast Asia.  
This is not to suggest that there are not a large proportion of rural households in the 
Nam Songkhram Basin involved in farming, but rather that the importance of it 
within the overall local economy tends to be over-empasized in official documents 
compared to other livelihood strategies, including those based on wetlands product 
harvesting and non-farm income, especially remittances sent back from family 
members working elsewhere but still registered locally. The agriculture that is 
practiced, can broadly be split into three main categories as follows, with perceived 
trends shown in brackets: 
1. Traditional – low external input, low-risk, (but high labour requirement), 
rainfed and irrigated, subsistence, extensive systems (Majority but slowly 
declining) 
2. “Modern” – High external input, high-risk, (but low-labour-requirement), 
irrigated, sometimes for export, intensive systems i.e. agribusiness-led 
(minority & declining) 
3. “Alternative” – Organic or low agrichemical input, use of modern irrigation 
methods (on-farm) and understanding of plant and soil needs to restore and 
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build-up fertility. Integrated Pest Management. King’s sufficiency theory 
agriculture & integrated farming (minority, but steadily increasing)  
While there has been a definite trend of expansion of the agricultural frontier into 
remaining natural forest and wetland habitats in recent years observed by the 
author between 2004-07 and confirmed by GIS surveys such as those of 
Suwanwerakhamtorn et al., (2007), the rate of expansion is now severely limited 
by the relative lack of available land left to convert. In other words the 
agricultural frontier has nearly reached its limit. Most of the agricultural frontier 
expansion observed has for been for one of three purposes: 
• Increase in area of land planted to monocrop eucalyptus plantations, 
including both reclamation of natural wetland habitat and conversion of 
agricultural land. 
• Increase in area of land planted to monocrop rubber plantations, including 
expansion into upland natural forest and conversion of land formerly 
planted to cash crops on upland terraces. 
• Increase in area of land planted to dry season rice, mostly on converted 
natural wetland habitats, including seasonally flooded forests on the 
floodplain. 
 
The agricultural expansion on the floodplain appears to have been fuelled by 
three main factors: 
• State policies encouraging the expansion of rice cultivation, dry season 
cropping and eucalyptus for pulpwood during the 2001-2006 Thaksin 
regime, coupled with the land- rush atmosphere created by the 
controversial “assets for capital” policy.  
• Lack of state protection or clear policies for conservation of sensitive, 
vulnerable and biodiverse wetland habitats, such as paa boong paa thaam 
which is now highly degraded and limited in extent throughout its range, 
allowing local people to exploit weaknesses in land laws and claim 
ownership by agricultural conversion. 
• A temporary rise in prices in some agricultural commodities between 
2005-07/08, encouraging further expansion of the agricultural frontier in 
former common property regime areas, especially those under ALRO 
status. 
 
Against this complex background where cultural, political, social and economical 
interests co-exist and act as agents of change, it is hardly surprising that there are 
any number of conflicts over natural resources and water management occurring at 
the local / community level and not just the basin and national levels, as has 
principally discussed up to this point. The author saw bitter struggles between 
factions at the community level transpiring during his time in Sri Songkhram District, 
often occurring between groups who seek to conserve the paa boong paa thaam and 
increase public conservation areas (including community forests and fish 
conservation zones), against other groups, often aligned with local political elites, 
who sought to convert the flooded forest to agriculture, introduce state-sponsored 
irrigation schemes and increase the area planted to eucalyptus and rubber 
plantations. Hence, understanding the dynamics of local conflicts is arguably as 
important as understanding the larger-scale conflicts, which could be a case for 
further unpacking the politics of scale. Lebel et al, (2007) have maintained out that 
examining the politics of space (including scale, position and place) is more helpful in 
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understanding the dynamic processes driving water resources politics, than only 
“politics of scale”. This paper has made a tentative start at this endeavour, although 
it has necessarily been selective in the overall range of cases examined. 
The trend towards local people planting pulpwood plantations across the floodplain is 
problematic, especially for NGO’s and civil society groups that have long campaigned 
against the proliferation of eucalyptus plantations when they were principally being 
planted by agribusiness, such as that of Sun Tech and Asia Tech Group on Tung Pan 
Kan (see Watershed, 1996; Guayjaroen, 2001). Now the planting is being done by 
local people voluntarily on their own land (often ironically grabbed also from common 
land), the arguments are not so straightforward as before. While the environmental 
impacts caused by eucalyptus plantations remain the same, it is not easy for a NGO 
to gain credence in a local community by campaigning on this issue. Even on Tung 
Pan Kan, villagers that struggled to reclaim the public land from Sun Tech are now 
planting new eucalyptus seedlings on the newly privatized land or in some cases, 
actively protecting remnant eucalyptus trees left from the Sun Tech plantation. Thus, 
I would argue that new ways are needed in understanding the underlying drivers 
governing natural resources management on the Nam Songkhram floodplain, which 
take into account all drivers involved.  
A new alternative paradigm was clearly introduced through the MWBP approach to 
wetlands management, by putting ecosystems and livelihoods at the forefront of 
decision-making and trying to include a wide range of stakeholders in planning and 
management of wetlands at multiple scales (Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006a; 
Blake et al, 2009). For the first time for any institution, MWBP regarded the Nam 
Songkhram Basin as a single ecological unit, while focusing primarily on the wetlands 
of the LSRB, given the broad remit of the programme and encumbent staff and 
budgetary limitations. Through close coordination with a large number of state and 
non-state stakeholders from local up to national, it was able to convene a number of 
basinwide and provincial meetings around the common issue of wetlands 
management, which culminated in the establishment of a Nakhon Phanom Provincial 
Wetlands Management Committee (NPPWC) chaired by the Provincial Governor in 
late 2006. The NPPWC included representatives from all the major water resources-
related agencies, plus a healthy number of non-state representatives including local 
resource users and allowed genuinely open and frank discussion about the major 
issues facing wetlands in the LSRB. While this Committee was not ultimately 
sustainable past the life of MWBP, it did for a time show promise in bringing together 
a broad range of actors for meaningful negotiation over water resources under a 
common platform. This was just one of a number of multi-stakeholder platforms 
convened by MWBP at the national, basin, provincial, district, sub-district and 
community levels during the course of the two and a half year project17.   
A future Ramsar Site? 
Perhaps as a result of the increased attention focused on the LSRB as a wetlands of 
international importance18 and growing recognition of the biodiversity and livelihood 
                                          
17 Many of the project documents related to this project can be accessed through the 
MWBP website at: www.mekongwetlands.org or for a more critical analysis of 
impacts, refer to Blake et al, 2009. 
18 The “Nam Songkhram River” had already been designated a “Wetlands of 
International Importance” according to criteria laid down by the Office of 
Environmental Policy and Planning (OEPP) and listed in the National Inventory of 
Wetlands since 1998.  
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values attached to the wetlands ecosystems of the Lower Mekong Basin, in 2006 
there was interest shown at the national level, specifically the Office of Natural 
Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning (ONEP) under the MoNRE, for 
proposing the LSRB as a potential future Ramsar Site. There was already one 
Ramsar Site within the Nam Songkhram Basin designated in July 2001, namely the 
Bung Khong Long Non-hunting Area, Nong Khai Province, on the upper reaches of 
the Nam Mao, a tributary stream of the Nam Songkhram River. However, Bung 
Khong Long is a modified seasonal lake and marsh system, that is relatively discrete 
compared to the much larger and more complex floodplain wetlands ecosystem of 
the LSRB, which is harder to define in terms of its geographical boundaries and 
ecological limits. Adopting the LSRB as a Ramsar Site would be far more challenging 
conceptually and practically, given strict resource limitations of ONEP. Therefore, 
following discussions between ONEP and the MWBP National Office, preliminary steps 
in completing a Ramsar Information Sheet (RIS) for the LSRB were conducted by 
MWBP / IUCN staff based at the Demonstration Site. 
Using data collected during an earlier Wetland Inventory, Assessment and Monitoring 
(WIAM) protocol and other baseline data held by MWBP, the RIS was completed and 
sent to ONEP for further consideration in June 2007. It was decided that the LSRB 
wetlands do meet the criteria established by the Ramsar Secretariat on six points, as 
indicated in the table 6 below. 
 
Table 6. Criteria by which the Lower Nam Songkhram Basin wetlands meet Ramsar 
Site standard criteria. 
Criteria No. Description LSRB 
situation 
1 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it contains a representative, rare, or unique 
example of a natural or near-natural wetland type found 
within the appropriate biogeographic region 
 
2 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it supports vulnerable, endangered, or 
critically endangered species or threatened ecological 
communities. 
 
3 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it supports populations of plant and/or 
animal species important for maintaining the biological 
diversity of a particular biogeographic region 
 
4 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it supports plant and/or animal species at a 
critical stage in their life cycles, or provides refuge 
during adverse conditions. 
 
7 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it supports a significant proportion of 
indigenous fish subspecies, species or families, life-
history stages, species interactions and/or populations 
that are representative of wetland benefits and/or 
values and thereby contributes to global biological 
diversity 
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8 A wetland should be considered internationally 
important if it is an important source of food for fishes, 
spawning ground, nursery and/or migration path on 




VII Broad implications, challenges and opportunities 
Research Questions 
Q/ If the case is typical, what may be the replicability of findings to a number of 
places in the Mekong Region with more or less similar attributes and characteristics 
and context? 
Q/ If it is atypical, what is the significance of the findings due to its criticalness, 
uniqueness and/or revelatory nature? What lessons does this case of decision-
making convey to developments in the Mekong now or in the near future? 
Q/ From this case, what might be the opportunities for other parts of the Mekong 
Region, for more constructive engagement in water allocation decision-making and 
finding? 
Q/  What other research issues emerged that deserve further research attention? 
Q/ what are current engagement/constructive intervention opportunities to overcome 
barriers, move past gridlocks and further improve water allocation decision-making, 
etc? 
Broadly speaking, the Nam Songkhram Basin could be considered a fairly “typical” 
middle size river basin in the Lower Mekong Basin, in terms of its bio-physical 
conditions certainly although perhaps less-so socio-economically. While it is 
obviously less mountainous than most rivers found in Lao PDR and the Mekong east 
bank in Cambodia with a correspondingly gentler incline, the lower reaches of rivers 
such as the Se Bang Fai, Se Bang Hiang, Se Don and many of the major tributary 
rivers draining into the Tonle Sap are quite similar in nature to the Nam Songkhram. 
Several of these rivers also experience a marked backwater and occasional backflow 
effect from the Mekong mainstream’s influence in the same way that the Nam 
Songkhram does. Hence, the hydrology and aquatic ecology of these river systems 
can be broadly compared as sharing certain similarities. The socio-economic 
comparisons would be less strong, given the proportionately higher income, non-
farm work opportunities, life expectancy, literacy rates, access to clean drinking 
water and other social development indicators found in Northeast Thailand compared 
to the neighbouring states of Cambodia, Lao PDR and Viet Nam. For example, rural 
poverty rates (% households) between 1997 – 99 were estimated to be Cambodia 
(39 %), Lao PDR (41 %), Thailand (22 %) and Viet Nam (46 %), according to data 
provided by The Mekong River Commission (2003). The range of livelihood strategies 
practiced and the high proportion of people still involved in exploitation of fisheries 
and wetlands-based livelihoods is high and possibly on a par with several of the 
other river basins mentioned in Lao PDR. 
Within Thailand, however, the Nam Songkhram Basin especially its lower floodplain 
part could be considered atypical of other river basins, including the much larger Chi-
Mun Basin that dominates the Khorat Plateau. This is nothing to do with the vast 
difference in size, but the fact that the Nam Songkhram still experiences a relatively 
healthy capture fishery based primarily upon migratory fish from the mainstream 
Mekong and has the unique to Thailand, massive annual rainy season floodplain 
inundation which ensures the aquatic productivity. This is both a function of its 
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natural hydrological characteristics (no rapids as in the lower section of the Nam 
Mun) and the fact that the Nam Songkhram’s hydrology has not been massively 
altered by dams, as with the Chi-Mun system along its entire length. While all the 
Nam Songkhram tributaries have water control infrastructure at several points along 
their length (from small weirs through to large dams like the Lam Nam Oon dam), 
the mainstream Nam Songkhram is presently without a dam along its lower 300 kms 
or so. In other words, the connectivity between the Nam Songkhram and the Mekong 
River is still functional, which is reflected in the high biodiversity and bioproductivity 
of fish catches, especially at the end of the rainy season.    
Despite the unique (to Thailand) functional flood pulse and relative abundance of 
water resources and wetland habitat throughout the year in the LSRB, the basin is 
still tarred with the same “water scarce” label as the rest of the Isaan. For 
government agencies such as RID and DWR, few distinctions are made in water 
resources literature between parts of Nakhon Phanom or Nong Khai with over 2,000 
mm rainfall/annum and parts of Chaiyaphum or Nakhon Ratchasima with less than 
1,100 mm rainfall/annum. Both areas tend to get described as “semi-arid” or 
“drought prone” and proscribed the same solution of requiring further water storage 
required to provide water for agricultural and domestic consumption. At the other 
hydrological extreme, the Nam Songkhram is also considered by hegemonic state 
institutions such as RID and DWR as having a serious flood problem which even 
though it predictably happens annually for 2-4 months, has been dubbed a “natural 
disaster” and attracts compensation payments for inundated land. These twin “crises 
narratives” of consecutive floods and droughts has dominated popular discourse, 
when compared to alternative narratives surrounding the fertility of the wetlands and 
the natural hydrological regime stressed by NGO’s, civil society groups and a few 
state agencies working in the area. Nevertheless, it is argued, the prolonged efforts 
to promote understanding of floodplain wetlands by MWBP and its partners and the 
Tai Baan Research Network, has helped to foster new understandings about wetlands 
ecosystem-livelihoods linkages which have challenged the dominant narratives (e.g. 
Blake, 2006; Blake and Pitakthepsombut, 2006b; Tai Baan Research Network of the 
Lower Songkhram Basin, 2005a). This was indicated by more balanced coverage in 
both the Thai language and English language media (e.g. Glahan, 2006)   
There has been a forty year history of sustained state intervention in water resources 
management in the Nam Songkhram Basin, principally by one or two hegemonic 
actors, most prominent of which has been RID starting with the construction of the 
Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project in 1967. At that stage of regional development, 
when there was still armed insurrection by communist forces in the area it is argued 
that the rationale was as much ideological as it was aimed at improving agricultural 
production. Indeed, this project was not fully operational for 15 years and only 
became a success in terms of increasing employment and raising income levels in 
the early 1990s, after sustained support from a USAID contract farming and 
agribusiness promotion project. However, the success was not sustained and it is 
understood that today dry season usage levels are not over 10 % of irrigable area 
and many agribusiness companies have left the area. The same is true of the LSRB 
where agribusiness involvement peaked in 1990-92, after which it experienced a 
steady decline due to internal and external factors, culminating in the closure of the 
last agro-processing plant in Sri Songkhram District in 2007. This saga of 
agribusiness boom and bust was dealt with in Case 2, but the narrative has not yet 
reached its conclusion due to the fact that the agribusiness in question – Sun Tech 
Group PCL – has reinvented itself with a new name and still holds title to vast land 
reserves on the Nam Songkhram floodplain. As other neighbouring countries appear 
to be following down a similar road of promoting agribusiness, selling off natural 
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resources rapidly (often not to the highest bidder but the best connected), 
commodifying and privatizing many former common property resources, and 
entering into a brave new world of inter-regional and inter-global links; the case of 
the Nam Songkhram Basin could be particularly illuminating and instructive for 
interested actors externally. In many years, large parts of Cambodia and Lao PDR 
are at a similar stage of development with similarly healthy natural resources as the 
Nam Songkhram Basin had 30 – 40 years ago and face similar choices. Whether the 
lessons are learned, depends largely on the ability of key actors and decision-makers 
to acknowledge these links and similarities and being able to act appropriately to 
divert or mitigate the worst excesses. To follow the same pattern of development 
observed in the Nam Songkhram Basin, invites the real possibility of many more 
dams being built without a purpose and wide reaching impacts or previously healthy 
and life-giving wetland ecosystems being transformed into the kind of lifeless plains 
seen atplaces like Tun Mon in the dry season. 
   
• This section will broadly argue that the Songkhram Basin could be considered 
“typical” of other river basins in the LMB, both in a bio-physical sense and 
socio-economically, BUT with some fundamental differences which will be 
pointed out and contrasted. For example, the “water poor” label common to 
descriptions of Northeast Thailand is hardly fitting to this massive wetland 
area where water scarcity is not a limiting factor for most floodplain villages 
for most of the year, but water abundance could be considered limiting to 
agriculture while favouring other livelihood activities such as capture fisheries. 
The geo-politics of the Basin are common to the other river basins of NE and 
Northern Thailand with a similar history of top-down, natural resource 
(mis)management and environmental degradation. 
• Because of the relatively long history of state intervention in water resource 
management with both documented and anecdotal evidence of variable 
development outcomes, it will be argued that the Songkhram Basin can offer 
salient lessons for other river basins in Laos and Cambodia, which are at a 
similar stage of development to the Songkhram Basin some 20-30 years ago, 
just on the cusp of or in full throes of forest clearance, basin closure and 
agribusiness intervention. 
• This section could unpack some of the National Water Policy, consider the 
degree with which it is being implemented, where there are contradictions, 
and how potentially it could be improved and more rigorously implemented to 
its original intent. The dominant role of the two Thai water management 
institution leviathans – RID & WRD – has to be considered in any analysis and 
what hope there is that they can be reformed to work for sustainable water 
management, rather than political interests and personal, short-term financial 
gain.  
• Recommendations for potential and urgent research issues will be offered. 
 
Conclusions 
• The primary justification driving water resources development in the Basin 
has been providing irrigation water for agriculture as both a solution to the 
region’s “drought problem” and “poverty problem”. These meta-justifications 
have been consistently used by the dominant state agencies involved in water 
resources management throughout the last five decades and still underpin the 
stated reasons for pursuing the Water Grid and Nam Songkhram Projects. 
However, if one examines the success of existing irrigation projects for 
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meeting their objectives one finds a long trail of over-stated benefits and 
unrealized ambitions from some of the smallest projects up to the largest. 
Especially the largest. This report has revealed just several examples through 
the case studies, but the case of the Upper Songkhram Project “weirs” at Ban 
Muang and Ban Nong Gaa which have still to irrigate a single rai out of the 
48,000 rai claimed by the state or the Lam Nam Oon Irrigation Project held 
up as star performer in Thailand by the RID which only has 5 – 10 % 
utilization of potential irrigable area in the dry season are representative of 
the exaggerated claims made for irrigation potential. The reasons for failure 
are complex and many, but largely stem from popular perceptions of scarcity 
coupled with uneven power relations allowing single solution approaches to be 
applied without serious challenge.  
• The Songkhram Basin is characterized by multiple actors working at multiple 
scales towards multiple objectives, often non-compatible due to fundamental 
differences in ideologies and worldviews. There has been a tendency in the 
past to simplify conflicts over water and natural resources into such 
dichotomous groups as local villagers and NGOs (= powerless) versus state 
agencies and private agribusiness (= powerful), when of course, reality is far 
more complex. Villagers are no more homogenous as a group, as are state 
employees and both incorporate a wide gamut of worldviews and ideologies. 
Yet, nevertheless there is still the temptation to clump local people living in 
communities as “villagers” or “peasants” or “farmers” when they could often 
spend part of their year living in a Thai urban area, part in their home village; 
be employed part of the time in industry, part in agriculture; be sometimes 
an employee, sometimes self-employed and sometimes an employer (e.g. 
during rice planting or harvest); be a rice farmer, fisher, labourer, livestock 
raiser, and gatherer of wetlands and non-timber forest products 
consecutively. In other words, many contemporary Thai villagers in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin as elsewhere in NE Thailand pursue multiple livelihood 
opportunities and are adept at moving between urban and rural lifestyles, as 
well as often taking jobs overseas in a wide range of countries. Yet despite 
these diverse occupations, as far as hegemonic state agencies dominant in 
the field of water management are concerned, rural people are portrayed as 
poor rice farmers in desperate need of irrigation water and state development 
projects, which is presently lacking due to drought and insufficient funding. 
• Despite the national water vision and policy endorsed by the Cabinet in 2000 
and efforts to establish River Basin Committees and implement IWRM 
nationwide (e.g. UNESCO, 2006), it is clear from the experiences in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin that these efforts locally fall far short of the ideals set in 
Bangkok. While UNESCO (2006) claimed that, “Planning process [sic] for each 
river basin has been done on a principle of grass root level participation 
through the RBC mechanism”, first hand reports from colleagues active in 
various aspects of natural resources management and familiar with the local 
RBC suggested otherwise. They reported that the RBCs were anything but 
participatory or transparent, with little fundamental planning or debate over 
water resources planning and direction occurring, but more a process of 
vetting a shopping list of projects submitted by various state agencies and 
prioritizing them for implementation. These people, an academic, a wetlands 
conservation project manager and a community leader working at grassroots 
level were highly disparaging and skeptical of the value of the RBC process. 
Meetings were infrequent and described as “top-down”. 
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• Large-scale water infrastructure projects proposed for the Nam Songkhram 
Project, such as the Nam Songkhram Project, have thus far failed to consider 
the trans-boundary impacts of the projects in question. Because the projects 
mostly involve damming the mainstream, thus acting as a physical barrier 
and altering the river’s seasonal flows, there would inevitably be downstream 
ecological impacts especially with regards to aquatic organisms which would 
affect the mainstream Mekong River due to the intimate hydrological and 
ecological links, an international waterway. There could also be other direct 
impacts on water quality both from the deterioration of water quality in the 
reservoir and chemical run-off resulting from increased intensification of 
agriculture stimulated by irrigation. Hence, communities on both sides of the 
Mekong in both Thailand and Lao PDR would likely experience negative 
impacts from any such water infrastructure development and thus be classed 
as trans-boundary impacts. At the same time, the LSRB is vulnerable to any 
water infrastructure developments occurring upstream or downstream in the 
Mekong Basin which might negatively impact fish migrations, both on the 
mainstream Mekong and major tributaries such as the proposed Nam Theun 1 
Project (Blake, 2008). 
• In the past it has been tempting for some commentators from civil society 
and the media to present state and non-state actors in the Nam Songkhram 
Basin in a rather simplistic light. The state actors and institutions tended to be 
presented as the corrupt, aggressive developers ignoring environmental and 
local concerns (often in alliance with greedy private business interests), while 
the villagers were presented as the innocent victims of unchecked 
development which destroyed their natural resources-based livelihoods. The 
state actors and local actors were nearly always presented as homogenous 
entities, diametrically opposed in their prime interests. Reality of course if far 
more complex, and these simplistic representations do not allow for the 
diversity that exists amongst each group of actors at all scales from local to 
national and international. It would be equally wrong to paint a picture that 
struggles over water governance are only between local and higher level 
actors, as there are also everyday conflicts occurring over access and rights 
to water and natural resources at the community level and even occasionally 
household level which are rarely, if ever, recorded publically. Thus it is very 
difficult in a short report to capture the complexity and diversity present in 
the Basin, but it will have to suffice here to record that it exists. 
Recommendations 
• The Nam Songkhram Basin needs its own River Basin Committee, 
distinct and independent from the Mekong Area 2 RBC it currently 
resides under as six arbitrary sub-basins which cannot act or plan in a 
coordinated single vision for the Basin due to the present structure. 
• The new single Nam Songkhram Basin RBC should be significantly 
different from the existing RBC’s across Thailand, which have had a 
rather poor image to date. This probably implies disengaging itself 
from the present top-heavy WRD bureaucratic structures and 
processes, and finding a new more independent role and structure. 
Naturally, the RBC should strive for greater transparency, broader 
participation and subsidiarity than has hitherto been the case in other 
river basins.  
• It is inadvisable that new large or medium size irrigation projects 
should be built, given the problems with existing systems and poor 
participation rates, but rather emphasis should be put on solving the 
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problems and increasing agricultural production through agro-
ecological means and methods. Where irrigation systems have been 
abandoned or are hardly used, studies should be made into possibly 
retiring them and in some cases implementing dam removal and 
ecological restoration projects. 
• Dominant institutions could benefit from examining the rationale for 
and recommended practices or processes used in Multi-Stakeholder 
Platforms (MSPs) or Dialogues, as a means to ensure more informed 
and inclusive interaction and knowledge exchange between key actors. 
While this approach may seem counter to their present hegemonic role 
in Basin water management, equally to continue the exclusive and top-
down decision-making processes of the past, will inevitably lead to 
further conflict and ecological damage, undermining the socio-
economic futures of all Basin inhabitants who depend on healthy 
ecosystems for their livelihood.  
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Annex 2  Timeline of Significant Basin Events 
 
DATE EVENT 
1957 Introduction of nylon fishing nets to Songkhram Basin and start of 
modern “Era of commercialization” 
1961 First five year National Economic and Social Development Plan 
commences  
1965  Parallel to a process of concessionary logging, commercial charcoal 
production started, reaching a peak around 1975, and over by 
1979 
1975 Formation of Agricultural Land Reform Office (ALRO) with mission 
of land re-distribution to poor farmers 
1978  Tawan Farm – first agribusiness venture in NS Basin established 
1981 Lam Nam Oon large-scale storage dam and irrigation project 
completed 
1983 NEDECO/TEAM report for Interim Committee for Investigations into 
Mekong Basin completed, recommending first irrigation mega-
project for Songkhram 
1984 Sun Tech Group Company Ltd arrives in basin, acquiring land and 
establishing intensive farming operations  
1988 Sun Tech Ltd builds tomato processing plant and expands farming 
ops in Sri Songkhram District  
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April 1989 Nam Songkhram Project approved by Cabinet for feasibility study 
and design to be prepared by DEDP 
March 1990 DEDP hire Engineering Consultant Company Group, Asian 
Engineering Consultant Ltd (AEC), Pal Consultant Ltd (PALCON) 
and Sir William Halcrow and Partners Ltd (HALCROW) to design 
project and conduct EIA. 
Jan 1994  Nam Songkhram Project’s first EIA rejected by National 
Environment Board. New EIA/mitigation plan contract given to 
Khon Kaen University team. 
1995 DEDP estimate Nam Songkhram Project will cost c. $400 million to 
complete 
1996   • Asia Tech Pulp & Paper Ltd (sister company to Sun Tech) 
proposes building 150,000 tonne/year pulp mill in 
Songkhram Basin 
• Nam Songkhram Basin Conservation and Rehabilitation Club 
formed as local community-based network 
• Sept 96 a seminar on ways to reduce environmental impacts 
resulting from Nam Songkhram Project was held in Bangkok 
for various stakeholders 
1997  
 
• Asian economic crash – “tom yam gung” effect – causing 
postponement/cancellation of many projects 
• “People’s Constitution” ratified giving local communities 
greater participation in decision-making and responsibility 
for natural resource management 
• Dec 97 Thai NGO Project for Ecological Recovery hold 
seminar in Bangkok for key stakeholders, incl. local 
community representatives, about the Nam Songkram 
Project 
1998 Upper Songkhram Basin Development Project is implemented 
under Accelerated Rural Development Office oversight, building 
numerous dams, weirs and irrigation reservoirs. 
1999 • Lower Songkhram Basin recognised by OEPP as a “wetland 
of international significance” 
• Revised Khon Kaen University EIA  and EMP completed and 
sent to OEPP for review 
October 2000 National Water Policy approved by Cabinet 
2002 MoNRE and DWR formed during ministry reorganization. DEDP 
closed down and irrigation projects passed to RID. 
March 2002 Nam Songkhram Project rejected by Thai cabinet as having high 
costs and insufficient benefits 
Feb 2003 MWBP Demo Site project office in Sri Songkhram District opens 
July 2004 Official start of MWBP Phase A project 
Late 2004 Lowest mainstream dam / “weir” at Ban Nong Gaa between Udon 
Thani and Sakhon Nakhon Provinces completed by DWR, effectively 
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blocking flows d/stream. No irrigation benefit achieved. Uncertain 
purpose. Similar dam built 30 kms upstream in previous year is 
rapidly abandoned.  
2005 • PM Thaksin’s “National Water Grid” plan proposed, aiming to 
irrigate 90 million rai nationwide, incl. inter-basin water 
transfer from Nam Ngum Basin, Lao PDR to Nam 
Songkhram Basin 
• Aug 05 Thaksin visits Sri Songkhram District during flooding 
and declares it a “national disaster”, recommending a dam 
be built at the mouth of the river – Nam Songkhram Project 
returns 
2006 ONEP suggests proposing LSRB as a potential Ramsar Site 
Dec 2006 MWBP Phase A complete and project closed 
June 2007 UNDP-TRAC project completed – IUCN involvement in LSRB ceases 
  
 
Annex 3 DPSIR model linkages in LSRB wetlands-agriculture DPSIR 
model linkages in LSRB wetlands-agriculture 
The Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin wetlands were selected as a case study for 
inclusion in the Guidelines on Agriculture, Wetlands and Water Resource Interactions 
(GAWI) project, coordinated by the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations (FAO), Ramsar Convention on Wetlands and Wageningen University and 
Research Centre (WUR) (Wood and van Halsema, 2008). The so-called drivers, 
pressures, state changes, impacts and responses (DPSIR) framework was applied to 
the LSRB wetlands case study, specifically considering rice paddy and fish 
culture/capture systems. The report concluded that using the DPSIR framework 
analysis there had been no integrated response in the LSRB to the challenges posed 
by intensifying agricultural development in sensitive wetlands habitats, resulting in 
profound impacts on ecosystems services and functions. It showed that there tend to 
be single agency responses to problems (both real and constructed), with little inter-
agency coordination or integration, while the multiple benefit wetlands services 
important for local livelihoods, were mostly poorly recognized or seen in terms of 
agricultural benefits only, which encouraged conversion of the wetlands to monocrop 
plantations (both rice and industrial pulpwood trees). This expansion of the 
agricultural frontier led to impacts on capture fisheries, flooded forest food and 
medicinal products, livestock grazing and other common pool resource declines 
causing loss of diet, income and resource opportunities for local communities.  The 
multiple linkages revealed by the DPSIR model are shown in the web of relations in 
the diagram below.  
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Annex 4.  Some key similarities and differences between Tai Baan Research 
and Intermediate E-Flows Assessment approaches  
Main characteristics of 
research 




Utilises locally situated 
knowledge 
Y Y/N (but recognizes 
LEK) 
Utilises scientific knowledge N Mostly 








ownership and acceptance 
Y Y/N 
Makes extensive use of 
secondary data 
N Y 
Is relatively fast to implement 
and can be completed within a 
narrow time frame  
N Y/N 
Is adaptable and responsive to 
local changing local reality 
Y/N Y 
Requires external “experts” 
during start-up phase and for 
guidance 
Y Y 
Is readily transferable to other 
basins 
Y Y 
High labour time input required Y N 
Uses much technical jargon, not 
immediately accessible to 
outsiders 
Y Y 
Involves wide spectrum of 
stakeholders in process 
Y Y 
Uses peer-review at various 
stages of research process 
Y Y/N 
Builds capacity as an integral 
part of research process 
Y Y 
Is local action-oriented Y N 
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ANNEX 5. The Department of Water Resources – Vision, Policy and Strategy 
Vision of the Department of Water Resources  
“The Department of Water Resources is the main agency that is determined to 
achieve excellence in managing water resources of the country in an integrated, 
efficient and sustainable way, by applying principles of good governance for the 
quality of life of the people.” 
Policy of the Department of Water Resources 
Manage, conserve, rehabilitate, develop and solve problems of water resources 
efficiently, justly and sustainably, according to              principles, by concentrating 
on participation of local administration organizations, community groups, networks, 
private organizations and all other groups in society, in order for a good quality of 
life for the people. 
Strategy of DWR 
1. To propose policies, plans, regulations and measures for managing water 
resources that are fully integrated, using a process that ensures participation of all 
stakeholders in the basin, in order to sustainably develop the country. 
2. Manage, develop, conserve and rehabilitate water sources throughout the 
country, in order to meet the needs of the people, together with managing in order 
to use benefits sustainably and protecting, alleviating and solving water crises. 
3. Promote and support the strengthening and ability to participate of people 
who are impactees, local organizations and networks in managing water, together 
with public relations, building knowledge, and spreading technology in order to 
ensure sustainable management of water resources. 
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1Abstract 
This paper analyses the establishment, activities and impacts of the Mae Kuang 
River Sub-basin (RSBO) and Upper Ping River Basin Organizations and how they 
have interacted with other pre-existing institutions and platforms in the Mae 
Kuang watershed. So far the Maek Kuang RSBO has not been an effective multi-
stakeholder platform. Farmers note it has been largely irrelevant to their water 
allocation problems that are managed by muang fai and the Mae Kuang Dam 
organizations.  Irrigation officials note that the RSBO works outside the Mae 
Kuang irrigated areas and so irrelevant to their core work. Water users in the 
Northern Industrial Estate in Lamphun obtain their water through other channels 
and address water quality issues in other venues. Despite limitations with 
stakeholder participation in, and resources for, river basin organizations, various 
other water user groups and networks continue to be active in addressing water 
management problems. Pre-existing institutions – in short – remain crucial to 
negotiation and conflict resolution processes. A watershed-oriented RSBO in Mae 
Kuang is still needed to help deal with complex water allocation and quality 
challenges among sectors and locations, but must be built in coordination with 
pre-existing and alternative platforms 
Introduction 
Water management in urbanizing regions is complex as it involves many actors 
with divergent and shifting interests and cultures. As water management is a 
social and political process, multi-stakeholder platforms (MSPs) are often 
promoted as a way to support deliberations that can inform negotiations and 
decisions. The potential of innovative forms of cooperation and consensus-
building, however, need to be understood within specific socio-economic, political 
and ecological contexts.  
In favourable circumstances multi-stakeholder platforms can help build mutual 
understanding, resolve disputes and become a prelude to more difficult 
negotiations or assessment of options (Warner 2006, Dore 2007). In 
unfavourable contexts such as those of high social inequity, disorganized 
stakeholder groups and low technical and financial capacities, multi-stakeholder 
platforms may have serious limitations (Faysse 2006).  
Effective water governance depends on management of conflicts and securing 
meaningful participation of all stakeholders (Hirsch 2006; Both Ends, 2005). Local 
weaknesses as well as local strengths need to be considered. The study of 
successes and failures of novel multi-stakeholder platforms should be sensitive of 
history. As resource conflicts have been inherent in societies, ways of managing 
such conflicts have developed in many cultures and places. Diverse arenas where 
resource users share resource problems, exchange ideas and seek solutions are 
continually created and modified through time.  
New multi-stakeholder platforms, thus, must do their work alongside pre-existing 
resource management arenas and institutions (Mollinga et al. 2007). This raises 
questions of institutional interplay (Young 2002):  Do new platforms engage with 
or detach from pre-existing institutions? Do they enhance, compete, weaken or 
cause mixed consequences to previous institutions? How do stakeholders, 
especially disadvantaged ones, use multiple platforms to pursue their goals?   
In many parts of the world integrated water resources management is being 
promoted through reforms that create river basin organizations (RBOs) ( Biswas 
                                          
1 Working paper in preparation for submission to a journal (Water Alternatives or 
Water Resources Management). Please do not redistribute or cite without 
contacting the authors (llebel@loxinfo.co.th; santita.ganjanapan@gmail.com). 
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et al. 2005). In the Mekong Region, many water resource management experts 
have expressed hopes that river basin organizations could improve the allocation 
of water resources. A few believe that much will depend on what roles RBOS take 
upon themselves – in short – how they do their social work. One possibility is that 
they convene and support multi-stakeholder platforms.   
Relevant experiences with similar structures are mixed ranging widely in scale, 
contexts and designs.  At one end of the scale there are studies of pre-existing 
relatively small, relatively homogeneous, groups of water users. In the upland 
areas these are typically called watershed organizations or networks and are 
typically involved in management of land, forests and water resources. In rural 
lowlands, these watershed organizations or networks are more commonly known 
as water user groups or associations being engaged in allocation and 
management of water for irrigation purposes.  From the latter we know that too 
much control by state agency leads to recurrent failures because they leave 
inadequate scope for local management decisions (Patcharee 1995, Patcharee 
Arthan 1995, Tan-kim-yong et al. 2005, Molle 2007). From the former we know 
that insecure de facto rights of access and use of water, forest and land act as a 
disincentive to more careful, long-term management (Wittayapak and Dearden 
1999, Lebel et al. 2008). 
At the other end are analyses of efforts to manage large international rivers, 
typically through river basin organizations and international agreements. These 
efforts in the Mekong Region emphasize allocations of flow among countries and 
trans-boundary impacts of large projects and so do not always capture 
widespread but highly localized use of water-related services (Jacobs 2002, Lebel 
et al. 2005, Molle et al. 2009).  
At both very small and very large scales, therefore, the number of different 
stakeholders visible to processes of deliberation and negotiation are often 
modest. In between those scales, especially in urbanizing regions, the diversity of 
stakeholders is often much higher including both agricultural and non-agricultural 
water users. Due to proximity and mobility of water stakeholders in peri-urban 
areas, interaction among them remains plausible. The Bang Pakong Dialogue 
Initiative is one possibility where local stakeholders can share and find common 
problems and solutions (Dueňas, 2007; Pangare et al., 2007; Prangthip, 2007).   
Over the last five decades water and land uses in the Upper Ping watershed n the 
inter-montane valley around the cities of Chiang Mai and Lamphun have been 
transformed first by the expansion and intensification of commercial agriculture 
and then on-going urban-industrial growth and tourism (Lebel et al. 2009).   
With urbanization, domestic, service and industrial demands for water have 
expanded.  
Expectations for water allocation, protection from floods and pollution control also 
rise. Disputes and contests among very divergent interests increase. 
Municipalities, local governments in the peri-urban areas, and other decision-
making bodies need to make some difficult decisions about the allocation of water 
as well as management of flood risks and control of pollution.  
Diversification and intensification of lowland agriculture caused by green 
revolution technology resulted in multiple cropping systems, increased water 
demand and water shortage and water conflicts especially in the dry season. 
Intensification and diversification of agriculture in the highland areas are results 
of state policies to stabilize shifting agriculture, to suppress narcotics and to stop 
deforestation. Commercial crop production in the highlands as well as 
territorializing state policy of forest protection and evacuation of forest 
communities added to intense resource conflicts among highland communities, 
between highland communities and the state as well as between highland 
communities and lowland communities. 
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This paper analyses the establishment, activities and impacts of the Mae Kuang 
River Sub-basin (RSBO) and Upper Ping River Basin Organizations (RBO) and how 
they have interacted with other pre-existing institutions and platforms in the Mae 
Kuang watershed. The study is a follow-up and extension of David Thomas (2005, 
2006a) who documented the early establishment of the Mae Kuang and several 
other RSBOs in the Upper Ping in detail. In it we argue that despite limitations 
with stakeholder participation in, and resources for, river basin organizations, 
various other water user groups and networks continue to be active in addressing 
water management problems. Pre-existing institutions – in short – remain crucial 
to negotiation and conflict resolution processes both inside and outside river basin 
organizations. A watershed-oriented RSBO in Mae Kuang is still needed to help 
deal with complex water allocation and quality challenges among sectors and 
locations, but must be built in coordination with pre-existing and alternative 
platforms.  
Methods 
Document review and in-depth interview 
We used official documents, directories of watershed committee members, 
meeting reports as well as direct observation of several meetings held during 
research period. Our focus was on the establishment of alternative water 
management organizations including muang fai water user groups, the Mae 
Kuang River Sub-basin Working Group, the overlapping Ping River Basin 
Committee, the Mae Kuang Tara Dam Irrigation Water User Organization 
supported by the Royal Irrigation Department and the Village Volunteers Network 
for Protection of Mae Kuang Environment and Nature.  
We made in-depth interviews with past and current members of watershed 
committee and working groups as well as others with knowledge and key 
responsibilities related to water management. So far we have collected interviews 
from following informants:  farmers, village heads, muang fai irrigation 
committee members,  representatives from Tambon Administrative 
Organizations, NGO workers, representatives from industries and services, Mae 
Kuang irrigation officials, members of Ping and Mae Kuang Watershed 
Organizations and representatives from the Secretariat Office of the Ping 
Watershed  Committee.  Topics included water problems, perceived 
responsibilities, challenges and possible solutions of Watershed Organizations, 
how the RSBO contributes to integrated river basin management and water 
conflict management, and how RSBO performances are relevant to stakeholders 
interests.  
Sample of households in upper part of Mae Kuang sub-basin 
A random sample was drawn from for eight contiguous sub-districts in Chiang Mai 
province in the peri-urban transition zone. Of 505 household numbers listed in 
our randomly drawn sample from government lists 66 were not current:  in 38 
cases there was no house with that number, and in another 24 cases a building 
was present but had no occupants, and 4 cases it was the second household of 
someone already in sample. Of the 439 potential households in the sample we 
were unable to complete questionnaires in 39 instances. In 15 cases we were 
unable to make appointments and meet the residents that neighbours told us 
were normally resident despite repeat visits, including in evening or on weekends.   
In 9 cases the reason was that household members we met were physically 
incapable of responding to questions because of deafness, mental disabilities, 
alcoholism, or serious illness. In 15 cases households refused cooperation.  
Complete information was therefore collected from 400 households. 
Analysis 
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We analysed changing structures and operational orientation of river and sub-
river basin committee and working groups using descriptive statistics.  
As multi-stakeholder platforms consist of actors holding different power and 
knowledge, we use political ecological approach to study river basin organizations 
as space of contestation and negotiation for access to water resources. 
Stakeholders use and integrate different knowledge to negotiate for access and 
control of water resources at different spaces and scales.  
Issues 
The Mae Kuang watershed is one of 15 officially recognized sub-basins of the Ping 
river basin. It covers 1661 km2 (First Regional Office of Water Resources, 2007; 
Punya Consultant and Sigma Hydro, 2003) in four districts of Chiang Mai province 
and two districts of Lamphun province (Figure 1). Depending on source evergreen 
and deciduous forest covers 52-59% of the watershed, but is almost largely 
restricted to higher elevations (Thomas 2006a) (Piphat, Daranee and Saowanee, 
2002; Panya Consultant and Sigma Hydro Consultant, 2003). About a third of 
land is devoted to agriculture and 7-8% to residential use. Mae Kuang has total 
population of 291,000 of which half are classified as rural. 
Figure 1 Study area. (Source: Thomas 2005) 
A. Topography and sub-basin 
boundaries in the Upper Ping 
river basin. 
B. Mae Kuang river sub-basin 
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Water-use 
Average rainfall in the Mae Kuang sub-basins is just over 1100mm (Thomas 
2006a). Natural surface water yearly averages 564 million m3, with 470 million 
m3 in the rainy season, and 94 million m3 in the dry season.  
Several different estimates of total annual water demand have been made with 
slightly different assumptions.  Thomas (2006a) estimated 577 million m3 of 
which 546 are for irrigation, 21 for domestic, and 10 for industry. Another 
estimate suggests 489 million m3 with 459 for irrigation, 16 for domestic and 10 
for industry and tourism (Punya Consultant and Sigma Hydro Consultant, 2003). 
A third estimate suggested total 337 million m3 of which 328 are for irrigation, 8 
for domestic and 10 for industry (Piphat, Daranee and Saowanee, 2002).  
The main point to draw from these estimates is that over 95% of water use is for 
agriculture and that use already succeeds storage. Total storage capacities of 68 
state-developed projects are 337 million m3 with Mae Kuang dam dominating with 
a capacity of 263 million m3. Mae Kuang dam storage in practice, however, is 
usually well below capacity, thus  in December 2009 near beginning of dry season 
water was only 30% of storage capacity, and on March 24, 2010 only 19.2% or 
50.496 million m3 (Mae Kuang Operation and Maintenance Project 2009a).  Of the 
57,200 hectares of farmland in the sub-basin 89 % is ‘potentially’ irrigated and 
the rest is rain-fed. Of the land irrigated approximately a quarter is in Muang fai 
systems and rest in state projects, most from Mae Kuang Dam (Mae Kuang 
Operation and Maintenance Project 2009a).  Seasonality is a key issue with 
irrigated areas served by Mae Kuang Dam in dry season typically less than a 
quarter of those possible in wet season. 
Groundwater use 
Groundwater withdrawals are very important part of water management in the 
basin. Groundwater recharge averages 40 million m3 per year with safe yield of 8 
million m3 per year. While most recharge of the Chiang Mai inter-montane basin 
is from surrounding hills the Mae Kuang river also appears to recharge 
groundwater (Asnachinda 1997).  
Many private wells, typically 50m deep, were already in place of agriculture in the 
early 1980s   (Margane and Tatong 1999). Models suggest that the highest rates 
of groundwater abstraction in the Upper Ping basin are around San Sai and San 
Kamphaeng, both in the Mae Kuang sub-basin (Margane and Tatong 1999).   
One estimate made several years ago suggests withdrawals already were around 
7.9 million m3 per year which is close to the safe yield (Panya Consultant and 
Sigma Hydro Consultant, 2003).  Many more wells have been dug in the last 
decade. One survey suggests that of the current 1,334 groundwater wells, 85% 
were drilled during the past ten years, and more than two-thirds to serve 
domestic demand.  Only 10% of new wells were for agricultural uses, and of 
these 85% are in Muang district of Lamphun – the downstream area where water 
scarcity is most severe. Almost 70% of the new wells for industrial and services 
purposes were also in Muang district of Lamphun. 
An important institutional change after the bureaucratic reforms of 2002 was the 
transferring of responsibilities of several former government agencies responsible 
to rural tap water provision to the Department of Groundwater Resources.  
Formerly 4 agencies were responsible for rural tap water provision:  Department 
of Mineral Resources, Department of Public Works, Department of Health and 
Department of Rapid Rural Development. They drilled groundwater for rural 
communities. After bureaucratic reform (1 October 2002), all their works were 
combined and transferred to the new Department of Groundwater Resources. 
There are two rural tap water management patterns. First is management by tap 
water management committee. Water users must organize themselves into water 
user groups, select rural water supply committee, draw water use regulation and 
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maintain the systems. Second, management by local administrative 
organizations:  municipalities, tambon administrative organizations and provincial 
administrative organizations ( Department of Groundwater Resources, 2006).  
Water pollution 
Water pollution of both surface and groundwater is a serious problem in Mae 
Kuang sub-basin. In the upper part of the sub-basin, there are problems with 
pesticide contamination (Suphang, Watts and Punya, 2007).  In the lower reaches 
there are multiple pollution problems.  
Surveys by the Pollution Control Department during 1997-2001 found surface 
water quality deteriorated as moved downstream from Sansai district to Mueang 
district of Lamphun (Panya Consultant and Sigma Hydro Consultant, 2003).  
Contamination due to phosphorus, nitrate-nitrogen and ammonia is higher than in 
other river sub-basins in the Ping watershed.  
Pollution is caused by many sources including municipal and industrial effluents, 
as well as intensive cropland as well as pig and dairy farms. Other sources of 
pollution come from small-scale and cottage industries which produce traditional 
mulberry paper, food-processing and batik textile as well as other industries not 
covered by typical regulations applying to factories (Thomas 2006a: 92; Piphat, 
Daranee and Saowanee, 2002). Organic pollution results in very low dissolved 
oxygen all year round.  In the dry season there are reports each year of dead fish 
floating in the river near industrial plants and dense urban land uses.  
A study in 2007 by the First Regional Environment Office (Chiang Mai) in 2007 
documented similar trends.  Water in Doi Saket district of useable for domestic 
consumption with modest treatment and suitable for fishery, agriculture, and 
conservation of aquatic lives as is.  Prior to reaching the Northern Industrial 
Estate, water quality had deteriorated and needs substantial treatment before it 
could be used for many purposes. Downstream from the estate water quality was 
only suitable for transportation.  
There is a history of conflicts over water pollution among farmers, urban water 
users, industrial and service operators.  High quantity of ammonia and nitrogen 
are caused by direct effluents from communities without treatment (First Regional 
Environment Office (Chiang Mai), 2007.  Water quality indicators often exceed 
standards (Pollution Control Department, 2009). Greenpeace (2007) reported in 
2007-2008 that groundwater was contaminated by such toxic chemicals as lead, 
copper and zinc in Nong Ped village near the Northern Industrial Estate in 
Lamphun province. 
The Northern Industrial Estate was accused of causing pollution in the paste. 
Wastewater treatment facilities were subsequently constructed by NIE and 
operated by a private company. The NIE claimed that there are more industrial 
plants outside NIE which may or may not have adequate wastewater treatment 
facilities.   
Allocation conflicts 
Access to water depends substantially on position within the Mae Kuang 
watershed. Doi Saket and San Sai district in the upper reach receive relatively 
more water from the Mae Kuang dam, whereas the middle reach, in San 
Kamphaeng district and Mae On branch-district receives less water. The lower 
reach of the sub-river basin, in Ban Thi and Mueang districts of Lamphun 
province, receive the least water as they are at the tail of the main irrigation 
canals.  
There is serious competition over water allocation at least twice a year at 
meetings at Mae Kuang dam focusing on what areas will receive how much water 
(in cubic meters) during what time (how many days with water and how many 
days without water). During dry season when Royal Irrigation Department 
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dissuade farmers from growing rice, farmers at upper reach insist on growing wet 
rice, whereas farmers in the middle reach grow rice only when they can have 
water. Farmers in lower reach have to give up growing wet rice as there is not 
enough water.  
Farmers and the Irrigation  Department are both strategic in negotiations and 
subsequent patterns of water use. Farmers typically over-plant relative to 
agreement expecting to be able to use images of crops in the ground as a way to 
lever additional water at the end of the dry season when shortages are most 
acute (to prevent disastrous crop losses); the irrigation department, on the other 
hand, is conservative in its recommendations for land-uses, aware that it will 
often have to deal, in practice, with appeals for special assistance as the dry 
season unfolds. 
Position within irrigation systems is also important at finer scales. In in-depth 
interviews noted that farm at tail end of system were often short of water and as 
a result lost crops and were in debt. Others pointed out, however, that some of 
the latest canal infrastructure associated with Mae Kuang dam reduced the 
accessibility of water compared to what they had before under the Muang Fai 
system because of height differences.  
In the upper reach where household survey was carried out water shortages were 
most likely between March and May, peaking in April at 18%, and rare outside 
this period.  Altogether about 22% of households reported some shortage in at 
least one month. Duration of longest shortages experienced was as follows: less 
than or equal to a week (7%), between a week and a month (10%), more than a 
month (4%). Shortages were primarily experienced by those needing water for 
rice (14%). Shortages were much less frequently experienced for other 
agricultural activities, like field crops (2%), orchards (3%), livestock (2%), or 
aquaculture (1%).  Non-agricultural uses rarely experienced shortages (all < 
1%). Households who have suffered shortages typically attribute them to low 
flows in the dry season (83%) and less frequently to consumption by others 
(23%) or changes to water delivery systems (33%). 
The Mae Kuang Dam and associated irrigation reservoirs and infrastructure seem 
to have raised expectations about availability of water beyond what can actually 
be delivered.  Downstream peri-urban, municipal and industrial areas experience 
more serious water stress and conflicts than in the upstream areas.  
Officials at Mae Kuang dam, in some years, “ask” farmers to stop cultivating dry-
season rice in order to save water for urban consumers (Techawongtham 2004). 
Agricultural water users in Mae Kuang Dam are upset that the Provincial Water 
Authority has higher priority in water than farmers as it buys water from the dam 
to produce urban tap water. They complain that the Provincial Water Authority 
and the Northern Industrial Estate, pumps away ‘their’ water for sale as tap water 
for urbanites and factories.  
Tap water in the Northern Industrial Estate in Lamphun is drawn and treated from 
Mae Kuang river, and wastewater from industrial plants within the Estate is 
treated before releasing into the river. If drought occurs and water is not 
sufficient for production, the Northern Industrial Estate may ask directly from the 
Royal Irrigation Department to release additional water from the Mae Kuang 
Dam. According to three officials at NIE and two irrigation heads at Mae Kuang 
dams, to date, NIE has never asked for irrigation water from the dam, and dam 
personnels have never sent water to NIE. The Sahapattana Industrial Park in 
Lamphun province pumps groundwater for its factories to its reservoir that has a 
storage capacity of 0.5 million m3. Many industrial plants outside the Northern 
Industrial Estate and Sahapattana Industrial Parks use groundwater for their 
production (Sahapattana Inter-Holding, 2009).   
Perpetual water scarcity due to increasing and diversifying water demand 
prompts a number of industries, services, golf courses, housing estates, and 
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villages to increasingly extract groundwater or dig ponds for their own uses. As 
urbanization continues, new residential areas opted for groundwater extraction 
for domestic consumption. In addition, idle farmland caused by land speculation 
prompted some industrial factories to negotiate for water from some local 
irrigation heads while other factories extract groundwater for their own 
production.  
The biggest and most controversial solution to water deficit in the Mae Kuang 
sub-basin is inter-basin water transfer project proposed by the Royal Irrigation 
Department. The mega-project is expected to annually divert 147 million m3 from 
Mae Taeng and Mae Ngad rivers, which are two tributaries of Ping river, through 
tunnels into the Mae Kuang reservoir. It is anticipated that irrigated farmland in 
dry season and for urban and industrial purposes could be roughly tripled. Public 
hearings for this controversial mega-project were done and construction budget 
prepared, but construction has not started as the environmental impact 
assessment report has not yet bee approved by the National Environment Board 
(Mae Kuang Operation and Maintenance Project, 2009). There are criticisms from 
some water users in Mae Taeng irrigation system that they have long experienced 
water shortage and disputes in their own system and that inter-basin transfer 
would exacerbate these problems.  
Mae Kuang RSBO and Upper Ping RBO  
Origins  
Responding to promotion by Global Water Partnership, Asian Development Bank 
and World Bank for integrated water resource management, the Thai government 
established river basin committee for 25 major watersheds in the country and 
created pilot project on sub-basin participatory watershed management model in 
the Ping river in 1999 (Thomas 2006b).  
The institutional reforms were, in a large part, a response to specific conditions 
placed on loans to the Agriculture sector by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
following the 1997-98 financial crisis (Lebel et al. 2009). This included guidelines 
and requirements for promotion of integrated water resources management 
concepts through to introduction of river basin committees or organizations, and 
the creation of so-called apex regulatory authorities under new water laws 
(Abonyi, 2005). Lobbying by farmers with concerns over water pricing has been 
an important factor in the institutional stalemate with a national Water Law that 
would give administrative, policy-making and regulatory teeth to RBOs and the 
Department of Water Resources.  
In 2000, the National Water Resources Committee was established by Prime 
Minister Office Regulation. Participatory selection process of Ping Sub-river basin 
Committee consecutively by diverse groups of representatives from sub-district, 
district, provincial and basin levels. In 2003 the bureaucratic reforms established 
the Department of Water Resources, and new selection process of two set of Ping 
Upper and Lower Ping River Basin Sub-committees according to the same 2003 
regulation. The project on participatory watershed management was led by the 
Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning in the Ministry 
of Natural Resources and Environment and financially supported by ASEM II Trust 
fund managed by World Bank. 
Three sections of Ping river basin were studied and planned: upper ping section 
1, Mae Kuang river sub-basin, and lower Ping section 5. The tasks were to 
develop a model for integrated water management that can be applied in other 
watersheds by establishing RSBOs, catchment action plans, and preparation of 
operation manuals, strengthening capacities of water-related stakeholders 
particularly local administrative organization and community organizations in 
watershed planning, implementation and monitoring processes, and reinforcing 
control and incentives in pollution abatement.  
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David Thomas (2005, 2006a) documented the selection and early establishment 
of the Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Organization (RSBO) in some details 
summarizing some of the difficulties and lessons learnt as well as training and 
planning activities carried out. Although the challenges were recognized there 
was substantial hope that a flexible and negotiated approach to design of river 
sub-basin organization’s structure and functions would lead to much better 
planning and dispute resolution mechanisms in the peri-urban mix. At the outset 
it was been obvious that Mae Kuang  RSBO needed better coordination but that 
getting the required cooperation would be a challenge. Several well established 
groups and coalitions of interests around key agencies had already articulated 
their visions. There were a lot of agendas on the table. Several multi-stakeholder 
platforms already existed, ranging from muang fai water user groups, to the 
Royal Irrigation Department supported Mae Kuang Dam Water Users Association.  
Reorganization and representation 
According to the 2003 Prime Minister Office Regulation, Mae Kuang Watershed 
Working Group is a part of a hierarchy of watershed committees (Table 1, Column 
2). The National Water Resources Committee managed at the helm, followed by 
the Upper Ping and Lower Ping Watershed Sub-committees, the Mae Kuang 
Watershed Working Group, Provincial Watershed Working Group, District-leveled 
Watershed Working Group, and Sub-district-leveled Watershed Working Group. 
The reason why administrative-based groups coexist with hydrological-based 
groups is due to Thai bureaucratic structure and the nature of spatial units. 
Watershed boundaries and administrative boundaries do not overlap perfectly. 
Mae Kuang sub-basin, for example, encompasses parts of six districts of two 
provinces, while other districts fall into other river sub-basins.  Integrated water 
management based on sub-basin boundary is theoretically convenient, but state 
budget is practically distributed and audited through hierarchy of line agencies 
and local administrative organizations. As local administrative organizations have 
become increasingly important in terms of budget allocation and natural resource 
management responsibilities within their jurisdictions, it is difficult to manage 
based on watershed unit alone.  It is hoped that availability of both spatial and 
administrative bodies can facilitate coordination. 
 
Table 1 Multi-level water management organization  
                           
Level 
                       2004-2008                        2009 
                          
National 
 National Water Resources 
Committee 
 National Water Resources 
Committee 
                    
Watershed 
Upper Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee 
Ping River Basin Committee 
3  Academic Working 
Groups: Integrated Plans, 
Information, Public 
Relations and Participation 
Ping River Watershed 
Management and Academic 
Sub-Committee 
Mae Kuang River Sub-basin 
Working Group 
Mae Kuang River Sub-basin 
Working Group 
                       
Local 
Provincial River Basin 
Working Group 
Provincial River Basin 
Working Group 
District River Basin 
Working Group 
District River Basin 
Working Group 
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Sub-district River Basin 
Working Group 
                               - 
 
 
There is a fair bit of documentation about changes in structure and composition of 
the initial working group that set up the RSBO and then RSBO itself. Initial 
proposal for membership of RSBO were modified following discussions (Table 
2).First a group of 45 was established. A later directive issued by DWR suggested 
new group should have only 36 members. There were to be 6 representatives of 
local organizations, 6 agricultural water users, 6 business/industrial water users, 
6 representatives of people’s organizations/environmental NGOs, 6 
kamnan/headmen, 1 academics or knowledgeable person, and 5 government 
officials (2 DWR, 1 RID, 1 Groundwater Resources, 1 Protected Forest Officer 
from MONRE). In the end, no one filled in posts of academic, and there were only 
2 representatives of business/industrial water uses from Lamphun, and 2 from 
people’s organizations or environmental NGOs. Two persons concurrently held 
two positions within this RSBO as both agricultural water users and kamnan, and 
as agricultural water user and representative of a people’s organization. A third 
person held posts in higher and lower level working group and the Ping RBO. A 
fourth was both an RSBO member and leader/founder of recently-established 
Lower Mae Kuang network from Ton Thong district, Lamphun. 
 
Table 2. Final structure of the first Mae Kuang RSBO 
Chairpersons  and Secretaries 
 Elected Locally 
 
Sub –Committes  
Linkages with Local sub-watershed committees 
 
Membership composition:  
Old existing community organizations 
Community forestry networks 






Ethnic minority groups 
Housewives groups, Women’s development groups 
3 
3 
Local government (TAO, municipalities, PAO) 
Kamnan/ Village headmen 










Total membership 45 
 
During 2007-2009 changes in governments caused multiple changes in RSBs and 
RSBOs committees with new rounds of selection (Table 1).Previous committees at 
district and sub-district levels are excluded for the reason that provincial 
committee can coordinate already through administrative hierarchy. A new set of 
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Ping River Basin Committee was appointed in August 2008, a new set of Ping 
River Basin Management and Academics Sub-Committee was introduced in 2009, 
and appointment of Provincial River Basin and District River Basin Committees 
were completed in 2009.  
After the August 2008 reshuffle the Mae Kuang RSBO was to have 36 members 
distributed widely across stakeholder groups (Table 3).  Representation of non 
central government stakeholders was substantially better than in organizations 
and committees at higher and lower spatial administrative levels. In terms of 
areas being represented, however, it is found that not all areas within the Sub-
river basin are well represented. There was, for instance, no one applying to be 
selected as representatives from industrial and services water user group in 
Lumphun. Neither are there any representatives from academics and sub-district 
administrative organizations from downstream areas of Mae Kuang sub-river 
basin.   
Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Committee and most of RSBOs in Ping river basin, 
however, are still in the process of selection in late 2009. New selection process 
was employed based on application for at least six applicants for each 
representatives of water users, and let applicants select representatives among 
themselves. Those who are selected become Ping River Basin Committee, and 
those who are not selected are appointed as members of the new Ping River 
Basin Management and Academics Sub-Committee. The same process is also 
used for selection of other river sub-basin, provincial and district watershed 
working groups. Size of the new Ping River Basin Committee reduced to 36 
committee, but the sizes of watershed working groups vary according to the sizes 
and complexity of each sub-river basin. 
As of March 2010, selection of the new Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Working 
Group was still on-going. Based on pattern of three other river sub-basin working 
groups which now have been appointed expect around half from government 
including 40% from line agencies and 10% from subdistrict administrative 
organizations. A further 10% are either village headmen and district khamnan. 
Agriculture was typically around 10%.  This suggests a rather drastic shift away 
from wider representation and greater focus on central government agencies 
(Table 3). 
 
Table 3 Percentage of Stakeholders in Watershed Committees and Working 
Groups at end of 2008  

































BS/Industry  5.4 4.6 17 3.5-
4.0 
0 
NGO  5.4 4.6 17 0 0 
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Community  0 0 0 0 21-
29 
Religion  0 0 0 0 1.4-
4.2 





During 2004-2008 the Upper Ping Watershed Working Groups each with 24-27 
members on Integrative Planning, Information and Public Relations and 
Participation were each dominated by Government stakeholders (67-85%). 
Typically there were only two, and sometimes one or no, representative from 
agriculture, industry, civil society and ‘resource persons’. In the more recent Ping 
River Watershed Management and Academic Sub-committee with 47 members 
just under half are from government (Table 3).  Government representation in 
the Upper Ping River Basin Sub-Committee has increased with the changes in 
organization after 2008 (Table 4). At the same time representation of farmers 
was slashed. 
 
Table 4 Stakeholder Composition of the old Upper Ping River Basin Sub-
Committee and the current Ping River Basin Committee (as of early 2010). 
Stakeholder 2004-8 




















 37 36 
 
The key point is that throughout the establishment period of the hierarchy of 
watershed management structures there has been a lot of attention to 
representation on committees with efforts made to come up with a system that 
can fit in with existing administrative hierarchies.  This included some individuals 
belonging to multiple committees and thus providing mechanisms to link them.   
Mandate, responsibilities and resources 
The major tasks of Ping River basin Committee and the working groups as 
perceived by the committees and members are to produce integrated water 
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management plans, and to strengthen capacity of network groups. Such network 
groups vary from muang fai irrigation groups to watershed conservation groups, 
housewives groups, youth groups, and other groups by disseminate knowledge 
and information as well as budget and materials for activities such as watershed 
conservation, ceremonies to pay homage and offerings to watershed spirits, tree 
ordination, prolongation of river life ceremonies, reforestation and construction of 
check dams in watershed areas to retain moisture in watersheds. Most of such 
activities, however, are done more in Chiang Mai province than in Lamphun 
province. Activities in Lamphun province are mainly digging and cleaning 
irrigation canals and restoration of water quality. The committees tasks are to 
consider whether plans and measures can solve water-related problems, to what 
extent plans and measures can be integrated, whether there are redundancies 
and conflicts among plans and measures.  
RSBOs (Sub-River Basin Working Groups) collect information regarding 1) water 
and other natural resources; 2) water infrastructure that are already completed; 
water demand (in order to propose plans & projects on water resource 
management within sub-river basins to the Provincial Watershed Working Group 
and the Ping River Basin Committee); 4) coordinate state agencies’ operation 
plans regarding water resource management, development and conservation of 
water bodies, water allocation, water resources rehabilitation, flood prevention 
and control, drought, water quality in order to prepare catchment-scale operation 
plans; 5) public dissemination of information on water resources and RSBO to 
people within catchment in order that they learn and have correct understanding; 
6) compromise and conflict resolution regarding water resources within sub-river 
basins; 7) follow up and evaluate performance of government agencies regarding 
water resources within catchment and report to RBO committee and sub-
committees; 8) Any work assigned by RBO committee and sub-committees.  
Responsibilities of Provincial Watershed Working Group are similar to Sub-River 
Basin Working Group except that they deal within the whole province whereas 
Sub-River Basin Working Groups deal within their own sub-river basins.  
Responsibilities of Ping River Basin Committee (RBO) are: 1) submit 
recommendations to National Water Resources Committee about policies, plans, 
projects, ways to solve problems in water resource management including 
performance of government agencies, local administrative organizations and 
private sectors within river basin; 2) prepare plans on water resource 
management within river basin; 3) coordinate in preparation of operation plans 
and budgets of government agencies and local administrative organizations so 
that they correspond with water resource management plans within river basin; 
4) prioritize activities, determine water quantities to be used by each activity and 
determine water allocation measures suitable to available water based on equity 
and efficiency; 5) follow up and evaluate performance of government agencies 
within river basin; 6) encourage local administrative organizations in 
management of small water bodies for benefits and equity; 7) acquire information 
and facts on water resources in order to prepare statistics, information, 
comments, recommendations regarding basin management; 8) compromise and 
conflict resolution regarding water resources within river basin; 9) coordinate 
operation on water resource management with other RBOs; 10) disseminate 
information to the public, get comments and make the public understand water 
resource management; 11) appoint sub-committees and working groups to work 
on assignments by the RBO; 12) work that are assigned by the National Water 
Resources Committee. 
Planning activities  
The focus on data collection and planning; very little is done to directly address 
water allocation conflicts. Operationally water allocation within Mae Kuang sub-
river basin is done by the RID. The RBO and RSBO do not have formal authority 
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to allocate water or manage conflicts. They do not have the legal power to 
enforce such plans; line agencies may and may choose not to follow their. This 
situation would change if the draft water law was promulgated.     
Planning is a largely an aggregation exercise with little effort to consider 
complementarities or contradictions. Criteria for setting priorities for projects are 
established and used to prepare submissions to committees and Bureau of 
Budget at higher levels. Plans and projects that do not receive any budget must 
be revised at local level, and resubmitted for consideration in following fiscal 
years. Moreover at the provincial and lower levels governors, district heads, and 
sub-district heads shoulder many responsibilities, and cannot be expected to 
always keep a watershed perspective in mind.  In practice the ideals of integrated 
water resources management are hard to pursue. 
Integrated water resources management plans are typically for 5-10 years with 
shorter plans prioritized higher. The annual planning process lasts approximately 
10 months from July to March, from villages in July to Cabinet in April before 
going to parliament. There are currently two basic pathways to a plan (Figure 2). 
In the first pathway, plans and projects are prepared by line agencies and 
submitted to National Water Resources Committee before going to the Bureau of 
Budget at the end of March. These do not have to pass through a prioritization 
process. The second pathway is for villages to propose plans and projects. Sub-
district working groups consider their appropriateness, and district working 
groups prioritize plans and projects according to criteria. Then, provincial/RSBO 
working group will consider and prioritize again before going to management and 
academic sub-committee to consider and prioritize, before going to 
ministries/departments for budgeting. From here, the pathway separates, one to 
other line agencies before reaching Bureau of Budget. Another to DWR, NWRC, 
and continue to Bureau of Budget as well.  
River basin or sub-basin plans proposed by government agencies to solve water 
problems at sub-basin, basin, or beyond sub-district levels, can include physical 
infrastructure and non-structural measures.  Plans are divided into six categories: 
water development, flood mitigation, drought mitigation, water management, 
water resources conservation and restoration, and water pollution abatement. 
Further subdivisions are used for budgeting.  
Plans proposed by local communities though TAO should solve problems at village 
level or in specific areas. These action plans are collected from suggestions and 
needs of people during first round of local meetings, and are reviewed again in 
the second round of local meetings. Most of the local plans are for solving 
domestic and agricultural water deficit and improving water use efficiency. 
Analysis of budget allocation gives some indication of the role and influence of 
stakeholders within the sub-basin. The 2010 yearly budget allocation for state 
plans within the Mae Kuang sub-river basin was allocated as follows: RID (89%); 
Department of Groundwater Resources (4.8%), Department of Water Resources 
(3.8%), Provincial Water Authority (1.5%), Department of National Parks, Wildlife 
and Vegetation (0.5%), and Department of Land Development (0.4%). Out of 
this budget allocation, most went to infrastructure development and 
improvement, that is, for flood prevention (55%), reservoirs (14%), canals 
(12%), weirs (9%),  groundwater drilling (4.8%), pipelines (2.7%), water 
pumping (2.5%) and check dams (0.3%),  and reforestation (0.11%). 
This can be compared with 2010 budget allocated for the whole Ping watershed: 
RID (79%); Department of Public Works and Urban Planning (11%),  Department 
of Groundwater Resources (3.7%), Department of Water Resources (2.4%), 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Vegetation (1.5%), Department of 
Prevention and Rehabilitation of Public Disasters (0.4%), and Department of Land 
Development (0.3%). 
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The second type of integrated plan (Figure 2) based on local inputs for the whole 
Ping river basin is more diverse in terms of recipient government agencies:  
Department of Groundwater Resources (52%), Department of Water Resources 
(35%), Department of Pollution Control (3.1%), Royal Forest Department 
(3.0%), Department of Factories (1.8%), Department of National Parks, Wildlife 
and Vegetation (1.8%), Royal Irrigation Department (1.5%), Department of Land 
Development (1%), , and Department of Environmental Quality Promotion 
(0.5%). The total budget for Ping watershed in 2010 was 4090 million Baht. 
During meetings observed of the Upper Ping Working Group on Integrated 
Watershed Plans in 2004, representatives from local groups in Chiang Mai 
negotiated the prioritization of plans and projects. It was agreed to give 
opportunities to local representatives at sub-district and district levels to prioritize 
plans and projects rather than letting higher-level committees prioritize them. 
They reasoned that local communities are closer to water problems and directly 
receive both costs and benefits from the projects. Nevertheless there are 
complaints by local water user groups that they participated in making plans and 
budgets necessary for solving water problems at local level, but their bottom-up 
plans are often changed at higher scales.  
An NGO representative interviewed thought that that the RBO/RSBO was a good 
idea but ineffective because it lacked resources. There was no local branch office 
for Mae Kuang Working Group, so meetings had to be done in hotels. But with 
little budget for travel, or low allowances for members, the incentive to work 
were not there. Budgets for operations of the organizations have fallen and as a 
consequence they cannot run their own meetings as frequently as they would 
wish and consultation exercises with wider public have to be curtailed.  The 
organizations are encouraged to run their meetings in parallel with events held at 
provincial or district levels. 
In Mae Kuang sub-watershed, there were neither proposed and approved projects 
on improvement of water quality and pollution control nor prevention of soil 
erosion and improvement of land use (Table 5). Most projects were construction 
of water sources and distribution systems for agricultural use, domestic use, and 
flood prevention e.g. weirs, reservoirs, canal construction & improvement, village 
tap water, groundwater provision for village, dykes and drainage ways. Smaller 
number of projects focused on improvement, maintenance and restoration of 
natural and pre-existing water bodies and headwater areas as well as personnel 
development. Consequently, water problems and conflicts cannot be solved 





Figure 2. Integrated water resources management planning process. Two 
planning pathways are highlighted (1 and 2). (Redrawn by authors). 
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To reiterate, in the bottom-up pathway the planning process starts at declaring 
water-related needs at village level and the tambon water working group collects 
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and draft plans (Figure 2). District, Provincial and Mae Kuang River Sub-basin 
Working Groups then relate them to watershed and provincial strategies. Another 
planning sub-committee then considers and screens them so that they fit national 
government, provincial and watershed strategies and urgent needs. The 
secretariat then analyzes and screens projects using a system of prioritizing 
criteria. After this the Ping RBO will consider and forward proposals to DWR, 
National Water Resources Committee, Bureau of Budget, Cabinet, and eventually 
Parliament (Figure 2). 
 
Table 5. Percentage of Budget Allocation for Different Activities in Mae Kuang 
Sub-watershed in 2007 as Proposed by District-Level River Basin Working Group 
and Prioritized by the Office of Upper Ping River Basin Sub-committee  
Parts of 
Watershed 















          0.17           10.79        5.68 
San Sai, 
Chiang Mai 












              0           9.53        5.12 
Mae On, 
Chiang Mai 
          0.09           6.71        3.33 








              0           14.70        8.87 
Ban Thi, 
Lamphun 
              0            7.15        4.24 
                                     Totals            0.56            67.6        31.83 
 
Pre-existing institutions and alternative platforms 
The Mae Kuang RSBO and Upper Ping RBO were introduced into a context with a 
history of conflicts over allocation of water (see Section 3) and uncoordinated 
activities by various agencies and community-based organizations.  Pre-existing 
institutions and alternative platforms were already in place leading to a set of 
potential interactions (Figure 3). The interactions which took place or did not, but 
probably should have, will be analyzed in this section.  
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Figure 3 The complex institutional context of the Mae Kuang RSBO. New 
organizations are in bold with fine-dotted lines indicating formal relationships. 
Solid lines indicate pre-existing institutions and relationships and dashed lines 
some of the important new relationships that had to be developed, but were not 





Muang fai irrigation organizations 
Muang fai irrigation organizations consist primarily of farmers who use common 
irrigation water. Farmers within these organizations are diverse ranging from 
paddy farmers to vegetable, flower and orchard farmers, and from landowners, 
tenants, absentee farmers/orchardists/landowners. Although they cannot be 
called true multi-stakeholder platforms, muang fai organizations accumulate 
experiences in effective water allocation and conflict management through 
centuries of watershed management history, and have shown potential and 
flexibility in dealing with new challenges (Potter, 1976; Abha 1979; Vanpen 1986; 
Vanpen et al. 1980; Vanpen and Leuchai 1982; Tanabe 1981, 1994; Uraivan 
1983).  
Vanpen (1986) pointed out that muang fai organizations, or people’s irrigation 
organizations, were more effective than state irrigation organizations. Uraivan 
(1983) and (Tanabe 1981, 1994) indicated that these organizations practiced 
some form of participatory democracy at the grassroots level. They were granted 
customary use rights of facilities and water rights in exchange for responsibilities 
in operation and maintenance according to communal rules and regulations. 
Members elected irrigation head along with committee based on technical skills 
and leadership ability. Not every member had a right to vote, though. As muang 
fai organizations prioritized rice production, only rice landowners have rights to 
vote on the basis of one man one vote. Other members who were orchard owners 
or tenant farmers did not have any rights to vote. In practice, this classification of 
Page 487 of 852
PN67_2010_12 
Improving water allocation through multi-stakeholder platforms in the Mae Kuang watershed, northern 
Thailand 
Santita Ganjanapan, Louis Lebel 
 20 
members was not mutually exclusive as a rice landowner can also own an 
orchard. Anyway, the application of which rights depended upon specific 
situations. Members of muang fai organization could be at the village level or 
beyond village level (sub-basin level) which included several villages or sub-
districts (tambons). Members were varied in terms of crop types and land uses. 
In the past, all members were peasants, and water demand was mainly related to 
agriculture.  
The allocation of water was based on allocation of water rights to members. 
Members had rights to draw water according to their contribution in the operation 
and maintenance of the system. Water conflicts erupted within village and 
between villages. Traditionally, conflicts, arising from water overdraw or water 
thefts, within the village could be managed using traditional mechanisms. For 
example, irrigation leader serve as mediator to warn or to collect fines from 
violators. Inter-village conflicts, caused by water diversion at tail-end farmland, 
were also successfully managed by similar mechanisms. 
Muang fai systems are changing. In the past Muang Fai leaders solved water 
allocation and conflicts based on their (moral) authority. Negotiation started from 
levels of leaders. If it was not successful, negotiation would go down to levels of 
assistants and eventually water users.  As urban and industrial water users 
increase in number and in their water demand, new water conflicts erupt among 
farmers and non-farm water users. Traditional rules, leadership and processes of 
muang fai organizations become too constrained to effectively cope with 
complexity of conflicts (Tanet, 1994). Nowadays, negotiation with non-farm water 
users can be easy or difficult. If non-farm water users are not related to 
administrative leaders (like kamnans or village headmen), negotiation can be 
easy. If they are related to local administrative leaders, negotiation can be 
compromised.  At present, muang fai communities view that negotiation is more 
important than water allocation as the latter is long developed and settled now. 
Current situations of diverse stakeholders require greater ability to negotiate, so 
muang fai leaders have changed from disappearing charismatic leaders to 
administrative leaders like kamnan, headmen, or persons working for influential 
figures. A number of muang fai leaders – some, if not all, who are representatives 
of agricultural water users – have become members of Mae Kuang RSBO. Moral 
leaders are less important. It is anticipated that new type of muang fai leaders 
are more capable to manage conflicts.    
With the introduction of modern agricultural technology and increasing 
intensification and diversification of agriculture, multiple cropping became 
prevalent. As a result, water shortage was more pronounced especially in the dry 
season and at the tail-end portion of irrigated farmland. Water demand and water 
allocation became complex because of diverse cash crops with spatially and 
temporally different water requirements. New lowland cropping patterns are 
complicated with different crops being transplanted, tended and harvested at the 
same time (Anan 1984). (Sopon 1989) found that muang fai organizations 
adjusted in three ways. Firstly, by sharing of new source of water supply such as 
diverting  groundwater to needy fields in exchange for some water fee exemption. 
Secondly, redistribute water in the dry season on a rotational basis, and 
shortening the rotational cycle to lessen problems of water thefts. Thirdly, 
negotiation to release water to downstream users in other villages, once effective 
in the past, fails under the new context of intense competition for irrigation 
water. Intervention from district government offices is increasingly sought in 
order to get fair share of water to drought-prone areas.  
The rapidly-expanding Chiang Mai and Lamphun cities induces agricultural land 
conversion turning full-time farming into part-time farming, and productive 
farmland to idle land. Migration of young ex-farmers to seek non-farm jobs in 
cities and industrial estates causes labour shortage in agricultural production and 
irrigation system maintenance.  Farmers cope with labour problems by turning to 
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rain-fed agriculture, converting labour-intensive paddy fields into less labour-
demanding longan fruit orchards, diversifying crops to cater urban markets, 
growing high-yielding varieties to avoid yield reduction, and also diversifying 
income sources to include non-farm activities. Women become more involved in 
irrigation works, which used to be male domain, as male labour move to work in 
town (Sopon, 1993). Moreover, agricultural water scarcity due to competition for 
water by urban and industrial demand coupled with small land holding caused 
farmers to rely increasingly on non-farm employment (Pearson, 1996, 1999; 
Cohen and Pearson, 1998)  
Muang fai organizations consequently have to downsize and adapt by developing 
new strategies. As parts of irrigated areas are converted, they are excluded from 
water services. Some muang fai organizations, thus, sell water surplus in wet 
season to non-farm water users. In dry season, however, many opt to extract 
groundwater to irrigate dry season crops (Sopon, 1993). Within the context of 
agrarian restructuring, urbanization and industrialization, muang fai organizations 
find it difficult to sustain by themselves under changing technological and 
environmental limitations. They have to mobilize financial and technical resources 
from government agencies for system rehabilitation and maintenance, and seek 
legal status to obtain identity and rights to development funds and programs. 
They restructured their organizations by reducing irrigation assistants and 
including semi-government village head in the management committee. The 
reason was to facilitate resource mobilization from government agencies. Some of 
them create new links with capital rather than with state. This indicated increased 
hybridization of interests and strategies. The trend is towards greater state 
control over allocation of water and the bureaucratic incorporation of muang fai 
organizations (Pearson, 1996, 1999). 
In a few cases changes have gone in the other direction in the Mae Kuang 
watershed. Another response to failures to address water allocation problems is 
to bring back older institutions and technologies. Due to inadequate irrigation 
from Mae Kuang dam and alternate water schedule which may not match crop 
needs, a number of farmers have found supplementary water by restoring 
abandoned muang fai systems.  
In the past, there were minimal linkages between muang fai organizations with 
state agencies through village and sub-district heads who served as semi-
governments officials (de Young, 1958; Wijeyewardene, 1965, 1973; Abha and 
Nisa, 1974; Tanabe, 1994). Despite the fact that muang fai organizations could 
manage conflicts due to their abilities to mobilize labour and resources, they 
increasingly seek assistance from government agencies for several reasons. 
Firstly, linkages with local government offices provide legal basis for tapping state 
financial and technical resources for system rehabilitation and maintenance. 
Secondly, conflict management experiences are constrained due to overlapping  
cropping schedule causing both intra-community and inter-community conflicts. 
For intra-community conflicts, social relations, informal sanctions, and increased 
fines are still effective. Nevertheless, mechanisms to manage inter-community 
conflicts, such as upstream diversion of water at the expense of downstream 
users, became limited as problems were beyond muang fai capacity. Thus, semi-
government officials such as village headmen, provincial governors, or local and 
national politicians, instead of negotiation among irrigation leaders, are 
increasingly asked to mediate. Sopon suggested further that basin-wide 
intersystem coordination, represented by existing muang fai organizations, was 
necessary to resolve inter-community disputes. 
Alternative watershed networks  
At local community level, Thomas (p. 242) observed that diverse conservation 
activities had been going on for several years with suggestion and support from 
government agencies. Such activities had also been performed or newly initiated 
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by local groups as problem solving strategies. The number of such activities was 
increasing and using watershed organizations as platforms. This was supported 
by academic institutions, private sector, government agencies and international 
organizations. 
Management of the headwaters of the Upper Ping watershed are now under the 
responsibility of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation Department. The 
Department launched a participatory action planning to include forests, watershed 
and other environmental problems such as garbage and agricultural chemical 
pollution. Most of the projects were short-term including reforestation, vetiver 
grass cultivation, small weirs, information systems that integrate both scientific 
and local knowledge, and development of sub-basin environmental volunteer 
networks. 
Since 2004 the First Regional Office of Environment has supported more than 20 
local groups for activities including  include tree ordination ceremonies, river life 
prolongation ceremonies, check dam construction, repair and digging of irrigation 
canals, tree planting, improvement of landscape around reservoirs, and training 
on water resource management. 
The Office has supported only one local group in the Mae Kuang watershed. 
Beginning in  2006 it supported the Huay Kaew Reservoir Conservation Group in 
Mae Faek subdistrict, San Sai district with a tree ordination ceremony in 
watershed forests. The 76-membered group receives a small sum of budget from 
the Office of Ping River Basin Committee.   
It was observed that the Office of Ping River Basin Committee (which reports to 
Department of Water Resources, MONRE) also gave technical advice and small 
financial support to local networks for these rituals as well as reforestation 
activities. However, there is only one network in Mae Kuang watershed linked to 
the Office. By contrast, the First Regional Office of Environment of MONRE works 
with several grassroots networks.   
Local water user groups within Mae Kuang sub-river basin do not limit themselves 
to interacting with Ping RBO or Mae Kuang RSBO. They started networking and 
negotiating parallel to RBO/RSBO. One group started in 2006 in the lower reach 
of Mae Kuang basin. Village Volunteers for Natural Resources and Environment in 
Lamphun province, were informed about water pollution in Mae Kuang river by 
the First Regional Office of Environment, Ministry of Natural Resources and 
Environment (MONRE) that regularly monitors water quality through 7 river water 
monitoring stations. They involved different stakeholders (government agencies, 
NGOs, mass media, religious organizations and civil society), and initiate a 
project on pollution abatement and control through forum on “Huam Haeng Huam 
Jai Kuen Nam Sai Heu Nam Kuang” (Join Force and Mind to Return Clear Water to 
Kuang River). Believing that solution must start at grassroots level with local 
knowledge, they have Ton Thong Tambon Administrative Organization as their 
chao phap (convenor/facilitator).  
Another related activity is to raise awareness of changing water quality and form 
new alliances through the project of Dhammachatyatra (or Nature Walk). This 
was done in 2007 by mobilizing three major existing institutions in Thailand: 
village, temple, and school, (or ban, wat, rongrian).  A number of schoolboys and 
men were ordained as novices and monks with supports from villagers. Then, 
monks, novices, schoolchildren, teachers, villagers and some government officials 
walked to different major temples along Mae Kuang river observing and 
discussing about pollution, water flows and changing environmental quality. The 
walk started downstream from riverside temples in Mueang district of Lamphun 
province upstream to riverside temples in Saraphi, Sankamphaeng, San Sai and 
eventually Doi Saket districts in Chiang Mai province. This was done during April, 
June, July, August and September 2007.   
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In February 2009, another forum under the same name was organized, and 
another Dhammachatyatra was done in March 2009 starting from the upstream 
temple in Doi Saket district and ending at the downstream temple in Mueang 
district of Lamphun. Added to this were buad pa (tree ordination) ceremony at a 
headwater village in Mae On branch-district, and sueb chata mae nam (river life 
prolongation) ritual for Mae Kuang and Mae Lao rivers in Doi Saket district. Local 
knowledge and rituals played important roles in raising awareness and restorinag 
watershed forests and river ecology. This was done with participation from 
government officials and some private companies and industrial estate. 
Nevertheless, Ping RBO, Mae Kuang RSBO and First Regional Office of Water 
Resources do neither involve in these activities nor coordinate with First Regional 
Office of Environment. In fact, it was observed that Ping RBO, Mae Kuang RSBO 
deal very little with water pollution problems. Institutional domain and sectorial 
responsibility are clear. 
Another group which coordinates with the Lamphun group is in the upper part of 
Mae Kuang. They are Mae Kuang Watershed Forest Conservation Committee. 
Their work encompass 6 tambons or 55 villages. Six tambons are Thep Sadet, Pa 
Miang, Huay Kaew which are responsible for forest protection, and Cheung Doi, 
Luang Nua and Mae Pong which are based mainly on agriculture.  The upper 
watershed group has been active since 2001 with elected chairperson. Members 
work with neither salaries nor budgets. Without any budget from state line 
agencies, they tried to raise small funds by organizing pha pa religious ceremony. 
They, however, receive small sum of money from some tambon administrative 
organizations and some private companies. They hold monthly meetings in Huay 
Hong Krai Development Study Centre in Doi Saket district. Members include three 
representatives from each tambon (18 members), and 5 representatives from 
each village. Also present in meetings are government officials and local 
administrative organizations. Their work include forest protection and restoration 
through fire control, tree ordination, river life prolongation. 
This networking can be a sign of development towards some form of multi-
stakeholder platform outside RSBO. Some consider merging the two groups into 
one Mae Kuang network. However, this network does neither include industrial 
and service stakeholders nor coordinate with Watershed Committee.  Issue of 
institutional domain and sectorial responsibility. (Participants in the forum 
consisted of local administrative organizations whose jurisdiction are adjacent to 
Mae Kuang river, First Regional Office of Environment based in Chiang Mai, 
Provincial Natural Resources and Environment Officials from Lamphun, Chiang Mai 
and Chiang Rai, Haripunchai Research Institute, Religious Organizations, mass 
media, village headmen and community leaders, Doctor Sem Pringpuangkaew 
Foundation, civil society and other government officials. 
In order to negotiate for some external support, local stakeholders in the 
headwater of Mae Kuang sub-basin combined their local knowledge with newly-
acquired knowledge about paying for environmental service. The headman 
claimed that villagers worked hard to safeguard and restore headwater forests 
and increase clean and steady water flows to Mae Kuang river. Thus, they should 
get some financial (or technical) support for doing such service. One headman 
disclosed,  
“…The reason why there is  water scarcity in Mae Kuang river is that there 
are too many people, too many water users. When lowlanders face water 
problems, they come to the dam, but they do not visit ( its) headwater. 
Some local people (there) are disheartened. They do not have any incentive 
to protect forests. Lowlanders do not bring money to help highlanders. 
Highlanders have to buy rice. They collect non-timber forest products, work 
as agricultural wage laborers, and (use earnings) to buy rice for their own 
consumption. People in the whole Thep Sadet sub-district have to buy rice 
for their consumption…The Ping River Basin Committee does not give any 
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support to us…Mae Kuang network is very small. We raise funds through 
pha pa ceremony which barely pays for our work. The state does not help 
us..” 
Coordination and competition 
Different agencies have their own plans for the sub-basin. Negotiating shared or 
compromise vision has been tough. First plans therefore focus on organizational 
and procedures more than objectives (Thomas 2006a).  The presence of several 
strong groups made it harder to agree on common approaches during 
establishment phase (Thomas 2006a). A common perception at the start was that 
the separate coalitions or factions do not work together very well.  
 
From our surveys of households in the upper parts of the Mae Kuang basin we 
know a bit more about public perceptions of the various platforms and networks. 
Overall a third (32%) of households (in the upper reach of Mae Kuang) belonged 
to a water user group. Two-thirds (68%) said they usually attended water user 
group meetings.  Men were more likely to belong water user groups and hold 
committee positions than women. Of households belonging to a water user group 
about three-quarters said their households paid a water user fee (76%) and had 
water use rights (78%). But the overlap between paying fees and having rights 
was imperfect: 84% who paid fees had rights, whereas 18% who did not pay still 
had rights. Overall about a fifth (21%) of respondents said they knew a member 
of the Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Committee. Of these about two-thirds (62%) 
had been involved in some of the Committees activities. A similar fraction (24%) 
of respondents knew members of the Mae Kuang Dam Water User Group and of 
these 60% had been involved in some of the Water User Group’s Activities. 
In our surveys in 2009 we also asked households about their alignments with 
different factions or groups. For just under half of households water was simply 
not an issue for which they saw themselves belonging to a particular stakeholder 
group. For those who did we asked them which groups (including the one they 
belong to if relevant) they felt were allies when it came to water management 
issues.  The results are summarized in Figure 4 confirming the multiplicity of 
existing platforms and networks for water management. 
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Figure 1 Stakeholder’s perceptions of their allies in dealing with water 
management issues.  Circles are groups to which households consider themselves 
to belong or are represented in. Arrows are proportion of all links with allies a 
group has that are with a particular stakeholder group.  Not shown are links to 
own group which ranged from 44-81%. Other rare groups included: rainfed-






One reason RSBO remains ineffective, according to a committee member we 
interviewed, is persistent bureaucratic competition.  At the national level this 
starts between Ministries with river basins arena of rivalry (Molle 2007).  The 
Department of Water Resources and Royal Irrigation Department are the key 
counterparts.  The relatively new Department of Water Resources tries to 
establish itself and develop new working mechanisms through water law and 
watershed committees (Figure 3). State agencies including Royal Irrigation 
Department may either follow this pathway or directly submit plans and budgets 
to Bureau of Budget and eventually to the cabinet.  
A retired RSBO committee member (who is also wet-rice farmer) criticized the 
RSBO as ineffective in solving water scarcity problem in the Mae Kuang sub-basin 
(specifically Mae Taeng Mae Ngad Mae Kuang interbasin water transfer project) 
claiming that the RBO/RSBO has neither power nor resources, and very slow to 
take action.  The RID initiated the project but needs to gain public acceptance by 
organizing several public hearings during 2008-2009 (some RBO/RSBO 
committee members attended the public hearings, but they were not convenors). 
Some local leaders support the project by organizing meetings in 33 sub-districts 
in Chiang Mai and Lamphun in order to get water users’ signatures (which they 
called referendums when, in fact, it may be more like petition) to be submitted to 
the government. (This act of seeking water users referendum was frown upon by 
some Ping RBO & RSBO members claiming that it is not normal process for 
project development. The process should start from common visions, planning 
and development of projects which occur annually. Plans and projects must 
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correspond to provincial development strategies.  The referendum was later 
discouraged).   
At more local levels there are also inter-provincial issues within the Ministry of 
Interior: when the Upper Ping RBO is chaired by the Chiang Mai Governor, the 
Lamphun governor is reluctant to join as a “deputy”. Within the Ministry of 
Environment there are coordination problems among related agencies 
(Department of Water Resources, National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation 
Department, Department of Environmental Quality Promotion and Office of 
Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning).  
One RBO Academic Sub-committee noted that when water users are faced with 
water-related problems, they usually ask for help from formal local leaders and 
district officials. They neither contact RBO nor RSBO because procedures along 
this channel are time-consuming, and RBO & RSBO will eventually coordinate with 
line agencies that have direct responsibilities. For instance water users in six sub-
districts in irrigation area of Mae Kuang dam were successful in having water 
delivered to their dry areas by shifting from Mae Kuang water to more abundant 
Mae Faek-Mae Ngad river through negotiations directly with line agencies. 
Engagement with the public  
Engagement with the public can be through formal representation or through 
deliberation in public events.  In some ways the RBO/RSBO became more open to 
local participation. Local representatives, for instance, are given chances to 
become members of higher-level committees. For example, some representatives 
at sub-district level in Mae Kuang sub-basin became also members of watershed 
committee at district, sub-river basin and even Ping river basin. Recently, one 
local water user representative from lower Ping section is appointed as a member 
in the National Water Resources Committee. In addition, committee chairpersons 
are usually government officials such as provincial governors, district heads, or 
head of local administrative organizations. Recently, a local representative from 
civil society from Kamphaengphet province is chosen to become deputy 
chairperson of the Ping Watershed Management and Academics Sub-committee.  
In events convened by both the Department of Water Resources and Royal 
Irrigation Department participation is often construed as providing information or 
at best consultation rather than two-way interactions implied by meaningful 
participation (e.g. Rowe & Fewer 2000). For example, during meetings at district 
offices to enhance capacity to integrated water resource management and 
preparation of integrated water resources plans at district and sub-district levels, 
audience were informed about concept of integrated water resources 
management, how to prioritize plans and projects according to pre-determined 
criteria, stages in preparation of annual integrated water resources budget plans, 
village-level forms to be filled in about projects in terms of water problems, 
nature of projects, benefits to how many households, and whether public 
hearings are done. Village headmen will prepare such plans and projects with 
approval from villagers in public hearings. Then, the plans/projects will be 
submitted to sub-district working groups, district working groups and Office of 
Ping River Basin Committee respectively to be  prioritized according to different 
sets of criteria. 
A representative questioned nature of stakeholder participation saying that, 
“…Government agencies do not understand participation... They want 
photographs and process of giving ideas. But do higher-level organizations 
agree with those ideas? Do they simply want to create (participatory) 
process to justify their search for budget, or to justify plan/project 
approval? We cannot probe whether the process is transparent or not. 
(Local) ideas that are collected may be rejected later…Local plans/projects 
proposed by TAOs, municipalities or muang fai irrigation groups are often 
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not approved. We do not know which projects are approved since there 
are numerous projects being considered each year… ” 
Other organizations gained support from local groups. There were local views that 
participation was made only with supporting agencies. Many thought that their 
views were not represented in the sub-basin plans. They thus felt dominated by 
the agencies, and that some important policies are ignored. 
Participation is also gender skewed (see also: Resurreccion et al. 2004). Despite 
women being involved in water use and management, participation of women 
within Mae Kuang sub-river basin is minimal and is at lowest (sub-district) level 
and not higher (district, provincial and sub-basin levels). Exception is that at river 
basin level, there are a few educated women participating, e.g. in Ping Watershed 
Management and Academics Sub-Committee. 
Compared with local leaders and agricultural water user groups who regularly 
participate in meetings, representatives from industrial and service water user 
groups participate less in meetings. Though private entrepreneurs are 
represented in Ping RBP and Mae Kuang RSBO, they admitted that they seldom 
joined meetings. Some even acknowledged that they did not know that they are 
representatives in RBO and RSBO, and were never invited to join the meetings. 
Some know that they are representatives but admit that they are too busy to 
attend meetings. The opportunity cost of participation is high and the gain from 
participation is trivial. Some do not see benefits of participation as they can have 
access to other water sources such as groundwater or have their own storage of 
water.  
Discussion  
Is the Mae Kuang river sub-basin an effective multi-stakeholder platform? Most 
stakeholders we interviewed did not think so. Farmers felt they were irrelevant to 
water allocation problems compared to alternative platforms available such as 
those supported by muang fai and the Mae Kuang Dam organizations.  Irrigation 
officials view the RSBO as irrelevant to water allocation because it works outside 
the Mae Kuang irrigated areas and see their own work as having been, largely, 
successful at dealing with allocation challenges.  
The Ping RBO and RSBOs consider themselves working at policy and plan 
formulation level. They do not manage water conflicts in the Ping and Mae Kuang 
watersheds. There are controversial water projects and problems in this area: 1) 
Mae Taeng-Mae Ngad-Mae Kuang water transfer; 2) construction of Ping 
watergates to replace three hundreds-year-old weirs on Ping river which is 
adjacent to Mae Kuang sub-basin; 3) water competition between farmer and 
Provincial Water Authority within the Mae Kuang sub-basin; and 4) water 
pollution in the lower Mae Kuang sub-basin near industrial estates. While the  
RBO and related RSBOs in cases# 1and 2 were often put in the meeting agenda, 
and members of Ping RBO and Mae Kuang RSBO participate in the related public 
meetings, they neither organized or convened such meetings of stakeholders nor 
manage these conflicts themselves.   
One outstanding exception in which the Ping RBO directly dealt with is water 
conflicts in Mae Sa sub-watershed where organic and inorganic water pollution 
was produced by the Elephant camp, resorts, and commercial farmers. The Ping 
RBO and Mae Sa RSBO organized meetings to manage such conflicts in 2006. As 
for Mae Kuang sub-watershed where there are many complicated water conflicts, 
no conflict management has been done yet. In fact, decision to manage this 
conflict was made from national level, and not at local or basin level. 
Traditional channels of administrative and political power like village headmen 
and kamnan along with newer TAOs, however, are usually more important to 
solving local water problems than the RSBO.   Working with, or enabling effective 
actions by, local elected governments and appointed administrators is essential.   
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The roles of Mae Kuang RSBO and Ping RBO are limited to integrated planning 
and coordinating projects with minimal political clout enabled by the Order of the 
Office of Prime Minister which is considered a lesser law. The Watershed 
Committees have not made their own integrated water resource management 
plans yet, but they coordinated other agencies’ plans and projects. Each fiscal 
year, the RBO and RSBOs consider plans and projects from water-related 
government agencies and local administrative organizations in order to integrate 
all of them. Due to limited time, limited personnel and voluminous tasks, all plans 
and projects are put together with limited only limited consideration of 
redundancies and not much more integration. 
So far most RSBO decisions seem to be about process and scope, rather than 
allocation itself. Even basic vision is still in dispute. This in contrast to other 
platforms in area which are longer established and have much better defined 
agendas and decision-making sets.   
Several important limitations constrain the effectiveness of the Ping RBO and Mae 
Kuang RSBO. 
First, water resource management by RBO/RSBO still face the problems of 
stakeholders lacking a watershed perspective. Although some plans, projects and 
budget allocation are prepared on watershed basis, many are also be proposed 
via local and supra-local administrative organizations. Budget allocation, critically, 
is still based on conventional jurisdictions. Coordination among government 
agencies are difficult. When Ping RBO and Mae Kuang RSBO consider plans, 
projects and budgets, all stakeholders including government agencies have to be 
present. This can be difficult. 
Second, RBO and RSBO have also been plagued with budgetary problems and 
long delays in appointments of committees.  Political instabilities since the last 
military coup in October 2006 have been one factor.  Political crises are main 
obstacles to operation of RBO/RSBO as they are appointed by Order of the Office 
of Prime Ministers. Thailand has seen several prime ministers already, and have 
to recruit and appoint new sets of RBOs and RSBOs.  
Third, despite RBO/RSBO being involved in plans, projects and budget 
preparation, conflict management still rely on local administrative organizations 
(TAOs) and district officials rather than RBO/RSBO.  They would like greater 
authority that would be granted to them if the Water Bill was passed. It is not 
clear, however, whether this would actually enhance their role as conveners of 
multi-stakeholder platforms, or, instead lead to even more entrenched 
bureaucratic turf wars and alienation from agricultural water users.  
Despite these many outstanding limitations and constraints the RSBO and RBO 
may still have important virtual or indirect functions. Because people are listed as 
being members they are invited to many meetings even-though the RSBO itself 
may be inactive.  
The Ping MBO is learning to networking with local organizations. It tries to link 
with around 100 diverse groups including Muang Fai organizations, forest 
conservation groups, youth groups, housewives groups and so on. The most cited 
are two Muang Fai organizations in Chom Thong district, one Mae Wang forest 
and water conservation network, one Wiang Nong Long Water Development for 
Life Group in Lamphun, and one Mae Sa Watershed Restoration Group in Mae Rim 
district, Chiang Mai. All of them are outside Mae Kuang river sub-basin, and four 
of them are further away from urban Chiang Mai. The nature of such networking 
is that the Ping MBO gives small financial, technical and material support to 
projects that are initiated by those groups.  
In terms of social acceptability, the RBO/RSBO has improved over the years and 
become more acceptable by government agencies,  as one representative 
reflected, 
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“The structures of RBO/RSBO are good, but implementation is not 
acceptable among government agencies. But things improve during the 
past 2-3 years…. There must be some changes in operational 
regulations…” 
On the other hand the shift in membership since 2008-9 towards much higher 
representation of government in the Mae Kuang RSBO along with similar shifts in 
other parts of multi-level hierarchy would seem to imply less opportunities for 
public participation and deliberation and thus even less chance that it can be 
effective as a multi-stakeholder platform.  The wider public may withdraw what 
little support it has given.  
Conflicts over use, allocation and quality of water in the Mae Kuang watershed 
persist. The diversification of livelihoods and land-uses in some ways limits what 
many pre-existing platforms and institutions with a more narrow sectoral or 
geographic focus could achieve.  A platform that can facilitate discussions across 
sectors and places would still be helpful for integrated planning and management 
of water and could, if done well, reduce conflicts and support negotiations.  Some 
alternatives to the Ping RBO and Mae Kuang RSBO exist. 
Muang fai irrigation groups in the peri-urban interface linger and still have 
potential to manage water resources and manage conflicts, but they need support 
from government agencies. Muang Fai organizations have effectively allocated 
irrigation water for a long time, but in many places have grown weaker due to 
lack of labor and money, environmental changes and activities of state agencies. 
The Ping RBO and related RSBOs have learnt this lesson, and are reaching out to 
create networks with them. Their networks, however, are still limited in number, 
and do not include active networks in Mae Kuang sub-basin that have developed 
parallel to RBO/RSBO. Those networks are working with other government 
agencies.Many Muang Fai organizations persist, and some are transforming 
themselves in directions akin to multi-stakeholder platforms.  
Among many government and non-government actors in the Mae Kuang sub-
watershed, the key actor is Department of Irrigation which dictates water 
allocation from Mae Kuang, Mae Ngad dams, Mae Taeng weir as well as small 
reservoirs. Members of these watershed committees, sub-committees and 
working teams represent different groups of stakeholders. While almost half of 
them are representative from water-related government agencies, 
representatives from local organizations were selected using bottom-up approach.   
For the medium-term it seems highly unlikely that they a comprehensive platform 
will emerge from these basin organizations to address the diverse water 
allocation problems in the Mae Kuang watershed.  The Ping RBO and Mae Kuang 
RSBO, if they are to contribute to integrated water resource management, need 
to pay much more attention to and learn how to work with pre-existing platforms 
and institutions which themselves are also changing.    
Likewise watershed networks that have played constructive roles in reducing 
conflicts and improving land and water management in other locations could be 
strengthened within Mae Kuang watershed with help from the RSBO.  
Different actors have different perspectives on what are the most important water 
allocation and management issues in Mae Kuang watershed. The RSBO has a 
niche, but it is a challenging one: helping other stakeholders develop a broader 
watershed perspective that looks beyond their immediate interests.  A pragmatic 
perspective suggests this will involve a combination of social learning and more 
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Conclusions  
Several platforms co-exist in the Mae Kuang River watershed with varying scopes 
and engagement by different stakeholder group. The Department of Water 
Resources’ efforts to introduce an RSBO appears to have met with little success 
for a variety of reasons, including bureaucratic competition, lack of resources, 
and a failure to adequately take into account pre-existing platforms and 
institutions.  Powerful local coalitions continue to support and work through 
alternative platforms and channels; but problems with cross-sectoral allocation 
and coordination persist.  
To be effective as a multi-stakeholder platform for dealing with water allocation 
and related development challenges the Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Organization 
should re-start from existing capacities and organizations and grow outwards 
from these to deal with complexities of competing and complimentary water uses 
in the peri-urban tension zone around Chiang Mai and Lamphun cities. 
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Introduction 
Vietnam’s economic reforms that started in 1986 have changed the whole make-up 
of the country and have been called ’one of the greatest success stories in economic 
development’ by the Asian Development Bank in 2003. Rapid growth has occurred in 
both industrial and agricultural sectors, which contribute more than half of the 
country’s gross national product NEA/WB/DANIDA, 2002). Since then, living 
standards have improved gradually, both in urban and rural lowlands. A 1999 report 
on poverty prepared by the World Bank (WB, 1999) indicated that the number of 
people living under the poverty line declined from 58% in 1993 to 27% in 1998 due 
to rapid economic growth and government policies. By 2002, the poverty rate 
reported by the United Nations Development Program was about 12%. 
While the country’s economic reforms have undoubtedly resulted in a major 
expansion of industrial and agricultural outputs and in an overall reduction of poverty 
rate, these have posed serious problems and challenges on the state of environment.  
Several scholars have pointed out that the country’s strategy has implied a drive 
towards optimal utilization of the country’s natural and human resources for fast-
track economic growth and the subordination of long-term environmental concerns. 
But ironically, unlike other countries in Southeast Asia, Vietnam entered this period 
of catch-up industrialization and modernization with a large catalogue of unresolved 
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environmental problems. It is thus forced to play a delicate balance between 
economic growth and environmental concerns (Di Gregorio, Rambo & Yangisawa, 
2003; Sinh, 2004; O’ Rourke, 2004). In this context, economic growth too often 
becomes the overriding priority to the exclusion of environmental considerations 
despite principles that have already been set in official discourses (Kelly, Lien, Hien, 
Ninh, & Adger, 2001) 
One of the hallmarks of Vietnam’s ongoing economic reforms has been private sector 
development and its enhanced integration with the global economy.  It is in this 
sector that tension between fast track and rapid economic development on one hand, 
and the environmental concerns on the other hand is being intensely played out.  
This chapter examines this tension through a primary research of industrial water 
use and wastewater management in a craft village of Vietnam.  The private 
production case examined in this study is a most  pervasive mode of privatized 
industrial production in Vietnam – the household-based artisanal production – that is 
linked to domestic and international markets. There are presently 1439 craft villages 
in Vietnam, of which 70% are located in the North of the country.   The majority of 
craft villages (up to 80%) are household-based artisanal production. Craft villages 
create employment for 11 million people, which account for 30% of the labor force in 
the rural and semi-rural areas.  Products of these craft villages contribute an amount 
of 600 million USD/year to the national economy through exports. The particular 
craft production (i.e. metal manufacturing) too, which is the subject of this paper, is 
not only a popular form of livelihood in peri-urban and rural areas. Incidentally – and 
paradoxically – it performs an important environmental function of recycling while 
itself creating new and heavy local environmental and health burdens. 
The structure of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the issues 
of privatization and environment in the current reforms in Vietnam. Section 2 
provides an overview of the study site and a discussion of history of development of 
Van Mon commune. Section 3 describes metal recycling process, water use and 
water pollution in the village. Section 4 presents a profile of villagers’ craft livelihood 
and its impact on the environment and health.  The concluding section analyzes the 
key issues in the tension between livelihood and environment, governance problems 
and explores an alternative approach for the commune.   
1.  Privatization and environment in the current reforms in Vietnam 
A keystone policy of economic renovation (doi moi), endorsed by the Vietnamese 
Communist Party at its Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, was a shift away 
from command economy model toward a market system. A major feature of this 
policy was allowing households, whose bulk were rural farming households, the right 
to choose their own crop to plant,  and/or craft activity to engage in, to sell their 
products directly in the market, and to appropriate privately the returns and rewards 
from these economic activities.  (Kerkvliet  2005; Luong 2003). This meant country-
wide de-collectivization, and the reinstitution of the family and the household as the 
most important economic unit, especially in the rural areas.  This development would 
define in the years following the doi moi policy an important feature of privatization 
trend in the country.  
Thus, in the 1990s privatization in Vietnam was characterized  by rapid expansion of 
household enterprises rather than the growth of domestic corporate sector 
(Gainsborough 2004: 44). In a 10-year period, from 1988 to 1998, handicraft 
households among the industrial sectors categories of the countries registered a 
growth of 318,555 to 553,043 units (Luong 2003). These enterprises were mostly 
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concentrated on trade, repairs and personal services. Craft production for export was 
also a major concentration of the private household enterprises. These range of 
household or micro-enterprise production had several things in common: their 
competitive advantage, low technical-technological requirements, and relatively low-
start up costs (Giao and Cuong 1995).   
By 2001, the number of formal private enterprises had significantly increased.  
Foreign direct investments (FDIs) too rose sharply, mainly in the form of joint 
ventures with state enterprises as local equity partners, pushing the private sector 
development to a new level. Despite the growth of these formal private companies, 
however, household enterprises registered in 2000 still numbered about 644,000 
comprising a significant 11% output share of Vietnam’s total industrial production.  
While the registered output contribution of this particular segment of the private 
sector might be much less than that of state-owned establishments (41% of output 
share), and FDI enterprises (35% of output share), its major importance lies in 
terms of human resource and geographic employment absorption.  This particular 
segment not only employs a huge number of people, but also absorbs and makes 
more productive otherwise economically stagnant rural and peri-urban areas of the 
country.  Furthermore, its significance is much more when one considers that 
compared to the other private or non-state business organization categories, this 
group has a huge intractable, non-registered household entities (Muller 2005). 
Further, formal distinction between household enterprises becomes blurred and the 
latter’s size needs to be adjusted upwards when one considers that many farming 
households are also engaged in craft enterprises. According to the surveys used to 
assess poverty in the country in 2005, three quarters of households are involved in 
farming, and 38 per of which run a small business of one sort or another (a third are 
not related to farming) [VCG 2005].  While accounting for these activities is certainly 
difficult, these data clearly indicate that entrepreneurial activities of farming 
households are thriving. 
Side by side with privatization reforms boosting industrial production, it is 
noteworthy that Vietnam has considerably improved the policy framework for 
environmentally sustainable development.  Since the mid-1980s, the government of 
Vietnam has become more active in the field of environmental protection.   
Preparatory research projects and capacity building in regulatory and monitoring 
system, creation of reserve areas started during this period. culminated in putting in 
place a basic legal framework for environmental regulation in the country, the Law 
on Environmental Protection (LEP)1. LEP appears to be the enabling legislation that 
laid out the rights, responsibilities and structural relationships between ministries, 
political-administrative units, economic units and individuals through which the law 
will be carried out (Di Gregorio, Rambo & Yanagasiwa, 2003: 194-95). Concrete 
progress on the ground has been less however (VCG 2005: 122).  
Particularly in the water sector, a number of laws and regulations have been issued 
by the Vietnamese Government to protect water resources. Instruction 487/TTg 
dated July 30, 1996 strengthened the state management of water resources. The 
                                          
1 LEP, among others, also required environmental impact assessments (EIAs) of new industrial 
plants and land use plans, authorizes the government to levy environmental taxes and 
charges, and the official issuance of ambient and source standards for various types of 
pollution and the necessary inspections to pursue compliance to these standards (Di Gregorio, 
Rambo and Yanagasiwa 2003: 195). 
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Law on Water Resources was enacted in 1998, followed by the Decree No-
179/1999/ND-CP specifying the implementation of the Law. However, there has been 
serious limitations regarding the implementation of Laws. The Provincial 
Departments of Science and Technology (DoSTEs) have identified over 3300 
polluting enterprises that cause water and air pollution (NEA/WB/DANIDA, 2002). For 
rural areas, the National Program for clean water and environmental sanitation in 
rural areas was approved in 1998. Targets for 2005 include 80 % of the rural 
inhabitants having access to clean water and 50% having hygienic latrines. 
Nevertheless, the majority of the breeding farms and the artisanal villages presently 
do not have facilities to treat their wastewater. Most of wastewater is directly 
discharged into fish ponds, canals and rivers without treatment, which in turn affects 
adversely local people’s health and the environment. 
Compliance and enforcement of environmental regulatory standards of private 
industrial companies remains problematic. This has been concluded in the following 
studies on the environmental performance of corporate industries.  O’ Rourke (2002) 
discussed how how air pollution by private industrial companies operating outside 
export processing zone, in the form of boiler gases, soot and dyes, has caused 
respiratory problems among residents of neighboring residential communities. On 
the other hand, Minh (2002) found out that considerable environmental pollution are 
also committed by private industrial multinational companies operating mostly in 
industrial zones and export processing zones, where regulation and environmental 
infrastructures are better than those of private companies located in unplanned and 
non-industrial or residential areas . However even in these industrial and export 
processing zones, as for example in case of Ho Chi Minh city, wastewater treatment 
facilities for one have scarcely been in good and consistent operations.  It has been 
argued that because industrial zone management boards are under pressure to 
attract new enterprises and keep existing ones by any means possible, they 
frequently expedite permitting, including environmental impact assessments (EIAs).  
Further, though mandated to comply with environmental regulations, management 
boards often act as “screens between Department of Science and Technology, and 
the Environmental (DOSTE) monitors and individual firms within their sites” (Di 
Gregorio, Rambo & Yangisawa, 2003: 182). Intervention by management boards has 
often blunted compliance by industrial companies to regulatory standards set. These 
deficits in wastewater management by the corporate industries particularly in Ho Chi 
Minh have contributed hugely, together with untreated domestic wastewater to the 
critical level of pollution of Saigon River (Sajor and Thu: 2009).  
What has not been covered by recent studies related to  privatization and 
environment in Vietnam has been the domain of household-level manufacturing or 
craft production (for a few exceptions, see DiGregorio et al. 1999; Ha, Kant, 
Maclaren 2008)  There are important reasons though why this should be an 
important focus of study of privatization and environment in  Vietnam. First, as 
mentioned earlier, private household-level craft production continue to constitute a 
most pervasive and important aspect of privatization and economic reforms, 
particularly in terms of providing employment in the rural and peri-urban regions. 
Second, as economic units and actors, households and its members are known to act 
in a manner that puts consideration to basic livelihood interests and gains first while 
subordinating environmental and health costs. Third, the diffused character of this 
micro-scale manufacturing process create environmental burdens both to producer 
and non-producer households and entire communities, and therefore disentangling 
residential and manufacturing functions that combine within a household poses a 
special  challenge to spatial planning and community-wide development. Fourth, 
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effectively managing pollution in craft villages, especially industrial waste water, 
implicates the issue of conflict-laden relationships between the right of households to 
livelihood, the right of communities or settlements to a liveable and healthful 
environment, and the right and duty of the state to safeguard ‘public’ water 
resources from degradation.  
2.  Background and profile of a craft village: Man Xa village 
Craft villages have had a long history and role in Vietnamese national development. 
They are a typical feature in the social, economic, and cultural tradition of Vietnam, 
particularly in the countryside and, more recently, in the peri-urban areas of the 
country.  They have made significant contribution to economic development and to 
changes in the national economic structure, especially in terms of enhancing local 
incomes and employment in the villages.  Hence government policy makers have put 
special emphasis on the development of craft villages as part of its employment and 
rural development strategy (Digregorio et al. 1999; Ha, Kant, MacLaren 2008).  Over 
the past decades, many craft villages have started to recycle waste materials.  In 
Vietnam today, there are three types of recycling craft villages: plastic recycling, 
metal recycling (foundry villages) and paper recycling villages.  
In the Red River Delta region, after the introduction of the economic reforms, many 
villages redeveloped their specialized craft occupations as a means of improving their 
livelihoods. These villages had traditionally been engaged in artisan, craft and trade 
activities for decades in addition to their agricultural activities. But majority of these 
activities disappeared during the co-operative pre-Doi Moi era. However, since the 
1980s, these occupations, customarily grouped into handicrafts and small craft 
industries, have grown at par with other industries. According to government 
sources, craft villages exhibited growth rates (measured in the value of output) of 
roughly 8% per year in the period between 1988 and 1998 (State Support, 1998). In 
the provinces surrounding Ha Noi, where a few important village industry clusters 
dominate, provincial rates of growth have generally been higher. Between 1996 and 
1997, there were more than 178 craft villages and commune clusters in Ha Tay, Bac 
Ninh and Hung Yen Provinces (Ba, 1997; Cuong and Nguyen, 1998). In some 
villages, these activities have become “traditional craft” with valuable products such 
as paper, iron/copper products or sculpture in Bac Ninh Province, plastic tools in 
Hung Yen Province, and pottery in Ha Noi City, among others. These non-farming 
activities generate jobs for local farmers, especially during leisure time and farm 
labor slack period. These industrial villages, as both processors and producers, have 
provided much of the demand for recycled materials. The virtuous cycle of rising 
demand and increasing supply has, in effect, meant that nearly all recyclable 
materials that appear in Ha Noi’s economy eventually find their way into production 
(DiGregorio et al., 1999).  
2.1 The Study Site 
Van Mon Commune located in Yen Phong District, Bac Ninh Province is about 21 km 
Northeast of Ha Noi and is 7 km Southwest of Tu Son town. Van Mon is bordered in 
the north by Yen Phu commune and Cho town; in the south by Huong Mac, Tu Son; 
in the east by Cho town and Dong Tho commune, and in the west by Thuy Lam 
commune, Dong Anh, Hanoi (see Annex Figure 1. Location of Van Mon Commune). 
The commune is accessible by roads and waterways. 
Van Mon has 5 villages, which are Quan Do, Quan Dinh, Man Xa, Phu Xa and Tien 
Thon. It has a total area of 424.84 ha, of which 268 ha is agricultural land, 65.1 ha is 
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residential land, 91.3 ha is special use land and 0.38 ha is unused land. Van Mon has 
one primary and one secondary school, one health clinic, and one market that is 
opened every day. 
The commune has a population of 9359 people and 1709 households (based on the 
2005 census). The annual population growth rate is 1.65. Of the total population, 
3762 or about 40% are in the working age. Seventy percent of adult workers are 
engaged in artisanal production and rice production, and 30 % are purely engaged in 
farming rice. On average, per capita rice production is 167 kg of milled rice/6 
months. 
Van Mon has a long history and culture. Elderly individuals within the commune have 
experienced life under three regimes: the French colonial government, the Japanese 
occupation, and independent Vietnam. war, women did not only actively participate 
in agricultural production, but also joined the army to fight against the US military 
forces as men did. During the Doi Moi reforms, tradition of hard struggle and hard 
work has been brought into play in the market economy to improve their livelihoods 
and household economy. 
The average rainfall in the area varies between 1240 and 1598 mm per year. The 
rainy season often coincides with the prevalent period of the southwest or southeast 
wind (between May and October) accompanied by atmospheric turbulences 
(including tropical convergent strip, typhoon, tropical low pressure), creating long 
lasting medium and heavy rains (Bac Ninh DONRE, 2005). Rainfall during this period 
makes up about from 75% to 80% of the total annual rainfall. Rainwater creates a 
surface current, a part of which infiltrates to enrich the ground water in the area. 
Thus, rainwater provides a considerable volume of water for production and daily 
activities of villagers; it is also a medium for spreading pollution.  
Dry season, on the other hand, lasts six or seven months from November to May of 
the following year, when rainfall is very little, accounting between 15% and 20% of 
the total annual rainfall. In some years, there are no rains at all for a period lasting 3 
to 4 months. March is the month that has the lowest evaporation level in the year of 
67mm. During the dry season,  oil and iron concentrations in certain points of Ngu 
Huyen Khue River and the sewage canals are much higher than during the rainy 
season. On the other hand, as we will elaborate in a latter section, for certain other 
parameters of pollution it may be higher during the rainy season, an indication that 
surface flow during heavy rains collects others pollutants from a wider area outside 
of the village. 
Flowing through the area of Van Mon with a length of about 2km and joining the Cau 
River in Van An commune of Bac Ninh province is Ngu Huyen Khue, an inland river 
originating from Chau Khe commune (Tu Son district). The river provides water for 5 
districts including Yen Lang, Dong Anh, Tu Son, Yen Phong and Tien Du. The Ngu 
Huyen Khue River is between 50 and 70 m wide with a water flow of 60m3/second. 
In the rainy season, the water level of the river fluctuates from 3 to 10m depending 
on the area. The river’s water is used for irrigation purposes. It also receives waste 
sources of various types from the area. 
2.2 Development of Van Mon’s craft village 
Aluminum melting actually started under the French era in the neighboring province 
of Bac Ninh, in Hiep Hoa, Bac Giang, but it was easily adopted by Man Xa village, 
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which has a long history of craftsmanship2.  From here it spread to the other villages 
of Van Mon commune. It is said that Mr. Hoang Duc started the craft by making pans 
from the body of an American airplane shot down in the village in 1963. (These pans 
later came to be named after him.) Then in 1965, aluminum melting was developed 
and spread to the whole village, and by 1967 an aluminum melting cooperative 
became established.  With the cooperative’s formation, households did not produce 
pans on their own anymore. Instead, they were formed into production brigades, 
which were under the management of the cooperative.  
However, the collective model revealed many limitations and mistakes, such as poor 
management skills of cooperative cadres, poor distribution of goods and reduction in 
cooperative members’ income. Therefore, in the early 1980s with the collapse of the 
cooperative model, household-based artisanal production increasingly displaced 
cooperatives (DiGregorio et al .1999; Luong 2003) 
Although the doi moi adoption as an official national policy occurred in 1986, years 
prior to this many villages both in north and south regions of the country have 
already been shifting to their attention to household-based private economic activity, 
and less priority on collective brigades.  In many cases, this had the tacit sanction of 
local authorities (Kerkvielt 2005). Thus, in Van Mon villages in particular, by 1982 
households had already started with privately operated aluminum melting and 
experienced properity. In addition, a number of households in the village also 
conduct lead, and zinc melting. In the last 5 years, Man Xa has expanded its markets 
to China. Villagers began melting aluminum bars for factories, plants and to export 
instead of making pans for the domestic market. This is partly because more and 
more households in Vietnam today use electric rice cookers instead.  More 
importantly, aluminum bars brings higher profits. In 1995 junk trading was also 
started and developed in Man Xa. Villagers usually buy junks from other provinces 
and after sorting them out they sell them to households that are engaged in melting 
or to people elsewhere outside the commune. 
Economic reforms (doi moi) were introduced in 1986 in Vietnam, which included the 
elimination of the cooperatives’ monopoly and encouragement of privatization and 
market liberalization. The reforms have dramatically improved living conditions in 
Vietnam. Since doi moi started many households in Van Mon decided to separate 
from the cooperative and privately invest in aluminum and metal melting to develop 
their household economy.  
2.3. Metal recycling, water use, and waste water and other pollution 
discharges 
At present Man Xa is engaged in aluminum and color metal melting. The main 
product of the village is aluminum bars. Main materials used for production of these 
bars are various types of aluminum scraps.  In addition, villagers also produce pans 
and pots, which are purchased by ethnic minority people. In Man Xa at present,  
there are more than 200 households in engaged in this industrial activity. Table 2.3.1 
below shows figures of aluminum outputs of Man Xa. To produce these outputs, an 
amount of 8000 tons of aluminum scraps and 1200 to 1500 tons of fuel are used per 
year.  
                                          
2 Man Xa started its silk weaving as far as Y Lan’s time during the Ly Thanh Tong dynasty 
(1023 – 1072). At the time, villagers made long dresses and brassieres. In addition, they were 
engaged in making tofu and alcohol and agricultural production. But from 1958 to 1960 fabric 
weaving fell into oblivion.   
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Table 2.3.1 Outputs of aluminum production in Man Xa 
Product Output per year (ton) 
Melted aluminum: 400 to 500  
Metallurgic aluminum: 4000-5000  
(Source: The provincial Bac Ninh report on the current status of the environment)  
 
In the past, villagers in Man Xa commune used only clean aluminum as the  material 
for melting. The production chain therefore was relatively simple. Clean aluminum 
was melted and poured into forms for casting. Main products of this process were  
home utensils hand crafted by village households. In the last ten years however a 
variety of similar but better designed and factory-made items (commnlhy made of 
other materials, such as glass and stainless steel), have dominated the market.  The 
market demand for aluminum home utensils products made in the village has 
diminished. As a consequence, the majority of villagers have switched to simply 
producing aluminum bars from melting aluminum scraps. Crafting recycled aluminum 
into finished product utensils have become very limited. 
Aluminum scraps vary in type and size. They can be divided into two main groups:  
• Consumer product aluminum scraps (e.g.) empty cans, aluminum frames, 
pots, pans, etc.) . 
• Production aluminum scraps (e.g. parts or pieces of machines or equipment 
made of aluminum alloy)  
Both have been used by local households. But the main material group to be used 
depends on the scale of household production. For medium and large production 
scale households, consumer product aaluminum scraps are commonly used. 
Although this type of scraps are more expensive, aluminum recovery is relatively 
greater, at 80 to 90%, with small amount of slag. For small production scale 
households, which have less operational capital, production aluminum scraps, mostly 
alloys,  are their choice, since these type of scrap materials cost   However, the 
aluminum recovery rate from this type is lower, which is from 50% to 60%, and with 
a lot of slag. 
Aluminum scraps are brought by scrap merchant in trucks to the village.  These are 
then purchased and sorted out by artisan households.  On the other hand, merchant 
buyers also regularly purchase  the finished product aluminum bars of households. 
They are transported by trucks from the village, where they are purchased by 
factories in the cities or exported abroad as semi-processed raw materials.  
In household based aluminum melting, the technology is backward.  Fuel used is coal 
dust and fossil coal, with a production norm of 80-100 kg/100 kg of aluminum 
products.  With an average of production of 80 kg per household per day, and with 
70 percent of households involved in production, the village utilizes some 17,000 kg 
of coal each day. 
The aluminum production process in the household has seven main steps as 
described below (See Annex Figure 2 Aluminum Production Chain):  
1) Washing and preliminary treatment of scraps. (This use water and 
produces waste water) 
2) Melting of scraps in primary pot 
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3) Pouring of molted aluminum into primary moulds (rough moulding) 
4) Transfer of moulded aluminum to a secondary pot for continuous 
melting. 
5) Pouring of molten aluminum from secondary pot to moulds for forming 
bars 
6) Cleaning of moulded bars in a  basin  
7) Finished bars are prepared for sale and transported outside the village.  
There are two auxiliary steps involved that links or flows from certain main steps.  
These are the following: 
• Slag produced in the melting of scraps in primary pot (Step 2), which 
still contains aluminum materials, is transferred  into a filtering tank.  
The aluminum retrieved through filtering is put back again in the 
primary pot.  (Step 2 also produces semi-processed aluminum 
products which may be used as inputs for other aluminum production). 
• Continuous melting of aluminum in the secondary pot (Step 4) 
produces slag, which are dumped on the ground.  
Water is used, and waste water is generated in washing of scrap materials 
(Step 1); in filtering slag for further recovery of residual aluminum contents 
(auxiliary of Step 2); and in cleaning of molded bars in a basin (Step 6), just before 
they are ready for selling. On the other hand, solid waste is produced in the form of 
dumped slag from as a waste of melting in secondary pot (Step 4). Further, a large 
volume of toxic gasses of various types is formed and dispersed to the surrounding 
environment (See Annex Figure 3 Production Chain of Aluminum Bars and Wastes). 
In Man Xa, water used for manufacturing comes from drilled wells and irrigation 
canals. In the past, a fairly large amount of water was utilized for cleaning materials 
and cooling products. Compositions of discharged wastewater depend on the type of 
materials. Recently, water used for the manufacturing process has remarkably been 
reduced. Some households even do not utilize water for production. A number of 
households have changed to mainly aluminum melting, a process that does not 
require cleansing of scraps. Instead, scraps are placed directly into melting pots; 
molten aluminum is then poured into moulds and naturally left cool without using 
water for cooling. 
According to a study, materials used for aluminum recycling mainly comprise cans 
and old/broken pots (Dang 2005). Thus, key compositions of wastewater discharged 
during this stage contain a mixture of dirt from cans. For cleaning  production 
aluminum scraps, discharged wastewater have toxins and oil. Further, based on 
survey results, the average amount of water used for production is 1.2m3/ton of 
aluminum products.  
A number of products that need surface processing cause wastewater containing 
some acid, base or chrome compound. In addition, plating also discharges a great 
amount of wastewater that causes pollution (wastewater normally has low pH, 
containing many metal ions). Cinder filtering also causes wastewater with a great 
deal of heavy metals. Concentration of manganese (Mn), nickel (Ni), and zinc (Zn) in 
wastewater after cleaning of finished products are much higher in concentration 
compared with those in wastewater discharged in the process of cinder filtering. 
Meanwhile, the aluminum concentration in wastewater discharged from the cleaning 
is lower than that of the wastewater discharged from the cinder filtering.  
At present, recycling of other types of scraps, such as lead and zinc, has also started 
in the village. A number of households are also not only engaged in trading scraps 
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for aluminum manufacturing but also other waste materials from broken 
machines/equipment, electric cables, used electronic materials, and batteries, among 
others. After being sorted out they are then sold to manufacturing households or 
elsewhere outside the commune. Water used for the cleaning of waste 
materials/scraps would afterwards contain oil, chemicals, and dust, therefore 
accumulating into high concentrations of oil and toxic chemical pollution. At the same 
time, wastes from aluminum melting have been disorderly discharged and piled up 
together with other types of wastes/scraps all over the area in the village. Since they 
are not covered by anything, they are swept away by rainwater, thus seriously 
polluting the village’s water resources. 
The wastes produced from manufacturing activities mainly include cinder, broken 
metal scraps and gases from kilns (Dang et al., 2005). Gases have abundant toxic 
components such as aluminum gas, COx, SOx, and NOx. Such substances as SOx, 
and NOx emitted into the atmosphere would turn into nitric acid (HNO3) and then fall 
on the ground, and into lakes, ponds, rivers and streams. This is the acid deposition 
process. Consequently, in addition to the direct impacts on human health, these 
gases are main causes of acid deposition phenomenon, adversely affecting water 
resources.  
3. Livelihood vs environment and health  
Metal craft occupation has brought livelihood security and a certain level of 
prosperity to Van Mon villagers.  However, along with economic benefits have come 
negative environmental and health impacts that threaten this acquired benefits itself 
by people in the locality. 
3.1 Livelihood and income stability 
Results of field survey conducted by the researchers on the valuable possessions of 
households in the village suggests a certain level of prosperity by rural and semi-
rural standard of living in Vietnam. Two of ten rich households and three of 16 upper 
middle households sampled have trucks. One of ten rich households, two of 16 upper 
middle households and all households in the poor group have cars. Respondents in 
the middle group are the only ones whose households that did not own any trucks or 
cars. All of the sample households had motorbikes, TV sets, video, refrigerators, 
radios, furnaces, electric fans, gas stoves.  
The indebtedness profile of households in the village similarly suggests relative 
stability of income sources. Based on survey conducted by the researchers in 2006 of 
households that borrowed during that year or had been in debt in the previous year, 
majority of households in the rich, upper-middle, middle groups and all households 
in the poor group were able to pay back their loans and had no debts anymore. (See 
Fig. 3.1 below.) The figure also shows that rich households borrowed the highest 
amount of money (VND 16.5 million per household), followed by the upper middle 
(VND 14.3 million per household) and then by the middle (VND 2.1 million per 
household). In general, however, all households in the four groups did not borrow 
money higher than their annual income. Households did not also find it   difficult to 
pay back their debts either. 
Out of the total 474 households in Man Xa, 235 (50%) are engaged in aluminum and 
metal smelting.  Based on the sample surveyed, major significance of metal melting 
and junk trade in the livelihood portfolio of households in all socio-economic groups 
is undoubted. (See Annex Figure 4 Profile indebtedness of households.)  
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Unlike any other agricultural communes in the Red River Delta the majority of 
villagers, except for those in the middle households in the craft village of Man Xa, do 
not earn income from sales of agricultural produce or animal husbandry. Households 
in the middle group are also those that earned most from high-return occupations – 
aluminum and metal melting, and junk trading. They are followed by the rich 
households, which earn from metal melting, by the upper- middle, and then by the 
poor respectively in terms of earnings from metal-related occupations. On the other 
hand, the poor households earn the next most from junk trade, followed by the 
middle and then by the rich. The upper-middle is the only group that has households 
engaged in both aluminum and metal melting, and junk trade.  No group of 
households draws income from state wage.  
Table 3.1 Net cash income sources of different social groups of 
households/year/capita in 2006 
 Rich (VND) Upper-middle 
(VND) 
Middle (VND) Poor (VND) 





















Other 0 0 5000000 
 
0 
Total 13,980,953 20,031,666 24,152,381 13,000,000 
 
The data in Table 3.1 above further show some more interesting patterns. 
Unexpectedly, the rich households are not the ones who earn the most from all 
sources3. The middle group households are the ones that earn the most from all 
sources, followed by the upper-middle.  By engaging themselves in non-farm sources 
of income and in both aluminum and metal melting, and junk trade the middle and 
the upper-middle have optimized their earnings compared with the rich and the poor 
households. The data also demonstrates that incomes from non-farming activities 
are much larger  compared with a meager income earned by a rice farmer (VND 5 
million per capita per year). This also explains why despite the majority of people 
interviewed during the field survey being quite aware of worsening water pollution in 
their community, they are still willing to continue and expand  aluminum and metal 
melting. 
3.2 Water resources degradation  
According to village informants, about twenty years ago up to 95% of households 
used water from dug wells of 10-20 m deep. In the last 10 years, all villagers had 
switched to using water from drilled wells with average depth of 40-45m. They 
                                          
3 Although a caveat to this is that heads of the rich households might not have correctly 
reported their incomes in our survey. 
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realized that the quality of the water that they were using had gotten worse, and 
thus they dug deeper for getting better water quality of water.  During the time of 
this field research, it was observed that many households have drilled wells of 90-95 
m deep.  
Furthermore, according to elderly people in the village, some years ago there were 
still seven or eight fishponds, whose water quality was still good for raising fish 
despite the fact that these ponds also served as wastewater receivers. Today, there 
are only three of these ponds  left, one of which is heavily polluted. As far as fifteen 
years back, according to informants, the village had a common well too, which was 
7m wide and whose  water was reportedly good. This well was filled in 5 years ago 
due to the bad quality of water.  
At this point, one might wonder why water quality was still generally good yet the 
villagers at the time were already engaged in aluminum melting. While local 
households around two decades or so ago did already engage in aluminum melting 
their number were small.  (The village’s population too was small.). At present, the 
population has dramatically increased. More importantly, due to far greater market 
demand, many households today have been intensively engaged in the craft 
industry. They are also not only into aluminum, but also zinc and lead melting, which 
further intensifies water pollution. 
In Man Xa, large volumes of wastewater are increasingly discharged into the 
environment. It is a typical densely populated craft village. Large amounts of water 
are used for domestic activities and animal husbandry purposes and discharged 
without any treatment. Likewise, huge volume of industrial wastewater is also 
discharged directly into the local water bodies also without treatment. All drainage 
canals in the village have not met the requirements of hygienic conditions. By the 
time the research was being carried out most of sewage canals did not have cover. 
Drinking water  
Household in Man Xa village have no access to the piped water. Local people rely on 
water from drilled wells or rain water for drinking and domestic use. They do not use 
water filters at all. The demand for clean water in the area is some 60l/person/day 
and night (DONRE/Bac Ninh Province, 2005). The average volume of water exploited 
is approximately 0.5m3/day/well. For drilled wells, the figure is higher, which is 
about 1.5m3/well/day. Rainwater is also one of the water sources that villagers like 
to use4.  
Based on water samples collected from both drilled wells and collected rain water 
current status of the quality of water used for drinking and daily activities exhibit the 
following characteristics:(1) the concentration for most heavy metals (except for 
iron) has not exceeded the standard for drinking water; however, iron concentrations 
in the two drilled well water samples are three to eight times higher than the 
standard level for drinking water; (2) microorganism parameters (total coliform), on 
the other hand, are lower than the standard levels; (3)only one out of the three 
water samples was found with H2S in a drilled well ( (however, it is still within the 
permissible levels); (4) two samples of drilled well water were polluted by oil and 
concentration in one of the two exceeds the standard levels; (5) NH4+ concentration  
is high not only in the underground water but also in the rain water, exceeding the 
                                          
4 A few households, which are located near Van Mon’s People’s Committee (including the 
commune’s health clinic), have been supplied tap water, which was under the program on 
Clean Water for Rural Areas. 
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standard level for drinking water5; (6) and BOD5 concentration in all the water 
samples is higher, 3-5 times exceeding the standard levels.  
During the rainy season, the concentration of most parameters is lower compared 
with the one in the dry season. Yet, some parameters such as oil, total N, and H2S 
are a bit higher than those in dry season. It is noteworthy that oil has been found in 
the rainwater samples. Nevertheless, the concentration of oil is still at a permissible 
level (0.008 mg/l). Oil was found in all collected samples (drilled well water and rain 
water sample). In addition, a number of parameters of BOD5 and NH4+ in the 
rainwater samples are lower in the rainy season when compared with the dry 
season, but still exceeding the permissible limits. Meanwhile, there is no difference in 
these parameters in the drilled-well water samples between those taken during rainy 
season and during dry season. 
During the rainy season, the aluminum concentration in the rainwater of households 
that are not engaged in aluminum melting is quite high (0.9mg/l), exceeding the 
permissible limits for potable water (0.5mg/l). This can be explained by the fact that 
aluminum dust created during the manufacturing process scatter and fall onto the 
house roofs and finally draining into the rain water tank. Therefore, these households 
are still affected although they are not involved in the melting of aluminum. 
Meanwhile, those that are engaged in aluminum melting have lower aluminum 
concentration. It is likely that these households are more careful in the reserving of 
the rainwater and protecting it from being polluted by aluminum dust. 
For almost all of the other remaining parameters, no distinct difference in rain water 
samples between aluminum manufacturing households and non-manufacturing ones 
has been observed. There is also no significant difference in these parameters in the 
drilled-well water samples and tap water samples. It should be noted that three out 
of 4 potable water samples (including treated piped water sample) is polluted by lead 
with a concentration, which is quite exceeding the permissible level (0.012-
0.016mg/l compared with the standard level of 0.01mg/l). Attention should even be 
paid to piped water management, since some parameters including lead in the 
treated tap water sample are slightly higher than the permissible level. In sum, Man 
Xa villagers’  potable water of rain and well water have strong signs of being polluted 
as shown in a number of parameters of  BOD5, NH4 and lead. As a result, it is of 
great urgency to treat potable water resources to ensure that villagers have access 
to clean water. 
Irrigation canal water and river water 
Water, Based on samples from rice paddy and irrigation canals collected during the 
rainy season, water contains some heavy metal concentrations (like Zn, Pb, Hg and 
Cr concentration) [See Table 3.2.1 below].  But these are much lower than the 
permissible level for irrigation water (TCVN 2000).  
 
Table 3.2.1 Selected Heavy Metal Concentration in Rice Paddy and Irrigation Canal 
Parameter Unit of measure Rice Paddy Irrigation canal 
Zn mg/l <0.01 <0.01 
Pb mg/l 0.066 0.003 
                                          
5 Contrary to common practice in the area, rainwater thus needs treatment before use.  
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Hg mg/l 0.0001 2E-04 
Cr mg/l <0.001 <0.001 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Ngu Huyen Khue River provides an important water source 
for many socio-economic activities in the region, including for irrigation purposes. 
The Ngu Huyen Khe River flows through Chau Khe Commune (Tu Son District, Bac 
Ninh Province), where a well-known iron manufacturing village named Da Hoi and 
other artisanal villages like Dong Ky, Phu Lam paper (Tu Son District), and Phong 
Khe paper (Yen Phong District) are located. Most toxic substances coming from these 
villages are discharged directly into the river, which then pour into Van An water 
gate in Van An Commune, Yen Phong District before finally flowing into the Cau river. 
Untreated sewage is discharged into the environment, canals, ditches, fields and the 
Ngu Huyen Khue River.  
Result of a survey of the quality of water at the Van Mon Bridge in 2004 (Bac Ninh 
DONRE, 2005) shows that during the dry season, the quality of water was not good 
and the concentration of polluted substances was higher. Results of water sample 
analysis from the researchers own fieldwork in 2006 confirm a much worsened 
situation. Concentrations of BOD5, NH4, Pb and Cu exceed the permissible level. 
During the dry season, the BOD5 concentration exceeds the permissible level though 
not much (16.5mg/l compared with the standard level of 10mg/l). However, during 
the rainy season, the BOD5 concentration increases dramatically in both river water 
samples – 4 times higher than the standard for natural water bodies, despite the 
water-current in the river being stronger during this time.  It is possible that during 
this time the river water becomes not only polluted largely by local waste sources, 
but also by sewage discharged from upstream of the river.  
Further, there are signs of heavy metal pollution like Pb in the water samples taken 
in the rainy season (0.075-0.013mg/l), which are higher than the standard  for 
natural water bodies, but lower than the standard  for irrigation water. The Cu 
concentration in most of the water samples is also higher than or as high as the 
permissible level for natural water bodies. 
In sum, the water quality of irrigation canals, rice paddies, and the Ngu Huyen Khe 
River is still good for agricultural and irrigation purposes. Nevertheless, in terms of 
natural water, the concentration of some substances exceeds the permissible level. 
Effective measures to control and treat the quality of the river water are needed to 
conserve the quality of river water for a wider range of other purposes. 
Drainage canals and sewage ponds  
The concentration of certain substances in the water samples taken from sewage 
canals is quite high6. The concentration of COD varies from 238mg/l to 291mg/l, 
which is two or three times higher than sewage standard level of Type B. The BOD5 
concentration is also very high - higher than the standard level of Type B and two 
out of which exceed the standard level of Type B. The concentration of ammonia is 
also very high, which is 51-90ml – 50-90 times as high as the standard level of Type 
B and 5-9 times as high as the standard level of type C, which must be licensed by 
                                          
6 Due to the absence of specific standards for artisanal villages’ sewage, we have used instead 
standards for industrial sewage – the Vietnamese standard 5945/1995 which is higher than 
the standards for household sewage – as the benchmark.   
 
Page 518 of 852
PN67_2010_14 
Livelihood and environment trade-off in Doi Moi: Industrial water use and wastewater management in a 
craft village in peri-urban Hanoi 







the authorities. Phosphorus total concentration is also higher than the permissible 
level though not very much. Generally, the metal concentration is not high. Most of 
them are lower than the standard level of Type A (except for Fe which exceeds the 
standard level of Type B). The oil concentration in drainage canals is higher than the 
standard level of Type B and C used for industrial sewage. One sample is 6 times as 
high as the standard level of Type C. 
The village sewage ponds used to be ponds for agricultural purposes and daily 
activities. However, they are now seriously polluted. The metal concentration such as 
Hg, Pb, Cu exceeds the permissible level stipulated for natural water bodies. The 
concentration of Hg and Pb also exceeds the standard level of Type A. The 
parameters of organic pollution is very high, even higher than the standard level of 
Type A (BOD5) and Type B (COD) stipulated for industrial sewage  
The result of the analyzed water samples collected drainage canals and sewage 
ponds during the rainy season shows that the concentration of substances in water 
samples taken in the rainy season is very high,  even higher if compared with that in 
the dry season.  The concentration of pollutant substances in water samples taken 
from the sewerage canal of non-manufacturing households is also lower than that of 
manufacturing ones. However, the concentration of almost all pollutant substances is 
very high, exceeding the permissible level for household sewage and industrial 
sewage of Type B. 
It can thus be said that sewage canals of manufacturing households are seriously 
polluted even in the rainy season. The COD concentration approximates and exceeds 
the permissible level regulated for industrial sewage of Type C; the BOD5 
concentration is 2.5 to 2.7 times as high as the permissible level stipulated for 
industrial sewage of Type C. The NH4+ content is also very high (8 times as high as 
the permissible level regulated for industrial sewage of Type C). These sewage 
samples contain some metals whose concentration exceeds the permissible level of 
Type A.  
The pollution level in the sewage ponds in the rainy season is lower than that in the 
dry season. However, the organic pollution level is still high, exceeding the standard 
level of Type B stipulated for industrial sewage and much higher than the standard 
level for natural water bodies. Water in those sewage ponds is not safe for any other 
purposes. Moreover, the accumulation of dirt and toxics must be taken into 
consideration in the region’s sewage management. Similarly, special attention should 
be paid to the management and the control of the pollution level in sewage canals. 
The situation calls for necessary measures to treat household sewage as well as 
production sewage before it is discharged into the village’ drainage systems. 
3.3 Impact on villagers’ health, especially on women and girls  
Due to the villagers’ own low environmental awareness rubbish are thrown into the 
drainage canals, thus reducing their draining capacity. Further, organic wastes when 
degraded pollute the water. Out of 474 households, only 280 households have 
hygienic toilets. The rest did not meet the requirements of sanitation. This is also a 
major source of water pollution. Stagnant wastewater in the drainage system has 
caused unpleasant odor. During the rainy season, since the drainage systems do not 
function well, wastewater spills over from the canals into the village lanes, polluting 
the environment and posing risks to human health. 
Man Xa’s rapid development of craft industry, including associated demographic 
growth, and the absence thus far of solutions to effectively abate water pollution 
have combined to make the level of environmental pollution in the village a health 
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hazard. All wastewater receiving water bodies are polluted at an alarming rate, thus 
posing risks to the environment and to local villagers’ health.  
To date, no technical research has been carried out yet to directly establish and 
explain the causal relationship between degraded water quality in the village  and 
health status of the local population. However, indicators and signs strongly 
suggesting the negative impact of wastewater on humans have been ubiquitous in 
Van Mon. These too have increasingly become villagers’ concern. 
In assessing possible impacts of wastewater on villagers’ health, 80 households 
heads were asked which water resources they used for what purposes. They were 
also asked to describe the quality of water resources. Further, they were asked 
whether there was any disease related to water that members of their household had 
contracted, and if their answer is positive, whether they sought medical treatment.  
Regarding the aforementioned queries, the majority of those interviewed said that 
Man Xa’s water resources are polluted. However, the impact of water pollution on 
villagers’ health is claimed to be insignificant. Further, heads of 47 households were 
asked -- “During the past 12 months have members of your household suffered from 
any diseases or health problems?” Figure 5 (See Annex Figure 5 Diseases or health 
problems suffered by sampled households in 2006) shows that the majority of the 
rich, upper-middle and the middle claim not to have any health problem at all. The 
minority of these groups and all the poor group however admit to suffering from 
having a cold and respiratory problems. 
However, an inspection of the Van Mon’s Health Clinic’s records show a contrary 
picture.   Man Xa villagers’ visits to the health clinic have been increasing annually 
(see Table 3.2). In addition, because in actual practice, local villagers have also 
normally gone elsewhere to seek medical treatment, the real number of households 
who have sought medical treatment would obviously be higher than the figures 
below.  
Table 3.2 Man Xa villagers’ visits to Van Mon Health Clinic 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Visit 547 598 625 670 725 
(Source: Van Mon Health Clinic’s records in 2006) 
The number of deaths in the village had considerably increased when years 2004 and 
2005 are compared (see Table 3.3.2 below). The cases of death while giving birth 
and of infants in 2005 were two to three times as high that the preceding year. The 
number of people contracting diarrhea also increased by 200, majority of them were 
children. While the data below presents only two consecutive annual periods and not 
enough to present a time-series trend, still the increases are significant and do 
urgently need further investigation. 
Table 3.3.2 Diseases and health problems in Man Xa in 2004-2005 
STT Type of disease 2004 2005 
1 Number of death 
while giving birth 
2 8 
2 Number of 
common death 
43 76 
 At home 36 40 
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 Elsewhere 7 36 
3 Death of infants 5 10 
4 Miscarriage 3 5 
5 Diarrhea 426 601 
6 T.B. 713 748 
7 Food poisoning 5 15 
(Source: Van Mon Health Clinic’s records in 2006) 
Table 3.3.3 shows the number of deaths due to cancer for the last 4 years. It was 
reported that the majority of those who died of cancer were between 50 and 60 
years of age and the majority of them were men (22 men) and the rest were women 
(15 women). The causes of cancer have not yet been specified. However, the number 
of those who had cancer had increased year by year (based on interviews with the 
head of Van Mon’s health clinic). One likely causal explanation posited by local health 
specialists is the worsening environmental pollution in Van Mon. What lends 
plausibility to this reasoning is fact that the number of those who died of cancer and 
of those who contracted other diseases in Van Mon was between 2 and 3 times 
higher compared to the number of other communes in the district that are not 
engaged in artisanal activities (Yen Phong District’s Health Center records).  
According to public health specialists, polluted water is the main reason that causes 
stomach and intestinal cancer. 
Table 3.3.3  Number of deaths due to cancer 
Type of cancer 2003 2004 2005 Up to 6/2006 
Stomach/intesti
nal 
2 3 4 2 
Lung 4 3 6 1 
Other 3 4 3 2 
Total 9 10 13 5 
(Source: Van Mon Health Clinic’s records in 2006) 
Further, interviews with the head of Van Mon’s Health Clinic reveal a number of 
alarming health information. The number of villagers visited the health clinic for 
medical treatment was from 1.3 to 1.5 times higher than those of other communes. 
The majority of those who had pollution-related diseases of the respiratory were 
children (accounting for 75%). Death of expectant mothers and infants was mainly 
caused by premature birth. In 2004 there were two cases of embryo death and 4 
cases in 2005.  
When the head of Van Mon’s Health Clinic was asked about common wastewater 
related diseases, she said that these are skin diseases such as rashes and allergy. 
According to her, the number of people in Van Mon who acquired these diseases is 
three times higher than in other communes. However, the commune’s Heath Clinic 
did not have the complete supporting data, since villagers did not always come to 
the clinic for medical treatment for this disease. Instead, they usually had self-
treatment at home or bought medicine and then applied it themselves.  
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The head of the Van Mon’s clinic also believes that stomach cancer is being caused 
by local water pollution. She recalls that in 2004 eight people, three of whom were 
children under 10 years, contracted chemical poisoning. The circumstance was that 
their households were engaged in the trading of junks that had chemicals, which 
were not carefully checked before being sorted out. It was reported that the eight 
people were sent to a hospital in Hanoi where they spent two weeks before they 
made a full recovery. In 2005, there were two more cases of chemical poisoning. 
This demonstrates that scraps contained many toxic chemicals that were not 
carefully checked by villagers. When they are washed, toxic chemicals, such as acid, 
mercury, herbicides and other toxins, pollute local water resources.  Further, 
according to the same informant, two families in Man Xa had two babies who died 
when they were above one year of age. It was reported that they were affected by 
toxics and even dioxin in the junks. However, no scientific study and evidence has 
verified this incident.  
There is no evidence so far of any significant gender differentiated health impact of 
local water pollution or bad water quality. It would seem that the condition is of the 
nature of general health concerns. However, because of their distinct role and 
exposure to certain craft activities women have become likely victims in Man Xa in 
craft occupational accidents. According to key informants, during the last three years 
there have been five cases of explosion occurring and victimizing workers melting 
aluminum, who in the village the majority are women. The consequence is that five 
women who were in the late twenties and early thirties lost their eyes. Some others 
had their thighs being injured or burned. It is important to note that all these women 
were not on health insurance. Further, while working they have not been provided 
protective goggles nor work clothing at all. Those who lost both eyes are the most 
difficult cases.  The burden to support the family is now placed on the husband’s 
shoulders. 
In sum, there are many and strong indications of in Man Xa’s water pollution 
impacting on villagers’ health. The number of people who have died of cancer and 
have pollution-related diseases of the respiratory and intestinal systems is 
increasing. Women and children have been adversely affected.  Although there is no 
scientific evidence to show that women have been more affected by water pollution 
or bad quality of living and drinking water they have become victims of the 
development of artisanal activities in the village. Since villagers’ awareness is still 
low – and perhaps too because of their own material stakes in the craft production -- 
they have not realized nor highlighted the impact of water pollution. But records of 
the clinic and health experts’ opinions strongly point to the contrary.  
Conclusions 
The particular case of Man Xa craft village discussed here mirrors the major tension 
between private sector development and environment and health agenda unfolding 
in the context of Vietnam’s current chosen path of rapid industrialization and 
economic growth.  While such a tension is also present in the operations of private 
corporate industries (as well as state-owned industries) in the country, the pervasive, 
diffused and virtually intractable characteristics of household-level manufacturing in 
craft villages create particular and unique difficulties in solving the problem through 
the use of simple state-centric or top-down official planning and regulatory policy 
instruments. 
At the core of tension between private household craft production and its 
environmental costs is the right of people to livelihood pursuits and their notion of 
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natural water bodies as common goods.  In the case discussed here, for example, 
the Ngu Huyen Khue River, which provides an important water source for many 
socio-economic activities in the region (including irrigation purposes, canals and 
other ponds in the commune), is considered a common property. Villagers therefore 
discharge wastes directly into this water body, which is the cheapest way for their 
waste disposal. Perhaps they do care that their behavior would in turn adversely 
affect their health, but certain pragmatic considerations such as, for example, food 
security, may blur urgency and importance of their health stake. The farmers’ 
mentality and the lifestyle of small producers push them to look at the short-term 
profits and ignore or de-prioritize for action the longer-term and wider benefits, and 
persistent effects of pollution.  
On the other hand, the enforcement of environmental law is weak and, more 
importantly, there are overlaps and no clear mandates between relevant ministries 
and branches and between ministries and branches and the localities. It is also very 
doubtful if simple command-and-control legal instruments and enforcement 
techniques can be effective at all in tackling pollution of  private household-size and 
micro enterprises. In Vietnam, if enforcement of environmental laws and regulations 
is already a big problem vis-à-vis private corporate firms, such is a bigger – and 
perhaps an insurmountable -- problem vis-a-vis millions of household scale craft 
production units that are spread over a wide area and operating with a large dose of 
informality.   
That there are no easy government-imposed solutions to the problem was recently 
highlighted by a failed plan in 2005 made by the Bac Ninh Provincial People’s 
Committee to designate, relocate and concentrate villagers’ workshops in a special 
35 ha area for craft activity of 300 households. The plan was resisted by villagers, 
and government failed to force them to move their workshops into a new area whose 
creation would have required them to give up most of their agricultural lands and 
retain only a small portion amounting to a seventh part of their lands.  A second 
alternative plan currently under study by the provincial government is to limit the 
size of a new manufacturing site of the commune to 5 to 10 ha, in order not to 
dislocate other agricultural lands in use.  According to the second plan, formal 
registration as enterprises at the district level would be required for every household 
in order to operate in the new manufacturing site; those failing to do so would be 
banned altogether from household-level craft manufacturing.  
In connection with the second plan, a local office of the environment has been set up 
recently. This office has obliged all producers in craft villages to have environmental 
licenses, which are issued by the provincial Department of Natural Resources and the 
Environment. Those failing to do so will not be able to transport scraps and products 
into or out of the village.   More importantly, their clients cannot buy their products, 
if they don’t have a license. According to the villagers in Van Mon, the province has 
not issued them licenses simply because the provincial government wants to move 
their workshops out of the village  (a residential area) to a concentrated production 
area. This concentrated area does not exist as yet however.  While this new hardline 
policy might force households to comply with the environmental law, on the other 
hand, the same might force small manufacturing households out of business, leaving 
the field only for large producers. 
While state-centric and command-and-control regulatory measures alone provide 
little hope to effectively manage the problem, letting households alone to devise 
their own solutions is a non-starter option either.  Aside from their own resources 
limitation, as the Man Xa case shows, households as micro economic agents tend to 
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be trapped in immediate livelihood and economic gain consideration that have thus 
far blurred or ignored longer-term environment and health trade-offs. Further, the 
case also shows that economic reforms have opened up opportunities for many, but 
have not benefited the entire community. Although the gaps in income may not seem 
excessive, new access to productive resources have laid seeds for continued rapid 
social differentiation in the future. The village is stratified and response to market 
demands has been different for individuals, While recent experiences of transition 
economies confirm that socio-economic inequality is quite unavoidable in market 
reforms, excessive inequality and exclusionary development, of course, is 
undesirable and can be a major block, among others, to achieving environmental 
sustainability goal. Thus, growth-driven social stratification in the context of 
liberalization of the economy and market reforms may also encourage atomized, 
individualistic orientations, and raise the hurdle to realize collective inter-household 
and community cooperative consensus and actions for managing the public good, a 
necessary, factor to effectively address the pollution in craft villages. 
In Vietnam. renovation reforms have undoubtedly set an unstoppable momentum for 
local communities and households to enhance their productivity through private 
household-level production.  To a large extent, strong momentum of household 
economic initiatives have pulled many out of poverty especially in the rural and peri-
urban areas, and started them out on a track of upward social mobility. But, at the 
same time, this momentum of privatized household craft production has also created 
new and complex problems of environment and health impacts. The latter calls for 
new governance approach and mechanisms, which are obviously not in place yet.  In 
the new governance approach, strong state regulation and effective enforcement is 
indispensable, which in Vietnam is still lacking in the field of environmental 
management, But more importantly, inter-household and community cooperation is 
an important prop not simply to exact minimum uniform compliance to statutory 
regulations and standards. Household and community cooperation and voluntarism 
are necessary to draw up responsive and enforceable environmental plans and 
standards at the local level, and innovative approaches and technology.  For 
example, decentralized wastewater management proven to be effective in many peri-
urban areas in developing countries involves decentralized decision-making and 
participatory planning and water segregation at source (that is, at household level). 
The same holds true for effective community-based health programs that emphasize 
prevention, protection and early monitoring of pollution-related diseases. 
Thus far, however, households’ and communities’ roles in environmental governance 
in Vietnam have been on a large deficit.  In sum, in the context of household craft 
production, local-regional governance of water resources would not only require 
effective state actions and instruments at both the central and local levels and, 
perhaps more importantly, engagement of community and households with the 
public authorities in collaborative and participatory planning and negotiated decision-
making to handle the tension between household livelihood interests, community 
welfare, and ecological sustainability and macro economic goals pursued by the 
state. doi moi policy let individual households free to enhance their individualized 
production. It pulled many out of poverty, a major achievement by itself. Perhaps, it 
is high time now to energize and mobilize cooperative and community ethos in 
genuine partnership with the state, to take care of the environmental and health 
costs of doi moi in the peri-urban and rural localities.   
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Figure 1. Location of Van Mon Commune 
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Figure 2 Aluminum Production Chain 
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Figure 4 Profile indebtedness of households 
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Figure 5 Diseases or health problems suffered by sampled households in 2006  
QuickTime™ and a
BMP decompressor
are needed to see this picture.
 
Page 531 of 852
  
Annex 2.  
Some images of the metal recycling craft village in Van Mon Commune, 




Photo 2. Furnace for melting scraps   
 Photo 1. Local people living together  
with sraps (unused wastes) 
 
  
Photo 3. Sewage gate used by Man Xa 
 
Photo 4. Ngu Huyen Khue River running 
through the commune 
 
 
Photo 6. Waste pond of Man Xa village 
 
 
Photo 5. Sewage gate of aluminium 
manufacturing households 
 







Photo 7. Agriculture area in Man Xa Village 
 
Photo 8. Aluminium products 
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Introduction   
Women often have less access to water and related natural resources than men; 
what access they do have often depends on relationships with men. Differences in 
property rights between men and women are often an underlying reason for 
differences in access (Meinzen-Dick et al. 1997). Formal ownership rights and 
management responsibilities in irrigation, for example, often rest with men 
(Zwarteveen 2008). Men and women also have different needs and concerns in 
water use (Crow & Sultana 2002). Water is typically not just used for irrigation, 
but also for fishing, aquaculture, home gardens and livestock (Meinzen-Dick & 
Bakker 1999; Ols 1999; Smits et al. 2010). Irrigation water user groups often 
neglect the multiple uses of water and in doing so neglect the interest and 
concerns of women (Cleaver 1998).  Although women may be farmers and water 
users they are often under-represented  in water and river management 
organizations (Resurreccion et al. 2004; van Koppen & Hussain 2007).  
Unequal representation may be a contributing cause to water-related insecurities 
experienced by women. In response more and more interventions by state 
agencies and non-governmental organizations look to increase the visible 
participation of women in water governance bodies.  The challenges are often 
underestimated. There are a several common reasons.  
First pre-existing gender relations often require sustained effort to change that 
goes beyond immediate water-management related issues and short-term 
recruitment and facilitation projects to establish new water user groups. Cultural 
norms with respect to what is considered masculine or feminine activities and 
thus the “proper” roles and tasks for men and women are not easily re-molded. 
Second many interventions follow primarily an instrumentalist logic – increased 
representation of women it is argued would lead to higher production or more 
efficient water use or greater conservation of natural resources – rather than 
having empowerment of women or addressing skewed gender relations as their 
core objective. Increased participation in these situations may do little for gender 
equality if it just translates to more responsibilities and work (Ivens 2008; 
Resurreccion & Manorom 2007).  
Third gender as a social category rarely acts in isolation of other ways of 
discriminating among people, in particular, socio-economic class, ethnicity or 
livelihood.  Both self- and external perceptions of difference can impact rights of 
access and fairness of allocation. Again the specific attributions and assumptions 
made by one group of stakeholders about another are also likely to vary with 
cultural contexts (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2008; van Koppen & Hussain 2007). 
Overall, gender relations are an important, but still relatively neglected dimension 
of efforts to expand stakeholder participation in water management. Gender 
relations, we suggest, are one of the important driver of social differences that 
underline water insecurities experienced by men and women (Figure 1).  At the 
same time water insecurities, over time, may also feed-back to influence social 
differences and the evolution of gender relation, especially as livelihoods and 
socio-economic contexts shift. Either way improving understanding how women 
(and men) engage in conventional and new ‘participatory’ water management 
initiatives is important to addressing insecurities.  
In this paper we assess efforts at two contrasting locations in the Upper Ping 
River Basin in northern Thailand to reduce water-related insecurities of men and 
women by individuals, households and through multi-stakeholder processes. The 
first site was in a peri-urban transition zone with several hundred years history of 
locally built and managed irrigation systems overlain with modern canals and 
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management regimes (Lebel et al. 2007). The second site was an upper-tributary 
mountainous watershed in which sprinkler irrigation for cash crops has expanded 
among Hmong and Karen ethnic minority farmers, also with a long history of 
settlement. We focused on insecurities related to shortages of, and conflicts over, 




Figure 1 An initial, simple, conceptual framework for a study of gender relations, 
ethnicity and water insecurities.  
 
We addressed three main questions:  
What are the main gender differences in the use and management of water?   
How are these differences perceived and explained in different cultures? 
How have water insecurities affected, and been influenced by, gender relations 
and ethnicity?   
How have women and men of different ethnicities and authorities tried to reduce 
insecurities, and with what consequences for the vulnerabilities of women and 
men?  
After description of our methods the rest of this paper is organized around each 
of these three questions. 
Methods 
Household survey 
A sampling from for eight contiguous sub-districts in Chiang Mai province (see 
Table 1) covering the peri-urban transition zone was constructed from data 
provided by the Thai government agencies. We tried several sources and used 
that which we found most reliable and up to date.  
In Mae Kuang, of the 505 household numbers listed in our randomly drawn 
sample from government lists 66 were not current:  in 38 cases there was no 
house with that number, and in another 24 cases a building was present but had 
no occupants, and 4 cases it was the second household of someone already in 
sample. Of the 439 potential households in the sample we were unable to 
complete questionnaires in 39 instances. In 15 cases we were unable to make 
appointments and meet the residents that neighbours told us were normally 
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resident despite repeat visits, including in evening or on weekends.   In 9 cases 
the reason was that household members we met were physically incapable of 
responding to questions because of deafness, mental disabilities, alcoholism, or 
serious illness. In 15 cases households refused cooperation.  Complete 
information was therefore collected from 400 households.  
In Mae, the all households in the Upper Mae Hae Watershed were included in the 
sample. Of 709 household numbers obtained 84 were not current:  in 42 cases 
we could find no trace of a house with that number, and in another 42 cases 
either house had been removed or if present was not normally occupied. We 
contacted village headmen to help search for homes in each village. Of the 625 
remaining potential households in the sample we were unable to complete 
questionnaires in 39 instances. In 29 cases we were unable to make 
appointments and meet the residents that neighbours told us were normally 
resident despite repeat visits, including in evening or on weekends. This probably 
included a few individuals who simply did not want to participate.   In 10 cases 
the reason was that household members we met were physically incapable of 
responding to questions because of age-related disabilities.  Complete information 
was therefore collected from 586 households. 
In-depth interviews 
Interviews were collected using a standard interview guide including questions 
about water and natural resource management as well as gender relationships 
and roles.  In Mae Kuang 14 women and 28 men were interviewed as follows: 
farming residents (15), non-farming residents (10), village heads (9), local 
officials (5),  and experts (3). In Mae Hae 11 women and 17 men were 
interviewed as follows: farming residents (17), village heads (2), traditional 
leaders (2), water group leaders (2),  and officials (5).  
Interviewers worked in pairs. Interviews were carried out in either standard or 
northern Thai dialects in Mae Kuang and also in Karen in Mae Hae and later 
transcribed into standard Thai.  Male and females informants were encouraged to 
talk openly and freely around water management, livelihood, insecurity and 
gender issues. Interviewers prompted for explanations and examples but avoided 
making judgements. Interviews typically took 30-45 minutes to complete.  
Interviews were taped and transcribed then imported into NVIVO software.  
Coding was done at two levels. The first set of codes was based on broad areas of 
inquiry.  A second set of codes was developed based on themes emerging during 
the analysis. We also used key-word searches to dig more deeply into issues that 
turned up in early stages of analysis but which had not been coded in detail in 
earlier rounds.   
Study Areas 
Mae Kuang 
The Mae Kuang watershed is one of 15 officially recognized sub-basins of the Ping 
river basin (Figure 2). It covers 2,734 km2 in four districts of Chiang Mai province 
and two districts of Lamphun province. Evergreen and deciduous forest covers 
just over half of the watershed (Thomas 2006), but is almost completely 
restricted to higher elevations. Average rainfall in the Mae Kuang sub-basins is 
just over 1100mm.  Over 95% of water use is for agriculture and that use already 
succeeds storage. Seasonality is a key issue with irrigated areas served by Mae 
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Figure 2  Study areas. Topography and sub-basin boundaries in 





Our study focused on the upper parts of the basin lying largely within the inter-
montane valley where water access is generally higher than further downstream. 
Access to water depends substantially on position within the Mae Kuang 
watershed (Ganjanapan & Lebel 2009). Doi Saket and San Sai district in the 
upper reach receive relatively more water from the Mae Kuang dam than lower 
reaches (Ganjanapan & Lebel 2009).  
Dependency on agriculture varied moderately across the eight sub-districts in the 
peri-urban transition case study, Mae Kuang (Table 1). Those subdistricts with 
more households engaged in agriculture also tended to be more likely to have 
history of water conflicts (Nong Yaeng, Luang Nua) and those with least rural 
livelihoods (San Sai Luang, San Na Meng) the least frequent histories of water 
shortages. Low income households could be found in both lower and higher 
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Table 1.  Spatial variation (across sub-districts) in basic indicators of 
livelihoods, wealth and water access and conflict histories at the 
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Mae Hae Watershed is located within the upper Mae Chaem river sub-basin 
(Figure 2) near border of Mae Chaem, Samoeng and Wang Districts, in Chiang 
Mai province, northern Thailand  Expansion of dry season cropping made possible 
by technical innovations with PVC pipes, pumps and sprinkler irrigation  has 
contributed to rapid expansion of cash cropping and resulted in substantial 
conflict over irrigation water among and within villages and ethnic groups (Hmong 
and Karen). Climate variability is an important factor in the severity of conflict 
each year, but so are other factors, like rising, or changes in patterns of, demand 
with crop choices and number of users or technologies.  
In Mae Hae, the vast majority of households have agricultural income sources 
(Table 1). Half of all households had combined average cash incomes of less than 
5000 Baht per month with some variation among sub-districts. Car, mostly pick-
ups, ownership was high for mountain areas, but on average across the 
watershed lower than in the peri-urban setting.  
Gender relations and ethnicity 
Indicators of gender relations 
Women in lowland Muang households, in general, are more likely to hold major 
assets than in upland households (Table 2).  This is especially true for land where 
almost half is owned by women in lowland areas.  In upland households both 
women and men take major responsibilities, but in lowland households this is 
more frequently a role for women.  Decisions to borrow money more frequently 
involve both men and women in upland than lowland households but signatories 
on loan agreements are usually men whereas in lowland households a significant 
fraction of loans also formally involve women (Table 2). 
 
Table 2  Some indicators of gender relations within households by ethnic 

















94 6 + 77 16 7 60 37 2 
Owner of 
land 
94 6 0 76 18 6 52 41 4 
Owner of 
car 




14 9 74 8 15 74 25 52 21 
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51 1 2 47 6 6 29 23 13 
 
Gendered behavior 
We asked respondents to score eight behaviors on a scale from very feminine (1) 
through netural (3) to very masculine (5). We analyzed scores using analysis of 
variance taking into account the gender and ethnicity of the respondent (Table 3). 
A value of 3.0 indicates agender-neutral means scores, with lower scores 
indicating femininity and higher scores masculinity.  
The findings can be grouped into four patterns.  
‘To complain a lot’ was seen as a feminine behavior by all groups. ‘To follow 
opinion of others’ was also seen as a feminine behavior but with some complex 
interactions between gender of respondent and ethnicity (Table 3).  
‘Think about, care for others’ was overall seen as a more feminine trait by women 
respondents than men especially in Muang communities with overall average 
score near gender-neutral (Table 3). 
The other five behaviors were seen as masculine to varying degrees (average 
scores > 3).  Hmong considered the behaviors ‘using physical force to win 
arguments’, ‘liking give opinions’ and ‘avoiding cooperation’  more masculine than 
other two ethnic groups.  For the latter two behaviors women respondents gave 
more feminine weighted responses than men (Table 3).  
For the last two behaviors ‘convince through reasoning’ and ‘think ahead, plan’  
female muang respondents scored these much more feminine relative to males 
than in other ethnic groups (hence the significant interaction term between 
gender and ethnicity).  Hmong viewed these traits as more masculine, Karen 
somewhat intermediate, and Muang the least (Table 3).   
 
Table 3. Means scores on the femininity and masculinity of eight conflict 
and cooperation related behaviors of men and women from three ethnic 






Male Respondent Female Respondent 
Hmong Karen  Muang Hmong Karen  Muang 
Follow 
opinion of 
others   
G x E 
* 
E * 
2.55 2.71 2.86 2.59 2.89 2.66 
Use physical 









2.04 2.21 2.13 2.01 2.16 2.21 
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3.72 3.48 3.27 3.58 3.47 3.07 
Think ahead, 
plan 












3.06 3.09 3.03 2.86 2.98 2.70 




3.63 3.46 3.39 3.46 3.32 2.98 
 
Division of labour 
To understand division of labor we asked respondents how many times out of ten 
certain activities in their household were done by either men or women (which 
one was randomly chosen and unrelated to gender of respondent).  The findings 
for 15 tasks are summarized in Table 4.  The scores for men and women are 
therefore independent.  
Tasks around the home are more often done by women, for example, cleaning 
the house, washing clothes, taking care of others, cooking meals and washing 
dishes (Table 4). Repairing homes is men’s work.  
Agricultural field activities are done by both men and women, but with men 
having on average a larger role in all three communities (Table 4).  Preparing 
feed for livestock, however, is mostly women’s work in upland, but more likely to 
be men’s work in the lowland. Collecting fuel wood is done more by men than 
women in Hmong and Muang communities, but more by women in Karen 
households (Table 4). 
The sum of average scores for men and women from a particular ethnic group 
may not be equal to 10 for a couple of reasons.  Combined scores may be less 
than 10 because that activity is not widespread in that category of household, for 
example many Muang households are not involved in agriculture (Table 4). On 
the other hand a combined score for a near universal activity like “cleaning 
house” or “washing dishes” is more than 10 because both sexes tend to report 
the contributions of their own gender higher than that of their opposite. The 
difference is between women and men respondents is largest in Muang 
communities. 
 
Table 4. Means scores out of 10 for frequency of activities of men and 






Hmong Karen  Muang Hmong Karen  Muang 
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Repair house GxE 
*** 
 






6.50 4.78 3.43 4.09 5.39 2.33 
Preparing 

































3.14 3.87 2.64 8.22 7.95 6.83 
Washing 
clothes 
G *** 2.42 3.20 2.55 7.30 7.10 7.08 
Taking care 
of pre-school  
G *** 
E *** 




























3.36 4.03 3.16 7.91 7.02 7.11 
 
Apart from agricultural activities most households in Mae Hae collected a range of 
products from forest areas for domestic use but few to sell (Ratanawilailak et al. 
2009). There are substantial differences in collection practices of men and women 
and between Karen and Hmong communities. Hmong woman, for instance, are 
renowned as experts in collection and use of forest herbs. Traditional knowledge 
is passed down among generations. In Karen households men have greater 
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knowledge of forest herbs than women as they have more opportunities to enter 
forest areas. 
Karen women are responsible for gathering fuelwood – a good fuel wood pile in a 
house with a daughter is interpreted as a sign that the women of the household 
are hard-working and is praised. In Hmong families fuelwood is gathered by men 
– if they don’t it is a sign that men are lazy, but women will collect instead. Men 
collect timber for building houses and fences.   
Men and women in both cultures collect wild vegetables from the forest. Hunting 
of large forest animals is done by men. Men won’t eat animals caught by a 
woman because they say it will bring bad luck to the village. Women eat what 
they catch. Women usually hunt smaller animals like frogs and fish. Food and 
fodder for chickens and pigs is usually collected by women. Most of these gender 
differences are not absolute; for most there were significant fraction of 
households in which both men and women carried out the activity. 
Water use and access 
Men and women get water from similar sources that depend on locations: in 
uplands mostly from streams and canals, and in lowlands also public piped water 
supply. 
Agricultural water uses are much more prevalent in upland rural Mae Hae than 
lowland per-urban Mae Kuang.  But considering just those households using 
water for specific purposes than some major gender differences are apparent 
between upland and lowland households. Both men and women use water for all 
purposes in most households in Mae Hae  (Table 5). In Mae Kuang there is much 
more gender specific uses with men using water more for agricultural activities 
and tourism-related activities then women, whereas women were more frequent 
users for home businesses and home cleaning. 2 3 
 
Table 5  Uses of water by men and women (% households in which the 
water source is used, no calculation for rare uses <10 occurences). 
 Mae Kuang Mae Hae 
 
Water uses Men Women Both Men Women Both 
Paddy rice 32 11 58 5 2 93 
Other field crops 40 9 51 2 2 96 
Fruit orchards 37 11 52 2 2 96 
Livestock 36 18 45 2 6 92 
Home gardens - - - 2 13 86 
Tourism 48 8 45 - - - 
Home business 18 29 53 1 3 95 
Cleaning house 21 29 50 2 19 80 
 
 
Risks and insecurities 
                                          
2 Q46  - some poor distinctions between sub-questions: e.g. 46.1 and 46.6 
3 Should expand discussion of this table using qualitative interview information 
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Shortages 
In both Mae Kuang and Mae Hae, water shortages were most likely between 
March and May (Table 2).  Very few houses were short between August and 
January. More households usually experienced water shortages in at least one 
month in Mae Hae (56%) than in Mae Kuang (22%)4.  
In Mae Kuang duration of longest shortages experienced was as follows: less than 
or equal to a week (7%), between a week and a month (10%), more than a 
month (4%). Shortages were primarily experienced by those needing water for 
rice (14%). Shortages were much less frequently experienced for other 
agricultural activities, like field crops (2%), orchards (3%), livestock (2%), or 
aquaculture (1%).  Non-agricultural uses rarely experienced shortages (all < 
1%). 
In Mae Hae duration of longest shortages experienced was as follows: less than 
or equal to a week (12%), between a week and a month (33%), more than a 
month (6%). Shortages were most common for crops (35%) followed by rice 
(26%). Shortages were much less frequently experienced for orchards (3%) and 
home gardens (0.3%),  
 
Table 6.  Percentage of households reporting water shortages as typical 
in each month. 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Mae 
Kuang 
1 2 12 18 6 2 1 1 0 1 1 1 
Mae Hae 2 6 30 38 23 12 7 2 1 1 1 2 
 
In Mae Kuang households who have suffered shortages typically attribute them to 
low flows in the dry season (83%) and less frequently to consumption by others 
(23%) or changes to water delivery systems (33%). Likewise, in Mae Hae 
shortages are attributed to low flows in the dry season (53%) and less frequently 
to consumption by others (17%), changes to water delivery systems (2%) or 
reduced rainfall (2%). 
We analyzed multivariate association between various candidate predictor 
variables and a household experiencing water shortages using binary logistic 
regression. Water shortage could be measured in two ways: by presence of 
activities for which water short and experiences of shortage by month.  They 
yielded very similar results so we only report first. 
Households having an agricultural production income were seven time as likely to 
experience water shortages than those which do not (odds ratio = 6.8, 95% CI 
4.14-11.3). Once taken into account study area and low income were not 
significant predictors. 
There was no evidence that indicators of gender relations within a household 
were associated with the likelihood of a household having experienced water 
shortages. Indicators tested included: women having bank accounts, a role in 
borrowing decisions, ownership of land.  We adjusted for single-women headed 
households. Women and men reported similar levels of household water 
shortages. 
Conflicts 
                                          
4 Note this based on Q56 (months) if ask in a different way (Q55) by activity fractions are 
slightly different (54 and 18%) 
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Altogether 7.5% of households in Mae Hae and 5.8% in Mae Kuang acknowledged 
having been in a conflict or dispute with other water users about the allocation, 
management or use of water. Three-quarters (72%) in Mae Hae and half (48%) 
were between water users located upstream-downstream from each other.   
The impacts of conflicts differed between Mae Hae and Mae Kuang (Table 7) with 
higher impacts on relationships within households reported in Mae Hae.  In no 
instances did respondents say women were more affected by conflicts than men; 
but in 30% of cases in Mae Hae and 4% in Mae Kuang men were said to have 
been more affected. According to both men and women respondents, men (21%) 
more frequently play an important role in conflict resolution than women (7%). 
Three households in Mae Hae and one in Mae Kuang reported threats of as a 
consequence of water related conflicts. 
 
Table 7. Impacts of conflicts. 
Impact of conflict on Mae Hae Mae Kuang 
Relationships within households 30 4 
Relationships with rest of 
community 
25 35 
Ability to grow food 11 13 
Technology choices 30 4 
Livelihoods 11 14 
Water sources 11 0 
 
Conflicts also occur because differences in how rights of access to land and water 
are interpreted. One way this can happen is after a household moves. Thus a 
household that now lived in a separate village believed they still had a right to 
land and water they enjoyed where they use to live. In one case one family fired 
shots near another’s house as a threat.  The village heads of Huay Kamin Nai and 
Huay Nam Chan met to settle the dispute without resorting to police, but 
appealing to local institutions. In this case the culprits had to go through a public 
ceremony (“Koh Karma”) asking forgiveness by pouring water over the heads of 
the victims and wrapping their wrists together. The village heads also agreed and 
emphasized that if there was a recurrence they would report to the police. 
Minor conflicts among water users of course may be settled directly by those 
involved. Village heads and water user committees, however, are often requested 
to come and help resolve conflicts in the dry season (March-May). Village 
headmen have an important role in water management. The instruments they 
use include the systems and laws of the Thai state, local institutions of water 
users and village-level customs important to resolving conflicts. 
We analysed multivariate associations between candidate predictors of ever being 
in a household conflict over water in same ways as for shortages. The findings 
were similar. 
Households having an agricultural production income were almost four time as 
likely to experience water conflicts than those which do not (odds ratio = 6.6, 
95% CI 2.73-15.8). Households in Mae Hae were 2.3 times as likely (95 % CI 
1.18-4.59) to have been involved in conflicts as those in Mae Kuang. Low income 
was not associated with risks of conflict. 
As for shortages there was no evidence that indicators of gender relations within 
a household were associated with likelihood of a household experiencing water 
shortages. Indicators tested included: women having bank accounts, a role in 
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borrowing decisions, ownership of land.  We adjusted for single-women headed 
households.  
 
Participation and institutional capacities  
Water user groups 
Overall 31% of households in Mae Kuang and 69% in Mae Hae belonged to a 
water user group.  Men were more likely to be members than women in Mae 
Kuang a Khon Muang community, but in the uplands both men and women were 
often members (Table 8).  Committee positions, however, in lowland and, even 









Table 8. Gender balance of household representation in water user 
groups and their committees.  
 Mae Kuang Mae Hae 
Water User Group 
Member 
(n=126) (n=403) 
Men 61 19 
Both 17 78 
Women 21 2 
Water User Group 
Committee 
(n=44) (n=117) 
Men 73 91 
Both 18 2 
Women 9 7 
 
Both men and women respondents agree that when women participate in 
meetings about water management – which they only infrequently do  (7.5% of 
households) – they are usually listened to (93%).  But there was some variation 
among areas (or ethnicities): with upland households (96%) more likely to listen 
to women attendees than lowland ones (85%).  The findings were independent of 
gender of respondents.  
Watershed management organizations 
Knowledge of and participation in larger-scale water management institutions, 
however, was more common in Mae Hae. In Mae Hae, more than half (57%) 
knew of the Mae Hae Watershed network. Of these 86% had been involved in 
their activities.  In Mae Kuang, about a fifth (21%) of respondents said they knew 
of the Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Committee. Of these about two-thirds (62%) 
had been involved in some of the Committees activities.  
Mae Kuang 
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David Thomas (Thomas 2005, 2006) documented the selection and early 
establishment of the Mae Kuang River Sub-basin Organization (RSBO) under the 
Upper Ping River Basin Organization.  Initial proposal for membership of RSBO 
were modified following discussions (Table 9). Women’s participation was 
‘secured’ through representation in categories of “housewife” and “women’s 
development” groups.  Ganjanapan and Lebel (2009) followed-up during the 
politically unstable period between 2007-2009 where changes in governments 
caused multiple changes in RSBs and RSBOs committees with new rounds of 
selection and budget cuts. Under a new directive issued by Department of Water 
Resources the committee was reduced from 45 to 35 members. The Mae Kuang 
River Sub-basin Committee and most of RSBOs in Ping river basin were in the 
process of re- selection in late 2009 (Ganjanapan & Lebel 2009). 
Overall participation has remained gender skewed.  Despite women being 
involved in water use and management, participation of women within Mae Kuang 
sub-river basin is minimal and is at lowest (sub-district) level and not higher 
(district, provincial and sub-basin levels) in the working group hieararchies. One 
exception is that at Ping river basin level, there are a few educated women 
participating, for example, as part of the Upper Ping Watershed Management and 








Table 9. Final structure of the first Mae Kuang river sub-basin committee 
 
Chairpersons  and Secretaries 
 Elected Locally 
 
Sub –Committes  
Linkages with Local sub-watershed committees 
 
Membership composition:  
Old existing community organizations 
Community forestry networks 






Ethnic minority groups 
Housewives groups, Women’s development groups 
3 
3 
Local government (TAO, tessaban, PAO) 
Kamnan/ Village headmen 










Total membership 45 
 
Mae Hae 
In 1999 the Mae Sa Nga Watershed Unit was established by the Forest 
Department to prevent village encroachment and recover degraded forests in the 
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watershed as well as deal with various state agencies. The unit then formed the 
Mae Hae Network Committee (MHNC) to initiate forest protection activities. 
Representatives are drawn from each of the 15 villages in the watershed which 
are formally clustered into 7 “administrative” villages.  The committee, financially 
supported by the Forest Department, meets each month. These forums provide 
space for village representatives to raise issues and explore shared interests. But 
the committee often finds that it lacks the necessary authority to resolve water 
and land-use related problems at both larger, watershed, and smaller, stream, 
levels.  Moreover the Forest Department’s objectives in conservation often clash 
with users interests in access to resources. Meetings of the committee are held at 
the office of the Royal Project in Mae Hae village. The Royal Project is both a 
water-user and a water manager and coordinates with state and development 
agencies.  The Mae Hae committee has always been made up entirely of men.  
 
Discussion  
What are the main gender differences in the use and management of water?   
How are these differences perceived and explained in different cultures?  
Women are major users of water for agriculture in the uplands, but less so in the 
lowlands.  In the lowland, Muang, culture, irrigation is viewed as a masculine 
activity. In the uplands the role of women is more widely accepted and 
acknowledged; women are frequently part of water user groups. 
Men, however, dominate ‘decision-making’ positions in both community-based 
and state-led water organizations in upland and lowland areas. Women’s lack of 
representation and influence in upland organizations, in particular, does not 
reflect their acknowledge roles as farmers and irrigators.   
Cultural norms with respect to roles and rights of women among Karen, Hmong 
and Muang are different and don’t fit simple stereotypes or neatly match roles in 
water management.  Women in lowland Muang households, for instance, are 
more likely to hold major assets like land or vehicles; but decisions to borrow 
money were much more likely to involve both men and women in upland Hmong 
and Karen households than in lowland Muang households.  
There were many similarities but also some substantial differences in perception 
of men and women and among cultures with respect to whether certain argument 
and conflict-related behaviors were feminine or masculine characteristics. These 
observations have implications for facilitating negotiations or conflict resolution in 
multi-ethnic contexts. First they provide a counter-argument to simplistic 
assumptions that traits like masculine assertiveness are desirable in such 
situations (Thompson et al. 2010). In these communities, but with significant 
differences by ethnicity, behaviors typically thought of as masculine would tend to 
escalate conflicts and reduce cooperation. Second they imply a need to consider 
underlying cultural-differences when seeking to empower women in such complex 
settings. Men and women from and in different cultural contexts are working 
against a different background of assumptions about likely behavior. 
 
How have water insecurities affected, and been influenced by, gender relations 
and ethnicity? 
The design of this study allowed for relatively direct tests for interactions between 
gender relations and water insecurities, with a constraint that the settings did not 
include exceptionally severe shortages or violence-ridden conflict. In this 
“modest” context water insecurities at the household level are not strongly 
influenced by gender relations.  Moreover, households where women control 
assets or finances, or have greater roles in decision-making, were not more or 
less likely to experience water shortages or be involved in conflicts.  
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How have women and men of different ethnicities and authorities tried to reduce 
insecurities, and with what consequences for the vulnerabilities of women and 
men?  
Women are major users of water for agriculture in the uplands, less in the 
lowlands. Their formal roles in water management decision-making bodies do not 
reflect their actual roles and responsibilities. Cultural norms with respect to roles 
and rights of women among Karen, Hmong and lowland northern Thai, are 
different, again adding considerable complexity to efforts to improve gender 
balance in water governance. Meaningful participation in lowland communities, in 
particular, seems problematic given existing gender relations and attitudes 
towards water management responsibilities.  
The government approach to water insecurities in the lowlands has been to build 
more water storage and delivery infrastructure, sometimes building over pre-
existing communal irrigations schemes. In the uplands investments in 
infrastructure has been more limited and apart from some early reservoir 
construction focused on securing village domestic use water supplies from 
mountain streams. Most of the irrigation infrastructure apart from two reservoirs 
is private.  
Conflicts and shortages impact on relationships within households and the 
community. It is not clear, overall, how the interventions by authorities at 
different levels have made women or men more or less vulnerable. Local 
institutions related to water management, both in lowland and upland settings, 
however, are clearly important for resolving the vast majority of local disputes.   
Limitations, significance, what next 
This study had several important limitations and points to a few important topics 
for further research. 
Ethnicity was used here as proxy variable for culture.  Despite being a crude 
proxy the findings of this study show that culture is important to the ways gender 
relations and water management are connected to each other. At the same time 
it is important not to put too much emphasis on ethnicity. First ethnicity is in part 
confounded by location with our simple design – all Muang households were in 
lowlands and all Karen and Hmong were in uplands. There are many other 
differences from living in these two settings apart from ethnic-related culture.  
Second, most households are now engaged in a market economy and culture is 
reshaping itself strongly with elements of both fusion and recreation. There is an 
important dynamic element which is missed by one-off classification of 
households, however, it is done. More direct measurement of norms and how 
they are changing and how they vary with place would provide much sharper 
understanding of interactions with gender relations as a producer of social 
difference. Finally, drawing too much attention to “ethnic-based” differences also 
carries with it some risks that it could reinforce prejudices of water managers and 
decision-makers. 
Further work on gender relations and water insecurities should be carried out in 
locations with more persistent and serious conflicts. As move further downstream 
in the Mae Kuang river sub-basin this would mean engaging with water quality 
issues and larger-scale industries. 
Conclusions  
Gender relations are an important, but still relatively neglected dimension of 
efforts to expand stakeholder participation in water management.   An improved 
understanding of bargaining and negotiating power, constraints on agency, and 
the alternative strategies open to women in increasingly ‘participatory’ water 
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management initiatives remains fundamental to reducing water insecurities and 
social justice.  
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Currently, Vietnam irrigation development policy directions are divided between the 
objective to continue increase rice production through agricultural intensification and 
to improve farmer’s livelihoods through crop diversification and integrated farming. 
While the first objective requires the construction of new large-scale irrigation 
system in deeply flooded area, the latter demands the modification in management 
of existing irrigation physical infrastructure for non-rice crops, in particular brackish 
aquaculture in the coastal zones. This article attempts to fine tune this division. It 
argues that the Government of Vietnam’s plan to expand irrigated areas in the 
Mekong River Delta, MRD) should be discussed beyond the conventional line of food 
security and poverty reduction argument. Using the evolution of Vietnam irrigation 
policy from the last three and half decades as its reference, the article highlights the 
potential of polycentric decision-making concept, focusing on the concept’s ability to 
capture the multiple forces, interests and resources essential for the future irrigation 
development in the MRD. 
Introduction 
The Vietnamese Mekong River Delta, MRD) is the last region of the country through 
which the Mekong River reaches out into the South China Sea, called East Sea by 
Vietnamese). The delta has a total area of four million hectares for nearly 18 million 
of Vietnam inhabitants in 2006, about 22% of the whole population of the country). 
Compared with other Asian countries, Middle Asia, North-East Asia regions) annual 
average runoff volume per capita representing the water resource in the MRD is very 
high, at least four times that in other regions, and according to data recorded in 
1990, this was about 35,000 m3/capita, Can, 2000). However, due to high seasonal 
variation with over 90% of rainfall and surface water are concentrated during the 
flood season from May to November, the great potential for agriculture and 
aquaculture production in the MRD is only exploited if flood is controlled and 
irrigation in the dry season is improved.  
The Mekong Delta comprises a vast flood plain with an elevation of 0-4 m above 
mean sea level. It is formed of eroded sediments from the upper basin that are 
deposited in the lower basin, Fedra, 1991). The river network of the Mekong as it 
reaches the MRD consists of nine estuaries and a dense canal network. The River 
discharge at Tan Chau in the Tien river (Fig. 1) is 3-5 times larger than that at Chau 
Doc in the Hau River (Nguyen, 2006). The Vam Nao, connecting river 20 km 
downstream of Tan Chau and Chau Doc, conveys water from the Tien River to the 
Hau River, augmenting flow downstream of this point. There is an extensive network 
of canals that has been constructed in the last 300 years. The structures comprise 
7,000 km of main canals, 4,000 km of secondary canals on-farm systems, and more 
than 20,000 km of protection dykes to prevent early floods, MARD, 2003). 
Massive infrastructure development in the Mekong Delta highlights the area’s 
importance for the country’s agriculture development. Vietnam was still a net rice 
importing country in 1985, but it exported 1.4 million tons of rice in 1989 and 4.6 
million tons in 1999. In 2000, agriculture occupied 85% of the total area of the MRD 
and contributed more than 50% of the staple food and 60% of the fish-shrimp 
production of Vietnam, Minh, 2000). Since that year, the Mekong Delta has 
contributed more than 90% of rice exported from Vietnam. This remarkable increase 
in rice production is related to the rapid growth of rice planted area in the past 20 
years aided by the expansion and increased density of the irrigation and drainage 
system.  
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Traditionally the life of Vietnamese in the MRD is closely linked with water bodies as 
typical rice-water agriculture is practiced. This close link is evidenced from the 
creation of the River-Water Civilization, Van minh Song Nuoc), which represents 
population settlement along the river and canal levees. This River-Water Civilization 
is based on intensive water use, including domestic water supply, navigation, 
irrigation, aquaculture and fishing, and industrial use. Almost all of the delta people’s 
activities and infrastructure are highly dependent on irrigation and drainage systems 
and very adaptable to the changes in water regime.  
Historically, the delta was sparsely populated before large scale settlement by the 
Vietnamese began 300 years ago. The study by Biggs, 2004) of the hydraulic history 
in the delta discusses how the first canals were built from 1820. In the late 19th 
century to early 20th century, the French continued to construct a large-scale canal 
network, Cho Gao Canal, Xa No Canal) through dredging and settlement measures. 
In addition, many water control projects were constructed by central government 
from 1975 onwards. These include floodgates, saline protection dams and dykes, 
sluices, and pumping stations. Channel density is about 20 - 30 m/ha and the 
channel area occupies 9% of the delta area, An, 2002). The interlacing rivers and 
dredged canals have been connected together with a total length approaching 5,000 
km in 1993, Ministry of Transportation, 1993). However, the canal network was 
expanded and improved rapidly for irrigation purpose, therefore in 2002 the total 
length was estimated approximately 7,000 km of which 4,430 km are principal and 
primary canals with a width of 8-40 m and a bottom elevation at -2.0 m to -4.0 m 
below mean sea level.  
Based on the natural conditions, the MRD can be divided into three main water 
resource zones, Fig. 1). Boundary of flood and salinity at different levels are showed 
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Figure 1: Three main water resource zones in the Mekong Delta 
 
 
Figure 2: MRD Water Resource Extremes:, a. left) Maximum water level in flood 
season;, b. right) Maximum salinity intrusion, Truong and Ketelsen, 2009) 
 
Each year, from July to December, a large part of the delta is inundated from both 
the overflow from the Mekong River and local rainfall, Fig. 2a). In the northern part 
of the MRD, approximately 200-250 km from the Mekong river mouths, the Long 
Xuyen Quadrangle, covering mostly An Giang province and a part of Kien Giang 
province) and the Plain of Reeds, Dong Thap and Long An provinces) mainly covered 
by acid sulphate soils, ASS) have poorly drained depression areas with inundation 
lasting up to 4-6 months. The reclamation of acid sulphate soils for agriculture 
pollutes water in canals and shallow ground water by acidic substances, aluminium, 
iron and other heavy metals. 
Due to the policy of increasing rice production in the MRD, in last 30 years dry 
season rice crops expanded to 3.8 million ha, more than three times than dry season 
rice area in other Lower Mekong Basin countries combined) in the northern and 
central zones contributes to water shortage and induces more saline intrusion in the 
coastal zone. The saline affected area, Fig. 2b) expands throughout the Mekong 
Delta in two main coastal zones that constitute over a half of the total land of the 
delta:, i) the Eastern coastal zone running from Vam Co River through the Hau River, 
with an affected total area of 780,000 hectares; and, ii) the Ca Mau peninsula with 
1.26 million hectares, CTU and DANIDA, 1996) where about one third is also covered 
by acid sulphate soils. In these coastal zones, rice and shrimp development causes 
conflicts over water requirements for rice crop and shrimp production.  
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Since the life of local people is mainly based on agriculture, irrigation development is 
the most important driver for improving livelihoods, in particular of the poor in the 
MRD. This article looks closely at the evolution of decision in MRD irrigation during 
the last three and half decades. Referring to this policy evolution, we will look back 
to the future how decision in irrigation should be made.  
 
Brief history of irrigation development in the MRD before 1975 
The acknowledgement of the MRD’s high agricultural development potential has 
started as early as the 18th century. Major canal projects such as the Vinh Te Canal 
were excavated during 1820-1825. The fastest development was from 1860 to 1930 
under the French colonial regime when many canals were excavated and cultivated 
area was enlarged rapidly. Biggs et al., 2009) also reported that under French 
colonial rule the aspiration to develop technical, large-scale irrigation system 
continued. From 1890 to 1930, more than 165 million cubic meters of earth were 
dredged and the total area put under cultivation rose fourfold to over two million 
hectares. Driven by the objective to raise the colony’s production of rice, the first 
projects to build “Dutch dikes” and saltwater dams and irrigation canals for fresh 
water supply began under colonial rule in the 1930s. French colonial officials believed 
that the colony’s rice production can be increased by resettling many thousands of 
poor tenants to the new lands and drew up massive plans to relocate farmers from 
the Red River Delta into the broad depressions such as the Long Xuyen Quadrangle 
and Plain of Reeds as well as the coastal region. Nevertheless, the war period, 1945-
1975) was important for incubating new strategies of water use that often involved 
reverting to relying on local resource management, especially in resistance zones 
controlled by Vietnamese revolutionaries. The study as well as implementation of 
large irrigation projects under this period is restricted due to the war. The first 
irrigation development plan was prepared by HANSI, Serviced’ Hydraulique Agricole 
et de Navigation du Sud IndoChine) that covered both the western part of Hau river 
and the Plain of Reeds. However, only limited projects for canal excavation and 
construction of sluices along the coast were included. From 1960 to 1972, many 
irrigation projects were studied, such as the My Phuoc project – 14,000 ha by 
SOGREAH in 1963, the Thanh Quoi project – 1,300 ha by US Army Corps of 
Engineers in 1968, the Go Cong project by Korea Government in 1971, the Plain of 
Reeds project by US Army Technical Corps of Engineers in 1971. Intermittently into 
the 1970s, Nippon Koei then fulfilled contracts to re-develop the construction works, 
and in 1972 actually completed construction of anti-salinity dikes and barriers in Tiep 
Nhut project, southeast of Soc Trang province. The Go Cong ‘pioneer agricultural 
project’, similarly focused on salinity intrusion control, was funded by the Asian 
Development Bank, ADB). 
For the entire MRD, a water resources development plan studied by the Development 
and Resources Coorporation, D&R), US in 1968 by the request of the Mekong Delta 
Development Program comprised of a dike and water control system to increase the 
rice production in the MRD to 10 million tons by 1990. Irrigation development of both 
Cambodia and Vietnamese Mekong Delta was included in the Report on the 
Indicative Basin Plan-1970 by the Mekong River Committee with similar plan by D&R, 
Committee for the Coordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin, 1970). 
In 1974 the the Netherlands Delta Development Team completed a set of reports for 
agricultural development with improved water control in the Cambodia and 
Vietnamese Mekong Delta, but only provided recommendations by zone without 
concrete projects, The Netherlands Delta Development Team, 1974). 
Page 559 of 852
PN67_2010_16 
Irrigation expansion in the Vietnamese Mekong Delta: Back to the future 




Irrigation development after 1975 
Following the end of the War in 1975, the re-unified Vietnamese government 
immediately commenced a ‘rice everywhere’ campaign due to severe food shortages 
in the country and embarked upon a number of new reclamation projects in war-torn 
areas but with little overall effect on raising productivity. Saline water was in the 
state’s point of view a constraint to agriculture rather than a resource for 
aquaculture, as farmers view it today, and flood a threat and constraint to 
intensification. This ‘rice everywhere strategy’ was intensified following the severe 
flood of 1978, when floating rice crops were devastated, which served to justify 
investment in flood-protection dikes, canals and pumping stations. This strategy was 
further strengthened in the 1980s, as the country continued to experience food 
shortages, Hoanh et al, 2003). Such schemes to manage water across vast 
territories were first realized slowly, with mainly earthworks by hand and limited 
machinery and small sluices, and it was only after the “doi moi”, reform or 
renovation) period with market liberalization starting in 1986 that the government 
was financially able to invest in large-scale plans again.  Since then, the MRD has 
become one of the most productive zones for rice and aquaculture in the world, 
supplying more than 70 and 50 per cent of Vietnam’s foreign export amounts of 
these staples. Since 1986, the Vietnamese government has tried to shift the cost of 
maintaining canals and other infrastructure away from the central government to 
provincial governments and private landowners as part of a broader strategy of, 
fiscal) decentralization. Such decisions have challenged sub-national and local 
authorities to find new cooperation models that can sustain and improve their 
systems. Secondly, in an attempt to widen the consideration of water resources 
management from the historical focus on irrigation development, control over the 
development of waterways and irrigation has shifted from the single domain of a 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, MARD) to shared responsibility with 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Environment, MONRE), Molle and Hoanh, 
2009). 
In this section the evolution of irrigation development policy in the MRD  during the 
last 35 years is reviewed. Using the Vietnamese government reunification in 1975 as 
the starting point and based on the evolution of the policy view in agriculture and 
irrigation development, seven different policy periods are identified. The length of 
each period is not uniform as this depends mainly on the occurrence of policy 
change. The policy analysis looks at the main events and achievements during each 
period, as well as possible policy interconnection between two or more consecutive 
periods. In this way, present and future irrigation development policy in MRD is 
analyzed in relation to past policy decisions, rather than as a separate policy decision 
that stands on its own.  
 
Formal process of decision in irrigation development  
First, the Central Government and all Ministries prepare a long-term socio-economic 
development strategy for 10 years, including agriculture and irrigation, to submit to 
the National Assembly for approval. This strategy was based on a resolution 
prepared by the Communist Party Committee and approved by National Party 
Congress. Before 1990, Vietnam did not set up a complete Strategy on socio – 
economic development. During the war, the Party determined two strategic tasks as 
to build socialism in the North of Vietnam and to fight for unification of the country. 
After the war, two main strategic tasks are to build socialism and to protect the 
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nation. Based on the socialist revolution process, socio-economic development 
strategy, and science and technological development strategy were built during the 
transitional period. So far, Vietnam has prepared development strategy for 2 periods, 
the “10 Year Strategy for Socio-economic Stabilization and Development during 
1991-2000” prepared in 1990 and the “10-Year Strategy for Socio-economic 
Development during 2001-2010” prepared in 2001. The second strategy is to 
accelerate the industrialization and modernization following the socialism direction so 
that Vietnam becomes an industrial country by 2020. 
Because planning is a key characteristic of centralized communist economies 
Government of Vietnam formulated their 10 year integrated socio-economic 
development plan based on the approved development strategy, then a 5 year 
development plan with detailed programs and projects, and development guidelines 
for all regions and sectors. The First Five-Year Plan 1960-1965 was only applied to 
North Vietnam during the war. The Second Five-Year Plan was implemented in 1976-
1980 after the country reunification. For irrigation, the Institute for Water Resources 
Planning, IWRP) and the Southern Institute for Water Resources Planning, SIWRP) of 
MARD are in charge of preparing the irrigation development plan in corporation with 
other sector planning institutes such as agriculture, aquaculture, construction, 
transportation, energy.   
The approved development plan then is put under implementation phase by 
formulating a number of irrigation projects for feasibility studies implemented by 
various institutions such as water resources planning institutes, water resources 
research institutes, hydraulic design institutes, later became companies), water 
resources university. When these feasibility studies are approved, an irrigation 
design study is carried out to provide the requirements of hydraulic works to 
contracting companies as the Dredging Companies and Hydraulic Works Management 
and Operation Companies under MARD, or Construction Companies in other 
Ministries. 
While all irrigation plans and most of feasibility and design studies are done by the 
Central Government institutes or companies, the construction, and thus decision in 
investment) and management of irrigation systems are allocated to different 
management levels with some overlapping in responsibilities. Principal and primary 
canals are under responsibility of Central Government. Primary and secondary 
canals, Fig. 3) are under responsibility of provincial authorities. District authorities 
are responsible for secondary and tertiary canals, and communes are responsible for 
tertiary and on-farm systems. There are some overlapping in responsibility on 
primary canals between central and provincial, secondary canals between provincial 
and district, and on tertiary canals between district and communes. This overlapping 
is to ensure interaction and integration between authorities at different 
administrative levels. Official participatory irrigation management, PIM) and 
irrigation management transfer, IMT) to direct water users as Water Sharing Groups, 
WSGs - “to duong nuoc” in Vietnamese) and farmers have also started, but the 
effects are still limited. The informal management system, such as oral agreement 
among actors, farmers, WSGs and companies) are still more common, but not 
documented.   
Under the management system in Vietnam, participation in decision is requested, 
therefore group decision is dominant. However, this group decision approach leads to 
a problem in management because no individual wants to be responsible when 
decision is wrong, or considered as wrong by the others). Therefore even in reality 
certain person, as Chairman or Director) is the real decision maker, a group meeting 
for making a decision is always requested, and the final decision was officially 
assigned to the group with a minute of the meeting. Document on decision made by 
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individual is not usually prepared, and if exists, it is not publicized. Only in few 
special cases, as for the late Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, decision on water resources 
development in the MRD was publicized. 
During the strong centralized period, before reform in 1986), the decision process 
was top-down, from Central Government to lower levels, and decision was made by 
supply side, water resources ministry) rather than demand side, agriculture and 
other water use sectors).  After reform, under the new market oriented economy, 
demand side and local management authorities have started to play more important 
roles in decision process. However, the main actors are still agencies that control the 






























Figure 3: A typical canal network with settlements along canal bank in the Mekong 
River Delta 
(Imagery@2009 DigitalGlobe, Cnes/Spot Image, GeoEys from Google Wikimapia) 
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What is left for irrigation in 1975 
As mentioned above, during the French colony period until 1954, because 
uncultivated land was still large and population density was low, irrigation was 
mainly combined to the development of canal systems for navigation and 
resettlements to expand into the new fallow regions. Therefore decision on irrigation 
during this period was not clearly documented. The expansion of canal system was 
decided by the French agencies. Improvement of irrigation system was implemented 
in the small scale where settlements were setting up and farming was implemented., 
Kham, 2008). 
During the Vietnam war, due to the need of rice production for South Vietnam, 
decision on large irrigation projects were made by the Government as planned by the 
General Department of Irrigation, Ministry of Public Works. However, due to the war, 
irrigation development was centralized but only limited number of small projects 
could be implemented.. Decision were mainly done at the central government levels, 
based on the agreements between Ministry of Public Works and other Ministries such 
as Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Defense… Provincial authorities and community 
had very little role in decision, but mainly in implementing the projects in 
cooperation with state and private companies in dredging and construction of 
irrigation systems. However, the real decision was not only by the General 
Department of Irrigation at central Government and Inter-provincial Irrigation 
Departments in the Mekong Delta, but also the military who was controlling the 
security. Donors were also playing important role in deciding the size of the projects, 
e.g. ADB in the Tan An and Go Cong projects, the Japan Government in the Tiep 
Nhat project, D&R, 1968: in Kham, 2008).  
 
Decision on irrigation in the Mekong Delta after 1975  
1975: Irrigation development without plan – political decision 
In the aftermath of the Vietnam War in May 1975, government at all levels was busy 
with the rearrangement of the state’s management system and the preparation for 
the reunification process. During this transition period, power vacuum occurred in all 
development sectors. Irrigation development plan in the MRD prepared during the 
war was considered no longer suitable for the new situation and new management 
structure. At the same time, the government did not have any ready-formulated plan 
to replace the old one. In this context, irrigation development activities were 
proposed primarily to occupy and control the labor force that existed in the 
communities, ‘public service labour’ contributions - lao dong cong ich). Small canals 
were dug by hand in every province without planning and design. Later such 
unplanned development led to several problems, in particular in the areas of acid 
sulphate soils where disturbing surface soils caused serious pollution of acidity into 
canal systems and spread over the fresh water zones at the beginning of rainy 
season.1 Water resources, “thuy loi” in Vietnamese) was called water disaster, “thuy 
hai” in Vietnamese). 
1976-1977: Bringing experiences from Red River Delta to the Mekong River Delta 
                                          
 
 
1 Such way of using labour force was phased out in favour of charging a fee and replacing manual dredging 
with the hire of mechanical dredgers. 
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Four months after the re-unification of the country, established to study the water 
resources development plan, mainly focusing on irrigation for rice. From the 
agriculture policy point of view, Vietnam is represented by two rice bowls at two 
ends connected by a bamboo stick. One rice bowl is the Red River Delta, RRD), and 
the other is the MRD. The MRD was expected to be a much bigger rice bowl than the 
RRD due to its fertile soil and larger arable area. Therefore while the new water 
resources development direction for 1976-1980 was still under study by a Water 
Resources Planning Team for the Mekong Delta of the Ministry of Water Resources a 
decision was made to bring experiences from the RRD to the MRD.  
The Water Resources Planning Team produced its first report on irrigation 
development entitled: “Direction for Water Resources Planning for Mekong Delta in 
1977-1978”. This report was used as basic reference for the Water Resources 
Development Plan in 1976-1980. The plan proposed to increase rice production in 
the MRD through the introduction of large pumping stations and large canal system 
following the irrigation development model from the RRD. In practice, these large 
pumping stations with capacity of few hundred m3/hour, Russian type produced by 
factories in the North) for service area of 1,000 ha are not suitable to the MRD where 
pumping lift is low, 1-3 m compared to 5-10 m in the RRD). Not to mention that soil 
property in the MRD with high clay contents causes cracks and leaching of water in 
above-ground canals after a short distance of some ten meters. Moreover, unlike in 
the RRD, in the MRD, most farmers preferred to pump their irrigation water 
independently, using their portable low-lift pumps rather than depending on large 
pumping station. These small pumps were based on a 4-12 horse-power Japanese 
engine purchased before 1975 for dual purposes: irrigation and navigation, “shrimp-
tail boat”). However, these small pumps were considered as a individual productiong 
equipment of capitalism to tight farmers with their market, engine, spart parts...) 
and did not support the large cooperative approach therefore they should be 
replaced by the large Russian pumping stations. Farmers were requested to 
contribute the pumps into cooperative properties, and operation of individual pumps 
were limited by gasoline control or other administrative measures. The use of these 
low-lift pumps were recovered later by the take off in pumps as a results of the 
liberalization of trade restrictions in Vietnam and the support given by the Chinese 
government to promoting exports of cheap pump sets to many areas in various 
countries, including the RRD. In turn, at the end of this period many large pumping 
stations were abandoned, while others still operating had very low efficiency with 
each station only used to irrigate few farms near the station., Therefore in the 
irrigation in the next period, these low efficiency pumping stations were not included.  
At the same time, several WSGs continued to use the small irrigation systems with 
canals at ground surface and low-lift pumps efficiently, and taking advantage of high 
water level at high tide. So in fact, the farming community continued to play an 
important role in irrigation management at the farm level, despite the government’s 
top-down decision. These WSGs naturally developed in the community due to the 
needs of water sharing and the traditional culture of people living in the MRD without 
much intervention by external actors. 
1978-1980: Political will at any price without impact assessment  
The damage of rice crop due to severe flood in the MRD in 1978 caused serious 
shortage of rice in the country, and thus strongly politicized government’s decision 
on irrigation development at that time. The concept of achievement by political will 
under centralized decision system applied during the war was applied in irrigation 
development when the government decided that the defined development objective 
that is to increase rice production in the MRD should be achieved at any price 
without attention to social, economic and environmental impacts. Due to the 
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shortage of rice in the whole country, the Government requested each province 
should provide as much as possible. This policy led to an administrative measure: 
blocking the market by prohibiting transport of rice and other basic food as meat 
from this province to another province, with a hypothesis that local people would 
provide more rice and agricultural products for subsistence when they could not find 
in the market. The model of cooperatives in the RRD was also applied to support the 
objective of increasing rice production.  
In the irrigation sector, effort to increase rice production was done through the 
expansion of rice planted area with higher yield dry season crops, the summer-
autumn from May to August before the flood and the winter-spring from 
November/December to February. This expansion was done primarily with expansion 
of irrigation system and the support from local authorities and farmers. Thank to the 
abundant radiation, leaching effect of flood water and fertility from flood sediment, 
rice yield of the winter-spring crop, 4-6 tons/ha) is much higher than that of main 
rainy season crop, 1.5-2.5 tons/ha). The main constraint in promoting dry season 
rice crops was water, as it was not always available at the rice field during this crop 
season. Irrigation became the key determining factor in government’s policy focus on 
dry season crops. Yet, ensuring irrigation water provision to the expanded area for 
dry season crops is not without any constraint. Lack of dredging equipment, petrol 
and capital were among the constraints reported by the Minister of Water Resources. 
Nevertheless, driven primarily by political considerations at national level, a top 
leader insisted that the expansion should proceed by organizing large public fields for 
digging canals by hand, and that the government would print more money bills as to 
address the lack of capital. Another leader thought that farmers in the MRD, forced 
into the same model of cooperatives in the RRD, would support Government policy in 
increasing of rice crops when irrigation water was available, Kham, 2008). 
Obviously, decision in irrigation in this period was still made by the top leaders at 
Central Government and was not based on the results of engineering, socio-
economic and environment studies. The Ministry of Water Resources, provincial and 
local authorities had to focus all their efforts to follow such decision under several 
constraints as mentioned above. Other actors were only playing minor roles. Decision 
in irrigation development were also focusing on the poor and remote areas with low 
population under the control of the National Liberation Front during the war, but 
most of these areas are with poor soils, flooded or intruded by saline water, and 
under developed due to the lack of capital for infrastructures and appropriate 
management knowledge.  
1981-1985: more studies needed before making decision 
The failure to expand expected dry season crops made the Government realized that 
decision based only on political will without scientific back-up does not work, Ninh, 
2003; Dieu, 2006). This realization was evidenced from the formulation and 
implementation of State Program 60-02 and 60B focusing on biophysical, socio-
economic survey in the MRD and State Program 06-03 for integrated water resources 
management in the MRD. Updated data and analysis results from these state 
programs provided background information to revise the irrigation development plan. 
Furthermore, from 1981 to 1985, the line Ministries also expanded topographic and 
hydrological surveys into the areas where accessibility was limited during the war to 
strengthen their planning database. An elevation point map at scale 1:25,000 was 
established, cross-sections of main rivers and canals were updated and a network of 
over 100 hydrological stations were built to monitor water level, flow, salinity, acidity 
and other water quality parameters. With updated topographic and hydrological data, 
hydraulic and salinity models were also developed and regularly refined to simulate 
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better the water conditions under different construction and management 
alternatives.   
Under the new development plan, the MRD was divided into 5 large water 
development zones, namely Long Xuyen Quadrangle, West Hau River, East Tien 
River, Transitional Zone between Tien and Hau Rivers, and Ca Mau Peninsula.  Water 
resources plan was revised in details by planning teams in charge of each zone. A 
delta-wide water resources development plan for 1986-1990 was formulated with the 
main objective to increase rice production to 9-10 million tons in 1990, as planned 
by D&R) and 15-16 million tons by 2000. At a smaller management scale, the MRD 
was divided into 120 water sectors, and irrigation projects were formulated for each 
or a group of sectors connected by main rivers or canals. Provincial irrigation 
development plans were also prepared by provincial authorities with the assistance 
of national planning institutes.  
Based on these plans, irrigation development was implemented in different parts of 
the MRD: 
• In the Northern part where the land is deeply flooded, covered by acid 
sulphate soils and fresh water source are limited in the dry season, a main 
canal network was excavated from the Tien river to the Vam Co rivers, from 
the Tien river to the Hau river, and from the Hau river to the Gulf of Thailand 
to irrigation for the winter-spring rice crop in the low flow season. A low dike 
system would allow protection from the August flood, lower than the flood 
peak that usually occurs in September or October) and harvesting of the 
summer-autumn rice crop. After this rice crop was harvested, flood water is 
allowed to flow into fields for trapping fertile sediment and leaching out 
pollution.    
• In the Central part of the Delta where the land is moderately flooded but 
fresh water is abundant, existing canal network was improved with denser 
secondary canals, and dike for full flood protection was built so that rice crops 
can be cultivated through out the year. 
• In the Southern part where the land is intruded by saline water and fresh 
water source is limited, dike and sluices for salinity control were built and 
canal network was improved to cultivate two rice crops in a year instead of 
only one rainfed rice crop. 
 
Although the water resources plan completed in 1985 had not taken into account the 
all development factors under the reform policy, in particular the environmental 
impacts in flooded and saline areas, these irrigation measures helped the farmers in 
the MRD to increase rice production from 4.7 million tons in 1975 to 7.0 million tons 
in 1985 and later to 9.0 million tons in 1990. 
During this period, the decision was not only based on political will of top leaders at 
Central Government anymore, but based on results from scientific studies 
implemented by scientists and researchers at universities and at research and 
planning institutes. Possible environmental impacts and effects on livelihoods of local 
people in irrigation development became part of policy consideration. At the same 
time, this new policy approach with focusing on scientific studies created more room 
for policy discussion. Such discussion was most apparent in the excavation plan of 
new canals, like the Hong Ngu canal) in the Plain of Reeds, Kham, 2008). The 
excavation of new canals in that zone received strong objection from both national 
scientists at various universities and research institutes as well as international 
scienties who studied the reclamation of acid sulphate soils in other countries around 
the world. They argued that these new canals would drain out acid water into the 
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Mekong River and cause pollution to the rice areas. At the same time, the voice of 
Provincial People Committees was stronger in the decision of irrigation development. 
This was evidenced from the strong request of stopping the excavation of Hong Ngu 
canal by the Chairman of Dong Thap Province during the visit of Minister of Water 
Resources to his province. Referring to the analysis provided by his scientific group 
that were contradictory with the opinion of scientists and planners of the Ministry, 
the Chairman thought that this new canal will lower the groundwater table and lead 
to more severe acid water situation. Only after a long discussion, the Minister could 
convince the Chairman to allow the excavation of this canal to be continued.2  
However, since government control of market chains remained strong, rice 
production did not increase as fast as expected because no motivation for farmers to 
invest into farming, although water for irrigation was provided for growing 2-3 rice 
crops per year. At the end of this period the country leaders understood that the 
model of cooperatives from the RRD to convert all farm production resources such as 
land, machine, labor force… to common cooperative properties could not be applied 
in the MRD because of differences in natural resources, socio-economic conditions 
and culture. Therefore during this period the decision at farm level by farmers and 
WSG continued to be the most important in irrigation, although large scale irrigation 
systems were built or strengthened by Government, for examples the Tan Thanh-Lo 
Gach, Hong Ngu, Dong Tien, An Phong-My Hoa, Nguyen Van Tiep in the Plain of 
Reeds, the Tri Ton, Ba The, Muoi Chau Phu, Rach Gia-Ha Tien in the Long Xuyen 
quadrangle, the KH1, KH3, KH5, O Mon, Cai San, KH7, KH8 in the west Bassac. 
1986-1995: Irrigation reform 
The shift made by the government of Vietnam from centralized economy controlled 
and subsidized by the Government to “socialism-oriented” market economy, under 
doi moi) which allows competition in supplying and consuming of products had a 
great effect in the country’s production systems, and also in irrigation. Driven by the 
economic benefit they could get from their farming practices, farmers and WSG 
started to use the irrigation systems at full capacity for cultivation. Table 1 
hereunder shows how farmer’s decision to change their  cropping systems and 
increase irrigation water use has resulted in expansion of irrigated farming area as 
well as increase in rice production. Area of double and triple rice, either 
supplementary irrigated at the beginning of rainy season or fully irrigated during dry 
season, were expanded from 619,000 ha in 1985 to 1,023,000 ha in 1990 and 
1,163,000 ha in 1995. At the same time, area of one rainfed rice decreased from 
1,355,000 ha to 891,000 ha and 674,000 ha. The rate of conversion from one rice to 
irrigated double/triple rice during 1985-1990 was about 2 times of the rate during 
1976-1980. With irrigated rice in the dry season, average rice yield increased from 
3.0 tons/ha in 1985 to 3.7 tons/ha in 1995 and 4.0 tons/ha in 1995. However the 
                                          
 
 
2 After this canal was linked to the West Vaico River, acid water was pushed into this 
river by a strong flow from the Mekong River, then the water quality in the acid 
sulphate soil areas was improved and suitable for rice cultivation. Based on this 
result, many other canals through the acid soil areas in the Plain of Reeds and the 
Long Xuyen Quadrangle were excavated. It is difficult to conclude that such decision 
of canal excavation was really based on scientific analysis or on the perception of 
playing with risk by trial and error experiment in the real world that could be only 
accepted in the management system of Vietnam.    
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increase in rice yield under market economy also caused difficulty to farmers in 
making decision of investment into farm irrigation and changing cropping systems 
because of market price fluctuations with product supply and demand, and the lack 
of facilities for post-harvest processing and storage3. The Government understood 
that not only irrigation or agriculture, but harmonizing of development plans of all 
sectors are essential.    
 
 Table 1: Rice production in 1980-2005  
Item Unit     1980     1985     1990 1995 2000       2005 
 Agricultural land 1.000 ha  2,442 2,463 2,498 2,970  
 Of which: 3 crops/year 1.000 ha  4 97 148 359  
                2 crops/year 1.000 ha  615 926 1,015 1,334  
                1 crop/year 1.000 ha  1,355 891 674 292  
 Total planted rice area 1.000 ha 2,263 2,346 2,547 3,121 3,946 3,826 
Rice yield ton/ha 2.26 3.01 3.71 4.02 4.23 5.04 
Rice production 1,000 tons 5,114 7,061 9,449 12,546 16,702 19,299 
Source: SIWRP, 2005 and General Statistics Office, 2007. 
 
These changes indicated a fact that the real actors in the irrigation decision were 
farmers who decided to change their cropping systems, and thus to increase 
irrigation water use. However, the irrigation planners and other actors claimed that 
their decision in improvement of canal system during the preceding 10 years was the 
precondition for farmers’ decision. No matter who were real decision makers, 
irrigation development was paid more attention by not only by the Central 
Government, but by other actors as provincial, district, commune officers and water 
managers, farmers and WSG, because irrigation water became a condition for 
improving the production and their livelihoods.  
Under the reform, from 1987 the policy in water resources development in the MRD 
was also changed: not only focus on irrigation for agriculture but also on integrated 
water resources management, IWRM) for all economic sectors, including navigation 
and transport, flood control, rural development, domestic and industrial water 
supply. By the end of 1980’s the fresh water area along the main rivers in the central 
MRD has been developed with double/triple rice and other high value crops as 
vegetable and fruit trees at a speed faster than in the flooded and salinity intrusion 
areas at upstream and downstream. The Government then decided to focus water 
resources development on three large zones where water control was still limited: 
the Long Xuyen Quadrangle, the Plain of Reeds and the Ca Mau Peninsula. The 
irrigation system during this period was evaluated by irrigation planners as an open 
system with several advantages: easy intake of irrigation water and drainage of 
                                          
 
 
3 During the first few years after rice production increase, harvested paddy was 
stored in many schools and commune offices because farmhouses were full, and 
sometimes rice bags were used as gift at the wedding ceremony.     
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excess water, being used as navigation route, maintaining free migration of fish 
species, not require high skill in operation and maintenance but a major 
disadvantage of this system was the difficulty in control water flow, water quality, 
including salinity intrusion and pollution.  
Donors returned to the MRD to support the construction of irrigation system in small 
projects few thousand hectares, such as the Tam Phuong project of funded by 
Australian in 1985-1990. Although these projects are small, a budget of few millions 
US$ in 1985 was quite significant when annual GDP, PPP) per capita was still as low 
as US$ 492, compared with US$ 1,646 of Thailand in the same year, and with US$ 
1,008 of Vietnam 10 year later in 1995 and US$ 2,792 in 2008). The most important 
contribution of donors to the decision in irrigation was at the beginning of 1990s 
when the Government also understood the limitation of Vietnamese capacity in 
planning for development under market-oriented economy. A project to prepare the 
Mekong Delta Master Plan funded by UNDP was implemented from 1990 to 1994 by 
World Bank and Mekong River Committee Secretariat. The NEDECO, a Dutch 
consultant group, was selected to carry out this study, with the coordination of the 
National Planning Committee and contribution of line Ministries such as Water 
Resources, Agriculture and Food Industry, Forestry, Fisheries, Health, Transport, 
Construction, Energy, Sciences and Technologies, and 11 provinces in the MRD.  
For irrigation, the Master Plan proposed: 
• Adjust production systems and crop calendar so that irrigation demand at the 
lowest low flow period will not increase and salinity intrusion is maintained as 
during 1990-1994. 
• Expand the salinity control projects such as the South Mang Thit, the Quan Lo 
Phung Hiep, and the West Vam Co to irrigate for 2-3 rice crops in a year in the 
coastal zone. 
• Strengthen the dike for protection from August flood in the Northern part of the 
MRD, and intake flood water at the peak of flood to avoid from increasing flood 
level in Cambodia. 
• Strengthen the dike for protection from annual peak flood for the central parts 
where fruit tree and 3 annual crops are cultivated.  
Under this Master Plan, there large Improvement of Water Resources Infrastructure 
projects were proposed for funding by World Bank with total investment funds of 
USD 128.4 million in which the IDA loan is SDR 72.8 million, equivalent to USD 
101.8 million according to exchange rate at the signing date of Loan Agreement): 
the O Mon Xa No, 45,430 ha) in fresh water zone, the South Mang Thit, 225,680 ha, 
covering the Tam Phuong project mentioned in Box 1) and the Quan Lo Phung Hiep, 
178,888 ha) in saline water zone, location in Figure 4). 
These projects fit well the decision of the Government to expand the irrigated rice 
into the flooded and salinity intrusion areas. However, in these areas population 
density was still low, infrastructures and facilities were poor. Therefore together with 
improvement of irrigation by strengthening or excavating of canals, new settlements, 
road, electricity and public infrastructures as school, market, hospital, etc were also 
built along the canals. Such development reflected a change in the basic concept of 
development: decision based on political will of top leaders does not work if it is not 
supported by actors at lower levels and affected people. Such sharing of decision 
power in irrigation was also reflected by the allocation of responsibility on different 
canal levels: principla and primary canals by Central Government, secondary canals 
by provincial, tertiary canals by provincial and district, and on-farm by commune, 
WSG and farmers. Nevertheless, planning and budget management was still 
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centralized at Central Government with a requirement of increased rice production 
every year to each province. A target of every province during this period was to join 
the club of 1 million tons of rice as encourage by the Government. On the other 
hand, construction works were allocated to companies at different management 
levels depending on canal levels. O&M were still based on irrigation fee and subsidy, 
but the operation agencies were converted to state-owned companies. 
1995-2000: The need for, and effect of, a strong leadership 
In principle Ministry of Water Resources was responsible for all water resources 
development in the country, in practice hydropower was under the Ministry of 
Industry, domestic water supply was under the Ministry of Construction and 
navigation was under the Ministry of Transport. Therefore for improving the 
coordination between irrigation and agriculture in rural areas, in October 1995 the 
Ministry of Water Resources was combined with the Ministry of Agriculture-Food 
Industry and Ministry of Forestry to formulate the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, MARD). 
Until 1995, irrigation system in the fresh water and saline water has been basically 
developed or under construction, see example in Box 2: Quan Lo Phung Hiep 
project). However, severe flood damages in the deeply flooded area occurred in 
1991, 1994, 1996 and 2000. The reason why flood control in deeply flooded area 
was not considered in the previous period because: 
Flood control will affect the flood depth in Cambodia, and the costs of alternatives for 
minimize increase of flood depth in Cambodia are too high for considering in the 
preceding period when Vietnam economy was not developed yet. 
•   There was a strong objection by many scientists and local leaders to the full flood 
control plan prepared by water resources planner with the following arguments: 
flood water with sediment contributed fertility to the rice fields as a significant source 
of nutrient for the soil where farmers were still poor and had only limited capital for 
fertilizer inputs, although the survey showed that in most areas, sediment 
precipitated quickly after a short distance from river or canal banks, and the more 
significant effect could be leaching effects and cleaning of toxic and crop diseases 
rather than sediment). 
• Catching wild fishes in deeply flooded area provided a significant income to the 
poor. 
flood control changed the flow regime and caused negative impacts on the 
environment, in particular acid water pollution would be serious when the canals 
were excavated in deeply flooded areas covered by severe acid sulphate soils in Plain 
of Reeds and Long Xuyen quadrangle., later experience in these areas showed that it 
took 3-5 years to leach out the acidity on the disturbed soils on the embankments of 
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Box 1: The Tam Phuong project, location in Figure 4), Adopted from Australian Mekong Resource 
Centre, 2004). 
The Tam Phuong project in Tra Vinh province reflect in practice the tension between the development 
objectives of equity and sustainability that was not taken into account when the decision of irrigation 
system was made. Tra Vinh is one of the poorest provinces in the MRC, with a high proportion of its 
population classified as poor. The project aims included: salinity intrusion control; acid sulphate soil 
control; drainage; and rice intensification. The project was constructed between 1985 and 1990, and 
covers an area of 7 000 hectares, reaching over 30 000 people. 
According to gross measures of productivity the Tam Phuong water control project is regarded as a 
success by provincial and local officials. Rice production from the area has increased beyond 
projected levels, with the target production of 42 000 tons of rice exceeded by 6 000 tons in 1998. 
The local population, however, is faced with considerable challenges, including poor returns from 
rice, decline in environmental quality due to agro-chemical use, high cost of rice inputs, difficulties of 
water access and control, inequitable water access, and barriers to diversification. There are 
numerous costs associated with local water use, including: pumping costs, government irrigation 
fees and contributions, and private water-access fees. The primary cost is associated with water 
pumping, which is highly variable yet increases significantly for those without direct access to canals. 
There are also extra costs incurred by those who hire pumps, usually the poor and female headed 
households. Irrigation fees constituted a small but significant cost of production. Fees are set by 
provincial water resource authorities according to national guidelines. These fees form a crucial 
income source for provincial irrigation authorities since they have been reorganized as a state owned 
enterprise and seek to be financially autonomous of the central level. 
Over the 15 years since completion of the Tam Phuong project, due to the low income base of the 
irrigation enterprise officials were faced with the disheartening prospect of overseeing the irrigation 
and water control scheme slowly degrade and fall apart before their eyes. Poor design, as well as 
neglect of the dynamic nature of local environmental conditions, flux of tides, seasons and silt laden 
water) contributed to the rapid siltation of canals and the failure of sluice gates. The local tertiary 
canal system is seriously inadequate in coverage and capacity, and results in problems of access for 
close to half of those interviewed. This results in people having to pump-through their neighbor’s 
fields. The Evaluation Report of the Tam Phuong project identified this poor design of the tertiary 
system, stating there was a “gross underestimate of the density of the [required] on-farm irrigation 
and drainage systems”, Asian Institute of Technology and Mekong Secretariat 1991:21).  
Basic system maintenance is critical to ensuring water access is fair and equitable, as those with 
poor access or with land far from water sources are the first to suffer when systems begin to break 
down. The prioritization of funds for maintenance of existing irrigation systems by government at the 
central and provincial level remains seriously inadequate. Instead, whilst the existing system was 
woefully inadequate and inequitable in terms of water access, the government undertook to allocate 
central funds and borrow from the World Bank for a vastly expanded water control system for 
elsewhere in Tra Vinh and neighboring provinces, World Bank Mekong Delta Water Resources Project 
– South Mang Thit Component). There is a clear implication here for the way ODA is used to support 
poverty alleviation. The resolution of equity concerns, in terms of ensuring there is not an unfair 
burden of water access placed on the poor, needs to be considered in line with sustainable financial, 
operation and maintenance strategies. Such strategies need to be worked out by local authorities in 
partnership with local communities to find lasting solutions applicable to projects and the broader 
policy context. 
In 2004-2005 the Japanese government supported the rehabilitation of the canals and canal gates of 
the local area of the Tam Phuong system. This reliance on aid to undertake basic maintenance and 
system upgrade undermines the potential of local authorities together with local communities to 
identify sustainable solutions to system maintenance. An implication of this long-term study for aid is 
that greater emphasis needs to be given to promoting internal financial sustainability within project 
operation to ensure project sustainability and equity.  
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Box 2: The Quan Lo Phung Hiep project, location in Figure 4)  
The Quan Lo Phung Hiep region in the Ca Mau peninsula with a total area of approximately 
450,000 hectares, is a target area of rice land expansion in the 1990s. The Region is a low-lying, 
flat delta with elevation less than 1.5 m. The two most important soil groups are the acid sulphate 
soils, 52% of the total area, mainly in western part) and the saline soils, 47%). Sandy and peaty 
soils only cover about 1% of the total area. During the dry season, the difference in tidal regimes 
drives flows from the South China Sea to the Guild of Thailand causes high salinity intrusion across 
the Region. During the early part of the rainy season, water pH in the canals drops from normal 
values, 6-7) to below 4 due to acid water flushed from acid sulphate soils. Salt water intrusion 
from the seas via four main rivers, the My Thanh, Ganh Hao, Cai Lon and Ong Doc makes water 
quality in most parts of the region unsuitable for irrigation from January to June. Therefore 
protection against salinity intrusion, especially through the My Thanh and Ganh Hao rivers, was 
identified as the key intervention for agricultural development. Based on the assessment on 
engineering feasibility, socio-economic benefits and environmental impacts of a study in 1989-
1991, the option of construction of 12 large sluices along the national highway for protection 
against salt water intrusion and irrigation of the central part of 250,000 ha was selected.  
The prefeasibility study by ESSA et al., 1992) proposed that the construction of 12 large sluices 
would be implemented in two or three phases with a sequence from east, Bac Lieu province) to 
west, Ca Mau province) and a delay of few years in between to check impacts of canal excavation 
and land use change on acid sulphate soils in the western part. However, while waiting for a loan 
from the World Bank Mekong Delta Water Resources Project – Quan Lo Phung Hiep Component), in 
1993 the Government decided to build the project by national budget, and the construction of 
large sluices were implemented almost simultaneously to provide equal investment budget to both 
provinces. The construction of the first 3 large sluices in the east was completed in 1993, and 
effects on water conditions and subsequently on expansion of rice area have been observed since 
1994. In 1996, the double rice area was up to 82,000 ha. Only in 1997 when 7 sluices were built, 
the Feasibility Study for Update Environmental Impact Assessment and Environmental Action Plan 
were reviewed, SIWRP, 1997 and Haskoning, 1998) to decide the implementation of the World 
Bank project, and a project appraisal document was prepared in 1999. Until 2000, when 11 sluices 
have been built and the secondary canals in the acid sulphate soil area have been excavated, the 
total area of double and triple rice and upland crops was up to 101,000 ha, 35% of target 
protected area), but mainly in non acid soils in the western part. 
In areas with acid sulphate soils from the mid-1990s onwards shrimp growers, attracted by the 
high profits - 2 to 10 times of rice cultivation - of producing tiger shrimp, Penaeus monodon) for 
export, switched to stocking tiger shrimp post-larvae, and pond shrimp culture became popular, 
Brennan et al., 2000). The area of shrimp culture increased from about 10,000 ha in 1990 to over 
30,000 ha in 1996, SIWRP, 2003). As the sluices in the western fringe of the study area became 
operational after 1998, thereby advancing the salinity-protected area westward, the supply of 
brackish water required for shrimp production was cut off, many farmers were forced to abandon 
aquaculture and to convert to less profitable rice farming. Conflicts between agriculture and 
aquaculture due to water control with a peak in 2001 when shrimp growers broke a sluice to intake 
saline water into the protected area prompted the Government to re-examine the original policy 
emphasizing rice production and to explore alternative land use plan and sluice operation that 
would accommodate shrimp cultivation in the western part while maintaining the areas of intensive 
rice production in the eastern part. A significant expansion of shrimp cultivation area were 
observed with 51,000 ha in 2001 and 64,000 ha in 2002. 
While the water control system for irrigation has been not completed, and land use has been 
changed back to brackish water aquaculture, the Tact Thu large sluice with a shiplock with a cost 
of about 5 million US$ was decided in 1997 to be built in the Ong Doc river at the western border 
of the protected area by a loan, also from World Bank, for improvement of navigation separated 
from the World Bank Mekong Delta Water Resource Project. Therefore after its construction from 
2001 to 2007 this sluice has not been operated for its main purpose of salinity control because of 
change in policy that allows brackish water aquaculture rather than only targeting to fresh water 
agriculture in the region. 
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Therefore a concept developed during preceding periods was “living with flood” that 
encouraged local people living on water or running to higher elevation places as 
canal banks during 4-5 months of flood season, from August to November or 
December. However, with denser population, higher cost infrastructure and larger 
rice crop area under improved economy and livelihoods, this concept was questioned 
and revised. Flood control, in combination with irrigation, transportation and 
settlement was decided as the main target of water resources development. The 
objectives of flood control were:  
• Protect from flood for urban areas, rural settlements and main transport routes in 
the flooded areas. 
• Reduce water level at the beginning and the end of flood season for the safety of 
two rice crops, the Summer-Autumn and the Winter-Spring by improving 
drainage to the Guild of Thailand and West Vaico River. 
• Reduce water depth at the flood peak period to lower the costs of infrastructure 
but does not cause significant increase of water level in Cambodia.    
• Improve soil properties, in particular in severe acid sulphate soils for expansion 
of cultivation area into fallow land. 
• Improve living conditions for rural people.  
• Protect the country boundary by two layers of canals and highways, one highway 
N1 along a canal at the border between Cambodia and Vietnam and the other N2 
along a canal at a distance of 20-30 km. 
Because there were many concerns about impacts of flood control in the past, such 
combination of flood control with other development purposes might not be decided 
if there was not a strong leader, the late Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet, who 
spearheaded Vietnam's "economic miracle" of the 1990s. With the position of Prime 
Minister from 1992 to 1997, he was one of the leading figures to bring about the 
reform that transformed Vietnam from a socialist system to one of the world's 
fastest-growing market economies. He decided to implement many important 
projects in the country during his term such as the North-South 500 kV power line, 
the Ho Chi Minh Highway, the Dung Quat Oil Refinery. He is also praised as a leader 
who was willing to listen the advise from scientists in making decision.  
In the MRD his name is associated with the Decision 99/TTg 9/2/1996 on “Long-term 
direction and 5 year plan 1996-2000 for irrigation, transport and rural development 
in the MRD”, Khai, 2008). This case is quite different to the traditional culture in 
Vietnamese management where the decision is always attached to a group as 
mentioned above, and reflects his strong leadership. With this Decision, from 1996 
to 2000 the total investment for development in the MRD was estimated 15,500 
billion VND or 9% of GDP, equivalent to 1.4 billion US$, with exchange rate US$ 1 = 
VND 11,000 in 1996) of which Government invests 46% and people in the MRD 
contribute 54%. Flood control was paid much attention in this investment decision 
because of the above mentioned contradictory opinions. To support to this decision 
while there are different opinions among scientists of various Ministries and 
universities, a special team of scientists was formulated to study water control 
alternatives for the MRD. The team was headed by Professor Academician Nguyen 
Van Hieu, who is a well-known specialist in neutrino physics, but was Chairman of 
the Vietnam Institute for Sciences and Technology. Although Prof. Hieu is neither a 
water resources planner nor a rural development expert, his leading position helped 
P.M. Kiet to bring scientists of different institutes and universities, and water 
resources planners to a compromise alternative that is not too extreme in terms of 
full protection, but also not continuing the simple “living with flood” under natural 
conditions and partial flood control for some areas as before. 
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Although a set of flood control measures in each zone were proposed and approved 
by the Government in 1999, the flood control plan was revised and implemented 
from 2000 to 2005. The Decision by P.M. Kiet in 1996 helped to bring into practice 
the concept of IWRM targeted in the preceding periods but restricted by the lack of 
coordination among different actors such as Central Government, line Ministries, 
Provincial People’s Committees and local people. With his decision in digging canals 
for multipurpose in the flooded area, in 2009 the An Giang People’s Committee 
agreed to honor his name for a 50 km canal to replace the former name T5, 
http://www.cpv.org.vn/cpv/Modules/News/NewsDetail.aspx?co_id=30701&cn_id=3495
18).  
With the expansion of irrigation into the deeply flooded area, the land reclamation 
was at high speed during this period. During 10 years from 1976 to 1985, about 
282.000 ha were converted from fallow land into cultivated land. However, during 
the next 10 years 1986 to 1995, only 56,000 ha were converted, possibly because 
under the reform policy that allowed farmers to decide land use systems and sold 
their products to market, people tried to exploit effectively their existing resources 
before moving into fallow land area. During this 5 year period from 1995 to 2000, 
the reclamation area was 473,000 ha, brought the total arable land in the MRD to 
2,971,000 ha, or 74.8% of total area. So, a conclusion could be that decision on 
resource management at highest level provided the basic conditions for decision in 
irrigation at field-farm level to be realized.  
During this period, with strong leadership in decision of investment, and improved 
economy that allowed the Government to have internal budget to implement the 
development plan, the role of donors was not dominant, see Box 2: the Quan Lo 
Phung Hiep project).  
 
2000 onwards: Decision under diversification in a changing world  
Until 2000, the significant increase of rice production due to reform policy, from 
about 10 million tons of paddy in 1976 to 30 million tons in 2000 has been enough 
for domestic consumption, and a part for export. About 2 million tons of rice in 1990 
and over 4 million tons in 2000 onwards were exported. Irrigation development has 
to move away from the concept of monoculture with rice everywhere. Two conflicting 
directions in irrigation development in the MRD appeared from the beginning of this 
century. On one side, a conservative direction is the continuation of developing and 
strengthening irrigation systems for freshening the whole delta to improving rice 
production because of food security of the country. On the other side, the reform 
direction considers increase of rice production not a development target anymore 
because revenues from rice crop is very low compared with other crops, but 
diversification, including using saline water as resource rather than a constraint, and 
improvement of agricultural product quality are needed to improve income and 
livelihoods of farmers.  
From 2000, the Government started to look for land use options that can convert 
about 350,000 ha of rice land with low yield in the whole country into other land use 
types with higher revenues. In the freshwater area, irrigation system was modified 
and operated for non-rice crops such as vegetable, fruit trees, rice-fish or fresh 
water aquaculture. These changes were mainly decided by farmers or WSG who 
manage small scale irrigation system. In the flooded area, the construction of 
infrastructure including canals and sluices for flood control and irrigation, road and 
settlement were continued. But the most significant changes in land use and 
irrigation system were in the salinity intruded zone where farmers converted their 
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rice and agricultural land into brackish water shrimp fields because revenues from 
shrimp for export is about 10 times higher than rice, see Box 2: Quan Lo Phung Hiep 
project). The area of aquaculture in the MRD were expanded from 135,700 ha in 
1991 to 289.400 ha in 1995 and 571.700 ha in 2002, of which 422.200 ha were 
brackish water aquaculture, mainly shrimp. Irrigation system were changed to adapt 
to the new land use systems, for example sluices that were designed and operated 
to protect from salinity intrusion in the dry season were modified or operated for 
intaking saline water for shrimp cultivation. The system that combined drainage and 
irrigation in the same canal network for agriculture is likely not suitable for 
aquaculture because fish and shrimp are more sensitive to water quality change and 
pollution than crops. Separate canals for drainage and irrigation were suggested and 
started to be build at small scales of farm and WSG.  
However, after Vietnamese products expanded their share in global market, product 
prices in international market have stronger and faster influences to production 
systems, and subsequently to decision in irrigation in the MRD. For examples, the 
ban of Vietnam basa catfish into US market in 2001, the antidumping import tariff on 
Vietnam's shrimp in 2004 by the U.S. Department of Commerce, DOC), or the 
soaring of rice price in international market in 2008, had immediately influence on 
domestic prices of these products, and thus to area, production and inputs, including 
irrigation water use. Up to the time when this paper was prepared, impact of global 
financial crisis in 2009 on irrigation has not been seen clearly yet, but it could be 
clearer in the near future. 
Due to diversification and uncertainties under the market-oriented economy with 
conflicting water demands for agriculture and aquaculture, decision in irrigation 
development is facing with new challenges, but these challenges are different for 
different actors. The Central Government has to decide the continuation of 
agricultural development in the country. This trend is reflected by the annual budget 
allocated to line Ministries. In 2006, MARD budget, ranked second behind that of the 
Ministry of Transport, was 3,154 billion VND, 197 million US$) of which 2,018 billion 
VND, 126 mil US$, 64%) was allocated to infrastructure investment. At lower levels, 
under the economic decentralization process, the provincial and district authorities 
have to decide which irrigation system in their territory is invested or strengthened 
to provide suitable conditions for improving production and livelihoods of local 
people. The Construction Companies and the Hydraulic Works Management and 
Operation Companies are also facing with the process of financial independency 
without subsidy and competition in market requested by Central Government. 
Donors are also facing with new challenge. A mission of World Bank team was 
recently organized in August 2009 to prepare a project on Mekong Delta Integrated 
Rural Development Project for 2011-2015, but the Vietnamese agencies are 
interested to getting new financial supports for the construction of 2 large sluices, 
the Cai Lon and Cai Be to completely enclose and freshen the central part of Ca Mau 
Peninsula, although the effects and impacts of these sluices still need more studies. 
A review of  the implementation of Master Plan 1994 to prepare for a update Master 
Plan and new investment projects was also suggested, although water resources 
development plan is revised every 5 or 10 year and usually contains more and more 
heavy construction infrastructures for fully control water conditions, Figure 4). 
Under the diversity in a changing world, making decision in irrigation development in 
the MRD is more difficult than before, therefore likely the key decision makers are 
those who are controlling the allocation of fund for irrigation, including new 
construction, strengthening or rehabilitation, or maintenance and operation.  
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Figure 4: Water resources development plan in 2010, Source: SIWRP, 2005).  
Contribution of irrigation in the Mekong River Delta in last 35 years 
With the above decisions during last 35 years, irrigation has contributed significantly 
to the increase of rice production in the MRD. In 1975, the total rice area was 1.86 
million ha, 24.5% of floating rice, 59.1 % of transplanted rice and only 9.0% of 
double rice) and the total rice production was 4.7 million tons, corresponding to a 
rice yield of 1.5 to 2.0 tons/ha. In 2004, the total rice area was enlarged to 2.06 
million ha, but area of double or triple rice was 72% and the total rice production 
was 18.5 million tons. With irrigation water, and combined with other agricultural 
practice, farmers in the MRD was able to achieve an average rice crop of over 4 
tons/ha.  
Discussions on decisions in irrigation 
Evolution of decision in irrigation development 
The following tables give an overview of the policy evolution in irrigation 
development in the MRD from the 1975 onwards. The comparison of this evolution 
throughout the 7 periods in last 35 years clearly shows that decision varied with 
policy views and involvement of actors in the process with targets not only for 
irrigation itself but for the outcomes of irrigation development. 
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Table 2:  Comparison of irrigation decision in each period 
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Who are the actors in irrigation development decision-making?  
Through the decision-making processes described above, the following actors are identified 
and their involvement is discussed: 
National Assembly: in principle, National Assembly, as representative of all people of the 
country, is the highest decision body for all development programs, including irrigation 
development. However, many National Assembly members are Government officers, 
including Prime Minister and Ministers, Chairman of Provincial People Committees and 
Departments, therefore their decisions are strongly influenced by the central Government 
policy views.  
Central Government and line Ministries, in particular the Ministry of Water Resources, MWR, 
merged to MARD in 1995): the key actors who prepare and decide the development 
programs, including irrigation, in the whole country. Therefore their decisions cannot only 
focus to the MRD, but are based on a relatively equal development for all regions in the 
country. Even in the MRD, equity in development opportunities are also taken into account 
through the allocation of budget for irrigation development. 
Provincial People Committees and line Departments: in principle, these are also key actors 
in irrigation development in their provinces. However, their roles depend on the 
centralization and decentralization processes that vary during different periods. For 
example, MARD has tried to establish a river basin organization, RBO) for the MRD by 
support of donors such as Australian Government to respond to the requirement of 
coordination in water control by provinces that is sharing a common irrigation system as the 
Quan Lo Phung Hiep project. However, while the provincial water managers need to interact 
regularly in decision on operation of the sluice system for satisfying water requirement for 
rice and shrimp crops, in 2005 the Minister of MARD signed a decision for the establishment 
of an RBO for the Quan Lo Phung Hiep system with functions focusing more on giving policy 
and direction rather than operation. The RBO Committee, led by a Vice Minister and the 
Director General of DWR based in Ha Noi, meets only once a year, and the office is located 
at the southern office of DWR in Ho Chi Minh City. 
District and Commune People Committees and line Departments: the roles of these actors 
are mainly to build and operate irrigation schemes in their districts or communes that were 
decided by Central and Provincial Government. During some years after the reform, started 
in 1986), district was considered as an economic development unit with more power in 
development decision. However, due to the lack of capacity and the recentralization, they 
roles in decision got back to the previous.  
Communities: besides the formal government systems up to commune and hamlet levels, 
communities exist as an informal body that influence to the development decision, in 
particular in land and, irrigation) water use. The relationship in the community is reflected 
by a fact that people in the MRD usually distinguish themselves by their original communes, 
i.e. their life links closely with the commune where their family is based. Therefore local 
people usually pay much attention and share opinion on decision with others in the 
community.     
Water Sharing Group (WSG) and Farmers: obviously irrigation decision at field-farm level is 
decided by individual farmers. However, all the farms in the MRD are linked to a very dense 
canal and river network of principal, primary, secondary, tertiary and on-farm system, Fig. 
4), therefore a WSG is usually formulated by farmers who are sharing the same water 
course. In some cases, the WSG becomes an official body, similarly to a formal Farmer 
Cooperative during some periods) that is accepted in the commune, but in most cases the 
WSG is operated by moral agreement without any paper. 
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Irrigation Project Management Boards (PMBs), Dredging Companies, and Hydraulic Works 
Management and Operation Companies: these are state or provincial authorities implement 
the irrigation projects. PMBs, one for the Mekong River Region, and the other for the Bassac 
River Region) are operated as Government agencies that manage the irrigation investment, 
supervise the project implementation. The Dredging or Construction Companies dig the 
canals and build the constructions as sluices, pumping stations… of the project. After 
constructed, the irrigation systems then were transferred to the Hydraulic Works 
Management and Operation Companies for operation and maintenance. Although these 
agencies or companies, in principle, do not involvement in irrigation decision, but somehow 
they directly contribute or control the efficiency of irrigation projects and thus the decision 
of the future projects. 
Private sector and agricultural product consumers: these actors are still playing minor role 
in decision or investment into irrigation systems, but mainly influence through demands of 
agricultural products. One example is the demand of brackish water shrimp that is exported 
to international and domestic market has a strong influence in the investment and operation 
of irrigation system at the provincial and local levels in many provinces.  
International donors, including lending organizations as ABD, WB: these actors have 
different roles in different periods. In the first few years just after war finished, the 
connection with donors was interrupted. The return of donors in at the end of 1970’s and 
early 1980’s were most welcomed because of the difficulty in country economy. This 
situation lasted for over 15 years because the country still needed external support for 
irrigation development. However, from the late 1990s the improvement of country economy 
has allowed more national budget for development projects, irrigation development has less 
depended on external funding sources, hence roles of international donors has been less 
critical. Although supports from donors are still preferred and decided by Central 
Government, provincial authorities started to question whether such supports are really 
needed, in particular about the loan that future generations will have to pay back. 
Centralization vs decentralization 
Current debate on decision-making pattern in irrigation development centers on polarized 
views towards centralization and decentralization, Fontenelle, 1999; Fritzen, 2006).  The 
Vietnamese MRD case shows, however, that the crucial issue in irrigation decision making 
lies in the ability to synergize government’s policy objective with farmers’ development 
needs, rather than the need to choose the path of centralization and decentralization per se. 
Between 1986-1995, rapid increase in rice production was achieved through development 
collaboration between the government’s and farmers’ efforts: the first through its policy 
decision to expand high value agriculture area, and the latter through their motivation to 
change/adapt their cropping system and increase irrigation water use accordingly. This 
evidenced that there is no direct link between successful policy outcome and the formation 
of farmer organization as a prerequisite for farmer participation, as this is often advocated 
by international development agencies. On the contrary, the MRD case also shows how 
farmer participation took place outside the internationally defined 
institutional/organizational framework of Water User Associations. The irrigation policy 
evolution in the MRD shows the importance to capture farmers’ actual development needs 
within the defined policy framework, rather than to promote prescribed farmer participation.  
This remark is not to give the wrong impression with regard to the importance of farmers’ 
role as development agent in irrigation. Irrigation development policy outcome relies 
primarily on farmers’ ability and response. Policy evolution in the MRD evidenced the 
important role played by farmers in shaping the actual policy outcome. It should be 
emphasized that the need to involve farmer in decision-making process should be based on 
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farmer’s willingness to participate in the process, rather than as a formal development 
requirement.   
 
The evolution of irrigation policies in the MRD shows that Government of Vietnam’s current 
achievement in agriculture development, in term of increase rice production) is rooted in its 
past decision to involve researchers in the overall decision-making process, and thus its 
ability to see the importance of creating a room for policy discussion as a medium to gather, 
technical) information. The way the government distinguished its water resources 
development plan, 1981-1985) according to the different agro-ecological and socio-
economic conditions in the MRD brings into light an important transformation in the 
decision-making pattern in Vietnam irrigation development from centralized political 
decision based on blue-print development model to a more comprehensive decision 
supported by the necessary technical and contextual background and information.  
The fact that this policy discussion is focused on technical issue in water resources 
management, not always involving farmers and other non-state actors shows that this 
policy discussion still was framed within the centralized decision-making pattern in irrigation 
development context at that time. In this context, stakeholder participation and 
involvement in the decision-making process becomes a less prominent issue vis-à-vis 
government’s ability to gather information that is crucial for defining the outcomes of the 
proposed policy. Nevertheless, farmers’ lack of motivation to increase rice production due to 
government’s administrative measures highlights government’s inability to connect their 
defined policy with farmers’ development interest. Fortunately this mistake was corrected in 
the reform period.  
The role of researchers in stimulating policy debate/discussion in irrigation development is 
an important first step towards the establishment of polycentric decision-making 
mechanisms. As discussed in the earlier sections, scientific/technical debate/discussion on 
the issue of flood control enables the provincial government to question the central 
government’s decision and thus negotiate their development perspective vis-à-vis the 
defined policy guideline or decision.  
The question remains, however, how Vietnam can use its experiences in irrigation policy 
formulation in the past to define its future irrigation policy direction. Currently, Vietnam is 
facing major challenges to cope with the changing development tendency from rice-focused 
to diversification, and to a certain extent from infrastructure-oriented to farmer-focused 
development. In the next section, the concept of polycentric decision-making is introduced 
as a conclusion of this paper. Its potential role is allowing the Vietnamese government to 
embark on their new policy journey in irrigation development.   
Back to the future: A new hope in irrigation development? 
Polycentric decision making4 has the potential to cope with future challenges for irrigated 
agriculture, which is to improve land and water productivity in relation to the global attempt 
                                          
 
 
4  Neef, 2009) introduced that the institutional theory of polycentricity was first developed 
by Ostrom in 1961 for the study of collective goods in metropolitan areas. It was only 
recently that the concept of polycentricity gained currency both as a theoretical construct 
and an analytical framework of multi-scale and multi-stakeholder water resource 
governance systems in non-urban areas. Polycentric governance regimes have been 
described as "complex, adaptive systems without one central authority dominating all of the 
others in regard to all policy arenas".  
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to reduce environmental damage, Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in 
Agriculture, 2007). This potential lies in its ability to fit into the changing, evolving 
characteristics of water resources management from single objective, for crop production) 
to multiple functions, including domestic and industry water uses, environmental services), 
as well as from single crop to multiple crop and crop diversification. In this context, 
polycentric decision making can direct the path of irrigation investment strategies, based on 
the development interests of different stakeholders, within but not limited to the agricultural 
sector.  
Polycentric decision making addresses weaknesses of both centralized and decentralized 
decision-making systems, and at the same time synergizing the systems’ strength points. In 
the first place, polycentric decision making offers a conceptual and practical alternative to 
cope with the present physical and institutional inertia embedded in decentralization trends. 
Conceptually, polycentric decision making has the potential to resolve the scaling 
constraints for both centralized, down-scaling) and decentralized, up-scaling) decision 
making. Polycentric decision making links state’s agency’s macro knowledge and 
understanding of system management with farmers’ local knowledge and experience with 
regard to their micro level farming practices. For instance, it provides the state an access to 
grass-roots decision-making processes, while parallel to this it also gives farmers access to 
information with regard to government policy interventions.  
Secondly, polycentric decision making has the potential to address the problem of state 
fragmentation and the issue heterogeneity in general, in relation to farmers’ farming 
systems, decisions, and their development perceptions) as it focuses o the variation of 
stakeholders and their multiple perceptions, positions, and interests at multiple levels, 
hydraulically and administratively). Similarly, instead of running the risk of excluding any 
actors, it emphasizes on the need to include all actors, as well as the necessity to synergize 
their involvement. In addition, polycentric decision making does not only create a new 
decision-making platform with better access to information, but it also provides a greater 
room for manoeuvre for all actors involved, and thus more coordinated decision-making 
basis to reorient or redefine their development roles in relation to their, changing) 
perceptions and interests.  
Thirdly, polycentric decision making allows for experimentation in developing rules to fit a 
range of conditions, Ostrom et al., 1993). This characteristic is very important in shaping 
the system’s flexibility and adaptability to a changing environment.  
For the Vietnam context, polycentric decision making has the potential to enable the state 
to interact with all stakeholders and to converge their different interest as to increase the 
chance to have a win-win policy direction as well as to prevent repeating past policy 
mistakes. The different policy periods show how the government attempts to achieve its 
goal to increase rice production through agriculture extensification, then intensification, and 
back to extensification and crop diversification. The existing technical infrastructure in 
irrigation system is crucial in defining the actual direction(s) of this policy, re)shift.  
In addition, Neef, 2009) proposed that polycentricity and deliberation should be viewed in a 
configurative sense. Polycentricity may be seen as the number and density of nodes, actors) 
and links, interactions) in a resource governance regime, while deliberation refers to the 
power relations among these actors and the frequency, quality and depth of interactions, 
i.e. the modes of communication and decision-making, negotiation and coordination 
mechanisms, information flows, and approaches to mediation and conflict resolution. This 
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suggestion is quite useful for the decision in irrigation of the MRD. Although it is a long way 
to achieve the real polycentric decision making in irrigation development, the evolution of 
decision making process has showed some indications of such direction. 
As formulated by Biggs et al., (2009): “To what extent are future development choices 
constrained by the weight of a history of past choices supporting the state’s technological 
domination over water environments?” highlights how technical characteristics of large-scale 
irrigation systems in the MRD reflect the centralized decision-making structure in the 
country’s irrigation system management. Moreover, as observed by these authors: “The 
way in which delta master plans and basin management schemes have been established in 
the past has produced trends towards technocratic management and solutions that favor 
major modifications to the river’s hydrology that remain problematic in the present”. This 
lasting effect was evidenced from the way investment in irrigation and water control in the 
MRD continued to be focused on large-scale infrastructure projects, following the 
construction legacy of past projects, the Go Cong pioneer agricultural project, and the 
construction of anti-salinity dikes in Quan Lo Phung Hieu project. Yet, at the same time, 
farmers’ ability to convert agricultural land into brackish water shrimp fields as well as their 
ability to modify small-scale irrigation systems towards integrated farming evidenced that 
the existing technical characteristics of the irrigation system should not be treated as a 
static element in irrigation policy development. On the contrary, technical modification and 
to a certain extent the restructuring of decision-making process in irrigation development is 
possible if this is in line with farmers’ development needs. Within this context of policy 
uncertainty, polycentric decision making can be introduced as a new mechanism to develop 
new rules in irrigation development. These new rules centered on the coexistence of rice 
farming and crop diversification/aquaculture, as to find ways to optimize both type of 
farming. Irrigation policy direction in the MRD should then be referred to this process of 
rules formulation.  
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Abstract 
The push for irrigation expansion has been an important public policy issue and the 
subject of numerous development discourses in Cambodia. Some of the key policy 
makers in Cambodia argue that without large-scale irrigation schemes, subsistence 
farmers will remain trapped in a life of poverty and hunger. However, with limited 
government budget allocation, the sector remains weak and dependent on external 
assistance both financially and technically. 
One of the new donors interested in irrigation development in Cambodia is the well-
known oil-rich gulf state of Kuwait that has promised to loan US$546 million in soft 
loans to Cambodia for an infrastructure project primarily focused on the agricultural 
sector. Of this amount, $360 million will be used to construct an irrigation system 
(130,000ha) and a hydropower project (40 MW) on the Stung Sen tributary of the 
Mekong River in Kampong Thom Province.  
This paper will attempt to review the politics of decision-making behind the current 
irrigation expansion in Kampong Thom Province, which is one of the six provinces 
around Tonle Sap Lake. There have been 488 irrigation schemes identified in the 
province with potential irrigation areas of 140,000 ha. The attached case study 
focuses on the existing irrigation system in Stung Chinit tributary and the current 
plan for a hydropower and irrigation system on the Stung Sen tributary. Both 
tributaries are located in Kampong Thom Province on the northern side of Tonle Sap 
Lake in central Cambodia.  
Introduction  
In an effort to encourage economic growth, generate employment, and reduce 
poverty, the Cambodian government adopted the “Rectangular Strategyi” in 2004. 
Building upon this strategy, the government designed the National Strategic 
Development Plan 2006-2010 (NSDP) which identified key sectors to prioritize 
investments for meeting the goals and development targets of the Cambodian 
Millennium Development Goals (CMDG). The NSDP outlines the priorities in each 
sector including good governance, health, education, economy, and agriculture. 
In the wake of the 2008 food crisis, the Royal Government of Cambodia has renewed 
its effort to establish the country as an important exporter of rice. As a result, 
agricultural expansion, including irrigation system development, has become an 
important development in the country. The need for irrigation systems to improve 
rice productivity and crop diversification has been commonly cited by both 
government officials and many development agencies.  
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It can be argued that better irrigation systems and the expansion of land use are 
crucial if the government is to accomplish its ambitious goal of producing 15 million 
tons of rice per year by 2015, which is more than double the 7.1 million tons 
currently forecast for this year. Rice production for 2007 and 2008 was 6.76 million 
tons.  
The Minister of Agriculture has been quoted in the pressii as being confident that 
Cambodia can expect to export 8 million tons of paddy rice by the year 2015. The 
minister has argued that Cambodia’s closest neighbors, Thailand and Vietnam, were 
the first and third largest rice exporters in 2007 with 9.5 million and 4.5 million tons 
respectively. One rice dealer with a trading house in Singapore estimated that 
Cambodia exported 600,000 to 800,000 tons per year directly or indirectly via 
Thailand, and that those numbers could increase to 1.5 million tons in one or two 
seasons if the government was focused. However, he was skeptical that 8 million 
tons is feasible in such a short time. Obviously, these numbers would require more 
that just increased yields. Twice-yearly harvests and extensive expansion of 
cultivated areas would also be required.  
The recent master plan published by JICA in 2007 showed the Tonle Sap Lake and its 
catchments areas to be the most important region in the country for poverty 
alleviation as well as overall economic development. However, there were some 
major problems identified by the master plan. They included:  
• A low ratio of farms currently under irrigation  
• A lack of comprehensive rehabilitation work in the region  
• Deterioration of plot bunds  
• A low ratio of establishment of FWUC 
• Insufficient canal capacity 
• Degraded irrigation structures  
The outcome of the study justifies the four major reasons for irrigation construction 
and renovation:  
1. The need for effective water resource utilization, particularly in those areas 
dominated by rain-fed agriculture where the existing irrigation systems are 
malfunctioning 
2. The search for effective land utilization in those areas often affected by flood 
drought such as the areas surrounding the Tonle Sap Lake  
3. The importance of effective human resource management because of this sectors 
influence on operation and maintenance of infrastructure improvements  
4. The dire need to achieve stable food supply and poverty alleviation in the areas 
surrounds the Tonle Sap Lake.  
Because of limited financial capabilities and technical skills, the government has to 
depend on external development agencies such as ADB, France, Japan, Australia, 
and South Korea, to meet these needs (For more information on donors, please see 
table 1). One of the newest donors is the oil-rich gulf state of Kuwait that has 
promised to loan $546 million USD in soft loans to Cambodia for an infrastructure 
project, which will focus primarily on the agricultural sector. Of this amount, $360 
million USD of the loan will be used to construct an irrigation system (130,000ha) 
and a hydropower project (40 MW) on Stung Sen tributary in Kampong Thom 
Province. The total catchment of the Stung Sen Tributary is 16,250 km2, the largest 
of the 12 tributaries that flow into the Tonle Sap Lake. The total catchment area of 
the 12 tributaries is 86,140km2 with an average annual run off of 76,000 million m3. 
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The remaining money from the Kuwait loan will be used for road construction in 
Battambang Province.  
Objectives 
This paper provides preliminary reflections on the current proposed and on-going 
irrigation developments and agricultural transformations in Kampong Thom Province. 
It explains the ecological and economic setting of the provinces, the rationale behind 
irrigation expansion, the current proposed development of Stung Sen and the 
lessons learned from existing irrigation scheme in Stung Chinit.  The paper responds 
to questions on how Cambodia is currently making decisions concerning the 
extensive new irrigation development. It also explores how decisions are being 
perceived in the Mekong Region about new schemes vis-à-vis modernization of the 
existing infrastructure.   
This paper is organized into six sections. The Introduction or first section gives basic 
information on the background of irrigation development in Cambodia and the 
reporting process used to develop this paper, the second section (Current Situational 
Analysis) provides information on the current situation in Cambodia, the need for 
irrigation expansion, the current irrigated areas, and food security issues. The third 
section (External Development Partnerships) describes the overall external 
development in water and irrigation systems, the current development on Tonle Sap 
tributaries and government investments in irrigation systems and agricultural 
sectors. The fourth section (Case Studies on Current Irrigation Projects) presents 
case studies from Kampong Thom Province examining the two large-scale irrigation 
schemes currently in place. Complex ecology and issues are also presented. Section 
five (Expansion and Decision-Making Methods in Irrigation Development) deals with 
irrigation expansion and decision-making in the provinces. This narrative begins at 
the regional level and works up to the national level, including the political drivers 
and lessons learned from the existing scheme implementation. Finally, the 
Conclusion, or final section, reflects on the decision-making mechanism and gives 
suggestions for irrigation investment.   
Methods 
The methods used in this paper build on the previous work done by a research 
fellowship on irrigation and water management from 2006-2008, which was hosted 
by the Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture (CEDAC).  
The researcher conducted three field visits between 2008 and 2009. The first field 
visit took place in late 2008. Several key informants were interviewed including 
representatives from the provincial departments of environment, agriculture, water 
resources and meteorology; senior provincial program advisors for projects to 
support democracy and decentralization; NGO workers from CEDAC/GRET; a former 
officer of the Fishery Action Coalition Team (FACT) based in Kampong Thom; and a 
Farmer Water User Committee (FWUC) for the Stung Chinit irrigation scheme. The 
researcher also had the opportunity to travel along the Stung Sen tributary to areas 
surrounding the provincial town and to visit the flood plain of the Tonle Sap Lake 
starting with the Stung Chinit irrigation scheme and on to various irrigation schemes 
along the Stung Sen River.  
The second visit took place in August 2009. The researcher met with the FWUC at 
Stung Chinit to consult on the current status of the irrigation operation and 
maintenance. The representatives from the Irrigation Service Center (ISC) based in 
Kampong Thom were also consulted regarding the current irrigation management in 
that province. The researcher was also able to consult with the irrigation construction 
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company, regional director of IWMI, and many of the donor agencies in Cambodia 
during the August 2009 visit. The third visit took place in November 2009 where 
deputy provincial governor, local authorizes and communities in Sambo commune of 
Sambo district along Stung Sen were also consulted and interviewed.   
The author also met with senior officials from MOWRAM regarding the challenge of 
irrigation development and expansion in Cambodia. The researchers also had a 
chance to attend informal discussions between various departments from MAFF, MoE, 
and experts from the Council for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD) under 
the Office of Council of Minister regarding natural resource management, agricultural 
performance, and roles and responsibilities of each department in future work 
related to these areas. The researchers also attended a national workshop organized 
by MOWRAM and AFD on February 11, 2009 entitled “Moving toward a Sustainable 
Operation and Maintenance of Irrigation Schemes in Cambodia.” 
In addition to the above mentioned field visits and meetings, the research team was 
able to visit selected irrigation schemes in other provinces in Cambodia to learn more 
about governance issues related to irrigation. Finally, the CEDAC Irrigation Work 
Group held three discussions to develop and prepare this paper.  
Current Situational Analysis 
Cambodia covers an area of 181,035km2 of which 54.1% is forests, 23.4% is used 
for agriculture, 6.8% are wetlands, 15.6% is wood and grasslands, and 0.1% are 
settlements (Save Wildlife Cambodia, 2006). Cambodian agriculture is predominantly 
organized into small farmer communities. The plight of these communities access to 
natural resources and land ownership is possibly one of the most significant land use 
issues facing Cambodia today.  
The National Institute of Statisticsiii estimated the population of Cambodia to be 13.4 
million, which represents an inter-census annual population growth rate of 1.5%. 
There are 94 men for every 100 women. Nearly three-quarters of the country is 
under 30 years old and were born after the end of the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979.  
It was estimated that 85% of the total population relies on a fragile balance of 
agricultural, fisher, and forestry products for survival.  
The UNDP (2008) estimates that 40% of Cambodia’s people (5.4 million) are living in 
poverty (defined as living on less than $1.25 USD per person per day). The 
Cambodian Government, using its own poverty line of $0.50 per day, estimates 
poverty at 30.1% of the population, a decrease from 34.8% in 2004. Rural poverty is 
34.7%, down from 39.1% in 2004, and poverty in Phnom Penh fell from 4.6% of the 
population to 0.8% in 2007. Despite these decreases, an increasing trend in 
inequality among the population is being observed.   
With such high poverty rates and the hopes of increasing rice exports justified by the 
recent food crisis of 2008, the government has furthered its interest in increased rice 
production to meet domestic needs and to capitalize on the opportunities for 
expanding exports. Cambodia is situated in the Mekong basin, in between the world’s 
top two rice exporting countries - Thailand and Vietnam (Randey and Bhandari, 
2009) – and has the potential to participate in this well-developed export market 
(despite poor export performance in the recent past because of various constraints). 
The Need for Irrigation Expansion   
Many Cambodian farmers are able to harvest rice only once annually because of the 
lack of a consistent water supply. However, with their superior irrigations systems, 
both Thailand and Vietnam have managed to harvest two or three crops per year, a 
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considerable comparative advantage for the export market (although in Thailand this 
has not been achieved in the Northeast region, which is in similar to Cambodia in 
terms of soil and fertility).  
The current Strategy for Agriculture and Water 2009-2013 aims to ensure enough 
safe and accessible food and water for all people; reduce poverty while increasing 
the Gross Domestic Product per capita; and ensure the sustainability of natural 
resources. The goal for agriculture and water resources management is to support 
poverty reduction, food security, and economic growth by enhancing agricultural 
productivity and diversification and improving water resources development and 
management (TWGAW, 2007).  The strategy has laid out five program areas to focus 
on with the help of financial assistance from donors and technical assistance from 
working group experts: 
• Institutional capacity building and management  
• Food security support  
• Agriculture and agri-business support  
• Water resources, irrigation, and land management  
• Agricultural and water resources research, education, and extension services    
The Tonle Sap Lake and its tributaries make up a very important region, not only for 
mitigation of poverty but also for the economic development of the country. A JICA 
study in 2007 suggested that in order to optimize the land use in the River Basin 
area, integrated agricultural development plans should include both irrigation and 
rain-fed areas of the four river basins of the Tonle Sap Lake.  
Senior officials from MOWRAM agreed that water is important for supporting 
agriculture productivity and acknowledged the need for large amounts of money and 
investment for irrigation and infrastructure. Most irrigation systems were built during 
the Khmer Rouge regime from 1975 to 1979. Most of the systems that remain are in 
poor condition. Recently, severe droughts and flood have affected most of Cambodia. 
MRC proposed various water storage strategies and dam construction projects 
between 1957 and 1995; however, none of them were constructed in Cambodia. On 
August 24, 2009, Mr. Veng Sakhon, Secretary of State of MOWRAM, argued that 
farmers who continue to use their traditional methods to cultivate rice without using 
dikes to store water would continue to be vulnerable to drought for the next five to 
ten years. Therefore, there is a need for canals to connect water from water sources 
to the paddy fields.  
Current Irrigated Areas 
Information on the current irrigation systems and the actual irrigated areas is 
available from several sources. The MOWRAM inventory in 2007 showed 2,402 
irrigation schemes with total irrigated areas of 1,046,263 ha in all the provinces (IFC 
and DAI, 2008). With support from various External Development Partners - 
including the Government Counterpart Fund and National Budget - 253 irrigation 
schemes of varying scales have been rehabilitated or constructed from 1999 to 
2006, securing in which water for rice cultivation over an area of 716,453 ha (32% 
of Cambodia’s total rice cultivation area). Flood-control dikes protect 130,550 ha of 
land and sea-protection dikes (Polders) protect 18,390 ha from sea intrusion. More 
than US $76,700,000 has been used for the aforementioned rehabilitation projects 
(Sakhon, 2007).   
According to a survey conducted by CEDAC in 2008, an irrigation inventory covering 
13 provinces with a total cultivated land area of 2,327,024 ha and a population of 
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11,560,708 recorded 2,525 irrigations schemes with a wet season irrigation surface 
potential of 901,543 ha (equals 39% of the total cultivated land are) and 321,167 ha 
of surface irrigation during the dry season (equal to 14% of the total cultivated 
land). The survey classified the schemes into 3 categories: Functioning Well, Partially 
Functional, and Not Functional. Characteristics of the “Functioning Well” irrigation 
schemes included good quality reservoirs, dams, and other structures as well as a 
distribution network system in good condition and able to function to at least 60% of 
the original designed specs. The “Partially Functional” irrigation schemes were those 
operating at 40% to 60% of the original specs, and those operating at less than 40% 
were classified as “Not Functional.” According to the available data, of the 2,525 of 
recorded irrigation schemes, only 6% fell in the “Functioning Well” category while 
32% were classified as “Partially Functional”, and 62% were considered “Not 
Functional” (CEDAC 2009). 
Food Security 
Food security issues for rural households and the desire to increase exports are two 
of the driving factors pushing irrigation renovation and construction. According to 
MAFF, the rice balance for 2008-2009 shows a surplus of 2,025,033 tons of milled 
riceiv. This sector generates 34.4% of the GDP compared to the industry sector’s 
23.8% contribution and the 41.8% generated by the service sector. The gross value-
added income increases for agriculture explains the increased value of this sector 
from 5,078 billion Riel in 1999 to 7,174 billion Riel in 2007, and 7,562 billion Riel in 
2008.  
Despite being largely self-sufficient in rice and food production, Cambodia 
experiences regional and seasonal problems of food availability. Thirty percent of the 
population lives under the Cambodian government’s definition of poverty - US$0.50 
per day per person. Nation-wide, 23% of the population was food-deprived in 2008, 
consuming less than the daily intake requirements of 1,715 calories per person.  
The food security and poverty situation varies between regions and social groups. 
Geographically, 90% of the country’s poor live in the rural areasv.  Phnom Penh, the 
capital, has a poverty rate of only 4.6% as compared to the provinces around the 
Tonle Sap Lake or the Upland Mountain regions that have poverty rates of 42.8% 
and 52.02%, respectively. Even within provinces there exists a wide variation in 
nutrition intake and food availability. These variations can be seen by examining 
commune-level statistical data. For example, stunted growth rates in children under 
the age of five are reported to range from 17-75% at the commune level - an 
alarming variation. 
External Development Partnerships in Water Resources and Irrigation 
This section illustrates the current projects on irrigation investment, the search for 
new donors and the investment made by government. 
Current irrigation investment  
The amount of governmental budget and technical skill allocated to agricultural 
extension and development has remained a sensitive subject. It is clear that major 
sources of investment come from both grant and loan from external development 
agencies and bilateral aid. There are 18 sector-related activities to agriculture with 
funds totaling US$627,149,194.23. Three major sectors received outstanding 
support from external donors: emergency food aid, natural resource management, 
and irrigation and water resource development. Data obtained from the Council of 
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Development for Cambodia (CDC) in August 2009 showed irrigation and water 
resource development received financial assistance of almost US$200 million.  
In addition, official and the most valid data provided by Cabinet of MOWRAM in mid-
October 2009 revealed 26 projects were officially approved of which 10 projects are 
grants with total fund of US$94,480,000 and 16 projects are loans with total budget 
of US$1,008,200,000. Listed below are the projects being active from 2008 to 2015. 
 





Name of Project/Program 
Project Cost (US$) Implementatio
n Period Grant Loan 
A- Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)       
1- 
West Tonle Sap Irrigation and Drainage 
Rehabilitation and Improvement Project 
  60,000,000 2010-2015 
2- 
Kandal Stung - Bati Irrigation Rehabilitation 
Project 
  22,000,000 2011-2014 
3- 
Upper Slakou River Irrigation Rehabilitation 
Project 
  24,200,000 2011-2014 
4- 
Small Scale Infrastructure Projects (Japanese 
Irrigation Sector Loan Project) 
  59,300,000 2010-2013 
B- Asian Development Bank (ADB)       
1- Northwest Irrigation Sector Project   30,000,000 2008-2010 
2- 
Tonle Sap Lowland Irrigation and Rural 
Development Project   20,000,000 2009-2013 
3- Water Resources Management Sector Project   20,000,000 2010-2015 
C- International Monetary Fund (IMF)       
1- 
Easternvi Water Resources Development 
Project (Phase -I) 
33,380,00
0   2008-2010 
2- 
Eastern Water Resources Development 
Project (Phase -II) 
19,500,00
0   2011-2013 
D- French Development Agency (AFD)       
1- Northwest Irrigation Sector Project 3,700,000   2008-2010 
2- Water Resources Management Sector Project 
10,000,00
0   2010-2015 
E- Korean International Cooperation Agency 
(KOICA) 
      
1- Batheay Flood Control Project 2,200,000   2008-2009 
2- Kraing Ponley Water Resources Development   26,700,000 2008-2013 
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Stung Dauntry Water Resources 
Development Project   36,000,000 2009-2015 
F- KUWAIT       
1- 
Feasibility Study for Stung Sen Water 
Resources Development Project 1,200,000   2009-2010 
2- 
Stung Sen Water Resources Development 
Project   360,000,000 2010-2015 
G- QATAR       
1- VAICO Irrigation Rehabilitation Project   200,000,000 2009-2013 
H- CHINA       
1- Kainghot Irrigation Rehabilitation Project   55,000,000 2009-2011 
2- Kampong Trabek Flood Control Project   35,000,000 2009-2011 
3- 
Stung Keo Water Resources Development 
Project   40,000,000 2009-2012 
I- INDIA       
1- 
Stung Sreng Water Resources Development 
Project   5,000,000 2009-2010 
2- 
Stung Tasal Water Resources Development 
Project   15,000,000 2009-2011 
J- AUSTRALIA (Ausaid)       
 1 
Cambodian Agricultural Value Chain 
(CAVAC)vii 10,000,000   2009-2013 
K- ITALIA       
1- 
Kamping Pouy Irrigation Rehabilitation 
Project (Phase I) 2,000,000   2008-2009 
2- 
Kamping Pouy Irrigation Rehabilitation 
Project (Phase II) 4,500,000   2010-2012 
L- Poverty Reduction and Growth Operation     
  
Bamnak Irrigation Rehabilitation Project and 
other projects 8,000,000   2009-2010 




00   
 
Table above shows US$94,480,000 of grants and US$1,008,200,000 of loans for 
irrigation and drainage system. Major donors include JICA, ADB, IMF, AFD, KOICA, 
Kuwait, Qatar, China, India, Australia, and Italia. Grant from IMF is part of debt 
canceling of US$82 million to Cambodia for rural development of which $52,880,000 
goes to irrigation work managed by MOWRAM and the rest go to water sanitation 
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and clean water managed by Ministry of Rural Development.  This amount did not 
report the current loan from Korea with $200 million and China with $850 million. 
Outstanding loan come from Kuwait with $360 million approved, follow by Qatar of 
$200 million, JICA with $165 million, China with $130 million, ADB with $70 million,  
Koica around $63 million and India with $20 million. Total loan for irrigation and 
drainage work officially approved up to early October 2009 shows more than 
US$1billion (US$1,088,200,000). It is noted that these funds are managed by 
MOWRAM, while other sectors related to agricultural production and extension are 
managed by MAFF.  
 




Map above shows major irrigation area being proposed and developed along Mekong 
floodplain and Tonle Sap Great Lake as well as Tonle Basac floodplain in Cambodia.  
Cambodia also receives favorable debt relief from international banks. IMF has 
qualified Cambodia for debt relief program under the Multilateral Debt Relief 
Initiative (MDRI) of US$82 million equivalent. The objective of debt relief is to 
Page 597 of 852
PN67_2010-17 
Irrigation Expansion in Cambodia: Understanding the Process of Decision-Making 







support the government’s effort to reduce poverty in the rural areas of eastern 
Cambodia through enhanced agricultural production, thereby alleviating food 
insecurity and improving farming household incomes. The immediate objective is to 
improve use of water resource and take advantage of the potential for irrigated 
agriculture through (i) improved water resource management by 
rehabilitating/upgrading small-and medium-scale irrigation schemes and other water 
management infrastructures; (ii) strengthened capacity of communities and 
institutions to plan, implement, manage, and maintain such infrastructure; and (iii) 
improved agricultural support services to the beneficiary water users.   
The fund covers three sectors. The first two sectors refer to Easternviii Rural 
Irrigation Development Project (ERIDP) that is being implemented by MOWRAM while 
Ministry of Economic and Finance is responsible for overall supervision of the project. 
This project includes: (i) rehabilitation and development of irrigation infrastructure, 
and (ii) improvement of irrigation management through strengthening of farmer’s 
water user communities. Under ERIDP about 50 irrigation sub-projects in small and 
medium scale category (small <200ha < medium <5000 ha < large) will be 
rehabilitated or developed. No large-scale irrigation schemed will be rehabilitated or 
developed under this project. All activities were planned to be completed by the end 
of 2009.  Now the government has agreed to utilize US$52,880,000 for two phases: 
phase one with US$33.38 million from 2008-2010 and second phase with 
US$19,500,000 starts from 2011-2013.   
The third sector is implemented by Ministry of Rural Development (MRD) on clean 
water, safe drinking water and sanitation with total fund of around US$30 million. 
This project covers the western provinces to include Battambang, Banteay 
Meanchey, Siem Reap, Kampong Thom, Udor Meanchey. IMF required government to 
have money in hand and use it directly to alleviate poverty in rural areas or for rural 
development and rehabilitation. 
Two major project documents are relevant at the time of writing this paper.  First the 
ADBix project on Kingdom of Cambodia: Tonle Sap Poverty Reduction and 
Smallholder Development Project” showed US$48.82 million to be invested from 1 
January 2010 to 31 December 2017. The project document shows ADB share of $24 
million (with $6 million loan) and IFAD with $13.38 million, Government of Finland 
with $5 million, Cambodia government contribution $5.13 million and beneficiaries 
with $1.01 million. The project will be executed by MAFF covering four provinces in 
the Tonle Sap Basin, namely Banteay Meanchey Kampong Cham, Kampong Thom, 
and Siem Reap. It is expected to benefit about 500,000 households (or about 2.0 
million people) in 156 communes of these four provinces through investments, 
training and capacity building, and livelihood field demonstrations and follow-ups. 
The majority of households in the Project communes involved in agricultural 
production have less than 1.0 hectare of usable agricultural land and are considered 
smallholders. Second, ADB (2008) conduct study on “Issues and Options in 
Agriculture and Natural Resources Sector in Cambodia” shows investment 
requirement for this sectors from 2009-2018 are estimated at US$4,055.81 million 
covering five major sectors including: (i) Infrastructure, (ii) Technology Development 
and Dissemination, (iii) Credit, (iv) marketing, (v) Institutional Strengthening and 
Service Delivery, and (vi) contingency (10%).  
Another important donor is the Qatar government. Beginning in 2008, Qatar has 
been investing US$200 million in Cambodian farmlands across Svay Rieng Province’s 
Vaico River. This project will irrigate over 300,000 ha of rice fields (Mekong Times, 
August 11, 2008).  In a personal interview on July 13, 2009, the Director of the 
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Department of Hydrology and River Work and the Deputy Director General of the 
Technical Affairs Unit of MOWRAM revealed that the Master Plan for Vaico Irrigation 
Project has been further developed. The project now covers two provinces - Svay 
Rieng and Prey Veng - where the majority of the water will be diverted from the 
Mekong River and will irrigate around 100,000 ha. This figure is a reduction from the 
300,000 ha outlined in the 2008 article.  
The Search for a New Development Donor 
In early 2009, the Cambodian government sent a delegation led by the Prime 
Minister to visit Kuwait. It was considered the first visit from the Cambodian 
government that aimed to expand business and trade ties with Kuwait. During a 
speech in Kuwait, the Cambodian Prime Minister said “Cambodia has much land that 
could turn to agricultural purpose, given proper investment in irrigation. The 
Cambodian government understands that agriculture is a key factor in strengthening 
and widening national economic growth, the reduction of poverty, and may prove 
vital as the national attempts to avoid the worst of the international financial crisis”.  
Four agreements were signed during the visit including air transport services, 
tourism cooperation, and MOUs' dealing with the exchange of manpower and the 
development of Stung Sen irrigation systems in Kampong Thom Province.  
Speaking at a press conference on January 16, 2009, the Deputy Prime Minister and 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation reported that “Cambodia 
has land and we need money to invest. Kuwait has the money to invest in our 
agricultural land and the produce will be exported to Kuwait”. They support the idea 
that this agreement could help increase rice yields by completing irrigation projects 
and, therefore, help the Cambodian people to rise above poverty.  The official 
reported that the Stung Sen Irrigation Project would cover 130,000 ha of paddy rice 
and lead to a three-fold increase in paddy rice harvests per year. This project would 
also produce up to 40 megawatts of hydroelectric power, providing electricity to the 
whole of Kampong Thom Province. He also reported Kuwait’s promise to help 
Cambodia on small-scale projectsx, which would cost up to US$20 million.  
In an interview with Cheng Sarouenxi, an irrigation engineer for MOWRAM, it was 
explained that the feasibility study on Stung Sen is currently being proposed for 
bidding with funding and technical support from Kuwait. The total funding US$1.2 
million started sometimes in July 2009. The study will take from 8 to 12 months to 
produce. The study will focus on soil conditions, the location for irrigation 
construction projects and small-scale hydropower projects.  
Government Investments 
Government’s investments in irrigation development increased by an annual average 
of 2% from 2003-2006, eventually reaching about US$10 million in 2006. Irrigation 
investment is not attractive due to its low financial return (Narong, 2008xii). From a 
social perspective, irrigation investment does not benefit many of the landless poor, 
households that are nearly landless, or farmers practicing rain-fed farming or located 
at the tail-end of the water distribution system. However, commercial farmers can 
benefit from crop diversification made possible by assured irrigation.  
In 2005, MOWRAMxiii committed to expand 25,000 ha of irrigated land per year by 
renovating existing irrigation systems or constructing new systems using its own 
resources, which increased from US$6 million in 2005 to $10 million in 2006 and $16 
million in 2009. The National Strategic Development Plan 2009-2013 reports $200 
million of the $1.2 billion needed for development in this sector has been secured 
Page 599 of 852
PN67_2010-17 
Irrigation Expansion in Cambodia: Understanding the Process of Decision-Making 







through external donor support. However, the lack of human resources and technical 
skills among MOWRAM officials remains a big concern in implementing the project 
properly and efficiently (MOWRAM has only 2-3 irrigation engineers in each province 
currently).  
There are promising trends in government spending on this sector. The current 
spending on agriculture (MAFF, MOWRAM, and MRD) has doubled from 52.7 billion 
Riel in 2001 to 118.6 billion Riel in 2007. The spending has tripled since 2000. Total 
spending on the agriculture sector increased more than 10 fold during the last 
decade from 18.6 billion Riel in 1997 to 200 billion Riel in 2007 (Narong, 2008). Even 
with these increases from the government, the funding for agricultural extension, 
adaptive research, and marketing is still limited. 
Case Studies of Current Irrigation Development Projects 
In this section, the detailed socio-ecological prospective in Kampong Thom, the 
current status of the tributaries and their irrigation schemes, the upstream and 
downstream watersheds of the Stung Sen and Stung Chinit tributaries, and the 
rationale behind the decision-making process will be discussed. A case study based 
on a series interviews and perceptions of those directly and indirectly involved with 
the existing irrigation scheme in Stung Chinit will be highlighted.  
The Socio-Ecological Perspective in Kampong Thom  
Kampong Thom is one of the six provinces surrounding Tonle Sap Lake. The province 
is located at the center of Cambodia, 168 km from Phnom Penh. This province is 
bordered by Kampong Cham and Kratie Provinces on the east, Kampong Chhnang 
Province on the west, Siem Reap Province to the south and Preah Vihear and 
Thailand to the north.   
The province covers an area of 1,506,397 ha divided that can be divided into the 
following areas:  
Cultivated areas -180,920 ha 
Forest land - 1,046,000 ha 
Residential land and roads - 115,850 ha  
Fallow land and grassland - 162,627 ha 
The province is divided into eight administrative districts, 81 communes, and 732 
villages. There are 125,554 total families or a total population of 635,005 (Women 
make up 51.63% or 327,863). The population density is 45.9/km2. 
Rice is the major crop. The province has a vast area of wet rice cultivation totaling 
161,600 ha. However, the province has only been able to cultivate 80 to 90% of this 
area. Wet season rice yield per hectare averages a meager 1.5tons per hectare. Dry 
season rice cultivation is 5,431 ha which yields an average of 1 ton/ha (Provincial 
Department of Planning, 2008).  
In certain areas along Stung Sen River, dry season rice cultivation proved with high 
yield range from 4-7 tons/ha with intensive inputs includes fertilizers, pest 
management and good water (mostly pumping water from the river). These areas 
include Stung Sen district down to Kampong Svay district along the river.  
The province is also rich in high quality fish resources. At the time of the study, there 
were seven fishing lots covering an area of 65,353 ha in four districts: Kampong 
Svay - three commercial fishing lots; Staung district - three fishing lots; and Santuk 
and Barray districts - one fishing lot. Two out of the seven fishing lots were kept as 
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reserve lots including lot No. 2, which covered an area of 1,100 ha situated in 
Kampong Svay, and lot No. 4 which covered an area of 1,800 ha situated in Staung 
and Kampong Svay district.  Fishing lots No. 1, 2 and 3 where situated in Kampong 
Svay while fishing lots No. 4, 5 and 6 were situated in Staung and Kampong Svay. 
Fishing lot No. 7 was situated in Santuk and Barray districts.  
It was estimated that the average harvest per year from these lots ranged from 
5,000 to 15,000 tons of fish per year while aquaculture harvests range from 3,000 
tons to 4,000 tons making this province one of the leading freshwater fishery 
producing provinces surrounding the Tonle Sap Lake.  
Tributaries and Existing Irrigation Systems   
Besides an abundance of natural resources for fisheries and rice production, the 
province also has a complex watershed system and existing irrigation schemes.  
The Tributaries 
There are four major watersheds/tributaries that play an important role as water 
sources, waterways and social and cultural influences for Kampong Thom Province. 
They are:  
• Stung Sen River whose total length is 265 km. It flows from Preah Vihear 
province to Tonle Sap Lake. An interview with the Provincial Director of 
Environment suggests that the stream might actually begin in the Dangrek 
Mountains and flow a total of 300 km to the Tonle Sap River.  
• Stung Chinit runs 293 km in two districts: Santuk and Baray.  
• Stung Staung has a total length of 153 km. The Chinese are conducting 
Project development feasibility studies on this tributary.  
• Stung Taing Krasing has a total length of 103 km. Some parts of this tributary 
were dammed during the Khmer Rouge regime and other sections are being 
renovated for irrigation purposes.  
Local villagers and traders use the tributaries for boats, machine boats and ships up 
to 5 tons as a means of waterway transportation during the wet season. Interviews 
with local people revealed that some parts of the Stung Sen River have a depth of 
10-13 meters during September to November and up to 10,000 m3/s flows in the 
river during this period (Provincial development planning 2008).  
B) Current Irrigation within Kampong Thom Province 
Compared to other parts of the nation, Kampong Thom Province has more existing 
irrigation schemes, most of which were built during the Khmer Rouge regime. The 
irrigation scheme inventory conducted by the CEDAC team in late 2008 showed 488 
schemes in Kampong Thom Province. These figures comprise the highest percentage 
of the irrigation schemes compared in the country. 
Large-scale irrigation capacity beings at 5,000 ha and consists of 3 schemes covering 
irrigated areas of 35,562 ha in the wet season and 5,662 ha in dry season. One 
scheme (Stung Chinit Irrigation) has been renovated with completed reservoirs and 
completed structures for irrigation even though it has not reached its original goal. 
This scheme was built during the Khmer Rouge regime with a potential for 12,000 to 
15,000 irrigated ha in wet season. The current structure can only irrigate around 
2,000 ha due to increased operational costs and the majority of the scheme being 
ignored during the renovation.  
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Table 2: Current Status of Large-scale Irrigation Schemes in Kampong Thom  






Wet  Dry 
1 Tumnub Peam  Staung  7,000 1,500 Rain-fed  3 No   
2 30 September 
reservoir  




3 Stung Chinit  Santuk  7,000 2,000 Chinit 
tributar
y  
1 Yes  
Total  35,562 5,662  
Note: 1 refers irrigations schemes classified as ”Functioning Well”, 2 refers to 
“Partially Functional” schemes, and 3 refers to “Not Functional” schemes  
 
The existing medium-scalexiv irrigation schemes consist of 120 schemes with a 
potential irrigated area of 56,308 ha. Existing small-scale irrigation schemes consist 
of 339 schemes covering an area of 22,344 ha. The total irrigation schemes are 
estimated at 462 individual schemes with a potential irrigated area of 114,214 ha.  
The province is also vulnerable to flood and drought. In September 2009xv, the 
Minister of Agriculture reported 20,000 paddies were affected by flooding, with 2,000 
ha destroyed and the rest surviving only with intervention from the ministry. The 
Minister also acknowledged that the rice crops currently affected not only flood but 
drought and insects as well.  
The Decision to Use Stung Sen and Stung Chinit Tributaries  
Upstream Watersheds  
The upstream watershed of Stung Sen and Stung Chinit is known as the only 
contiguous area of lowland dry evergreen and semi-evergreen forest left standing in 
mainland Southeast Asia. Situated to the west of the Mekong River (where four 
provinces meet - Kampong Thom, Kratie, Stung Treng and Preah Vihear), it covers 
an area of approximately 5,250 km2 (Global Witness 2007).   
The watershed is home to rare wildlife species such as elephants, gaur, banteng, 
tigers and the Asiatic black bear. It is critically important to the lives of some 
256,000 people living in 340 villages in and around the forest. For these 
communities, the forest provides a livelihood, not only through resin tapping, but 
also by providing building materials, medicine and food. It also has great cultural 
significance, as it contains large numbers of burial groves and spirit trees that have 
particular significance for indigenous minority groups such as the Kuy. In addition, 
forests such as Prey Long provide important watershed management services to 
Cambodia’s rural population by regulating the water flow in agricultural areas. 
The new agreements with Kuwait will require the use of all of the Prey Long and 
watershed areas of Stung Sen and Stung Chinit if food for Kuwait is to be produced 
in Cambodia. Many experts feel that Kuwait will need around 4 million ha of land – 
far greater numbers than the 130,000 ha mentioned in previous discussions.  
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The watershed area has faced threats before. In their report in 2009, the East West 
Management Institutes (EWMI) described how tens of thousand of trees were logged 
in the 1990s by companies such as Meng Ly Heng, Colexim, and Timas. Some of 
those trees had existed before the days of Angkor Wat and where almost three arm 
spans or 500 cm in girth. The logging was discontinued in 2002 and Meng Ly Heng’s 
concession was cancelled due largely to the anti-logging efforts of local communities 
and increased taxes. 
During the rainy season, water flows into Tonle Sap Lake from Stung Sen and Stung 
Po Rong (the watershed are of Stung Chinit) making the area important in managing 
the water in the Tonle Sap Lake at the very heart of Cambodia.  
During the 2008 visit, the researcher observed the controversial practices of electro-
fishing and fine net usage throughout the region. Seine and permanent gill nets were 
also used in the Stung Sen River during the dry season. Almost every villager in the 
Stung Sen River area is involved with fishing in some form or other and therefore, 
the continued decrease of fish populations observed all along the Stung Sen River 
affects everyone. Medium and commercial fishers have been asked to purchase 
licenses to operate legally. Each license can run up to US$1,000 per person, which 
puts additional strain on the people in this area. Fish equipments include floating 
fishing net and seine net putting along the river and some places across the river.  
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Gold mining began at the mouth of the Stung Chinit watershed in 2006. Villagers in 
Rovieng have traditionally panned for gold for years and villagers in Phnom Chi 
began panning for gold in the 1980’s. Eventually, businesses began to mine for gold 
in these two areas and introduced the use of chemicals to the process.  This resulted 
in the poisoning of streams and has had severe impacts on animals and people alike; 
nearly 100 cattle have died. Now, foreign companies have been given permission to 
mine in both of these areas and are expected to begin large-scale operations in the 
near future.  The local Kuy people have been known historically for their iron 
production, which they practiced until 1970. Chinese and Korean companies have 
begun to explore for iron ore in Rovieng and Chey Sen districts. Iron mining is only 
done on a large scale in most countries because it is otherwise unprofitable. Greater 
resource depletion in these areas is of great concern to local people and the nation 
as a whole.  
In late September to early October 2009, the province was one of the worst hit by 
Ketsana typhoon on those areas associated with Stung Sen River. Interviewed with 
provincial, local authorities and local communities showed the Ketsana affect 45,989 
ha of paddies with 13,451 ha recover while 20,753 ha were complete destroyed 
(with total cost of US$8,820,025). Loss of other productive assets for local 
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communities are reported to be US$190,525. The combination of typhoon and 
torrential rain  affected 447/738 villages from all districts, destroyed 109 houses, 
428 roofs house destroyed and 5 were partially destroyed with 33,687 families 
affected and 16,990 families become vulnerable, 20 people reported death and 45 
injured.  This put more pressure on food security and irrigation development along 
the stream.  
B) Downstream Watershed  
Various national institutions (including CNMC, MOE, and MAFF) have designated the 
lower areas of the streams as the Stung Sen Core Area of Tonle Sapxvi. This area 
covers 6,355 ha. This area is believed to support more than 300 species of 
invertebrates, 210 species of birds, more than 170 fish species, more than 30 
species of reptiles, 20 species of mammals and 5 species of amphibians (MoE, 2008). 
The Stung Sen Core Area has been acknowledged as a vital area for biological 
research, ecotourism, cultural importance, and educational and economic value. With 
the help of this designation and recognition, the conservation and restoration of this 
important ecosystem is hopeful. Threats still remain, however, as illegal fishing and 
other threats include the mining and conversion of forest in the form of economic 
land concession to the local fishing lots continue to be reported during most of the 
year. 
Expansion and Decision-making Methods in Irrigation Development  
Numerous discussions and interviews at the provincial level have shown that the 
most commonly cited rationale for expanding irrigation development in Cambodia is 
the improvement of livelihoods among the rural poor. This section of the report will 
discuss the decision-making methods at various levels as well as consider various 
influences and other factors in hopes of clarifying how decisions are made and how 
they affect the countries natural resources. 
Decision-making Mechanisms 
A) At the Bilateral Level 
Top leaders from both Cambodia and Kuwait attended exchange visits to promote  
bilateral aid and diplomacy relations, which included opening an official embassy in 
the country. During the official visit to Kuwait from January 13-15, 2009, the 
Cambodian Prime Minister presented a speech during the welcome dinner at the 
Kuwait Prime Minister’s house.  
The speech readxvii:  
“This evening, his Excellency the Prime Minister and I discussed and exchanged 
views on bilateral relations as well as regional and international issues in a very 
cordial atmosphere and with extensive mutual understanding.  We agree to have 
four documents signed, namely: 
• Agreement on Air Service 
• MOU on the Field of Exchange of Manpower 
• Agreement on Tourism Cooperation 
• MOU on the Implementing the Development Project in the Stung Sen River 
Basin in addition to the seven documents previously signed in August of last 
year. 
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B) At the National Level 
The Cambodian Prime Minister hopes that these documents will foster mutually 
beneficial cooperative efforts between Kuwait and Cambodia in the areas of tourism, 
development, and economic trade.  
At the national level, the Council of Ministers - or the cabinet - is the country’s top 
executive agency, and it facilitates and guides the activities of individual ministries 
and local agencies. It is chaired by the Prime Minister with two Deputy Prime 
Ministers serving as vice chairpersons. There are currently 207 ministers and 
secretaries of state from 25 individual ministry departments, which include the ten 
current Deputy Prime Ministers. The Prime Minister has the power of chairman on the 
Council of Ministers and as well as most other national councils and committees. To 
facilitate the development of external development partnerships and technical 
assistance opportunities, the government has formed various national development 
councils including the Council for Development of Cambodia. There are currently 18 
working groups based on sector development approaches. One of the technical 
working groups focuses on agriculture and water development and is co-chaired by 
MAFF and MOWRAM with co-facilitation efforts from various external development 
agencies.  
C) Council for Development of Cambodia (CDC) 
The CDC is also chaired by Prime Minister Hun Sen. The first deputy of the CDC is 
the Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Economic and Finance while the Senior 
Minister and Minister of Commerce acts as the second deputy of the CDC. The 
deputy secretary general is the current senior minister Sun Chanthol, former Minister 
of Public Work and Transportation.   
The council is divided into three boards:   
• Cambodia Rehabilitation and Development Board (CRDB) deals with all Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) including grants and bilateral aid   
• Investments Board deals with the private sectors which include special 
economic zones, investments, FDI, Domestic Investment, and regulatory 
framework 
• Special Economic Zones Board which oversees the 4 special economic zones 
in operation, the 2 which are being built, the 21 which have been approved, 
one single window import/export procedures, and infrastructure development  
Investors who wish to avoid the criteria and complexity of the ministries often apply 
directly to the office of the Council of Ministers or the Cabinet of the Prime Minister.  
Their letter of recommendation then goes down to the CDC for discussion. The CDC 
consists of many ministries including MINE, MOWRAM, MAFF, MEF, and other related 
ministries. The CDC meetings will often approve a decision with suggestions to have 
correction and changes. 
As of 2009, approved investments by country and sectors (1994-2008) under 
components 2 and 3 had reached US$15,258 million. China leads investments with 
$6,132 million followed by South Korea with $2,740 million. Malaysia has invested 
$2,199 million, and the USA comes fourth with $1,178 million. The EU is next with 
$1,060 million. Singapore has invested $326 million, Taiwan has $636 million 
invested, Hong Kong has $274 million, Thailand invested $570 million, and Japan 
completes the list with $143 million worth of investments. Total investments were 
shared among four major sectors: 1) Tourism - 50%; 2) Service 23%; 3) Industry - 
2%; and 4) Agriculture - 5% (Chanthol, 2009xviii).  
D) Technical Working Groups 
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To facilitate and coordinate development projects and assistance in Cambodia, a sub-
decree in 2004 was established 18 technical working groups.  The Technical Working 
Group on Agriculture and Water (TWGAW) is co-chaired by MAFF and MOWRAM. 
These technical working groups also receive technical support from various donors 
working in the sectors. The goal of the groups is to coordinate the ongoing projects 
within a sector. In the agriculture and water sector, there are five existing programs 
that need to be correlated to form one comprehensive program. The significant 
funding required to coordinate and implement this comprehensive program is 
expected to come from grants and loans received from external development 
agencies.  According to recent reports, the Chinese and Kuwaiti investments are not 
integrated to the technical working groups as they work directly with top government 
officials. 
Decision-making at the Ground Level 
The responsibility for irrigation construction is directly proportionate to the funding 
available to the level of authority in question. For example, the provincial level is 
responsible for construction schemes with a total budget up to US$50,000. The 
national level is responsible for projects with budgets above $50,000. This criteria 
and division of responsibility creates many problems during implementation. In 
addition, information sharing between national level officials and provincial level 
officials is almost nonexistent. Personal interviews with various stakeholders at the 
provincial level revealed that little or no explanation is given for how or why certain 
development schemes are chosen.  
Case 1: The Decision-making Process for the Proposed Stung Sen Irrigation Scheme   
During an interview on December 4, 2008, the Provincial Director of Environment 
provided the following motives for choosing the Stung Sen River for large-scale 
irrigation development.  
The national Cambodian government is within its rights to construct irrigation where 
it sees relevance. The Provincial Director had no objections to the national level 
decision. The province has a large amount of cultivated areas – during the wet 
season, the floodplain in Tonle Sap Lake area is between 50,000 to 70,000 ha.  
During dry season, this area has no water for rice cultivation while there is an 
overabundance during the wet season. Adequate irrigation and storage systems 
would provide consistent irrigation year round.  
The irrigation scheme could provide much needed food stability in the province. As 
the population of the province nears 1 million people, modern agricultural systems 
are necessary to replace the antiquated conventional methods. 
More farmers are becoming dependant solely on this area for their rice cultivation 
needs. Fewer farmers are going upstream to cut forest and cultivate rice production 
and many have stopped cultivating floating rice during the wet season.  
During an additional interview with a provincial NGO activist, it was revealed that the 
Stung Sen is considered the main source of fish ecology and fish migration because 
of its strong hydrological flows. Upstream, the forest provides many wildlife 
sanctuaries. The stream catchment system could provide a large quantity of water 
that would be ideal for irrigation and hydropower, and there is a large amount of 
arable land that could be converted from floating rice cultivation to recession rice 
practices. The NGO activist noted that the provincial governor encouraged the 
change from floating rice to recession rice practices during 2005 – 2006 to support 
the idea of exporting rice to Kuwait, which resulted in a greater need for irrigation 
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during the dry season (Interview with Mr. Iem Chanrith, former officer of FACT, 
December 5, 2008). 
Other interviews with provincial departments of water, agriculture, mining, energy, 
and industry revealed that many officials were not clear on schemes development or 
implementation. Several departments knew only that the construction would take 
place on the river. Villagers living along the upper areas of the river reported that 
they were initially consulted about the irrigation scheme but they had no detailed 
information as the project is in the early stages.   
Case 2: The Decision-making Process for the Stung Chinit Irrigation Scheme 
The Stung Chinit Irrigation renovation can be traced back to the early 1990’s when 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) approved the Special Rehabilitation Assistance 
Loan (SRAL) for emergency rehabilitation of infrastructure, which included some 
irrigation systems. During preparation of the SRAL, it became clear that there was 
interest in additional investments for irrigation development (ADB 2000) and that the 
Stung Chinit area was one of the priority candidates for these investments. The first 
feasibility study was conducted by an ADB expert in the mid-1990’s. Due to 
continued insecurity and civil unrest in the area, the expert was unable to produce 
sufficient information to justify the overall investment of the scheme.  
In 1999, GRET/CEDAC was commissioned by AFD to conduct an additional/ 
complementary feasibility study.  The study focused on three components:  
• Agricultural productivity and improvement. This sector showed that 85% of 
people interviewed were willing to support the irrigation scheme. People living 
upstream were particularly supportive while those living downstream were 
less supportive In addition, the technical team from MOWRAM who came to 
conduct a study on resettlement and land impacts had taken that opportunity 
to buy land in the area where they knew the irrigation construction would 
take place.  
• Institutional support towards the FWUC creation.  
• Testing underground water as an alternative to irrigation development. This 
test, which was conducted in and around 30 villages in the area, showed that 
groundwater was not a viable alternative method to irrigate the paddy fields.  
According to CEDAC research team members who were involved in the socio-
economic survey before the start of the project, both provincial and ministerial 
officials suggested that the research team focus on the irrigation need of farmers, 
especially for the dry season rice, in the specified area and the province as a whole. 
Team members also recalled that villagers still used irrigation up to 1986 but most of 
the major areas did not have water. The study showed that around 85% of the 
villagers interviewed were willing to have the irrigation scheme renovated based on 
the existing model of the Khmer Rougexix and would be willing to pay an irrigation 
fee. It should be noted that during the time of the study, areas in the province were 
still unsafe because of the existing Khmer Rough soldiers whose presence made 
villagers hesitant to move upstream to cut wood.  
However, after improvements were made on the roadsxx and the safety issues were 
resolved upstream, many villagers began to migrate upstream for woodcutting and 
shifting cultivation. Most villagers living in the focus area began borrowing money 
from middlemen in the markets to spend on woodcutting. They spent around three 
days per trip and the profits they gained from selling the wood went back to partially 
paying their debts. This activity was illegal and many of the villagers were fined by 
the forestry administration and the police checkpoints among the roads.   
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Political Drivers: Issues of Origins   
The way on how decision is made is strongly influenced by political interest and actor 
involved. There have been trends for politicians from the birthplace and origins to 
patronage people support from their place. Personal observation revealed that at 
minister level, they need to stand for election in one district, which is mostly the 
place they are from. If they lost election at the place they are from, this means their 
position has been insecure as well. Based on this logic, many times, technical 
expertise and assistance has to be used to fulfill politically driven requirements. 
Some politicians listen to advice from technical experts but others see these experts 
as merely tools to use to accomplish their personal projects.  
Interviews with Development Officers working on the Stung Chinit Irrigation Scheme 
since 2001 revealed that the project promotion was influenced by such national 
political actors as: the current Minister of Tourism, whose homeland is situated in 
Baray district; the National Bank Governor, whose house is located along the Stung 
Taing Krasaing stream in Santuk district; and the current First Deputy President of 
the National Assembly. These are the main human resources of the CPP party who 
are in charge of the districts and provinces in the political patronage system. Another 
important actor at the provincial level is the current District Chief of Santuk, who is 
very active in mobilizing people toward development and forming working groups at 
the grassroots levels.  
Lessons Learned from Project Participation   
In late 2008, farmers from 15 out of 25 villages were surveyed on their willingness 
to conduct dry season rice cultivation. The majorities of the farmers either refused to 
participate or were unable to cultivate during the dry season because of the following 
reasons:  
• They were busy with their lower areas of rice cultivation (Rice cultivation in 
the Tonle Sap floodplain is sometimes known as recession rice cultivation 
during the dry season). 
• The cultivated areas were far from their homes. 
• Farmers are busy with upstream woodcutting and selling. 
• Farmers are busy with livestock care for cattle and buffalo.  
• Some villagers were busy climbing palm trees to produce palm sugar. 
• Farmers were busy clearing new land upstream (outside command areas). 
Since October to December 2009 and will continues, many villagers in Kraya 
of Santuk district have been arrested by local polices and authorities as they 
protest against the economic land concession granted by government to 
large-scale agro-industrial. The concession also overlaps with their current 
farming and residential land.  No clear solution had been made during the 
writing.  
• Farmers previous experience with the dry rice cultivation in the focus areas 
were of little benefit to them economically. The investments did not provide a 
return. 
• Villagers complained that dry season rice cultivation makes their paddy field 
waterlogged and results in more grass and weed growth. 
• They find it difficult to plough during the wet rice season. 
• Traditionally, most cattle and buffalo are released during the dry season and 
it is difficult to work and feed these animals during the dry season. 
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• Pest pressure was prevalent in the dry season. 
For these reasons, the push for local farmers to invest their labor and capital in dry 
season rice cultivation was discontinued. 
Another concern was that the irrigation scheme did not respond to the needs of the 
local people. Research by GRET/CEDAC staff working with the project reported that:  
Local villagers did request the construction companies - both foreign and local - to 
adjust the scheme based on requests from local farmers, but the companies did not 
listen to their complaint and based their decisions on knowledge collected by 
technical experts. Most of the construction companies belonged to MOWRAM so that 
the same people when dealing with the local farmers played both the roles of 
constructers and officials. Therefore, most of irrigation scheme were not good quality 
or efficient designs. (Interview, September 16, 2009).   
The CEDAC team who worked in Stung Chinit observed that there were conflicting 
ideas on the need for irrigation between the local farmers and the government. The 
villagers had hoped for a partial irrigation system that would work in conjunction 
with the wet season irrigation already in use. The government, however, decided to 
develop a large and complex system of irrigation canals. This top-down decision-
making process tends to support large, modern irrigations schemes without taking 
into account the lack of capacity to manage and operate these schemes at the local 
level. MOWRAM has often complained about the lack of human resources and 
capacity at the provincial level.  
In addition, the establishment and recognition of the FWUC took place around 6 
years to get official recognition from MOWRAM. It was suggested that this process 
should be done at the provincial level including the responsibility to properly allocate 
funds and to create a better business environment for the private sector and civil 
society. The national level should play a role at the macro level advocating and 
coordination with the EIA. Meanwhile, future efforts should be made to research and 
reflect on the ability of local partners to manage the schemes and operate the 
irrigation systems as mentioned in the PIMD guideline. According to the PIMD 
guideline, the government will subsidize five years of operation before the 
transferring control to the local farmers. To date, this practice has not been applied, 
resulting fewer benefits from the irrigation scheme in the dry season. 
Land reallocation in Stung Chinit is considered a success despite the confusion of 
local farmers at the onset of the project. The concept of the land reallocation was to 
justify the land lost by sharing and regrouping those plots of land closest to the 
irrigation canals of each block. This practice took longer than expected as some 
farmers had up to five different plots of land and some blocks were shared by seven 
different villages.  
A summary of the lessons learned from the Stung Chinit Irrigation scheme is listed 
below.  
1. Irrigation development proponents should consider the actual needs and 
interests of the local farmers as well as the livelihood and rice dependency of 
these farmers.. The need for crop system diversification is evident. In the 
case of Stung Chinit, farmers depend not only on rice but also on small-scale 
watermelon and other cropping systems.  
2. The priority of irrigation development is to provide complementary irrigation 
to ensure the stability and high productivity of rice harvest in the wet season. 
Developing irrigation for the purpose of two to three rice crops should be 
secondary due to the soil conditions in many parts of Cambodia.  
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3. Officials need to decide on the type of irrigation scheme based on 
geographical and hydrological factors. Consideration must be given not only 
to the type of irrigation scheme but also the nature of the local farmers and 
their willingness to participate in collective action or CPRs that are often 
require by irrigation schemes. The case from Stung Chinit will require farmers 
to develop planning; participate in discussions and negotiations; and act more 
independently once the project has completed its mandates. The experiences 
of GRET/CEDAC suggested that the schemes should range from 100 to 1000 
ha with fewer villages involved (using hydrological boundaries). The more 
villages that are involved, the more problems that occur as villagers become 
less willing to contribute. Fewer villages mean less political boundaries and 
better in organizing collective action. Yet donors have a preference for large-
scale schemes (as shown by the case of Kuwait) 
4. The capacity of the community as well as the local government agencies to 
operate and maintain the systems needs to be taken into consideration. The 
larger the scheme the more capacity required. 
5. To be operational, the irrigation scheme requires support from local 
authorities to solve problems and collect water fees. Other provincial 
departments are needed to show collaboration and support for the scheme 
such as PDOWRAM, PDA, Provincial Department of Environment and Police 
officers.  
Decision-making Tools 
In principle, the environmental process assessment requirements related to 
agricultural and irrigation development project must apply. 
The interview with the Provincial Department of Environment revealed hat EIA and 
SIA are needed but the main goal of irrigation development is to improve the 
livelihoods of the local people. The consequential impacts of large-scale irrigation 
construction would not last for long. Therefore, EIA will not be needed until later on.  
The Department of Environment official proposed two things to be considered:  
The feasibility study must focus on current natural resource status (resource 
valuation or Payment Ecosystem Services). Expanding the irrigation systems will 
require additional water and rice production. Other production to be considered 
includes aquatic resources, biodiversity, and ecology, which are the main source of 
livelihoods.  Fish does not provide 100% of the protein needs to the people in the 
province but it does provide a large amount (Currently, fish accounts for about 50-
60% of protein intake.). The fish quantity will be reduced due to the irrigation 
reservoir expansion for recession irrigation in the floodplain, which involves more 
intensive pesticides and chemical usage.  Currently, there is only one fishing lot 
along the Stung Sen tributary. 
Large-scale irrigation development must be able to balance the loss and benefit. The 
proposed water diversions across the rivers with many irrigation scheme along it will 
be inevitably change the flow of water including other resource such as aquatic, fish, 
and flood forest. Agricultural practice will change from conventional to modern 
methods, seasonal cow and buffalo raising in dry season flood plain as well as farmer 
seasonal resettlement for farming will also changes.  
This interview showed the need for a complete, full-length feasibility study in order 
to formulate the correct project master plan. It was also suggested that there be 
more consultations with local communities including line institutions. Meanwhile each 
institution should prepare a detailed report and study describing their skills and 
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responsibilities during and after implementation of the scheme and present the 
report and findings of the feasibility report at form workshop for the villagers in the 
focus area.   
According to EIA guidelines, the Provincial Environmental Development agency 
(DOE) is responsible obtaining IEIA approval on all projects costing less than $2 
million USD. Projects with a budget surpassing $2 million USD must be reviewed and 
approved directly by MOE central.  
IEIA and EIA requirements vary from sector to sector. For the irrigation sector, IEIA 
or EIA is required for projects covering or affecting more than 5,000 ha. (A detailed 
list of IEIA and EIA requirements is listed in Table 3.) 
 
Table 3: IEIA and EIA Requirements for Agriculture-related Projects 
 
Project Type and Associated Activities  Size/Capacities  
1. Agriculture  
i Forest concessions > 10,000 ha  
ii Logging  >500 ha  
iii Land covered by forest  > 500 ha  
iv Agricultural and agro-industrial land  > 10,000 ha  
v Flooded and coastal forests  Any size  
vi Irrigation systems  > 5,000 ha  
vii Drainage systems > 5,000 ha  
vii Fishing ports  Any size   
2. Agriculture-related Projects  
i Food processing and canned goods  > 500 tons/year  
ii All fruit drink manufacturing  > 1,500 liters/day 
iii Fruit manufacturing  > 500 ton/year  
iv Orange juice manufacturing  Any size  
v Sugar refining  > 3,000 ton/year  
vi Rice mills and cereal grains  > 3,000 ton/year  
vii Chemical fertilizer plants  > 10,000  
viii Pesticide industries Any size  
ix Animal food processing  > 10,000 ton/year  
Source: MoE (1999): Annex of sub-decree on EIA process  
 
In the case of Stung Chinit, scenarios where developed after the operation was fully 
functional with the assistance of a French expert. Developing different scenarios and 
applying IMT models can predict the sustainability of a scheme. Sustainability cannot 
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be achieved unless the government follows through with their financial commitments 
for maintaining the schemes as stated in the policies they developed on sustainable 
irrigation management.  
A cost-benefit analysis was applied to Stung Chinit irrigation scheme but it failed to 
predict the reality of the situation. One of the most contested issues is that the 
scheme coverage has been reduced while the financial expenses continue to increase 
including prolonged construction and operational expenses due to poor coordination 
among the key stakeholders. Fish pass monitoring and migration research have been 
done but with no follow up. Currently, the fishery communities and the fish pass 
monitoring have failed to be fully functional.  
Conclusions    
The Cambodian irrigation and water sectors have generated increasing interest 
among large-scale investors, particularly the areas surrounding Tonle Sap Lake and 
the Mekong Floodplain. However, there has been little success in the selection of, 
and support for, the current decision-making process.   
Even though the rationale to build large-scale irrigation remains a high priority 
among senior government officials, it is difficult to understand why the government 
wishes to expand the new schemes as there are many schemes that are not working. 
It seems that they are not learning from the past mistakes. There is no consultation 
with stakeholders, include also inside the government. The first preliminary 
observation made by the study reveals that there are huge amounts of money being 
poured into the farming sector. Meanwhile the selected target provinces often are 
the places where key political actors or decision makers reside and attract these 
projects using their political connections.  
Many of the tools available to improve the decision-making process have not been 
used. This is partly due to a lack of technical knowledge, partly due to an overtly 
zealous desire to compete with neighboring countries, and also to the political nature 
of most projects. The government has used this competitive desire to justify ignoring 
the tools available.  
In addition, public consultations concerning the project development and planning 
among local stakeholders remain weak. The experiences and observations from the 
Stung Chinit Irrigation Scheme suggest that irrigation proponents need to consider 
the actual needs and interests of the local farmers as well as their overall livelihood 
dependency on rice cultivation versus off-farm activities. Before a large-scale 
scheme is implemented, alternatives need to be explored based on geographical and 
hydrological components. At the local level, there should be discussions about 
whether the farmers’ livelihoods support the need for irrigation systems, what 
potential cropping systems are available and whether the community is open to 
collective action. 
Because of the increasing investments and grants in the agricultural sector, good 
governance and transparency are increasingly important.  There should be a third 
professional party who helps to implement the work at certain levels with the 
financial support of the development partners. For instance, the PDOWRAM and the 
Irrigation Service Center implemented by GRET/CEDAC and financed by AFD could 
provide technical assistance to farmers through agricultural extension, 
demonstrations and scheme construction. Direct investments to small-scale farmers 
in the form of loans should be considered as a viable way to generate employment. 
For example, if loans of US$100 to $200 were given to 2.6 million families, the total 
amount of reinvestment and growth would be significant.   
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Organizational and leadership development between FWUC and the O&M needs to 
take place early in the development stages or the schemes are likely to collapse. 
More farmers should be trained on water harvesting techniques, particularly in those 
areas at the watershed level.  
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Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia at the dinner hosted by His Excellency Sheikh 
Nasser Al-Mohammed Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, Prime Minister of the State of Kuwait, in 
honor of the Cambodian Delegation 
(http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/unisql1/egov/english/home.view.html. xviii Chanthol Sun, Senior Minister and Vice Chairman of Council for the Development of 
Cambodia, “Why Do business in Cambodia?” 2009.  xix The renovation was not as complicated and modern as it is today.  xx Rural road construction was completed in Stung Chinit in 2008. However, signboards were 
posted reading that completion took place in 2006 to justify the poor quality of the roads. 
Some villagers destroyed those signboards to show their disgust with the construction 
company. Most of the rural roads in Stung Chinit were still very dilapidated as of 2009.  
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The ecosystem services derived from upland watersheds are important to the 
well-being of people living in them, others living downstream and to society more 
widely (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Braumann et al. 2007, Lebel et 
al. 2008).  Perceived or realized services often include providing food, timber, 
fuel-wood and non-timber products, pollination and pest control for crops, water 
for irrigation or hydropower, sites for cultural activities, flood protection, buffered 
base flows, carbon sequestration and water filtration. The specific benefits people 




* Contribution to the Global Land Project Book on “Vulnerability and resilience of land-use 
systems” edited by Ademola Braimoh.  
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obtain from a watershed are highly dependent on the mixture of ecosystems 
present, landscape structure and social contexts. 
As a consequence of this variety of valued services pursuing multiple 
management objectives is a practical reality for most upland watersheds in 
Southeast Asia.  It is also a source of contestation and conflict. Managing a 
watershed for one particular service or user may result in trade-offs in provision 
of other services and for other actors. Local communities and governments have 
frequently tried to prioritize, eliminate or integrate use of different services with 
combinations of plans, rules, incentives and information (Lebel and Daniel 2009). 
Spatial planning has been the favoured approach. Governments have devised 
classifications for land, forests and watershed and used these to restrict or 
encourage particular activities (Laungaramsri 2000). Upland communities have 
also made spatial plans, but with typically more flexible and overlapping systems 
of rights for using different resources – that is, with a less strictly territorial 
perspective.  
An important adjunct of plans is to associate landscape units with rules of use 
and responsibilities. Rule-making can be by, or in consultation with, users or it 
can be dictated by more remote authorities. Co-management models have often 
been promoted because they provide opportunities to consider services valued at 
different levels.  
Although many rules are do’s and don’ts, alternatives that create incentives may 
be more effective in some situations (Wunder 2007). Markets for ecosystem 
services have been established in various parts of the world as an alternative to 
regulations to encourage conservation of valued services. Their performance 
depends on institutional design details and socio-political contexts (Wunder et al. 
2008b).  
The quality of information about services and impacts of use and management is 
crucial to most efforts at governing them but often receives insufficient attention 
(Carpenter et al. 2009).   Payments for ecosystem services, for example, require 
a good understanding of which actions actually secure provisioning and indicators 
that can be monitored (Engel et al. 2008). In many cases unambiguous, place-
specific, evidence that particular land-covers provide a service is lacking – for 
example, flood protection benefits (Bruijnzeel 2004, Locatelli and Vignola 2009, 
van Dijk et al. 2009). Local, experience-based knowledge, and scientific 
knowledge are not as frequently integrated as needed (Berkes 2009). Building 
awareness and understanding through integrated assessments and monitoring 
are crucial (Lele 2009) but will never be a substitute for politics around which 
services and users should be prioritized. 
In this paper we deepen an earlier short review (Lebel and Daniel 2009) with a 
more focussed analysis of experiences in the southeast Asia region. We remain 
interested in both institutional and political dimensions of governing ecosystem 
services from upland watersheds. The rest of this chapter is organized around the 
three themes of plans, rules, incentives and information. 
Plans 
A common approach to managing the complex set of services from upland 
watersheds is through spatial land-use planning, zoning some areas for 
biodiversity conservation, watershed protection, forestry, agriculture, tourism or 
multiple uses. Most governments in south-east Asia have adopted policies for 
controlling land-use in upland watersheds. The extent to which users and 
residents are involved in planning varies as does the influence of plans on 
practices. 
Protected areas  
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Most conservation policies and strategies of governments are founded on the idea 
of separating people from their environments in systems of protected areas 
(Chopra et al. 2005). A discourse around the benefits of ecosystem services has 
usually been added to early justifications based on biodiversity and recreational 
or cultural values, focussing on either downstream communities or more recently 
on global environmental benefits of reduced deforestation. The protected area 
approach argues that conserving natural ecosystems in a close to intact state will 
maintain a full suite of ecosystem processes, and thus, the full range of  services, 
which forests or other forms of native vegetation provide.  
Vast areas of the tropics were declared as protected areas between 1980 and 
2005 (Naughton-Treves et al. 2005). Indonesia has set aside about 12.5 % of its 
land area in protected areas for nature conservation; Malaysia about 31% 
(EarthTrends 2003, UNEP-WCMC 2003); Thailand about 19% percent for 
conservation (ICEM 2003c, IUCN 2007). The practice of allocating large areas as 
conservation areas and parks has spread in the 1990s to other countries in the 
Mekong region. Lao PDR has established an extensive set of protected areas 
covering more than 21 % (ICEM 2003a) and Cambodia 18% (ICEM 2003b). While 
most protected are located in the uplands (as lowland areas have already been 
cleared of native vegetation) the extent to which use of forest goods and services 
is restricted varies among countries (Thomas et al. 2008). The effectiveness of 
management also varies widely with many parks existing only on paper, promised 
local benefits to residents from tourism often smaller than expected, and conflicts 
created over access to land, resources and services (Roth 2004a, Naughton-
Treves et al. 2005). 
As of 2008, Thailand’s Royal Forestry Department had established more than 200 
protected area units covering approximately 19% of the country’s land area. The 
government of Thailand intends to increase protected area systems to 30% of the 
country in 2016 (Trisurat and Pattanavibool 2008). The implications for the 
upland communities, particularly ethnic peoples, living and farming in protected 
areas declared as national parks, wildlife sanctuaries and watershed areas are 
huge and tensions involving farming communities fighting state forest land 
classification have become increasingly frequent (Wittayapak 1996, Poffenberger 
1999). At larger scales the outstanding challenge is that benefits from existence 
value of biodiversity frequently do not align with the value of habitat conversion 
to agriculture for local poor communities (Fisher and Christopher 2007). 
However, parks have failed at forest conservation; special deals are possible to 
convert land for tourism and even personal use. In Thailand’s Khao Yai National 
Park, a proposed golf course and resort that began construction was halted only 
after protests (Laungaramsri 2002a, Ross 2003).  Powerful military or political 
figures can acquire “protected” areas or land designated for resettlement of 
displaced villagers but typically remain un-investigated (Phongpaichit 1999).  
Studies of a biodiversity conservation in Ruteng Park on Flores Island in 
Indonesia provides a closer look at the links between the conservation of 
biodiversity and the livelihoods of rural people who live on the fringes of the 
parks and protected areas. An early study demonstrated the economic value of 
drought mitigation services to farmers downstream of forest in upland watersheds  
inline with policies of the Indonesian government and park (Pattanayak and 
Kramer 2001). A subsequent study linked forest cover to prevalence of diarrhoea 
presumably through impacts on drinking water quality illustrating another under-
appreciated service of the park (Pattanayak 2007). Parks can provide multiple 
ecosystem services and benefits. 
Forest and watershed classifications  
Control and authority over forest areas of most countries in Southeast Asia rests 
with the national or state government.  In Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand, state control over forests has grown since the establishment of forest 
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service agencies during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.    Governments 
have exerted authority over forests through land classification and zoning 
schemes, for example, by attaching regulations prohibit local access or use 
depending on whether a parcel of land is classified as “forest” or “upland” (Lebel 
et al. 2004). 
In Thailand forests are defined by the 1941 Forestry Act as “land without 
occupants” and as “land with no right-holders” (Forestry Act 1941). As land areas 
become classified as ‘forest reserves’, there is a great deal of ambiguity of 
ownership of agricultural lands in rural areas particularly in collectively-used lands 
such as community forests, sacred forests, and fallow farmlands (Sato 2003). 
Agricultural land in forest reserves make up the majority of agricultural lands in 
Thailand in areas typically classified as degraded forests. Only a minority of 
private land holdings used for agriculture have full title deeds.  Often agricultural 
land holdings do not have the concept of ownership in the modern sense and are 
limited to either usufruct or ‘sithi krobkrong’ and squatter’s rights or ‘sitthi 
japjong’ (Sato 2003). The changes made to legal categories and procedures for 
land over the past several decades are an important source of contemporary 
conflicts over land. The current legal categories of rural and forest land in 
Thailand illustrate some of the governance problems created by categories and 
definitions driven by interests in a narrowly framed set of services.  
The National Forest Reserve Act of 1964 attempted to centralize forest control; by 
1985, the RFD declared approximately 45 percent of the country’s total area as 
forest reserves. But lands designated as state national forest reserve often had 
no trees or already had people residing in those areas (Hirsch and Lohmann 
1989, Flaherty and Jengjalern 1995). 
The RFD’s designation of forests as being driven by the expansion or maintenance 
of its own power and control over territory (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995) does 
not completely explain official motives but may also include departmental 
factionalism. For example, designation of reserved forests before 1938 that was 
undertaken by the authority of local administrative sections could not realistically 
expand the authority of RFD. Some regional forest officers enthusiastically urged 
the designation of reserved forests at that time because they thought if they did 
not do so, the forests would disappear. Thailand’s foresters were also conscious 
of the need for spatial enclosure of forest lands for so-called scientific forestry 
(Wataru 2003). 
Other Mekong region countries follow systems similar to that of Thailand with the 
difficulty that the state spatial classification system finds it unable to incorporate 
other types of land-uses such as swidden systems.  
Swidden areas are a mosaic of different-year fallows and secondary forest areas 
some of which subsequently also are transformed into upland rice fields and then 
back again into fallows. Fallow forests that are part of the swidden rice cultivation 
cycle of upland communities cover large parts of Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, 
northern Thailand, Lao PDR and Vietnam. Secondary forests, which regenerate on 
the fallow swiddens, are rich in tree species and complex with respect to stand 
structure. The farm-forest fallow-swidden ecosystem (including the trees and 
wildlife species) is part of an extensive indigenous knowledge system. But as 
swidden cultivation is actively discouraged by officials, the system is undergoing 
many changes and also increasingly being replaced by permanent rice farming. 
The land use changes are causing a reduction in the area covered by fallow forest 
ecosystem with subsequent negative impacts on biodiversity (Rerkasem et al. 
1994, Schmidt-Vogt 1998, Laungaramsri 2002b, Walker 2004).  
State management uses positionality to make strictly bounded static spatial 
categories such as “conservation forest” and “village land”. Categories of this type 
can be easily delimited on a map and made legible to future officials. Conversely, 
swidden space and village management does not fit since it does not take the 
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shape of straight lines but instead follows streams and mountain ridges, contains 
rough edges, and often defines location in relation to another's field or a 
landscape marker  (Roth 2004b).  
Concerns around landslides, floods, soil erosion and sedimentation have driven 
much research and policy on agriculture on sloping lands (Blaikie and Muldavin 
2004a, Forsyth and Walker 2008). A recurrent rationale for policies and projects 
has been that maintaining or increasing forest cover will secure key ecosystem 
services – often without much specific attention to tree species involved or 
impacts of alternative land-uses. The scientific evidence base for many services, 
like flood protection, however, often remains modest and controversial (Bruijnzeel 
2004, Locatelli and Vignola 2009, van Dijk et al. 2009). Scientific knowledge 
about watershed services is frequently used selectively or misrepresented in 
justifying upland policies (Forsyth 1996, 1998, Walker 2003, Blaikie and Muldavin 
2004b).  
In Thailand, watershed classification (Chankaew 1996), like the definitions of 
forest lands, was also used as instruments to strengthen state control of upland 
resources, restrict expansion of farmlands in upland catchments and threaten 
highland farmers with resettlement (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995, Laungaramsri 
2000). This is illustrated in the ground where watershed classification can even 
lead to entire provinces or districts in northern provinces of Thailand coming 
under strict conservation status. For instance, most of Mae Hong Son province 
falls under the highest order of protection Watershed 1A, thus prohibiting all 
settlement and agriculture, and placing huge stress on the communities who live 
and farm in the province. In practice implementation of the classification has 
been left incomplete as the Thai state does not have the capacity, political 
support or available land to resettle all upland farmers into lowland areas (Walker 
and Farrelly 2008). 
Watershed classifications across the region are grossly similar with classes of high 
to lower restrictions on uses. Most areas in mainland Southeast with restricted 
classifications are in uplands (Thomas et al. 2008). The Watershed Classification 
Project carried out by the Mekong River Commission Secretariat between 1989 
and 2001 elaborated a basin-wide classification indicating the sensitivity of 
watersheds with regard to resource degradation (mainly by soil erosion). It aimed 
to develop a decision-support tool. Along with the classification, the project 
produced general recommendations for sustainable land use in each Watershed 
Class. For instance, for “Watershed Class 1: Protection Forest Areas” with very 
steep slopes and rugged landforms, commonly uplands and headwater areas, the 
project said that as a rule, these areas should be under permanent forest cover. 
Notably, the project also added a caveat that “account needs to be taken of 
traditional rights and land use practices” (Heinimann et al. 2005). 
State schemes for classifying and planning land-uses do not correspond closely 
with actual provision of ecosystem services; swidden, multi-species orchards, and 
agro-forestry may yield more services than mono-crop plantations labelled as 
forests and assumed to be service-rich (Cairns 2007, Bhagwat et al. 2008, Xu et 
al. 2009). In Southwestern China indigenous land-use practices may be more 
beneficial to long-term conservation objectives than protected areas (Sharma and 
Xu 2007, Xu and Melick 2007). In the typical, dynamic and mosaic landscapes of 
much of upland Southeast Asia various ecosystem services are not coincident in 
space or time. Hydrological services like base stream flows at the end of the dry 
season and flood protection services during the wet season may both be valued 
even when how to secure them is not fully understood (Forsyth and Walker 2008, 
Neef and Thomas 2009).  
Participatory land-use planning  
A recurrent challenge for planning is getting adequate information about 
ecosystem services at scales relevant to decision-making (Turner and Daily 
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2008). Local knowledge is often crucial but only available if planning agencies 
allow space for meaningful local participation (Thomas 2006).  
A good example is the work of ICRAF, CARE and local government and non-
government organizations in the Mae Chaem watershed of Chiang Mai province 
(Thomas 2005). Such activities are also a helpful background to more bottom-up 
processes of basin management in areas beyond the rural-interface and merging 
into rural- peri-urban landscapes. When multiple stakeholders including scientific 
and local experts are involved, underappreciated services can be better 
understood, as for example, from Ruteng Park described earlier. 
Institutional frameworks such as watershed management committees, 
organizations or networks, that may be mandated by government or emerge 
independently, can help solve local resource allocation problems. However,  such 
organizations may not have much formal decision-making authority or budget but 
take on basic planning, conflict resolution and negotiation functions (Thomas 
2006). In the Upper Ping river basin, the Thai government established several 
river sub-basin committees that each adopted slightly different committee 
structures and activity plans to deal with the range of stakeholders and issues 
important in their sub-basin (Thomas 2006). The challenge was introducing new 
organizations with recognized cross-sectoral planning mandates in a context 
where individual agencies and water user groups already had well-organized 
networks and coalitions (Thomas 2006, Mollinga et al. 2007). Local communities 
also make plans to manage their watersheds (Wanishpradist 2005). Overall, 
however, it is rare to find direct involvement of stakeholders in analysis of 
ecosystem services as a basis for informed negotiations and decision-making 
(Fisher et al. 2008). 
A range of accounting techniques are available to help people understand 
dependencies on ecosystem services from generalized ecological footprints 
through to valuation of specific services (Jenerrete et al. 2006, Patterson and 
Coelho 2009). The ecological basis of many exercises, however, remains tenuous 
as context specific evidence is frequently lacking or inadequate. The importance 
of participatory and deliberative methods for accounting and evaluation is likely 
to grow (Spash 2007) especially where knowledge about hydrological services is 
strongly contested (Forsyth and Walker 2008). 
Classifications reflect the interests of those who build them. There is a need to re-
conceptualize land-use planning for conserving ecosystem services as a process 
of joint assessment and negotiation.  Current land classifications produce tensions 
and conflict; they need to be adjusted to fit “prior use” of areas currently 
classified as “forest land” irrespective of the quality of forest now and reward 
good management rather than penalize it. Validation is possible with aerial 
photograph and satellite-based remote sensing. 
Rules 
Rules and regulations underpin plans helping to define rights of access and use of 
ecosystem services and responsibilities for their management. Institutional 
instruments are diverse including quotas, licenses, concessions, seasonal bans as 
well as other customary rules, taboos and norms. 
Property rights and land tenure  
Whether an ecosystem service is a private, public, club or common good makes a 
difference to how they might be governed (Engel et al. 2008, Patterson and 
Coelho 2009). Individual property rights for services which are excludable and 
rival are particularly useful to farmers as they encourage investment in land – for 
example to grow trees which may not provide returns for many years. Formal 
title deeds are also useful as collateral in obtaining loans (Walker 2006).  
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As public goods are used more intensively they can become rival goods and need 
other institutions to be managed sustainably (Fisher et al. 2008). Pre-existing 
private property rights may hinder efforts to manage for services that are 
common pool resources – rival, but non-excludable – and coordination 
mechanisms are needed (Patterson and Coelho 2009).  
Some hydrological services like drinking water supplies from springs or streams 
are managed as club goods (Engel et al. 2008). Others are treated as common 
property of a sub-watershed, village or even a group of neighbors. Rules of use in 
community forests typically specify amounts or seasons during which valued but 
scarce forest resources can be collected (Cairns 2007, Kerr 2007).  Rules for 
common pool resources are often flexibly bundled, so that allocation of scarce 
bamboo clumps or trees with resin or others needed for spiritual ceremonies 
might be allocated to individuals or households whereas access to regrowth might 
be open to all for grazing (Lebel 2005).  Hydrological services like flood protection 
or dry season base-flows requires coordination between upstream and 
downstream users and findings ways to secure mutual benefit (Kerr 2007).  
The conventional logic that formal land tenure enhances sustainable land and 
forest management is challenged by experiences in Thailand (Daniel and Lebel 
2006). For example, although ethnic minority groups in the Northern uplands 
commonly do not have permanent land use rights, long-term investment in land 
resources is common practice (Neef et al. 2000). For ethnic people, formal access 
to land may often be less important than access to the Thai citizenship cards and 
the capacity and flexibility of household members in exploiting new income 
sources on-farm and off-farm (Knupfer 2002, Thomas et al. 2008).  
A common strategy of farmers in trying to prevent land claims of state forestry 
officials where local rights are not otherwise recognized is to plant fruit trees or 
tea shrubs, as it was believed that forestry officials would not claim land that has 
already been planted with perennial crops. Another response was to convert rain-
fed swidden rice fields or fallows to permanent paddy fields or cropping systems 
(Neef 2001). Additionally, some communities try to avoid land losses through 
“appeasing” of the forest officers by being active in “forest protection” and 
reforestation (Knupfer 2002). 
Lao PDR, Vietnam and China went through periods of collectivization and then re-
allocation of agricultural and forest land so some of the tenure issues are different 
than those in Thailand (Thomas et al. 2008). Land has been allocated to both 
individuals and villages. The Lao government has had a particularly forceful policy 
of ending swidden cultivation.  
Overall, it is hard to draw strong conclusions on the relative performance of 
formal and informal arrangements. In remote areas a lot depends on local 
institutions and relations with local officials rather than formal land certificates 
and regulations (Walker and Farrelly 2008, George et al. 2009). Both formal and 
informal tenure can matter, and that their interplay can be positive with respect 
to livelihoods and environmental outcomes.  With proximity or when more 
profitable opportunities arise – for instance related to eco-tourism or logging 
concessions – ambiguities in land tenure often become more problematic 
(Wunder et al. 2008a). Clarifying property rights can be an important aspect of 
governance of upland watershed services, but formal land tenure is not 
necessarily a pre-requisite to establishing management systems for ecosystem 
services, especially where informal, use rights are locally recognized and 
respected. 
Community-based management  
Property rights may be vested in communities rather than households and 
individuals. Community forests have become an arena for spatial negotiation of 
land and forestland use between the state, timber companies and local 
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communities as well as a means of promoting local participation in forest 
management. But many community forest programs are failing because of 
external factors promoting forest degradation are stronger.  
In Cambodia, ministerial order recognizing forest sites as potential community 
forestry areas is the first step towards formal recognition of community 
management of forest areas. In December 2008, more than 100 villages in 
several provinces were granted formal management of about 127,000 hectares of 
forest in 87 forest sites by Cambodia’s Minister for Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries.  Another 37 potential community forest areas covering 18,000 hectares 
were already recognized in Siam Reap in 2007 bringing a total of 145,000 
hectares of forest under recognized local management. The next step of formal 
registration through signing a CF Agreement with the Forestry Administration, will 
give communities full legal access and management rights over local forest areas 
for 15 years, protecting these areas from commercial and other outside interests. 
It also enables some of Cambodia’s poorest people to benefit economically, with 
rights to use forest resources including timber (RECOFTC 2009). 
In their comprehensive review of community-based forest management in the 
Philippines, Lasco and Pulhin (2006) conclude that the strategies of planting trees 
in farms and landscapes has had largely positive environmental effects, for 
example, for soil and water conservation, carbon sequestration (also see section 
below) and biomass production.  Other studies of complex agroecosystems like 
benzoin and rattan gardens in Indonesia highlight how reduced intervention in the 
system can lead to ecological succession-processes increasingly similar to those 
found in native forests after disturbance and thus important to biodiversity 
conservation as well as productive use (Garcia-Fernandez and Casado 2005). 
Agroforestry practices using trees and cover crops greatly reduce soil erosion 
compared to monoculture plantations without groundcover (Sidle et al. 2006). 
Management practices cannot be understood separate from their social example. 
For example, the tea or miang forest areas in Nan province of northern Thailand, 
important for supplying tea, are not only maintained as a watershed forest 
comprising part of the muang faai traditional irrigation system, but also serve as 
an agro-ecotourism centre bringing in cash income and supported by the local 
government (Wittayapak and Dearden 1999).  
Co-management for resource use can produce differing tensions depending on 
the policy emphasis on village, households or individuals. In Vietnam, for 
instance, during the 1950’s and the 1960’s, the national government encouraged 
villages to formulate cooperatives, though the membership of the cooperatives 
and decision-making processes may have continued to reflect traditional modes 
of operation. By the 1960’s and 1970’s, the government tried to establish 
multivillage cooperative units or communes. However, the 1980’s brought policies 
that shifted away from collectivization, returning authority to the village, and, 
most recently, to households. This may make it possible for villages may regain 
greater autonomy, creating opportunities for traditional institutions to reestablish 
their role in resource-use decision making. Yet government policies and 
programs, while de-emphasizing collectives, give little recognition to the role of 
the traditional villages. Instead, these new policies and programs emphasize 
empowering the household or individual (Sowerine et al. 1998, Sowerine 2004).  
Co-management arrangements with state agencies, firms and other actors are 
institutionally diverse. One of the recurrent factors important to success is 
building networks of trust which enable social (Lele 2004, Armitage et al. 2009, 
Berkes 2009). In the context of upland watersheds with their dynamic and 
complex mix of ecosystem services valued at multiple scales (Lebel et al. 2008) 
the challenges and rewards are particularly high. 
Logging concessions  
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European forestry influences are evident in state forest management practices 
that follow scientific forestry norms developed in the eighteenth century and 
which were focussed on supplying colonial powers the raw materials to 
industrialize (Bryant et al. 1993, Lang 2000, Contreras 2003). In mainland 
Southeast Asia, the colonial British Empire dominated and controlled the teak 
trade in India, Burma (Myanmar) and Thailand. In Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia it 
was the French. Colonial forest centralized authority in national capitals, using 
licenses, concessions, and military force as needed to gain control of forest 
resources. 
Southeast Asian governments and their corporate counterparts have viewed 
logging as an important source of power and revenue (Pasong and Lebel 2000, 
Dauvergne 2001, Butler and Laurance 2008). Revenues from timber exports in 
the Philippines in 1950-1969 were used for rebuilding the country from the 
devastation of wars. In Malaysia, timber rents make a significant contribution to 
growth, exports, savings, investment, government revenue and fiscal capacity. 
Forestry is a dominant sector in the Laotian economy: despite restrictions on 
logging and high export taxes implemented in 1989 – which decreased its share 
of total exports by 36 percent – timber and wood products remained the major 
export (replacing hydroelectricity). In 2000, the forestry sector contributed 5 
percent to GDP increasing from 3.4 percent in 1990 (FAO 2002). In Cambodia, 
both the Khmer Rouge and afterwards the elected government exported timber to 
Japan, Thailand and Vietnam (Billon 2000).  
The Indonesian government took control of forest resources in 1967 distributing 
over 60 million hectares (ha) in timber concessions to private companies often 
connected to military leaders (Pasong and Lebel 2000, Dauvergne 2001). The 
industry is controlled by only a handful of players; Barito Pacific, for example held 
more than 10 percent of the concessions and control over about 6 million ha. 
The management of forests in Indonesia was based on a land use classification 
which distinguishes protected forests, limited and general production forests, and 
conversion forests and areas for parks and reserves (Dick 1991). Clear felling is 
allowed in conversion forests, and transmigration settlements are developed from 
contiguous logged areas.  In production forests, concession period by timber and 
logging companies had been extended to 35-year harvesting cycle to induce them 
replant and pay the government appropriate fees from forest exploitation.   
The need to generate foreign exchange for debt servicing, the increased demand 
for raw industrial materials both in the domestic and international markets have 
helped induce the replacement of complex forest ecosystems by monoculture 
plantations.  The pulp and paper industry for instance in Indonesia has expanded 
rapidly since the 1990s.  Some estimates suggest that as little as 10 percent was 
actually harvested from plantation timber with rest coming from illegal cuts in 
natural forests. Forests were also cleared to plant fast-growing species (Barr 
2001). This conversion to tree plantations has resulted in forest loss and internal 
displacement, increased social conflicts over land, and worsened small-landholder 
tenure insecurity (Lang 2002). 
In Lao PDR, the rising price of natural rubber products due to the demand of the 
Chinese market over the last decade has attracted rubber plantation investors 
from China, Thailand and Vietnam to seek land concessions all over the country 
(Manivong and Cramb 2007). Throughout the region one of the largest concerns 
is the impacts on water-use as rubber is a demanding crop and many of the areas 
where is now expanding are highly seasonal with dry season where water 
scarcities are already a constraint on agriculture (Xu 2006, Mann 2009, Ziegler et 
al. 2009). 
Logging bans 
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Several countries have invoked logging bans in native forests in response to 
serious flood events (Daniel 2005, Xu et al. 2007).  
Until the 1989 logging ban, the Thai government gave concessions to companies 
to log large parts of the forest area that lay outside national parks and wildlife 
sanctuaries.  Indiscriminate logging practices usually led to continuing 
deforestation where 30-40 percent of the residual younger trees were destroyed. 
Hence, most logged-over forest areas became quickly degraded, and were further 
exploited by human activities as rural communities and land speculators obtained 
access through the logging roads (Kashio 1995a, 1995b).  
After the 1989 logging ban, the Thai government promoted a wood import policy 
and Thai logging companies expanded logging concessions into the neighbouring 
countries of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Daniel 2005). The logging of 
neighbouring country forests has also resulted in illegal logging operations in 
Thailand’s forests, particularly along the borders (Cooper and Palmer 1992). 
Illegal logging in the forests of the Salween National Park and the Salween 
Wildlife Sanctuary along the Burma/Myanmar and Thai border was one of the 
most well-known timber scandals in the post-logging ban period.  
China’s logging ban was introduced in 1988 alongside several other major 
policies, like the sloping land conversion program of 1999, that combined 
enforcement and incentives to increase forest cover on sloping lands (Bennett 
2008). These national policies have had major impacts on livelihoods and land-
uses in the ethnically diverse sub-tropical watersheds of Yunnan Province (Xu and 
Melick 2007, Xu et al. 2007, Xu et al. 2009) leading to, for example, the almost 
complete elimination of swidden cultivation by the Hani and its replacement by 
rubber (Xu et al. 2009). 
Incentives 
Payments for ecosystem services 
Payments for environmental, or ecosystem, services (PES) have emerged as an 
alternative or complement to spatial planning and regulatory approaches to 
conservation (Wunder 2007, Engel et al. 2008). PES schemes are voluntary 
transactions in which an environmental service is bought by a buyer from a 
provider if and only if the provider secures service provision (Wunder et al. 
2008b).  Such schemes share similarities to eco-certification of products and 
other incentive-based mechanisms, like environmental taxes or subsidies (Engel 
et al. 2008, Jack et al. 2008). Common challenges include clarifying property 
rights, getting prices right and linking actions to compensation (Fisher et al. 
2008). PES appear to be most relevant when an ecosystem service is under 
threat in marginal lands where opportunity costs are modest and land claims 
clear (Wunder 2007). 
For PES, the distinction of whether the ES provided are public goods or those in 
which they are not is an important distinction. Not all ES are pure public goods, 
i.e. consumption by one user does not affect consumption by another; many 
other ES are, in fact, either excludable or rival in consumption. In particular, 
many water services are “club goods” where only those holding water rights or 
those located in a well-delineated watershed benefit. This has implications both to 
identify the users and arrange for them to pay for service provision as well as to 
direct the benefits to the providers. This can affect questions of equity as well 
(Corbera et al. 2007). 
To date only a few such schemes have been operating for a significant period in 
Southeast Asia; quite a few of these deal with watershed protection and related 
services. Many are related to the Reward the Upland Poor for Environmental 
Services (RUPES) program (Swallow et al. 2007, Van Noordwijk et al. 2007, 
Leimona et al. 2009). 
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In the Philippines, concern over loss of biodiversity ranked very high among 
stakeholders in designing a PES program in the Peñablanca Protected Landscape. 
The PES program thus was initiated with high conservation, cash payments and 
investments in carbon crediting as the most beneficial option. The design of the 
PES program showed that the linkages between land use and the level of 
environmental services was crucial to the sustainability of the PES program.  The 
financial, economic, social and environmental factors were of equal importance in 
designing the PES program (Bennagen et al. 2006).    
In northern Thailand, upstream, ethnic minority, communities are expected to 
conserve upland watersheds, stream flows and biodiversity while also 
simultaneously being widely perceived by lowland communities and policy-makers 
as a threat to, rather than providers of, ecosystem services (George et al. 2009, 
Sangkapitux et al. 2009). A study in the Mae Sa watershed found that payments 
for water resource by downstream resources users was possible with upstream 
farmers willing to adapt their farming practices given adequate compensation 
(Sangkapitux et al. 2009). While building awareness about ethnic communities’ 
sustainable practices around ecosystem service projects could help change 
lowland perceptions, discrimination against upland minorities continues due to 
power and control over upland resources residing with lowland Thai policy 
makers. 
Wunder et al. (2008b)  reviewed a sample of programs invoking payments for 
environmental services that included several studies from tropical South America 
and found user- as opposed to government-financed programs were better in 
terms of fit to targeted beneficiaries, local conditions and needs, and monitoring. 
China, Mexico and Costa Rica each have large programs giving payments to 
landowners for changing land-uses (Sanchez-Azofeifa et al. 2007, Jack et al. 
2008). 
Rewards or compensation does not have to be direct cash payments to 
individuals; they could be non-monetary payments to groups or in form of 
guarantees of privileged or secure access (such as land tenure) to services or 
other resources like training (Leimona et al. 2009, Neef and Thomas 2009). Non-
financial incentives may be more important to poverty alleviation than direct 
payments (Leimona et al. 2009). 
In the complex resource management situations typically found in upland 
watersheds introducing new markets for ecosystem services  needs to consider 
carefully existing access rights as well is who is excluded and who will benefit or 
be at a disadvantage (Corbera et al. 2007, Mollinga et al. 2007).  Poor, 
marginalized and otherwise vulnerable groups are often more dependent on 
ecosystem services and have relatively low opportunity costs than others (Jack et 
al. 2008) but their capacities to engage may also be limited. Poor farmers in 
Vietnam uplands with small holdings were unlikely to join reforestation schemes 
unless compensation was adequate to cover loss of food production (Jourdain et 
al. 2009).  Moreover, when there are many poor small providers transaction costs 
can be high and thus not competitive (Jack et al. 2008).  Studies of two carbon 
sequestration projects in Mexico showed how women and poorest were excluded 
from designs and that outcomes reflected political affiliations with project 
managers (Corbera et al. 2007).  Non-participants in ecosystem services projects 
may also be impacted adversely, for instance, when landless farmers lose access 
to common pool resources (Wunder 2008). Although evidence about welfare 
impacts remains modest the emerging findings suggest that PES programs, on 
balance have had relatively small positive effects, and are unlikely to become 
central to poverty alleviation efforts (Wunder 2008).  
Ultimately, how rules are arrived at may matter as much as their final form. 
Thus, who runs a project is a crucial feature of PES schemes (Corbera et al. 2007, 
Wunder et al. 2008b). Intermediaries may be created by service buyers or 
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sometimes a third party. Non-governmental organization may be helpful where 
farmer’s groups (as providers) are not formally recognized or buyers unfamiliar 
with negotiating directly with farmers (Neef and Thomas 2009). Reliability of the 
organization and the ability to build trust in schemes are crucial (Koellner et al. 
2008, Neef and Thomas 2009). An assessment of the management capacity of 
seven organizations that sell ecosystem services from tropical forest in Latin 
America, for example, found that marketing and client satisfaction were often 
neglected and that different market actors have very different criteria and 
preferences making it necessary for suppliers to target offers carefully (Koellner 
et al. 2008). The role of marketing in successful PES activities has not received 
adequate attention.   
Monitoring of policies and projects is important to: detect incomplete or distorted 
implementation; assess compliance with agreements; evaluate actual impact; 
and, learn from past to improve future interventions (Lebel and Daniel 2009).  
Payments must be based on what can be monitored, usually land-use, but in case 
of carbon sequestration projects more precise accounting is often possible 
(Wunder et al. 2008b).  Sometimes the evidence-base that links land-use to 
delivery of particular environmental services is weak (Wunder 2007). The typical 
assumption that “forests” provide the necessary ES is a good example. Another 
problem is permanence: how to ensure ecosystem services continue to be 
protected, especially after payments from a particular program or policy end 
(Wunder et al. 2008b).  Donors may be worried about financing long-term 
projects and how to handle non-compliance given traditional role as aid providers 
(Wunder et al. 2008a).   
Despite some significant limitations, PES and related schemes are an important 
addition to the set of policy options and instruments to integrate conservation 
and development. The quality of such schemes ultimately rests on achieving a 
shared understanding of ecosystems services, benefits and burdens. 
Certification 
Certification is a practice intended to give a “green” seal of approval to tree 
plantation or “reforestation” projects and includes chain-of-custody monitoring. 
One of the foremost timber certifiers is the Forest Stewardship Council, whose 
members comprise forestry and forestry-related corporations that are part of its 
“economic chamber”. In the 1990s, successful NGO campaigns, particularly 
regarding unsustainable logging practices in the tropics, led to increased 
consumer awareness about the consumer’s role in forest destruction. When 
consumers began to ask their suppliers for certified wood, a number of NGOs, 
together with businesses, decided to promote a process for enabling companies 
to offer and consumers to choose a "green" product, and resulted in the 
establishment of the FSC.  The FSC allows certifier companies to inspect and then 
certifies logging and plantation companies who can then sell timber with a FSC 
certified label.  
FSC’s certifier companies are active in Southeast Asia and the Mekong region: In 
2006, two forest areas in central Laos covering about 50,000 ha in the provinces 
of Khammouane and Savannakhet, were the first forests in Indochina to achieve 
FSC certification (WWF 2006). But the independence and credibility of the FSC 
has increasingly come under question with FSC’s failure to prevent the 
certification of non-compliant companies (Carrere 2006, Butler and Laurance 
2008). 
Instead of limiting FSC to forest management certification, organizations and 
businesses participating in the process decided to also include plantation 
management as part of its mission lending FSC support to contentious large scale 
monocultures that have resulted in severe impacts on many indigenous and other 
local communities.  In the Mekong region, FSC chain of custody has been no 
guarantee against illegal timber smuggling for instance from Laos to Vietnam. 
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Increasing public awareness of ecosystem services can help garner wider support 
for their conservation at level of policies and for improving management practices 
in watershed areas(Patterson and Coelho 2009). This can be simply at the level of 
identifying and communicating previously unknown or under-appreciated 
services, through efforts to value benefits, to integrated assessment of social and 
ecological impacts and responses (Braumann et al. 2007, Lele 2009). 
Opening plans and information to scientific review and consultation is vital to 
ensure that any relevant policy options are not missed or ignored. This is 
especially true for instance with fire management where the conventional view of 
fire is that of a destructive agent requiring immediate suppression. Fire 
management is crucial for some forest ecosystems to thrive and ensure continued 
carbon stocks and fluxes (Murdiyarso and Lebel 2007). Fire and disease 
management can be used to meet land management goals under certain 
ecological conditions.  
Forest management practices for carbon conservation and sequestration range 
from slowing down deforestation and assisting regeneration in the tropics to 
afforestation schemes and agro-forestry (Canadell and Raupach 2008). Carbon 
sequestration can help with climate change protection, but there are many 
constraints to effective climate-forestry policies. Accidental and deliberate spread 
of fires into forests can result in huge emissions of CO2 destroying carbon stocks 
and affecting other watershed services (Murdiyarso and Lebel 2007).  The best 
option for reducing carbon emissions in tropical regions is to avoid deforestation 
and degradation in the first place (Canadell and Raupach 2008).  
At the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) it was agreed to pursue a 
mechanism for reduced emissions from deforestation and degradation or REDD 
(UNFCCC 2009). REDD has potential to benefit developing countries, including 
swidden cultivators (Mertz 2009), but only if the funding channels and projects 
are designed in ways that the poor actually benefit – an outcome highly 
contingent on quality of governance within countries. 
A formal meta-analysis of studies exploring the watershed services provided by 
tropical forests and plantations (Locatelli and Vignola 2009) found evidence – 
contrary to public perceptions and official policies of several countries – for lower 
base flows under planted forests than non-forest land-uses. It should be 
emphasized that this evidence comes from studies of only pine and Eucalyptus 
plantations; how plantations with other or native species effects the hydrological 
cycle is not known. This is consistent with earlier reviews (Calder 2002, Bruijnzeel 
2004). At same time some evidence was also found for lower total flow and 
higher base flow under natural forests than non-forest land uses when a subset of 
data from small watershed studies with large differences in forest cover were 
analysed (Locatelli and Vignola 2009). The authors acknowledge important 
constraints in number of available studies of different forest types, and noted that 
when larger dataset including larger watersheds was analysed no significant 
differences were found.  
Valuation studies have to make many assumptions, but may help convince 
decision-makers on the needs for conservation of certain land-covers and –uses 
because of the ecosystem services they provide. Most studies are hopeful about 
policy impact rather than demonstrating it. 
As an example of a typical study Chanhda and colleagues (2009) divided land-use 
in Luang Namtha province of northern Laos into six classes and derived 
ecosystem service values for each category based on 11 biomes in a global 
ecosystem service valuation model (Costanza et al. 1998). On this basis the 
authors estimated that the forest land cover changes in Luang Namtha Province 
resulted in a net decline of US$ 8.9 million in ecosystem services between 1992 
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and 2002 from potential forests. The decline in the value was due to soil erosion, 
flooding, drought and other impacts.  The authors concluded that the high rate of 
loss of such services will have serious long-term negative ecological 
consequences and recommended that land-reclamation projects be controlled and 
based on rigorous environmental impact analysis that included assessment of 
impact on the ecosystem services (Chanhda et al. 2009).  Use of such indirect 
estimates for services has many limitations given that values for even an 
individual service from a particular forest type can vary widely among places 
(Lele 2009). 
A much more detailed and convincing analysis is that done by Pattanayak & 
Kramer (2001) investigating drought mitigation services of forests in Ruteng 
Park, Flores, Indonesia. They found evidence that the park provided a drought 
mitigation service in the form of base-flow to farmers downstream and were able 
to estimate its value in terms of coffee and rice products. Using scenarios for re-
establishment of forests consistent with goals of park management they were 
also able to show that further increases in forest cover would result in both 
increases and decreases in base-flow depending on local conditions and land-uses 
in different watersheds. From a policy perspective this implies could target 
specific watersheds with right mixture of climatic and other features where 
increased protection will yield benefits of this service (Pattanayak and Kramer 
2001).  
The complexity of landscape changes in many upland watersheds and diversity of 
services and interests they provide within and beyond the watershed precludes 
holding much faith in the absolute numerical findings of valuation studies. At least 
as important as understanding aggregate economic welfare is addressing the 
question of wins and who loses under different scenarios of landscape change and 
why (Lele 2009). Van Beukering and colleagues (2003) note after their valuation 
of multiple services from Leuser National Park on Sumatra, Indonesia, that 
although conservation benefits many stakeholders the “political power of logging 
and plantation industries” means that benefits continue to accrue to just the few 
stakeholders that favour logging and deforestation. Public awareness building, 
consultations and negotiations may be critical to secure support for management 
strategies (Pretty and Smith 2004). 
Discussion  
Upland watersheds in Southeast Asia provide a diverse range of ecosystem 
services that are often highly specific to particular land-covers and ecosystems 
present, the landscape configuration, and social organization. A diverse range of 
projects, policies and other initiatives have aimed to alter how these services are 
governed. In this paper we explored these through the lens of plans, rules, 
incentives and information. 
Planning has conventionally been led by government bureaucrats relying on neat 
physical and institutional separation into conservation and use and 
instrumentally-driven definitions of classes.  Forest and watershed classifications 
and zoning schemes have been constructed assuming and asserting strong 
relationships between particular classes and ecosystem services without attention 
to service users, alternative land-uses or how ecosystem services are actually 
provided.  This has led to unnecessary conflict between state agencies and local 
communities, disincentives for local conservation actions, and missed 
opportunities for activities that would maintain ecosystem services and also 
contribute to poverty alleviation. 
Meaningful participation of local resource users alongside the conventional 
planning done by managers and, more recently, ecosystem experts, should lead 
to more informed and appropriate land-use plans for upland watersheds that 
have a chance of being implemented.  Deliberative approaches to planning and 
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assessment should help deal with competing knowledge claims about 
relationships of different land covers and uses with ecosystem services while 
recognizing that uncertainties of understanding may not be easily reducible. Local 
engagement is particularly crucial as the benefits of improved watershed 
management are often localized and without cooperation and partnerships long-
term management goals are hard to pursue (Aylward 2005, Warner 2006). 
Regulations important for managing ecosystem services can be top-down, self-
generated or more frequently a combination of local, informal, rules and national, 
formal, regulations (Lebel and Daniel 2009). Interventions where there are 
multiple ecosystems services and derived benefits invariably create winners and 
losers. Projects and policies to improve watershed management are undertaken 
in the context of pre-existing institutions (Mollinga et al. 2007) and as a 
consequence power relations which modify implementation and help shape 
outcomes. There is therefore a need to strengthen legal support and information 
sources for disadvantaged groups – like ethnic minorities – in dealing with formal 
legal processes. We suggest that it is important for future land and forest policies 
to leave some flexibility for local government and communities to adjust property 
right systems to local cultural and ecological contexts of upland watersheds. This 
can take place within a wider framework, for example, that strongly restricts 
commercial exploitation of certain forest products, but not their subsistence uses.  
Incentives can encourage provision of desired ecosystem services and protection 
of the ecosystems that underlie provision of those functions. Experiences with 
payments or rewards for ecosystem services is growing in the region suggesting 
that when used appropriately it will be helpful addition to the set of policy options 
and instruments to integrate conservation and development in particular places. 
Outstanding issues include ensuring equitable access, legitimacy of process, and 
that changes in watershed management actually contribute to well-being of those 
in most need (Chan et al. 2007, Corbera et al. 2007, Wunder 2008). These 
challenges are not restricted to instruments like payment or rewards for 
ecosystem services. A review of 103 ecosystem service projects – from 37 
countries – implemented by The Nature Conservancy and the World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF) looked at projects using traditional conservation tactics such as land 
purchase and restoration,  but  also  adopting new  approaches  such  as  
targeting  working  landscapes,  using  new  financial tools, and involving 
corporate funding and partners (Tallis et al. 2009). The review showed that all 
kinds of projects sometimes but often did not meet priority socio-economic 
needs.  
Voluntary approaches are often more flexible than regulations and plans but only 
work if incentives are adequate or messages and social norms are persuasive 
enough. Building awareness about ecosystem services is invariably an important 
part of any intervention, locally or externally led. At the same time many projects 
and policies have been pursued in absence of detailed understanding of 
ecosystem functions and services (Carpenter et al. 2009, Daily et al. 2009).  Un-
validated assumptions about the relationship between land-covers and 
hydrological services from watersheds, in particular, abound (Bruijnzeel 2004, 
Aylward 2005).   Much more research on ecosystem services is needed across 
Southeast Asia, from understanding of ecosystem processes through to benefits 
and impacts on people.  For many watersheds where decisions are being made 
now significant knowledge uncertainties will remain. Critically drawing on diverse 
knowledge sources with an expectation that will need to negotiate, learn and 
adapt is the best strategy.   
Projects and policies that hope to successfully improve the management of 
ecosystem services should seek, and expect, to learn from past interventions.  
Actual management practices in use for timber, water and other ecosystem 
services from upland watersheds frequently do not match plans on paper, follow 
agency rules or fit government or other expectations based on simple incentives. 
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Positive changes to ecological sustainability and human well-being are rarely 
demonstrated directly. In our review, we found monitoring to be the least well 
developed area of governance: independent and timely post-evaluations of 
projects and policies are necessary but rare.  
There are many reasons including uncertainties in how ecosystems and people 
will respond to interventions (Berkes 2009), as well as more insidious ones, like 
deception and corruption. Institutions need to be flexible enough to update rules 
to fit new knowledge or emerging conditions rather than assuming solution is 
identifying the best practice, land-use or allocation (Lebel et al. 2004). The 
spread of invasive species, climate change and other larger scale environmental 
changes  with potential impacts on ecosystem services (Chopra et al. 2005) 
provided by upland watersheds implies that adaptive responses will be 
imperative.  
Conclusions  
The upland watersheds of Southeast Asia provide a range of ecosystem services 
and derived benefits important to well-being of people within them and beyond. 
The specific services provided and how they are valued vary hugely from place to 
place underlying the importance of both ecological and social context. 
Communities, governments and firms have taken different approaches to 
negotiating and sharing these benefits, as well as trying to deal with trade-offs 
between them. In this paper the governance of services was explored through the 
lenses of plans, rules, incentives and information. 
Four broad conclusions emerge. First, multi-stakeholder planning improves the 
assessment of under-appreciated services and users, but does not eliminate 
importance of power relations or contestation of knowledge claims by 
stakeholders with divergent interests. Second efforts to regulate the management 
of specific or an ambiguous set of ecosystem services with externally imposed 
rules invariably create winners and losers with outcomes which often depend on 
pre-existing institutions, political contexts and dominant beliefs about 
relationships between land-covers and ecosystem services. Third incentives to 
conserve ecosystem services are closely related to perceived benefits of doing so 
regardless of whether direct monetary payments are involved or rewards are in 
other forms.  Fourth, shared understanding of the evidence for, and uncertainties 
around, particular ecosystem process, service and benefit relationships, is crucial 
to progress, underlying the importance of monitoring and more adaptive 
approaches to integrating ecological and social understanding.   
Taken together these findings underline the need to pay greater attention to 
issues of governance in the design and implementation of policies and projects to 
manage ecosystem services from upland watersheds. Improving governance of 
services is both a technical challenge of improving understanding of ecosystem 
processes and how they relate to benefits, and a social challenge of ensuring that 
interventions allocate benefits and burdens fairly while also improving the well-
being of vulnerable and otherwise marginalized peoples.   
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3.1 MSPs: A basis for fairer water governance 
Multi-Stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are a part of governance in which different 
stakeholders are identified, and usually through representatives, invited and assisted 
to interact in a deliberative forum that focuses on: 
• sharing knowledge and perspectives; 
• generating and examining options; 
• informing and shaping negotiations and decisions. 
MSPs are not the only places where deliberation takes place.  MSPs and dialogues 
are words that are often used interchangeably.  This may be misleading.  Any 
‘dialogue process’ implies deliberation is central.  There may be much dialogue and 
deliberation embedded in advocacy organizations, diplomacy, operations within the 
party room, the parliament, contract drafting, the corporate board room or the 
village committee.  However, as the name specifies, MSPs refer to where deliberation 
is fostered among multiple, diverse stakeholders. 
MSPs are an approach for constructive engagement and learning about complex 
problems where facts and values may be in dispute.  Choices about water often 
involve society contesting facts, such as the most efficient way to supply water, 
recover delivery costs, and provide efficiency incentives.  Choices about water also 
often involve contesting values, for example, whose priorities and needs matter 
most, when there is insufficient water to satisfy all demands. 
MSPs may lead to the creation or strengthening of bridges of understanding between 
actors representing wide-ranging interests, and the satisfactory resolution of at least 
some differences.  An MSP can bring into sharper focus substantive differences of 
approach and priorities that may not be easily reconcilable.  By articulating these 
differences in the public sphere, an MSP can contribute to a sounder basis for 
negotiation and decision making. 
 
“MSPs ARE AN APPROACH FOR CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT AND 
LEARNING ABOUT COMPLEX PROBLEMS” 
MSPs can be influential by bringing together stakeholders in a new form of 
communication and decision finding.1  In this way, they can ensure that differences 
are respected – or at least better understood – while pursuing fair and effective 
workable agreements about complex issues. 
Influence is different to authority.2  Many MSPs are not necessarily vested with, nor 
must they claim, authority to make decisions.  To do so may invite resistance and be 
counter-productive. Although not all dominant political cultures support or permit 
MSPs, in many places MSPs are part of a broader trend towards new forms of 
governance based on collaboration that build and draw upon social capital. 
 
“MSPs CAN BE INFLUENTIAL BY BRINGING TOGETHER STAKEHOLDERS IN A 
NEW FORM OF COMMUNICATION AND DECISION FINDING” 
A way of focusing the MSP contribution to water negotiations is to use the 4Rs, 
(introduced in Chapter 1) as part of a systematic and semi-structured approach.  
Recapping, the 4Rs refers to rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities.  For example: 
• The rewards being sought from the care, use and further development of 
water resources, and the distribution of the full spectrum of the possible 
rewards/benefits/costs of various options; 
• The involuntary and voluntary water-related risks; 
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• Water-related rights; 
• The various water-related responsibilities of state and non-state actors. 
While 4Rs can always be useful as reference points, MSPs do not all need to follow 
the same format or structure.  MSPs exist in different shapes and sizes.  But, as a 
guide, there are desirable characteristics of MSPs.  These are summarized in Figure 
3.1 and explained in Sections 3.2–3.5 to provide an outline for an ‘ideal-type’ of MSP 
that can contribute to fairer, more effective water governance.3 
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3.2 Desirable context for MSPs 
3.2.1 Clear purpose and scope  
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The purpose of an MSP needs to be clearly articulated in terms of its political and 
practical boundaries to enquiry, the derivation, extent and duration of its mandate, 
and a justification of how the MSP might improve existing governance. 
Questions to consider include: 
• Is the MSP trying to shape the higher-level discourse of the wider political and 
institutional environment, i.e., the ‘big context’?  Examples are MSPs focusing 
on climate change and its implications (including for the Earth’s hydrological 
cycle), examining global drivers and possible societal responses, such as 
mitigation approaches, financing adaptation, and establishing equitable 
carbon markets.  Other MSPs include the deliberations before, during and 
after global fora such as the World Water Forum and the World Water 
Congress. 
• Is the MSP focusing on building a policy-shaping network and space for 
debate in a particular community or place, intending to catalyze reflection and 
action on some shared issues?  An example is the MSP working with the many 
actors and institutions with a stake in improving river basin governance in 
Namibia and Botswana’s Okavango floodplain; or the Mekong region (see 
Case 3.1). 
• Is the MSP focusing on informing and shaping a particular negotiation 
process?  For example, devising a fair and effective water allocation and 
management regime in the irrigation systems of the Vietnam delta; or the 
MSP informing the negotiation and review of the agreement to enable the 
continuation of mining –subject to more stringent Fly River pollution controls, 
and sharing of rewards – in the western provinces of Papua New Guinea.4 
Answers to these questions should determine the design of the MSP and tactics to 
optimize engagement, particularly regarding choices of convenors, facilitators, 
invitees, agenda and tools.5  There are more ideas on how to clarify the purpose and 
scope of an MSP later in this chapter. 
“THE PURPOSE OF AN MSP NEEDS TO BE CLEARLY ARTICULATED” 
 
 
Case 3.1 “Exploring Water Futures Together” in the Mekong Region 
A new water governance paradigm was needed in the Mekong Region which encompasses Cambodia, 
Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam and southern China. 
On main streams and tributaries disputes exist resulting from interventions to natural flow regimes and 
overt or default allocation decisions.  These interventions are justified on grounds of: flood control, more 
irrigation for food or fibre production, urban or industrial supply, improving ease of navigation, or boosting 
energy production via hydropower.  There are associated disputes about altered sediment and nutrient 
loads, fisheries, livelihood options, groundwater use, water re-use, and diversions (inter-state, intra-state, 
inter-basin and intra-basin). 
An alliance of actors in the Mekong Region cooperated to convene and implement an MSP undertaken at 
national and regional scales.  The convening coalition comprised: IUCN, the Thailand Environment 
Institute (TEI) – a national organization focused on sustainability; the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI) – an international research organization; and the M-POWER regional knowledge network 
whose core membership is from, and focus is on, the six Mekong Region countries. 
The purpose and scope has been to make it routine in the Mekong Region for important national and 
transnational water-related options and decisions to be examined in the public sphere from a range of 
perspectives.  The MSP aimed to demonstrate this practice.6 
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3.2.2 Credible and competent convenors 
Convenors are those who call people to come together and collectively engage in an 
issue.  There are many possible convenors for MSPs and they can be either from 
within or outside of government (see Box 3.1).  Credibility and competence are 
essential.  Credibility will be linked to the ‘social capital’ of the convenor or convening 
coalition.  Without the capacity to build new or upon existing relationships, 
convenors will be unable to establish an MSP constituency.  Without competence, 




Box 3.1 MSPs and dialogue tracks 1, 2, 3 
The terminology of dialogue tracks 1–3 is one way of differentiating between water 
governance fora, some of which are MSPs, and the different convening possibilities. 
Track 1 refers to processes of governments and associated bureaucracy, including 
inter- and intra-state fora.  In the eyes of States these are ‘official’ and most 
legitimate.  The dominant logic is, for the most part, still implicitly accepting of 
rational, self-interested behaviour, particularly in international affairs.  Track 1 
dialogues are convened by state actors for state actors.  The UN General Assembly is 
an example.  They may be deliberative, but they are not multi-stakeholder. 
Track 2 refers to governance processes involving State, UN family, donor/lender, civil 
society and business.  These interactive forums are usually convened and led by an 
actor or coalition closely aligned with States ensuring government representatives 
remain privileged actors, such as with the International Assessment of Agricultural 
Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD).  The convenors are usually 
focused on enhancing the effectiveness of States by widening the field of ideas and 
influences.  Track 2 MSPs may be convened by state or non-state actors, but usually 
widen the range of stakeholder involvement. 
Track 3 refers to research, dialogue and advocacy efforts led by civil society or 
business, less impeded by or less subordinate to State actors.  These fora are 
committed to enlarging the political space and are often optimistic about the 
potential of MSPs to find and assist in negotiating better ways forward for society.  
The convening is led by non-state actors, and by design should bring in the full range 
of relevant stakeholders or possible contributors to addressing an issue.  Convening 
coalitions are often a useful way of aggregating the social capital of the individual 
convenors.  Tracks 2 and 3 are often now grappling with the idea and practices of 
deliberative MSPs.  Practice may be less than ideal, but there are many promising 
efforts around the world where Tracks 2 and 3 are trying to improve the quality of 
their MSPs to inform and shape water-related debates, generate options, and inform 
and shape negotiations. 
 
3.2.3 Appropriate scales and levels 
Clarifying purpose and scope is a precursor to thinking about scales and levels.7  
Scale is the spatial, temporal, quantitative or analytical dimensions used to measure, 
or rank, and study an issue (see Figure 3.2).  Levels are the units of analysis that 
are located at different positions on a scale. 
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Water management is often institutionalized around the spatial scales of government 
(i.e., administrative) or hydrology.  The scale of government has different levels, for 
example: district, provincial, national, regional, global.  The scale of hydrology also 
has different levels, for example: water-well, aquifer, stream, lake, reservoir, small 
watershed, larger national river basin, or international river basin. 
MSP convenors must be aware that analysis and action may best occur at various 
scales and levels – single or multiple.  For complex water issues it is usually multiple.  
A strength of MSPs is that they can be flexibly constructed so as to fit any scale or 
level, but also to enable cross-level and cross-scale deliberations. 
 
“CLARIFYING PURPOSE AND SCOPE IS A PRECURSOR TO THINKING ABOUT 
SCALES AND LEVELS” 
 
Figure 3.2 Scales and levels 
 
Figure 3.28 shows some examples of typical levels on five different scales (one 
temporal and four spatial).  Examples of cross-level and cross-scale interactions are 
given for a pair of spatial scales.  Some multi-level processes are shown on the 
ecological scale. 
Actors contest scales and levels, overtly through debates, media releases, lobbying 
and protests, and more subtly, through use and control of technologies, indicators, 
deliberations over measurements and controlling political sites..  Thus, some actors 
push for hydrological scales – watersheds to river basins – as levels correspond to 
manageable units in their models or infrastructure they operate.  Others promote 
conventional, area-based administrative hierarchies – districts to regions – arguing 
that this is where capacity, accountability and legitimacy already exist.  Differences 
between administrative and hydrological scales, for example, are a common source 
of tensions in water resource governance.  
Contests can arise in MSPs because different actors favour particular scales and 
levels in their analysis, arguments and responses.  Convenors may take steps in 
selection of participants and format to ensure there are constructive exchanges and 
debate within and between relevant scales and levels. 
The scales and levels used in an MSP should eventually be a joint product of 
biophysical and social processes.  It is rarely possible, and probably undesirable, in 
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an MSP being undertaken for a complex water issue, to be too strict, too early about 
scale and level choices. 
The physics of flows, and the dynamics of ecosystems or social institutions can often 
be collectively better understood if scale and level boundaries are not overly 
constrained at the beginning of an MSP.  For example, seasonal dynamics of flow 
regimes are important to fish (and thus fishers) on different temporal levels than the 
operational and planning logics of hydropower generation, irrigation and flood risk 
management. 
“CONTESTS CAN ARISE IN MSPs BECAUSE DIFFERENT ACTORS FAVOUR 
PARTICULAR SCALES AND LEVELS” 
 
3.2.4 Sufficient resources, political support, and time 
Without adequate resources – human, financial, informational and intellectual – an 
MSP will not reach its potential.  Competent people will be needed to support the 
operation of the MSP.  Costs will be incurred and so funding needs to be organized.  
Uncertainties will need to be addressed with information and people that have the 
knowledge that can help to move forward. 
It is vital that any MSP has sufficient political space and momentum to permit or 
encourage establishment and support.  The need for some degree of political support 
is unavoidable.  This does not just refer to political support from the State, but 
rather is a reminder that an MSP must have some type of supportive stakeholder 
constituency with either influence or authority.  In the case of Cape York, Australia 
(see Case 3.2) the political support wavered, but endured for long enough to ensure 
the MSP was given a chance to make its best contribution. 
“IT IS VITAL THAT ANY MSP HAS SUFFICIENT POLITICAL SPACE AND 
MOMENTUM” 
 
Case 3.2 Breaking down the wall in Australia’s Cape York 
The MSP of CYPLUS (Cape York Peninsula Land Use Strategy) was born in the 1990s 
after 20 years of intensifying conflict about major development proposals, mining, 
land rights, cattle grazing and Aboriginal land rights in the Cape York Peninsula of 
north-eastern Australia.  CYPLUS was an intensive and extensive MSP to develop a 
Cape York Land Use Strategy – not water-focused, but undoubtedly complex – in a 
remote area of northern Australia covering 137,000 km2 but home to only 18,000 
people, the majority of whom are of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander descent.  All 
levels of government were actively involved. 
People who studied CYPLUS were told by one participant: ‘Before CYPLUS there was 
a brick wall between graziers (cattle farmers), greens and aboriginal people on Cape 
York – they were all trying to cut the Cape up into little pieces for themselves but 
there wasn’t enough to go around.  CYPLUS broke down the wall’.  The researchers 
also warned of the need for a long-term commitment, which for CYPLUS was 
envisaged as at least 10 years, during which time there would be (in the Australian 
political system) ‘at least three elections and countless changes in policies, programs 
and players involved in the effort’.9 
 
The saying ‘Rome was not built in a day’ also applies to MSPs which require an 
investment in time and patience, some degree of continuity, and then follow-up.  If 
the time allowed is too short, it is hard for an MSP to do its job.  If the MSP is not 
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followed up, or is not taken into account by decision makers, many participants will 
be disillusioned and re-engaging with them in the future will likely be more 
difficult.10  A key lesson noted by an observer of a Canadian MSP (see Case 3.3) 
was that: ‘One of the main criticisms aimed at collaborative systems of governance is 
that whilst they provide opportunities for deliberation and wider participation in 
decision making, they often produce implementation failures because insufficient 
attention is given to outputs that will have an impact on the problem at hand.  As a 
result, participants may lose enthusiasm for further collaboration if there is little sign 
of their efforts having a positive effect’.11 
Case 3.3 Balancing power in the Fraser Basin Council in Canada 
The Fraser Basin spans 13 watersheds in western Canada and supports more than 
2.5 million people with an economy based on natural resources.  The need for a 
more integrated approach to effectively and sustainably manage the land and water 
resources has long been recognized. 
The Fraser Basin Council was established in 1997 as an MSP to pursue sustainable 
development through integrated river basin planning and management.  It 
succeeded the Fraser Basin Management Programme, which was seen as being 
dominated by government interests. 
The Council is a not-for-profit organization with a corporate structure that aims to 
address multi-jurisdictional issues to resolve disputes using a consensual rather than 
a legal or bureaucratic approach.  It was specifically designed to complement, as 
opposed to duplicate, government management functions.  A Charter for 
Sustainability was initially developed as a means of creating shared understanding 
among the diverse groups.  The Charter outlines problems as well a vision, and 
articulates the values, principles and rules to guide collective action.  
The institutional set-up of the Council was carefully crafted in order to create a space 
for equitable deliberative opportunity amongst diverse stakeholders to influence 
policy and programme decisions.  It was recognized that a key challenge for 
collaborative governance is to provide fair representation, given that there are 
always economic and political power imbalances between groups that have legitimate 
interests in various facets of river basin management. 
The Council included 36 directors drawn from three tiers of government (federal, 
provincial and local), First Nations, community groups, businesses as well as social, 
economic and environmental issues.  To ensure fair local involvement, there were 
five regional committees for specific watersheds comprising of representatives from 
local government, First Nations and sectoral interests. 
 
3.2.5 Politics and power recognized 
When scoping an MSP it is necessary to consider politics and power explicitly. 
Politics is a slippery concept.  Comments from almost 50 years ago remain useful: 
‘Politics is about policy, first and foremost; and policy is a matter of either the desire 
for change or the desire to protect something against change’ and ‘Politics is a 
natural reflex of the divergences between members of a society… [where]… there is 
a variety of perpetual disagreements which arise from fundamental differences of 
condition, status, power, opinion, and aim’.12  Water sharing is not just about 
technical choices.  Contesting different views is the realm of politics.  MSPs are a 
place for this contesting.  MSPs are one way of ensuring that political tussles include 
evidence and exploration of different values and perspectives. 
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“WATER SHARING IS NOT JUST ABOUT TECHNICAL CHOICES” 
 
Another elusive concept is power.  It can be seen as the ability to shape the context 
and conduct of others.13  This is helpful, but it only gets you so far.  It is useful also, 
and very relevant to MSPs, to think of power in terms of assets and power relations 
(see Figure 3.3).  Thinking of both can help in understanding the context. 
“WHEN SCOPING AN MSP IT IS NECESSARY TO CONSIDER POLITICS AND 
POWER EXPLICITLY” 
 
MSPs are likely to be more influential if they are endowed with adequate helpings of 
‘assets’ including: resources, participants in strategic positions, individuals with 
leadership ability, and a rich inflow of ideas. 
For some, politics and therefore political analysis, is focused on an analysis of power 
– identifying and interrogating its distribution, exercise and consequences.  How 
power relations are manifested is just as important as whether particular actors have 
power – ‘power to act’, power with others’, ‘power over’ and ‘power to lead’14 – all 
are important, as with the invocation of the wax, wick and flame metaphor in Box 
2.1 in Chapter 2..  MSPs are more likely to be agents of constructive engagement if 
the power relations manifested are a healthy mixture of these different forms.  
Perhaps most important and integral to the success of MSPs is fostering the 
acceptance by many participants that there is new and additional power in 
collectively working with others. 
“INTEGRAL TO THE SUCCESS OF MSPs IS FOSTERING THE ACCEPTANCE 
THAT THERE IS POWER IN COLLECTIVELY WORKING WITH OTHERS” 
 
Figure 3.3 Power 
 
 
3.3 Elements of good process 
MSPs earn legitimacy, at least in part, by demonstrating high-quality process.  To do 
so requires attaining and maintaining high standards of deliberation, facilitation, 
inclusiveness, information exchange and communication to the participants and 
wider constituency. 
“MSPs EARN LEGITIMACY, AT LEAST IN PART, BY DEMONSTRATING HIGH-
QUALITY PROCESS” 
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Deliberation is integral, by which we mean: ‘deliberation is debate and discussion 
aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which participants are 
willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new information, and claims made 
by fellow participants.  Although consensus need not be the ultimate aim of 
deliberation, and participants are expected to pursue their interests, an overarching 
interest in the legitimacy of outcomes (understood as justification to all affected) 
ideally characterizes deliberation’.15 
MSPs are rooted in a belief in the value of ‘authentic deliberation’16 between people 
with different perspectives.  In this way, MSPs give privilege to the power of 
argument, explanation and reason over other types of power.  Therefore, it is 
important to note that stakeholders who do not have language and communication 
skills can be disadvantaged, unless adequately represented. 
“MSPs GIVE PRIVILEGE TO THE POWER OF ARGUMENT, EXPLANATION AND 
REASON OVER OTHER TYPES OF POWER” 
 
3.3.2 Facilitated 
To enable deliberation, good facilitation is an essential characteristic if MSPs are to 
reach their potential.  Ideally in a group of MSP facilitators, there would be a mixture 
of men and women of varying cultural backgrounds, united by having open minds.  
These facilitators need to possess a reasonable share of the following traits: 
Listener: Ability to listen and create an atmosphere where others will listen (not just 
talk). 
Enabler: Ability to see who is participating and who is not, and to find ways to 
enable all participants to contribute in an authentic way.  This includes stopping any 
particular individual or group from dominating an MSP. 
Linker: Willingness to prepare by thinking through the programme and backgrounds 
of participants, anticipating what might happen.  It is important the facilitator link 
the steps in the MSP process, maintaining some direction/focus, whilst also being 
adaptable to the needs of participants. 
Respectful: Respect and empathy for different people and the different world views 
that they hold.  This includes respect for different forms of knowledge – engineering, 
agriculture, ecology, economic, cultural, social, national politics, local villagers. 
Energetic: To maintain the enthusiasm of the participants to persist and work 
through what may be difficult tasks, the facilitator usually requires large reserves of 
personal energy. 
Familiarity with appropriate ‘facilitator techniques’: There are many 
techniques to encourage creative expression – such as buzzing, mind mapping, rich 
pictures.  A skilful facilitator can draw on these as components of the MSP method.17 




MSPs should enable representation of a wide range of stakeholders and their 
disparate interests via a flexible process which may have many different facets.  
Inclusiveness implies being respectful of diverse ethics, ways of reasoning, world 
views and priorities of actors. 
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“MSPs SHOULD ENABLE REPRESENTATION OF A WIDE RANGE OF 
STAKEHOLDERS” 
 
3.3.4 Informed and communicative 
MSPs should use and share the best available information, building the knowledge 
base.  MSP participants should become familiar with other relevant fora, plans, 
agendas etc.  The MSP also needs to communicate effectively with the wider public 
sphere if it wishes to create and maintain a constituency. 
“MSPS SHOULD USE AND SHARE THE BEST AVAILABLE INFORMATION” 
 
3.4 Desirable MSP content 
MSPs are not all the same.  Figure 3.4 provides a practical example of a hypothetical 
MSP which shows a plausible flow from acknowledgement of a concern through to 
deliberation and agreement on next steps. 
 
MSPs may involve regular meetings between core participants.  These might be 
informal gatherings beside an irrigation canal, next to a wetland, or on the banks of 
a river.  There might also be conferences/discussions open to the wider public, 
locally hosted field visits, electronic exchanges, government briefings, films, plays, 
historical texts, testimony, or commissioned research. 
Despite differences in the way they are set up and implemented, examples of 









Figure 3.4 Timeframe and sequence of hypothetical MSP 
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Source: Vermeulen et al., 2008, page 57. 
 
3.4.1 Setting up 
Setting up refers to the practical steps that must be taken in establishing an effective 
MSP.18  Essential steps include: 
• establishment of an interim MSP steering group; 
• articulating clear rationale for MSP; 
• building a constituency for the MSP; 
• preliminary examination of the wider MSP context; 
• assessing potential MSP designs and mandates. 
 
Establishment of an interim MSP steering group 
There are now hundreds of examples around the world of water-related MSPs. To get 
going has usually required an interim MSP steering group.  Some say ‘interim’, 
others ‘initial’ or ‘informal’.  Some prefer ‘working group’ or ‘committee’ to steering 
group.  It’s important, though, not to get hung up at this early stage.  The key is to 
start somewhere.  Final convening, management and coordination responsibilities for 
the MSP are sorted out and adjusted during the setting-up phase. 
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Case 3.4 Improving agricultural knowledge, science and technology 
A prominent recent example of an MSP was the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD).19  This was a five-
year process from 2003–2008.  Whilst not focused on water, it is nevertheless an 
excellent example. 
In the beginning a Steering Committee of 40 representatives from governments, 
agencies, industry, farmers and other rural producers, consumers, environmental 
and other NGOs produced a basic document in August 2003 calling for the 
International Assessment.  They chose to address this question: How can we reduce 
hunger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and facilitate equitable, 
environmentally, socially and economically sustainable development through the 
generation, access to, and use of agricultural knowledge, science and technology? 
A design process soon followed.  The first meeting of the parties (governments), five 
co-sponsoring UN agencies, World Bank and civil society representatives took place 
in 2004.  The government representatives (45 countries present) decided to go 
ahead with the Assessment.  They agreed on the content and scope of the 
Assessment and adopted outlines and procedures, a timetable and a budget of US$ 
10.7 million. 
The process became a UN inter-governmental process, which means the participating 
member state representatives made the final decisions and were asked to adopt the 
final report.  The initial Steering Committee morphed into a multi-stakeholder Bureau 
of 60 representatives of governments (30), civil society (22) and international 
institutions (8) to oversee the process. 
The IAASTD then undertook a comprehensive global assessment, that included five 
more detailed sub-global reports, of the role of agricultural science and technology in 
development, culminating in a final plenary in Johannesburg in April 2008 at which 
synthesis reports and summaries for decision makers were presented to all 
stakeholders. 
 
Articulating clear rationale for MSP 
The need for an MSP has to be explained and accepted before people will agree to 
invest time and effort.  What problems or opportunities will the MSP seek to address?  
How will an MSP fill a gap, or add value, to the existing efforts being made? 
• Diverse goals have catalyzed recent local, national, regional and global MSPs, 
including: 
• bringing some element of public deliberation into decision making about 
possible links between 37 major rivers across India (see Case 3.6); 
• micro-watershed equitable sharing of irrigation water in the Lingmutey Chu 
Watershed, Bhutan (see Case 3.7); 
• combining maintenance of the character of natural floods with hydropower 
generation in the negotiation of ‘environmental flows’ in the Senegal River 
Basin (see Case 3.9); 
• energy future – using national follow-up to the World Commission on Dams to 
address controversies about building large dams in Nepal (see Case 3.10); 
• better use and care for ground water in Umatilla County, USA;20 
• Improving cooperation among interest groups and negotiating a water charter 
to guide land on water management in the Komadugu Yobe Basin of the Lake 
Chad, northern Nigeria.21 
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“THE NEED FOR AN MSP HAS TO BE EXPLAINED AND ACCEPTED BEFORE 
PEOPLE WILL AGREE TO INVEST TIME AND EFFORT” 
 
Building a constituency for the MSP 
To reach its potential an MSP needs a constituency of diverse supporters.  Providing 
early opportunity for involvement is important.  Although people may constructively 
engage for different reasons, most will want to be convinced that the MSP is a 
genuine and worthy effort to search for fair and effective ways forward.  Building a 
constituency, means building a base of MSP supporters who are committed to 
engaging in a collective process.  It is far more than ‘engaging with stakeholders’, or 
undertaking a ‘stakeholder analysis’ (discussed below). 
“TO REACH ITS POTENTIAL AN MSP NEEDS A CONSTITUENCY OF DIVERSE 
SUPPORTERS” 
Preliminary examination of the wider MSP context 
The interim steering group needs to ensure that the wider MSP context is 
understood.  Some call this the ‘operating environment’ or the wider ‘political 
economy’.  It is important to get a basic overview of the present and relevant 
history, including an initial understanding of the range of perspectives of the MSP 
stakeholders.  This will provide guidance on the areas to be explored in more detail. 
Assessing potential MSP operating structures 
There are usually various choices for an MSP operating structure which will 
determine function, legitimacy and credibility.  Links to existing authority structures 
need to be clear.  For example, what is to be the link to existing levels of 
government (if any)?  Taking the time to investigate and introduce an appropriate 
structure is vital. 
Assessing MSP designs and mandates 
In the words of Jeroen Warner: ‘MSPs, by any other name, are currently “hot” in the 
water sector’ attracting diverse actors to operate collectively – at least for a time – in 
a ‘weird and wonderful panorama’ of different multi-stakeholder processes.22 
That said, there are many choices for the design of an MSP, which must match the 
purpose and scope.  The design includes operating structures and plans for carrying 
out the MSP.  The setting-up phase is critical in negotiating appropriate designs, and 
mandates, so that the particular MSP can serve the needs of the part of society 
grappling with a particular issue, hoping to make water governance fairer and more 
effective via a well-intentioned platform. 
3.4.2 Stakeholder analysis 
Stakeholder analysis is essential to properly design and implement an MSP.  It helps 
to clarify who to involve in an MSP and in what way.  It should provide a foundation 
and plan for participation throughout the MSP making it easier for stakeholders to 
engage, be respected, and learn from each other.  
MSP drivers – that is, the convenors, or steering group – must agree on criteria for 
determining stakeholders.  For many MSPs, the 4Rs are a useful starting point.  
What are the benefits and who may be involved in reaping a reward or bearing a 
cost?  What are the risks and who are the voluntary or involuntary risk-bearers?  
Who has or may claim a right to be involved, recognizing that some will always say 
their ‘right to participate’ is greater than others?  Who has a responsibility to be 
involved – legal or perhaps because of ‘civic duty’ – given the insights they possess 
and may be able to contribute? 
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List all the people and organizations that might fit the criteria.  The list may need to 
be revisited several times to ensure that all key groups and people are given the 
opportunity to engage, either directly or via representatives.  Allowing stakeholders 
to self-nominate can also ensure that those with an interest are not excluded.  
Decisions need to be taken on how best to involve people.  It is sensible to hear from 
all parties likely to be interested in the MSP so as to hear how they think they can be 
optimally involved in different ways. 
Various tools can be used to learn about stakeholders and their relationships, such 
as: brainstorming, actor mapping, interviews with key informants or producing ‘rich 
pictures’ with focus groups. 
It can be helpful to make a stakeholder matrix with the stakeholders along one axis 
and 4Rs criteria along the other (see Table 3.1).23  In complex situations, it is often 
the case that there are contesting views.  It can help to use the 4Rs to research the 
roles of different stakeholders in the MSP key issues. 
Cross-checking with different people can lessen the risk of oversights or bias.  If not 
too provocative, it can also be useful to prepare preliminary summaries of the 
influence and authority of different actors.  Recognizing the dynamism of actor 
relationships, it can also help to use the 4Rs to reflect on the power (influence and/or 
authority of different stakeholders). 
“STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS IS ESSENTIAL TO PROPERLY DESIGN AND 
IMPLEMENT AN MSP” 
 
Table 3.1 Stakeholder analysis using the 4Rs in a hypothetical water project 
4Rs  Rewards 
 – potential 
benefits 
Risks 






 – rights claimed 
Responsibilities 







Examples of the rewards, risks, rights and responsibilities which should 



































security etc.   









Right to be 
made better off, 
or at least not 
worse off. 
Recognition of 
the rights of 
others to try and 
improve their 
lives. 
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Developer Profit from 
construction or 












Follow the laws. 
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incorrect. 

















as with others, 






Risk of being 
marginalized 
from the 
political or legal 




seen to be 
engaging in a 
less than ideal 



















































the spirit of just 
laws and guiding 
regulations. 
 
3.4.3 Social contract between participants 
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The social contract is a summary of the rules of engagement in the MSP.  A social 
contract24 needs to be established between the convenors and all stakeholder 
representatives, which requires reaching some workable agreement on purpose, 
scope, political space, resources, time and process so that participants in an MSP 
understand the roles and responsibilities of all. 
Social contracts – which are also usually negotiated – should make the ‘participation 
promise’ clear, to lessen the chance of a mismatch between reality and expectations.  
For example, are stakeholder representatives being invited to: 
• Come together primarily to build relationships and share information? 
• Set the agenda for subsequent public or private sector action? 
• To brainstorm and problem-solve? 
• Join a consensus-building initiative? 
• To provide recommendations, or to take decisions? 
The social contract needs to be unambiguous and documented, such as for the global 
Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum (see Case 3.5). 
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IS A SUMMARY OF THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN 
THE MSP” 
Case 3.5 The ‘social contract’ of the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum 
In 2004, the International Hydropower Association (IHA) adopted Sustainability 
Guidelines, followed in 2006 by the adoption of a Sustainability Assessment Protocol 
(SAP).  During 2008–2009, the Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Forum 
(HSAF)25 examined whether it is possible to establish a broadly endorsed 
sustainability assessment tool to measure and guide performance in the hydropower 
sector, based on the IHA’s SAP.  The HSAF included on-ground assessments and 
meetings in USA, Zambia, China, Brazil, Iceland and Turkey.  In mid 2009 it released 
its draft Hydropower Sustainability Assessment Protocol (HSAP). 
The Forum membership included representatives of developed and developing 
countries involved in hydropower as well as from the NGO, finance and industry 
sectors.  At the beginning of the Forum, participants signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding and agreed to a detailed ‘Communications and Operating Procedures’ 
including, for example, that: 
 the HSAF will be transparent, conducted with goodwill, and will search for 
consensus; 
 where a consensus cannot be reached, the differences will be recorded and 
acknowledged in all HSAF documentation; 
 the HSAF will only use the name and brand of participants in public 
communication after obtaining their permission; 
 the decision on endorsement of the final product will be taken by each participant 
at the end of the process, after consultation with their respective constituencies; 
 participants reserve the right to withdraw from the MSP during the process.  If 
this action is taken, the withdrawing participant will provide a written explanation 
to the Chair. 
 
“THE SOCIAL CONTRACT NEEDS TO BE UNAMBIGUOUS AND DOCUMENTED” 
 
3.4.4 Comprehensive assessments 
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There are many deliberation-support tools that can be helpful when negotiating 
water-related resource use and further development.  It is axiomatic that MSPs 
should strive to ensure a comprehensive, meaning ‘sufficiently thorough’, 
assessment of issues, informed by all stakeholders, and ultimately of use to them all.  
There is now extensive experience in undertaking MSPs that have a substantial 
knowledge assembly, contesting and building component. 
 
Case 3.6 Civil society-led dialogue assessing river-linking schemes in India 
River diversions and basin transfers are some of the most contested water issues 
globally. 
India’s mega Interlinking of Rivers (ILR) project has proposed to provide 173 billion 
m3 of water to irrigate 37 million hectares through 31 links in Himalayan and 
peninsula rivers and associated large dams, reservoirs and canals. 
Proponents argue the merits of diverting water from ‘surplus’ rivers to ‘deficit’ rivers 
to increase irrigation and thereby food grain production, mitigate floods and 
droughts, and reduce regional imbalance in the availability of water.  Critics cite the 
negative ecological, economic and social costs, and argue for more effective ways to 
address food security.  
A coalition of civil society groups, led by the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), 
initiated an MSP in 2003 to comprehensively assess the benefits and risks of the 
project, and explore alternatives to river linking.  An initial working group, including 
civil society, government representatives, political leaders and media, spent eight 
months negotiating the set-up of the forum, and especially its members.  The 
resulting ‘National Civil Society Committee’ (NCSC) was comprised of eminent 
persons representing diverse views.  The NCSC was expected to: generate public 
debate; facilitate and improve information sharing between civil society and 
government; make available past knowledge and experience; and generate new 
knowledge about the project through independent studies. 
The NCSC successfully raised public debate on the issue and influenced government 
to rethink its procedures and actions. Although the establishment of the forum took 
longer than anticipated, the credibility and legitimacy of the process was largely due 




Scenarios are stories that outline possible futures.  For complex situations with 
associated uncertainty, scenario building in an MSP can help all participants think 
laterally and learn about each others’ different interests, values, priorities, 
assumptions, constraints and options. 
Scenario analysis has a history going back to the 1960s in the military and business.  
In recent times, as both the pace of change and uncertainty has increased, there has 
been renewed interest in scenario analysis and planning. 
The basic principle of scenario planning is to try and understand plausible future 
trends to help make strategic decisions based on an analysis of the possible 
consequences.  Some form of scenario analysis is highly relevant to many MSPs (see 
Box 3.2). 
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Box 3.2 Steps used in scenario building 
Step 1: Identify driving forces – from whatever source: politics, economics, 
social or ecological change, technical breakthroughs etc. 
Step 2: Identify predetermined factors – assessing what is inevitable about the 
future. 
Step 3: Identify critical uncertainties – assessing those areas where the future 
is uncertain, which can be prioritized according to importance and 
degree of uncertainty. 
Step 4: Develop scenario storylines – a series of plausible alternative futures. 
Step 5: Assess the implication of different scenarios – for the issue(s), 
organization(s), place(s) or sector(s) of concern. 
Step 6: Identify and use indicators – to enable continual reassessment and 
adaptation. 
 
Scenarios are an interpretation of the present as well as an image of a possible 
future.  Qualitative scenario storylines should be internally consistent and describe 
paths from the present to the possible futures.  Where data exists, quantitative 
modelling is a way of making scenarios more explanatory and coherent by making 
important connections more explicit. 
“SOME FORM OF SCENARIO ANALYSIS IS HIGHLY RELEVANT TO MANY 
MSPs” 
Formats and settings can be experimented with creatively.  The Georgia Basin 
Futures Project, for example, drew on expert knowledge and community inputs to 
build tools and a game for exploring what-if type scenarios for a basin on the west 
coast of Canada. Visioning is commonly used in scenario building and decision 
making, for example by policy makers and youth in Europe,27 and for much longer by 
indigenous people grappling with water sharing in the High Atlas mountains and 
Negev desert.28 
Role-playing games can also help stakeholders explore each other’s perspectives on 
water management options.  Case 3.7 introduces Companion Modeling, which 
combines role-playing games with computerized modeling to explore scenarios. 
“VISIONING IS COMMONLY USED IN SCENARIO BUILDING AND DECISION 
MAKING” 
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Case 3.7 Companion Modeling 
Companion Modeling combines role-playing games with computer model simulations 
to facilitate shared learning and explore scenarios in order to assist with collective 
decision making. 
The approach has been successfully applied to resolve conflict amongst villagers on 
water allocation for rice irrigation in Bhutan and Thailand.  Farmers in the Lingmutey 
Chu watershed in Bhutan played several sessions of the game to see the outcomes 
of various water-sharing strategies when applied both within their village and also in 
a collective approach between villages.  Role swapping was particularly effective in 
building common understanding amongst participants of the situations of other 
parties.  
The computerized multi-agent model allows rapid simulation of a more 
comprehensive set of scenarios of water sharing rules.  It examines the interactions 
among different actors (or ‘agents’) and between these actors and the common 
resource to be shared.  Researchers and participants can discuss the outcomes of the 
scenarios, and adapt the model so that scenarios genuinely reflect the on-the-ground 
situation.  
Participants initially engaged in the games as an exercise, but soon realized the 
power of the tools for joint analysis of complex issues.  Plenary discussions amidst 
the gaming sessions took the deliberations from simulation to reality.  Villagers in 
Bhutan concluded their sessions with a formal agreement on how to allocate water 
more fairly, including the creation of a water management committee and steps to 
develop rules and procedures.29 
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Case 3.8 Scenarios in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)30 assessed the consequences of 
ecosystem change for human wellbeing.  From 2001–2005, the MA involved the work 
of more than 1360 experts worldwide.  Their findings provide a state-of-the-art 
scientific appraisal of the condition and trends in the world’s ecosystems and the 
services they provide, as well as the scientific basis for action to conserve and use 
them sustainably. 
The MA Scenarios Working Group considered scenario development as a tool to 
explore possibilities for the future that cannot be predicted by extrapolation of past 
and current trends. 
The MA considered the possible evolution of ecosystem services during the 21st 
century by developing four global scenarios exploring plausible future changes in 
drivers, ecosystems, ecosystem services, and human wellbeing: 
 The Global Orchestration scenario depicted a worldwide connected society in 
which global markets are well developed and where there is a high degree of 
global cooperation. 
 The Order from Strength scenario examined a regionalized and fragmented world 
preoccupied with security and protection. 
 The Adapting Mosaic scenario explored a fragmented world resulting from 
discredited global institutions, in which local ecosystem management strategies 
are evolved and adopted by strengthened local institutions. 
 The TechnoGarden scenario was characterized by a globally connected world 
relying strongly on technology and highly managed and often-engineered 
ecoystems to deliver needed goods and services. 
Wetlands and water was a key part of the MA analysis, and many evidence-based 
key messages were distilled for policy makers.  For example, noting and exploring 
the policy decisions that have to be made involving trade-offs between agricultural 
production and water quality, land use and biodiversity, water use and aquatic 
biodiversity, and current water use for irrigation and future agriculture production. 
 
3.4.6 Selective use of tools 
There are many tools to support water negotiations, including the previously 
introduced stakeholder analysis, comprehensive assessments and scenarios.  Other 
tools are explored in companion books to NEGOTIATE, such as FLOW, PAY, SHARE 
and RULE.31 
FLOW introduces the user to the essentials of environmental flows.  Implementing 
‘environmental flows’ requires establishing water flow regimes which recognize 
ecosystem needs whilst trying to satisfy social and economic demands (see Case 
3.9).  FLOW explores how societies define flow requirements, modifications that 
might be necessary to infrastructure design and operation, finance and incentives, 
policy and legal frameworks, and the necessity to generate and maintain political 
momentum.  Environmental flows work requires the integration of a range of 
disciplines including engineering, law, ecology, economy, hydrology, political science 
and communication.  An MSP approach is very suitable for informing the negotiations 
and decision making about how humans interfere with natural flow regimes. 
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Case 3.9 Negotiating environmental flows in the Senegal River Basin 
Transboundary cooperation in the Senegal River Basin is led by OMVS (The Senegal 
River Basin Development Organisation) which provides a forum for joint efforts by 
Mali, Mauritania and Senegal (and recently, upstream Guinea) to respond to 
development challenges while operationalizing integrated water resource 
management. 
In 2002, the OMVS member countries adopted the first-ever River Basin Water 
Charter in sub-Saharan Africa, which was preceded in 2000 by the establishment of 
an Observatory of the Environment responsible for monitoring the state of the 
environment in the basin and impacts of development interventions. The Charter and 
Observatory were the culmination of a two-decade long process marked by studies 
and debates on optimal ways of managing the river waters and investing in major 
water infrastructure projects.  
The objective of the Charter is to provide for efficient allocation of the waters of the 
Senegal River among many different sectors, such as domestic uses, urban and rural 
water supply, irrigation and agriculture, hydropower production, navigation, 
fisheries, while paying attention to minimum stream flows and other environmental 
matters. It also establishes a process for approving new projects that may have 
significant impacts on those sectors, based on the provision of information to and 
consultation with all riparian stakeholders, including local users. 
The Charter drew on comprehensive analysis of the effects of the Diama and 
Manantali dams and exploration of alternatives to their current operation. The 
studies revealed the considerable and diverse benefits of the natural flood system – 
in terms of wetlands, fisheries, agriculture, livestock, forestry and groundwater 
recharge – benefits which needed to be factored into the operation of the dams and 
in planning of future development interventions. This was particularly essential since 
the majority of those affected rely heavily on the exploitation of water-dependent 
natural resources (traditional agriculture, fisheries, livestock, and exploitation of 
forest and wetland products).  
As a result, the Water Charter includes specific provisions for the release of water 
from the dams to help restore the floodplains and generate an annual flood, thereby 
recognizing the value of the floodplain ecosystem and traditional livelihood 
strategies.32 
 
3.4.7 Action recommendations 
MSP content must provide action recommendations.  There is no need to 
manufacture consensus if it cannot be reached, but workable recommendations for 
forward action must be sought, otherwise the MSP might end up being nothing more 
than an interesting discussion.  If empowered to do so, the MSP might also take and 
implement decisions, but this is dependent on the extent of the mandate. 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) (see Case 3.10) is an example of an MSP 
that provided extensive action recommendations, without claiming decision-making 
authority. 
“WORKABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FORWARD ACTION MUST BE 
SOUGHT” 
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Case 3.10 World Commission on Dams 
Don’t plan, build, protest, operate, decommission, propose, oppose or discuss a dam 
without it!  By 2000, the world had built 45,000 large dams to irrigate a third of all 
crops, generate a fifth of all power, control floods in wet times and store water in dry 
times.  Yet, in the last century, large dams also disrupted the ecology of over half 
the world’s rivers, displaced over 40 million people from their homes and left nations 
burdened with debt (Earthscan advertizing material promoting the WCD report) 
The World Commission on Dams (WCD) was a high-profile MSP which emerged from 
increasing public criticism of large dams.  It aimed to undertake a rigorous, 
independent review of the development effectiveness of large dams, to assess 
alternatives and propose practical guidelines for future decision making.  The WCD 
attempted to conduct an ideal, deliberative multi-stakeholder learning process.  
Government participated, but with the same standing as civil society.  There were 
many actors involved at the local, regional and international level – dam 
‘practitioners’, economists, sociologists, ecologists, political scientists and the media.  
The process received enormous publicity and international recognition.  In its own 
words it ‘provided a unique arena for understanding complex choices facing societies 
in meeting their water and energy needs’. 
The WCD commissioners produced a ‘consensus’ report, an informed and negotiated 
contribution, which was launched in a blaze of publicity in 2000, evoking a range of 
responses.33  The ‘WCD decision-making framework’ has since been evaluated for use 
as both an implementation and advocacy tool.  It is complex.  The framework 
includes three grounding global norms, five core values, five key decision points, 
seven strategic priorities, 33 associated policy principles, and 26 guidelines.  The 
task of trying to figure out how to combine these pieces of advice remains a 
challenge for post-WCD activity. 
Following the release of the WCD report, there were numerous follow-up activities, 
including MSPs, undertaken around the world.  The Dams and Development Dialogue 
in Nepal34 is just one example where diverse stakeholders assembled and persisted 
over several years to explore sensitive large dam issues in the Nepal context. 
 
3.5 Outcomes and impact 
There is a suite of desirable outcomes possible from MSPs that successfully manage 
to read and respond to the context, establish a fair and safe process, and generally 
display the desirable characteristics outlined in the preceding sections. 
In some places, the MSP approach has already become routine behaviour, but in 
other places an MSP is a new possibility.  In an example from Peru, it is claimed that 
an MSP has provided a positive and ‘unprecedented’ experience: ‘The multi-
stakeholder platform is an unprecedented mechanism in the country.  Throughout its 
history, Peru has developed a culture based on confrontation rather than one based 
on negotiation.  Therefore, experiences such as that of Yakunchik imply “learning to 
negotiate” after a long tradition of domination, submission and violence’.  (The MSP 
‘Yakunchik’, after the Quecha word for ‘our water’, was established at the end of 
1998 in the central highlands of Peru).  It was further claimed that: ‘As a result of 
the platform’s initiatives, irrigation has been placed on the regional agenda, and has 
led to the discussion of other issues such as the rural-urban relationship, conflict 
negotiation, organizational and institutional water management-related problems, 
and rural development.  In other words, the platform is contributing not only to the 
Page 668 of 852
PN67_2010_20 






development of a new social fabric, but also to activating the agenda of regional 
development’.35 
There is no attempt here to claim that all MSP experiences have been positive, but 
lessons have been learned, and there is sufficient evidence from around the world to 
conclude the following: 
• MSPs can lead to the expansion of representation and participation of 
stakeholders in governance, potentially increasing the legitimacy of public 
decisions. 
• MSPs can provide greater opportunity for discourses and norms to be 
launched and contested, ensuring that new and old perspectives are 
examined on their merits. 
• MSPs can assist in the recognition and understanding of interdependencies.  
Societal learning about interdependencies is vital among stakeholders who 
will often have different values, motivations, perceptions and priorities.36 
• MSPs enable reflection by representatives of various constituencies, 
clarification of existing accord and differences among stakeholders, and 
collective sense making. 
• MSPs can help deliberation become routine, enabling complex issues to be 
more rigorously examined. 
• MSPs increase the prospects of negotiations being more informed. 
• By providing a pathway for deliberation, MSPs can lead to better decisions, 
agreements and implementation. 
 
3.6 More potential, without claiming to be a panacea 
MSPs can be a valuable, collaborative addition to water governance when the issues 
are complex.  It needs to be stressed that MSPs are a complement to other forms of 
governing, not a replacement, and not a panacea.  There is potential for their wider 
use. 
Establishing the link between the policy-informing and decision-searching processes 
of an MSP and policy making and decision taking remains a skilled task.  However, 
by favouring deliberation, MSPs can give people of goodwill a better chance to 
constructively influence decisions that affect their lives. 
Chapter 4 provides guidance on consensus building, an elusive but key element of 
MSPs.  The construction and operation of MSPs, and the pursuit of consensus 
building, are central pillars of constructive engagement, improving negotiations, and 
a move towards fairer, more effective water governance. 
“MSPs ARE A COMPLEMENT TO OTHER FORMS OF GOVERNING, NOT A 
REPLACEMENT, AND NOT A PANACEA” 
 
CHECKLIST 
• Does the issue or problem warrant the extra effort of an MSP approach?  If 
so, proceed but keep in mind context, process, content, outcomes and the 
impact sought.  Figure 3.1 provides a guide. 
• Consider the 4Rs as a way of focusing the MSP: rewards, risks, rights and 
responsibilities. 
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• Be clear about the purpose and scope.  Ensure the convenors are credible and 
competent.  Pay particular attention when setting up the MSP and negotiating 
the social contract – or rules of engagement – with all participants. 
• Determine the appropriate scales and levels.  Pursue sufficient resources, 
political support, and time. 
• Recognize and attempt to understand the surrounding politics and power 
relations.  Strive for a process which is deliberative, facilitated, inclusive, 
informed and communicative. 
• Content can vary enormously but Figure 3.4 provides a guide.  Content can 
include interactive stakeholder analysis, scenario-building and assessments.  
Judgement should be exercised as to how comprehensive assessments should 
be. 
• The MSP should be clear on its audience, decision-makers and aim to provide 
action recommendations. 
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2 For a good discussion on influence and authority see Conca (2006). 
3 The figure guiding the chapter uses earlier work on MSPs by Dore (2007) and relates it to 
outcome mapping by Earl et al. (2001) and re-presentation of this mapping by Ricardo Wilson-
Grau (unpublished). This latter conceptualization introduces ‘spheres of control’ that are useful 
to keep in mind when considering the possibilities and limitations of MSPs.  The core of this 
outcome mapping approach is the focus on the importance of changing the social behaviour of 
actors.  Context is only partially within the control of the MSP, as context is partly inherited.  
Process, content and outcomes are within the control of the MSP and its participants.  Impact 
(higher-order than outcomes) is usually dependent on changing the behaviour of actors 
beyond the MSP participants. 
4 See IIED and WBCSD (2002) and NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Ok 
Tedi and Fly River negotiation over compensation: using the mutual gains approach in multi-
party negotiations by Barbara Sharp and Tim Offor. 
5 Clarifying scope and purpose is also key in a framework for ‘water management hierarchies 
for adaptive management’ which looks at levels, perceptions, tools, actors and institutions, see 
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2007).  The work of Pahl-Wostl et al. has departed from network studies by 
Kickert et al. (1997). 
6 For a summary of a Mekong MSP see IUCN et al. (2007). 
7 The section on scales and levels is adapted from Dore and Lebel (2009) who drew on earlier 
work of Lebel, and that of Gibson et al. (2000) and Sneddon et al. (2002). 
8 Dore and Lebel (2009). 
9 Mobbs and Woodhill (1999).  For greater detail about CYPLUS, see Mobbs (2000). 
10 A case on an MSP for a water and sanitation project in Bolivia illustrates the importance of 
timing to enable MSP recommendations to be acted upon (see A Multi-Stakeholder Platform to 
solve a conflict over a Water and Sanitation Project in Tiquipaya, Bolivia  by Vladimir Cossio on 
IUCN Water website).  
11 The Case about the Fraser Basin Council is a summary derived from Watson (2008) that 
also provides this quote.  More background information can be found at 
http://www.fraserbasin.bc.ca/ 
12 Miller (1962). 
13 Hay (1997). 
14 VeneKlasen and Miller(2002). 
15 Chambers (2003). 
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16 To the deliberative democrat, Dryzek, deliberation is ‘multifaceted interchange or 
contestation across discourses within the public sphere’, see (2001) where discourses are seen 
as ‘shared sets of assumptions and capabilities embedded in language that enables its 
adherents to assemble bits of sensory information that come their way into coherent wholes’ 
(1999:34).  MSPs provide a mechanism for such ‘contestation across discourses’.  In so doing, 
they are in accord with the social learning perspective, the ‘building blocks’ of which are: the 
constructivist paradigm, an orientation towards reflection and action, and commitment to a 
holistic approach, see Maarleveld and Dangbegnon (2002).  Just as MSPs are diverse in their 
purpose and emphasis, so too is the ‘broad church’ of constructivism which ‘both seeks and 
serves to restore politics and agency to a world often constituted in such a way as to render it 
fixed and unyielding’ (Hay, 2002).  So it can be seen that the deliberative democrats, the 
social learning school, and constructivists, have much in common.  Each emphasize the role of 
ideas as significant in reshaping the world. 
17 Wageningen International in The Netherlands maintains a very helpful MSP portal which 
includes excellent information about techniques, but also a regularly updated compilation of 
experiences from around the world. 
18 The text on setting up, stakeholder analysis and scenarios draws heavily on Dore et al. 
(2000). 
19 http://www.agassessment.org/ 
20 See NEGOTIATE case study about Umatilla ground water on IUCN Water website. 
21 See NEGOTIATE case study about KYB on IUCN Water website. 
22 See Warner (2007).  This quote is taken from the preface to this highly relevant book which 
provides 16 chapters exploring water-related MSPs from all corners of the world. 
23 Bird et al. (2006) have also proposed using a matrix to explore rights, risks and 
responsibilities. 
24 The notion of the social contract for the participants is similar to the IAP2 ‘promise to the 
public’ (discussed in Chapter 2).  An elaboration of this typology – looking at whether 
participants are invited to speak based primarily on their knowledge and skill (experts?), or 
based on their capacity to commit (authority?) or significantly influence the commitment of a 
constituency – can be found in Susskind et al. (2003). 
25 http://www.hydropower.org/sustainable_hydropower/HSAF.html 
26 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Interlinking of Rivers in India: 
Dialogue and Negotiations by National Civil Society Committee by Biksham Gujja, and Alagh et 
al. (2006). 
27 See NEGOTIATE case study on the IUCN Water website: Visioning on the future of the rivers 
Scheldt and Waal by Jeroen Warner. 
28 Wolf (2000). 
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29 See NEGOTIATE case studies on the IUCN Water website: Sharing Irrigation Water in 
Bhutan: Companion Modeling for Conflict Resolution and Institution Building by Gurung et al.; 
and Using Companion Modeling to level the playing field and influence more equitable water 
allocation in northern Thailand by Barnaud et al.  See also Building Shared Understanding – 
Use of role-playing games and simulations to negotiate improved water management in the 
Republic of Kiribati by Natalie Jones. 
30 http://www.millenniumassessment.org/en/Index.aspx.  For the conceptual approach and 
detail of the MA scenarios, see Millennium Ecoystem Assessment (2005b), with particular 
attention to Chap. 8 by Cork et al.  Water and wetland findings and recommendations are 
synthesized in Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005a). 
31 FLOW by Dyson et al. (2003); PAY by Smith et al. (2008); SHARE by Sadoff et al. (2008). 
All available at 
http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/water/wp_resources/wp_resources_toolkits/ind
ex.cfm.  SHARE provides a practical guide to water sharing across boundaries (or borders), 
with a focus on the 260 river and lake basins shared worldwide by two or more countries.  It 
explores potential costs and benefits of cooperation, and of non-cooperation, and principles 
and mechanisms for incentive creation and benefit sharing.  Transboundary negotations about 
water are an important issue between States.  An infusion of deliberation, whether multi-
stakeholder or not, would often improve the basis of negotiations and decision making.  PAY 
provides ideas about payment systems that can be established to maintain or restore 
watershed services critical for downstream water users.  When upstream services are valued, 
it provides an incentive for market systems to be explored as one way of encouraging land 
and water use that meets the needs of more than just upstream users. 
32Thanks also to Madiodio Niasse of the Global Water Partnership for contributions to this case.  
For more information see the Senegal contribution to the 1st World Water Development Report 
(OMVS, 2003). 
33 There was a huge knowledge base assembled and debated by the WCD platform which 
informed the final report of the Commissioners (WCD, 2000).  All reports, including details of 
the process, can be found online at www.dams.org.  Critiques abound, but any reviewer of this 
process should include Dubash et al. (2001). 
34 Dixit et al. (2004). 
35 Luis Suberon, quoted by Ore (2007). 
36 In the words of one MSP researcher: ‘If there is not a full recognition of interdependence by 
stakeholders, including water bureaucracies, and the need for concerted action, MSPs will 
remain paper tigers’ (Wester et al. 2007). 
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Introduction1  
Scenarios are internally coherent stories of the future. As such they are an 
important tool for long-term planning and policy. They can be qualitative or 
quantitative, look forward or backwards and be constructed at different scales 
(van Notten et al. 2003). Scenarios have been widely used in business and the 
military to plan in situations of high uncertainty with respect to opportunities and 
threats (Masini and Vasquez 2000, Neumann and Overland 2004). More recently 
scenarios have been used in studies of environmental change, natural resources 
management and development to  understand dynamic vulnerabilities and 
explore alternative, long-term, policy responses (Gallopin et al. 1997, Wollenberg 
et al. 2000, Peterson et al. 2003, Swart et al. 2004, Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment 2005).  
                                          
 
1 This paper is intended for submission as a chapter in a book on long-term policies. 
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Scenarios can be understand as learning processes or products (Hulme and 
Dessai 2008, O'Neill et al. 2008). Emission scenarios in the IPCC process have 
been crucial foundation to understanding and communicating possible future 
changes to climate (IPCC 2007). In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
process, for example, scenarios were seen as helping with education, 
communication, and decision-making (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2003).  
Strong engagement of stakeholders in construction and interpretation of 
scenarios in the sub-global assessments enhanced mutual learning about 
interests, capabilities and beliefs (Lebel et al. 2006, Lebel and Bennett 2008).  
Scenarios and associated mathematical models – including, the graphs, maps, 
images and figures used to summarize their outputs – may function as boundary 
objects. A boundary object is an artifact which serves as interface among 
different communities of practice  (Star and Griesemer 1989, Guston 2001). In 
climate science, for instance, the parameterizations of new model components 
are boundary object structuring the relationships between modelers and 
observers of climate change (Sundberg 2007). 
In scenario planning constructing storylines requires people with different 
viewpoints and knowledge to work together.  Quantifying parts of a scenario 
using models again demands that scenarios do boundary work between more 
holistic qualitative experts and modelers.  Scenarios as products may also be 
objects around which experts, policy-makers and other stakeholders discuss 
implications (Garb et al. 2008). The IPCC’s emission scenarios, for example, are a 
result of both science and negotiation. They are boundary objects around which 
scientists and policy makers have come together constructing and refining 
individual scenario storylines and sets (Girod et al. 2009). 
Boundary objects, as devices supporting research-action arenas (van Kerkhoff 
and Lebel 2006) and assessments (Cash and Moser 2000), can help bring 
different forms of knowledge together and lead to co-production of new 
knowledge.  Scenarios used iteratively are potentially important tools for long-
term, adaptive and reflexive policy-making (Voss et al. 2009), especially, where 
they are seen as objects to support deliberation rather than a substitute for 
politics or for over-riding differences in world views (de Vries and Petersen 2009, 
Meadowcroft 2009). 
This paper is a review of how scenarios have been used to address allocation of 
water resources and services in the Mekong Region. We focus on regional 
applications with a significant international component often contrasting the use 
of scenarios by the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and partners with 
possibilities suggested by other studies (Table 1). The scenario studies considered 
in this paper varied in several important dimensions. Most had a strong emphasis 
on qualitative models and only a few on developing full, qualitative, story lines. 
Most were built by experts, sometimes with consultation with a relatively narrow 
group of peers, and only a few with a broader range of stakeholders. The next 
four sections analyze these Mekong experiences, in turn covering: how scenario 
exercises start, how scenarios are made and used, and the influence of scenarios 
on learning and decisions. 
 
Table 1. Main scenario studies explored in this paper 
 








story lines  
OPTIM - Water 
Allocation Scenarios 
(Ringler 2001, 
IFPRI & Bonn 
University 
4 No Yes  Basic 
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Ringler and Cai 
2006) 




MRC 7 No Yes None 
BDP1 – 
Development 
scenarios Phase I 
(MRC 2005) 
MRC 5  
 
Narrow Yes  
 
Basic 
IBMF3 – Flow 
scenarios (MRCS 
2008) 
MRC 4 No Yes Basic 




Bank 2004, World 
Bank and Asian 
Development Bank 
2006) 
World Bank & 
ADB 
6 Narrow Yes Basic 
BDP2 - 
Development 
scenarios Phase II 
(MRCS 2008) 
MRC 9 Narrow Yes Basic 
HYDRO – 
Hydropower dams  
(MRC 2008b) 
MRC 6 Narrow Yes Basic 
WUP-FIN - Policy 







4 No Yes Basic 






Thomas et al. 2008) 
Chiang Mai 
University 
4 (4) No No Elaborate 
NSEC - North-south 
economic corridor 
project scenario 








Broad No Elaborate 
CSIRO - Impacts of 
climate change on 
Mekong River Basin 
water resource 
(Eastham et al. 
2008) 
CSIRO  2  No Yes None 
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TKK - Climate 
change assessment 







3 (3) No Yes None 
FISH - Hydrological 
scenarios and 
fisheries (Baran et 
al. 2007) 
WorldFish 4 No Yes Basic 
 
Initiation 
Scenarios are made for different reasons and in varied circumstances. During the 
last decade in the Mekong Region most exercises have been, one way or the 
other, concerned with the opportunities and risks from investments in large-scale 
infrastructure, including, dams, diversions, inter-basin transfers, flood 
embankments, irrigation schemes, transmission lines and road networks. 
Mekong River Commission initially constructed a set of “development scenarios” 
after the completion of the Decision Support Framework (DSF) in March 2004 as 
part work carried out under the Water Utilization Program (WUP).  The original 
seven scenarios (WUP-DSF,Table 1) were constructed primarily to evaluate and 
test the DSF. Several scenarios addressed indicators relevant to articles in the 
1995 Mekong Agreement, in particular, minimum dry season flows (Article 6A), 
Reverse flow in Tonle Sap in wet season (Article 6B) and average daily peak flows 
in the flood season (Article 6C).  Subsequently the set was revised to meet 
different, but often closely related objectives.  
A World Bank (2004) study released in November 2004 evaluating and using the 
DSF models aimed to “demonstrate the likely impacts of a credible variety of 
single- and multi-sectoral development scenarios” (MWRAS, Table 1). The report 
is clear that the aim was not to evaluate individual projects or merits of a specific 
development scenario. The key conclusion from this study was that “there is 
scope for significant levels of co-ordinated development with associated benefits 
to all basin countries.” 
Phase I of the Basin Development Plan (BDP) focused on investigating 
hydrological and environmental impacts of a range of development alternatives 
(MRC 2005). Scenarios were released in May 2005 to assist with strategic 
planning (BDP1, Table 1). The focus was on hydropower and irrigation as two 
sectors expected to have significant effects on mainstream flow.  Lack of 
sufficient consultation with member countries created some difficulties in 
understanding the purpose use of scenarios as well as the relationship between 
basin-wide and sub-area activities (MRC 2006a). Scenario planning was not a 
conventional practice in the respective national bureaucracies. 
According to Dr. Vu Van Tuan team leader of the MRC’s Basin Development 
Programme at the MRC Secretariat scenarios were being used in the development 
plan to “investigate the likely development space within which the LMB will 
operate over the next 20 years, based on national policies and plans, 
demographic trends and market demands, as well as external factors such as the 
impact of development in the Upper Mekong” (Tuan 2007).  This reflection is 
fairly similar to the declared purpose of the World Bank (2004) study which pre-
empted the BDP scenarios (Table 1). 
In phase II of the BDP the basin-wide scenario exercise continues to focus on 
existing, planned and potential significant, large scale, water resources 
development projects over the next 20 years (MRC 2006b). The emphasis 
remains on projects which have trans-boundary impacts or benefits.  
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Over-time the MRC has made more explicit references to the boundary functions 
of scenarios. A plan for scenario-based impact assessment report presented in 
October 2009 meeting stated the main aims were to “facilitate basin wide 
stakeholder discussions, government consultations and the detailed evaluations 
that each country must undertake to define the range of ‘acceptable trade-offs’, 
and ultimately assist in the preparation of the Basin Development Strategy, in 
particular the definition of the ‘development space’ and the strategic guidance for 
the integrated development and management of the various water-related 
sectors” (MRCS 2009).  
Apart from the MRC several other groups in the region have under-taken 
scenario-based analysis (Table 1). These have been less driven by treaty 
obligations or immediate policy or investment demands and as a result are a 
much more diverse group. 
Several studies were explicitly designed to look at effects of climate change on 
water resources and agriculture (TKK and CSIRO, Table 1). Two larger ones are 
highlighted here.  The study by Helsinki University of Technology and START 
Regional Center at Chulalongkorn University “aims to contribute to the discussion 
about the climate change-related impacts and adaptation strategies” (TKK and 
SEA-START RC 2009). Another study by CSIRO “investigates how the climate is 
likely to change in the Mekong Basin by 2030, and quantifies the uncertainty 
around future climate projections”(Eastham et al. 2008).  Both studies refer to 
but do not attempt to directly incorporate interactions with MRC’s development 
scenarios.  
Several other studies listed in Table 1 arose, at least in part, out of concerns 
about impacts on fisheries (OPTI, FISH, WUP-FIN). Two other scenario exercises 
(UPLAND, NSEC) were triggered by concerns about livelihoods and ecological 
conditions in upper tributary watersheds in the Mekong region, an areas largely 
ignored in other basin-wide scenarios and impact assessments accept as drivers 
in changes in flood risk in downstream areas.  
All scenario studies included an element of demonstration about them from 
outset– they were not thought of as definitive exercises. This was a particularly 
prominent rationale of the initial MRC models (WUP-DSF), economic scenario 
study (OPTI) and upland multi-level analysis (UPLAND). Another commonly 
shared element across many scenario studies was a stated concern with issues of 
poverty alleviation and regional development.  These two common features 
enhance the potential of scenarios to perform boundary work among different 
social groups both in construction and exploration. 
Construction 
How scenarios are made varies.  Important dimensions include the emphasis 
placed on storylines and model quantification and the level of participation or who 
is involved. When participation is extensive the distinction between making 
(construction) and using (exploration and communication) of scenarios is less 
useful. Most scenario processes have an iterative history and this can also lessen 
the separation between making and using. The vast majority of scenarios in the 
Mekong Region have been constructed primarily by experts, including 
consultants, often under the guidance of state officials. 
Basin development plans 
In the MRCs’ work, scenarios have been seen essentially as alternative 
hydrological model runs with inclusion of a particular set of existing and possible 
future infrastructure. Adding, dropping and adjusting individual scenarios from 
the set is straightforward and has happened regularly as different interests have 
stepped up to shape the boundaries of assessment and analysis. The initial set of 
development scenarios arising from the WUP program, for example, consisted of 
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seven scenarios (WUP-DSF), the World Bank mission study (MRWAS) a related 
but different six, and the BDP settled on 5 (BDP1, Table 2).  The third phase of 
the Integrated Basin Flow Management adopted a subset of four from the BDP1 
set, renaming some to more neutral terms (IBFM3, Table 2). A consultation 
process with the hydropower program used yet another set (HYDRO, Table 2).  At 
a regional consultation workshop in October 2009 a total of nine scenarios were 
listed and references made to additional work on climate change yet to be 
included (MRCS 2009). The plethora of scenarios used within MRC activities 
creates an additional layer of complexity, 
Control of how scenarios are constructed has a technical as well as rhetorical 
significance. Consider the labeling of scenarios and sets in the MRC series.  The 
prefix “definite future” and “likely future” are used to label particular sets of 
scenarios (BDP2, Table 2). In some applications it is “Chinese dams” in others it 
is “Upper dams”.  Different numbers of dams are called “low development” or 
“high development” (MWRAS, BDP1, Table 2). Moreover, irrigation and flood 
protection issues are labeled distinctly from considerations focused on 
hydropower energy “development”. 
There has been substantial controversy over the content of the scenarios, for 
instance, how operating rules are set for these dams is likely to be crucial to their 
flow effects, but information about those assumptions has not been made public. 
Another debate is what should constitute “baseline”. Scenario-builders and users 
who wish to downplay effects of infrastructure overall have tried, for example, to 
shift the baseline to include already constructed mainstream dams in China.  
The sequence with which infrastructure is also very important for impacts on 
flows and thus ecosystems sensitive to changes in seasonal flood regimes. 
Somewhat extraordinarily much of the scenario and modeling analyses carried 
out in the MRC series gloss over the dynamic time dimension of impacts of 
cumulative additions of infrastructure. Indeed consideration of these is often 
eliminated by comparing scenarios which are run for different lengths of time.  
Explicit storylines would help guide modeling of developments in the basin more 
explicitly and help reveal assumptions about interactions between infrastructure 
that now remain hidden. 
Another important constraint in the MRC scenario exercises is the ‘requirement’ 
that some aspects of the scenario work be approved by member countries – for 
instance the hydrological model set in DSF have been formally approved but not 
some of the tools critical for socio-economic assessment or models used in 
geographically more restricted analyses. As a consequence work done by the 
secretariat is not done with best available methods.  Some amount of exploration 
appears to proceed regardless of “formal” approval suggesting that scenarios also 
play an important preparation role to formal negotiations among states.  
Despite these limitations the persistence of scenarios in basin development 
discussions illustrates their utility to key actors. Scenarios are flexible and 
ambiguous enough that they can meet certain range of objectives easily; in short, 
they do some boundary work useful to those engaged in the process. One of the 
problems was that until the 2nd phase of BDP wider stakeholder consultation on 
the development scenarios had been quite limited.  
 
Table 2. A selection of storylines from scenario exercises. Short study titles as in 
Table 1. Storylines for two scenario sets are presented in slightly more detail as 




Scenarios in brief 
MWRAS Baseline – conditions existing in year 2000 
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China Dams – including all proposed Chinese dams 
Low development – based on population and water demand growth to 2020 with dams 
in Lao PDR and China 
Embankments – as for low development scenario but including 130,000 ha isolated from 
Cambodian floodplain 
Agriculture including substantial growth in water use for irrigation with dams in lower 
basins, and inter-basin transfers, and hydropower similar to low development  
High Development – similar to agriculture but including substantially more hydropower 
growth, including many proposed dams in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia 
UPLAND Rural first – multi-function landscape with relatively modest intensification (unified, 
localized) 
Food bowl – substantial expansion and intensification of agriculture (unified, globalized) 
Glocalization – multi-function landscape with agroforestry and use of biodiversity in 
conservation areas (diversified, localized) 
Services Park – conservation in large parks separated from areas of intensive agriculture 
and urban areas (diversified, globalized) 
 OPTIM Basin optimization 
Parity in water allocation 
Inter-basin transfer 














Flow Regime 1 (BDP1-Low) 
Flow Regime 2 (BDP1-Irrigation) 
Flow Regime 3 (BDP1-High) 
HYDRO Baseline 
Upper Mekong Dam 
Definite Future 
LMB Mainstream Dam 
LMB Tributary Dam 




Upper Mekong Dam 
Definite Future 
Forseeable future situation 
LMB 20 year plan 
LMB 20 year plan without 
mainstream dams 
LMB 20 year plan with 6 m/s 
(upper) 
LMB 20 year plan with 9 m/s  
Mekong delta flood management 
Long term future 
LMB long-term development 
LMB very high development 




NSEC Business as usual 
Green modernity 
Economic colony 
Back to the village 
CSIRO Baseline Future Climate 
TKK Change basin hydrology 
Sea-level rise 
Change basin + sea-level 
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Intensive Basin Development 
Extreme Basin Development 
Limited Development for Tonle Sap 
Watershed 
 
Uncertainties and scale  
Scenario exercises that are independent of treaty procedures, while still expert-
driven, have explored a wider range of approaches to construct scenarios and 
broader set of development and water management issues than infrastructure 
impacts on water flows. In this section we consider treatment of uncertainties in 
climate and regional development as well as issues of scale.  
Scenario studies about the impacts of climate change focus their efforts on 
comparing projected future climate with a historical baseline. Uncertainties are 
handled in different ways. For example the study by CSIRO (Eastham et al. 2008) 
used 11 GCM models all driven with the same IPCC A1B emission scenario to 
create 11 variants of historical climate (1952-2002) and future climate (target 
year, 2030). Medians were used to characterize most likely climate and variation 
among models “uncertainty”.  The use of multiple models by the CSIRO study is 
in sharp contrast to the MRC process where only the approved DSF model is used, 
thus essentially eliminating important sources of uncertainty from consideration. 
Climate projection scenarios do boundary work between researchers more 
interested in climate and those concerned with impacts and adaptation. They can 
also help with communication to a wider audience, for example, in explaining why 
business-as-usual strategies may not work.  
Other studies use more or less models and one or more emission scenarios (IWMI 
and World Fish 2009: 25). In all cases the focus is on future precipitation and 
temperature. Other models or trend analyses are then used to assess impacts, for 
example, with respect to water availability, agricultural production and changing 
population distributions  (Chinvanno et al. 2008, Eastham et al. 2008, TKK and 
SEA-START RC 2009). Other sources of uncertainty are not considered as part of 
the scenarios or immediate analyses but may be referred to in interpretation of 
findings as cautionary notes. For example, land-use is often assumed to remain 
as present apart from specific assumptions about water withdrawals for irrigation. 
More holistic scenario exercises need ways to identify and systematically explore 
major uncertainties. One simple way sets of scenarios are constructed is to focus 
on a small number of key uncertainties and take extreme combinations of sets of 
assumptions about these uncertainties (Figure 1). In a study about upper 
tributary watersheds, scenarios were constructed at the wider regional level 
based on different combinations of uncertainties in market (horizontal axis) and 
sectoral (vertical axis) development (Lebel 2006).  The Food Bowl scenario, for 
example, is strongly export agri-business oriented. Under this regional scenario 
the expansion and intensification of agriculture in lowland and wider valleys 
means much greater pressure on water resources and thus controls on water and 
land uses in upstream upper tributary watershed areas (Lebel 2006).  Developing 
more elaborate storylines with explicit time sequences, key drivers and triggering 
events requires making assumptions explicit. Here opportunities for storylines to 
do boundary work among disciplines and among participants with different 
perspectives and beliefs is high – allowing constructive interaction to continue 
even when understandings are not exactly the same, preferences differ, and fits 
between complex pieces of evidence is imperfect but improving. 
 
Figure 1. Four scenarios of regional uncertainties (Source: Lebel 2006). 
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What should be now clear is that insights do not only come from the articulation 
of individual story-lines, but also the contrasts between scenarios and the overall 
space of possibilities which they span.  Comparisons among scenarios are more 
likely to be interesting if each is plausible and some participants think it is likely.  
If each scenario has some positive and negative elements for most stakeholders 
than the kinds of discussion encouraged can move away from the “picking 
winners” type to exploring alternative assumptions and understandings. In some 
situation the scenarios may be designed to evolve towards divergent preferences, 
for example, following common policy narratives.  
Scale issues are often subsumed under assumptions about external conditions.  
The MRC has put a strong emphasis on trans-boundary impacts in its scenario 
analyses. A mechanism for including smaller projects as part of sets of 
infrastructure has been proposed for BDP2groups. This limits consideration of 
multiple and more local effects.  
The scenario study of impacts of built-structure on fisheries analysis explicitly 
dealt with impacts from interventions at three geographical scales – the Mekong 
Basin, Tonle Sap Watershed and Tonle Sap Floodplains – on the hydrology, 
ecology and fisheries of Tonle Sap Lake (Baran et al. 2007).  Although the four 
scenarios were not nested (FISH, Table 1) the first three include assumptions 
about development at the basin scale while a fourth focused on changes within 
the Tonle Sap watershed.  
One way to handle scale issues is to explicitly build scenarios at more than one 
level and analyse them jointly (Zurek and Henrichs 2007). The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (MA) was explicitly a multi-scale with sub-global regional 
assessments sometimes contrasting their own local scenarios with the over-
arching set of global scenarios (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Lebel et 
al. 2006).  Lebel (2006) nested scenarios at two spatial levels to explore key 
uncertainties that would impact livelihoods and landscapes in upper tributary 
watersheds of montane mainland Southeast Asia. The two scenarios are 
summarized in Figure 2. At the regional level the scenarios highlight the 
implications of different forms of market and political integration. At the upper 
tributary level the scenarios highlight changing dependencies on local natural 
resources and the extent of empowerment of local stakeholders in their 
management.  
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The explicit consideration of scale in scenarios opens up more possibilities for 
level-dependent interests and uses of water to be explicitly considered. In the 
Mekong region this is vital as otherwise myriad of local interests are over-looked 
in low resolution, large scale, assessment processes (Lebel et al. 2005).    
 
Figure 2. Multi-level scenarios for analysis of alternative futures of upper tributary watersheds 
in mainland Southeast Asia Upland scenarios. Four scenarios (boxes) are shown arranged 
against different combinations of uncertainties at the upper tributary level related to local 
empowerment (vertical) and resource base of livelihood systems (horizontal). These in turn 





Building scenarios together  
In a few instances scenarios are constructed together with a wider group of 
stakeholders.  Building scenarios together serves two functions  (Lebel et al. 
2006, Lebel and Bennett 2008). First it can help stakeholders get a better 
understanding of what each, in the longer term, thinks is desirable or not. Second 
because scenarios are plausible stories about the future they require articulation 
and discussion about people’s beliefs about cause-and-effect in development.   A 
better, mutual, understanding of assumptions that stakeholder have about water 
resources, climate change, technology, international relations and many other 
factors that shape development can help guide additional assessment where 
uncertainties are large and capacity building where key technical information is 
simply not understood or understandable. 
In October 2006 USER and M-POWER hosted a workshop in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
to specifically follow-up discussions at the Mekong Water Futures Dialogue (IUCN 
et al. 2007a) on the ADB-facilitated North-South Economic Corridor (Foran and 
Lebel 2007).  At the event participants explored development assumptions by 
building scenarios at local, regional and global scales (Figure 3). A substantial 
effort was put into training neutral facilitators to guide a process in which all 
participants were given opportunities for meaningful input and encouraged to 
explain their reasoning and explore differences in views. Participation in scenario-
building exercises may help understanding because it encourages critical 
examination of assumptions held by others.  
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Figure 3. The scenario-building process used to engage participants in a dialogue to explore 
the Asian Development Bank’s North-South Economic Corridor plans and reasoning (After: 




In the MRC process, consultation with other member states, and in some cases 
approval of specific elements by the Joint Committee, is seen in some ways as 
“participation”.  Clearly this is a much lighter and narrower notion of 
“engagement” in construction of scenarios than explored by some other 
exercises, and what is needed. Nevertheless, from the Secretariat’s perspective, 
scenarios are boundary objects that help them deal with other Commission 
bodies, like the Joint Committee and Council.  
Building scenarios together can help improve legitimacy of an analysis. This is 
one of the key reasons why participation and deliberation can be valuable.  
Legitimacy comes from both who gets involved and the quality of reasoning and 
debate.  Wider participation in scenario-building itself, however, is not yet a 
common practice in the Mekong Region. 
Exploration 
Once constructed, scenarios can be used in several ways.  One of the key 
functions of boundary objects is to improve communication. Scenarios have been 
used for both supporting dialogue as well as more one-way marketing of desired 
projects and futures.  Another is to take the scenarios as input into further 
analyses, for example, as part of an assessment of environmental or social 
impacts. The distinction between “the scenario” and “its analysis” is not always 
sharp. 
Communication and deliberation  
Scenarios are sometimes made primarily as a tool to communicate ideas. In this 
mode the boundary object has translation or mediation functions. How scenarios 
are received may not match the intentions of those communicating. The outcome 
may be acceptance, refinement or rejection. 
In June 2006 the Asian Development Bank released a working paper co-authored 
with the World Bank on an assistance strategy for water resources development 
in the Mekong Region (World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2006). The 
report aggressively re-confirmed the World Bank’s (2004) initial analysis which 
drew on the hydrological models in the MRC’s Decision Support Framework: 
“The bottom line message of this Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy is that the analytical work on development scenarios has, for the 
first time, provided evidence that there remains considerable potential for 
development of the Mekong water resources. The Mekong basin has 
flexibility and tolerance, which suggests that sustainable, integrated 
management and development can lead to wide-spread benefits. This may 
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contrast with the more precautionary approach of the past decade that 
tended to avoid any risk associated with development, at the expense of 
stifling investments.”(World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2006: 4) 
Critiques of the ADB and World Bank’s Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy followed. The absence of important ecological details from the models or 
assessment reduced the credibility of the findings. Other research in the region, 
including work done with and at the Mekong River Commission Secretariat, for 
example, has highlighted the importance of sediments, nutrient transport and 
even modest changes in flood pulse behaviour for ecosystem dynamics (Lamberts 
2006, Kummu et al. 2008, MRC and WUP-FIN 2008). Others were concerned with 
process of consultation.  There is need, for example, to make available all 
relevant documents (especially in regional languages) sufficiently in advance of 
consultations.   Some actors, like the International Rivers Network, had criticized 
the MWRAS as just a tool to create investments (IRN 2006). Others have pointed 
out to the limited civil society engagement and incorporation of inputs in the 
lead-up process (Cuomo and Frewer 2007).  
In Vientiane, Lao PDR, in July 2006 the World Conservation Union (IUCN), the 
Thailand Environment Institute (TEI), the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI) and the Mekong Program on Water Environment and Resilience 
(M-POWER) convened the “Mekong Region Waters Dialogue: exploring water 
futures together” (IUCN et al. 2007a, 2007b). The regional multi-stakeholder 
platform was meant as a contribution to ”improving water governance in the 
Mekong Region”. A key part of the meeting was to evaluate the Mekong Water 
Resources Assistance Strategy. The Banks had gone through their own 
consultation process but with little civil society participation. The need for greater 
transparency and stakeholder participation was a key message from the event. 
Another was a better understanding of the limitations of models (Adamson 2007) 
and the framings that scenarios had created eliminating consideration of 
alternative types of development. The dialogue event was followed up by 
exchange of correspondence between conveners and these agencies (IUCN et al. 
2007a).  
Follow-up meetings included a participatory scenario building exercise focussed 
on exploring the Asian Development Banks’ plans for the north-south economic 
corridor (Foran and Lebel 2007).  The scenario-building event offered a different 
way to exploring uncertainties and alternative visions of development. Apart from 
deliberation about assumptions and beliefs inherent in constructing scenarios 
together there were also sessions designed specifically for explaining and 
exploring scenarios with members of other groups (Figure 3). Presenting 
preliminary scenario analyses to others working at same or different level helped 
some groups further refine their own scenario sets (Foran and Lebel 2007). In 
this condensed exercise scenarios played an important direct boundary functions 
among participants from different countries and backgrounds. 
In the early history of international cooperation on the Mekong a key and early 
notion was that scenarios were options among which the member states had to 
ultimately agree upon. The 1987 revision of the earlier 1970 Indicative Basin Plan 
was prepared by consultants and staff of the Mekong Committee secretariat and 
published as “Perspectives for Mekong Development” (Le-Huu et al. 2003).  Short 
and longer-term development scenarios were supposed to be developed and a 
single one elaborated as the development plan. The consultants at the time said 
given the political context “establishment of a rigid blueprint for the basin’s 
development [was] an exercise with little practical meaning” (Le-Huu et al. 2003: 
40).   
Scenario planning in BDP2 appears to be returning to this earlier logic of 
“identifying the appropriate scenario” (MRCS 2008) as opposed to broader 
notions of exploring the space for development as espoused in the early World 
Bank (2004) study. BDP2 experts recognize that the actual choice is one for the 
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member states and Joint Committee but expect iteratively refined scenarios to be 
useful in negotiations. The boundary work of the scenario, if it unfolds as the BDP 
anticipates, would continue to help stabilize the policy and research agenda.  
In more recent years the MRC has increasingly held consultations on its analyses 
and plans including development scenarios. At the regional multi-stakeholder 
consultation on MRC’s hydropower programme held in September 2008 in 
Vientiane, results of modeled flow changes from various water resources 
development scenarios were presented by the MRC (2008a). The six scenarios 
discussed in terms of hydropower assumptions (HYDRO, Table 2). According to 
the presenter the scenarios and indicators were discussed by National Mekong 
Committees, line agencies and other regional organizations. The presenter also 
noted that “results will be discussed in various forums”.  In an interesting use of 
framing rhetoric the last three are treated as “Future Plans” in contrast to the 
“Definite Future” which includes both existing and yet to be built but “on-going” 
projects.  
At the first stakeholder consultation on BDP2 held in Vientiane, 12-13 March 
2008, participants argued that “the analyzed results of scenarios should be open 
for peer review” and “include public stakeholder consultation process before 
decision-making takes place”.  The exact steps in how the scenarios would be 
used in relation to Joint Committee, Council and stakeholder consultations was 
debated in meetings of the Regional Technical Working Group and process 
adjusted again. In short which boundaries a scenario object is supposed to help 
manage is subject to contestation with different actors pushing and pulling to be 
included or exclude others.  
In July 2008 as part of M-POWER I helped host and organize a workshop for staff 
in the BDP team of the MRC Secretariat and other experts to review draft working 
papers on development scenarios and IWRM strategy. Comparing what was being 
done by the MRC with what is possible with scenario planning methods I made 
several critiques. The lack of supporting storylines for modelling work, for 
instance, makes it hard to gauge plausibility of sequence of events, to explore 
assumptions and alternatives, and consider responses of people affected by 
infrastructure development.  The scenarios, in short, are not plausible stories of 
the future, but little more than alternative model runs. Another limiting feature is 
the lack of attention given to uncertainties, exactly the type of analysis for which 
scenario planning is most suited. Key assumptions are buried within the DSF and 
not open for full scrutiny. Risks and surprises have been reduced and eliminated 
rather than expanded and explored; as a consequence, very little can be said 
about the robustness or resilience of the ‘development scenarios’ as strategies for 
regional development.   Some of these limitations can be understood as arising 
from too strong a focus on quantification of the mainstream hydrograph and 
insufficient engagement with multiple stakeholders whose interests in water-
related resource development and management go well beyond these narrow 
considerations. These in turn are explainable in part by the political context in 
which scenarios are seen by key actors as boundary objects to negotiations 
among member states. 
Assessing impacts  
Among several findings presented at the hydropower program consultation 
(HYDRO, Table 2) it was noted that average dry season flows would increase by 
30-50% in northern parts of Thailand and Laos (MRC 2008a). Impacts on the 
flood pulse in downstream part of LMB, including flow reversals for Tonle Sap, 
were argued to be small fraction of historical year-to-year variability.  It was 
asserted that LMB Mainstream dam scenario would have no additional impacts 
because these projects would be run-of-river. The conclusions drawn by the 
presenter at that event using scenario analysis were particularly positive about 
low impacts of LMB developments “the flow changes caused by possible water 
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resource developments in the LMB will result in small mostly positive changes in 
salinity intrusion in the Vietnam Delta and relatively small changes in flooding 
patterns around the Tonle Sap compared to the natural year-to-year variability. 
The LMB mainstream dams would not cause flow changes beyond a daily 
timeframe” (MRC 2008a). 
Hydrological models are the foundations of the MRC DSF but not always the most 
appropriate tools for specific applications. The MRC/IBFM program using DSF 
predicted changes in water levels in lower basin of 0.15m whereas other studies 
using have suggested effects as high as 0.30m and 0.60m. The scheme used to 
assess hydropower dam impacts in the DSF is a simple add-on to software 
originally adapted from the Murray Darling Basin; it has been criticized as less 
than ideal for this application and should be improved (Adamson 2007, MRC and 
WUP-FIN 2008). 
There are other problems related to transparency as well. Scenarios cannot work 
as boundary objects for communication if they are opaque. Some important work 
using models to assess impacts of flows has been done but not shared. The 
results of a scenario study for MRC’s BDP by Beecham and Cross were not 
released. Work in the IBFM program assessed impacts of a “high development” 
scenario but IBFM Report 8 was not released for public distribution and discussion 
(MRC and WUP-FIN 2008). 
Despite these concerns and criticisms the MRC continues to work closely with the 
model-supplier and infrastructure cum engineering consulting firm Halcrow, 
especially within the IKMP process. Competition for contracts among different 
consulting and research groups is to be expected and normal, but underlines the 
need for high level of transparency in modeling activities or risk loss of credibility. 
The final report from the WUP-FIN project noted that “the MRC would benefit 
greatly from continuing validation and scientific review of the model system, 
which is necessary for its transparency and credibility, not least in trans-boundary 
context” (MRC and WUP-FIN 2008: p18). 
More independent development and application of basin wide models is needed to 
study impacts of new infrastructure, climate and other variables. Progress would 
ensue from model inter-comparison exercises, using standardized inputs and 
scenarios. Models like VIC and VMod would be examples of suitable instruments 
to compare against current components in the current DSF.  
The narrow hydrological focus of the “development” scenarios convened by the 
MRC illustrates how scenarios as boundary objects can also be used to narrow 
debate.  Hydropower is justified by reference to low impact on hydrograph of 
“development” according to their own hydrological models.  Scientific studies 
(often in collaboration with MRC itself) suggest much more care about drawing 
inferences about ecosystem impacts (Kummu and Sarkkula 2008, Friend and 
Blake 2009). A study using largely the same development scenarios of the MRC 
draws attention to possible adverse impacts of structures on fisheries in the Tonle 
Sap Lake (Baran et al. 2007). Dry season flows are particularly important in these 
contexts because they affect fish migration patterns and habitats and 
consequently fisheries productivity across the entire Mekong basin. 
Ecosystem and social impacts 
The MRC’s use of scenarios in IBFM work under the BDP focuses on effects on 
flows. The initial World Bank (2004) study acknowledged that the output of the 
models “is quite narrowly hydrological”. For some structures in some locations 
this may not be the most important impact.  Consideration is also needed for 
impacts on sediment transport, local impacts in specific sub-basins near 
structures, and ecosystems. Different kinds of impacts have very different levels 
of difficulty associated with them. Estimating impacts on changing water levels 
and water quality as in sediment capture is relatively straightforward, whereas 
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estimating effects on ecosystem productivity and interaction among structures, or 
cumulative impacts, much harder to estimate.  
Scenarios could benefit from more explicit consideration of ecological impacts and 
their uncertainties. Scenarios and mathematical models can be used together to 
simulate and interpret biophysical or social processes and interactions that would 
otherwise be hard to describe and thus explore.  The level of quantitative detail 
required in technical simulation and analysis of hydrological, ecological and social 
processes depends very much on the purpose for which scenario are being built 
and technical plausibility and capacities.  The many different models made of the 
Mekong basin or parts, like the delta, were built to serve different purposes 
(Sarkkula et al. 2007).  
The WUP-FIN project developed a number of models that could more explicitly 
examine ecosystem processes, especially in the Tonle Sap Lake, river and 
floodplain. The models allow exploration of different scenarios of, for example, 
tributary inflows, flow speed and direction, flooding characteristics, dissolved 
oxygen concentrations, sedimentation, larvae and juvenile fish drift (Sarkkula et 
al. 2004, Kummu et al. 2006, Sarkkula et al. 2007, Kummu et al. 2008). Kummu 
et al. (2005), for instance, used the DSF scenarios to drive hydrodynamic and 
water quality model they had developed for Tonle Sap Lake. In an initial study 
they compared the baseline to high development scenario and found significant 
impacts on floods and water quality characteristics in Tonle Sap Lake and 
floodplain (Kummu et al. 2005).  
Costa-Cabral and colleagues (2007a) used the Variable Infiltration Capacity (VIC) 
model to study interactions between soil land-use and -cover, soil moisture, and 
precipitation and how they affect run-off at large spatial scales in the Mekong 
River basin.  They found that spatial variation in soil moisture of deeper soil 
layers, a variable strongly affected by presence of deep roots as in forests, results 
in various delays in run-off relative to patterns of precipitation. Another important 
finding was that irrigation works in various part of the basin such as the Korat 
Plateau and Mekong Delta or around Tonle Sap Lake, by storing water in ponds 
increase re-infiltration and evapo-transpiration with the result that net run-off is 
further reduced.  As expected, snow melt is important for base flows in the dry 
season of the Mekong River  (Costa-Cabral et al. 2007a).  In a follow-up study 
the researchers explored several scenarios to study impacts of changes in land-
use and –cover and climate on run-off generation (Costa-Cabral et al. 2007b).  
The work of Costa-Cabral and colleagues (2007b) underlines the importance of 
considering all major factors affecting flows together. Changes in climate, land 
use and regulation of streamflow by dams interact with each other in complex 
ways. In their study they combined the VIC hydrologic model with another model 
of reservoir operations to explore effects of dams. Scenarios for climate came 
from general circulation model outputs whereas those for land-use from historical 
remote sensing studies. 
In both the VIC and WUP-FIN modelling applications scenarios were implemented 
as set of parameter settings in a complex model which was then run to simulate a 
set of variables of interest. The scenarios are very modestly developed: no 
broader vision about how such parameter settings could come about and with 
what sequence over time is provided. One consequence of this common approach 
is that there is no larger, coherent world, in which to interpret modeling finds, as 
would be the case if such investigations were combined with qualitative story 
lines (Figure 4).  
Many of the sub-global and global activities in the Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment, for example, tried to explicitly incorporate ecological processes into 
scenarios (Bennett et al. 2003). Ecosystems were not just impacted by changes 
in economic and social development, but changes in them could also feedback on 
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development process, for example, through changes in provision of goods and 
services (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005, Lebel et al. 2006).   
 
Figure 4. Ideal iterations between scenarios and models. 
 
 
The limitations of current scenario exercises concerned with water allocation and 
impacts of alternative water resources developments with respect to social 
processes is even greater than for ecological ones. At its simplest level there is 
the notion of linear analysis in which outputs from hydrological and ecological 
studies are carried over into social impacts at aggregate levels. One example is 
Ringler (2001) who used a coupled, aggregated, economic-hydrological model to 
study water allocation and use under alternative policy scenarios.  She considered 
five main water uses: irrigation, hydropower generation, urban-industrial water 
uses, fisheries, and wetlands. Trade-offs and complementarities between sectors 
and countries were explored.  The Resource Allocation Model developed by BDP1 
has some similar features. At this very broad-brush level impacts on livelihoods 
are hard to assess in much detail. More detailed models still need to be 
developed. In more sophisticated versions the over-arching scenarios which guide 
the modeling work should themselves incorporate contrasting but coherent set of 
assumptions about key social and institutional factors in development (see Figure 
4). In the 2006-2010 strategic plan the MRC claimed it “can develop a wide range 
of scenarios, extending the analysis from analyzing the initial hydrological 
implications to addressing the full economic, social and environmental impact 
(MRC 2006b: pg 16). 
 
Influence  
The influence of scenarios is difficult to assess with precision  (Hulme and Dessai 
2008). Most scenario building activities are poorly documented making it hard to 
assess learning unless the analyst was closely involved in the process. Scenario 
products are typically part of a wider assessment process and just one element of 
a wider set of factors supporting (or resisting) policy change making it 
challenging to attribute impact. Nevertheless a few tentative observations can be 
made from some of the studies discussed. 
Building scenarios together provides the best opportunities for learning. Initial 
involvement in construction provides real opportunities to discuss assumptions 
and differences in beliefs (NSEC, Table 2).  Here scenarios can perform many of 
the desired boundary functions simultaneously – helping communication and 
translation of ideas and understanding among disparate groups of people who 
although they work together may still have different interests, expectations and 
hopes for the future.   
Where such close interaction is not feasible allowing wider input into “scenarios” 
that are treated as drafts to be refined is another approach. Channels for 
meaningful input and iteration, in short, may also foster learning between 
scenario developers and wider group of stakeholders.  Where the organizational 
interests of the conveners in some outcomes are high, independent facilitation 
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may improve the quality of consultation feedback.  Otherwise actors may rightly 
perceive consultations as a marketing exercise and reject a process and thus 
product as lacking legitimacy. 
The history of MRC scenario sets suggests a tendency towards gaining broader 
public acceptance of expert-driven scenario products.  The feedback from 
consultations, however, has not fundamentally altered the scope, types of 
scenarios being explored or the hydrological flow focus (Table 2).  The constraints 
on “learning” include some which arise from control of the research and policy 
agendas by member states.   
In the Mekong region scenarios are still a “modest” part of the ‘discursive 
landscape’. Most scenario exercises have yet had little impact on allocation of 
water resources. The MRC scenario stream, however, has undoubtedly had some 
influence, in particular, after the World Bank analyses and launching of the 
Mekong Water Resources Assessment Strategy. The investment push encouraged 
by the multilateral banks was supported by some government actors in the region 
and helped justify their current strategies.   
At the same time the content and way scenarios were being used was challenged 
by other, especially non-state actors.  Scenarios here had a boundary function 
but not the one intended by their developers: a launching pad for wider criticisms 
of roles and strategies of multilateral organizations in water governance more 
broadly (IUCN et al. 2007a, 2007b). Scenarios exercises, like other knowledge-
intensive activities, are never completely separable from politics in the Mekong 
where claims are highly contested and stakes for different interests are high 
(Käkönen and Hirsch 2009). It is exactly these tensions cutting across issues of 
power and knowledge which suggest that scenarios do important boundary work. 
The history of construction and reaction to the MRC scenarios underlines several 
cautionary notes about policy impact. First, the most influential scenarios are not 
necessarily the ones produced by the best process. Alignment with powerful 
interests is crucial. Second, while good quality products matter, this is no 
guarantee of constructive policy impact.   Scenarios products also need to be 
well-tailored to specific policy-making targets or their saliency will be lost. Third 
the perceived legitimacy of scenario exercises is critical to their fate, and state 
actors are no longer seen as having an automatic monopoly; legitimacy can also 
be achieved through deliberative channels.  
Discussion 
In the Mekong Region scenarios have been used as tools to assess and explore 
water resource allocation. Most applications have been little more than alternative 
model runs; a few have developed more elaborate storylines; none have 
successfully combined simulation modelling with qualitative storyline approaches 
(Table 1). Participation in scenario-building in construction has been very 
constrained rarely going beyond the immediate peer or client group.   In short, 
the full potential of scenario-building exercises as boundary objects to support 
deliberative processes has not been realized. 
Scenarios reflect the social context in which they were developed. The MRC 
scenarios view development through the lens of dams and diversions – the 
hydropower they might generate, hectares of fields which might be irrigated – 
and not the many other ecological and social changes that would accompany 
major infrastructure development. Other alternatives for achieving livelihood and 
well-being objectives are not considered because they don’t fit this hydrological 
lens. Storyline are under-developed because all that is needed to run the models 
are assumptions about which dams and diversions are in place and how they are 
operated. Scenarios as products and boundary objects record the social work that 
was put into them. The narrowing framing of successive sets of DSF-derived 
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scenarios reflect this pre-occupation with transboundary impacts on flow to the 
exclusion of much else that matters. 
Most effort to improve scenario exercises remains in technical dimensions – 
better input datasets, higher quality models. Much less attention has been given 
to storylines or the assumptions made about development, for example, which 
set of dams and diversions are being built, and what their ecological and social 
consequences will be (also cumulatively). The technical style of presentation of 
many current scenario products – as tables of model outputs and graphs of water 
levels with scenarios tagged with simple labels like “high development” – limits 
their legibility for exploration to a much more exclusive group in ways that a 
storyline would not.  
Wider, more deliberative, use of scenarios in the Mekong Region could improve 
the accountability of major private and state actors involved in water resources 
development and management in several ways. First by encouraging actors to be 
more explicit about the key assumptions they make regarding causal connections, 
benefits and risks. Deliberative opportunities need to be created for this to 
happen, whether in discussion around a table, or through periods where reports 
and findings are open for scrutiny and comment. Second by strengthening the 
capacity of stakeholders to think strategically about the future, side-effects and 
unforeseen consequences are more likely to be identified. Scenario exercises 
force actors to explore time frames beyond typical planning horizons, and to 
consider alternatives beyond familiar, comfort, zones. This can help generate 
creative solutions.  
But there are constraints. In the Mekong Region lack of appropriate data and 
knowledge – about different kinds of hydrological, social and ecological processes 
and possible impacts of stream flow regulation, land and water uses, or climate – 
remains an important constraint on making and using scenarios.  For some issues 
quantification or detailed assessment may simply be impossible (Sarkkula et al. 
2007). For scenarios to be helpful for some allocation problems credible models 
are needed. If models are not open for scrutiny and comparisons their results are 
harder to trust. These constraints on model-based tool development have been 
noted in Europe where much effort has been put into tools to support water 
management in large rivers under the Water Framework Directive (Petts et al. 
2006, Borowski and Hare 2007). 
The constraints are also political. The ease and effectiveness with which scenarios 
can be used as boundary objects is affected by the broader political and scientific 
context in which they are undertaken. In an international river basin the primacy 
of governments in cooperative frameworks is often taken for granted. In the 
MRC’s work the focus has been on supporting negotiations among lower Mekong 
member states. It is only as a result of pressures from civil society that some 
expansion of the notion of participation beyond state officials has been begun to 
penetrate the logic of international cooperation. Opportunities for non-state 
actors to influence scenario development – to shape the boundary object – 
however remain small as the primary clients continue to constrain its evolution. 
The notion of boundary objects provides a useful starting point for examining 
scenario processes, products and influence.  As boundary objects, scenarios do a 
substantial amount of  social work (Garb et al. 2008). They help bring different 
types of expertise – scientific, managerial and political – together in all stages, 
from initial conception through to construction and use.  The ambiguity and 
flexibility can allow different parties to continue a conversation and negotiation 
without having identical understandings or objectives. Moreover, if well 
constructed, a set of scenarios spans a meaningful space in which a substantial 
range of pathways and perspectives can be captured, beyond the individual 
scenarios articulated in detail.   
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At the same time scenarios are not automatically deliberative or inclusive.  
Scenarios are used often by groups who want to push a particular agenda as by 
those who wish to see open discussion about alternatives and uncertainties. 
Scenarios as simplifications are useful for marketing and persuasion, not just as 
entry points for debate and exploration. Even where deliberative, the extent to 
which space is given to vulnerable and politically marginalized voices depends 
greatly on how they are convened and led and the channels opened for input in 
the process.  
The circumstances under which scenarios emerge, the process by which they are 
constructed and used, the understandings they produce, and their influence on 
negotiations, decisions and actions need further evaluation.  Expanding on our 
initial questions for this study we suggest it will be useful for future work to 
systematically consider scenario development from initiation through to use in 
terms of process, product and influence dimensions (Table 3). Ethnographical 
studies of scenario making and use are likely to be particularly helpful in 
understanding the social work they do and how they relate more broadly to 
framing, assessment and decision-making processes. 
Table 3 Simple analytical framework for assessing and comparing scenario 
exercises used in this paper 
 Process Product Influence 
Initiation What triggered? 
Who convened? 
How was product 
framed? 
 
What were the sources 
of legitimacy? 
What was the purpose? 
Construction How were scenarios 
constructed? 
Who participated? 
Which boundaries did 
scenarios span? 
Which trends, 
uncertainties, and scales 
were considered?  
Which resource uses and 
users were considered?  
How were models and 
storylines used? 
Did participants learn 
from each other? 
How was credibility and 
saliency sought? 




Who was consulted? 
How was deliberation 
enhanced (constrained)? 
What features of 
product enabled 
(limited) exploration? 
Did the product fit social 
context in which it was 
explored? 




perceived as credible 
and salient? 
What did stakeholders 
learn? 
Conclusions 
Scenario-building exercises could strengthen the quality of deliberations around 
water allocation problems in the Mekong Region.  Scenarios could be important 
boundary objects through which researchers, policy-makers, water managers, 
users and affected people could interact to explore and generate alternative 
solutions. But so far, scenarios in the Mekong – with a few exceptions – have 
been used primarily to help experts work together on models and then 
communicate findings from those modelling exercises to a narrow set of clients 
concerned with just gross changes in flows. This is a very narrow interpretation of 
what scenarios are that restricts the boundary functions they could play in 
improving and democratising water governance in the Mekong Region. 
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Abstract 
Scale is a key feature of regional waters and its politics cuts across ‘basin’ 
boundaries. In the Mekong Region there is a recurrent demand for water 
resources development projects and major policies proposed by government 
leaders and investors to be scrutinized in public. As the size of these projects 
increase there is also need to consider the benefits and risks not only within, but 
also across, borders. Deliberative forms of engagement are potentially very 
helpful because they encourage supporters and critics to articulate assumptions 
and reasoning about the different benefits and risks associated with alternative 
options. Deliberative processes may compliment and inform more conventional 
representational and bureaucratic approaches to planning and decision-making. 
But they are also likely to be subject to the sort of scale politics which can 
confound institutionalized decision-making. Scale contests arise in dialogues and 
related arenas because different actors privilege particular temporal, spatial and 
administrative levels in their analysis, arguments and responses. This paper 
explores how deliberative engagement has been affected by, and responded to, 
the politics of scale. Five case studies from the Mekong Region are analysed. We 
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find evidence that scale politics can affect who participates, the format, the 
content and outcomes of deliberative engagement. Conveners have sometimes 
responded to, and overcome, debilitating forms of scale politics, for example, by 
creating multiple venues, altering languages and styles of interaction, and 
supporting representation by otherwise silent interests, but deliberative 
engagement is still far from being a norm in the Mekong Region. 
Keywords: water governance, politics of scale, deliberation, Mekong Region, 
hydropower, dialogue  
Introduction  
There is no single, correct, area for managing regional waters. In the Mekong 
Region the spaces corresponding to formal systems of representation or 
administrative authority over water- and land-uses typically have different 
boundaries and are part of separate hierarchies of responsibility and 
accountability (Hirsch 2001; Lebel et al. 2005; Molle 2007b; Sneddon 2002).  
These, in turn, rarely correspond to simple, hydrological, notions of a basin.  
Inter-basin diversions and transfers, groundwater extraction, tidal barriers, and 
virtual water in trade, increasingly make it hard to manage water solely at the 
level of the basin. Key ecological processes, from the lifecycles of aquatic 
organisms through to major nutrient cycles and sediment transport and 
deposition processes are often multi-level, requiring careful consideration of both 
spatial and temporal scales (Sidle et al. 2006; Sneddon 2007).  As a consequence 
the goods and services arising from flow of water and associated ecosystems are 
also multi-level.  Moreover, different users and uses become more closely 
associated with different levels and scales. Scale is a key feature of regional 
waters and its politics cuts across ‘basin’ boundaries. 
In the Mekong Region, local impacts, uses and management actions have been 
largely invisible by the ways in which key state agencies enumerate benefits, 
burdens and risks.   When objectives in development are articulated in terms of 
monetary flows through governments then it is the grand, or “mega”, projects 
which are emphasized and promoted (Bakker 1999; Molle and Floch 2008). Large 
dams for hydropower, massive diversion schemes for irrigation and long walls for 
flood protection are promised as ways to solve water management problems, 
secure energy and alleviate poverty. If objectives in development were to be 
described in terms of livelihood security of households living along the banks of 
the river then alternative priorities and options emerge. The importance of 
seasonal wetlands and fisheries are emphasized as are technologies which can be 
locally accessed and controlled, like small weirs, local canals and pumps.   
The objectives and means of water resources management and development 
need to be debated. Different perspectives on developing regional waters need to 
be compared, for instance, with how they might affect social-ecological resilience 
at different levels, which social values they prioritize and the understandings 
upon which they are based. The proposals of national leaders and investors need 
to be scrutinized in public for the benefits and risks they involve both within and 
across borders (Dore 2007). Deliberation is an important process because it 
requires supporters of projects and policies to articulate their reasoning and 
identify which level-dependent interests they serve or risks they create.  
This is both a need and a challenge in the Mekong Region. All countries share 
recent histories of highly centralized authorities, military rule, and remain, at 
best, semi-democracies. Access to information through normal channels remains 
uneven. International banks and private firms have often had better access to 
information from, and stronger accountability relationships with, national 
governments than a country’s own citizens. In these circumstances there are 
expectations and hopes that various alternatives arising out of direct action by 
citizens, including farmers and fishers, or structured assessments, joint fact-
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finding, multi-stakeholder dialogues  and other forms of deliberative engagement 
will lead to fairer allocation of burdens, benefits and risks. Given the significance 
of scale issues in water politics in the Mekong Region it is inevitable that 
deliberative forms of engagement will have to grapple with scale challenges.  
Thus, the main question addressed by this paper is: How have efforts at 
deliberative engagement, being affected by, and responded to the politics of 
scale?   
Deliberative engagement  
Deliberative engagement in this paper refers to structured and informed 
conversations in which various stakeholders “are willing to revise preferences in 
light of discussion, new information, and claims made by fellow participants” 
(Chambers 2003). A key feature is that there is time to consider different issues, 
evidence and arguments. Deliberation can help people learn about others’ 
problems, interests and shared resource constraints (Dryzek 2000; Leeuwis and 
Pyburn 2002).  It may also expand acceptance of decisions and outcomes, and 
thus, effectiveness of implementation efforts (Dore et al. 2004). Engagement 
activities may be convened by state, multilateral, private or community 
organizations. 
Deliberative engagement can take place at different levels: local watershed 
groups may argue over allocation rules and validity of claims about causes of 
shortages; national water committees may debate priorities among basins, 
regions and sectors; international meetings negotiate allocation of water among 
states by season.  Deliberations may also confront questions about the 
appropriate scale and levels of assessment and policy responses (Pingree 2006). 
Deliberative engagement, therefore, may be part of, help shape, and be subject 
to, politics of scale. 
Politics of scale  
Scale is defined as the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions 
used to measure, or rank, and study any phenomenon (Gibson et al. 2000), and 
levels as the units of analysis that are located at different positions on a scale 
(Fig. 1).  Scales of interest in water management often have, or imply, hierarchy 
(Lebel and Imamura 2006). Thus, choosing a scale implies constraining and often 
specifying a particular set of levels.  
Scale, represents a class of key choices, commitments and constraints (Cox 
1998; Lebel 2006; Swyngedouw 1997). Some actors are free to select their 
vantage or participation points, whereas others are restricted by mandates to 
viewing water resources and management from a particular level. Actors contest 
scales and levels, overtly through debates, media releases, lobbying and protests, 
and more subtly, through use and control of technologies, indicators, 
measurements and controlling the channels of contestation (Lebel et al. 2005).  
Thus, some actors push for hydrological scales with levels that correspond to 
manageable units in their models or infrastructure they operate. Others promote 
conventional, area-based administrative hierarchies, arguing that this is where 
capacity, accountability and legitimacy already exist. Differences between 
administrative and hydrological scales (Fig. 1), for example, are a common 
source of tensions in water resource governance.  
Scale contests also arise in dialogues, assessments and other forms of 
deliberative engagement because different actors privilege particular temporal, 
spatial and administrative levels in their analysis, arguments and responses 
(Lebel 2006; Lebel et al. 2006). Conveners may take steps in selection of 
participants and format of events to ensure there are constructive exchanges and 
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debates among levels and scales. Efforts aimed at shifting the scale of 
assessment, allocation or management strategy we call “rescaling” and to 
prioritize particular levels on a scale, “levelling”. But scales and levels cannot be 
adjusted or shifted entirely at whim. Seasonal dynamics of flow regimes are 
important to fish (and thus, fishers) on different temporal levels than the 
operational and planning logics of hydropower generation, irrigation and flood risk 
management (Sneddon et al. 2002). Likewise ecological processes can be 
mapped to different spatial levels (Fig. 1). The spatial organization of ecosystems 
across landscapes at different levels can have has profound impacts on mobility 
of animal and plant populations, particular, for aquatic life forms restricted to 
rivers and wetlands (Lebel et al. 2008). Ultimately, the scales and levels in use 
are a joint product of biophysical and social processes; they are not 
unambiguously defined by the physics of flows, the dynamics of ecosystems or 
social institutions. 
Methods  
Our approach was to analyze a set of five case studies of deliberative 
engagements (Table 1) concerned with water resources development and 
management in the Mekong Region. A case typically included several events and 
associated documentation over a particular period.  Table 1 summarizes the key 
features of the case studies.  
For cases one and five in Table 1 all of the information we used was based on 
secondary sources.  For cases two and three we also had the benefit of direct 
observations as participants in some of the meetings. For case four the authors 
were intimately involved as members of the convening group.  
The five case studies map to different levels on two spatial scales, hydrological 
and administrative-territorial, but comprise similar time or planning scale (Fig. 2).  
Watershed or river sub-basin organizations, irrigation districts and water user 
groups are other venues with associated dialogue processes important for water 
management at finer time scales. National water committees typically make 
decisions on large-scale, long-term infrastructure as well as key decisions or rules 
on allocation and flood diversions for major national river basins that are 
seasonal. These later arenas are not considered further in this paper. A few of the 
key actors convening various processes on the longer-time frames described in 
the text are shown (Fig. 2). 
Negotiating the 1995 Mekong Agreement  
The negotiation of the 1995 Mekong “Agreement on the Cooperation for the 
Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin” were difficult because, 
without the active engagement of China,  the incentives to cooperate were 
perceived by Thailand to be less than for Laos, Cambodia or Vietnam (Radosevich 
2000). Thailand, like China, had the resources and interest in making bilateral 
deals to meet growing water and energy needs (Dosch and Hensengerth 2005). 
The interventions of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) were 
critical as initial manoeuvring by Thailand and Vietnam threatened to prematurely 
end negotiations (Browder 2000). It took a series of meetings, first agreeing on 
the terms and procedures, and then moving through multiple rounds of revisions 
of a single negotiating text (Radosevich 2000).   
With an eye to the future possibilities for dams and diversions, the most difficult 
negotiations centred on Articles 5 and 6 (Radosevich 2000). The text finally 
agreed to embed a principle of reasonable and equitable utilization, subsequently 
also adopted in international water law. It was agreed that different rules were to 
apply for the Mekong mainstream than the tributaries. It was also agreed that 
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some interventions would require only notification of all members; more 
substantial interventions with possible transboundary impacts require prior 
consultation (Ma et al. 2008). The 1995 agreement was less constraining for 
Thailand than the earlier ones of 1957 and 1975 as it no longer included a veto 
on Mekong River mainstream development by members (Browder 2000).   
The final agreement represents an important rescaling of region and basin. It 
turned projects like the Kong-Chi-Mum inter-basin transfer scheme and the 
controversial Pak Mun dam (Foran 2006), which began life as internationally-
driven exemplars, into just another “national” project with “local conflicts” 
(Sneddon and Fox 2006). By design the Mekong River Commission (MRC) is an 
amputated river basin organization – its tributaries pruned and headwaters 
lopped.  The agreement’s focus on equitable utilization among states has helped 
render fishers, and other water users which rely on local services, less visible 
(Bakker 1999; Sneddon and Fox 2006).   
Under the 1995 Agreement parties agreed to ensure acceptable minimum 
monthly flows, enable natural wet season reverse flow of the Tonle Sap and not 
to exacerbate floods. It was further agreed that the details – such as, defining 
what is “acceptable” – would need to be worked out subsequently in the 
formulation of a basin development plan (Article 24), and the establishment of 
rules for water utilization and inter-basin diversions (Article 26).  
The 1995 Agreement established the MRC as the implementing agency with 
separate Council at the Ministerial level and a Joint Committee of senior 
bureaucrats (Fig. 3). Each of the countries separately established National 
Mekong Committees (NMCs) headed by their representatives on the Joint 
Committee institutionalizing some of the politics of scale apparent in 
deliberations.  Subsequently, for example, countries like Thailand found it easy to 
weaken its MRC links, commitments and presence by appointing a Committee 
poorly connected to real decision-making and resource control within the country. 
The Committee has been affiliated with The Department of Water Resources in 
the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment since 2002 administrative 
reforms but remains poorly connected to older and more powerful agencies like 
the Royal Irrigation Department and the Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand. These circumstances persist, in part, because NMCs were not part of 
original Agreement. These level and scale gaps, or lack of interaction, are both 
cause and consequence of scale politics.  
The interests of donors and multi-lateral agencies in regionalization of water 
resources management were critical to the establishment of the MRC. This 
influence has continued with most of MRC’s budget for work activities coming 
from donors. The financial independence from the member countries has its 
merits and drawbacks. On the one hand it could mean assessment and research 
activities could go ahead without being easily blocked by member states 
withholding funding; on the other hand this also makes it easier for governments 
to disown and externalize MRC’s work when it is in their self-serving interests. 
The negotiations which culminated in 1995 are an example of a deliberative 
process among governments promoted by international actors, shaped by 
national concerns, but cognizant of regional-level issues, that ended in agreement 
to cooperate. Subsequent negotiations on the specifics of planning basin 
development and water allocation rules have been difficult and the task set for 
the MRC remains unfinished.  
Planning basin development  
The 1995 Mekong Agreement mandated the MRC to prepare a Basin Development 
Plan (BDP). That process was delayed for several years, in part, because of 
insufficient donor funds (Browder 2000).  
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The first phase of BDP process began in 2002. National governments were viewed 
as the primary stakeholders in MRC negotiations:  governments are described as 
“internal” and non-state actors, “external”.  In the BDP process external 
stakeholders got involved through forums at country, basin or sub-area levels. 
These happened relatively late in the process, but by early 2005 a series of 
forums had been completed (MRC 2005).  The consultations resulted in more 
than 400 project proposal ideas. Many were at relatively local levels, whereas the 
BDP’s mandated focus has been on basin-wide development projects and national 
projects with potential transboundary impacts (MRC 2006). Among the lessons 
acknowledged were that there were important differences among member 
countries in how they perceived and incorporated public participation in planning. 
Deliberative norms are still far from being widely accepted with water 
bureaucracies continuing to privilege internal expert and politician-led assessment 
of options and decision-making. The MRC BDP group also thought that 
transboundary multi-sector dialogues were more difficult to conduct than those 
within a country about a single sector (MRC 2005).  Sokhem and Sunada (2006) 
predicted that major disconnects between conversations in the MRC structures 
and those within countries were likely to persist and thus prevent real integration 
of basin-level and national-level development plans. 
Initial plans for phase II of BDP strongly emphasized investment and were 
approved by the MRC Council in 2005, but later revised as a result of donor calls 
for a more balanced view of development. According to the MRC the second 
phase (2006-2010) “is designed to institutionalise the participatory planning 
process established during BDP Phase I”.  In March 2008 the MRC Secretariat 
organized a stakeholder consultation forum on BDP in Vientiane, Lao PDR (MRC 
2008).  Members from the water governance network M-POWER provided 
facilitation support and suggestions on the draft agenda to ensure adequate 
discussion of important topics. Several experts also participated in a follow-up 
workshop to review draft working papers on development scenarios and IWRM 
strategy. In these discussions questions frequently arose about choices of levels 
and scales at which indicators and model outputs should be evaluated. Diverse 
and broader engagement takes time, but should lead to better plans. 
In any case, events are overtaking plans. On paper the MRC has a role as a 
convenor, but in practice it has scrupulously avoided contentious issues and 
disputes.  It has often been absent from or silent about major bilateral or national 
government proposals for, and  decisions on, water resources development in the 
basin (Jacobs 2002; Osborne 2004).  In the first decade of its operation, the MRC 
secretariat has had little involvement in, and usually very limited information 
about, the hydropower development on the Mekong River mainstream in China, 
and on tributaries in Laos and Vietnam.  Its hydropower program strategy first 
agreed to in 2001 only secured funding in 2006 and in September 2008 was 
holding its first regional multi-stakeholder consultation.  The MRC was sidelined 
while the four countries of the upper Mekong—namely China, Burma, Laos and 
Thailand—agreed to implement a navigation improvement project that involved 
blasting of several rapids along 900km stretch of the river between Jinghong in 
China to Luang Prabang in Lao PDR. In the past it has also been excluded from 
speculations about possible Lao-Thai water transfers, and diversions from the 
Mekong to irrigate more of northeast Thailand (Molle and Floch 2008).  It 
distanced itself from the environmental impact assessment process for Sesan 
dams and operational incidents that have affected downstream communities 
(Wyatt and Baird 2007). 
Although it has not been able to engage when it probably should have, the 
secretariat of the MRC secretariat has emerged as a significant knowledge broker.  
The 2006-10 Strategic Plan explicitly acknowledges this role. A combination of 
consultants external to region and appointed researchers within the region has 
produced a significant body of knowledge that could inform public deliberations 
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on many aspects of water resources development and management. 
Unfortunately, wider dissemination and use of data, models and other research 
findings has often been controlled.  Out-going communications are filtered by 
centralised information management practices in the Secretariat (Hawkesworth et 
al. 2007).  The MRC Secretariat argues that it is not an independent organization 
and is bound to respect member countries wishes, especially on sensitive 
information.  This lack of transparency has frequently been raised by critics in 
dialogue (e.g. IUCN et al. 2007a) and is undermining the credibility of the 
organization (Hawkesworth et al. 2007).  These knowledge needs to be 
disseminated more widely; doing so will strengthen not weaken the role of the 
MRC in facilitating and supporting deliberative engagements. 
The core MRC program on basin development planning has largely been a 
technical support activity; its impact on negotiations among countries has been 
slight. Scale politics is part of the explanation of why deliberations have not led to 
significant joint planning decisions. Other actors, in particular banks and investors 
are meeting, in other arenas, are debating and forwarding water resource 
development agendas without much regard for the BDP process. 
Banking on regional hydropower cooperation  
To a certain extent all regions are imagined, but the Mekong ‘region’ is 
increasingly becoming an institutionalised reality for both State and non-State 
actors.  There are several notions of ‘region’. In the previous two sections we 
focussed on the Lower Mekong as it has been constructed for and by the MRC. In 
this section we explore the deliberative elements of initiatives driven by the Asian 
Development Bank and World Bank for a much a larger territory, the Greater 
Mekong Subregion which includes the countries of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, 
Thailand and Vietnam as well as the territories of Yunnan Province and Guangxi 
Zhuang Autonomous Region of China (ADB 2007). 
The Greater Mekong Subregional (GMS) economic cooperation was established in 
1992 with financial support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) to 
emphasise transboundary expansion of trade, investment and infrastructure 
among the six countries – Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and 
Vietnam – an idea found attractive to these national governments. The profile of 
the ADB-GMS has grown in recent years with a series of inter-governmental 
summits between these Heads of State.   “Regional waters” were initially left off 
the GMS agenda to ensure that the developing cooperation on a range of other 
fronts – including trade, opening borders, telecommunications, and road transport 
– was not destabilised.  But this does not mean water resources development has 
not been on the Agenda of the ADB. Behind the leaders’ summits are numerous 
Ministerial and expert group meetings and negotiations.  In more recent years 
many of these have dealt with energy security and cooperation (Yu 2003) often 
providing entry points to “water resources” development issues.   
An example was the release in June 2006 of a working paper co-authored with 
the World Bank on an assistance strategy for water resources development in the 
Mekong Region (World Bank and Asian Development Bank 2006). This report re-
affirmed the World Bank’s (2004) Mekong Water Resources Assistance Strategy 
which used the hydrological models in the MRC’s Decision Support Framework to 
justify further investments in dams based on the argument that they have 
acceptably low impacts on hydrology at larger spatial levels. The joint paper 
argues for the potential for development of Mekong water resources and claims 
the “basin has flexibility and tolerance”.  It also called for abandonment of the 
“precautionary approach of the past decade that tended to avoid any risk 
associated with development, at the expense of stifling investments” (World Bank 
and Asian Development Bank 2006). These strategies were important topics in an 
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independently convened dialogue (see next section) because various civil society 
organizations did not feel there had sufficient public input into their original 
formulation.  
Multilateral banks have played a role in constructing a narrative of a Mekong 
region in which more investments in hydropower are likely. In 2005 the World 
Bank approved loan guarantees for the Nam Theun 2 dam in Lao PDR making it 
possible for financing of almost 1.6 billion USD to go ahead, the largest single 
investment in the country’s history. Both the World Bank and Asian Development 
have opportunities to guide investments through conditionality on loans, technical 
expertise and political connections. Looking to the future the political influence 
and leverage of the multi-lateral banks may be on the wane as a more diverse 
group of commercial banks and other investors enter the Mekong Region. This 
will create new challenges for coordination and transparency.  Ensuring 
responsible corporate practices in these circumstances will benefit from setting 
high standards and codes of practices for the private sector and monitoring to 
make sure these are followed. 
The ADB organized three regional consultation workshops in Bangkok on the GMS 
Energy Strategy between July 2006 and June 2008 to discuss findings of their 
energy strategy study. The first workshop included senior government officials 
from the GMS countries and representatives from academia, civil society, 
development and private sector organizations (ADB 2006). At the workshop there 
was broad agreement that “a participatory approach would be essential in 
strengthening ownership among GMS countries, facilitating consensus building, 
and ensuring the sustainability of the regional energy strategy” (ADB 2006). 
Representatives from civil society groups argued the importance of assumptions 
and quality data as these could greatly effect outcomes of the modeling work and 
the need to improve transparency of energy planning processes at the national 
level.  Another area of concern and of divergent views were on what were the 
realistic expectations for renewables in future energy mixes (ADB 2006). The 
draft strategy document  (ADB 2008) tabled at the third workshop argues 
strongly in favor of regional integration of energy supply infrastructure from an 
economic perspective but gives much less attention to political and financial risks.   
For more than a decade a discourse of the Mekong Region as under-developed 
has been used by multilateral banks to re-scale plans for how resources should be 
managed for a particular form of capital-intensive development  through 
arguments about the benefits of integration, economies of scale and, at the same 
time, the “naturalness” of the region (Bakker 1999; Molle and Floch 2008). 
Conventional hydropower technology fits neatly with notions of rescaling 
development. Large projects need foreign investment and expertise. While size 
makes these projects conspicuous; technical complexity often keeps the planning 
and decision-making processes out of the public domain and well beyond reach of 
many local communities that ultimately would be directly affected by such 
projects (Bakker 1999).  Moreover hydropower converts a water service to 
electricity that serves distant consumers, outside the basins and even beyond 
national borders where the infrastructure is located and impacts are felt. This re-
scaling brings with it changes in groups of state-level or international 
stakeholders which must be dealt with (Hirsch 2001). 
Multilateral, and increasingly other large commercial, banks through loan 
agreements, technical support and teams of consultants have a huge influence 
over large and long time frame project cycles because these require money and 
human resources.  Multilateral banks are creating an investment region; other 
actors now need to mobilize to make sure those investments are adequately 
scrutinized. 
Exploring water futures together  
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Public consultation by the multilateral banks has historically been very limited. 
Most meetings are dominated by States and their officials, international financial 
institutions, and the private sector. As a result several groups have launched 
parallel activities to query and propose alternatives. In November 2002, for 
example, a meeting on “Dialogue on River Basin Development and Civil Society in 
the Mekong Region” held in Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand, concluded with calls for 
much greater civil society involvement (Dore 2003). Another meeting convened 
by the non-governmental organization Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional 
Alliance with other partners in November 2004 drew similar conclusions and 
called for the establishment of a Mekong People’s Council (Wongruang and 
Samabuddhi 2004).  This did not happen. In other cases dialogues did not 
proceed as planned.  A National Water Dialogue held in Lao PDR in 2005 
illustrates some of the challenges: half of the knowledge inputs were banned the 
night before the event.  Any paper that mentioned China was considered 
inappropriate for publication by? the National University of Laos. 
In this section we focus on the activities of one network which the authors helped 
establish and have been closely involved in. M-POWER or the Mekong Program for 
Water Environment and Resilience began in 2004 as the Mekong Water 
Governance Network (M-POWER 2008). For M-POWER, the Mekong Region is 
taken to encompass the territory, ecosystems, people, economies and politics of 
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam, and China’s Yunnan Province.   M-
POWER made a deliberate choice to focus on the wider region, including several 
international and many domestic river basins, rather than to overly focus on the 
Mekong River Basin and thereby frame too much ‘in’ or too much ‘out’ of different 
political arenas. M-POWER activities are supported by a network of about thirty 
partner organizations.  Most members are from academic and non-governmental 
organization, but also belong to international organizations and government 
agencies. The network has funding from several sources, including Echel Eau and 
IFAD through the Challenge Program for Water and Food for its activities, but 
ultimately relies mostly on the diverse voluntary contributions of its partners. 
In November 2004 the Water and Nature Initiative of the World Conservation 
Union (IUCN) convened a high-level roundtable on “Using Water, Caring for 
Environment: Challenges for the Mekong Region” at the 2004 World Conservation 
Congress in Bangkok. The M-POWER network provided some facilitation support 
and speakers. The event included Ministers from five Mekong countries (all but 
Myanmar) as well as non-governmental actors. Some sensitive issues, like inter-
basin diversions, Nu-Salween infrastructure and threats to Great Lake - Tonle Sap 
ecosystem were discussed.  For our analysis here we consider the “Mekong 
Region Waters Dialogue”. 
In July 2006, IUCN with other partners including the Thailand Environment 
Institute (TEI), the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and M-
POWER, hosted the “Mekong Region Waters Dialogue: exploring water futures 
together”. The event, held in Vientiane, covered governance issues in several 
sectors and at several levels (IUCN et al. 2007a; IUCN et al. 2007b). The 
dialogue was intended to be “a regional multi-stakeholder platform organized to 
provide an opportunity for high-quality, multi-faceted debate and learning that 
will contribute to improving water governance in the Mekong Region”. One part of 
the meeting and report specifically asked participants to evaluate the role and 
governance performance of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and 
Mekong River Commission.  Other parts reviewed their strategic plans for the 
region providing commentaries and suggestions.   
The multiple and changing roles of MRC and its secretariat, for example, were 
hotly debated. Some stakeholders would like to see it involved more in 
investment facilitation, others in regulation, and yet others more as a knowledge 
broker or convener of dialogue-like activities. As described in the earlier case 
Page 708 of 852
PN67_2010_22 
Deliberation, scale and the governance of water resources in the Mekong Region 
Louis Lebel, John Dore, Po Garden1,3  
1 Unit for Social and Environmental Research, Chiang Mai University, Thailand 2 Griffin nrm, and 
Australian National University, Australia 3 Internews, Chiang Mai, Thailand 
 10 
studies the MRC has had some difficulties with each of these roles individually. It 
has struggled to take information it has in hand or needs about ecological 
processes at multiple levels into planning.  It has also struggled with 
simultaneously considering water-related services derived from the basin and 
used at different levels and scales. Overall the deliberative engagement stressed 
the need for greater transparency and stakeholder participation, consistent with 
some of the promises in the draft 2006-10 Strategic Plan (IUCN et al. 2007a). 
The critique of the ADB and World Bank’s Mekong Water Resources Assistance 
Strategy covered many areas, including issues of process, like the need to make 
available all relevant documents sufficiently in advance of consultations, 
preferably with local language summaries, so they can be properly reflected on 
during dialogue activities (IUCN et al. 2007a).  The discussions also questioned 
some of the key assumptions about development needs and river basin 
management capacities.  Although there was no consensus reached in these 
debates, they were important in helping different stakeholders learn about the 
limitations of their own understanding and analyses as well as the sometimes 
very different perspectives of other stakeholders. 
The dialogue event was followed up by exchange of correspondence between 
conveners and these agencies which were included in the final report (IUCN et al. 
2007a). The Dialogue event may have contributed to the way the Word Bank and 
Asian Development subsequently downplayed their Mekong Water Resources 
Assistance Strategy and also helped trigger greater interest in multi-stakeholder 
processes.  
A set of follow-up national level and language dialogues then took place in Lao 
PDR and Cambodia. The activities in Cambodia, for example, were organized 
through the Cambodian Water Working Group which represents more than 30 
non-governmental, international and other organizations. The working group is 
facilitated by the Cambodian Center for Study and Development in Agriculture 
(CEDAC) - CEDAC was also one of the founding members of M-POWER - and 
places a strong emphasis on irrigation and its interaction with other water uses 
and users. Between November 2005 and February 2007 the working group held 
12 meetings and two study tours.  
A two-day dialogue event was also held in October 2006 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, 
to specifically follow-up discussions at the Vientiane event on the ADB-facilitated 
North-South Economic Corridor (Foran and Lebel 2007). This meeting was 
notable for its diverse participation, including representatives from Myanmar as 
well as the ADB. The event focused on exploring development assumptions 
through building scenarios at local, regional and global scales.  
Networks and organizations with flexible and diverse links with governments, 
firms and civil society are in a good position to convene and facilitate dialogues 
on sensitive but important topics for development in the Mekong Region. The 
outcomes of these are not primarily in terms of decisions on projects, policies or 
institutional reform (Table 1) but rather in making sure alternatives are assessed, 
rights, risks and responsibilities acknowledged and mutual understanding 
improved (Dore 2007). On the other hand such processes may lack the coherence 
and continuity which well-funded and institutionalized relationships bring with 
them. Thus, by mid-2008 the Water Futures Dialogue process appeared to be 
splitting into several relatively independent threads.  IUCN and M-POWER, for 
example, were planning to convene and follow-up different parts of the agenda, 
while other actors like the MRC and ADB may be increasingly taking on convening 
roles for consultation-style events. At more local levels within countries parallel 
experiments are underway, in particular, with river basin organizations of various 
sorts and at different levels, often premised on notions that they would support 
engagement with various stakeholders within and beyond government (Molle 
2007a; Thomas 2005). 
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Managing fisheries in Tonle Sap – Great Lake  
The fisheries of the Tonle Sap - Great Lake (TS-GL) ecosystem are crucial to the 
diet and livelihoods of the population of Cambodia  (Kummu et al. 2008; Kummu 
et al. 2006; Sokhem and Sunada 2006). More than 60% of the floodwater of the 
TS-GL comes from the Mekong River, the remainder from the catchment areas of 
the lake.  At full flood the TS-GL temporarily stores about 15% of the average 
annual discharge of the Mekong River (MRC et al. 1998).  While estimates vary, 
one finding puts the present annual fish catch from TS-GL at 235,000 tonnes 
depending on the season (van Zalinge et al. 2001), an indication of the Lake 
ecosystem’s extraordinary productivity (Lamberts 2006).  
The Tonle Sap Basin Organization was set up with funding from ADB as a 
dialogue forum among line agencies and local government under the Cambodian 
National Mekong Committee (Wright et al. 2004). Olivier Serrat (2004), a senior 
economist with the ADB said at a meeting on their Tonle Sap Basin Strategy in 
Phnom Penh in March 2004 that “ natural resources do not recognize 
administrative boundaries and decisions in one part of a basin can have 
significant impacts on natural resources elsewhere… it stands to reason that the 
Tonle Sap basin’s natural resources would be best managed through the 
mechanism of long-term plans developed collaboratively by local, provincial and 
national stakeholders”.  But practice has unfolded differently. The extent of 
opportunities for public participation in its operations and future planning roles 
appear modest with representation on committees by “selected” NGOs. The 
original plan called for sub-basin institutions (Milner 2005), but these do not 
seem to have been linked or created. From the outset limited financial resources, 
technical skills and inadequate representation of a diversity of stakeholder 
interests have constrained the effectiveness of the basin organization (Sokhem 
and Sunada 2006). Although the Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization was 
set up under the Cambodian National Mekong Committee it is not well connected 
or supported by other key agencies in the Government of Cambodia nor by the 
MRC and the NMC? (Sokhem and Sunada 2006).  
The lake looms large in national politics in Cambodia by its sheer size and 
importance as food and income sources, but when development discussions are 
scaled up to regional development these values are often downplayed in 
assessing other metrics – like counting potential mega-watts of hydropower 
electricity generation and more recently the size of oil reserves. 
Scientific assessments give grounds for concern about the local social and 
environmental impacts of upstream dams and diversions on natural flood regimes 
and sediment transport  (MRC and WUP-FIN 2007). Looking up a level, attempts 
to manage the lake area without reference to planned interventions elsewhere in 
the Mekong River Basin make no sense.  Looking down a level there has been no 
effort to integrate the organization’s basin-wide management actions with pre-
existing local arrangements (Middleton and Tola 2008).  In Sokhem and Sunada’s 
(2006) view the proliferation of institutions, within Cambodia and internationally, 
are a barrier to problem solving because of fragmentation and 
compartmentalization of responsibilities.   
The donor-driven Tonle Sap Basin Management Organization appears to have 
been completely bypassed, and maybe also replaced, with the creation by the 
Government of Cambodia of a new entity in October 2007, the Tonle Sap Basin 
Authority (Royal Government of Cambodia 2007). The Royal Decree which 
established the authority was prepared quickly and without broad public 
consultation (Middleton and Tola 2008). The thirty or so members of the new 
Authority come largely from various central ministries and Provincial Governors. 
The Cambodian National Mekong Committee has one member. No positions are 
available for fishers or farmers or civil society organizations. Some press articles 
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have claimed that primary motivation was to coordinate the exploration of oil 
(Associated Press 2007). 
In the Mekong Region integrated water resources management at the basin level 
through creation of river basin organizations has again and again proven much 
more difficult in practice than plans and promises would suggest (Biswas 2005; 
Molle 2008). Linking institutions at different levels has been hard, in part, 
because none of the individual levels are secure or functional. The Tonle Sap case 
study again underlines that claims about stakeholder participation and dialogue in 
basin initiatives need to be treated with substantial skepticism. Very often what is 
meant in the Mekong Region is participation of different central government 
agencies and more local government structures (e.g. provincial) and integration 
means little more than trying to achieve some modest degree of coordination. 
Scale and deliberation  
Ecological processes, actors, and social institutions relevant to governance of 
water resources in the Mekong Region map to different levels on multiple scales 
(Fig. 2).  This creates tensions and opportunities in which scale issues come to 
the fore in political contests. Efforts in deliberative engagement have been 
affected by, and responded to, politics of scale in a several ways. In the following 
sections we group these into four: who convenes and participates, format and 
venues, content and lastly, outcomes.  
Who convenes and participates  
Scale politics defines and limits who participates and with what roles in 
deliberations.  The Mekong Agreement negotiations were driven by tensions 
between international agencies and a few donor countries interested in 
regionalizing development, and rather disparate state interests. One consequence 
was the exclusion of the upper basin countries, China and Myanmar, neither of 
which had much to gain from joining and potentially more to lose.  Another was a 
rather narrow focus on state-level interests.  At one level lower, the Tonle Sap 
case study documented similar winnowing processes at work determining who 
participates. Deliberation here took place largely among central and provincial 
state agencies. There was little opportunity to deal with important transboundary 
issues related to international developments in the basin or to engage with local-
level institutions already in place within the basin. These two example show how 
deliberation at, and about, some levels may be hindered by scale politics. 
The BDP process inherited many constraints from the initial Mekong Agreement, 
especially, the emphasis on state level interests and trans-boundary impacts 
within the lower basin. Nevertheless, the MRC responded to criticisms about the 
lack of wider engagement with stakeholder consultation meetings in latter half of 
phase I and phase II. This created opportunities for information about ecological 
processes important to more local-level livelihood interests to be tabled. This is 
an example of levelling as it drew attention to different levels at which water 
resources and related services are used and managed. It is still too early to see if 
these decisions by conveners will have any long-term influence. Nor is it certain 
that these conversations will have much influence on national planning or 
practices. 
In the Mekong Region governments are still seen by many as the actor that needs 
to be convinced or changed to solve water governance problems in the region at 
all levels, from international through to local. But research and practices suggest 
a much more complex mix of actors are involved in water governance (Lebel et 
al. 2007). Moreover, the array of firms and banks, and to a lesser extent, local 
water user groups, environmental and social development advocates are not 
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without strategies and skills in deploying various institutions of the state at the 
levels they work best at. 
Who convenes particular events or process matters a great deal for its legitimacy 
and credibility and who attends and how they participate.  Perceived neutrality 
with respect to countries (but not perhaps towards notions of regionalization) in 
negotiation was an important feature of the UNDP’s role in the discussions which 
led to the Mekong Agreement. In the other cases conveners were clearly not 
neutral, but they did, with varying degrees of competence and success, attempt 
to lay-down procedures and include stakeholders they felt were needed.  Getting 
all relevant stakeholders to participate is a major task for conveners.  It requires 
good communication and follow-up.  In the BDP Phase II stakeholder 
consultation, for example, there were no representatives from Upper Mekong 
countries and only a few invited civil society groups chose to attend. 
Multi-stakeholder engagement requires careful attention to participation.  One 
lens that is helpful in identifying sets of interests and stakes in water 
management is scale.  Many water-related services have level-dependent 
elements or are subject to strong cross-scale interactions which if taken into 
consideration through representation may lead to more constructive politics in 
deliberative arenas. Thus, if a disadvantaged group, with strong level-dependent 
interests and stakes is being ignored or sidelined in policy and negotiations it 
makes sense for conveners to find ways to include them. 
Format and venues  
Scale politics has shaped the format, venues and procedures of dialogues and 
assessments.  The regionalization efforts in Mekong Agreement, Basin 
Development and hydropower cooperation cases have been challenged by 
farmers, fishers and civil society organizations as not giving sufficient attention to 
local place-specific impacts, interests and concerns.  Such groups have used mass 
media and created alternative events to comment and provide alternative 
perspectives on development. 
Venue and language choices empower different stakeholders.  For the cases we 
studied, however, physical venues continue to be largely convention halls, 
government offices, or big hotels in capital cities. Interests aligned with large 
spatial levels are usually favored by such settings. In the Mekong Region, several 
of the case studies described, illustrate the value of allowing periods for 
discussion and reflection in native languages as these improve content and level 
of engagement in discussions.   
Quality facilitation is crucial to give fair opportunities for everyone present to 
meaningfully participate and to ensure claims and arguments can be queried, 
verified or countered.  Many sessions in dialogues and consultations with 
stakeholders remain dominated by formal presentations by the conveners; 
opportunities to query and discuss key issues in-depth are contained to short 
periods before lunch.  Facilitators in the Mekong context need to not just consider 
language, but also power and influence associated with positions, and in response 
deploy tactics to allow different stakeholders to engage without being crushed by 
the articulate or influential. 
Conveners have also tried to respond to debilitating effects of some form of scale 
politics.  In the Water Futures dialogue process, the main regional dialogue 
focusing on transboundary issues and multilateral agencies was held separately 
from several national level events, but with some cross-participation. One of the 
rationales for these activities has been to try to create more direct conversations 
among actors with strengths and capabilities at different levels. Some conveners 
will adopt tactics like keeping some groups of stakeholder of very even capacity, 
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power or highly polarized positions in separate events or tables during part of the 
process.   
Most of the cases we studied indicate the need for, but challenges in, carrying out 
meaningful multi-level conversations without undermining credibility, salience or 
legitimacy. In deliberative engagements some actors, including conveners, 
continue to exercise power through controlling where, when and how deliberative 
engagement takes place and what levels are on the table for scrutiny and 
discussion and which are taken as given.   
Content  
Scale politics has shifted agendas and substantive content of deliberations. The 
processes of scaling and leveling have been prominent. On the one hand leaders 
in government, business and financing incessantly about regional geometries -- 
growth quadrangles and corridors, water and energy grids.  A pertinent example 
is the promotion of a Thai Water Grid by then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra 
of Thailand in which diversions and withdrawals from neighbouring states are 
glossed over by labelling a National project when it is convenient to do so (Molle 
and Floch 2008). These discursive practices shift agendas to larger level interests 
and associated technologies and projects. The rescaling of regions via large 
infrastructure projects also involves levelling. Local uses of water resources for 
irrigation and fishing are simply made invisible by a high, regional, vantage point 
and the statistics or policies operating at the level.  Our case on cooperation in 
energy and water is a strong example of this form of scale politics affecting the 
content of conversations. The Mekong Agreement case is another, in that the 
focus on allocation among states has made invisible many of the within-state 
allocation issues. 
Problems with access to, and the quality of, scientific knowledge has been an 
important constraint in several of the cases we examined. The MRC, for instance, 
has had a history of suppressing access to reports, preventing its own scientists 
from speaking about their findings in regional events, and avoiding disclosure of 
information it feels might be ‘sensitive’ to member governments.  On the one 
hand this is seen as careful management, and the other it is seen as a lack of 
transparency. The tensions between international and state-level as well as state 
and more local levels is part of the explanation for these constraints on the 
content of deliberative engagements in the region.  
Even so, new understanding or awareness of issues from increasingly 
independent research capacities in the region are countering efforts that would 
seek to compress issue-management into a particular scale and level.   For 
example, the river basin scale may suit surface water flows, but be a poor fit for 
aquifer management issues that arise as use of groundwater expands. Likewise, 
climate change requires action within, but also beyond the boundaries of any sub-
global polity.  
Some conveners have tried to create constructive discussion about cross-level 
and cross-scale issues through structuring who speaks in which session and mix 
of topics covered in meeting agendas. The Water Futures case, for example, had 
a multi-level scenario building exercise that encouraged participants to grapple 
with development issues at several spatial levels, first separately, and then 
together (Foran and Lebel 2007). 
Deliberative engagement activities like dialogues and roundtables can help deal 
with scale issues by querying choices of scales and levels. They may be particular 
important when they draw attention to vulnerable and disenfranchised 
stakeholders with limited access and influence via other political channels. 
Outcomes  
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Scale politics has altered impacts and outcomes of deliberations. In our first 
example, negotiations produced a lop-sided and weak RBO. In our second 
example, subsequent activities under agreement were resisted by agencies within 
states with result that detailed commitments or follow-up actions, for example in 
domestic legislation did not eventuate. Deliberative engagement among diverse 
stakeholders cannot be expected to reach consensus or address all the challenges 
in making policy and institutional changes. But it should at least improve mutual 
understanding among actors, allow exploration of alternative options, help define 
rights, risks and responsibilities and have some constructive influence on future 
behavior (Dore 2007).  Some disconnects will persist in part because of scale and 
level-dependent interests and power. 
Conveners have tried to manage some of the politics of scale in deliberative 
engagement. As planning processes are often iterative there may be 
opportunities for conveners to come back and evaluate the influence of findings 
from earlier rounds of deliberative engagement. For example, the Water Futures 
regional event included an evaluation and debate about just how well ADB’s 
policies on paper, like the one on “Water for All”, was actually being used in 
investment projects (IUCN et al. 2007b).     
Overall, attributing, or attempting to measure, the impacts of deliberative 
engagement on policy-making processes, negotiation outcomes, and institutional 
forms is not a straightforward exercise; making strong claims about level-
sensitive variations is even more difficult. Additional conceptual work is needed 
on how to best delimit deliberative activities into meaningful units of analysis and 
characterize their features so their evolution can be clearly described and 
alternative initiatives can be compared (Pingree 2006). More work is also needed 
on using scale as a lens to describe political interactions in more mechanistic 
ways (Lebel et al. 2005; Young 1994). This work can build on the findings here 
that show important scale politics is not only evident among the formal 
institutional arrangements but also found in the less formalized and often loosely 
connected world of dialogues, consultations and roundtables that make up the 
essence of a lot of deliberative engagements. 
Conclusions 
In the Mekong Region water governance is multi-level and multi-scale, but with 
many disconnects. Actors draw on both formal and informal institutions as well as 
more ad hoc arrangements at different levels as issues move between relatively 
exploratory and more decision-oriented arenas and practices. Actors also push 
and pull issues up and down levels to where they have more influence and power 
– a process of rescaling or levelling. This is underlined by the contested meanings 
of even the notion of a Mekong Region and the set of water resources to be 
considered.  
There are many “Mekongs”. The interests of investors, officials in government 
agencies, and small, local users of water, such as fishers and farmers, or distant 
city dwellers needing energy are visible or not depending on how boundaries are 
set.  Likewise, there are many ‘waters’. From flood protection and energy 
production services through to meeting needs of farmers in the dry season and 
securing valuable fisheries, there are correspondingly very different ways of 
valuing and prioritizing uses and users.  
Scale politics can affect who participates, the format, the content and outcomes 
of deliberative engagement. Informed, multi-stakeholder deliberations that are 
sensitive to multi-level interests on similar or different scales appear crucial to 
influencing powers, challenging re-framings of issues and stakes, and negotiating 
for or protecting the interests and needs of minorities, women, migrants and 
diverse groups of the poor. Deliberative engagement also appears crucial to 
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navigating the complex contests over rights to, and responsibilities for, water 
which it not as easily contained within single, neatly defined, basin boundaries. 
Many important decisions about water are still made in non-transparent ways. 
Meaningful, public deliberation is still the exception rather than the rule.  Among 
early efforts deliberative engagements vary hugely in inclusiveness, quality of 
content, structure, and how they are facilitated. As a result the quality and 
influence of those conversations and relationships varies.  Dialogues, good and 
bad, broad and narrow, may all influence negotiations that help shape allocation 
rules that are crucial to improving water governance.   
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I. Abstract 
This paper introduces holistic scenario analysis as a method with potential to inform 
water-related allocation disputes, in particular disputes driven by different 
approaches to defining rural development. 
In the Mekong region, qualitative and quantitative options analysis often gets labeled 
"scenario" analysis. Our focus however is on the use of holistic (i.e., comprehensive, 
qualitative) scenario analysis. Such applications are still limited in the region, but in 
three locally-oriented cases we review, they made modest contributions to water-
related policy processes. The scenarios consisted of more- and less-desirable 
variations around the status quo, with the final scenario in the set conveying a 
particular "pro-local" vision of rural development.  
Scenarios, as structured sets of narratives, can influence policy change when they 
are used in competitive rhetorical action. In the present Mekong development 
context, multi-stakeholder scenario building activities can help inform pro-poor 
development. Informing development can be done by generating transparent and 
well-reasoned counter-narratives, as well as guiding actors in their search for robust 
policy and project-level interventions. The review discusses content that should be 
covered for pro-poor rural scenarios, as well as process design choices and trade-offs 
involved in linking scenarios to policy clients. 
II. Scenario Analysis and its Uses 
Scenario analysis refers to processes and techniques of generating insight about 
different ways the future might unfold. Scenario analysis is used in very diverse ways 
by a diversity of actors (Lebel 2009; van Notten et al. 2003). In the business sector, 
scenarios have long been used as a tool to explore future risky business 
environments and formulate strategy (van Notten et al. 2003; Visser and Chermack 
in press).  
Organizations that work with rural communities, such as CIFOR, have used scenarios 
to expand the range of alternatives being considered and get people to think through 
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what might be required to bring about particular desired futures and avoid non-
desirable ones (Wollenberg et al. 2000).  
Proponents of scenario methods argue that they can be designed to:  
• facilitate social learning among actors, possibly resulting in common 
understandings, new policy narratives, and social connections between actors 
(Da Costa et al. 2008); 
• empower local people (Wollenberg et al. 2000; Thongbai et al. 2006 Enfors et 
al. 2008); 
• support public participation processes (Foran and Lebel 2007; Patel et al. 
2007) and embed participation in policy making (Da Costa et al. 2008); 
• identify robust development interventions at local level (Enfors et al. 2008); 
• support robust decision making by policy actors (Chermack 2004; Da Costa et 
al. 2008) 
Scenario analysis is broader than modeling 
The word "scenario" is commonly – and somewhat confusingly – used to refer to 
what is actually a "policy alternative" or an "alternative case."  And thus scenario 
analysis is often used to refer to what is actually modeling or case study analysis. 
Modeling methods explore the effect of changing parameter values of a narrow range 
of focal variables. In the Mekong region, examples of modeling or strategic analysis 
(which use the term scenario) include:  
 
• Hydrological scenarios commissioned by the World Bank as an input to the 
MRC's basin development planning process ("BDP") (Podger et al. 2004; 
World Bank and ADB 2006); 
• A strategic environmental assessment of Vietnam's hydropower development 
plans (Soussan and Nilsson 2009) 
 
In the Mekong region, policy makers are much less familiar with scenario analysis 
conceived as the systematic exploration of different types of processes across 
a wide range of uncertainty (including processes from more than one policy 
sector and level of analysis).  
Conceived in this way, scenarios are not predictions, forecasts, or model runs. 
Rather, they are plausible stories about how the future might unfold, stories with 
explicit narrative structure.1  
The goal of formal scenario analysis (also referred to as foresight analysis) is to 
generate contrasting stories of what the future of a geographical area, or a policy 
sector, or an organization might look like, depending on plausible combinations of 
known, but uncertain social and environmental forces. The analyst gains insight in 
the contrast between alternative stories.  




1Models have a narrative structure, but that structure is usually implicit. 
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Figure 1 shows the essential difference between scenarios and models, and Figure 2 
shows how they can be used to complement each other. This review focuses on the 
use of rural development scenarios, with an emphasis on holistic scenarios (i.e., 
"qualitative and comprehensive" scenarios in Fig. 2).  
Figure 1 Essential difference between scenarios, models, and stories 
 
Source: adapted from Ghanadan and Koomey (2005). Note: What makes a "story" 
more amenable to analysis and evaluation chiefly involves the degree to which 
assumptions of causality are transparently communicated. One way to do so is to 
develop multiple stories which can be contrasted in a structured manner. Models 
may have higher internal validity than scenarios. 
 
Figure 2 Ideal relationships between scenarios and models 
 
Source: Lebel 2009 
 
2.1 Holistic scenarios 
Good scenarios are rigorous, self-reflexive narratives: they attempt to be internally 
coherent, to incorporate uncertainties, to be explicit about assumptions and causality 
(Foran and Lebel 2007; Lebel 2006). When people produce holistic scenarios they 
portray social change, highlighting important processes, both likely and uncertain. 
The word "portrayal" suggests oral and written representation as well as visual 
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imagery. Visual imagery can be an effective way to convey the essence of a set of 
scenarios (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3 Four scenarios for the future of Makanya district, Tanzania 
 
 
Source: Enfors et al. (2008). Notes: This study argued that policies to reduce risk 
and support farmer innovation (such as micro-credit and knowledge exchanges) 
would be robust across the range of futures captured in the scenarios (2008: 53). 
'“Agricultural advance” describes a future dominated by a rapid market-oriented 
agricultural development. In “Managing on the margins,” the dry climate makes 
farming-based livelihoods difficult and people have to struggle to provide for their 
families. “Community cohesion” centers on collective action and small-scale 
improvements of current farming systems. “Industry imperial” describes a future 
where 'smallholder farming loses importance as people start working in industries 
and factories . . . .' (2008:52). 
Power of Narratives 
The notion that scenarios involve a structured form of story-telling directs us to pay 
attention not just to the coherence of their reasoning about social change, but also 
to how they work as narratives, and how narratives work in policy making.  
The construction of policy narratives is ubiquitous: there is no shortage of state and 
NGO-led planning exercises in the Mekong. Each of these development interventions 
comes with some statement of what the future should be like. Scenarios must 
somehow link to these policy narratives to be relevant. Hence to influence and 
improve governance it is worthwhile thinking about scenarios as candidate policy 
narratives. 
Narratives on social reality perform important political tasks: they simplify complex 
reality through representational and rhetorical devices such as metaphor, analogy, 
historical references, and emotional appeals (Foran 2006). Story-lines (that is, 
simplified narratives) form the basis of political coalitions. As Hajer (1995) explains: 
“shallow and ambiguous” by character, story-lines allow diverse actors to “expand 
their own understanding and discursive competence.” They are “discursive cement 
that creates communicative networks between actors with different or at best 
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overlapping perceptions” (1995: 62–63). Simplifications allow concrete policy action 
and problem closure. 
For example, Friend et al. (2009) argue that in the Mekong Region, an enduring 
narrative of wild-capture fisheries decline exists, with four distinctive storylines:  
1 wild-capture fisheries are an open access resource which must inevitably decline in 
the face of population growth and development; 
2 fishing is a marginal activity with limited potential for generating economic 
development;  
3 aquaculture can and should replace wild-capture fisheries;  
4 it is necessary to trade-off sustainable wild-capture fisheries for economic 
development. 
The fisheries decline narrative justifies a variety of state-sponsored development 
interventions such as wetlands reclamation, hydropower development, reservoir 
construction, aquaculture promotion, and fisheries stocking (Bush 2004; Molle et al. 
2009). 
Friend et al. (2009) critique and rebut each of these storylines. Against (2), for 
example, they argue that in southern Lao and Cambodia, agriculture and fisheries 
are intertwined and ubiquitous activities, to the extent that it is more accurate to 
think in terms of river- and wetland-based livelihoods, not rice-based livelihoods 
(2009: 322).  
Recognizing the power of the dominant – but questionable – fisheries decline 
narrative, Friend et al. (2009) argue that the need exists to construct a more 
nuanced and hopeful counter-narrative, or, as they put it, a "future scenario" of how: 
. . . fisheries and the people who depend on them can contribute to 
setting development objectives. . . a future scenario in which fisheries 
are not merely a resource of conservation value, but a resource whose 
management is central to meeting the varied developmental 
challenges of the Mekong River Basin (2009: 325). 
 
This appeal to "scenario" motivates us to explore whether holistic scenario analysis is 
in fact a useful method to re-image and re-write the future.  
Scenario building can enhance an organization's decision making by uncovering and 
challenging the assumptions managers use to make decisions. These assumptions 
are embedded in policy narratives and associated mental models. Existing narratives 
and models may be inadequate with respect to how they treat uncertainty, or they 
may be poorly matched to reality (Chermack 2004:307). 
Among the scenario applications that helped create and amplify new policy 
narratives, some of the most prominent were organized in South Africa during the 
final years of apartheid. These include two well-resourced projects led by the private 
sector in the late 1980s, and a university-led MSP (the Mont Fleur process) initiated 
in 1992 (Galer 2004). The Mont Fleur MSP included leftist academics and (patiently 
recruited) members of the liberation movement. Participants agreed that South 
Africa was facing an interlocking political, economic, and social crisis, and that 
simultaneous intervention was needed to avert further deterioration. Participants 
generated several dozen draft scenarios before narrowing them down into four 
scenarios for the future of South Africa.   
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III. Holistic scenarios: use and significance in the Mekong Region 
In the Mekong region, the construction of normative rural development vision 
narratives is a relatively common and accessible practice. It is part of routine 
development practice. In Thailand, "localist" narratives, critical of mainstream 
development, and championing self-reliance, became more popular after the Asian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s (Parnwell 2005). 
The construction of quantitative models that explore rural development issues is 
slightly less common and accessible, but also an area of active practice, particularly 
among economists. The construction of scenarios – narratives that capture and 
explore uncertain drivers – is less common, as noted above. Key actors championing 
the use of holistic scenarios are the World Agroforestry Center (ICRAF) and Chiang 
Mai University, Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER).  
This section reviews three applications of holistic, rural development scenario 
analysis in the Region. In general, scenario applications can be classified in terms of 
their goals, their process design and their content (van Notten et al. 2003). 
Scenario methods and applications are flexible in terms of how they develop each of 
these dimensions. Tables 1–3 summarize these features for the reader. 
3.1 A scenario-building multi-stakeholder process in Northern Thailand  
Chiang Mai province, Northern Thailand has been the site of a number of 
upstream/downstream conflicts between water users in tributary catchments. In the 
Mae Chaem watershed, upstream farmers growing maize, soybeans, shallots and 
other commercial crops have been framed by authorities and downstream users as 
causing stream pollution and soil degradation. 
Upstream users have less power than downstream users because of their ethnic 
minority status, and also because they may live or farm on land which the national 
government has claimed as protected areas (Thongbai et al. 2006). This scenarios 
project was part of an ongoing development intervention called the "alternatives to 
slash and burn agriculture" project. The scenario application took the form of three 
expert-supported scenario building workshops. The application can also be 
considered a multi-stakeholder process (MSP) in that it aimed to create dialogue 
between local authorities, NGOs, and a representative sample of villagers (Table 1). 
Prior to the participatory scenario work, experts at ICRAF and Chiang Mai University, 
Unit for Social and Environmental Research (USER) conducted a regional-scale 
scenario analysis, which Thongbai et al. subsequently compared to the results of the 
local level scenarios (2006: 9-10). 
Outcomes  
Although the project's stated goals were modest, consisting of exploration and 
experiment, Thongbai et al. report a significant breakthrough in cooperative 
management of local water, soil, and forest resources. This began during the second 
workshop when "all parties admitted they had equally caused damage" to the 
watershed. Participants agreed that one of three scenarios produced was most 
desirable. This consisted of a localist, yet outward-oriented scenario containing 
"more alternatives and sustainable, diversified activities":  
 
S3: . . . adopting organic farming or other high-value crops with less 
land required, using indigenous knowledge and beliefs to conserve 
forest and natural resources . . . reforestation using native plants . . . 
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eco- and cultural tourism to generate more incomes, and more self-
awareness, co-operation and participation . . . . As a consequence, 
landscape and natural resources will be restored . . . independent 
livelihoods and well-beings, self-esteem and cultural identity will be 
sustained . . . . (ibid, p. 8) 
 
Participants formulated a consensus set of recommendations to local authorities 
(2006: 8, 9). At the end of the process participants reported an increase in 
problems-solving capacity and a sense of empowerment (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 Mae Chaem scenario building MSP 




Inclusion of norms  
Vantage point (forecasting v. 
backcasting) 











Process Design (intuitive v. formal 
analytical) 
 
Intuitive because participatory 
(Expert scenario workshop followed by 3 participatory 
workshops (n=25) well distributed among social 
categories such as gender, age, sector, 
upstream/downstream) 
 
Participation: Mode / Level  
Data (qualitative v. quantitative) 
Data collection method (participatory 
v. desk) 
Resources (limited v. extensive) 
 
Direct / High (MSP) 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Extensive (multiple workshop events supported by 
national experts) 












Sustainable small holder agriculture; education and 
diversification; cultural identity 
Small farmers and state agents 
 
Increasing household expenses; declining natural 
resource base; changing regulatory regimes 
Snapshot 
Moderate (BAU, agrarian decline, agrarian renewal) 
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Temporal nature (sequential or 
snapshot) 
Range of possible futures 
Level of interaction between 
variables 
Moderate? 
Outcomes (in terms of stated goals) 
Introduce concept and scenarios 
process 
Explore methodologies of 
participatory scenarios for NRM and 
planning 





Other outcomes (evident and 
inferred) 
Changes in positions (discourses) 
Changes in policy narratives 
Increases in social capital  
New agreements between disputants 
Empowerment 








Source: Author's analysis. Notes: First column refers to choices in a typology, 
adopted from (van Notten et al. 2003). "Change in policy narrative" includes change 
in understanding and social learning. "Not known" means data insufficient to 
determine. 
3.2 Scenarios for Pak Mun Dam's operations 
In April 2001, in an attempt to resolve a long-running conflict between hydropower 
production and fisheries impacts from Pak Mun Dam, the Thai government under PM 
Thaksin Shinawatra ordered the dam's operator to open all eight sluice gates of Pak 
Mun Dam for four months, May-August. It also mandated Ubon Ratchathani 
University to conduct a multi-disciplinary study on the impacts of opening the gates 
(UBU 2002). This study was one of several exercises in knowledge production, all of 
which unfolded in a highly contested setting (Foran 2009; Foran and Manorom 2009; 
Ubon Ratchatani University [UBU] 2002). The UBU research team began presenting 
findings in September 2002. The final section of the 6900-word executive summary 
presented four alternatives:  
(1) Maintaining the status quo (maximize electricity production; sluice 
gates normally closed);  
(2) A five-month seasonal opening;  
(3) An eight-month opening;  
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(4) A year-round opening for five years (no electricity production)2.  
We can consider UBU's four alternatives as a set of expert-led, decision support, 
normative scenarios. The structure of the executive summary – a linear 
examination of the strengths and problems of the first three options, before 
concluding with the last – suggest that the authors preferred the five-year opening 
option: 
Alternative 4. Opening the sluice gates year-round. This Alternative 
follows from the consideration that many technical solutions to the 
Dam's problems in electricity generation can be found, by obtaining 
auxiliary energy from other sources in the country and/or importing 
energy from Lao PDR. However the problems of community 
economics do not quite have solutions, and are not solvable by 
technical means.  The Dam has affected poverty and natural 
ecosystem in fertility in a manner not possible to deny.  Problem 
solving for more than 8000 households (a figure estimated by the 
study team, differing from the 6,176 households that received 
compensation by EGAT) will require the resources, cooperation, and 
time of many concerned parties. 
As well, electricity generation is not an urgent necessity at this time.  
This is because upon consideration of the role of the Dam in the 
stability of electricity system, electricity supplied to the Ubon 
Ratchatani zone (including Mukdahan) comes from many sources.  
Even if the Dam does not generate any electricity, stability of electric 
current is not negatively impacted. 
However, the government might consider [these issues] in regard to 
state investment. . . .  
Economic growth, especially growth from industrial development that 
requires electric energy has not yet developed as forecasted. The Dam 
does not yet play a full potential role in irrigation.  It is appropriate to 
direct benefits from the Moon River basin to community-based 
economics by ceasing use of the Dam for electricity generation for 
now, until electricity demand changes from current conditions. 
This period, during which electricity generation by the Dam halts, will 
provide benefits of restoring ecological conditions, economics, and 
community livelihood.  Villagers will be able to access fishery resources 
throughout the seasonal round.  They will be able to use a variety of 
fishing gear (each household tends to have a variety of gear) to catch 
fish following the seasonal natural cycle of the Moon River. In addition, 
opening the sluice gates year-round will give community is the 
confidence to invest both capital and labor [in fishing]. Restoration of 




2 UBU argued that for at least another five years, the dam’s chief benefit, improving 
electric power reliability in the lower Northeast, could be substituted by increasing 
electricity imports. 
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nature will occur, as well as restoration of community livelihoods 
founded in their original locations. 
Initially, opening the sluice gates year-round might occur for a period 
of approximately five years, coinciding with economic forecasts 
predicting that electricity demand will not change greatly, or if it does 
change, can be adequately met by other sources.  During this time, 
there should be preparation to obtain irrigation benefits from the Dam, 
by thorough and detailed surveying and study. Consideration needs to 
be given to conditions mentioned above: building basic infrastructure, 
policy-making regarding agricultural crops grown in irrigated areas, 
and cooperative management, the capacity for which many 
communities already have. 
(UBU 2002: Khor 17-18; emphasis added) 
 
The UBU scenarios were generated by expert interpretation of a large and complex 
study, drawing in particular on findings about community social relations; local 
farming systems; fisheries incomes; fisheries catch per unit effort during the 
experimental dam opening; electric power flow analysis; and a stakeholder 
consultation organized with local leaders (village headmen and TAO members). The 
scenarios attempt to support decision making in that they focus on one key variable 
(dam opening and its impacts) while other uncertain drivers (such as the 
sustainability of small holder farming) are treated in less detail. The scenarios are 
normative in that running through the UBU Executive Summary is the normative 
storyline that technical substitutes exist for goods provided by the dam, but none 
exist for improving the security of community-based livelihoods (UBU 2002). The 
explicit prioritization of community-based livelihoods over energy security is a public 
policy argument which leads to the conclusion that any significant opening is 
preferable to the status quo. As noted above, the problem-solution structure of the 
text ends with Alternative 4 as the authors' implicitly-preferred solution. 
Outcomes 
Normative scenarios can be an effective way to synthesize and communicate the key 
findings of a long study. The UBU scenarios did succinctly capture a spectrum of 
strategies with respect to Pak Mun's future operations, and also discussed drivers 
such as state investment in integrated agriculture and irrigation.  
Some critics of the study complained that the Executive Summary was too long, and 
that the alternative scenarios were confusing. They did not offer a single, explicit set 
of policy recommendations (statements made at consultation on final draft study, 
Ubon Ratchathani, 6/9/2002).  
Quite aside from the alleged complexity of the scenarios, it is worth noting that by 
2002, stakeholders had long aligned themselves into two discourse coalitions, 
holding opposite policy narratives on the value of Pak Mun Dam (Foran 2006: ch. 6, 
8). In general, during the history of the conflict, three policy narratives on the future 
of Pak Mun Dam circulated:  
(1) [Beginning 1991] The dam should be built and continue to operate, 
but additional efforts at reservoir stocking and livelihood restoration 
are needed; 
(2) [Beginning 1999] Decommissioning is needed to restore migrating 
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(3) [Beginning 2002] A four-month wet season opening is sufficient to 
allow fisheries migration, and also allows dry season water storage. 
Two broad clusters (i.e., heterogeneous groups) of actors deployed these narratives: 
a mainstream cluster and a critical cluster (see Foran 2006: chapters 6-7). Thus 
different actors interpreted UBU's four alternatives in different ways, to argue their 
respective positions.  
Pak Mun's most vocal supporters – including some print and radio journalists) – 
accused the authors of the Executive Summary of siding or actually conspiring with 
anti-dam activists. Dam opponents – including some legislators and human rights 
commissioners – found it useful as an authoritative statement. In particular they 
seized on the study's finding that the dam was not essential to meeting electricity 
needs and used this as a public debating point with senior EGAT management at a 
November 2002 seminar organized by the Senate Committee for Public Participation. 
An admission by the EGAT governor that lower Northeast Thailand's electricity 
demand could be reliably met by imports in turn led UBU's president to change his 
position, and call for a year-round opening (Foran 2006: 232, 233). 
As noted above, the UBU study was one of several exercises in knowledge 
production. Elites who aligned with the mainstream discourse coalition could refer to 
several other studies – as well as common-sense lay discourse – to formulate their 
positions (Foran 2006: ch. 7; Foran and Manorom 2009). But among the rival studies 
and associated policy narratives, the UBU study was unique in that it presented one 
crystallized set of alternatives which took seriously the prior policy narratives critical 
of the Dam. 
In summary, the politicized arena significantly limited the impact of the UBU study 
and its synthetic scenario analysis. But it did not prevent the main messages of that 
analysis from reaching decision makers, including those whose positions were 
subject to change. 
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Table 2 Pak Mun scenario application 
Goal of scenario work (exploration v. 
decision support) 
Decision support 
Inclusion of norms  
Vantage point (forecasting v. 
backcasting) 















Participation: Mode / Level  
Data (qualitative v. quantitative) 
Data collection method (participatory 
v. desk) 
Resources for scenario work (limited 
v. extensive) 
 
Indirect (expert-conducted) / Medium 
Mixed 
Mixed 
Extensive (multi-disciplinary study + one synthesis 
workshop) 







Dynamics (events and processes 
[drivers])  
 
Temporal nature (sequential or 
snapshot) 
Range of possible futures 




Community-based livelihoods; fisheries; irrigation; value 
of hydropower; migration 
Small farmers, electricity utility, state agents responsible 
for agricultural development 
Declining natural resource base; ecological restoration; 
agricultural intensification; changing dam operation 
regimes 
Snapshot 
Moderate (BAU, agrarian decline, agrarian renewal) 
Moderate? 
Outcomes / Effectiveness  




In terms of other outcomes  
Changes in individual positions 
 
Y [see Foran (2009)] 
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Changes in policy narratives  
Increases in social capital  
New agreements between disputants  
Empowerment 
Support for future use of scenarios 
method 
Y (Five-year opening = new narrative) 
 
Y (between study team & AOP) 
N (final decision imposed by force) 
Not known 
Not known 
Source: Author's analysis. 
 
3.3 Songkhram basin: scenarios under the banner of E-Flows 
In the Songkhram basin, an "environmental flows" study conducted by the Mekong 
Wetlands Biodiversity Program (a collaboration between lower Mekong governments, 
IUCN, MRC, and ADB) included scenario building as part of its methodology. The 
extensive floodplain of the lower Songkhram is noted for its high biodiversity, flood 
pulse ecosystem, and wetland-dependent livelihoods.  The basin has not experienced 
the high-intensity conflicts of the lower Mun basin. However Thai government plans 
since the 1980s (most recently under RID) to build dams and weirs throughout the 
basin, and especially large structures in the lower basin, have been challenged as 
inappropriate by environmental NGOs and by environmental arms of the state. 
Equally important, smallholder famers have expanded rice and (more recently) 
eucalyptus onto the floodplain. Some agribusiness operations, aided by official 
policies of intensification, succeeded in privatizing large tracts of previously common 
property on the floodplain, although some ensuing agribusiness operations were not 
successful (Blake et al. 2009). 
In addition to the challenges outlined above, the Songkhram basin lacks an 
integrating river basin organization (RBO). Instead, the basin falls under the 
jurisdiction of four provincial governments and six sub-basin committees (modeled 
after RBOs) (Blake n.d.-b). 
During the 2000s there has been a growing interest in environmental flows 
assessment and planning as one way to implement principles of integrated water 
resources management model (IWRM). Environmental flows (also referred to as "E-
Flows" in the Mekong) has been promoted by organizations such as IUCN as a 
participatory, deliberative, ecosystem-based approach to IWRM, which otherwise 
might continue to be dominated by economic and engineering approaches (see 
Dyson et al. (2003).  
Table 3 summarizes the features of the E-Flows scenario work conducted by MWBP in 
the Songkhram. The process design consisted of an expert multi-disciplinary 
environmental flows assessment, followed by one expert scenario analysis workshop, 
followed by one multi-stakeholder dialogue event.  
 
Expert scenario workshop 
The E-Flows team consisted of national and international experts in fields such as 
hydrology, fisheries, botany, and agriculture. As an input to the expert workshop, 
four qualitative development scenarios were prepared by project coordinator David 
Blake: 
(S1)  Building two controversial floodplain dams: the Nam Songkhram 
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and the Nam Oon; 
(S2)  Building a Water Grid in Northeast Thailand (including Lao-Thai 
water transfers, but not the S1 floodplain dams); 
(S3)  Business as Usual: agricultural intensification, many small 
infrastructure projects, no major projects; 
(S4) Implementing an Alternative Development Paradigm: shift to 
sustainable (low external input) agriculture; focus on demand-driven 
water resource development; shift to informed, bottom-up, 
precautionary decision making; shift to internalizing impacts of rural 
development (Blake n.d.-a). 
The first three scenarios shared the dominant (mainstream) storyline that rural 
poverty alleviation requires additional irrigation infrastructure. The first two scenarios 
were presented in relatively simple terms, consisting of different levels of one focal 
variable, which was water infrastructure development (irrigation and flood control 
structures).  
The latter two scenarios were more complex. S3 was motivated by a detailed 
analysis of trends since the 1970s (see Table 3: Dynamics), and assumed 
continuation of those trends. S4 assumed a reversal of those trends, implementing a 
new and genuinely participatory RBO receptive to existing policy narratives about 
integrated agriculture (Blake n.d.-a) 
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Table 3 Songkhram scenario application 
Goal of scenario work (exploration v. 
decision support) 
Mixed: exploration (E-flows assessment); decision 
support (multi-stakeholder dialogue event) 
Inclusion of norms  
Vantage point (forecasting v. 
backcasting) 







Issue (sustainable livelihoods, irrigation development, 
wetland ecosystems)  
20y 
Local (3 village sites) + Sub-regional (lower Songkhram 
Basin) 
 
Process Design  
Intuitive v. formal analytical 
 
 
Formal (at level of overall study) 
Participation: Mode / Level  
Data (qualitative v. quantitative) 
Data collection method (participatory 
v. desk) 
Resources for scenario work (limited 
v. extensive) 
 




Scenario Content  










Temporal nature (sequential or 
snapshot) 
Range of possible futures 




Rural development, wetlands ecosystem management 
Water infrastructure; wetland habitat, goods, and 
services; irrigation; community-based livelihoods 
Small farmers, irrigation and agricultural development 
agencies, politicians, agribusiness 
Loss of upland and wetland forests; agriculture and 
fishing intensification; wetlands conversion; ecological 
restoration; decisions to invest in water infrastructure ; 
altered flow regimes 
Mixed 
Moderate (BAU, ecological decline, ecological renewal) 
Moderate1/ 
Outcomes / Effectiveness  
In terms of stated goals 
Capacity building (in E-Flows 
 
Y 
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In terms of other outcomes  
Changes in individual positions 
(discourses) 
Changes in policy narratives 
Increases in social capital  
New agreements between disputants  
Empowerment 










Source: Author's analysis. Note: 1/"moderate": cross-sectoral interactions 
recognized but not fully modeled. 
 
The qualitative scenarios summarized above then fed into an expert workshop aimed 
at describing how each would affect the "river flow regime." This flow regime was 
first defined in terms of how the development scenario would alter, if at all, a 
detailed list of "critical hydrological flow events", ranging from dry season low flows 
to large class inter-annual floods.  
Interestingly, the lower basin floodplain dams scenario (S1) had the largest impact 
on the hydrological flow events, not the Thai Water Grid scenario. However, 
Scenarios 1–3 all resulted in significant negative ecological impacts. Discussion of 
social changes focused on negative impacts, which ranged from loss of floodplain 
food and livelihoods and declines in water quality (under BAU), to forced 
resettlement (S1), to a shift to high-capital, high-risk farming systems with 
attendant landholding consolidation (S2). Time limitations prevented full analysis of 
ecological and social impacts, or discussion of Scenario 4 (Blake n.d.-a). 
 
Multi-stakeholder dialogue 
Key findings from the E-Flows assessment and expert scenario workshop were 
presented to participants at a day-long dialogue meeting held in May 2007, which 
the author attended. Participants included representatives from national, provincial,  
and local governments, academia, civil society, and local communities (Blake n.d.-b; 
see also Blake, PN67 Case Study. The meeting was conducted in Thai and chaired by 
a professional facilitator from Thailand Environment Institute. 
The meeting included an afternoon two-hour small-group qualitative scenario-
building activity. At the beginning of the day, participants were given a briefing 
paper, summarizing scenarios S1–S4 from the expert workshop. During the small 
group activity, they were invited to review scenarios S1 and S3, both scenarios of 
wetlands loss and agricultural intensification. 
Participants were asked to discuss "the current situation, including problems in 
different dimensions, and to offer clear approaches to solve or mitigate those 
problems" (Blake n.d.-b) [pp. 8, 11]. Small groups then reported in detail back to 
plenary. Plenary discussion also included the sharing of sustainable development 
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vision statements, which emerged as counter-narrative to the intensification 
scenarios discussed. 
Some of these sketches were highly idealistic with respect to the sustenance of 
ecosystem based livelihoods. However, they emerged from lengthy preceding 




With respect to stated goals, the E-Flows assessment (including the expert scenarios 
workshop), was successful in capacity building among the study team. For instance, 
after immersion in the hydrologically-focused methodology, a social scientist on the 
Team eventually argued that other "flows" driving rural change, such as migration, 
needed to be explored in more depth. To the extent study team members are 
influential practitioners in the Region, the application constitutes a step towards 
improving practice in environmental impact assessment (EIA) and in multi-
disciplinary assessment. 
During the dialogue meeting, the use of scenarios helped participants focus on 
floodplain wetlands, an ecosystem that is of importance to poor peoples' livelihoods, 
and threats to those ecosystems and associated values.  
Decision support was not a stated goal of the expert workshop, but the focused 
definition of Scenarios 1 and 2, combined with hydrological modeling findings, 
allowed specific policy arguments to be made: e.g., that "any attempt at upstream 
regulation of the Nam Songkhram or tributaries will have a negligible impact on flood 
control" (Blake n.d.-a:27). 
Decision support for sustainable resource management, by contrast, was a goal of 
the dialogue meeting. The meeting report compiled multiple management 
suggestions from participants on topics ranging from livelihoods to ecosystem 
conservation to administrative reform. The meeting concluded with discussion of a 
draft statement calling for the establishment of a four province inter-provincial 
working group. The working group would seek to deliver more integrated river basin 
management. 
IV. Comparative assessment 
Context, definition and relevance 
The above section reviewed three projects that involved envisioning the future of 
rural livelihoods in specific localities in the Mekong region. Building normative 
scenarios was an integral activity in all three. 
In terms of context, in all three applications, scenario analysis was a component in 
a larger action research project aimed at improving forest or water resource 
management in contested settings. 
In terms of definitions, the Thongbai et al. (2006) application was the most 
methodologically sophisticated. For example, multi-stakeholder scenario building 
activity was explicitly and correctly identified as a "visioning" activity (Evans et al. 
2006). The compatibility of the local level scenarios with higher-level drivers was 
also explored in a separate step by experts (Lebel 2004).  
In terms of relevance, in the case studies reviewed above, scenario organizers 
understood the tool to be directly relevant in supporting bottom-up participatory 
planning. It is less common for scenario exercises to document participant-
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stakeholder reactions.  In a one-and-a-half day multi-stakeholder scenario-building 
workshop conducted in the region, Foran and Lebel (2007) found that some 
participants wanted the qualitative scenarios they built to contain more detail. Others 
considered the workshop a useful capacity building activity. 
 
Scenarios and their political influence 
Framing the future  
Scenario building involves directly framing future states, impacts, and options, both 
those that are likely, sought and feared. Framing/counter-framing refer to rhetorical 
action3 deployed to further a political objective. The discourse in framing/counter-
framing can range from terse speech acts (fragments of narratives) to the more 
elaborate knowledge claims in policy narratives and scientific reports. 
Framing/counter-framing is a political driver – that is, a social process that 
contributes to political change (Foran 2009; Foran 2006; Snow et al. 1986). 
The appeal of qualitative methods is that knowledgeable participants or analysts can 
create complex and plausible narratives, as shown in Scenario 3 from Mae Chaem, 
and Scenario 4 from Songkhram. The strength of these narratives is their 
accessibility and rhetorical appeal as visions of sustainable localist development. 
These eco-localist visions motivate many civil society (and some state) actors to 
implement community-based development, and are especially resonant in Thai 
democratic politics. 
 
Improving water governance 
The ability of any discrete method – including holistic scenario planning – to 
influence governance is always mediated by other drivers of policy processes, 
including competing narratives, competing knowledge brokers (Foran 2006; Foran 
and Manorom 2009), and associated interests. 
In all three cases reviewed, use of the tool led to the development of explicit policy 
recommendations, which argued for increased allocation of resources to addressing 
the needs of marginalized small holder farmers, and re-framing top-down 
approaches to common property resources. In two out of three cases (Mae Chaem 
and Songkhram) these recommendations were legitimized by a multi-stakeholder 
endorsement. In these cases scenarios played a role in planning processes that were 
not solely distributive bargaining negotiations. 
Significant findings 
The review uncovered several noteworthy findings, beginning with the paucity of 
qualitative scenario applications in the Mekong region. Outside the Mekong, 
qualitative and multi-stakeholder scenario exercises for rural futures occur in a 
variety of settings (see Evans et al. 2006), but are still rare in the Mekong region.  




3"Rhetorical action" refers to the competitive, strategic, monologic use of language 
by actors to persuade audiences of preferred courses of action (Naurin 2007). 
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Second, none of the three case studies solely used formal scenario methodology (by 
which we mean structured exploration of contrasting combinations of uncertain social 
and environmental forces). Rather, in each of the three cases, the qualitative 
scenarios were developed intuitively: either because the authors regarded their 
development as self-evident (Pak Mun, Songkhram), or as a deliberate 
participatory technique (Mae Chaem). 
The third finding is about how the scenarios were organized and presented in textual 
form. In all cases, the sets of scenarios produced consisted of more- and less-
desirable variations around the status quo, with the final scenario in the set reading 
like the "preferred" one. In each case, in the final scenario, small farmers and their 
locally-based livelihoods are sustained by balanced commercialization and 
intensification (tourism, high value-added agriculture, demand-driven irrigation). 
Such livelihoods and cultures are also sustained by significant local empowerment 
and improvements in human capital. The final scenario functioned as a detailed 
policy narrative conveying a vision of rural development. Organized and presented in 
this way, the whole exercise helps legitimize the localist counter-narrative. 
 
V. Broad implications, challenges, and opportunities  
Qualitative scenario methods to explore and sustain rural futures are still rare in the 
Mekong region, and thus their overall impact has been limited (see Table 4 below). 
However, in each of the policy-oriented applications reviewed above, these types of 
scenario methods were an integral component. 
Conditions and mechanisms for the tool to influence policy  
Generally speaking, Mekong water governance has consisted of a series of policy 
domains dominated by elite actors, institutions, and mainstream (modernist) 
development narratives. Improving Mekong water governance in this context 
involves a host of reforms at different levels. The specific potential of scenario 
methods is that they offer a means to critique dominant development narratives 
which, as discourse, constitute powerful contextual drivers of action. 
 
Table 4 Summary of outcomes, selected Mekong scenario exercises 








Stated goals met? 
 
Y Y Y 
In terms of evident outcomes  
Changes in positions 
(discourses) 
Changes in policy narratives 
 
Increases in social capital  
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Source: Author's analysis 
 
As sets of contrasting policy narratives, scenarios highlight the fact that the future is 
uncertain and hopefully open. In the dominant Mekong context, scenario building 
might be received as a type of framing, that is, rhetorical action that threatens to 
undermine dominant policy narratives (Foran 2006; see also Snow et al. 1986).  
The more radical or paradigm-breaking the range of plausible futures considered, the 
less likely such an activity is to offer anything that policy elites focused on short-
term incremental decision making perceive to be useful. (The need for sustainability 
transition may be urgent and credible to the analyst, but not salient to the 
politician.) On the other hand, scenarios by definition present a range of alternate 
futures, leading to a range of possible value-laded policy narratives. A scenario 
project may, but does not need to, conclude with one preferred vision. 
The manner in which scenarios are received of course depends on the specific policy 
domain, and the terms on which policy elites are involved. It will be influenced by 
other micro-political drivers, such as media framing, elite intervention, and 
negotiation (Foran, 2009). 
Scenarios designed to offer a reservoir of knowledge for the public might increase 
the range of potentially receptive audiences. A well-designed communication 
strategy – making use of audio and visual media deserves consideration (Da Costa et 
al. 2008).  
 
Approaches to influencing governance 
One approach to influencing governance is for scenario applications to link with 
compatible policy processes, both existing and emerging. Two obvious processes are 
IWRM and MSPs.  
IWRM – IWRM has become a globally promoted institutional framework for water 
resource management. However, as an umbrella concept, it is also a contested 
domain (Biswas, Varis, and Tortajada 2005).  
MRC is currently implementing an IWRM-based basin development planning process 
("BDP"). Compared to previous exercises at MRC, the BDP program appears to be 
taking a more participatory turn. However, the BDP's definition of scenarios has thus 
far emphasized water modeling-centered applications, with implications for 
accessibility and transparency. Not surprisingly for an inter-governmental program, 
there has been limited recognition of the value of holistic scenario analysis. It would 
be necessary for scenario proponents to continue to seek to influence the agenda of 
the BDP. 
Multi-stakeholder processes (MSPs) can be defined as organized processes 
designed to facilitate active and informed participation in particular policy issues 
(Foran, n.d.). Defined broadly this way, all MSP processes include both competitive 
and cooperative interactions. In addition, MSPs may be designed to seek common 
understandings of a problem, or they may not (see Foran, n.d.: Section 4.3.5).  
As we saw in this review, scenario analysis is compatible with, and can complement 
MSPs. Indeed, a multi-stakeholder dialogue can be designed around scenario 
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building activities (Foran and Lebel 2007). However, if actors join – or consent to an 
MSP – primarily to engage in distributive bargaining, they are unlikely to be 
interested in scenario building or scenario analysis. Such contested settings and 
cases are more likely to be the norm in the Mekong region.  
In these arenas, scenarios influence policy processes indirectly, as tools to help 
develop logically robust policy arguments (e.g., rebutting the GMS policy narrative 
that connectivity builds prosperity, see Lebel and Foran 2007). Both MSPs and 
scenarios must answer questions of participation: whose process or scenario is this, 
how much room for interests of weak and less organized (Warner 2007).  
Advantages and disadvantages: implications for process design 
Two weaknesses of MSPs are that they can be resource intensive, and that space for 
participatory processes is limited in non-democratic and democratizing Mekong 
countries. Multi-stakeholder scenario analysis would share these limitations.  
Expert-generated scenarios might circumvent both resource and participation 
problems. However, experts eventually need to find receptive audiences, suggesting 
the need to actively reach out to various policy actors (whether state or civil society) 
using appropriate communication strategies. Experts can directly advocate on policy 
reforms. Revkin (Revkin 2009) for example documents the advocacy efforts of IPCC 
scientists Rajendra K. Pachauri and James Hansen, both of whom have used their 
standing to access the mass media and promote policy prescriptions. Scenario 
organizers need to think about the credibility, salience, and timing of their messages, 
as well as the advantages and disadvantages of having other actors (such as regional 
media or NGOs) convey those messages (Da Costa et al. 2008). Overall, an iterative 
scenario process involving experts, multiple stakeholders, and carefully designed 
opportunities for elites, may be most effective.  
In the present developmentalist context, scenario activities focusing on rural futures 
should offer policy or project-level recommendations that should perform well across 
the range of uncertain futures (see Enfors et al. 2008 for example).4 These should be 
specific enough to inspire and mobilize practitioners. 
Opportunities 
The Mekong region during the 2000s is one where powerful actors have pursued 
strong interests in infrastructure and natural resources development (including large-
scale irrigation, hydropower, agricultural plantations, and mining concessions). The 
consequences for poor rural people are highly uncertain. The concentration of 
activity pursued in rural areas (often justified by policy narratives about economic 
growth and poverty alleviation) has generated media attention, significant volumes 
of critical analysis and commentary by civil society actors, and – in early 2009 – a 
civil society campaign to "Save the Mekong." 
Despite the generic challenges discussed above, scenario analysis is a method well-
suited to exploring, clarifying, and re-thinking the future of small farmers in this 




4 The argument made here is that the policy recommendation (not the scenario) 
should be robust. 
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dynamic and contested region. More holistic scenario applications are needed, 
combining both expert and lay stakeholder input. 
 
Wanted: More holistic foresight analysis about rural futures 
Water-related decision making in the Mekong Region has been dominated by a 
number of potent, but simplistic, policy narratives (Friend et al. 2009; Foran and 
Manorom 2009). In these narratives or “story-lines”, poor rural people can be lifted 
out of poverty by large-scale water resources development, which will make their 
farmland more productive; likewise, the introduction of modern inputs and practices 
will make their agriculture more productive. Technologies enabled by the state and 
other modern elements of society will reduce farmers’ vulnerabilities to nature. In 
parallel, the integration of subsistence production into larger-scale markets will also 
benefit the poor. Vulnerabilities to changing market conditions can be managed 
through more sophisticated interventions. 
Narratives of rural and agricultural development matter because most of the world’s 
poor people still make a living in rural areas (Hazell et al. 2007). Any development 
intervention which can grow sectors in which the poor make a living deserves 
analysis. Another reason that narratives featuring market integration and 
technological progress need to be taken seriously is that they have worked in the 
past, notably in the post-WWII ‘Green Revolution’. In the 2000s, food policy analysts 
argue that underinvestment in agriculture and rural infrastructure has produced a 
‘food crisis’ of stagnant productivity growth and unaffordably high prices, which lead 
to depressed nutritional intake among poor consumers (von Braun 2008). 
Although transformations are needed in the world’s food systems, it is less common 
to hear from subsistence farmers directly; more often they are characters in stories 
told on their behalf, stories told and retold by policy elites and disseminated more 
broadly through mass media, until they have the force of hegemonic discourse.  
Not only does this have sober implications for self-determination, autonomous 
agenda-setting, and other aspects of participation: another problem is that the 
stories told – no matter how well-intentioned or participatory – may be laden with 
questionable assumptions about how the future will unfold, how social change can be 
manipulated.5  
In the case of Pak Mun Dam, proponents claimed the dam would allow productive 
reservoir-style fisheries to be developed, replacing migratory capture fisheries. More 
recently proponents attempt to link dam closure to dry season water security (Foran 
and Manorom 2009). In the case of Nam Theun 2, sponsors claim that dedicated 
livelihood restoration programs will make resettled people better off (Lawrence 
2009). 
Scenarios relevant to marginalized and vulnerable people would have to capture key 
uncertainties with respect to the future of their livelihood strategies (see Table 5). 




5 Note the gap in reasoning, between a macro-level policy narrative such as "we 
need to grow more food" and a local-level policy narrative such as "we need to grow 
more food here." The analyst needs to ask: to what extent do such narratives ignore 
local complexity? 
Page 742 of 852
PN67_2010_23 







For example, Table 5 shows a list of existing processes which have interacted to 
shape farming in Thailand, which, combined with emerging processes, will shape the 
future. 
Many of these drivers are determined at levels higher than a specific locality. 
Scenario analysis ideally would also explore national, regional, and global drivers 
(Lebel 2006; Foran and Lebel 2007), although few examples of multi-level analysis 
exist (Enfors et al. 2008; Kok, Biggs, and Zurek 2007) 
Fossil fuel prices, price volatility, and their economic ramifications will have profound 
impacts on conventional agriculture and agri-business (see Annex). Energy futures in 
the region therefore deserve scenario analysis as well. 
 
Table 5 Key drivers affecting smallholder farming livelihoods in Thailand 
 
Category of driver Examples 
Demography 
 
growth, aging, migration, health (HYV) 
Development of 
agricultural techniques  
 
integrated farming, organic farming, new slow-release 
fertilizers, GM-crops 
Energy  availability and cost of petrochemical inputs, 
opportunities for bio-energy production 
Irrigation systems effectiveness, cost, maintenance 
 
Macroeconomic situation  growth rate of economy, distribution of wealth, cost of 
labour, commodity prices 
Consumer preferences Organic food, IPM food, geographical origin of food 
Public policy drivers  
 
trade liberalization, energy policy, privatization, 
decentralisation 
Rural policy drivers agriculture and rural development subsidies, micro-
finance, land tenure (esp. related to wetlands and 
common property floodplains) 
Source: Adapted from Gomez-Limon et al. (2009) 
 
Conclusion 
"Scenario" analysis in the Mekong is frequently conceived of as policy analysis 
focused on qualitative and quantitative options analysis. This conceptualization has 
the advantage of familiarity among policy clients and other powerful actors, but is 
inadequate as a tool to imagine and inform the search for robust solutions to long-
term, complex, and uncertain futures.  
This review focused on qualitative and "holistic" scenario applications – that is, 
applications that attempted more comprehensive analysis. Such applications are still 
limited in the Mekong region. In the three cases reviewed, "holistic" scenario 
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methods dealt with a range of uncertainties affecting the future of small farmers in 
given localities. They produced new local area-based and issue-based policy 
narratives which could then be used in policy advocacy. 
In all cases, the sets of scenarios produced consisted of more- and less-desirable 
variations around the status quo, with the final scenario in the set functioned as a 
detailed policy narrative conveying a vision of rural development. In each case, in 
the final scenario, small farmers and their locally-based livelihoods are sustained by 
balanced commercialization and intensification (tourism, high value-added 
agriculture, demand-driven irrigation). Such livelihoods and cultures are also 
sustained by significant local empowerment and improvements in human capital. 
Such desirable outcomes reiterate the need for reforms that increase downward 
accountability and effective delivery of resources allocated towards rural 
development.  
Actually attaining a future resembling the one envisioned requires a set of robust 
interventions and enabling policies at different levels, from local to supra-national. 
None of the local case studies reviewed fully elaborated these co-requisites. 
However, future applications of scenario method could attempt multi-level analysis, 
with analysis of global and regional drivers led by experts (Kok et al. 2007; see also 
Annex).  
The final section of the review discussed content that should be covered for pro-poor 
rural scenarios, as well as process design choices and trade-offs. 
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Annex 
Exploring Mekong Futures: an opportunity for holistic scenarios? 
In 2009 CSIRO/AusAID developed an initiative to fund scenario projects exploring 
the future of water, food, and energy issues in the Mekong. This proposal was guided 
by a core team consisting of advocates of MSPs, holistic scenario methods, and 
agent-based modeling. The design consists of local case studies, which were 
awarded based on factors such as connections to policy making venues, clear 
discussion of water-food-energy linkages, and geographical representation. In 
addition, the project proposes to build a regional-scale agent-based model based on 
household level sampling. The project thus proposes to combine qualitative scenarios 
with the production of a new integrated quantitative model. As a contribution to this 
initiative, the author developed a proposal titled "Thailand's farming future in 3-D: 
development, democratization, dematerialization?". 
Proposal (abridged version of original submitted June 2009) 
 
Mekong Region Futures 
Expressions of Interest (EOI) to undertake ‘local’ studies 
 
Name of leaders/Affiliations 
 
Dr. Tira Foran (CMU-USER), Study Coordinator [G, Ey, S] 
Dr. Decharut Sukkumnoed (Healthy Public Policy Foundation) [Ec, G, Ey] 
Dr. Shabbir Gheewala (King Mongkut Univ. of Technology Thonburi) [Ey, Eng]  
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Dr. Sawaeng Ruaysoongnern (Khon Kaen Univ.) [A, G] (to be confirmed) 
Expertise in brackets: A – agriculture; Ec – economics; Eng – engineering; Ey – energy; F – 
fisheries; G – governance; S – scenario methodology.  
 
Name of partners/Affiliations 
Indicative list; full list of 
research partners to be 
determined 
 
Key participants:  
Local government: selected Tambon Admin. Organizations  
Farmers' networks / NGOs: selected networks and NGOs promoting integrated agriculture 
Central government: National Economic and Social Advisory Council; Office of Self-
Sufficiency Economy; Dept of Water Resources; Royal Irrigation Dept; Dept of Alternative 
Energy Development and Energy Efficiency; National Economic and Social Development 
Board 
Private: Federation of Thai Industries; Social Venture Network Thailand;  Thailand 
Development Research Institute 
International: International Water Management Institute; World Bank; Asian Development 
Bank 
Title of proposed study 
Thailand's Farming Future in 3D: development, democratization, dematerialization? ~ Exploring energy, water, and 
farming futures to the year 2050 
Geographical area 
Northeastern Thailand: Scenario-building workshops will be conducted in rural communities selected as exemplifying key 
driving forces 
Context and ‘nexus’ 
Context: During the second half of the 20th Century, Thailand emerged as one of the largest economies in mainland Southeast 
Asia as a result of a historically open economy, large-scale development assistance support by the U.S. during the Indochina 
War, and relatively successful democratization. Based on intensified fossil-derived multi-cropping in the Chao Phraya basin, it 
became the world's number one rice exporter. After a shift towards greater economic liberalization in the 1980s, Thailand's 
industrial growth, and the accompanying movement of people out of agriculture (seasonally or permanently), also quickened.  
However Thailand's emergence as a large, affluent Southeast Asian country has also come with a number of governance and 
sustainability challenges: 
- failure of agricultural development to reduce smallholder poverty; small farmers face chronic debt as a result of low-profit 
crop production; 
- slow pace of industrialists and related institutions in capturing higher-value niches in the global economy, thus 
perpetuating relatively low-value added industries; 
- unequal ability of people to access basic entitlements (health, justice, education), contributing to persistent poverty, 
income inequality, and geographic inequality 
- high cumulative impacts of growth, with impacts extending beyond national borders, indicated for example by rising CO2 
emissions per unit GDP (Nguyen et al. 2007a) and problems with water quality, availability, and environmental flows. 
Many of these problems are evident in Northeast Thailand (Bello et al. 1998; Molle et al. 2009a).  
As it navigates the 21st Century, Thailand will face emerging social-economic-ecological tensions. These include the fragility 
of the political party system; administrative and policy ineffectiveness; and ongoing distributional conflicts, both within and 
spilling across the region's political borders. Thailand also will face exogenous uncertainties, such as protectionism in 
agricultural export markets, climate change, and the threat of major discontinuities in supply of imported fossil fuels. In 2110, 
no guarantee exists that people enjoy the same material standards they did a hundred years earlier. 
Nexus: In the discussion above, relationships between energy, food, water, people, and governance are manifold and bi-
directional. For example, fossil energy constrains conventional agriculture. Public policies shape bio-energy futures. Driven by 
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populist storylines of agricultural modernization, large-scale irrigation development undermines aquatic ecosystems and 
dependent communities. Lack of institutional support constrains demand-side energy and water management.  
Changes and decision making 
Objective: To build capacity among policy makers and the public to examine the uncertain future of Thai farming, and to 
design robust, pro-poor policies.  
Approach: Our project has a deliberately long time horizon. We therefore take an inclusive view towards "decision making": 
actors can decide within existing sets of rules, or they can decide to change institutions.  
Decision makers: We focus on early to mid-career journalists, academics, businesspeople, NGO workers, and state 
technocrats. Our 40-year time scale shifts focus from the present, which is inevitably politicized. By doing so, we also hope to 
stimulate the interest and participation of senior decision makers, in an atmosphere that favors more creative and 
holistic thinking. 
Key decisions we aim to inform and influence: (1) We want to strengthen the discourse of integrated farming. Many actors 
influence this discourse including civil society farmers' networks, and the Office of Self-Sufficiency Economy. (2) We aim to 
contribute to debates around irrigation expansion in Northeast Thailand. 
Wider regional significance 
Most people in the Mekong region have rural or semi-rural livelihood strategies. Northeast Thailand's smallholder farmers are 
among the Mekong's more advantaged. Yet they often suffer from serious accumulated debt. Will they be forced to exit, 
resulting in land consolidation, or are more prosperous smallholder futures plausible? In what ways does Thailand's agrarian 
trajectory pre-figure the intensification trajectories of Lao or Cambodian lowland farmers? 
Can farming systems be safeguarded from ineffective irrigation development? Can farmers do better, at lower 
intensities of resource use and impact? Northeast Thailand is one place to look for answers. 
Approach and capacities 
Methodology: Our general approach is to balance participation with technical rigor. Scenarios will be area-based and issue-
based. We favor the method presented by Kowalski et al. (2009), which combines scenarios, modeling, and multi-criteria 
analysis in a participatory manner. We adapt this method to a farming-centered study as follows: 
(Step 0) Outreach and participant recruitment.  
(Step 1) The study mails participants written briefs about key driving variables, which are existing processes which have 
interacted to shape NE Thai farming, which, combined with emerging processes, will shape the future. Briefing about these 
drivers, their importance, and their trends is necessary to structure participant discussion.  
According to Gomez-Limon 2009 et al. (2009) examples of key variables include, on the "supply" side: development of 
agricultural techniques (integrated farming, organic farming, new slow-release fertilizers, and GM-crops); energy 
(availability and cost of petrochemical inputs; opportunities for bio-energy production); irrigation systems (low vs. high 
effectiveness). "Demand side" drivers include demography (growth, aging, migration); macroeconomic situation (growth rate 
of economy; distribution of wealth); and consumer preferences. Public policy drivers include trade liberalization; 
agriculture and rural development subsidies; energy policy. 
Note: Many of these drivers are determined at levels higher than Northeast Thailand.  We will explore national, 
regional, and global drivers. We cannot overstate the importance of higher-level energy drivers to local studies 
on long-range futures. Energy futures in the region therefore deserve scenario analysis as well (extending 
forecasting approaches such as IRM-AG 2008). 
(Step 2) [Participant Workshop 1] Begins with oral briefing on drivers. After the briefing, the team guides participants to 
generate alternative stories (scenarios) about the future. Scenarios contain different plausible and logical combinations of 
supply drivers, demand drivers, and public policy drivers.  
(Step 3) [Participant Workshop 2] Participants meet again, review the alternative scenarios, then proceed to review a list of 
criteria, suggested by the study team, that they can use to evaluate the scenarios (and later rank them in order of preference). 
Examples of criteria include: prices and yields of various agricultural crops and animal products; input costs (seeds, 
fertilizers, pesticides, energy, labor, management costs; water); public subsidies; regulatory regimes (restrictions on certain 
farming practices). Other criteria (quantitative or qualitative) might include: ease of market access; local employment; degree 
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of land concentration; role of off-farm economy; social justice, and regional food and energy sufficiency.  
(Step 4) Study team invites experts (by interview, survey, or commissioned study) to review the qualitative scenarios, and put 
numerical bounds on each criterion, scenario by scenario. For example, how much do farm incomes and sizes vary between a 
baseline scenario, an open market scenario, and a local sustainability scenario? The team creates a matrix which compares 
the qualitative scenarios according to the evaluation criteria. If necessary, modeling can be done to help complete this task 
(e.g., economic and land-use change simulations; see European Commission 2007: chapter 4). We prefer models with user-
friendly interfaces, and welcome advice from Core Team on which models are most appropriate. 
(Steps 5–6) [Participant Workshop 3] In Step 5, The team presents the matrix to participants for further dialogue. During this 
step, the study team asks participants (individually and/or as a group exercise) to rank the relative importance of each 
criterion.  
(Step 6) The study team aggregates the individual or group rankings to derive an overall ranking of the scenarios, and 
communicates this ranking as an input for discussion during the following workshop. 
(Step 7) Within one month, study team publishes draft proceedings, including the qualitative scenarios, evaluation matrix, and 
rankings. 
(Step 8) Study team conducts telephone interviews with key participants to obtain their impression of the process as well as 
specific policy recommendations.  
(Step 9) [Final workshop] If desired, a public event can be organized to close the project and allow actors to present policy 
recommendations to media.  
(Step 10) Team publishes final report.  
All workshops will be professionally facilitated. We will interview key informants and elites who might otherwise not 
participate consistently. Most activities will be conducted in relevant field sites (not in urban conference rooms), with 
time budgeted for farm visits hosted by local farmers.  
Comment on vantage point: Our proposed methodology does not backcast (i.e., reason backward from a future desired state). 
Some actors may regard backcasting as more practical, because of the direct link to planning. However rigorous backcasting is 
enhanced by an approach which allows nuanced and objective treatment of uncertainty (forecasting). As the study progresses, 
those interested in developing robust long-range plans will be encouraged to do so, with support from the study team. 
Existing data relevant to this proposed study (examples) 
Subject domain Provider / Title Date Duration Resolution Meta-Data / Other Link
Multiple (production, price, farmgate 
value, yield/ha, …) FAO / Various 2004 1996-2006 National
http://faostat.fao.org/site/3
57/default.aspx
Rural households' livelihood assets, 
income, expenditures, agricultural debts









Rural households' livelihood assets; 
development aspirations
Ubon Ratchathani Univ. / 
(see Ref. below) 2002 1990; 2001-02
65 villages, lower Mun basin: 
households' financial, physical, 
natural capital  
Not displayed above but relevant are various sources of data on energy (see IRM-AG 2008; Nguyen et al. 2007a;b). 
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Negotiating water flows should be an essential part of river basin management in 
the Mekong region. If put into practice, the concept of environmental flows could 
prove useful for improving water-related decision-making. Environmental flows or 
E-flows are defined as the water regime provided within a river, wetland or 
coastal zone to maintain ecosystems and their benefits where there are 
competing water uses. Central to the E-flows concept is the recognition that 
ecosystems not only have their own intrinsic value, but also provide humans with 
essential services. Implementing E-flows requires establishing water flow 
regimes, which recognise ecosystem needs whilst trying to satisfy social and 
economic demands. It also requires the integration of a range of disciplines 
including engineering, law, ecology, economy, hydrology, political science and 
communication. In the Mekong region there have been a few experiments with E-
flows as a tool for negotiating river basin management. The results from the 
existing case studies indicate that E-flows have the potential to significantly 
contribute to decision-making for improved water governance in the Mekong 
region. However, a basin-wide approach to E-flows is still lacking in the region, as 
is the involvement of multiple stakeholders and dissemination of vital data. 
Introduction 
Negotiating water flows should be an essential part of river basin management in 
the Mekong region. Implementing ‘environmental flows’ requires establishing 
water flow regimes, which recognise ecosystem needs whilst trying to satisfy 
social and economic demands. E-flowsi are a vital tool to facilitate participatory 
negotiation and can lead to more informed decision-making on water resource 
issues within countries and across boundaries. As rivers resources become 
increasingly competitive, a multi-stakeholder approach to E-flows is advocated, 
requiring the integration of a range of disciplines including engineering, law, 
ecology, economics, hydrology, political science, environmental science, fisheries 
and communications into the equation.  
While water resource management is typically a top-down, government-led 
process, E-flows brings together various stakeholders to determine an equitable 
way to share the river and leave enough to support the river’s ecosystem. The 
time is right for applying E-flows to the Mekong region. The emphasis on 
promoting economic development has hitherto been the dominant paradigm. 
Implementing and negotiating E-flows can help to ensure that within this 
development trend there is also recognition of how that can impact the 
environment upon which much of the rural economy still directly depends. 
Several E-flows pilot studies have been implemented in the Mekong region 
providing an opportunity to reflect on whether or not the E-flows concept can 
contribute to decision-making for improved water governance in the Mekong 
region. Different organisations such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and 
the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and partners have 
had rather different definitions and views on how to apply E-flows. Whilst the 
MRC’s program objective was to ‘apply the principle of E-flows and its concepts to 
determine appropriate water resources and development options and the 
maintenance of flows’, the procedure approved by the MRC focused on using E-
flows to determine minimum flows (MRC 2006). While IUCN’s work aimed to use 
E-flows to determine appropriate flows as part of multi-stakeholder negotiations. 
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These different approaches, in some cases, have led to confusion over 
terminology and application in understanding how this tool could be applied and 
utilised in the Mekong region to address water allocation and governance issues. 
In this chapter we reflect on the different terminology used for the environmental 
flows concept and its linkage to Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM). We then look at how E-flows have been used in the Mekong region by 
sharing several cases. The E-flows concept has been introduced in the Mekong 
region through IUCN’s book FLOW via the translating and building capacity on 
environmental flows in six languages and countries. The biggest achievement in 
terms of using the FLOW book has been to initiate a discussion of the linkages 
between hydrology, ecology, economy and society amongst some key regional 
stakeholders. Additional cases include an interdisciplinary multi-stakeholder 
approach used in the Nam Songkhram River Basin in Thailand, a rapid E-flows 
assessment carried out in the Huong River Basin and encouraging developments 
for adopting an E-flows policy and finally efforts to apply the E-flows concept and 
principles using an Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) approach in the 
Lower Mekong River Basin. 
Environmental Flows and Integrated Water Resources Management 
As one of the least development and least degraded rivers, the Mekong’s flow 
regime is essentially natural (King and Brown 2009). However, the region is faced 
with significant obstacles and challenges in implementing sustainable water 
resources management. With the overall population expected to continue to 
increase significantly, consumption trends rising with economic growth and more 
people likely to live in cities and towns by the year 2025 than ever before, 
freshwater ecosystems will be placed under continued pressure. This is due to 
water withdrawals for irrigated agriculture, the building of dams for hydropower 
to supply electricity, reservoirs to supply drinking water to large cities and 
navigational improvement projects to improve trade between countries. This may 
all be compounded by future climate change disruptions (WWF 2009). 
Historically water has been managed from a supply perspective 
with an emphasis on maximizing short-term economic growth 
from the use of water. Little thought has been given to the 
health of resources itself and there is a poor understanding of 
the implications of overuse or declining river health. Water 
resource managers are now trying to come to terms with the 
need to take a more holistic view of the river system. They 
increasingly understand that one needs to take care of aquatic 
ecosystems and the resources they provide for long-term 
economic viability (Dyson et al 2003; pp 15-16). 
Central to a more holistic view of E-flows within a broader framework of IWRM is 
a process that promotes the coordinated development and management of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems (Global Water Partnership 2000). It is important to recognize E-
flows as one of the tools of IWRM and as an important sector in its own right 
when looking at effective river basin management and planning. By identifying 
the environment as a sector it enables decision-makers to identify ‘trade-offs’ for 
water uses, such as water for irrigated agriculture, hydropower, drinking water or 
ecological purposes. At the same time, it should be recognized that the term 
‘trade-offs” may be problematic in the case of the Mekong Basin and emerging 
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tensions between the hydropower and capture fishery sectors, where it is 
commonly used to imply a technical approach as opposed to the political 
dimensions of decision-making, while drawing attention away from considering 
development options towards focusing on impacts (Friend and Blake 2009). 
Similarly, the social dimensions of E-flows are just as important to recognize the 
societal benefits that water and its associated services provides. E-flows can be a 
powerful tool to contribute to water resources decision-making and negotiating 
water allocation outcomes. 
During the last five decades, about 100 different approaches/methods have been 
described as environmental flows and more than 30 countries have begun to use 
such assessments in the management of water resources (Tharme 1996, King et 
al 2003, Arthington et al 1998). The concept and definition of E-flows varies 
nationally, regionally and globally. In many cases the concept of E-flows is not 
well understood and terminology used may differ markedly. For example, other 
terms used instead of E-flows include minimum flowii, instream flowiii, ecological 
flow and environmental demand, and may have a different meaning to each 
individual (Moore 2004, Hirji and Davis 2009). Some would disagree whether 
these terms are even synonymous with E-flows.  
The definition we use in this paper is, the water regime provided within a river, 
wetland or coastal zone to maintain ecosystems and their benefits where there 
are competing water uses (Dyson et al 2003). This has been further elaborated 
by the Brisbane Declarationiv as the goal of environmental flow management is to 
preserve socially valued freshwater ecosystem benefits and biodiversity”. It calls 
on governments, development banks and water managers to take immediate 
action to recognise the benefits of environmental flows in water resources 
planning and implement the important lesson learned from efforts to implement 
environmental flow protection around the world. Implementation of 
environmental flow provisions as part of effective water governance is seen as 
integral (Riversymposium 2007). 
Central to the e-flow concept is the recognition that ecosystems not only have 
their own intrinsic value, but also provide humans with essential services 
(Environmental Flows Network 2004). E-flows are important for freshwater 
dependent ecosystems in a river basin, as these ecosystems require a share of 
water to maintain their function. Freshwater ecosystems provide a wealth of food, 
medicine and fibre, water purification, aquatic organisms and wildlife habitat, 
tourism and recreational opportunities, shipping routes, employment, and 
opportunities for culture and spiritual renewable (Krchnak 2006). 
Freshwater ecosystems are equally important to urban and rural communities. E-
flows are therefore an important concept for strengthening the relationship 
between functioning healthy ecosystems and sustainable livelihoods for urban and 
rural communities. Ecosystems are not only a user of water in competition with 
other users, but the base from which socially-valued resources are derived and 
supported, and without which no sustainable uses are possible. 
Water for Development and Ecosystems 
An important aspect of E-flows is that it usually involves a compromise between 
‘water for development’ and ‘water for nature’ (Environmental Flows Network 
2006). 
With the global population quadrupling in the past century, and much of this 
occurring within the Asia-Pacific Region, it is unavoidable that areas of irrigated 
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agricultural land will continue to expand in some locations and water withdrawals 
from freshwater ecosystems will continue to increase (Richter et al 2006). 
Additionally, ongoing infrastructure development continues to compromise the 
health of freshwater ecosystems in myriad ways. 
Failing to allocate enough water for the environment is likely to cause the 
ecosystems already stressed to deteriorate, thereby seriously affecting local 
livelihoods (IWMI 2005). It is important that the myth that water allocated to the 
environment is water unavailable for humans (Krchnak 2006) is dispelled. 
Further, it needs to be recognized that the maintenance or rehabilitation of river 
systems is linked to poverty issues. Thus the contribution of E-flows via river 
ecosystems to achieving poverty alleviation needs to be acknowledged 
(Environmental Flows Network 2006). It is therefore necessary to show how E-
flows can be reconciled with sustainable livelihoods. 
This will involve a shift in thinking, which in many cases is already occurring in 
the Mekong region. For example, Osborne (2007) discusses the rapid changes 
that are taking place in the international rivers of Southeast Asia, such as the 
Salween and Mekong Rivers, with evidence to suggest that there is a new shift in 
thinking, with environmental and social impacts of development no longer fringe 
issues in the sub-region. 
The challenge now is to move beyond the water for development and water for 
nature debate and achieve a balance between these competing needs through 
using E-flows to negotiate water resources decision-making and ultimately 
improving the governance of water resources management in the Mekong region. 
Integrating and Negotiating 
There are a number of challenges and opportunities in implementing 
environmental flows. A challenge that applies to both developed and developing 
countries is the complexity of developing E-flows recommendations that are 
aligned with social goals, particularly in ways that involve all stakeholders in 
deciding upon the health of a country’s rivers (Krchnak 2006). Diverse 
stakeholder groups therefore need to be meaningfully engaged in the 
development of an e-flow regime. E-flows advocates stress “putting E-flows into 
practice is not easy”. It is emphasized that E-flows requires the integration of a 
range of disciplines from across the social, political and natural sciences, while 
adopting a learning process of negotiation between various stakeholders that 
bridge their different (and often competing interests) over water. Multi-
stakeholder Platforms (MSPs) are an important part of the flows negotiations 
process. For example, Dore (2007) indicates that “Multi-stakeholder platforms are 
just one part of governance where actors with either a right, risk or general 
interest (stakeholder) are identified, and usually through representatives, invited 
and assisted to interact in a deliberative forum, aiming for all participants to 
learn, understand alternative perspectives, and possibly negotiate alternative 
strategies and agreements.” It is recognized that there can be no single best 
method, approach or framework to determine an environmental flow. What works 
in one river basin, institutional or socio-cultural setting, may not necessarily work 
in another and so it is important to be aware of and attentive to lessons from 
other approaches. 
Environmental Flows in the Mekong Region 
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There is evidence of a broad adoption of E-flows within an IWRM approach across 
the world, with developed countries leading the way and many developing 
countries with advanced interest (Moore 2004). Furthermore, Tharme and 
Smakhtin (2003) reported clear evidence of increasing research and practice in 
environmental flow assessments within a number of Asia’s developed and 
developing countries including Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Taiwan. 
Many decisions in the Mekong region have to be made about flow management. 
E-flows provide a conceptual framework and information base to aid decision-
makers. However, the E-flows concept is not yet widely understood or used in the 
region. It has the potential to be a useful tool to increase understanding and 
cooperation over water.  
The countries in the Mekong region are at varying levels of E-flows understanding 
or implementation (see Table 1). Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet 
Nam have expressed interest or were in the early stages of undertaking 
environmental flow assessments (Tharme 2003).v In some cases, countries may 
have included E-flows in national legislation and policies such as in Vietnam. 
There has been no evidence of E-flows activity in Myanmar. 
The contributing factors to adoption and implementation are complicated and 
may include political support due to strong community interest or pressure, a 
river basin that is critically degraded due to over-allocation or overdevelopment, 
and projects that are donor driven or instigated by a river basin organisation. E-
flow adoption and implementation has been particularly strong where national 
legislation and policies placed E-flows as a priority within an IWRM framework 
and are also integrated into natural resource management plans at the 
catchment scale. 
There is no evidence in the Mekong Region of E-flows being used as a subject 
or concept in negotiation around water related developments as is the case in 
some other parts of the Asia-Pacific Region. For example, negotiations occurred 
between the Kerala and Tamil Nadu governments in India over interstate river 
water sharing from the Mullaperiyar dam. In South Australia, negotiations are 
occurring between various stakeholders in the Murray-Darling Basin in the 
development of natural resource management plans, which incorporate E-flows. 
Factors limiting the adoption of E-flows in the Mekong region include lack of 
awareness, resources, funds or political will. To be included in policies or 
regulations, some believe that there needs to be a strong agreement on the 
quantitative methods for E-flows. Others believe that the social dimensions are 
equally important and thus a balance is required. There is a limited level of 
capacity and ability to use E-flows as a negotiating tool among a diverse set of 
stakeholders. As some governments in the region believe they have more 
pressing water management issues that require immediate attention such as 
floods and droughts or river systems that are presently ‘undeveloped’.  
Table 1: Status of Environmental Flows Application in the Mekong Region 
 
Cambodia Participated in the MRC-led Integrated Basin Flow 
Management Study (IBFM) for the Mekong River 
Basin. E-flows have not been mainstreamed into 
river basin management, national legislation or 
policies. 
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China The interest and use of E-flows in China has 
developed steadily (Tharme and Smakhtin 2003). E-
flows are currently under experimentation within the 
Yellow River and Suzhou River with respective 
objectives for flushing sediment and water quality. 
Environmental Flows Assessments have been 
undertaken in the Zhangzi River. The Yellow River 
Conservancy Commission has been established and 
its regulation identifies that water allocation should 
include integrated management of domestic, 
agricultural, industrial, and environmental water use 
(see www.yrcc.gov.cn). There is also evidence of 
emerging research in hydrological engineering and 
aquatic ecology relevant to E-flows in China. 
However, there is no clear legislation or policies at a 
national level where E-flows have been explicitly 
recognized. 
Lao PDR Lao PDR was part of the IBFM Study for the Mekong 
River Basin undertaken by the MRC. E-flows have 
not been mainstreamed into river basin 
management, national legislation or policies at this 
stage. At the 1st National Waters Dialoguevi held in 
2007, participants agreed that principles of E-flows 
should be included in the revision of the Law on 
Water and Water Resources. 
Myanmar No evidence of use of E-flows in the country. 
Thailand The use of E-flows is a relatively new tool in 
Thailand. The IBFM study for the Mekong River Basin 
includes Thailand and IUCN and partners piloted an 
E-flows study in the Nam Songkhram River Basin in 
2007. There is a legislative and policy framework in 
which environmental considerations need to be 
considered for major development. However, 
constraints to the mainstream of E-flows in Thailand 
include the complexity of land and water use, 
institutional structures and social diversity, and 
availability of suitable methodologies, information 
and data. 
Vietnam The use of E-flows as a tool for IWRM is more 
advanced in Vietnam than in other countries in the 
Mekong Region. The Huong River is an example of 
where an E-flows assessment has been developed. 
Vietnam is also part of the IBFM study for the 
Mekong River Basin. The Law on Water Resources 
(1998) and the National Water Resources Strategy: 
Towards the Year 2020 recognises that to protect 
aquatic ecosystems attention to ensuring E-flows, 
within a suite of other measures, is necessary.  
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In the past few years a series of mini multi-stakeholder processes took place in 
Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam seeking to understand and 
then translate the book ‘FLOW: The essentials of environmental flows’.vii The book 
was unpacked, the concepts debated, and the book re-assembled in a local 
language translation by teams of government and non-government actors. This 
established a wider understanding of and constituency for environmental flows 
throughout the region. A different process took place in China, less participatory, 
but still resulting in a Chinese version of FLOW that was launched in Beijing by 
the Ministry of Water Resources. 
National constituencies are necessary before there is any likelihood of successful 
acceptance of any transboundary ‘environmental flows’ process.  
The Mekong River Basin is a place where environmental flows work has been 
experimented with on the mainstream, led by the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC), as part of their Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) process. This 
work had many supporters – more outside MRC than inside – who wanted it to be 
successful and contribute to river development scenario debates. To be useful, 
the work must continue to focus on key areas of concern. For example, it is 
widely recognised that the Cambodian nation is heavily dependent on the 
productivity of the Tonle Sap Great Lake wild fishery which is threatened by 
ecological disruption to the natural ‘flood pulse’ system caused by water 
infrastructure development related changes to the wet and dry season flow 
regimes.  
Clarifying the causes and extent of the threats, and then including that in basin 
development debates, is an important component of environmental flows work. In 
sub-basins of the Mekong, such as the Nam Songkhram River Basin – another 
flood pulse river system – in northeast Thailand, The International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) and partners also experimented with 
environmental flows processes with economic, ecological, social and 
transboundary dimensions. 
Furthermore, catalysed by major floods in 1999, IUCN worked with other 
organisations, including provincial authorities and the International Water 
Management Institute (IWMI) to institutionalise environmental flows work in 
Vietnam. The Huong River Basin is a classic case of competing uses for water, 
competing views about whether a flood event is a disaster or a natural 
occurrence, and a range of views about what should be done. In short, it is just 
the kind of situation where an environmental flows approach can contribute. 
Guttman (2006) referred to the need to “recognize the value of products and 
services provided by the river system” and that “the question of values is 
fundamental to identifying environmental flow requirements”. Most would agree. 
But, how to establish these values? In many parts of the Mekong region there has 
been an urgent need to find a way for different perceptions of value to be 
expressed and heard in some type of deliberative process of exchange. At the 
transboundary level, recent efforts in the Mekong River Basin have included the 
Basin Development Planning (BDP) scenarios and a Strategic Environment 
Assessment (SEA) process. The BDP and SEA processes, and whatever comes 
after them, could do well to revisit participatory modes of ‘environmental flows’ 
as a useful approach to ensure water-related negotiations do not beholden to one 
or other sectoral or stakeholder set of interests. 
The above mentioned examples are elaborated in this chapter to show the 
different experiments with E-flows piloting in the Mekong region and the 
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challenges and opportunities for moving towards negotiating water-related 
decision-making. 
Multi-stakeholder translations in the Mekong region – building capacity 
Between 2005-2007 the IUCN and partners led a process of multi-stakeholder 
translations of the book Flow: The Essentials of Environmental Flows (Dyson et al 
2003) into Burmese, Chinese, Khmer, Lao, Thai and Vietnamese. The English 
version of the book was unpacked, the concepts debated, and the book re-
assembled in a local language translation of teams of government and non-
government actors. This has established a wider understanding of and 
constituency for environmental flows throughout the Mekong region which was 
felt needed before any piloting of E-flows could take place. 
The process and product were equally important. In practice, the process of 
translation unfolded differently in each country, but tried to stay true to the 
principles (see Box 1). Working papers were assembled to work with professional 
translators to prepare an appropriate translation of FLOW in each country. Each 
working group included people with different perspectives to ensure that the 
translation process included collective understanding and learning. 
 
 
Box 1: Principles of the Translation 
Effort 
 
State and non-State actors 
Different disciplines 
Different perspectives 
Not privileging of any particular discipline 
or set   
of actors 
Take the time required to build a 
constituency 
Deliberate choice not to just have one 
translator  
but many contributors and peer reviewers 
 
China was the least representative of deliberative democracy, but the non-State 
got heavily involved in the reviewing of the Ministry of Water Resources draft text 
and had a large impact on the final text. Cambodia, Vietnam and Laos were all 
very deliberative with State and non-State actors. The Burmese translation was 
undertaken by a high-quality civic organization and in Thailand; a small team of 
four persons led the work. 
The product was then reviewed by experts from various backgrounds such as 
engineering, law, aquatic ecology, economics, hydrology, political science and 
geography. The strength of the process was that the working group and their 
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peers became champions of environmental flows in their countries and also 
regionally. 
Case of translating FLOW into Khmer 
“The only way (for Cambodia) to achieve good water management and maintain 
environmental flows is cooperation and consultation among the ministries 
concerned". His Excellency Sin Niny, Vice Chair of Cambodia National Mekong 
Committeeviii 
Cambodians are well aware that alterations to natural flow regimes pose a large 
threat to existing use and production from rivers and lakes, such as the Great 
Lake or Tonle Sap. Negotiating flow regimes is recognised as being important.  
There is curiosity as to whether E-flows has anything particular to offer. 
IUCN shared the FLOW book with key bilingual Cambodian partners in 
government and NGOs and sought their opinion on the potential utility of the 
book for Cambodia. There was enthusiastic support to proceed with an efficient 
process. 
An IUCN colleague, who had also facilitated the translation of the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) report, put his hand up to coordinate the process.  
He had learned a great deal from the WCD translation process and wanted to put 
his reflections from that process into action. A high quality translator who is very 
experienced in water and wetlands policy and practice was sought. With the 
facilitator and translator in place it was relatively easy to then build the 
Translation Working Group. The best people are always busy, and so it was 
agreed that the WG would meet on weekends – testament to the interest.  
IUCN’s support to multi-stakeholder water deliberations in Cambodia was a dual 
track. At about the same time IUCN began supporting the establishment and 
operation of multi-stakeholder Cambodia Water Group, facilitated by a very well 
respected NGO called CEDAC (Centre d'Etude et de Developpement Agricole 
Cambodgien/Centre for Study & Development in Agriculture). It was decided 
early on that this group with an agenda to foster deliberation about the most 
significant water issues confronting Cambodia, would not take on the quite 
specialized and onerous FLOW translation task. However, some of the Cambodia 
Water Group joined the translation team. And some of the translation team has 
subsequently become active in the Cambodia Water Group. 
So the translators finished their task, but that group has morphed into the 
Cambodia Water Group, which is fostering debates, and convening dialogues, 
about substantive issues facing Cambodian people. So far their focus has been on 
irrigation development and the momentum for E-flows has not been as strong, 
despite all the translation efforts, as in other countries such as in Thailand where 
piloting took place in the Nam Songkhram River Basin. 
A multi-disciplinary approach to environmental flows in the Nam 
Songkhram River Basin, Thailand 
The Nam Songkhram is the second largest basin in Thailand’s Northeast Region, 
known as Isaan, covering an area of 13,128 km2. It is situated in the far 
northeast corner of Isaan in an area bounded to the south by the Phu Phan hill 
range with divides the Nam Songkhram River Basin from the Khorat Plateau and 
to the north and east by low sandstone hills beyond which lies the broad arch of 
the Mekong mainstream and Lao PDR beyond. The Nam Songkhram River is 
characterised over most of its course by gentle gradients and impressive 
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meanders, with the last 250 kilometres or so flowing across a broad floodplain 
wetland landscape, just 140-160 meters above sea level. A defining feature of the 
Lower Songkhram River Basin (LSRB) is that it experiences a widespread flood 
across its floodplain each rainy season lasting between two to four months and its 
close eco-hydrological connections with the Mekong mainstream, not dissimilar to 
the Tonle Sap in Cambodia, albeit on a smaller scale. 
An environmental flows assessment was carried out in the Nam Songkhram River 
Basin in 2006-07. This was the first time this approach had been explored in 
Thailand. It was developed based on the conviction that E-flows does not only 
consider the importance of river flows from a physical and ecological perspective, 
but also relates to the socio-political side of the equation. The role that people 
play both as beneficiaries of the wider riverine ecosystem and at the same time, 
modifiers of the ecosystem are key to understanding E-flows, “flow is the key 
driver of the system” (IUCN 2005). The interdisciplinary environmental flows 
work in the Nam Songkhram River Basin was a preliminary step towards 
providing data and practical tools for river basin and water managers at national, 
regional and local levels to apply similar approaches for better outcomes. 
The E-flows approach combined two core elements: 
1. A step-wise dialogue and consultation process with key actors and 
stakeholders within the basin and at a national level before and after 
the collection of empirical data; 
2. An intermediate Environmental Flows Assessment exercise that collected 
field data across a range of disciplines at the height of the wet season 
flows and the lowest flow period of the dry season.  
The overall emphasis of the study was to be placed on comprehending the 
ecological and social links on the floodplain wetlands. It was stressed that an 
appreciation of the “flood pulse” concept and key hydrological events such as the 
magnitude, duration, timing, frequency of flood and peak and low flow 
characteristics would be important, so they could be related to individual 
disciplines. 
It was recognized that the concept of environmental flows was entirely new to the 
team and there were no local precedents to draw from. The basic methodology 
employed is described as follows: 
• Collection of data from three representative sites in the Basin, using an 
intermediate E-flows assessment (IFA) approach (see Table 1), integrating 
the skills and the knowledge base of a range of specialists using an inter-
disciplinary exercise. The field studies were timed to coincide with the two 
extremes of flow condition, i.e. peak flows in late August / early 
September 2006 and minimum flows in March 2007. This allowed first-
hand visualization of flow variations in consecutive seasons and provided 
snapshots of the biophysical and socio-economic-cultural conditions 
pertaining at these critical times of the year. Eight days were spent on 
each seasonal assessment, with two days spent at each field site. 
• Following the fieldwork in 2007, some possible future development 
scenarios were drawn up for the Nam Songkhram Basin. Based on the field 
findings and individual’s ‘expert opinions’, the team reassembled in May to 
make broad predictive summaries about likely impacts on flow, 
ecosystems and livelihoods that might result from the implementation of 
each possible scenario. The outcomes were used to inform proceedings of 
a subsequent multi-stakeholder dialogue that brought together a wide 
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range of basin actors, including state sector representatives from the 
agencies with the task of developing water resources at the basin or 
provincial level and local community representatives. 
This broad methodological approach emerged from an iterative process of 
negotiation and compromise between the parties involved that was considered 
appropriate to the local context. A key sub-goal of the research was to build 
individual capacity to understand the importance of E-flows while working in a 
multi-disciplinary team. Every effort was made for team members to work 
together and share insights. This approach, it is believed, helped to break down 
some of the barriers resulting from reductive research and fostered a better 
application of commonalities across the societal and natural science spheres. In 
this way, the research differed considerably from the approach taken by the 
MRC’s IBFM project, where subject specialists spent proportionately little time 
working alongside each other in the field or as a combined team. Though the  
IBFM project was designed to be multidisciplinary by having experts exchange 
knowledge regarding hydrological and social livelihood changes based on 
response to certain agreed indicators, the discussions were largely at a technical 
level (based on the specialists field) not allowing for an interdisciplinary approach 
or a process of engagement with diverse stakeholders in the field.  
 









Low 2 days 
– 2 
weeks 
Low  Low Planning 
Guide 














The Nam Songkhram River Basin E-flows study continually stressed the 
interdisciplinary linkages at the core of the process and underpinned the effort. It 
helped cement and broaden cross-disciplinary understanding amongst the team 
members and allowed them to more confidently talk about issues outside their 
core field of knowledge when communicating with interested observers, according 
to participants’ feedback. Simply put, they began to appreciate the wider linkages 
between flow, ecosystem and livelihoods towards the end of the process, which 
were not immediately apparent from the start. An increased knowledge and 
understanding of the river floodplain system and how hydrological flows affect it, 
became a key output of the E-flows process. An unexpected output was the 
realization that there are several other analogous “flows” occurring on and around 
the floodplain, beyond the material water flows that were the primary object of 
the team’s attention. These included the flow of natural resources on and off the 
floodplain; the flow of people in and out of communities or across borders; and 
the more symbolic flows of knowledge and power associated with water which it 
was felt by some team members are equally deserving of further attention in 
future flows studies. 
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Reflections on the E-flows study process as applied in the Nam 
Songkhram Basin 
From the start, the E-flows study brought a wide range of actors to a single 
critical arena to discuss the linkages between flows, ecosystems and livelihoods 
on several occasions and challenged many of the long-standing beliefs and 
notions that exist, while opening up new modes of critical enquiry and thought. 
Through the field study component, the E-flows study went a long way in 
demonstrating the benefits of not only multi-disciplinary studies, but cross or 
inter-disciplinary approaches. The team of specialists did not only go to the field 
to focus on their own disciplines, but actively engaged in sharing knowledge and 
experience about the floodplain ecosystem they studied between each member. 
The field study was quite unique in that it managed to time the visits to the field 
so that the team was able to witness and survey the river floodplain at the flow 
peak and trough of the annual flood pulse phenomenon. The benefit of this timing 
for both visualization and empirical grounding in relationships between flows, 
ecosystems and livelihoods is hard to underestimate and has theoretical and 
practical implications for any future studies that adopt a similar approach. 
Finally, it can be stated on a modest level that the study has proven itself to be a 
useful, economically efficient and participatory means to gaining insight into the 
social and natural processes at play in river basin and water management in a 
complex setting. As such, it is anticipated that the general approach and findings 
can provide useful lessons and pointers for future efforts to understand and 
influence environmental flows in Thai rivers. 
General conclusions drawn from the field assessments 
A strengthened understanding of the close relationship between the mainstream 
Mekong river and the Lower Nam Songkhram River Basin, in terms of ecology and 
hydrology, in particular the role of flooding arising from a notable backwater and 
occasional backflow effect on to the LSRB floodplain. Comparisons with the Tonle 
Sap (Great Lake) eco-hydrological processes would seem valid and worthy of 
further research. 
Because of the primary influence of the Mekong mainstream on LSRB flood 
timing, duration and extent (as highlighted in WUP-FIN models), any attempt to 
control flooding by building flow control infrastructure on the Lower Nam 
Songkhram River or main tributaries like the Nam Oon, is likely to be futile and 
counterproductive, creating new and undesirable environmental impacts, which 
so far have not been taken into account in project proposals. This is evident from 
existing top-down attempts to build irrigation and flood control infrastructure on 
the mainstream, as at Ban Nong Gaa, Ban Dung District, Udon Thani and 
tributaries as on the Huay Sing at Ban Tha Bor or Huay Uan at Ban Uan, both in 
Sri Songkhram District of Nakhon Phanom. 
The LSRB floodplain is in the advanced stages of an ecological transformation 
from being dominated by natural vegetation mosaics and diverse wetland 
habitats, to a more simplified ecosystem with fewer habitats and less biodiversity. 
This is principally as a result of removal of natural vegetation and conversion to 
agricultural land, in particular paddy fields and latterly, eucalyptus plantations. 
The ecological impacts of this transformation are not well studied, but abundant 
anecdotal and some empirical evidence collected during the study suggests that 
they are serious in terms of biodiversity loss and reduced aquatic productivity. 
The loss of ecosystem functions and services appear to be having serious 
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negative impacts on fishery productivity and local livelihoods through food and 
income security declines, reflected in such phenomena as increasing labour 
migration out of the area, reversing an earlier trend of in-migration. 
A rapid environmental flows assessment in the Huong River Basin, 
Vietnam 
The People’s Committee of Thua Thien Hue Province in central 
Vietnam wants to ensure responsible management of the Huong 
River Basin, which takes account of the health of the ecosystem 
and associated social and economic benefits. It is therefore 
supportive of the effort to learn about environmental flows, 
ultimately establish an environmental flow regime, and in so 
doing contribute to IWRM in the Huong River Basin (IUCN 2005). 
 
The E-flows approach was tested in central Vietnam’s Huong River Basin (Thua 
Thien Hue Province) where flooding and saltwater intrusion have been major 
concerns. In 2003-2004, a multi-partner approach, including the Huong River 
Projects Management Board, the International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI), IUCN and local government agencies, identified the importance of 
developing an Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) strategy in the 
province to maintain ecosystem integrity while providing social, cultural and 
economic benefits to the local people. Such efforts were part of an informed 
approach to wise water usage. 
Our quest for rapid economic growth must not blind us to the importance of 
protecting the flows our rivers need to stay healthy and productive.ix 
Over two-thirds of the population of Thua Thien Hue Province lives within the 
Huong River Basin, all of whom rely directly or indirectly on the river resources 
for their livelihoods and well-being. The river system also provides vital functions 
for many of the riparian and aquatic ecosystems supporting the rich biodiversity 
found in the province. The Tam Giang-Cau Hai Lagoon is one of the largest river 
mouths of its kind in Asia and is an important asset to the local people. Flooding 
in the rainy season and saltwater intrusion in the dry season are major concerns 
in this area due to geographical and meteorological conditions (IUCN 2005). 
In order to address the concerns in the Huong River Basin and determine a multi-
faceted and integrated solution to competing water uses, a rapid environmental 
flow assessment (EFA) was initiated in collaboration with the Huong River 
Projects Management Board, IUCN and the International Water Management 
Institute (IWMI). The Huong River basin was chosen as a pilot project for Vietnam 
largely because, while its problems were complex, its politics were relatively 
simple: the entire river flows through only one province. Vietnamese officials now 
say they are convinced the E-flows concept will eventually help unite rival 
interests on other rivers. Although the notion of opening policy making to public 
consultation is still touchy in the one-party state, officials say that is bound to 
change, too.  
Public participation is a process. It will take time, but it won’t come at once. But 
be assured that we at the provincial government are creating an opportunity for 
the public to be included in the decision-making process, and the environmental 
flows process is one way to do this.x 
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A key objective of the work was to assist local water managers and users to 
undertake the principles and practice of environment flows, to institutionalize 
EFAs as a normal part of IWRM and to build local capacity of partners to 
undertake such work in order to improve water resources decision-making (IUCN 
2005). 
The methodology used in the Huong River Basin was quite different than that of 
the Nam Songkhram River Basin and significant learnings from the Huong case 
were incorporated into the Nam Songkhram work. The Huong River Basin case 
was a rapid assessment, which did not enable a truly interdisciplinary approach 
as was done in the Nam Songkhram. The results from the Huong River offered 
few insights from the biological and social sciences, as it was heavily focused on 
hydrological aspects. The main methodological focus of the Huong River was the 
EFA workshop, which was held in 2004 to open dialogue of perceived future 
impacts of dams on downstream ecosystems and communities. The focus of this 
workshop was strongly on identifying present river conditions including river 
classification and hydrological, ecological and social conditions of the river basin 
in general and of the assessment site in particular. It was the hydrological regime 
that was further elaborated, identifying and distinguishing between different key 
elements of the flow regime (such as timing of wet and dry months and size and 
frequency of flood events) and their importance to ecosystems. An alternative 
hydrological regime scenario was estimated. A number of indicators were agreed 
upon and a synthesis of expert opinions of all participants into a single ecology 
matrix was made to demonstrate the impact of the agreed upon flow scenario on 
the various indicators. The matrix was intended to provide a tool for decision-
makers to weigh the various consequences of their management decisions (IUCN 
2005). 
Lessons learned from the Huong River environmental flows assessment include: 
• Significant time and resources are required for implementation of an 
immediate or comprehensive e-flow assessment. 
• Rapid e-flow assessment requires substantial reliance on expert judgment. 
• Expertise from a wide range of fields is essential. 
Recommendations included: 
• Start with open discussions among all stakeholders 
• Practical conditions at different regions/countries must be considered 
• Due attention should be paid to single-province river basins of special 
value, such as the Huong River Basin (IUCN 2005). 
Whilst valuable skills were obtained by the stakeholders involved in the rapid 
environmental flows assessment, more importantly a greater appreciation of the 
range of disciplines and perspectives required to inform infrastructure planning 
and flow negotiations was had. However there was still a general lack of 
understanding of the link between hydrology and ecology in environment flows 
assessment. This was deemed as one of the common limitations of rapid 
methodologies and also a function of limited data. It was also a challenge given 
this was the first time such an assessment had been carried out and the group 
tended to lean towards addressing the hydrological outcomes and once 
incorporating the broader ecological and societal needs it was felt that the 
hydrological results were sacrificed. Thus, a start to ‘negotiating’ the different 
disciplines was carried out but further steps are needed to truly utilize the E-flows 
framework to its greatest potential.  
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Environmental Flows and the Integrated Basin Flow Management Process 
in the Mekong River Basin 
An additional level of complexity in water resource sharing and exploitation is 
added when dealing with large transboundary river systems, such as the Mekong 
River Basin. This case example is quite different than the others explored earlier 
in the chapter as it a regional case study as opposed to a ‘country’ study and has 
strong political aspects. This different context has significantly different 
implications as to what the results of the story tell us.  
The MRC established a multi-disciplinary team to identify linkages between flow 
regimes that reflect the future options for water resources development in the 
Lower Mekong Basin (LMB), the status of natural resources and the local 
communities dependent on the river and its floodplain. Subject experts were 
selected from the four LMB countries, supplemented with international experts to 
develop capacity. A database on hydrological data of the Mekong River 
maintained by the MRC was being used to outline development scenarios and 
predict impacts, based on different flow regimes. The scenarios are expected to 
be used to inform and support public debate regarding impacts or changes to 
river resources and livelihoods, and support the decision-making process in the 
Basin.  
According to Guttman (2006), “the practical experience around the world of 
applying environmental flows assessment have mainly been on smaller systems 
often highly regulated, with an aim to restore some functions or values which has 
been lost (or were diminishing rapidly). Applying flow assessment to larger 
systems has often focused on restoring a specific component, such as salmon 
fisheries. The application of a comprehensive and holistic assessment of a larger 
systems, which is still in relatively un-modified condition (such as the Mekong 
River) is unusual and in the context of Asia unique. Under the MRC’s IBFMxi a 
particular approach, the Mekong Method, was under development based on the 
holistic approach in DRIFTxii (Downstream Response to Imposed Flow 
Transition).” The IBFM aimed to use the DRIFT approach to assess different 
scenarios based on biophysical and social-livelihood changes. 
Integrated Basin Flow Management or IBFM is a set of multidisciplinary activities 
providing information and knowledge to decision makers on economic benefits 
and environmental and social impacts of development as related to changes in 
the flow regime. The IBFM initiative at the MRC started in 2005. It attempted to 
apply a holistic approach to flow assessment for supporting integrated river basin 
planning in the Lower Mekong Basin and facilitating the trade-off process with 
increased knowledge of economic benefits and impacts of water resource 
development. The IBFM initiative endeavored to strike the balance between 
development taking place in the Lower Mekong Basin and its associated impacts. 
Ensuring the balance between water resources development and environmental 
protection remains the main challenge and it is central to the on-going debates of 
water resources development in the Lower Mekong Basin. Taking this goal as the 
point of departure for the IBFM study, the initiative was designed to support the 
decision-making process by providing high quality data, information and 
knowledge on the costs and benefits of water resources development. 
Two directions were envisaged: 1) to support river basin planning by allowing 
different water resources development options to be assessed, and provide 
information on costs and benefits of that development and impacts; and 2) to 
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contribute to the maintenance of flows on the mainstream of the Mekong (as laid 
out in the 1995 Mekong Agreement). 
The IBFM Mekong Method developed by the MRC involved determining: 
• The current hydrology of the river based on existing information such as 
historical flow data. This is to understand the Mekong flow season and its 
importance to the ecosystem and seasonal use of the Mekong resources 
for sustaining livelihoods; 
• Historical parameters to describe the flow conditions of the river and its 
relationship with the flow change; 
• Parameters to describe environmental and socio-economic benefits and 
impacts; 
• Flow response relationships quantifying how possible future changes in 
hydrological parameters would probably be expected to cause changes in 
environmental and socio-economic parameters (King 2006). 
The key IBFM activities included three components.  The first was a one-year 
hydrological assessment of the Lower Mekong Basin culminating in the publication 
Overview of the Hydrology of the Mekong Basin (Mekong River Commission 
2005). This provided the basis for further analysis of the flow into components 
and zones, which could be analysed separately with respect to flow changes 
(Guttman 2006).  
The objective of the second component of IBFM was to introduce an holistic, 
multidisciplinary approach to assess river flows from the perspective of beneficial 
uses (economic, social and environment) enabling discussion between the 
member-States on trade-offs and finally agreement on an acceptable flows 
regime (minimum flows) framework for basin development and flow monitoring. 
This work resulted in the first basin-wide flow assessment giving an 
approximation of the environment, economic and societal benefits and costs of a 
number of possible future flow regimes (10-30 years). All of the flow regimes 
considered combinations of possible irrigation and hydroelectric power 
developments in the basin. Other combinations of possible development activities 
could and should be considered. This flow assessment involved a multidisciplinary 
team of specialists mainly formed of hydrologists, economists, ecologists, and 
modelers. Biophysical, economic and social assessments were produced (Guttman 
2006). 
The third IBFM component aimed to launch research designed to provide more 
detailed and confident prediction of costs and benefits of changing flow regimes 
and to initiate a broad stakeholder consultation of consequences of flow changes. 
The focus of this stage was the social assessment. The underlying focus was to 
find out the number of people living along the river and using its resources for 
subsistence. The first step was to describe their links with the river and to 
delineate the width and length of the river corridor within which they live (King et 
al 2003). The number of people were then quantified and their sources and use of 
water were traced and studied. The social and economic assessment studies were 
the first attempt to put values on the Mekong resources and valuate its 
importance in financial terms. 
The term “trade-offs” has been used throughout the IBFM study however it is 
unclear whether this term is well understood. Which trade-offs is the MRC trying 
to pursue and which scale or form of trade-offs does the MRC aim to advocate. In 
the context of the IBFM, the trade-offs would be based on the knowledge of the 
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three streams of assessment where the prediction of flow changes on ecosystem 
and people’s livelihoods are factors into the trade-offs framework. A paper by 
Friend and Blake (2009) highlights the potential risks and contradictions resulting 
from an overly narrow focus by Mekong river basin and water resources planners 
on the notion of “trade-offs”, especially with regards to the tensions between the 
hydropower and fishery sectors. 
In comparison to say the Nam Songkhram E-flows case, IBFM Components 1-3 
demonstrated the process of application of the DRIFT methodology. The three 
streams of study were undertaken: biophysical, social and economic assessments 
with an overall goal to provide knowledge on costs and benefits of water 
resources development in the LMB. However, a key component of using an 
environmental flows approach to negotiate outcomes is public participation, which 
was left out of the process. According to King and Brown (2009), negotiations to 
determine an agreed ‘development space’xiii was not put into practice because the 
MRC IBFM project ended at the point of presentation of scenarios. However, 
stakeholder engagement was not implemented at any stage of the project, as 
was the case in the Nam Songkhram Basin. Furthermore, no publications 
resulting from the IBFM studies have been formally published and released in the 
public domain. IBFM Report 8, which documented the initial assessment of the 
three components, was initially released but then never formally published. 
Was the IBFM process carried out (but not completed) by the MRC an 
environmental flows assessment? Has the data and information collected and 
analysed contributed to decision-making around large infrastructural development 
such as hydropower or irrigation schemes? During the Mekong Region Waters 
Dialogue in July 2006, participants concluded that “the outputs of IBFM would 
become inputs to political discussions, so it was essential that there was 
transparency in the methods and indicators used, and that the rationale for 
different flow regime scenarios was clearly explained. Engagement of local 
communities must also be encouraged, in terms of both carrying out IBFM 
activities and assessing the accuracy of the results. A regular mechanism for 
channeling information from the public should be built into the IBFM process 
(IUCN et al 2007). It is not believed that any of the data developed was carried 
out in a manner in which to achieve a negotiated environmental flow regime for 
the Lower Mekong Basin. The process has been partly successful in introducing 
the IBFM / DRIFT concepts to MRC staff and consultants but it could be 
challenged as to whether the methods employed have promoted a full 
understanding of the Mekong’s resources and its multi-sectoral benefits. Is it 
clear from the IBFM initiative how the Mekong’s resources will be impacted due to 
flow changes from dominant paradigm development initiatives in the region e.g. 
hydropower projects. A great deal of knowledge has already been carried out to 
understand flow changes by other organizations. Thus, how has the data collected 
under the IBFM complemented or added-value in the environmental flows 
discourse?  
Global experience and guidance on E-flows requires integration of a range of 
disciplines and also negotiations between stakeholders to bridge different 
interests that compete for use of water. The reward is an improved management 
regime that guarantees the longevity of the ecosystem and finds the optimal 
balance between the various uses (Dyson et al 2003). There are several initial 
learnings from the IBFM process. Whilst the IBFM managed to undertake 
multidisciplinary research, which resulted in sharing and debating across the 
disciplines among the consultancy team and MRCS staff, there were no efforts to 
engage a wider stakeholder base and incorporate local knowledge into the 
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process. Secondly, translating the scientific findings into language accessible for 
decision-makers such as through policy briefs was not carried out thus leaving 
decision-makers unclear about the complex dimensions of IBFM and its potential 
use in informing decisions about water allocation in the Mekong. Moving towards 
negotiating decisions would be a next step after data is collected, analyzed, and 
stakeholders are consulted and have opportunity to feed into the process. Part of 
the reason for not being able to move forward was the lack of agreement on the 
findings and certainly we might revisit the “trade-offs” terminology, which can be 
argued as not well understood, contentious or possibly poorly translatable in 
Mekong languages. The other reason was underlying political tensions with the 
IBFM case later became more apparent than with the other cases presented in 
this chapter. Until information is in the public domain, trust is only built through 
public discussion of complex and sensitive issues, and it is unlikely that techno-
scientific and policy initiated studies will be able to contribute to informed 
decision-making.    
The IBFM work ground to a standstill and different initiatives have moved forward 
in taking the limelight such as the Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) of 
the Mekong Mainstream and the finalization of scenarios under the Basin 
Development Program.  Whilst these initiatives have made significantly improved 
efforts to involve stakeholders (where the IBFM process patently failed) it is still 
unclear as to whether the results will determine and commit the region to a 
negotiated flow regime, based on knowledge generated by the IBFM. 
Conclusions 
In the Mekong region there are various conceptions of environmental flows in the 
research community and among policy makers and practitioners. The examples 
presented in this chapter make the case that environmental flows is a useful tool 
for negotiating appropriate water regimes among multi-stakeholders. However, 
the question still remains as to whether implementing environmental flows in the 
Mekong region is an ‘impossible dream’ (IUCN, 2005).  There are clear differences 
between countries in the Mekong Region in terms of approach and understanding 
of E-flows. E-flows piloting in the Nam Songkhram River Basin in Thailand was 
applied at an intermediate level to ascertain appropriate water regimes in the 
river and identify stakeholder groups based on a multi-disciplinary team of 
experts formed  from academic, local government and community 
representatives. The case showed the difficulty in linking E-flows theory and 
practice but had strong emphasis on stakeholder engagement and dialogues as a 
contributing tool for piloting of E-flows. In the case of Vietnam, a rapid E-flows 
assessment was carried out in the Huong River Basin among diverse stakeholders 
however the assessment was not multi-disciplinary in nature and thus had 
difficulty in linking the hydrological and ecological aspects. Today, Vietnam can be 
seen as having moved the farthest in terms of government policy by 
incorporating environmental flows into policy at the national level. Some of the 
key government officials involved in the Huong River Basin study and the 
translation into Vietnamese can be seen as champions nationally of this approach 
and more work will be required to sustain these efforts.  
Many observers do not believe that the Integrated Basin Flow Management 
approach utilized by the Mekong River Commission was a genuine environmental 
flows assessment, as the knowledge produced in the IBFM process was not 
shared and stakeholders were not engaged. Negotiation base on information 
generated could thus not take place. However the work exemplified the need for 
a wide range of data to inform decisions on balancing economic and social 
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benefits of development with environmental and social costs. Procedures 
developed for environmental flows at the MRC focus on ‘minimum flows’ but does 
not go further in addressing a more holistic approach to environmental flows or 
using it as a tool for negotiating water regimes. A serious perceived weakness 
was the reluctance of MRC to publish its findings from the IBFM studies. The SEA 
and BDP now take over and could continue the process of determining an 
appropriate and negotiated flow regime for the Mekong that balances ecosystems 
and livelihood needs. 
These cases exemplify the need to ensure that E-flows becomes an integral part 
of river basin management not only as an abstract concept in legislation that may 
be vulnerable to different interpretations and thereby impossible to become 
effective in law enforcement but as a process that involves multiple stakeholders 
dialoguing to determine the best possible flow regime for the Mekong region. As 
the multi-stakeholder translation process of the book FLOW showed, capacity 
building and equally importantly, finding the correct translated terms for complex 
scientific concepts is a crucial element to enabling people to participate effectively 
in a environmental flows process. In short, for E-flows processes to be adopted in 
the region needs a sustained process of support and trust-building between 
numerous interested actors and institutions to build a critical mass of expertise 
and understanding during the period of conceptual internalization.  
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i There are many different methodologies, depending on the chosen emphasis.  
For a recent review see Tharme (2003).  
ii Minimum flows are used to describe the retention of enough flow to maintain 
river connectivity, especially for fish passage, but this is usually only one 
component of the flow regime that needs to be maintained, and there are few 
instances where an environmental flow consists of just a minimum flow (Hirji and 
Davis 2009). 
iii Instream flows imply the flows needed to maintain ecosystem services from 
flows within the river channel, but this excludes the often important floodplain 
flows that overtop the channel (Hirji and Davis 2009). 
iv The Brisbane Declaration presents principles and a global action agenda that 
responds to the most urgent needs to protect rivers globally. It calls for action 
that strongly encourages the governments, development banks and water 
managers to take immediate action to recognize the benefits of environmental 
flows in water resources planning and implement the important lessons learnt 
from efforts to implement environmental flow protection around the world. 
Implementation of environmental flow provisions as part of effective water 
governance is seen as integral (Riversymposium 2007). 
v For the four Lower Mekong countries, Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and 
Vietnam, their assessments have been largely linked to the IBFM process of the 
MRC.  China has moved further ahead through piloting E-flows assessments in 
various river basins and Vietnam has piloted a rapid E-flows assessment in the 
Huong River Basin and incorporated minimum flows into their national strategy. 
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vi In 2007, IUCN and partners organised a National Dialogue with the 
Government of Lao PDR and other stakeholders to discuss key water-related 
governance concepts including environmental flows.  
vii Dyson et al (2003) 
viii Quote in IUCN press release on Khmer Launch of FLOW (IUCN 2007) 
ix Quote by Dr Nguyen Thai Lai, MONRE, Vietnam, 2005 
x Quote by Nguyen Ngoc Thien, vice chairman the Hue Provincial People’s 
Committee in 2007 to IUCN. 
xi In 2006, The MRC Council approved the Procedures for the Maintenance of 
Flows on the Mainstream. The agreement includes: Specifically, except in the 
cases of historically severe droughts and/or floods, the Procedures apply to the 
cooperation in the maintenance of flows on the mainstream at selected stations: 
a) of not less than the acceptable minimum monthly natural flow during each 
month of the dry season under Article 6A; b) to enable the acceptable natural 
reverse flow of the Tonle Sap to take place during the wet season under Article 
6B; and c) to prevent average daily peak flows greater than what naturally occur 
on the average during the flood season attributed to intentional water releases 
from manmade activities and other facilities under Article 6C. The flows to be 
maintained at specified locations as stipulated in a-c above are set out in a 
separate document entitled “Technical Guidelines” to be adopted/established by 
the MRC Joint Committee (MRC 2006). The authors are not aware of the 
development of these Technical Guidelines. 
xii The Mekong Method aimed to incorporates useful aspects of environmental 
flows assessment as well as more conventional hydrological studies. DRIFT is a 
scenario-based framework, providing decision-makers with a number of options 
of future flow regimes for a river of concern, together with the consequences for 
the condition of the river (Dyson et al, 2003, p. 36).  
xiii Development Space is defined by present day conditions and the negotiated 
limit of ecosystem degradation as basin development proceeds (King and Brown 
2009). 
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I. Abstract  
The Mekong River Basin is facing rapid changes, including intensive plans for 
water resources development. While the different water-related projects are 
considered important for economic development of the riparian countries, the 
negative impacts that they are likely to cause for ecosystems and livelihoods are 
estimated to be remarkable. Assessing the likely impacts of such development at 
different geographical and temporal scales is therefore crucial for successful 
planning and decision-making. Yet, existing impact assessment (IA) processes 
seem in many cases to be inadequate to capture even the actual magnitude of 
the impacts at different levels and scales. They are also predominantly expert-
driven processes with a macro-scale view, leading easily to the neglect of local 
knowledge and contexts. Due to their technical nature, the assessments are also 
easily described in language that excludes most of the people from the discussion 
of their methods and results. 
It has been argued that impact assessment in such a dynamic and complex 
setting as the Mekong River Basin requires better coordination between 
assessments at different levels, and overall, more adaptive approach that makes 
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better use of assessments from local level up to the regional level (see e.g. 
Keskinen 2008). Impact assessment also requires the recognition of highly 
political nature of water resources development and related planning processes, 
including the decisions on the ways the IA approaches are used. The impact 
assessments should therefore not be only responsive, but also address the more 
strategic, policy-level issues related to water resources development. At the same 
time impact assessments form only one part of the planning and decision-making 
processes, and they should therefore be studied in the broader context which 
they are being used.  
This tool review looks at two major impact assessment methods, namely the 
Strategic Environment Assessment (SEA) and Cumulative Impact Assessment 
(CIA), and discusses their current use and future potential in the Mekong Region. 
Out of these two approaches, the SEA is a more strategic assessment approach 
that aims to anticipate the environmental impacts of planned development 
already in early phase –and at higher level– of planning and decision making. 
CIA, on the other hand, aims to evaluate the cumulative impacts of multiple 
different activities. While CIA can be used to support SEA, its use is usually more 
common on later stages of planning when many of the decisions about the focus 
and form of the development have already been made.  
Several IA frameworks and methodologies providing possibilities to look at 
impacts at different levels and phases already exist in the Mekong Region (see 
e.g. MWBP and IUCN 2005; Lazarus et al. 2006; MRCS/IBFM 2006; Swift 2006; 
MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007; ADB 2008; Bezuijen, Timmins, and Seng 2008; TKK and 
SEA START RC 2009). However, the use of different IA methods has so far been 
rather non-systematic, with weak linkages between different assessments. Also 
misunderstandings related to impact assessment methodology and terminology 
are common.   
Neither the SEA nor the CIA has –yet– been extensively used in the Mekong. 
They have, however, already for long appeared in the plans and strategies of 
both regional organisations and the governments of the riparian countries, and 
increasing amount of actors are including SEA and CIA as part of their planning 
process. Yet, the implementation of both of the methods seems still to be 
sporadic and weakly connected to the actual decision-making. The importance of 
understanding the possibilities and limitations of the two methods is therefore 
just increasing.  
The tool review seeks therefore to answer particularly to the following two 
questions:  
What are the general definitions of SEA and CIA, and what are the differences 
between the two (plus between them and other IA methods)?  
In which ways the two IA methods have been used in the Mekong, and what can 
be learnt from the recent SEA and CIA work undertaken in the region?  
II. SEA & CIA – An introduction  
The impact assessments are generally carried out to inform planning and 
decision-making about the potential consequences of certain decisions and plans. 
Indeed, environmental decision-making is relying already so much on technical 
expertise and assessments that Rayner (2003) has characterized the present era 
as the ‘age of assessment’. Consequently, there nowadays exists a wide set of 
different approaches, methods and tools for environmental, social and economic 
impact assessment in global, regional, national as well as local scales. It is 
important to realise that different approaches aiming to assess the impacts of 
different developments are by no means limited to SEA and CIA only, but 
plethora of other approaches do exist. Ironically, this has lead to situations where 
many IA methods are being developed and proposed but actually very few 
applied and used. This has very much been the case for example with the 
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different impact assessment processes within the Mekong River Commission 
(MRC).  
Due to large variety of different IA tools and approaches, one gets easily lost in 
the diverse possibilities provided by different, partly overlapping impact 
assessment tools. Even the agencies implementing the IAs are sometimes using 
wrong terms, talking of CIA when actually doing EIA, for example. Different 
impact assessment methods and approaches include Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA or CEA), Social Impact 
Assessment (SIA), Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA), Integrated 
Assessment (IA), Hydrological Impact Assessment (HIA), and Vulnerability 
Assessment (VA). A short summary of different impact assessment tools and their 
definitions is provided in Table 1. 
This tool review focuses on two impact assessment methods that are commonly 
among the less well-known approaches among the different IA methods. Overall, 
it can be said that out of the two approaches, SEA is more strategic and CIA more 
responsive. While SEA looks at the environmental contexts and constraints 
related to planning and decision making at earlier phases and higher levels, the 
CIA aims to look at the cumulative impacts of development that is usually at least 
partly planned already. To be truly effective, however, both of the methods 
should naturally be applied prior the implementation of the planned projects.  
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Table 1. General definitions of different impact assessment (IA) tools and 
methods.  




International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA 1999) 
defines the EIA as follows: “The process of identifying, predicting, 
evaluating and mitigating the biophysical, social, and other 
relevant effects of development proposals prior to major decisions 
being taken and commitments made.” The major dilemma across 
the world is what does ‘the environment’ in EIA mean? It is also 
important to note that for most writers environmental impacts 
don’t mean only environment, but more broadly “biogeophysical, 
socio-economic and cultural” effects (Vanclay 2004). In other 
words, EIA is closely connected to so-called triple bottom line 




To overcome to confusion between the different environmental 
impact assessment methods, the different methods and 
approaches as sometimes referred jointly as Environmental 
Assessment (EA). For example (ERM 2002a) defines EA to be a 
systematic process to examine, evaluate and document potential 
impacts of proposed developments so that they can be taken into 
consideration during the decision making process, and uses the 
term as a collective term for project-level Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA), programme, policy and plan-level Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) and for the assessment of 








Cumulative effects are the net result of environmental impact 
from a number of projects and activities (Sadler 1996). By 
definition, they are combined within a time and space framework 
established through direct and indirect activity effect relationships 
(ibid), and often in combination with the impacts of other past, 
existing and proposed actions. Each increment from each action 
may not be noticeable but cumulative impacts may become 
apparent when all increments are considered together. 
Consequently, CIA can be defined as “a systematic procedure for 
identifying and evaluating the significance of effects from multiple 
activities. The analysis of the causes, pathways and consequences 
of these impacts is an essential part of the process” (Cooper 
2004: p.4).  
SIA Social Impact 
Assessment 
In general terms, SIA is analysing, monitoring and managing the 
social consequences of development (IAIA 2003). SIA includes the 
processes of analysing, monitoring and managing the intended 
and unintended social consequences, both positive and negative, 
of planned interventions (policies, programs, plans, projects) and 
any social change processes invoked by those interventions. Its 
primary purpose is to bring about a more sustainable and 
equitable biophysical and human environment (ibid).  
                                          
1 Both names, Cumulative Effect Assessment and Cumulative Impact Assessment 
are used when cumulative impacts are assessed. Throughout this document term 
CIA is being used. 
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SEA is usually defined as a process of anticipating and addressing 
the potential environmental consequences of proposed initiatives 
at higher levels of decision-making, and evaluating the 
interlinkages with economic and social considerations (Sadler 
1995; OECD/DAC 2006). Thus, SEA aims at integrating 
environmental considerations into the earliest phase of policy, 
plan or programme (P/P/P) development, on a par with economic 
and social considerations. By doing this, SEA aims to mitigate 
negative implications and maximize potential positive synergies 
(World Bank 2006). SEA can consist of family of different 
approaches using variety of tools and making use of participatory 
process (OECD 2006).  
Int. A Integrated 
Assessment 
Int. A2 is commonly defined as: a structured process of dealing 
with complex issues, using knowledge from various scientific 
disciplines and/or stakeholders, such that integrated insights are 
made available to decision makers (Rotmans 1998: 155) 
Int. A has evolved rapidly over the last decade as a new scientific 
concept to address the need for more multi- and cross-disciplinary 
approaches. Rotmans (1998) note the increasing recognition for 
the field of Integrated Assessment, but at the same time 
recognises that the methodological basis is lagging behind the 
expectations from the outside world.  
Parker et al. (2002) provide an interesting review on the state of 
Int. A modelling, concluding that the science behind the modelling 
is often not new and in many ways it can be considered to be the 
combining of old areas of science and research to consider 




Out of the different IA approaches presented here, the HIA is the 
only one focusing specifically on water. HIA is defined as the 
prediction or estimation of the consequences of a current or 
proposed human action on hydrology, sediment transport and 
hydrodynamics (Kummu 2008). The impacts on global climate, 
such as increased evaporation into the atmosphere due to 
irrigated fields or greenhouse gas emissions from the reservoirs, 
are not considered in this work to be part of the HIA analysis. The 
HIA could be classified as a CIA or EIA conducted in the fields of 
hydrology, sediment transport and hydrodynamics. 
                                          
2 Also acronym IA is used for Integrated Assessment, but as we use it to refer 
impact assessment more generally, we apply here Int. A as an acronym for 
Integrated Assessment.  
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IA Tool  Definition 
VA Vulnerability 
Assessment 
Vulnerability can be defined in various ways depending on the 
field of application. One of the generally used definitions in 
relation to natural resources/environmental risks describes 
vulnerability as "the risk of adverse outcomes to receptors or 
exposure units (human groups, ecosystem, and communities) in 
the face of relevant changes in climate, other environmental 
variables and social conditions" (Clark and et al. 2000). 
Consequently, vulnerability assessment (VA) can be conducted in 
several scales and levels. According to Clark et al. (2000). VA, in 
contrast to EIA, selects a particular group, unit of concern or 
geographical area (e.g. landless farmers, boreal forest 
ecosystems, coastal communities, delta area) and seeks to 
determine the risk of specific adverse outcomes for that unit in 
the face of a variety of stresses. Further VA identifies a range of 
factors that may reduce response capacity and adaptation ability 
of the unit to stressors. 
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II.1 Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has emerged during the last decade 
as a response to conventional environmental impact assessment approaches’ 
inability to tackle increasingly complex environmental issues, including their 
integration with economic and social issues (Partidário 2004). By doing this, SEA 
aims to mitigate negative implications and maximize potential positive synergies 
(World Bank 2006). Thus, the SEA has been described as an approach for 
mainstreaming and ‘upstreaming’ environmental sustainability in the decision-
making hierarchy, trying to address the issue of environmental sustainability as 
early as possible in the decision-making process (OECD 2006).  
 
There are differing definitions for SEA, but SEA is commonly defined as a process 
of anticipating and addressing the potential environmental consequences of 
proposed initiatives at higher levels of decision-making as well as and evaluating 
the interlinkages with economic and social considerations (Sadler 1995; 
OECD/DAC 2006). It has also been defined as a process that integrates 
environmental and sustainability questions through visions, intentions and 
strategic proposals, with the final objective of improving the decisions (Partidário 
2007). SEA therefore aims at integrating environmental considerations into the 
earliest phase of policy, plan or programme (P/P/P) development, on a par with 
economic and social considerations. It is thus, as the name says, more strategic 
than most other impact assessments – it has even been said that SEA is a 
strategic facilitator of sustainability process (Partidário 2007).    
SEA thus encompasses assessment of both policy initiatives and actual plans that 
have physical and spatial dimensions. SEA can consist of family of different 
approaches using variety of tools, rather than a single, fixed and prescriptive 
approach (OECD 2006). A good SEA should therefore be adapted and tailor-made 
to each context it is applied, with strong participatory nature. As highlighted by 
(OECD/DAC 2006), SEA is a continuous, iterative and adaptive process focused 
on strengthening institutions and governance, and by no means a separate 
system or a simple linear, technical approach. In the context of the Mekong, 
however, for example the MRC seems to consider SEA more as a decision-aiding 
tool rather than as an actual decision-making process (MRCS (2005).  
 
STRATEGY? 
A concept used first in military science, strategy generally refers to the study and 
planning of means to achieve certain policy objectives.  
In planning and policy making, strategic approaches are not intended to find out 
what can happen in the future, but instead they aim to plan actions that make up 
possible routes to a desirable future (Mintzberg 1994; Partidário 2007). 
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Figure 1.  The relation of SEA and EIA in terms with the development of 
policies, plans, programmes and projects (OECD 2006). 
It is important to notice that SEA has basically the same purpose and concept as 
Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA): they both seek to identify potential 
environmental –and in their broader sense, also social and economic– impacts as 
well as to recommend the ways to prevent or keep impacts to acceptable levels. 
The most remarkable difference between the two is the phase that they are 
applied: SEA is applied to programmes, plans and policies i.e. at more strategic 
and earlier stage of the decision-making process than EIA (Figure 1). 
Consequently, it is sometimes said that while EIA addresses the effect of 
development on the environment, SEA addresses the effect of the environment 
on development (MRC/BDP 2003). SEA thus follows similar steps than EIA, but 
has much larger boundaries in terms of time, space and subject coverage. SEAs 
can therefore also be seen to serve as an umbrella level of analysis that feeds 
more specific EIAs and improves their quality (ICEM 2009a). Table 2 below 
summarises some of the main differences between the two approaches. 
Table 2. Some comparisons between EIA and SEA (Partidário 2007). 
SEA  EIA
The perspective is strategic and long-term The perspective is of execution in the short and medium-term
The process is cyclical and continuous The process is discrete, motivated by concrete                                                intervention proposals
The purpose is to help build a desirable future,                                               
rather than an attempt to know the future
The project to be assessed has to be known                                               
at relatively detailed level
The definition of what is intended is vague, there is a large              
amount of uncertainty and the data are always quite insufficient 
The definition of what intends to be done is relatively precise and 
data are reasonably available or can be collected through fieldwork
Follow-up in SEA is performed through the preparation and 
development of policies, plans, programmes and projects
Follow-up in EIA is performed through the construction                                                              
and implementation of the project
The strategy may never be put into practice given that the actions 
established in plans and programmes may never be implemented
Projects requiring an EIA are executed (or not),                                              
once their environmental feasibility is guaranteed
 
 
Internationally, the key milestones for the development and adaptation of SEA 
include:  
European Union’s Directive 2001/42/EC on SEA that entered into force in June 
2001 in all EU Member States (European Union 2001)  
Protocol on SEA to United Nations Economic Convention on Europe (UNECE) 
Convention on EIA in Transboundary Context, adopted in Kiev in May 2003 
(UNECE 2003)  
OECD/DAC Good Practice Guidance of SEA in development cooperation, endorsed 
by key donor agencies and International Financial Institutions (OECD/DAC 2006) 
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While the EU Directive naturally guides the actions of EU Member States only, the 
UNECE Protocol on SEA –that supplements the Convention on Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) in a Transboundary Context– is open to all members of 
the United Nations. The UNECE protocol could thus be adopted also by the 
Mekong countries, and would actually be very relevant in the region due to its 
transboundary nature. The protocol has not, however, yet entered force as it 
needs still to be ratified by at least 16 UNECE Member states (for the latest status 
of the Protocol, see http://www.unece.org/env/sea).  
The UNECE Protocol, once in force, will require its parties to evaluate the 
environmental consequences of their official draft plans and programmes in the 
transboundary settings. In addition, the Protocol addresses policies and 
legislation, although the application of SEA to these is not mandatory. The 
Protocol also calls for extensive public participation in government decision-
making. The public will not only have the right to know about plans and 
programmes, but also the right to comment, have their comments taken into 
account, and be told of the final decision and why it was taken. This kind of 
participation of the public in strategic decision-making builds on the Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (so-called 
Espoo Convention), and the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(so-called Aarhus Convention).  
The OECD/DAC Guidance on SEA puts a special emphasis on the value and 
importance of SEA in development cooperation, and seeks to provide broad 
guiding frameworks and principles in the operationalising SEA in practice (OECD 
2006). For this reason, the guidance is particularly relevant in the Mekong 
Region. The OECD/DAC emphasises that applying SEA to development 
cooperation has benefits for both decision-making procedures and development 
outcomes, as it can (OECD 2006): 
• provide the environmental evidence to support more informed decision-
making, 
• identify new opportunities by encouraging a systematic and thorough 
examination of development options, 
• prevent costly mistakes, by alerting decision-makers to potentially 
unsustainable development options at an early stage in the decision-
making process,  
• build stakeholder engagement in decision-making for improved 
governance, 
• safeguard environmental assets for sustainable development with poverty 
reduction, 
• facilitate transboundary co-operation around shared environmental 
resources and contribute to conflict prevention.  
As a practical example on the different contexts where SEA can be applied, 
(OECD/DAC 2006) identifies twelve key entry points for SEA at three broad 
settings3:   
• SEAs led by Partner Country Governments: 
• Macro-level strategies and plans 
• Policy reforms and budget support programmes 
• National sectoral development programmes 
• Infrastructure investments programmes and plans 
                                          
3 It is important to note, however, that due to the focus of the OECD/DAC, the 
recommendations seem to (over-)emphasise the role for donor agencies in 
implementing the SEA. 
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• Spatial development programmes and plans 
• Transnational planning 
• SEAs undertaken in relation to Donor Agencies’ own processes: 
• Country assistance strategies and plans 
• Donors’ partnership agreements with other agencies 
• Donors’ sector-specific policies 
• Donor-backed public private infrastructure programmes 
• SEAs in other, related circumstances: 
• Independent review commissions 
• Major private sector-led projects and plans  
II.2 Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA) 4 
Cumulative effects are the net result of environmental impact from a number of 
projects and activities (Sadler 1996). By definition, they are combined within a 
time and space framework established through direct and indirect activity effect 
relationships (ibid), and often in combination with the impacts of other past, 
existing and proposed actions. Each increment from each action may not be 
noticeable but cumulative impacts may become apparent when all increments are 
considered together.  
Consequently, CIA can be defined as “a systematic procedure for identifying and 
evaluating the significance of effects from multiple activities. The analysis of the 
causes, pathways and consequences of these impacts is an essential part of the 
process” (Cooper 2004: 4). CIA is, according to Hegmann et al. (1999: 3), 
“environmental assessment as it should always have been: an EIA done well”. 
Although no universally accepted framework for CIA exists, general principles 
have gained acceptance. These eight principles of CIA (Table 3) have been 
presented by Council on Environmental Quality (1997: 8). Each of these 
principles illustrates a property of cumulative effects analysis that differentiates it 
from traditional environmental impact assessment (ibid). The principles can be 
used to facilitate the CIA process planning, implementation and evaluation.  
Table 3. Principles of CIA (Adapted from Council on Environmental Quality 1997: 
8). 
 Principle 
1 Cumulative impacts are caused by the aggregate of past, present, and 
reasonably foreseeable future actions. 
2 Cumulative impacts are the total effect, including both direct and indirect 
impacts, on a given resource, ecosystem, and human community of all 
actions taken, no matter who (federal, non-federal, or private) has taken 
the actions. 
3 Cumulative impacts need to be analyzed in terms of the specific 
resource, ecosystem, and human community being affected. 
4 It is not practical to analyse the cumulative impacts of multiple actions 
on the universe; the list of environmental effects must focus on those 
that are truly meaningful. 
5 Cumulative impacts on a given resource, ecosystem, and human 
community are rarely aligned with political or administrative boundaries. 
6 Cumulative impacts may result from the accumulation of similar effects 
or the reinforcing gross interaction of different impacts. 
                                          
4 CIA can also be called Cumulative Effect Assessment (CEA).  
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7 Cumulative impacts may last for many years beyond the life of the 
action that caused the impacts. 
8 Each affected resource, ecosystem, and human community must be 
analyzed in terms of its capacity to accommodate additional effects, 
based on its own time and space parameters. 
 
If EIA assesses the effects of a project to identify and mitigate its key effects, and 
SEA is the same thing for strategic actions, then CIA cuts in the opposite 
direction. Instead of focusing on the effects of a given action it focuses on the 
receiving environment and considers all of the effects on a given receptor 
(Therivel and Ross 2007) (Figure 2).  
 













Figure 2. Example of actions and resources assessed by EIA, SEA and CIA 
(modified from Therivel and Ross 2007: 366) 
Identifying past, present and future actions is critical to establishing the 
appropriate geographic and time boundaries for the CIA (Council on 
Environmental Quality 1997). One particular project might not have very 
significant impact alone but cumulative impact of the active projects might 
exceed the significance threshold (see Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Time frames for project-specific and cumulative impact analyses 
(Applied from Council on Environmental Quality 1997: 17). Note: the possible 
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reinforcing gross interactions of the cumulative effects are not considered in this 
illustration.  
As are the temporal scales critical for the CIA process, so are the spatial scales. 
The CIA can be done at different spatial scales ranging from local to basin level. 
Further, CIA can be done either sectorally (e.g. only for climate – as shown in 
Figure 2) or multi-sectorally where the key sectors (e.g. water, climate, 
ecosystem, socio-economic, fisheries, etc) are selected to be covered by the CIA. 
The sectors and spatial scales to be included depend very much of the objectives 
of each particular CIA.  
The CIA process itself can be divided into three main phases, applying the 
division proposed by MacDonald (2000: 302) for cumulative effect assessment: a) 
scoping phase; b) analysis phase; and c) management and implication phase. 
Each of the phases has been further divided into interrelated steps. This kind of 
conceptual process provides an ‘idealised’ framework for the CIA process and 
should be taken as indicative only. Further, one should keep in mind that each 
case is different and the steps of the process are, at the end, case specific. 
Therefore, a case tailored CIA is always recommended.  
Scale issues are present in various interrelated steps of the CIA process. The 
spatio-temporal scales follow through the whole process and should be included 
in most of the interrelated steps. The scales should be recognised as an integral 
part of any IA process and taken into account from the beginning of the 
assessment process.  
Scales are particularly important when identifying the critical processes and areas 
of possible consequences, selecting the spatio-temporal scales of the assessment, 
identifying the data needed and available, selecting the methodologies and tools 
related to the process, and presenting the results of the assessment to the 
decision-makers and planners (Kummu 2008). Therefore, scale might serve as a 
tool for providing a common framework for the multi-disciplinary IA process 
(ibid). 
 
III. History of use and significance in the Mekong Region 
The on-going and planned water development projects in the Mekong Basin are 
likely to cause remarkable changes for the availability of these water-related 
resources, and consequently for the livelihoods of millions of people (World Bank 
2004b; IUCN et al. 2007a; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007). Different assessments and 
analyses have therefore been undertaken by actors at different levels to guide 
planning and decision-making. Yet, the current assessments provide differing 
estimates on potential environmental, social and economic impacts. Particularly 
basin-wide assessments have several challenges related to their 
comprehensiveness and overall reliability (see e.g. IUCN et al. 2007a; Mirumachi 
and Nakyama 2007; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007; Wyatt and Baird 2007; Kummu and 
Sarkkula 2008). Current assessments are also predominantly responsive, looking 
at the impacts of planned (or even already on-going) developments in the basin, 
while the more strategic assessments about the possible development paths and 
options –e.g. in form of Comprehensive Options Assessment (World Commission 
of Dams 2000) or Strategic Environmental Assessment– are basically non-
existing.  
It is, however, exactly these more strategic assessments that would be needed to 
consider the most sustainable options for development in the basin. Although the 
basin resources are already utilised in a variety of ways particularly through 
small-scale farming and fishing and diverse use of wetland resources (Mekong 
River Commission 2003; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007), the common justification for 
water resources development is the “underdevelopment” and “underutilisation” of 
the basin and its resources (World Bank 2004b). Consequently, most 
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development plans focus on sectors such as irrigated agriculture and hydropower, 
while a majority of the population in the basin actually depends on livelihoods 
more directly dependent on natural resources such as fish. Worryingly, these 
kinds of large-scale development interventions seem –despite their ultimate 
objectives on poverty reduction– in many cases actually to undermine the 
foundations of the livelihoods of the poorest groups by impacting negatively the 
availability of and access to common pool resources, most importantly fish 
(Phillips et al. 2006; MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007). 
The challenges related to impact assessment and, overall, to water development 
can be linked to the broader challenges with water governance in the Mekong 
Basin. In terms of governance, the planning and decision-making processes in 
practically all riparian countries remain relatively non-participatory and non-
transparent, hindering open discussion about the different development plans and 
their potential impacts. Due to the crosscutting nature of water, water 
management also falls under several different ministries and institutes; both 
vertical and horizontal discontinuities and even institutional rivalries follow, 
making water governance particularly challenging to coordinate (Hirsch et al. 
2006; Sokhem and Sunada 2006; Keskinen et al. 2007). 
III.1 Impact assessment within the Mekong River Commission 
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is arguably the most suitable organisation 
for basin-wide impact assessment in the Mekong River Basin. The Commission 
does not, however, have a common impact assessment approach that would be 
applied systematically in the Commission and its national committees. Instead, 
the different MRC programs have planned –and sometimes even implemented– 
several assessment methods over the years, often with relatively poor 
coordination between the programs. More recently, the MRC has been 
increasingly involved in both the SEA and the CIA, particularly in relation to the 
planned mainstream dams in the Mekong (Carew-Reid 2009; ICEM 2009a, 2009b, 
2009c, 2009d, 2009e). 
Within the MRC’s Basin Development Plan (BDP), assessment methods proposed 
during the past years have included Environmental Assessment system, so-called 
Project Screening Toolkit as well as the Social Impact Assessment process that 
makes use of the Social Development approach (MRCS/BDP 2005; MRCS/WUP-
FIN 2007). Assessment methods proposed within the Environment Programme, 
on the other hand, include Social Impact Monitoring (SIM) and Vulnerability 
Assessment (VA) systems that are currently being implemented through a 
combined SIM/VA assessment. In addition, the EP published already in 2002 
thorough plans for implementing EIA and SEA in its activities in the Mekong Basin 
(ERM 2002a, 2002b), but these plans were never put into action. An additional 
assessment project –now halted– within the EP (and partly within the WUP) was 
the Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) process that was one of the 
broader assessment approaches within the MRC (MRCS/IBFM 2006; MRC/WUP-
FIN 2007).  
At the moment, the BDP is undertaking a rather extensive cumulative assessment 
of environmental, social and economic impacts of planned water development in 
the basin. The assessment is based on the modelling of flow changes for different 
water development scenarios. The first, initial results from the modelling were 
presented in the MRC Hydropower Programme’s Regional Multi-stakeholder 
Consultation on September 2008. The modelling looks at six possible scenarios 
under three situations: 1) Baseline, 2) Definite Future and 3) Future Plan in the 
LMB, concluding that in the foreseeable future (next 20 years), the main flow 
changes in the Mekong mainstream will be caused by hydropower development in 
the Upper Mekong Basin. The modelling results were indicating only relatively 
small changes in the water flows, particularly in more long-term when the 
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impacts of increased irrigation are expected to offset the impacts of hydropower 
dams (MRC 2008). 
In addition, in spring 2009 the MRC launched a 14-month Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) process of the mainstream Mekong dams under 
consideration (MRC 2009). It will be the first SEA implemented within the MRC, 
and its reports are expected by the end of 2010: the set of inception reports were 
published at the end of 2009 (ICEM 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). The 
exact nature of the assessment is, however, still unclear, and it can even be 
asked whether the assessment really is SEA or actually closer to CIA (see e.g. 
Phonekeo 2009).  
Common to most of the different IA approaches applied so far within the MRC is 
that they have been planned in a relatively top-down manner and that they make 
predominantly use of aggregated, macro-scale data. Many of the assessments 
also focus narrowly to (pre-)selected issues only, instead of more comprehensive 
and cross-sectoral approach. Despite these challenges, the assessment results 
provided by the different MRC programmes are used to guide planning and 
decision-making on water development in the basin. For example the World Bank 
used the results generated by the MRC’s Decision Support Framework –and only 
by that– to formulate its Mekong Regional Water Resources Assistance Strategy, 
concluding that “there is scope for significant levels of co-ordinated development” 
in the basin (World Bank 2004b). Such a statement has been challenged by other 
actors and assessments, and it is also bolder than the conclusion given by the 
modellers themselves (Phillips et al. 2006; IUCN et al. 2007b; Middleton 2007; 
Käkönen and Hirsch 2009). 
III.2 SEA at the Mekong 
The Mekong Region doesn’t –yet– have too many examples of the actual 
implementation of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) in the water sector. 
There are, however, increasing number of plans for the SEAs both at regional and 
national level, with some SEA processes already implemented and others in the 
process of being implemented. There are naturally good reasons for this, as the 
numerous plans for water resources development in the basin have currently 
weak or even non-existing assessment of potential alternatives at more strategic 
and earlier levels of planning5. The construction of the hydropower dams in the 
Mekong Basin –particularly the mainstream dams in the Lower Mekong Basin– is 
also seen as the single most important strategic decision for the four MRC 
member counties since the signing of the Mekong Agreement in 1995 (Soussan 
2009). Related to this, the recent ADB-MRC-WWF report looking at the 
environmental criteria for hydropower development in the region concluded that 
there are clear advantages in initiating environmental assessment early in the 
planning process (King, Bird, and Haas 2007). Even more importantly, this view 
was shared by the MRC Member States at the regional consultation meeting on 
the MRC Initiative on Sustainable Hydropower in September 2008 (Soussan 
2009). Such views are –together with pressure from development banks and 
donors– likely to increase remarkably the implementation of SEA in the region.   
SEA at riparian countries 
Out of the different Mekong countries, Vietnam and China are the most advanced 
in terms of the actual implementation of SEA in the water field. In Vietnam, SEA 
is already required by law: the Law on Environmental Protection of 2005 
introduced the concept and defined specific requirement for SEA (Tu 2009). The 
law also identifies six areas where SEA should be applied for strategies and plans, 
                                          
5 Some would, however, argue that it is already too late for the proper SEA in the region, 
as many of the more strategic decisions regarding for example the modes of energy 
production in the riparian countries have already been largely done.   
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including integrated river basin planning processes at inter-provincial level (Tu 
2009). The SEA is, however, still a new tool, and awareness, understanding and 
capacity in its use is therefore at the early stages of development (ICEM 2008). 
In addition, the resistance for adopting the SEA in planning processes remains 
high, and as a result the influence of SEA on actual planning practices is still 
modest (Tu 2009). In the water sector, first pilot studies regarding the strategic 
environmental assessment for sustainable hydropower development in Vietnam 
have, already been done, and reports related to these processes published (ADB 
2009a; Soussan et al. 2009).  
Also China has already adopted the SEA into its legislation; it was included into 
the law on Environmental Impact Assessment in 2002. The law defines two types 
of SEA documents that should be prepared for two different plans, the regional 
plan and special plan (Gao and Xu 2009). Consequently, the SEA has been used 
already in number of fields ranging from river basin plans to transportation, with 
over 30 SEAs conducted at national level and more than 100 at local government 
level (Carew-Reid 2009).  
In other Mekong countries, the implementation of SEA is less systematic. In 
Thailand, SEA is considered as a “key historical initiative”, as it is expected to 
decrease the conflict between the people and the governmental sectors as well as 
to help developers to invest in sustainable way (Paranan 2009). Consequently, in 
2005 the National Environment Board appointed a sub-committee to consider and 
carry out SEA, and the SEA Guidelines were approved in 2009. SEA is, however, 
yet to be incorporated into the Enhancement and Conservation of National 
Environmental Quality Act (ADB 2009b; Paranan 2009).  
In Cambodia, Lao PDR and Myanmar, the SEA has not yet been really adopted at 
national level. The countries have, however, already been involved in some 
regional SEA initiatives. and SEA is in one way or another apparent in 
government plans and policies, particularly those related to EIA (ADB 2009b; 
Kyaw 2009; Salichanh 2009). The GMS Program also has plans to implement SEA 
in Lao PDR related to its plans to construct mainstream dams into the Mekong 
(ADB 2009b).  
A set of powerpoint presentations representing a good summary of the status of 
the SEA implementation in different Mekong countries (at the time) can be found 
from the GMS Program’s Power Trade webpage at:  
http://www.gms-powertrade.net/dsp_page.cfm?view=page&select=4   
SEA at regional level 
The two most important regional actors currently promoting SEA are the MRC and 
the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Program. In addition, the World Bank has 
been involved in SEAs particularly in Vietnam. The MRC started in spring 2009 a 
14-month Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) process of the planned 
mainstream Mekong dams, with outcomes expected in late 2010 (MRC 2009). 
The study is done by the International Centre for Environmental Management 
(ICEM), and it seeks to identify the potential opportunities and risks as well as the 
contribution of hydropower to regional development (Carew-Reid 2009; ICEM 
2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e). A special emphasis in the assessment is 
put to the stakeholder involvement6. 
The GMS Program is conducting SEAs in the Mekong Region through two 
interlinked processes: as part of its regional power trade initiative as well as 
through its Core Environment Program (ADB 2009b; Carew-Reid 2009; GMS-EOC 
                                          
6 As highlighted in the MRC’s website: “There will be many opportunities for various 
stakeholders to engage with and provide inputs to the SEA. The team conducting the 
assessment will engage with NGOs, civil society and community representatives” (MRC 
2009) 
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2009).The GMS Program’s SEAs focus on variety of issues ranging from tourism 
to energy, including also water-related assessments (ADB 2009b; GMS-EOC 
2009). 
In addition, other planning and impact assessment processes in the region have 
had similar kinds of strategic implications, although they have not necessarily 
been named explicitly as Strategic Environmental Assessments. For example, the 
Hydropower Strategic Impact Assessment of Laos, prepared by Norplan A/S for 
the World Bank (World Bank 2004a) and the study on Environmental 
Considerations for Sustainable Hydropower Development, published jointly by, 
ADB, MRC and WWF in 2007 (King, Bird, and Haas 2007) include strategic 
assessment processes that share similarities with the SEA.  
III.3 CIA at the Mekong 
With the increasing number of water development plans in both Mekong 
mainstream and its tributaries, the importance for the assessment of cumulative 
impacts of such plans is becoming more and more important. This need is also 
being recognised by both national and regional actors. For example the results of 
the consultations on hydropower development in the four MRC member countries 
(Soussan 2009) concluded that “Every person consulted was concerned about the 
cumulative effects of several dams along a relatively short stretch of river, with 
the eleven proposed schemes being clustered in two blocks. It was clearly stated 
that the present process of feasibility studies and impact assessment does not 
take account of these cumulative impacts, with each proposal being considered in 
isolation. This view was shared by the regulatory authorities consulted in the 
riparian countries (WREA in Lao PDR, MoNRE in Thailand)”.  
The CIA and related methods have been applied in the Mekong in various scales, 
ranging from tributary to basin wide assessment. Those have been made by 
various actors, such as ADB, WB, and MRC. Each of the CIA has been done for 
different purposes, with different tools and within various scales and levels7. The 
five cases of the CIA applied in the Mekong (listed below) have been selected to 
be analysed in this work (see Chapter IV.2): 
Nam Thuon 2 (NT2) (ADB 2004) 
Nam Ngum 3 (NN3) (ADB 2008) 
World Bank (WB) funded work at MRC (World Bank 2004b)8 
Basin Development Plan 2nd phase (BDP2) under Mekong River Commission 
(MRCS/BDP2 2009) 
Adamson (2001) water balance study9 
The Nam Thuon 2 CIA was the first published CIA done at the Mekong Basin and 
therefore significant step in water allocation assessment field. It was done as a 
part of NT2 hydropower project for both, tributary and basin scale. The NT2 CIA 
is multi-sectoral assessment covering a wide range of sectors from urban 
development to fisheries. Nam Ngum 3 is somewhat similar process to NT2, 
although done only for tributary scale.  
                                          
7 Scale: The spatial, temporal, quantitative, or analytical dimensions used to 
measure and study a phenomenon 
Level: The level refers in this work to the impact assessment sectors that are 
assessed within the domain of CIAs 
8 The World Bank CIA work refers here to the CIA work done at the MRC during 
the BDP phase 1 and partly during the IBFM project 
9 This water balance study is not really a CIA in its strict definition but referred as 
one in Kummu & Sarkkula (2008) 
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Two of the assessments, namely World Bank and BDP2, have been done under 
MRC. Their main focus has been to assess the basin-wide development impacts 
on hydrology and flooding. It is important to note that these two assessments 
were originally not called officially as CIAs as is the case with Adamson (2001). 
Their actual scope may thus have been a bit different than the one could expect 
from “real” CIAs.  
There are two other related cases in the Mekong, namely Lao "optimisation study" 
for dams , and possible Thai CIA study. Those are not, however, analysed in more 
detail in this document as there was not enough information available of them at 
the moment of writing.  
As listed above, there are few CIAs applied in the Mekong. Four of them include 
basin wide spatial scale (NN3 is done for sub-basin scale only) and the hydrology 
as an analysed sector is common to them all10. According to Kummu & Sarkkula 
(2008), however, there is urgent need for scientifically sound CIA in the Mekong. 
Despite of the existing studies (see above), there has not yet been done one that 
would be independent, transparent and coherent from all the aspects that are 
important in the assessment, such as tools, data, development scenarios, etc. 
Furthermore, it would largely benefit the overall understanding of the 
development impacts, should various CIA be done with using the same 
development scenarios and then compared with each other. That would give 
better understanding of the reliability of the range of impacts.  
                                          
10 NT2 and NN3 have also other sectors involved, see more in Chapter IV.2. 
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III.4 Applying CIA in the Mekong – case Tonle Sap 
Development in the river and the basin will alter the flows and floods in the basin. 
This is also the conclusion of the CIAs that have been recently made for the 
Mekong Basin (Adamson 2001; ADB 2004; World Bank 2004b). These CIAs are 
concentrating sectorally on hydrology. The impact of climate change on the 
hydrology has not been included in the CIAs, but it is considered to have an 
important impact on the Mekong and Tonle Sap hydrology, especially during the 
latter part of the 21st century (Penny 2008). 
Development impacts on the Tonle Sap 
Each CIA analysis (Adamson 2001; ADB 2004; World Bank 2004b) made for the 
Mekong Basin, mainly for hydropower impact assessment, concludes that dry 
season water levels would rise and wet-season water levels would be lower than 
at present. The flow alterations would be more significant close to the dam and 
gradually decrease with distance in the lower Mekong Basin. The flow alterations 
in the Mekong main stem would directly impact the flood pulse of Tonle Sap Lake. 
This is because around 60% of the Tonle Sap flood water originates from the 
Mekong, and the water level in the lake is controlled by the water level in the 
Mekong mainstream (MRCS/WUP-FIN 2007). 
Due to the considerable variety and ambiguity of different development plans, the 
prediction of cumulative impacts of ongoing and planned development is 
extremely challenging. For example, existing CIA studies focusing on flow 
changes have applied different approaches, and used different values, and 
therefore provide different estimates of the potential changes in flow. Three 
different CIA studies were analyzed and used for flow-alteration predictions: 
CIA 1: The Mekong River Commission (MRC) has compiled a basinwide CIA under 
the Integrated Basin Flow Management (IBFM) project by using Decision Support 
Framework (DSF) modelling tools (World Bank 2004b). 
CIA 2: The Asian Development Bank (ADB) conducted a basinwide CIA within the 
Nam Thuon 2 environmental impact assessment study (ADB 2004). 
CIA 3: Adamson (2001) compiled analyses of the downstream hydrological 
impact of the Chinese cascade of dams 
The focus of this case on the Tonle Sap system is for three reasons:  
Tonle Sap ecosystem forms a particularly important economic, social and 
environmental resource for the entire Mekong Basin and for Cambodia in 
particular (see e.g. Bonheur 2001; Keskinen 2006; Lamberts 2006; MRCS/WUP-
FIN 2007).  
The Tonle Sap is due to its unusual flood pulse system and immense aquatic 
production most probably among the most vulnerable ones to major changes in 
water quantity and quality of the Mekong River (see e.g. Kummu and Sarkkula 
2008; Lamberts and Koponen 2008).  
The Tonle Sap system has been the main focus of the recent research activities of 
the authors, and presents therefore a relatively well-understood case for 
discussion on the potential impacts of Mekong development. 
Scenario work carried out under WUP-FIN project, aiming to estimate the 
cumulative impact of the changing floodplain conditions in the Tonle Sap, focused 
on comparing the flow changes between Flow Regime FR3 (MRCS/IBFM 2006) 
and the baseline in 1997 and 1998 on a number of flood and water quality 
indicators of the lake and the floodplain. The comparison of the simulation results 
gave the following results: 
the inundated floodplain habitat would be reduced by 7-16% 
the period of inundation would be shortened by 1-2 weeks 
the increased dry season water level would inundate permanently (extending the 
permanent lake) a major part of the flooded gallery forest around the lake 
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dissolved oxygen conditions would worsen by extending strongly hypoxic in the 
floodplain during early flooding due to slowly rising flood 
sediment and nutrient input to the lake with the flood waters would be reduced 
A first estimate of the impact of the changing floodplain conditions was made by 
introducing a cumulative indicator for floodplain productivity potential by giving 
an estimate for the minimum and maximum value for each individual indicator. 
The calculation of the cumulative impact of the physical and water quality factors 
gave a value in the order of 25 % reduction in the floodplain productivity 
potential, even with rather conservative estimates for individual indicator 
changes. This estimate is well in line with the assessment made by the expert 
panel within the IBFM Phase 2, where it was estimated that Flow Regime 3 would 
result in an overall 20-30 % or more reduction in the productivity potential of the 
Tonle Sap Lake and its floodplain (MRCS/IBFM 2006). 
What about the cumulative impacts on Tonle Sap Lake? 
It is important to highlight that the impacts presented above provide only 
selected examples of some of the impacts that the water development in the 
basin is likely to cause. Keskinen et al. (2008) concludes that the actual overall 
impact to Mekong ecosystem will naturally be a combination of these different 
impacts, which also vary across different spatial and temporal scales. In the case 
of Tonle Sap, for example, it is yet very difficult to provide reliable estimates 
what would be the actual combined, cumulative impacts of different basin 
developments due to the complexity of the Tonle Sap system and lack of 
information on both planned development and the system functions.    
Keskinen et al. (2008) provides a good example of the major challenge related to 
current basin-wide impact assessment practices in the Mekong; the problem of 
assessing the cumulative impacts of basin developments, in particular to the 
more complex systems such as the Tonle Sap – or overall e.g. the fisheries or 
floodplain dynamics of the Mekong (Keskinen 2008). Meaningful impact 
assessment of these kinds of crosscutting issues would require a holistic approach 
that integrates expertise from several different disciplines and makes use of 
several different disciplines – and impact assessments focusing on different 
themes. Yet most of the current impact assessments in the Mekong Basin have a 
relatively narrow, sectoral focus, and they thus tend to ‘compartmentalise’ the 
environment and social systems into selected indicators and sectors only 
(Lamberts 2006; Keskinen 2008).  
Nevertheless, already the ‘sectoral’ examples of the estimated impacts indicate 
that the current plans for Mekong development are going to have considerable 
impacts on the river ecosystem, and consequently on livelihoods dependent on 
the river and the resources it provides (particularly when realising that the impact 
estimates presented herein are based on more conservative development 
scenarios than what the present day plans would require). Consequently, already 
the few examples presented herein are enough to justify a request for more open 
and better-informed discussion about the Mekong development and its impacts.   
IV. Comparative assessment of the tools in multiple cases  
IV.1 Comparative assessment of the SEAs  
As the Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEAs) are only starting to be 
implemented in the Mekong Region, there is relatively little material for a proper 
analysis of past SEA exercises. What is clear, however, is that the implementation 
of SEAs at both national and regional levels will be a long process that requires 
plenty of capacity-building and resources. Capacity building on SEA methods and 
practices has also been one of the most important needs raised by the 
representatives of different ministries and institutes in the riparian countries (see 
e.g. ADB 2009b; Kyaw 2009; Tu 2009). This is also illustrated in the case of SEAs 
in both Vietnam and the MRC, where the assessments are led by external 
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consultants. In addition, the riparian countries have very different institutional 
and legal capacities to embrace the SEA, and these need therefore to be 
considered in the implementation of SEA as well (World Bank 2006; ADB 2009b). 
On the other hand the data availability is not seen to present considerable 
problems for the implementation of the SEA, at least for the assessments done in 
relation to hydropower development (Soussan 2009). 
The findings from the SEA on Vietnamese hydropower development indicate that 
SEA can be a useful tool in the analysis of the social and environmental 
implications of water resources development as well as in raising discussion about 
the alternatives for current plans related for example to hydropower development 
(ADB 2009a; Soussan et al. 2009). The assessment process and its several 
documents also provide a useful reference for further work on SEA in the region. 
At the same time the process in Vietnam also indicates the potential challenges 
related to SEA. The most important challenge is the fact that the outcomes of the 
assessment depend greatly on the indicators and alternative scenarios –and, 
overall, on the focus– used in the assessment. While the SEA focused on the 
assessment of hydropower development, it can be asked whether the actual, 
strategic objectives of the SEA would have been better served if the original focus 
of the SEA would have been broader, covering for example the entire energy 
sector and policies (of which hydropower and particularly individual hydropower 
projects are only one part).    
The study on Vietnamese hydropower included also other limitations. The 
alternative scenarios for energy production in Vietnam, for example, included in 
the SEA focused only on thermal power, namely coal-fired thermal plants and 
combined cycle gas turbines (CCGT)11. Such a focus left more innovative modes 
of energy production –including increases in energy efficiency– outside the 
assessment, even when the SEA report itself concludes that the general efficiency 
of the energy sector is still low (Soussan et al. 2009). In a similar manner, the 
assessment of social impacts looked only at direct short-term impacts (most 
importantly resettlement), leaving more profound long-term impacts beyond the 
assessment (SEA Study Team 2008b; Soussan et al. 2009).  
Similar findings apply for the on-going SEA of the Mekong mainstream dams, 
implemented by the Mekong River Commission (MRC 2009). The objective of the 
SEA was from the very beginning defined rather narrowly, namely look at the 
mainstream Mekong hydropower development strategies and their potential 
opportunities and risks as well as contribution to regional development (Soussan 
2009; Phonekeo 2009). Nevertheless, the SEA has an important and ambitious 
aim to form several different scenarios based on different levels of dam 
construction, from none to all of the 11 proposed schemes. Such scenarios are 
also planned to include consideration of alternative sources of generation capacity 
                                          
11 The SEA report gives the following reasons for the focus on coal and CCGT; 
This is in line with Power Development Plan VI where the main part of thermal 
power in the future, apart from nuclear, will come from these sources; Diesel and 
oil-fired thermal plants are not considered to be economically viable compared to 
other thermal energy sources; Nuclear power has not been considered as an 
alternative in this Study; Import of more hydropower from neighbouring countries 
is not considered as an option; Increase of renewable energy, including small 
hydropower, is not considered feasible and can anyhow only account for a small 
amount mainly for supply to non-grid areas; and Increase of pumped storage 
capacity is not considered an option as it is a net consumer of energy and needs 
to be in balance with nuclear power development in Viet Nam (Soussan et al. 
2008). In addition, while the potential for energy efficiency and conservation was 
included in power demand forecast, it was considered difficult to estimate the 
potential due to data availability and reliability (SEA Study Team 2008a). 
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to replace the dams not included in each scenario, so that future energy demand 
can be met (Soussan 2009; Phonekeo 2009).  
While having a strong strategic nature and aiming to impact the broader policies 
related to hydropower construction, the assessment publications also indicate 
that the assessment may actually not end up to be much more than ‘just’ a 
cumulative impact assessment of already planned dams. Such an impression is 
supported e.g. by Phonekeo (2009), who concludes that a the present process of 
feasibility studies and impact assessment does not account for cumulative 
impacts, there is a need for the MRC’s SEA to provide a clear, transparent 
evidence-based assessment of these potential cumulative impacts. Although the 
CIA can –and should– be an integral part of SEA, a real, strategic SEA should not 
be reduced only to that, but must also include an assessment of broader policies 
and plans that lead to the increased need for hydropower development. It 
remains to be seen whether the MRC’s SEA really fulfils also the latter, more 
strategic dimensions.   
 
Page 795 of 852
PN67_2010_25 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA)  
Marko Keskinen and Matti Kummu 
 22 
IV.2 Comparative assessment of the CIAs 
The comparative assessment of the CIA studies has been made for the five 
assessments in the Mekong as listed above. The assessment is based on the 
tables where various characteristics of the CIAs are presented and discussed. 
Within the assessment, the CIAs are reflected through the questions presented in 
the PN67 protocol. It is important to note that many of the CIAs included in the 
table were originally not called officially as CIAs, and their actual scope may thus 
have been bit different than the one could expect from “real” CIAs.  
Brief background and introduction together with the purpose of the CIA are given 
in Table 5. The tools used in each CIA are summarised in Table 6 together with 
the scenario settings of the assessments.  
Table 4.  Overview of the CIAs.  
CIA Background Purpose 
NT2 The Nam Theun 2 (NT2) Hydropower 
Project is the largest infrastructure 
development project in Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic (PDR). The CIA 
estimates the potential impacts the 
project may have on the development 
of the area.  
Source: (ADB 2004) 
Aim was to analyse the combined 
impacts of a number of projects, either 
implemented together or in a sequence 
and of future developments and plans, 
in relation to NT2. Two development 
scenarios are presented based on a 5-
year and 20-year planning horizon.  
The anticipated output from the CIA is a 
comprehensive understanding of the 
cumulative impacts of the NT2 Project in 
the regional context. Further, the 
cumulative impacts of basin wide 
development plans were assessed.  
NN3 The work is part of ADB preparations for 
financing of the proposed Nam Ngum 3 
Hydropower Project (NN3), located in 
the Nam Ngum River Basin (NNRB) in 
Vientiane Province, in central Lao PDR.  
Source: (ADB 2008) 
The purpose was to estimate the 
cumulative impacts of the extensive 
hydropower development programme 
identified for the Nam Ngum Basin on 
various sectors. Three scenarios were 
assessed with two time horizons: 2013 
and 2020.  
WB The World Bank CIA work refers here to 
the CIA work done at the MRC during 
the BDP phase 1 and partly during the 
IBFM project. The results of DSF 
assisted the above mentioned activities 
to determine the relative scale of 
changes that accompany possible future 
states of development. 
Source: (World Bank 2004b) 
The DSF simulation results were aimed 
to assist the basin planning process to 
determine where the limits lie with 
respect to different concerns regarding 
changes in flows and subsequent 
impacts on environmental, social and 
economic parameters. Altogether six 
scenarios were simulated: 1. Baseline, 
2. China Dam, 3. Low Development, 4. 
Embankments, 5. Agriculture, and 6. 
High development. 
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CIA Background Purpose 
BDP2 The second phase of the BDP 
Programme (2006-2010) is designed to 
institutionalise the participatory 
planning process established during BDP 
Phase 1 and further develop the 
assessment tools and IWRM-based 
planning capacity to produce a rolling 
IWRM-based Basin Development Plan. 
The work is undergoing and the final 
results are not yet ready.  
Source: (MRCS/BDP2 2009) 
Altogether three scenarios has been set-
up and simulated by using the DSF: 1) 
Baseline, 2) Definite Future and 3) 
Future Plan in the LMB. The assessment 
has been made of changes in water 
flows, water levels, flooding and salinity 
intrusion.  
The work is continuation for the WB CIA 
presented above. 
Adamson The work compiled analyses of the 
downstream hydrological impact of the 
Chinese cascade of dams involving a 
reported 23 km3 of active reservoir 
storage 
Source: (Adamson 2001) 
The work aimed to estimate the impact 
of Chinese cascade of dams on the 
downstream hydrology by using simple 
water balance model. Two cases were 
simulated: 10% and 20% regulation.  
 
Table 5.  Summary of the tools and scenarios used.  
CIA Summary of the tools Scenarios used 
NT2 Two different tools have been used in 
the CIA for the hydrology and hydraulic 
part of the study: MikeBasin for the 
basin hydrology and MIKE11 for the 
floodplain modelling.  
Scenario simulations were carried out 
with MikeBasin, which is a water 
balance model for simulation of water 
allocation, reservoir operation, irrigation 
and other water uses. 
A one-dimensional river and floodplain 
model (MIKE11) was established for the 
Cambodian part of the Mekong, 
including the Mekong mainstream, Tonle 
Sap River and Great Lake, the Bassac 
River that runs in parallel with Mekong 
from Phnom Penh, and a simplified set-
up of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam.  
Two scenarios were used: 
5-years scenario 
20-years scenario 
Both of the scenarios included the 
following development sectors: 
hydropower, transport, irrigation, water 
supply and sanitation, urban 
development, fisheries, forestry, 
industry, mining, social development, 
conservation 
NN3 Simple water balance calculations were 
done to estimate the hydrological 
impacts of the development activities.  
The hydrological model MORDOR was 
applied for the area but no 
documentation for the simulations was 
available at the time of preparation of 
the CIA report.  
The Parsifal river-simulation model was 
applied to simulate the hydropower 
regulation. The Parsifal model was not, 
however, operational when this report 
was prepared. 
Three scenarios were used: 
Scenario 1: Present situation plus Nam 
Ngum 2 hydropower plant plus 61 000 
ha of pumped irrigation, mainly in the 
Vientiane Plains (down-stream of all 
hydropower plants included in this 
study) 
Scenario 2: Scenario 1 plus Nam Ngum 
3 hydropower plant 
Scenario 3: Scenario 2 plus Nam Ngum 
5, Nam Lik 1 and 2, Nam Bak 1 and 2 
as well as 39 000 additional ha of 
gravity-fed irrigation. 
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CIA Summary of the tools Scenarios used 
WB See above the BDP2 CIA – same DSF 
toolset has been used in this CIA. 
Altogether six scenarios were used: 
Baseline: Representing the development 
conditions that existed in the basin in 
the year 2000. 
China Dams: baseline + two current 
and two largest proposed Chinese 
dams. 
Low Development: baseline + minimum 
level of development  
Embankments: Low Development 
scenario + 130,000 ha isolated from the 
Cambodian floodplain 
Agriculture: Low Development scenario 
+ substantial growth in consumptive 
water usage in all the sectors but in 
hydropower 
High development: Agriculture 
Development scenario + substantial 
amount of hydropower growth. 
BDP2 DSF consist of three different simulation 
models: SWAT, IQQM and iSIS. They 
are combined together as follows: 
A series of hydrological models, based 
on the SWAT software have been set up 
to simulate catchment runoff. The SWAT 
model was used to estimate inflows to 
the other simulation models. These 
hydrological models provide input of 
runoff to a basin simulation model that 
uses the IQQM software. A 
hydrodynamic model, based on ISIS 
software is used to simulate the river 
system downstream of Kratie to the 
South China Sea. It uses the IQQM 
results as a boundary condition in 
Kratie.  
Includes six possible scenarios under 
three situations:  
Baseline: year 2000 
Definite Future: baseline + existing and 
planned dams in Upper Mekong + 
existing  and under-construction dams 
in LMB 
Future Plan in the LMB: definite future 
scenario + planned LMB dams (tributary 
+ main streams) + planned LMB 
irrigation and water supply 
Adamson Simple water balance model was used 
in this CIA. 




Common for all the selected CIAs is that they cover the hydrology sector. Three 
of the analysed assessments, namely WB, BDP2 and Adamson, are also limited to 
this. The other two (NT2 and NN3) are multi-sectoral analyses where hydrology 
has been only one part of the wider assessment (Table 7). Majority of the CIAs 
are basin-wide assessment while only NN3 covers smaller scale, namely Nam 
Ngum tributary. The others have, however, also sub-basin scale part in the 
analysis. The temporal scale varies, but most of the studies have various scales 
(Table 7).  
Table 6.  Scales of the CIA and sectors covered.  
CIA Scales Sectors covered 
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CIA Scales Sectors covered 
NT2 The CIA has five main impact zones (or 
spatial scales): 
Nakai Plateau 
Nakai Nam Theun NBCA 
Xe Bangfai basin and surrounding 
districts 
Nam Theun, Nam Kading and Nam 
Hinboun Basins and surrounding 
districts 
Mekong River Basin 
The temporal scales of the CIA are: 
5 years scenario 
20 years scenario 
The following sectors are covered in the 
CIA: 
Hydrology 









NN3 Spatial scales: 
Impact zones: 
Upper Nam Ngum 
Mid Nam Ngum 
Nam Lik- Nam Xong 
Lower Nam Ngum 




The following sectors are covered in the 
CIA: 
Engineering hydrology and hydropower 
production  
Greenhouse gas emissions from 
reservoir 
Water resources and water quality 
Land management and land use 
Irrigation 




Socio-economic and poverty issues 
Health issues 
WB Spatial scales: 
Sub-basin (LMB floodplains) 
Basin 
Temporal scale of the CIA is around 20 
years.  





BDP2 Spatial scales: 
Sub-basin (LMB floodplains) 
Basin 
Temporal scale of the CIA is 20 years. 





Adamson Spatial scales: 
Sub-basin (results are presented at 
various stations along the mainstream) 
Basin 
There is only one temporal scale in the 
analysis and that is the time when all 
the planned dams in the cascade are 
predicted to be in operation.  
The CIA covers only the hydrology 
sector 
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The main results of the assessments are presented in Table 8 with the discussion 
on the importance of the results.  
At this stage, structured cross-comparison of results from different CIAs is not 
feasible. Each assessment has been developed and used to answer different sets 
of questions, so direct comparison of results is difficult. Differences result not only 
from differences in the tools used, but also from a mix of other issues, including 
underlying assumptions, input data and the way research questions are posed.  
Table 7.  Main results of the CIAs and their potential importance.  
CIA Main results Importance of the results 
NT2 The results are presented for different 
scales for both temporal scales. The 
main results for the 20-years scenarios 
at the Mekong Basin scale are as 
follows: 
Dry season discharge at Savannakhet 
may increase by 135% while during 
floods, the discharges may be reduced 
by around 20% 
At Kratie the average annual maximum 
flow will be reduced 12% 
The water level will be reduced by about 
60 cm during floods and increased by 
about 70 cm in the dry season at 
Phnom Penh 
The changes in flow pattern will have a 
significant negative impact on floodplain 
and Tonle Sap Lake fisheries as these 
are favoured by high wet season water 
levels 
The changes in flow pattern will, 
however, have a significant positive 
impact by damping damaging flood 
incidents and by the increased dry 
season water level that will support 
irrigation and reduce salt intrusion in 
Mekong Delta. 
The NT2 CIA is probably the best 
achieved CIA study for the basin wide 
development impacts on hydrology. It is 
done transparently and it is well 
documented. The tools suite well for the 
purpose of the study. The results are 
also well presented in each scale and 
scenario.  
The study shows well the importance of 
assessing the cumulative impacts. The 
NT2 dam has a significant local impact 
but rather marginal impact at the basin 
scale on hydrology. At the same time, 
the cumulative impact of all the planned 
development in the scenarios will have 
remarkable impact on the hydrology 
and flood pulse characteristics.  
NN3 The CIA results are for the local and 
tributary scale only and therefore, while 
looking at the basin scale results this 
CIA is not relevant.  
Nevertheless, the results are relevant at 
the scales of the assessment.  
The spatial scale of the study is rather 
narrow covering only the Nam Ngum 
basin. Therefore, the results are 
important in tributary scale but when 
looking at the basin scale, the results 
are not that usable. Moreover, the 
methods used in the CIA were not 
completely reported and therefore, the 
results might not be very reliable.  
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CIA Main results Importance of the results 
WB The report concludes that the current 
development of the Mekong river is very 
limited and the natural flow pattern is 
essentially intact, as are the highly 
productive natural fisheries in the river. 
The ongoing and planned developments 
in the upper basin will result in 
significant transfers of water from the 
wet to the dry season. The summary of 
the results is as follows: 
The overall character of the hydrograph 
is maintained. 
Low flows are significantly increased 
and are higher than the historically 
observed range 
High flows are marginally reduced, but 
within the historically observed range 
This is the only report openly published 
of the DSF results and MRC scenario 
work. Therefore the importance of the 
results and whole document is 
unquestioned.  
Although the report well presents the 
results, the assumptions and limitations 
of the DSF work and scenarios within it 
are not well documented. The DSF work 
has been criticised by many, particularly 
its non-transparency. Therefore, there 
has been lots of questions about the 
reliability of the results.  
BDP2 The preliminary results are as follows: 
The pattern of distinct dry and wet flow 
seasons in the Mekong mainstream is 
maintained under all considered 
scenarios 
In the foreseeable future (next 20 
years), the main flow changes in the 
Mekong mainstream will be caused by 
hydropower development in the Upper 
Mekong Basin 
The flow changes caused by possible 
water resources developments in the 
LMB will result in small mostly positive 
changes in salinity intrusion in the 
Vietnam Delta and relatively small 
changes in flooding patterns around the 
Tonle Sap compared to the natural 
year-to-year variability 
The LMB mainstream dams would not 
cause flow changes beyond a daily 
timeframe 
Within the BDP2 CIA excellent work has 
been done in putting together the 
planned development activities, 
particularly the hydropower schemes.  
The simulation results are still 
preliminary ones and therefore those 
cannot be yet examined in detail. They 
are, however, strictly hydrological based 
on the hydrograph and do not take into 
account the recent findings related to 
the importance of maintaining the flood 
pulse characteristics. I.e. even relatively 
small changes in the dry season water 
level may have significant impact in 
ecosystem productivity. Therefore, 
there is still development to be done in 
the analysis.   
Adamson The conclusions of the study are that 
construction of large scale regulation 
storage on the Upper Mekong in Yunnan 
will have a major impact on the 
hydrological regime of the entire lower 
Mekong mainstream, particularly during 
the March-April when the Yunnan 
proportion of the total flow is largest. 
Adamson’s work was the first one to 
estimate the impact of the hydropower 
development on the hydrology. 
Therefore, even though the analysis was 
limited to only Chinese cascade of dams 
and hydrology-sector the work has an 
important role within the CIAs.  
The work is done with rather simple 
water balance calculations in 
transparent way. Therefore, the results 




Page 801 of 852
PN67_2010_25 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA)  
Marko Keskinen and Matti Kummu 
 28 
All the tools are in their own category relevant to water governance in the 
Mekong (Table 9). One criterion for the relevance has been the transparency of 
the CIA process and how the results have been published. Another criteria was 
how the CIA has assessed the main issue(s) it was originally aimed for. The 
impact of each CIA is discussed as well briefly.  
Table 8.  Relevance of the tool in water governance and possible impacts of the 
CIAs.  
CIA Relevance Impact 
NT2 The CIA was done as a part of the NT2 
project preparation. However, it also 
included the cumulative impacts of all 
the future water resources related 
development plans. The study was 
finalised, however, only after the 
construction of the NT2 had basically 
started. Therefore, the relevance for the 
NT2 project itself remains a bit 
questioned.  
The wider relevance for the study for 
water allocation governance may have 
some significant as the CIA was the first 
transparent and well documented CIA in 
the Mekong Basin.  
For the NT2 project the CIA did most 
probably not have great impact as 
described on the left. However, being 
the first CIA in the Mekong, it might 
have (had) impact on the following CIAs 
and ways of analysing the cumulative 
impacts in the basin.  
NN3 The study has been made for one 
tributary of the Mekong and therefore, 
the basin wide relevance for water 
allocation governance is small. 
However, the more local relevance is 
larger as the study includes multi-
sectoral analysis of various development 
plans in the Nam Ngum catchment. The 
hydrology part of the CIA is, however, 
very weak and has no relevance at all.  
The impact of the tool could not be 
analysed or discussed at this stage.  
WB Tool has been used in the MRC and in 
some account also in the countries. This 
is the only tool approved by all the MRC 
countries and thus, its relevance within 
MRC and NMCs is significant. However, 
the transparency of the process outside 
MRC has not been very successful.  
The tool has been criticised by many 
due to its non-transparency and largely 
unpublished results. Therefore, the 
impact of the results might have 
suffered from that. However, the total 
impact of the study is hard to analyse. 
BDP2 The work is undergoing and therefore, 
the relevancy of the work cannot yet be 
analysed.  
Within the BDP2 lots of efforts have 
been put to improve many of the 
shortcomings of the BDP1 (here 
referred as WB). Those are e.g. 
transparency, stakeholder participation, 
etc. Therefore, the impact of the 
process may increase from its ancestor.   
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CIA Relevance Impact 
Adamson First attempt to estimate the impacts of 
Chine dams on hydrology. Relevance to 
the water allocation governance is thus 
somewhat significant.  
Being first attempt to estimate the 
impact of Yunnan cascade of dams, this 
is important study. Further, Adamson 
(2001) showed with his study that it is 
possible to assess the hydrological 
impact with very basic tool (here water 
balance calculations) and that there is 
not always necessity for expensive and 
complicated tools. 
 
The improvement of the CIAs on the Mekong Basin water governance is briefly 
discussed for each assessment in Table 10. It is not straightforward, however, to 
assess such an impact. It is here assessed mainly based on the transparency of 
the project and how each assessment has impacted on the CIA field itself. The 
NT2 assessment was first CIA in the Mekong and well documented. Thus, it has 
got lots of attention. The first phase of BDP work has not been published by MRC 
and the overall process of DSF has not been very transparent. Thus, the impact 
has been rated not that significant. However, the BDP phase 2 has improved the 
participation and thus, its impact on the water governance issues might increase 
the importance of DSF outside the MRC.  
Table 9.  Improvement of water governance. 
CIA Improvement of water governance 
NT2 For the actual NT2 project the improvement was small. For the Mekong 
basin water governance, however, the improvement was probably more 
significant as this was the first CIA applied in the basin.  
NN3 N/A 
WB Relatively small; large project but the documentation of the tool and its 
results have been poor. Therefore, although the countries have been 
involved in the modelling activities, the work has merely stayed inside 
the MRC and CNMs. The findings neither methodology was not 
transferred well to the wide public.  
BDP2 Work is undergoing. It is therefore too early to be analysed its 
improvement compared to the first phase of BDP work.  
The preliminary results were presented in MRC’s hydropower consultation 
2008 being the first such an attempt where most of the stakeholders 
have been present. Thus, it seems that the results will be available for 
the public more openly and the whole process will be more transparent 
compared to the first phase.  
Adamson This was the first attempt to analyse the hydrological impacts of Chinese 
cascade of dams. Thus, potentially its impact has been significant on the 
water allocation issues in the Mekong.  
 
V. Broad implications, challenges, and opportunities: The way forward for 
SEA and CIA in the Mekong Region  
Challenges with current impact assessment practices in the Mekong Region 
indicate that there is a great need for more strategic and cumulative assessment 
approaches. Consequently, the increased attention towards both Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) and Cumulative Impact Assessment (CIA) at 
both national and regional levels is a promising sign. At the same time, however, 
the approaches have also a potential to be used in wrong ways, in terms of both 
methodology and substance. To prevent this to happen, it is important to 
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understand what the different assessments are actually supposed to be doing, 
and also to be actively involved in the assessment processes to ensure that these 
objectives are not forgotten or neglected.  
In terms of SEA, the current, relatively limited experience from the Mekong 
Region shows that while the SEA has a great potential to raise discussion about 
more strategic dimensions of water resources development, such dimension is 
also relatively easy to neglect. As a result, the assessments are easily reduced, 
for example, to cumulative assessment of already planned projects, rather than 
more strategic assessment of the actual impacts –and underlying reasons– for 
current development plans and policies. The SEAs may also be misused in other 
ways, for example by setting the scope of the assessment so that the alternatives 
for suggested plans are either out-of-date or are having clearly greater 
environmental impact, indicating that the assessed plans would be the best 
option after all. A truly strategic assessment should, however, also be able to 
think ‘out of the box’, and consider altogether new, emerging alternatives.  
The interest towards the CIA has also increased rapidly in the region during the 
recent years. As presented above, there have already been couple of CIAs done 
in the Mekong Basin (ADB 2004, 2008; SEA Study Team 2008a) and few that can 
be classified as being CIAs (Adamson 2001; World Bank 2004b; MRCS/BDP2 
2009). Those five CIAs have been analysed in previous chapter. The basin-wide 
CIAs implemented so far have had, however, also clear shortcomings, and their 
influence on the actual water policies can be seen to be rather small. Among the 
main reasons for this is that the CIAs are either done too late when the project is 
already commissioned to be started (e.g. ADB 2004), or the dissemination and 
documentation of the assessment have been insufficient and/or non-transparent 
(World Bank 2004b).  
On the other hand the already implemented CIAs provide an important 
experience on the pros and cons of the method and its application in the region. 
Related to this, there are promising signs that for example the on-going CIA at 
MRC (MRCS/BDP2 2009) seeks to learn from  the shortcomings of the BDP’s first 
phase. Nevertheless, there is still an urgent need for scientifically sound CIA in 
the Mekong done by independent researchers with transparent and coherent 
tools, data, development scenarios, etc. In terms of models used in the 
assessment, the CIAs would also benefit from using results from various 
hydrological models to enhance the reliability –and transparency– of the 
hydrological impact assessments of the development scenarios. In addition, the 
dissemination of the assessment results is extremely important for assessments 
to really impact planning and decision-making. Communication and information 
dissemination should thus be addressed much better in the upcoming 
assessments. 
These kind of practical recommendations provide, however, only the starting 
point on the way towards more comprehensive and engaging impact assessment. 
A truly meaningful impact assessment requires also the recognition of the highly 
political nature of water development, and consequently, of planning and impact 
assessment processes. The underlying reasons –and solutions– for the challenges 
with impact assessment are therefore likely to lie beyond merely methodological 
issues, and can instead be found from broader political processes related to water 
development. For this reason, impact assessment should build on transparent 
processes, and encourage dialogues with different stakeholders about the 
requirements, methods and assumptions used as well as the results achieved in 
the assessments. This kind of more open impact assessment approach can also 
help to facilitate discussion about the different development options, their 
impacts and consequent trade-offs, and, ultimately, can lead the assessments to 
be both strategic and cumulative by their very nature, building on the needs, 
concerns and ideas of different stakeholders (Keskinen 2008). 
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Although it can be argued that both the SEA and CIA in the Mekong Region may 
in many cases be “too little and too late”, we consider them to be worth 
supporting and striving for. For even with their limitations, they provide more 
comprehensive approaches to impact assessment than the currently dominating 
EIAs and other impact assessment approaches. At the same time there is a real 
danger that they –and particularly the CIA that requires advanced technical 
expertise– lead to overly specialised, technical discussion about the potential 
impacts of water resources development, leaving thus most of the stakeholders 
out from the discussions. Due to their focus on the issues at macro scale, the 
assessment may also neglect the existing diversity of local contexts in different 
countries. Finally, both the approaches have also –like any other approach– a 
potential for misuse and abuse, and they can also be used to depoliticise and 
‘saniticise’ development decisions. To prevent this to happen, it is important to 
follow up closely the implementation of both SEA and CIA as well as to keep 
emphasising the crucial importance of openness and transparency in such 
processes. Neither the SEA nor the CIA can be considered as silver bullet, but 
they do represent two promising tools to advice and facilitate discussion about 
the ways forward for the water development in the Mekong Region.     
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VIII. Annexes  
VIII.1 Annotated bibliography  
The key literature is annotated below, separated to CIA and SEA. The full list of 
references for the entire report follows after this.  
 
Annotated bibliography – SEA  
 
Web:  
There are few web sites that offer information and practical guidance on SEA 
(most of it in the European context, though) as well as some websites describing 
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ADB, 2009b. Harnessing Hydropower for Development – A Strategic 
Environmental Assessment for Sustainable Hydropower Development in Viet Nam, 
Policy summary, Asian Development Bank (ADB) and GMS Environment 
Operations Center, Bangkok, Thailand. Available online at: http://www.gms-
eoc.org/CEP/Comp1/docs/SEA_HarnessHydropower.pdf 
To our knowledge the first SEA process implemented in any Mekong country in 
relation to overall hydropower development. The SEA process described in the 
policy summary was essentially a pilot assessment implemented in the context of 
Vietnam’s Power Development Plan VI, supported by the ADB’s Greater Mekong 
Subregion Core Environmental Program and aiming to build capacities for the 
integration of SEA into the strategic planning of hydropower in Viet Nam, 
including the preparation of PDP VII. The policy summary includes descriptions of 
the five phases of SEA (Scoping; Baseline Assessment; Scenarios; Impact 
Analysis; and Weighting and Trade-Off Analysis) as well as overall conclusions 
and recommendations.  
 
ICEM, 2008, Strategic Environmental Assessment of the Quang Nam Province 
Hydropower Plan for the Vu Gia-Thu Bon River Basin, International Centre for 
Environmental Management (ICEM), prepared for the ADB, MONRE, MOITT & 
EVN, Hanoi, Viet Nam. Available online at: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Consultant/39536-VIE/default.asp 
A report describing a pilot SEA process for hydropower development in Vu-Gia 
Thu Bon River Basin in Vietnam that has currently around 60 proposals for 
hydropower projects. The objective of the pilot SEA was to demonstrate SEA 
methodology and good SEA practice through the assessment of hydropower 
proposals and other development activities in the basin, testing thus practical 
approaches for undertaking SEA in Vietnam. The report recognises 15 key 
economic, social and environmental themes of concern to sustainable 
development in the basin. In addition, seven “fundamental principles” that must 
underpin hydropower development in the basin were recognised: Net provincial 
economic gain; User pays; Multiple use; Safe operations; Net biodiversity gain; 
Net gain in minority well being; and Precautionary principle. 
 
OECD/DAC, 2006. Applying Strategic Environmental Assessment – Good Practice 
Guidance for Development Cooperation, DAC Guidance and Reference Series, the 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD). 160 pages. Available online at: 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/21/37353858.pdf  
A guideline report providing introduction to SEA and its use in development 
cooperation in particular. The report also aims to provide practical guidance on 
how to actually apply SEA in practice, and does this by presenting guidance notes 
and checklists for 12 key entry oints. The emphasis of the entire report is, 
however, perhaps bit too strongly on donor agencies.  
 
Partidario, M.R. 2007. Strategic Environmental Assessment – Good Practices 
Guide: Methodological Guidance, Portuguese Environment Agency, Amadora. 
Available online at 
http://www.seataskteam.net/index.cfm?module=Library&page=Document&Docu
mentID=6477    
A report seeking to provide methodological guidance in implementing SEA in 
Portugal that seems to be one of the most developed countries in terms of SEA 
legislation and regulations. Although focus of the report is thus strongly on 
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European context (with references to UNECE Protocol on SEA), the report includes 
some interesting examples of the theories behind the SEA and its 
implementation.  
 
Partidario, M.R. 2004. Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) – current 
practices, future demands and capacity building needs, Course Manual, IAIA 
Training Courses, International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA). 
A training course manual that was prepared to assist a two days training course 
of International Association for Impact Assessment (IAIA) on SEA. The manual 
contains background information on the evolution, concepts and principles of 
SEA. It also refers to existing legislation, procedure and guidance on SEA, 
reproducing examples from different contexts in Europe and North America. The 
manual also seeks to address the practical implementation of SEA, although it still 
remains largely theoretical.  
 
Soussan, J., 2009. Phase 1: Background Scoping Paper - For a Strategic 
Environmental Assessment of Proposed Hydropower Developments on the 
Mekong Mainstream in the Lower Mekong Basin, Prepared by Professor John 
Soussan, Stockholm Environment Institute - Asia. Available online at: 
http://www.mrcmekong.org/ish/sea.htm 
A report of the initial scoping study for the Mekong River Commission’s SEA, 
providing an introduction to the SEA approach as well as more specific guidelines 
and data needs for applying SEA in the Mekong Region and within the MRC. The 
report includes a summary of the results from consultations in the four MRC 
member countries about the most important strategic issues considering 
hydropower development, concluding that the complex and multi-faceted nature 
of hydropower development is widely recognized and noting that two issues stood 
out as having a strong consensus on their significance: the impacts on project 
affected people and the importance of likely ecosystems changes. It is also 
notable that all people interviewed regarded the issue of mainstream dam 
construction as “the most significant issue facing the river basin in contemporary 
times, and also the most challenging issue that the MRC will need to address for 
the foreseeable future”. The report also recommends that already “the initial 
stages of the SEA contain extensive consultations with a full range of 
stakeholders”. 
 
Soussan, J., Nilsson, M., Sinh, B. T., Lifwenborg, G. Tu, P. Q., Lam, T. Q., Hung, 
N. N. & Linde, L. 2009. Strategic Environmental Assessment of the Hydropower 
Master Plan in the Context of the Power Development Plan VI, Final Report, 
Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). 
This 143-page report represents the documented outputs of a 15-month process 
of analysis and consultation on SEA of Vietnam’s hydropower master plan. The 
report focuses on the methods, study and results of assessing the social and 
environmental consequences of hydropower development in Viet Nam. The report 
notes that the process illustrated that “SEA provides a powerful tool for the 
analysis of the social and environmental impacts of hydropower development”. 
The report considers also alternatives for the hydropower, focusing on coal-fired 
thermal plants and combined cycle gas turbines as “feasible alternative sources of 
power generation”. The report basically gives green light for hydropower 
development in Viet Nam, concluding that the “level of hydropower development 
envisaged in Power Development Plan VI can be justified when compared to the 
feasible alternative sources of power generation, which have higher economic, 
social and environmental costs”. The report also notes, however, that the 
“present approaches to address social and environmental issues in hydropower 
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development are not adequate and more effective mitigation and compensation 
measures must be introduced”.  
 
UNECE, 2003. Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention 
on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, United Nations 
Economic commission for Europe (UNECE). Available online at: 
http://www.unece.org/env/eia/sea_protocol.htm  
Official, legal text describing the protocol on SEA as adopted in Kiev in May 2003 
by 38 states and the European Community; it may be a good idea to complement 
this legal text with explanatory notes available at http://www.unece.org/env/sea. 
The protocol supplements the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) in a Transboundary Context (so-called Espoo Convention), and although it 
was negotiated under UNECE, it is open to all members of the United Nations, and 
could thus be adopted also in the Mekong Region. The protocol also calls for 
extensive public participation in government decision-making in numerous 
development sectors, with public having the right to comment, have their 
comments taken into account, and be told of the final decision and why it was 
taken. The protocol has not, however, yet entered force as it needs still to be 
ratified by at least 16 UNECE Member states. 
 
Veerheem, R.A.A and Tonk, J.A.M.N. 2000. Strategic Environmental Assessment: 
one concept, multiple forms, Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal, Vol. 18, 
No. 3, pp. 177–182.  
This concise scientific journal article discusses the early development of SEA and 
the challenges in its actual implementation in practice due to its various different 
forms. To overcome the confusion over different forms of SEA, the article also 
recommends certain generic SEA principles regarding: Screening; Publication; 
Monitoring; Timing; Environmental scoping; Socio-Economic Scoping; Views of 
the public; Documentation; and Quality Review. The focus of the article is, 
however, only on developed countries, with case study presented from the 
Netherlands.  
 
World Bank, 2006. Environmental Impact Assessment Regulations and Strategic 
Environmental Assessment Requirements – Practices and Lessons Learned in East 
and Southeast Asia, Environment and Social Development Department, East Asia 
and Pacific Region, The World Bank, Washington, D.C. Available online at: 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPREGTOPENVIRONMENT/Resources/EIA
&SEA-regional-review.pdf   
A report summarising the status of EIA and SEA regulations and requirements in 
12 East and Southeast Asian countries, including five Mekong countries 
(excluding only Burma/Myanmar). The country profiles annexed into the report 
provide a handy summary of the official situation in different countries regarding 
the situation with SEA, including also potential for SEA in different countries. 
However, due to increased emphasis on impact assessment and related 
regulations, some parts of the report may already be partly out-of-date.  
 
Annotated bibliography – CIA  
ADB. 2004. Cumulative impact analysis and Nam Theun 2 contributions. Final 
report. Prepared by NORPLAN and EcoLao for Asian Development Bank. 143 p.  
This report presents the results of the CIA of the Mekong basin development 
activities, concentrating on hydropower. The study can be categorised as 
hydrological CIA (i.e. sectoral CIA). The work was undertaken by Norplan and 
EcoLao. They used Mike Basin and Mike 11 models for the assessment. The report 
provides rather transparent and well documented CIA. The CIA conducted and 
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results of that are analysed in more detail in the CIA part of the Tool reviews of 
PN67.  
 
ADB. 2008. Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Preparing the Cumulative Impact 
Assessment for the Nam Ngum 3 Hydropower Project. Prepared by Vattenfall 
Power Consultant AB in association with Ramboll Natura AB and Earth Systems 
Lao. Asian Development Bank (ADB). 394 p. 
This report purposes to assist ADB in its preparations for financing of the 
proposed Nam Ngum 3 Hydropower Project (NN3), located in the Nam Ngum 
River Basin (NNRB) in Vientiane Province, in central Lao PDR. The outcome of the 
report is a strategic assessment of the entire Nam Ngum basin and the expected 
cumulative impacts of the extensive hydropower development programme 
identified for the basin. The work is closely related to another ADB project, the 
Nam Ngum River Basin Development Sector Project (NNRBDSP).  
 
Cooper, L. M. 2004. Guidelines for Cumulative Effects Assessment in SEA of 
Plans. EPMG Occasional Paper 04/LMC/CEA, Imperial College London. 49 p. 
Report provides guidelines for cumulative effects assessment (CEA) at strategic 
level. CEA can be undertaken as part of regional planning and land use studies 
but these guidelines have been developed to incorporate CEA into strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA) of development plans.  
The report consists of two parts: Part I provides the background and context for 
cumulative effects assessment, introducing the concept of cumulative effects and 
discusses the importance of addressing these impacts at a strategic level. The 
CEA process at strategic level is presented. Finally, it defines the role of CEA in 
the SEA process. Part II consists of the guidelines. Guiding principles for CEA are 
outlined. The report also explains how CEA fits within each stage of the SEA and 
plan preparation processes. Methods for addressing cumulative effects at each 
stage are discussed in terms of their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Hegmann, G., C. Cocklin, R. Creasey, S. Dupuis, A. Kennedy, L. Kingsley, W. 
Ross, H. Spaling, and D. Stalker. 1999. Cumulative Effects Assessment 
Practitioners Guide. Prepared for Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency by 
the Cumulative Effects Assessment Working Group AXYS Environmental 
Consulting Ltd and the CEA Working Group for the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency, Hull, Quebec. 134 pp. 
This guide has been intended mainly for the practitioners who are responsible for 
preparing Cumulative Effects Assessments (CEAs). The purpose of this report is 
to provide practitioners with: a) an overview and clarification of current 
understanding about the practice of CEA; b) suggestions on practical approaches 
to complete CEAs that meet statutory requirements and best professional 
practice; and c) case studies of approaches used by project proponents for their 
CEAs.  
 
MacDonald, L. H. 2000. Evaluating and Managing Cumulative Effects: Process and 
Constraints. Environmental Management 26(3):299-315. 
The focus of the paper is on the analytical aspects of assessing and managing CEs 
in natural resource systems. The paper will emphasize cumulative watershed 
effects, as these have been the most extensively studied and continue to be a 
flashpoint of concern. The paper aims to develop more rational procedures to 
assess CEs, clarify key issues for public debate, and ultimately help ensure that 
the limited resources for environmental regulation are utilized as efficiently as 
possible. 
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MRCS/WUP-FIN. 2007. Final Report - Part 2: research findings and way forward. 
WUP-FIN Phase 2 - Hydrological, Environmental and Socio-Economic Modelling 
Tools for the Lower Mekong Basin Impact Assessment. Mekong River Commission 
and Finnish Environment Institute Consultancy Consortium, Vientiane, Lao PDR. 
126 pp. Available on-line at http://www.eia.fi/wup-fin/wup-fin2/publications.htm. 
This report is a product of an extensive collaboration of Finnish, international and 
riparian experts. The purpose of the report is to describe and justify the 
approaches and strategies applied within the project as well as to summarize and 
synthesize the main results and findings of the WUP-FIN Project into general 
conclusions and recommendations. The report argues that without primary 
studies and data collection it is impossible to draw conclusions of process 
behaviour (nature, society) that is necessary to reliably assess the diverse 
impacts of different development plans.  
This report presents the main findings from all of the WUP-FIN activities and 
results: technical reports, working papers and publications that are available for 
studying the details of our field surveys, data analysis, model developments, 
socio-economic and policy analyses as well as impact assessment case studies. 
The report also brings the findings and recommendations into the discussion with 
experts, practitioners as well as with other stakeholders.  
 
Sadler, B. 1996. Environmental Assessment in a Changing World: Evaluating 
practice to Improve Performance. Page 263. International Study of the 
Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment Final Report. International Association 
for Impact Assessment and Canadian Environment Assessment Agency, Canada. 
This report comprises the framework, findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations of the International Study of the Effectiveness of Environmental 
Assessment. It presents the key points and issues related to the practice of 
environmental assessment.  
In Chapter 6 it reviews the SEA practises and concludes that SEA is viewed as a 
promising avenue for incorporating environmental considerations into the highest 
levels of development decision making. However, SEA systems are still at a 
relatively early, formative stage. Many practical questions remain about 
procedures, methods and institutional frameworks. The report presents the good 
practice guidance on the application of SEA and a disciplined approach to using 
SEA to address cumulative effects.  
 
Therivel, R., and B. Ross. 2007. Cumulative effects assessment: Does scale 
matter? Environmental Impact Assessment Review 27(5):365-385 
This article reviews how CEAs consider, and could consider, scale issues: spatial 
extent, level of detail, and temporal issues. It is based on an analysis of Canadian 
project-level CEAs and UK strategic-level CEAs. Based on a review of literature 
and, especially, case studies with which the authors are familiar, it concludes that 
scale issues are poorly considered at both levels, with particular problems being 
unclear or non-existing cumulative effects scoping methodologies; poor 
consideration of past or likely future human activities beyond the plan or project 
in question; attempts to apportion ‘blame’ for cumulative effects; and, at the plan 
level, limited management of cumulative effects caused particularly by the 
absence of consent regimes. Scale issues are important in most of these 
problems.  
However, article continues, both strategic-level and project-level CEA have much 
potential for managing cumulative effects through better siting and phasing of 
development, demand reduction and other behavioural changes, and particularly 
through setting development consent rules for projects. The lack of strategic 
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resource-based thresholds constrains the robust management of strategic-level 
cumulative effects.  
 
World Bank. 2004. Modelled Observations on Development Scenarios in the Lower 
Mekong Basin. Mekong Regional Water Resources Assistance Strategy. Prepared 
for the World Bank with Mekong River Commission cooperation. 142 p. 
This report gives a brief overview on the Decision Support Framework (DSF) 
under Mekong River Commission, and mainly on its hydrological component. DSF 
comprises a suite of models that make it possible to simulate major hydrological 
aspects of river basin behaviour, which can in turn support and inform the 
negotiations that are now addressing the water-sharing issues.  
This report summarises the results of modelled scenarios on the basis of agreed 
key indicators. The scenarios have been selected to represent feasible 
development scenarios - some balanced, others unbalanced - thus providing a 
range of possible outcomes.  
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EA Environmental Assessment (common term for different environmental 
assessment methods)  
EIA   Environmental Impact Assessment 
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(www.eia.fi)  
FR1, FR2, FR3 Flow regimes under IBFM, DSF model results 
GIS   Geographical Information System 
HIA   Hydrological Impact Assessment 
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IAIA   International Association for Impact Assessment  
IBFM   Integrated Basin Flow Management process of the MRC 
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IWRM   Integrated Water Resources Management 
LMB   Lower Mekong Basin  
MRC   Mekong River Commission (www.mrcmekong.org)  
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SEA   Strategic Environmental Assessment 
SIA   Social Impact Assessment 
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WB   World Bank 
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Abstract 
In the Mekong Region countries, peri-urban change driven by globalization 
seriously affects local water resources.  This can occur in two ways – through 
intrusion in the agricultural landscape of urban land uses that negatively impact 
on local water; or through livelihood diversification of households and their 
engagement in new own-account entrepreneurial activities that immediately 
reconfigure and complicate pre-existing water uses in the periphery.  This article 
investigates the latter through the use of two local case studies in Sam Rauen 
sub-district in Thailand and in Van Mon commune in Vietnam. The cases show 
how new water-using entrepreneurial activities of village households have created 
new demand for an appropriate quality of water in irrigation canal  (in the case of 
Sam Ruaen) and/or generates new water pollution source that degrades existing 
irrigation and river bodies  (in the case of Van Mon), which jeopardizes traditional 
uses of local water bodies and sharpen contestations over water quality.  Existing 
water- and land-related institutions in Thailand and Vietnam, which have 
remained single-focused, administratively fragmented and territorially bounded, 
and lacking in tools and capacity for regulating dispersed household based 
production, are practically inutile in managing water and environment in the 
midst of this development. The author argues for a distinctly peri-urban 
perspective in water management in the rural-urban interface, which among 
others, should address both water quantity and quality issues, macro-national 
and local trans-boundary problems, and most importantly, the complex trade-offs 
between livelihoods and environment/health at  household and community level. 
Among countries in the Mekong Region, Thailand and Vietnam have in recent 
decades experienced the most rapid urbanization and peri-urbanization.  They 
have also linked most robustly with the global, particularly with the international 
market and capital by liberalizing their trade and investment.  Thailand’s 
economy became transformed from an agriculture-based to an export-oriented 
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manufacturing and service economy in the 80s, with the unprecedented rise of 
foreign direct investment and ballooning of exports.  This development has 
become spatially expressed in urban expansion, and massive land conversions in 
the urban periphery with dramatic consequences on the state of water resources 
in these areas.  On the other hand, Vietnam’s economy has been undergoing 
reforms since the middle of the 1980s, after the Doi Moi policy that radically 
liberalized foreign investments, and introduced privatization and market reforms.  
This too has spurred the expansion of its main cities, and the transformation of 
extensive rural landscapes into peri-urban zones, with major consequences on 
land and water resources in the localities. 
This article aims to further investigate how transformations in the peri-urban of 
these two countries, influenced by the broader forces of globalization, have 
resulted in changes in local water resources.  It departs however from a focus on 
the link between land use change and water degradation. Instead, it particularly 
investigates local socio-economic changes as response to globalization and how 
these lead to new contestations on water use and associated water quality in 
communities and households in the peri-urban.  This is obviously a less dramatic 
change in the peri-urban water resource domain; but no less important and 
perhaps, even a more pervasive change process unfolding.  
This article is structured in the following. Part I reviews related literature on peri-
urban change, globalization and local water resources; Part II presents two 
narratives of new entrepreneurial activities and their impact on local water 
resources; Part III infers the implications of these cases on water management in 
the peri-urban of Thailand and Vietnam; and, Conclusions argue the meaning and 
significance of a distinct peri-urban perspective in water management.    
 
I.  Peri-urban Change, globalization and local water resources 
A conventional notion of understanding peri-urban interface is from a spatial 
perspective of city expansion or urbanization. The latter’s spatial dynamics of 
combined densification and outward spread of people and built areas may create 
a distinctive type of urban region where a single major city is of central 
importance and surrounding land is closely linked to it (Foreman 2008: 12). 
Particular to developing countries in the Asia-Pacific region, expansion of 
urbanization has taken a form widely known as Extended Metropolitan Regions 
(EMRs), an essentially city-centered regional growth, characterized by a complex 
of cities, towns, and urban-oriented rural population (Smith 2001; Pacione 2001: 
443-445). Mc Gee (1991) initially coined the term desakota1, but then adopted 
the concept of ‘extended metropolitan regions’ (McGee and Greenburg 1992).  In 
middle-income countries developing countries of Southeast Asia, rapid growth of 
mega regions around national capital primate cities, a process encompassing 
nearby provinces, has characterized these countries’ urban landscapes. 
Revisiting the concept of desakota, McGee (2003) referred to it as peri-urban 
areas, whose one defining element is the juxtaposition of the larger city cores 
within heavily populated intensive agricultural regions. This form has created a 
mixture of agriculture and non-agriculture activities and marked heterogeneity of 
land uses, mosaics of temporary, new residents and activities, mingled with 
longstanding land uses (Douglas 2006; Lynch 2005; Hardoy, Mitlin and 
Satterthwaite 2001). This has strongly put in question a widely accepted notion of 
spatial separation of rural and urban activities and departs from attempts at 
identifying discrete spatial boundaries. The focus is instead on conceptual 
distinctions and a process orientation, examined from a perspective of a 
continuum between poles of the urban and rural, and on understanding the 
                                          
1 From the Malay words for village and city. 
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dynamics of change as they affect particular parts of the peri-urban zone, as well 
as shifts in the position of the zone as a whole (Simon et al: 2006).  
Peri-urban concept therefore can also be regarded as both a spatial and temporal 
heuristic to capture one frontier space or context in a particular transition (Hirsch 
2009), a notion that is still consistent with desakota metaphor – that is, a hybrid 
zone with its own characteristics of diverse land uses, occupational mixes and 
juxtaposed marker of urbanity and rurality. Using Thailand as his observational 
field, Hirsch highlights three important characteristics found in the peri-urban as 
a frontier context of transition: (1) as new opportunities for capital; (2) as social 
space for deepening class relations accompanied by extreme degree of 
occupational diversity within households, and presence of new forms of 
production and own-account business; (3) enmeshing of environmental issues in 
the dynamics of development (Ibid).  These three important inter-related 
characteristics of the peri-urban, I will argue and empirically illustrate later, have 
direct causal contribution to intensification of contestation over quality of water in 
localities.  These dimensions of the peri-urban become more pronounced in the 
context of globalization, to which I now turn to. 
 
Globalization is multi-dimensional and not easily summarized, encompassing 
transnational and local linkages and intersecting vectors of changes in the 
economic, social, political and cultural fields driven by major improvements in 
communication, information and transportation technology.  Its impacts on cities’ 
expansion and peri-urbanization are well known.  In Southeast Asia for instance, 
many scholars have attributed the spatial expansion of core cities into mega 
urban region form to the effects of globalizing forces such as foreign direct 
investment (FDI) operating in partnership with domestic capital in export-
oriented manufacturing, and residential, commercial, and leisure projects in a 
context of highly liberalized and supportive national policies (Kelly 1999; Firman 
2000; Goldblum and Wong 2000;  Marcutullio 2003).   
Particularly in Thailand, expansion of industries in the erstwhile farming provinces 
creating a heterogeneous mix of land uses has been associated to FDIs rise 
(Parnwell and Wonguphsawat 1997), and of foreign investments and partnerships 
in real estate sector in aggressive building of middle and up-end luxury  housing 
estates that are sited farther and farther from the core city of Bangkok (Hewison 
2001; Evers and Korff 2000; Setchell 1995). On the other hand, in Vietnam, 
Hanoi’s and Hochiminh’s dramatic expansion to nearby rural areas has occurred 
after the Doi Moi, which opened up the economy to international capital and 
introduced the market economy.  Transformation is currently unfolding in 
Vietnam, with urban land uses and economic activities moving extensively into 
the densely populated Mekong Delta and Red River basins around the two cities 
and engulfing many villages and linking them into an emerging EMRs (Smith 
2001).   
However, globalizing forces that push forward the peri-urban change process is 
not only played out by way of engulfing many villages or ‘rolling over farmland or 
natural land’ (Foreman 2008:10).  Globalization also induces social and economic  
changes in local villages in the urban edge in the context of their enhanced trans-
local and trans-national connectivities, which result in transformations in the 
periphery. Leaf (2002) illustrates the urban impacts of these increasing 
connectivities in China and Vietnam through two village studies and how intra-
village diversification and rise of investments triggered by enhanced local-global 
transformed in a wholesale manner these villages in the urban edge. Time-space 
compression dimension of globalization (Harvey 1989) has also transformed rural 
kampungs in Malaysia as urban social spaces, at present also characterized, 
among others, by multiplicity and diversity of sources of livelihoods and 
occupations of local households (Thompson 2004) 
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The question then arises what are implications of these globalization-driven peri-
urban changes to water resources and use by villages at the urban edge or 
farming communities undergoing land use changes and unprecedented 
diversification of economic activities and own-account entrepreneurship?  
The above question is of special significance to the two rapidly urbanizing 
countries in the Mekong region, Thailand and Vietnam.  Many local communities 
that are at the edge of big cities of the two countries lie in deltaic zones, drained 
by rivers and man-made water canals which continue to be important resources 
to traditional livelihoods such as farming, livestock raising and fishing.  Peri-urban 
change in these areas would unavoidably impact on existing water quality and 
associated uses.  These can occur in two ways.  First,  the edge of the urban in 
the two countries, as an outcome of urbanization and enhanced global linkages, is 
intruded by new residential, commercial and industrial estates rendering their 
territory as virtual checkered landscapes of farms and urban enclaves and having 
major impacts on local water.  Secondly, many local communities on the urban 
edge diversify their livelihoods, engaging in certain own-account and household-
based new entrepreneurial activities that immediately reconfigure and complicate 
further pre-existing water uses in the vicinity. 
The effects on water quality and associated water uses of intrusive urban 
development and the juxtaposition of urban land use in farming areas in Thailand 
have been discussed elsewhere by the author  in a district level study in Bangkok 
peri-urban (Sajor and Ongsakul 2007; see also Askew 2003). What would seem 
not to have been addressed thus far in the emerging water and peri-urban 
literature in Southeast Asian countries pertains to how diversification of 
livelihoods and new entrepreneurial activities in peri-urban localities impact on 
traditional uses of water and contestations over appropriate water quality. How 
these are played out is important in our understanding of the notion that urban-
rural tensions in the domain of the environment and natural resources ‘have not 
only become spatially extended but more intense at the local level’ (McGranahan, 
Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2004). 
In the following, I will present two cases of how these tensions are played out at 
the local level.  One case is in Ratchaburi, Thailand and the other in the Hanoi, 
Vietnam 
II.  Two narratives of new entrepreneurial activities and water in peri-
urban villages 
Sam Ruaen in Ratchaburi Province, Thailand 
Sam Ruaen Sub-district is one of the seven sub-districts (tambon) of Muang 
District in Ratchaburi Province, a province located in the central plain of Thailand. 
Ratchaburi Province has a total population of 820,000 and an average per capital 
income of 1,800 USD annually. Like most of the provinces surrounding Bangkok 
Metropolitan Region, Ratchaburi’s economy has undergone de-agrarianization in 
recent decades, as reflected in the proportion of major sectors’ share in the 
provincial economy. Service sector contributes the biggest share  (51.8%), 
followed by industry sector (33.8%) and agriculture (15.4 %).  
Sam Ruaen is located in Muang Ratchaburi District, one of the nine districts 
making up the province. Muang Ratchaburi covers and area of 430 square km. Its 
population of 196,000 (2009) is the largest among the districts. Sam Ruaen sub-
district is 80 kilometers west of Bangkok and a mere 20 kilometers away from 
Muang municipality, the capital city of Ratchaburi Province. It is comprised of 
three villages (moo), and has a total household population of about 100. It is 
connected to the provincial capital by a first-class four-lane highway, a mere 
twenty-minute motor vehicle travel.  The geographic location of Sam Ruaen thus 
renders it easily responsive to the urbanizing influences coming from Bangkok 
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mega city itself and from nearby Muang municipality, the urban commercial and 
educational urban center of Ratchaburi. 
Bang Pa Canal, a 37-kilometer  natural supplementary waterway, originates from 
the upstream of Mae Klong River, a major river in Ratchaburi Province that 
empties into the Gulf of Thailand in Samut Songkram at the Bay of Bangkok. The 
canal passes through six districts of the province. When water level in Mae Klong 
is high, water gates in Bang Pa Canal are opened to allow water flow.  In Muang 
district, the canal flows in Sam Ruaen directly coming from Don Sai, a 
neighboring sub-district. From Sam Ruaen, Bang Pa Canal courses through Bang 
Pa sub-district, the last area before it courses back to Mae Klong River.  
Due to its location, that part of the Bang Pa Canal that runs through Sam Ruaen 
has been at the receiving end of water pollution from development upstream.  In 
1996, in Don Sai sub-district, the area in the middle of Bang Pa canal was 
developed into a 1,430 rai2 industrial zone, where a number of export-oriented 
factories, including garment, textile, aluminum and metal industries, have been 
located.   According to village informants,3 a number of these factories discharge 
their wastewater into the canal, especially at night. Many of these factories have 
not been complying with the regulation requiring point-source treatment of 
wastewater before discharge.   
Industrial pollution is further compounded in the canal downstream in the 
southern section of Don Sai. Majority of households here have since been working 
in the factories in the industrial and have ceased to engage in crop farming.  
Many households too have shifted to setting up piggery and cattle farms, which 
have become a thriving industry primarily to supply the burgeoning meat demand 
of the huge population of Bangkok metropolitan region.  Thus, water in Bang Pa 
Canal in this area downstream of the industrial estate is largely used for cleaning 
these livestock farms.   
At present, there are thirty livestock farms in Don Sai sub-district.  Typical size 
pig farms have 400 to 500 animals (classified as small farms). There are also 
several farms that have over 10,000 heads (classified as big farms). According to 
a survey of farms conducted in 2005, big farm operators normally have treatment 
system of wastewater. Small farms however do not generally treat their 
wastewater before discharge to the Bang Pa Canal.  In addition, canal 
maintenance is generally neglected by local government and communities in Don 
Sai sub-district.  Its banks are ill maintained and full of bushes and excessive 
hyacinth and weeds, which block free water flow. 
Based on in-depth water analysis at several points of Bang Pa Canal in Sam Ruen 
sub-district conducted in December 20064, quality of water based on certain 
parameters is most critical near the main pollution source of piggery and livestock 
farms concentrated in neighboring Don Sai sub-district.  At this point of the Bang 
Pa Canal bordering Don Sai, temperature of surface water is highest.  It is also 
where TDS (total dissolve solid) value (1793 mg/l) exceeds the standard amount 
specified by the Royal Irrigation Department (less than 1300 mg/l).  DO (dissolve 
oxygen) at the area nearest Don Sai has values lower than the official Pollution 
                                          
2 One rai equals 1,600 sq. meter. 
3 Key informant interviews in Sam Ruaen (July 2007).  
4 In-depth water survey was conducted in the area in late December 2006 in six 
samples points along the Bang Pa Canal in Sam Ruen sub-district as baseline data 
gathering preparatory to what afterwards became a CIDA-AIT Southeast Asia 
Urban Environmental Project on “Community and Stakeholder Participation in 
Water Quality Improvement and Pollution Abatement in Bang Pa Canal” in Sam 
Ruen sub-district.  The project was launched in the third quarter of 2007 and 
continued up to mid 2009. Water samples from the canal were tested in 
laboratory. 
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Control Department (PCD) standard.  Hence, both TDS and DO values that 
excessively deviates from official standard can be attributed, in combination with 
a few other factors, to waste water discharges from livestock concentrated in Don 
Sai. (Incidentally, DO value is also lowest and below official standard near the 
area Pikulthong, another border sub-district, where three large piggery farms are 
operating). 
Bang Pa Canal has traditionally been an important water source for people in the 
Sam Ruaen sub-district.  Up to the end of the last decade, households in Sam 
Ruaen had been making a living mainly through paddy farming, orchard farming, 
and backyard livestock, activities that are highly dependent on water in Bang Pa 
Canal.  This canal had also been used for domestic cleaning purposes. Rise in 
number of piggery farms, which increasingly became the source of water 
pollution of the canal in the neighboring district of Don Sai started in the 1980s. 
Village informants in Sam Ruaen say that even at that time there were already 
brewing tensions over water pollution perceived to be generated by the livestock 
and piggery farms in Don Sai since obviously this was seen as unfairly burdening 
the villagers’ own use of water of adequate quality where their traditional 
livelihood activities depended on.   However starting in the late 1990s, tension 
with Don Sai’s over the latter’s livestock farms’ wastewater discharges took a new 
dimension, when households in Sam Ruaen started to engage in ornamental fish 
farming for export.  
Ornamental fish farming for export to Japan was initiated in Muang municipality 
by a number of entrepreneurs in the late 1990s.  After initial success, one of the 
pioneers introduced ornamental fish farming to Sam Ruaen. He initiated a few 
households to the new technology, and supplied the fingerlings and connection to 
merchants exporting ornamental fish. Farmers in the Sam Ruaen, especially in 
Moo 2, immediately took up the new livelihood activity due its comparatively high 
earning returns.  By 2003, many households in Sam Ruaen had been engaging in 
ornamental fish farming. Today, around 20 percent of households have ponds.  
This has surpassed paddy farming, backyard livestock raising and orchard 
farming in terms of income returns for farmers.  Thus, households who engage in 
ornamental fish farming are clearly those who are economically better-off in the 
community.   
Ponds for ornamental fish farming have sizes ranging from 10 to 50 rai, which 
can hold approximately 10,000 fish per rai.  Local fish farmers draw water mainly 
from Bang Pa Canal, through the use of pumps. Because farmers do not have 
treatment system before (and also after) water use, they just let the water to 
settle in their ponds for 4 to 5 days.  Smaller farmers who cannot wait longer and 
who often opt to use immediately the canal water face greater risk of having 
unsuitable water for their fish. Ornamental fish are normally sold between one to 
six months of raising, depending on the size of fish being ordered from the export 
market.  After all the fish have been harvested, the farmers will release water out 
to dry the ponds for 4 to 5 months before being used again in the following year. 
Use of canal water by ornamental fish farming is far more sensitive to adequate 
quality compared to traditional water use in paddy farming, orchard farming and 
backyard livestock.  Sam Ruaen fish farmers have been the most vocal nowadays 
in expressing concerns over deteriorating water quality in the Bang Pa Canal, 
especially blaming the amounts of pollution coming from the livestock farms of 
Don Sai.  They have commonly experienced their fish die and float in the ponds, 
when water is colored dark green or brown.  In these occasions they have to 
relocate their fish to another pond or change water immediately. With the 
presence of ornamental fishing activity, level of water pollution from the 
upstream, which was already tension-laden but still tolerable vis-à-vis  traditional 
use, has become livelihood-threatening to a significant number of households in 
the Sam Ruaen. In this new context water quality has become a serious source of 
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open conflict and tension between the local officials and residents of Don Sai, and 
the local officials and residents of San Ruaen.   
Van Mon Commune in Bac Ninh Province, Vietnam 
Van Mon Commune is located in Yen Phong District in Bac Ninh Province. It is 
between two important nearby urban centers, about 21 km northeast is Ha Noi 
and 7 km Southwest is Tu Son town. The commune is very accessible by roads 
and waterways. It is comprised of five villages, which are Quan Do, Quan Dinh, 
Phu Xa, Tien Thon and Man Xa, the village site of this case study.  
Van Mon has a total area of 424.84 ha, of which 268 ha is agricultural land, 65.1 
ha is residential land, 91.3 ha is special-use land and 0.38 ha is unused land. The 
commune has a population of 9359 persons and has 1709 households (based on 
the 2005 census). The annual population growth rate is 1.65. Of the total 
population, about 40% are in the working age. Seventy percent of adult workers 
are engaged in artisanal production and farming, while 30 % are purely engaged 
in rice farming. On average, per capita rice production is 167 kg of milled rice/6 
months. 
The average rainfall in the area varies between 1240 and 1598 mm per year. The 
rainy season often coincides with the prevalent period of the southwest or 
southeast wind (between May and October) accompanied by atmospheric 
turbulences (including tropical convergent strip, typhoon, tropical low pressure), 
creating long lasting medium and heavy rains (Bac Ninh DONRE, 2005). Rainfall 
during this period makes up about from 75% to 80% of the total annual rainfall. 
Rainwater creates a surface current, a part of which infiltrates to enrich the 
ground water in the area. Rainwater thus provides a considerable volume of 
water for production and daily activities of villagers;  it is also a major medium 
for spreading pollution. Dry season, on the other hand, lasts six or seven months 
from November to May of the following year, when rainfall is very little, 
accounting between 15% and 20% of the total annual rainfall. 
Flowing through the area of Van Mon with a length of about 2km and joining the 
Cau River in Van An commune of Bac Ninh province is Ngu Huyen Khue, an inland 
river originating from Chau Khe commune in Tu Son district. The river provides 
water for 5 districts including Yen Lang, Dong Anh, Tu Son, Yen Phong and Tien 
Du. The river’s water is also used for irrigation purposes. It also receives waste 
sources of various types from the area. 
Aside from being engaged in paddy farming as their traditional major occupation, 
households in Van Mon have engaged in aluminum melting. This artisanal 
production began under the system of cooperative production brigade in the mid-
60s. With the collapse of the cooperative model, household-based artisanal 
production increasingly displaced these cooperatives.   
Man Xa, one of the villages of the commune, has been experiencing most 
prosperous period of aluminum melting since 1982. A number of households in 
the village also conduct lead, and zinc melting. Aluminum melting was boosted by 
the Doi Moi policy officially adopted in Vietnam in 1986, which included among others 
the elimination of the cooperatives’ monopoly and encouragement of privatization and market 
liberalization and enhanced global trade. Since then many households have decided to 
separate from the cooperative and to privately invest in aluminum and metal 
melting for household livelihood. Villagers also began the more profitable 
enterprise of melting scrap aluminum and produce bars for factories, plants and 
for export, instead of making pans for the domestic market that was the practice 
prior to Doi Moi period. In the last five years, Man Xa has expanded its markets of 
recycled aluminum to China. Today the village produces 400 to 500 tons of 
aluminum bars, from 8000 tons of aluminum scraps. 
Aluminum production process starts with the purchase and classification of 
aluminum scraps.  After sorting out and preliminary treatment, materials are 
melted in primary pots. They are then placed in primary moulds to make semi-
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finished products, in the form of bars that are used as inputs for other forms of 
aluminum production. Slag formed at this stage still contains aluminum and thus 
moved into filtering tanks. This is later used as input for the melting process in 
the primary pot in order to make full use of the material.  
After being melted in the primary pot, the aluminum can be continuously melted 
in the secondary pot. This is then moved to the next stage where products are 
refined. Slag formed in the process of melting in the secondary pot is waste and  
not reused. In household-based aluminum recycling three production processes 
involved – that is, washing of aluminum scrap material, filtering, and cleansing of 
finished products -- create waste water (aside from solid waste).  A large volume 
of toxic gas is also formed and dispersed to the surrounding environment. 
 
Households in Man Xa village have no access to the piped water. Local people rely 
on water from drilled wells or rain water for drinking and domestic use. This is 
now under serious threat of pollution since the intensification of household-based 
aluminum production. Based on water samples collected from both drilled wells 
and collected rain water current status of the quality of water used for drinking 
and daily activities exhibit the following characteristics: (1) iron concentration in 
the two drilled well water samples are three to eight times higher than the 
standard level for drinking water; (2) samples of drilled well water are polluted 
with oil and concentration in one of the two exceeds the standard levels; (3) 
ionized ammonium concentration is high not only in the underground water but 
also in the rain water, exceeding the standard level for drinking water.5; (4) and 
biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) concentration in all the water samples is 
higher, 3-5 times exceeding the standard levels.  
Furthermore, during the rainy season, aluminum concentration in the rainwater of 
households that are not involved at all in aluminum melting is quite high 
(0.9mg/l), exceeding the permissible limits for potable water (0.5mg/l). 
Aluminum dusts created during the manufacturing process scatter and fall onto 
the house roofs, eventually draining into the rain water tank.  
Quality of water on rice paddy and irrigation canals has also deteriorated. Based 
on samples collected during the rainy season, water contains some heavy metal 
concentrations (like zinc, lead, and mercury). On the other hand, Ngu Huyen 
Khue River is heavily polluted at certain points in the village. Concentrations of 
BOD, ionized ammonium, and lead exceed the permissible level. During the dry 
season, the BOD concentration exceeds the permissible level though not much 
(16.5mg/l compared with the standard level of 10mg/l). However, during the 
rainy season, the BOD concentration increases dramatically in both river water 
samples – four times higher than the standard for natural water bodies, despite 
the river current being stronger. This is because the river also passes other 
artisanal villages upstream collecting their untreated wastewater.  Further, village 
sewage ponds that used to be ponds for agricultural purposes and daily activities 
are also now seriously polluted. The metal concentrations exceed the permissible 
level stipulated for natural water bodies.  
Man Xa’s rapid development of craft industry, including associated demographic 
growth, and the absence thus far of solutions to effectively abate water pollution 
have combined to make the level of environmental pollution in the village a 
health hazard. All wastewater receiving water bodies are polluted at an alarming 
rate, thus posing risks to the environment and to local villagers’ health.  
Based on a survey of 80 households in Man Xa in 2006, majority of the rich, 
upper-middle and the middle households claim not to have any health problem at 
all.  A minority of these groups and all in the poor group however admit to 
                                          
5 Contrary to common practice in the area, rainwater thus needs treatment 
before use.  
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suffering from having a cold and respiratory problems.  Inspection of the Van 
Mon’s Health Clinic’s records show a contrary picture however.   Man Xa villagers’ 
visits to the health clinic have been increasing annually. The number of death due 
to cancer has also increased annually for the last 4 years. (based on interviews 
with the head of Van Mon’s health clinic). According to public health specialists, 
polluted water is the main reason that causes stomach and intestinal cancer. 
Further, the number of those who died of cancer and of those who contracted 
other diseases in Van Mon was between 2 and 3 times higher compared to the 
number in other communes in the district that are not engaged in artisanal 
activities6.  
 
The rise and intensification of household-based artisanal craft presents a serious 
governance problem for the authorities in peri-urban Hanoi.  There is clearly an 
environment/health and livelihood trade-off implicated. Today local commune and 
other authorities are in conflict with local households on how to manage water 
quality deterioration and associated health problems in these villages without 
prejudicing what has become a very important new source of livelihood. 
III.  Implications for water management  
In Sam Ruaen and Van Mon, changes in livelihood activities have put new 
pressures on resources – especially, on water – that are beyond the reach of 
functional environmental management regimes commonly found in the per-urban 
(McGranahan, Satterthwaite and Tacoli 2004). The two situations exemplify how 
lack of clarity of institutional responsibilities common in the peri-urban generates 
a tendency by government agencies to operate either sectorally or within the 
narrowly defined remits, or, perhaps to just dispose pollution and waste outside 
the administrative boundaries where they are generated (Davila 2006; Dahiya 
2003).    
These new livelihood activities and changes in water use highlight the importance 
of holistic planning and effective integrated management scoped in the peri-
urban, which ironically is not in the planning and management tradition of the 
peri-urban at all (Simon et al 2006; Allen 2006). Addressing the complexity of 
associated problems would also entail putting in place an integrated water 
resource management (IWRM) sufficiently scoping the peri-urban interface. A 
holistic and system wide management approach that aligns, among others, water 
quality and quantity, surface water and ground water, upstream and downstream 
water-related interests, and land-use and water management (Ahsan & Das Guta, 
1999; Braga 2001; Calder, 2005; Carter, Kreutzwizer, & Loe, 2004)). 
In more specific terms, three important dimensions of water governance 
problems typical in the peri-urban of Thailand and Vietnam are implicated in the 
Sam Ruaen and Van Mon cases.   
First. Single-focus traditional water management.  In the Sam Ruaen, Pang Pa 
Canal is under the direct responsibility of the Royal Irrigation Department (RID), 
whose traditional focus is on managing water quantity for irrigation allocation and 
control of canal flooding. In Thailand, it is still the RID that is entrusted with the 
duty to oversee and administer water in the peri-urban area. But despite 
expansion of its mandate to include solving water pollution (in addition to water 
allocation and flood control) such remains under-operationalized and in practice, 
merely an incidental concern of this traditionally water allocation body (Sajor and 
Ongsakul 2007).  On the other hand, Van Mon situation demonstrates the patent 
disconnect between micro-level land use on the one hand, and water use and 
management, on the other.  Water-using manufacture has been allowed to co-
exist in the same narrow physical space being used for residential and farming 
                                          
6 This is based on the author’s Yen Phong District’s Health Center records. 
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purposes.  This de-facto mix-up of uses with disastrous environmental and health 
consequences is a manifestation of failure of water sector and land sector 
agencies, among others, to co-ordinate and integrate their separate particular 
mandates in given localities to manage water, land, and the general environment. 
Second. Institutional constraint in local trans-boundary water quality problem. 
The conflict over water quality currently raging in Bang Pa Canal highlights the 
cross sub-district nature of local water management.  As mentioned earlier, 
pollution coming from  livestock farms in neighboring subdistrict of Don Sai  (and, 
to a certain extent, Pikulthong) has jeopardized ornamental fish farming  in Sam 
Ruaen.7 This particular pollution problem needs inter-subdistrict (and perhaps, 
inter-district) conflict resolution measures and mechanism, and common local 
trans-boundary planning and cooperation, a governance modality that calls for 
innovation and thinking outside the box.  The same local trans-boundary problem 
besets the riparian village of Man Xa and other villages along the Ngu Huyen 
Khue River. As earlier mentioned, waste discharges of artisanal activities in 
upstream communes along the river has further worsened the quality of river 
water in Van Mon commune, already being polluted by its own villages.  This of 
course has affected the general usability of the river water for irrigation of local 
paddies. Similar to Thailand, Vietnam lacks horizontal linkages between local 
territorial administrative bodies that can effectively address local trans-boundary 
problems  (Sajor and Thu 2009). 
Third. Failure to regulate spatially diffused small and household firms’ pollution. 
Peri-urban villages are sites of robust development of small and household firms’ 
production, especially in the context of these areas enhanced linkages with urban 
center and international market. In Muang district, small livestock farms have 
been flourishing, co-simultaneously with the household-based ornamental fish 
farming.  Though in varying degrees, both are polluters of canal water and 
groundwater. The two however are also in a contradictory relationship vis-à-vis 
the issue of appropriate water quality required by their specific production 
activity.  On the other hand, in Van Mon, household-based aluminum melting has 
become the new non- traditional users of water and new agents of pollution of 
local water bodies.  In both countries, regulatory tools and standards to curb 
wastewater discharges, and enforcement capacity hardly exist to effectively 
regulate pollution by small and household –based industries.  Effective control of 
the government in this particular industry sector becomes even more challenging 
due to the spatially dispersed and informal characteristics of these of firms. 
Conclusions  
The above narratives of Sam Ruaen and Van Mon and discussions on their 
implications on water management have shown how diversification of household 
economic activities in the context of enhanced global links of the peri-urban 
reconfigures pre-existing local water use and associated appropriate quality 
standard. New water-using entrepreneurial activities of village households create 
new demand for an appropriate quality of water in irrigation canal as in the case 
of Sam Ruaen and/or generates new water pollution source that degrades 
existing irrigation and river bodies as in the case of Van Mon, which jeopardizes 
traditional uses of these water bodies.  Existing water- and land-related 
institutions in Thailand and Vietnam, which have remained single-focused, 
administratively fragmented and territorially bounded, and lacking in tools and 
                                          
7 On the other hand, since ornamental fish farming also discharges pollutants in 
the canal, it can be assumed that this new activity has water degradation 
implications in  canal and ground water whose impact is likely in the neighboring 
or downstream sub-districts. This matter though was not investigated by the field 
research of this case study. 
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capacity for regulating dispersed household based production, are practically 
inutile in managing water and environment in the midst of this development.  
These discussions and findings open up another important dimension in the 
emerging literature of water and peri-urban of Southeast Asia.  Though still few, 
emerging studies have highlighted how conversion of land for urban use,  ‘rolling 
over’ or encroachment of the urban development into rural land have physically 
transformed existing local water bodies and have resulted to degradation of local 
water and associated conflicts.  On the other hand, what I have specifically 
focused on is how degradation and conflict in water quality can come about not 
only as a result of spatial encroachment or spatial juxtaposition of the rural and 
the urban, but through the dynamics of social and economic transformations of 
households that reconstitute them as new users of water serving their 
entrepreneurial activity in the process of livelihoods diversification.  New 
contestations over water quality arise because of new uses of water and new 
requirements of water quality that may be incompatible with and threatening to 
pre-existing or traditional uses of water and dominant quality standard.  
Holistic water management in the growing peri-urban of Thailand and Vietnam, 
and in more or less similar other countries in developing regions, need to address 
co-simultaneously impacts on water supply, quality, and associated conflicts 
arising from both spatial and social transformations currently unfolding in urban-
rural interface.  These transformations would become even more robust and 
gather stronger momentum as these areas become linked to globalizing forces, 
most especially with the international market.  There is a need for a distinct peri-
urban perspective in water management in the large in-between areas beyond 
the city core and before the rural hinterlands.  In rapidly urbanizing countries 
such as Thailand and Vietnam, this is imperative. 
A peri-urban perspective in water management necessarily has to put as its 
central agenda the task of addressing not only water quantity allocation issues, 
but water quality problems as well; and, the task of addressing not only macro-
national scale trans-boundary water issues, but more importantly local trans-
boundary water conflicts. And last but not least, peri-urban water management 
has to tackle the difficult and complex trade-offs between livelihoods and 
environment/health, at the household and village community, the scale where 
these concerns matter most. 
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I. Introduction 
Today, global recognition of an economic approach to environmental management 
is increasing in all sectors of the economy. Payments for environmental services 
(PES) have consequently emerged as a concept and tool for achieving ecosystem 
conservation, and at the same time improving the livelihoods of 
environmental-service providers. As a new innovative approach, however, not only 
the definition of PES is not yet formalized, but also the schemes of PES are great 
variable. Those made some confusion in research and practice. This short note is 
aimed to promote the understanding of PES through an introduction of the basic 
conception of PES and PES schemes in the context of Mekong region as well as its 
debates. It concluded by addressing the key points links to water allocation.  
II. PES: Definition and Terminology 
The idea of PES is to provide incentives and benefits for people who now utilize 
environmentally valuable ecosystems in return for them agreeing to utilize them in 
such a way as to protect or enhance their environmental services for the benefit of 
a wider population (van Noordwiik, et al, 2004). However, until now, no formalized 
definition of PES schemes exists in the literature, which causes some conceptual 
confusion. The most widely accepted definition provided by Wunder (2005) that 
based on five principals: [PES is]    
• a voluntary transaction where 
• a well defined ES (or a land-use likely to secure that service) 
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• is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) ES buyer 
• from a (minimum one) ES provider 
• if and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (conditionality) 
 
Based on this definition, PES features contrast with those of some other 
conservation approaches. PES is generally more direct than approaches like 
Integrated Conservation and Development Project (ICDPs)-which aim to indirectly 
promote conservation and explicitly combine conservation and development goals 
(Wunder, 2005)-or communicative instruments, which use communication to 
advocate certain types of environmentally positive behavior. PES is also generally 
more flexible than approach such as command-and-control systems or other 
protected area schemes (Leimona and Lee, 2008). 
Furthermore, van Noordwijk, (et al. 2007) has redefined the PES criteria in order to 
highlights the aspect of pro-poor as the environmental service provider who might 
be the prioritized group to receive the payment. According to them,  
PES need to be realistic, voluntary, conditional and pro-poor: 
 Realistic: PES schemes relate to real impacts on tangible environmental 
services of importance to at least some stakeholders  
 Voluntary: PES agreements are not fully imposed, but leave space for 
innovations and search for increased efficiency through voluntary 
agreements in the space between ‘willingness to pay’ and ‘willingness to 
accept’ 
 Conditional: PES schemes include conditions for the rewards to relate to the 
actual achievement of goals and standards 
 Pro-poor: PES schemes involve all stakeholders in the landscape, avoid 
increasing inequity or actively enhance equity on gender and/or wealth 
basis. 
Within the below understanding of PES features, various terms used for the 
remuneration of environmental services is would be get better and clearly 
understood.  
Payment for ES: the most widely used term. But, it is clear monetary associated in 
contrary to option of in-kind payment (Wunder, 2005)  
Markets for ES: also generally used term, particularly by IIED. It highlights not only 
economic incentives, but also competitive market mechanisms. (Landell-Mills and 
Porras, 2002)  
Reward for ES: it commonly knows as Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental 
Service they provide (RUPES). This ICRAF initiative is looking for justice for service 
providers being secured rewarded. (van Noordwijk, et al. 2004). Also, it has been 
called as compensation of ES, especially in Chinese context (Lu, et al. 2008).    
III. PES situated in the Mekong 
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In the context of Mekong region, also worldwide, forest provide four types of 
environmental goods and services to be sold. They are 1) protection of landscape 
beauty, 2) carbon sequestration and storage, 3) biodiversity conservation and, 4) 
watershed protection. Meanwhile, there are also government-led and 
market-oriented schemes for PES in the region. This section reviews the examples 
of how those four ES has been traded in Mekong and simultaneously address the 
role of government and market. 
Payment for Carbon Offsets(PCO): Payment for Carbon offsets is the way that buyer 
to get carbon emission credit from providers, for example northern electricity 
companies paying tropical farmers to plant or maintain additional trees. The 
payment schemes are under CDM (Clear Development Mechanisms) in Kyoto 
Protocol.  
In the Mekong region, to our knowledge, China and Vietnam are the most countries 
get involved. In Yunnan, China, the afforestation CDM project is funded by 
Conservation International (CI) and The Nature Conservancy (TNC). They are 
successfully sold the carbon emission to Europe Carbon Fund and 3M company. In 
Vietnam, the state afforestation program is applying for Carbon finance from 
international carbon market.  
More recently, with the increasing critiques on the gaps of CDM in protecting the 
existing tropical forest, where deforestation and peatland loss cause 20% carbon 
emission, an new initiatives called Reduced Emission from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (REDD) emerged at global level. The basic idea is to sell carbon storage 
from forest. In the region, Laos and Vietnam are actively engaged in this initiative. 
However, neither existing project under CDM nor REDD schemes get smallholder 
farmers involved. The Initiators are apt to put those target projects in the state- 
owned forest land to avoid tenure conflict issues on the one hand, and reduce 
transaction cost in operation on the other. Also, the most carbon trading systems 
set up in developed countries is too sophisticated that might eliminate the 
participation from developing countries.               
Payment for Watershed Protection (PWP): The common practice for Payment for 
Watershed Protection is that downstream water users paying upstream farmers for 
adopting land use that limit soil erosion or flooding risks. Also, the types of PWP is 
varies from government-led mechanism to private sector or multi-stakeholders 
interaction.  
In the Mekong context, the case of PWP is greatest among four of those ES traded. 
To our knowledge, China, Vietnam and Thailand have been implementing the 
largest scale PWP in the region. In China, the Sloping Land Conversion Program 
(SLCP) is largest PES schemes that financed by central government to convert 
agriculture land to forest at upstream of Yangtze and Yellow Rive. It aimed to 
protect the upstream watershed after the 1998 catastrophic floods.  Farmers 
received subsidies and seedlings from government for that land use change. In 
Vietnam, state launched “Government Watershed management contracts” to 
protect the upstream watershed. Also, Thai government invests to set up watershed 
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protection zone in Chiang Mai. On the other hand, there are also a number of small 
scale PWPs. For example, the hydrological company in Yunnan and Thailand invest 
considerable fund for upstream afforestation and payment of local communities to 
protect the forest.  
In practice, the most payment schemes for environmental services in Mekong 
region have been publicly financed. Those programs have few considerations about 
poverty of upstream communities on the one hand, the investment from 
government is insecure in a longer term on the other.  
 
Payment for Biodiversity Conservation (PBC): there are various ways for PBC. For 
instance, the conservation donors paying landholders for creating set-aide areas for 
biological corridors, or government may pay indigenous community for restricting 
their resource use in the protected area.  
In the context of Mekong region, the largest scale PBC is funded by Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) to set up Biodiversity Corridors in Great Mekong 
Subregion (GMS). In that project, they have aslo budget a great amount for local 
community who live in the corridors. The program is across all the countries in the 
region, Yunnan (China), Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and Cambodia. In 
addition, Internationally, Vietnam and Laos have International Cooperative 
Biodiversity Group (ICBG) work for Biodiversity Access rights. At the national level, 
for instance, China government established a fund to pay the local farmers whose 
forests were delineated as Ecological Forest for protection. However, the payment is 
too small to cover the opportunists cost of farmer.   
For PBC, there are comparatively few private sector involved. Rather, government 
and international organization as well as donor agency are playing the 
predominated position to promote and act in PBC.  
Payments for Landscape Beauty (PLB): The PLB is normally operated as tourism 
operators paying a local community not to exploit resource in a zone used for 
tourism (e.g. no hurting in a wildlife viewing, no logging in national park etc.). The 
PLB is most payment scheme that market mechanism applied among four types of 
traded ES.  
In the Mekong region, a number of examples adopted PLB. In Thailand, the 
Kancanaburi Ecotourism Cooperative Company operates ecotourism service to 
finance the protection of landscape. In Yunnan, Tiger Leaping Gorge is operated by 
private sector that charge the tourists for access permit. National Park in Laos, 
Vietnam and Cambodia also practices in one way or another to entitle the access 
right to tourists. However, the most commercialized PLB has rarely maintain as real 
ecotourism, as the booming of tourism market. That lead to degradation of resource 
in some case. Also, in some cases, the powerless local community is hardly to 
receive a fair payment.  
To sum up, four types of environmental goods could be sold separately as well as 
integratively. For instance, National Ecological Benefits Compensation Fund in 
China is the case bundled all environmental service. Furthermore, the 
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multi-stakeholders’ engagement has enrich various schemes. Government, 
company and donor agency play as the role of buyer, while NGOs play actively as 
intermediate to bridge buyer and providers. However, in practice, local community’s 
input in design and implementation of PES as well as full autonomy in participation 
choice need to be further enhanced.                    
IV. PES in Debates 
While the global increasing interests on PES, its debates also emerged to question 
how PES can better contribute to poverty reduction and environmental 
conservation. Three major contradictions exist:  
Fairness vs. Efficiency: Wunder (2002) has stated the significance to consider 
fairness and efficiency. He augured “…many look PES as a source of just reward for 
poor rural people who take care of the environment and continuously produce 
environmental services. But from an efficiency point of view, only those who 
constitute a credible threat to service provisions or are likely to actively increase 
provision should be paid. Schemes for PES face intrinsic contradictions, having to 
balance ES additionality and financial efficiency goals with fairness and 
stewardship-reward considerations.” Moreover, in conservation and rural 
development circles, what aspects (poverty or protection) would be prioritized for a 
PES schemes designs also become a hot issue to think over.    
Government v.s. Market: Government v.s. Market is long debates as “governmental 
failure” versus “Market failure” in Neo-classical economic viewpoint. On the one 
hand, the inefficient bureaucracies and high cost of coordination in government 
sector hamper the goal of PES. Also, financial durability of government is an issue 
for investing long-term PES schemes. The overruling of government might also turn 
a Voluntary PES schemes into a Command-and-control and PES-liked schemes. On 
the other hand, leaving decisions to market might lead to undervalue ES and 
marginalize pro-poor community. Thus, the critical issues is how to balance the role 
of government and market to use various economic instrument (e.g. tax, bond, 
green funds and fees etc.) for PES.   
Rights and Power: it is widely acknowledged that secured land ownership is 
precondition for PES. The property right enables the poor people to be defined as 
provider for participating into PES schemes. However, the right does not ensure the 
subsequent and reasonable payment. Considerable case shows powerless poor 
farmer is positioning in a marginal place for negotiating agreement of PES. As a 
result, undervaluation of PES and overrestricted resource access are the most case 
took place. Moreover, many poor community (e.g. ethnic group in Thailand) only 
hold the customary use right over the land and forest that may extremely prevent 
them from participating in PES schemes. The powerful elite may take hold of the 
land and marginalize the poor, if PES projects increase the value of the land and 
incentive to take control of it. Rights do not guarantee the benefit distribution. But, 
right is the precondition for PES. How to transform right in real power for control 
over land and negotiate with buyers is the very issue in the debates.       
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V. Concluding Remarks: PES towards Water Allocation  
PES is an innovative approach toward conservation and development. Although the 
critical debates existing, the promising future of PES is also predictable. To link with 
PN 67 project on water allocation, this concluding remark address key point for 
consideration in the project:  
1. Strengthen information sharing: information is power. It is crucial to sharing 
information related to ES among the stakeholder involved in water allocation. 
Enhancement of information sharing could improve poor people’s ability to 
participate in emerging market, strengthen their bargaining power in market 
creation and schemes designs, as well as availability for negotiation of 
environmental payment.  
2. Invest in training and education: since lack of awareness on PES, training for 
market creation, negotiation, management, financial accounting, contract 
formulation, and conflict resolution will all tend to be important. Technical sills 
relating to the delivery of environmental services will also be needed. Besides, this 
initiative also serve as key activities for raising awareness about wide range of 
stakeholders in this respect, particularly government sectors.  
3. Clearly and quantitatively cost-benefit analysis: Clear cost and benefit analysis 
for environmental service provided is the key information for market creation and 
PES schemes designing. In particular, a quantitative analysis on cost of providers is 
significant for negotiation and contract design. It is also fundamental data to avoid 
exploitation of poor farmer and improve fairness.   
4. Security of Property Rights: formulation of natural resource property rights is 
essential in order to give poor households control over, and rights to benefit from ES 
they provide in the long run.  
5. Social space for multi-stakeholders to negotiate and participate: A social space is 
important in order to facilitate negotiation, bargaining, and participation about 
improving recent payment schemes. However, at present, the limited participation 
by both local governments and residents in the design of payment schemes has 
impaired their willingness to pay; and, on the other hand, monitoring and 
evaluation by the tertiary sector is lacking in current policy implementation. 
6. Good governance and a cooperative institution: For sustainable management of 
natural resources to guarantee environmental services can be provided and 
improved continuously and improvement of policy design and implementation to 
ensure environmental payment can be made constantly and fairly, a cooperative 
institution is needed to manage both sectors. This institution should be established 
through participation with multi-stakeholders. The institution should be 
transparent, accountable, responsive, equitable, and efficient in policy design and 
implementation. 
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The allocation of the Mekong River’s 450 billion cubic metre annual flow is being contested 
by those who see the river primarily as source for hydropower and irrigation and those who 
believe its natural flow must be preserved to sustain the livelihoods of the ‘millions of 
people’ who depend on its ‘life-giving’ waters. Escalating demand for renewable energy is 
likely to result in new dams being built – and opposed – on the mainstream in the years 
ahead. This paper examines the challenges facing scientists at this critical juncture. It 
argues that, given the vastly different perspectives on the use of the river, there is a high 
risk of scientific research on the biophysical and social impacts of development being either 
ignored or distorted to serve the interests of either those in favour or opposed to dams.  It 
examines the very different contexts that scientists have to operate in, most of which are 
not conducive to objective, scientific research and the unbiased use of results by decision 
makers. It raises questions about the extent to which the scientific community can 
objectively answer the key question of how much ‘development space’ exists for new 
infrastructure development on the Mekong. The paper describes recent initiatives in the 
region that demonstrate that research on flow allocations can be done in a highly 
participatory and transparent manner. In such contexts there may be some hope for 
scientific research to form the basis for decision making on flow allocations.  The paper ends 
by suggesting that scientists should assess the ethical opportunities and threats involved in 
social impact assessment contracts before undertaking research. 
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1. Introduction: Contested Visions of the Mekong 
1.1  The Pro-Development Perspective 
The Mekong River, with an annual discharge of 450 billion cubic metres and a floodplain of 
over 77,000 square kilometres, is the largest in Southeast Asia. Along its course it drops 
nearly 5,000 metres from its source on the Tibetan Plateau before reaching the Delta about 
4,800 km downstream. With an average discharge of 14,500 cubic metres per second (MRC, 
2005) there is little wonder that the river has long been viewed as a potential source of 
hydropower. Fifty years ago the first plans were drawn up to use the Mekong river’s waters 
for power, with seven large mainstream dams proposed that would have generated over 
four times the amount of power required at the time for Thailand. Until the mid 1990s, 
when China started work on a cascade of mainstream dams, the river’s hydropower 
potential, estimated to be some 30,000 MW (MRC, 2008), remained largely undeveloped.  
Saved in part by the turbulent history of South East Asia, the lower Mekong remains one of 
the few major rivers in the world that is not fragmented by dams and retains much of its 
natural flow. However, the region’s new found political stability, economic liberalisation and 
rapid growth is likely to change this: once again riparian states are drawing up plans to use 
the Mekong mainstream as a source of hydropower, and increasingly these plans are being 
presented as an environmentally-friendly ‘green’ energy solution. Decisions made in the 
next few years are likely to have significant and irreversible implications for the flow of the 
river and for the millions of livelihoods that depend on it.  
The economic viability of the dams is underpinned by escalating demand. The electricity 
demands of Yunnan Province (China) and from the other riparian states have been forecast 
to grow nearly five fold, from 26,000 MW of peak demand in 2000 to over 102,000 MW in 
2020, with almost half of this demand coming from Thailand and approximately one third 
from Vietnam (Norconsult, 2003). In China two dams have already been completed that 
form part of a cascade that will exploit an 800-m drop over a 750-km stretch of river to 
generate 29,000 MW. Enthusiasm for hydropower in China is high as river flow is seen as a 
source of “clean” power for eastern China where dependence on coal-fired power stations 
has resulted in dangerously high levels of pollution (Dore, 2007).  
The Mekong has a highly seasonal flood pulse with dry season flows being as little as 6% 
percent of the wet season peak (MRC, 2008). However this flow pattern is set to change, as 
the release of stored water from upstream dams during the season will increase low season 
flows (once dams have filled), augmenting the viability of run-of-river hydropower dams. 
The combination of increased low-season flows, growing demand, rising energy prices and 
private sector interest is resulting in something of a “river rush” on the mainstream of the 
Mekong (Terra, 2007).  Now all riparian states have plans to tap into the Mekong and its 
tributaries, with over 200 new dams, including 11 on the mainstream being planned (MRC, 
2009). However, it is not just power companies who are eyeing the waters of the Mekong. 
Large-scale water diversion schemes are also reaching an advanced stage, including a plan 
to divert 2 billion cubic metres of the Ngum River in Laos to Northeastern Thailand via a 17-
km tunnel under the Mekong (Bangkok Post, 19 July 2008). 
Those in favour of tapping the Mekong’s hydropower and irrigation potential tend to 
promote this as a form of “sustainable development”, a term frequently used by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) in the context of its Greater Mekong Sub-Region (GMS) 
Programme (www.adb.org/GMS/strategy.asp). The ADB, in collaboration with the World 
Bank, argues the Basin’s “flexibility and tolerance” will allow for “sustainable, integrated 
management and development (that) can lead to wide-spread benefits” (World Bank/ADB, 
2006). The mood in the pro-development camp is bullish, with both banks suggesting that 
there is a need to move from the “more precautionary approach of the past decade” as this 
tended to avoid risk “at the expense of stifling investments” (World Bank/ADB, 2006).  
A key theme that emerges from the banks, and other organisations in favour of Mekong 
development, is that of ‘trade-offs’ resulting in ‘win-win’ situations.  Both banks call for new 
policies to support decision makers in assessing the economic, environmental and social 
trade-offs that will emerge when water use is changed and when communities dependent on 
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aquatic resources find their livelihoods at risk (World Bank/ADB, 2006). This is a clear 
recognition that there may be winners and losers emerging from the proposed risk taking. 
However, the overall belief in win-win outcomes appears to dominate the pro-development 
discourse, to the point that the protagonists suggest that any losers in the trade-offs game 
can be accommodated through compensation and mitigation measures, implying that the 
win-win scenario will eventually prevail. 
The unabated enthusiasm for large-scale dams and water diversion projects suggests that 
the ‘hydraulic mission’ of the riparian states of the Mekong is far from being filled. Fulfilling 
this mission is seen, by many, as paramount to the achievement of national goals and, 
therefore, as matter not just of poverty reduction but of ‘national security’, an attitude that 
many in Southern Africa will recognize from the recent past (Turton, 2005). Those seeking 
to further their nation’s hydraulic mission see ample opportunity for new infrastructure, and 
are convinced that any negative impacts associated with reduced river flows can easily be 
managed.  
1.2  The Alternative View 
Enthusiasm for large-scale infrastructure is far from universal. Throughout the region there 
are indications of dissent, with the opposition ranging from being well organised and open in 
Thailand to ad hoc, weak and often covert elsewhere (Guan, n.d). From these quarters a 
very different view has emerged over the years for the future of the river. They believe that 
dams will soon push the ecosystem to a “point of no return”, with local people paying an 
unacceptable price for someone else’s development (Watershed, 2002). For the anti-dam 
camp the maintenance of natural river flows is seen as vital to the Basin’s ecosystem in 
general, its fisheries in particular, as was well a myriad river ‘goods and services’ that are 
maintained by the annual flood pulse. 
The argument of those opposed to large dams on the Mekong rests on a number of key 
points, one of which is the river’s hydrology.  The International Rivers Network (IRN) argues 
that the pro-development camp - and in particular ADB and the World Bank – is 
misrepresenting the Mekong’s hydrology. They accuse the Banks of “massive over 
simplification” and of ignoring the range of flows in the dry and wet seasons. More critically 
IRN claims that the Banks completely ignore the changes that will occur in river ecology as 
a result of changes in sediment, flood pulse, flood plain inundation, water quality, and 
blockages to fish migration.   
A second key point of contention is that of river ownership. While the pro-development 
camp focuses on national or regional level benefits, the anti-development camp is largely 
concerned about the impacts on local people, especially on those who make greatest use of 
aquatic resources to sustain their livelihoods.  The latter see the riparian residents and 
resource users as the true owners of the river, not the national governments or river basin 
organisations. They believe that the fundamental decisions about the Mekong’s future 
should be made by those who will be most directly impacted, rather than by the 
beneficiaries of hydropower or large irrigation schemes, who are likely to live many miles 
away. The two positions represent a clash of perceived rights: the right of Governments to 
pursue national developments for the ‘greater good’ and the right of local communities to 
sustain their livelihoods on common resources used for generations.  
A third critical difference has to do with the effectiveness of mitigation and compensation 
measures. While the pro-development camp tends to presents an optimistic (although 
vague) view of the effectiveness of such measures, their opponents note that there is very 
little evidence of impacted households ever being able to fully recover - let alone improve - 
their standards of living.  The key failures noted in compensation plans are that they are 
overly ambitious, inadequately appraised, inappropriate to local needs, and based on 
unjustified assumptions about new technologies, such as fish ladders to facilitate migration 
and rabbit farming to replace lost protein (Blake, 2005). 
A fourth and very fundamental difference has to do with public participation and community 
consultation. Those opposed to dams generally claim that the developers make major 
decisions on the basis of very limited involvement of impacted people, with most workshops 
being held late in the process and being far removed from the people most likely to suffer.  
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They further accuse developers of extracting information from local people rather than truly 
involving them in decision making. 
1.3 Pressure on Scientists 
Within this contested context, social scientists are under pressure to generate results that 
can – at least ostensibly – be used to guide decision making on future river flows. Research 
on the impact of dams and other built structures on flow is being carried out in many 
locations and levels across the Basin, but in vastly different contexts. It ranges from 
strategic assessments of the cumulative impacts of changed flows ranges, using basin-wide 
models and predictive tools (Sarkkula et al, 2007), to myriad case studies on local 
livelihoods. In the next section we examine these contexts in more depth and look at how 
the attitudes of decision makers varies within these.  
2. Decision Makers’ Attitudes to Scientific Research in the Mekong 
Broadly speaking, for scientific research to have any impact on water resource management 
decisions the circumstances have to particularly favourable. In most contexts they are not. 
In this section different attitudes or responses of government officials towards scientific 
research are identified through five case studies. In the next section a series of other 
factors limiting scientists’ influence on water resource management decision making in the 
Mekong is explored. 
2.1 Tasang Dam, Burma: Ignore science, pursue the “development” agenda 
There are circumstances in the Mekong where scientists are highly unlikely to have any 
influence on decisions regarding river flow, notably in cases where totalitarian regimes have 
set hydropower development as a national priority to be pursued at virtually all costs. A 
clear example of this is the Tasang Dam in Burma on the Nu/Salween River, where three 
quarters of the 3,300 MW generated will be exported to Thailand. Although the 228m 
structure will create a reservoir 670kms long, inundating an area rich in biodiversity and 
unique species, the detailed design is being done without an Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA). Questions that are being raised by international organisations about the 
safety of the dam in an earthquake-prone area and about its social impacts and economic 
viability remain largely unanswered (Wong et al., 2007). The 13 ethnic minorities living in 
the catchment have never been given an opportunity to express their views. The ruling 
junta’s position appears to be ‘consistent’, at least in terms of stemming any opposition to 
the dam: “The military junta’s record on this issue is consistent. They will abuse or kill 
anyone who dissents” (Sai Win Pay, elected and exiled Member of Parliament from Shan 
State, 2000, quoted in www.burmainfo.org/eri/FatallyFlawed.pdf).   
2.2  Yali Falls, Vietnam: Superficial science covering conflicts of interest 
In other situations a country (or a developer) wants to be seen to be doing the right thing, 
but does not want to risk dam construction or flow allocations being changed by any 
research results. This attitude results in superficial ‘science’, with EIAs and other research 
being done unprofessionally, without community consultation, public scrutiny or peer 
review. One example of this is the series of EIAs involving the Yali Falls Dam on the Sesan 
River Basin in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, about 70 kilometres upstream of the 
Cambodian border. The first EIA was conducted in 1985 by SWECO, a Swedish engineering 
company with an environmental wing. It claimed that the impacts of the dam on would be 
“negligible” given the “sparsely populated” area downstream (Wyatt and Bird, 2007). 
Perhaps this conclusion was reached because, for some reason, the downstream study area 
was confined to an area 8 km long and 1 km wide. As a result, transboundary impacts on 
Cambodia were not considered at all. A subsequent EIA, conducted by Electrowatt in 1993, 
did little to change the impression of negligible impacts.  On the basis of the two EIAs 
construction of the 720 MW dam began in 1996. 
As construction and then operation (2000) of the dam got underway the impacts proved to 
be far from negligible. According to International Rivers Network: “At least 36 people have 
drowned due to erratic releases of water from the dam; at least 55,000 people have been 
adversely affected; they have suffered millions of dollars in damages due to lost rice 
production, drowned livestock, lost fishing income… and houses. In addition, there has been 
an increase in river sedimentation and erosion, destroying river-bank vegetable gardens; 
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hundreds of people have suffered stomach ailments, eye infections and skin rashes, which 
they believe are related to changes in the river’s water quality since the dam was built.” 
(IRN, 2002).  Even if these reports are in any way exaggerated it is quite apparent that 
significant impacts occurred as a result of the dam, for beyond anything anticipated by 
SWECO or Electrowatt.  Despite SWECO’s estimates of the likely impacts being so far off the 
mark – or possibly because of this – the company continued to work closely with Electricity 
of Vietnam (EVN) on several hydropower assignments in Vietnam, including the design of 
the Se San 3 dam downstream of Yali Falls.  
With mounting concerns being raised about the impacts these dams on communities 
downstream in Cambodia the ADB commissioned an assessment of Se San 3. The study, 
carried out be Worley Consultants from Australia, was never officially released by the ADB 
because of objections from Vietnam. However, through a leaked copy its contents have 
become well known. Worley describes SWECO’s analysis of Se San 3 impacts as “bad 
science”, with “unrealistic assumptions”, arguing that: “It does not represent a sound basin 
wide strategy for using water or other resources, and will lead to serious conflicts between 
water users within the basin …A wider and more scientific analysis, less dedicated to a 
single site and, dare one say, future consultant engineering work,” is needed” (Worely, 
quoted in Probe International Briefing, October 2003, emphasis added). 
Again, possibly because of its superficial analysis of impacts, in 2005 SOWECO was chosen 
by the Government of Vietnam to conduct an assessment of the transboundary impacts of 
changed flows in the Se San basin despite objections from Cambodia (Wyatt and Bird, 
2007) and to do an EIA of hydropower impacts on the neighbouring Srepok River. The 
former has never been released while that later has been described as “an incomplete 
assessment and therefore inadequate as a basis either for investment decision making or 
for planning mitigation and compensation with dam affected communities in Cambodia” 
(Probe International, 2007). In short, SWECO’s involvement in EIAs and flow allocation 
assessments, while also being involved in dam construction and energy master planning in 
Vietnam, represents a massive conflict of interest. The outcome is superficial science the 
results of which can easily be manipulated by decision makers.  
2.3  Theun Hinboun Hydropower Project, Lao PDR: Withhold the results 
As noted above, when scientists are hired as consultants to undertake flow allocation 
assessments, they are very likely to be under pressure from the developer (dam 
owners/operators) to produce favourable results, or risk not being employed again. When 
the results generated are not favourable to the developer, it is not unusual for them to 
simply withhold the report, as was the case with the Worley report. Another example of this 
emerges from the case of the Theun Hinboun Hydropower Project (THHP) in Laos, (owned 
60% by the Government of Laos) which diverts water from the Theun-Kading River, through 
a tunnel into the Hai and Hinboun Rivers. Before the project was completed in 1998 the 
ADB claimed it would be environmentally benign and would not impact people’s livelihoods. 
However, when the International Rivers Network (IRN) reported that all villages 
downstream had experienced a loss of fisheries, the ADB called for further study. A fisheries 
expert, Terry Warren, was approved and undertook a detailed assessment of impacts. 
Because the report was mildly critical of the project, both the ADB and the Theun Hinboun 
Hydropower Company simply refused to release it. Public disclosure of the findings only 
came about when Warren released the results himself, via the IRN website (Fisher, 2008).  
2.4  Pak Mun Dam, Thailand: Commission multiple research efforts, ignore the 
results 
In some contexts the government might be under considerable pressure to allow 
independent research to be conducted. However, in order to avoid an outcome that might 
be detrimental to the realisation of the proposed development, the government supports 
more than one assessment, and then ignores the key research findings and the 
recommendations of its own committee.  A clear example of this is the decision- making 
process in the case of the Pak Mun Dam in 2002 in Northeastern Thailand, which shows an 
interesting mix of decision makers tempting to respond to scientific findings, popular protest 
and political power at the same time. 
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The Pak Mun was commissioned in 1994 by the Electricity Generation Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) as a run-of-river hydropower dam.  It is located 5.5km west of the Mun River 
confluence with the Mekong and has a 17m high wall with a 60km2 reservoir. Its original 
design was modified to limit resettlement from 4,000 to 248 households. Considering the 
size of the Pak Mun, and the fact that it was redesigned to accommodate social and 
environmental concerns, it has sparked a considerable amount of controversy. A key reason 
for this is that the 1983 Impact Study did not include a comprehensive assessment of fish 
species, or of how household access to fish might change after the construction of the dam. 
Instead, it presented highly optimistic estimates of the benefits that would be obtained from 
stocking the reservoir with fish and essentially ignored the likely impacts of lost fish habitats 
and migration routes (WCD, 2000).  
From the start, local people opposed Pak Mun dam. The blasting of rapids below the wall 
had an immediate impact on their fisheries. Opposition to the dam gave birth to a powerful 
people’s organisation, known as the Assembly of the Poor (AoP). The AoP, supported by 
many NGOs and academics, claimed that the commissioning of the dam (through closure of 
the gates) had harmed their livelihoods as it had prevented migration of fish from the 
Mekong and had inundated their riverbank gardens. The AoP used a variety of methods to 
pressurise successive Governments over a decade, eventually convincing the Government of 
Thaksin Shinawatra, which came to power in 2001, to negotiate (Kanokwan and Hall, 2009). 
In 2001, the Thaksin Government agreed to re-examine the impacts of the dam with a view 
to considering whether or not to open the dam gates to allow free river flow. This resulted 
in the creation of various committees and a flurry of parallel scientific research efforts, none 
of which had any real impact on decision making. The chronology of events is informative as 
it demonstrates how the Government was able to give the impression of responding to 
people’s concerns through scientific research, while systematically ignoring the research 
recommendations that it did not favour.  
Based on the direct experience of one of the authors (Kanokwan) and interviews with 
another researcher directly involved (Tantuvanit), the chronology provides a rare glimpse 
into the ‘black box’ of decision making surrounding Pak Mun. It begins with Thaksin’s 
appointment of a National Committee to examine AoP concerns: 
March 24, 2001 The Thaksin Government appoints the National Committee on AoP’s 
resolution (NCAP) to address 16 concerns raised by AoP, headed by the 
Deputy Prime Minister Pongpol Adireksarn. 
April  9, 2001 
 
NCAP appoints a Sub-Committee to focus on resolving the Pak Mun 
question headed by Dr. Chaiwat Satha-Ananad , a lecturer at Thamasart 
University. 
April 17, 2001 Prime Minister Thaksin agrees to open the sluice gates of the Pak Mun 
Dam for four months to allow studies to be conducted on its social 
impact; this was later extended to thirteen months. 
May 9, 2001 
 
The Sub-Committee appoints a Steering Committee, headed by Dr. Suthy 
Prasartset, a lecturer at Chulalongkorn University, to focus on Restoration 
of Natural Resources and Livelihoods of affected communities.  
May 20, 2002 Prime Minister Thaksin appoints another committee, headed by Deputy 
Prime Minister Chawalit Yongjaiyuth on Overseeing and Monitoring Pak 
Mun Resolution.  
October, 2002 The Committee on Overseeing and Monitoring Pak Mun Resolution 
appoints sub-committee to work on screening research, headed by Dr. 
Suphavit Piamphongsant. He is chief inspector-general of the Science. 
This conducts detailed work screening research carried out by Tai Baan, 
Ubon Ratchathani University (UBU), Khon Kean University, the Office of 
Science and Technology (the later funded by EGAT) and 18 other  
research projects on the dam.   
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Government ignores the roles of the sub-committee on screening 
research on Pak Mun and did not wait to see the report.  
The Government asks the National Statistical Office (NSO) to conduct a 
rapid survey. The NSO supports Prime Minister Thaksin’s earlier decision 
to open the gates four months a year. This option is backed by EGAT, but 
opposed by academics and NGOs. 
August  2002 
 
November 2002 
The Committee on Overseeing and Monitoring Pak Mun Resolution invites 
researchers from all research projects to present their work at the 
Government House.  
The Committee prepares a synthesis report, due to be presented to 
Government in November 2002. Government denies them the opportunity 




Prime Minister Thaksin conducts a televised dialogue with researchers 
from UBU, Tai Baan team, Khon Kean University and the Office of Science 
and Technology. This researchers urge Prime Minister Thaksin to declare a 
year-round opening based on the findings.  
December 24, 
2002 
Prime Minister Thaksin takes a helicopter tour to inspect the Pak Mun area 
and confirm impacts with villagers. He meets mostly the pro–dam groups 
and decides to maintain his earlier decision of a four-month opening. 
June  2003 The sub-committee completes its final synthesis report, noting that most 
research projects had confirmed highly negative impacts on people’s 
livelihoods. It recommends year-round opening of the gates, based on 
evidence of livelihood restoration during the experimental dam opening. 
The report is ignored by the Thaksin Government.  
June 2007 The sub-committee presents the same report to the Interim Government 
(installed by the military). It is ignored. 
According to Assistant Professor Dr. Nalinee Tantuvanit, a sociology lecturer at Thammasat 
University, who was a member of the Committee on Overseeing and Monitoring Pak Mun 
Resolution, the decision to manage the dam was purely political. All the appointed 
committees provided the Government with legitimacy that gave the appearance that 
decision making regarding dam was backed up by scientific information, whereas, it was 
“actually completely political’ (Interview, 15 December 2009). Further evidence of this 
emerged in 2004 when the committee on the Restoration of the Natural Resource and 
Livelihoods was disbanded in the wake of internal conflicts, lack of budget and lack of real 
authority to fulfil their mandate. All pretences of compromise came to an end when Thaksin 
was ousted from power through a military coup on the 19th September 2006 and the new 
Government overturned Thaksin’s ruling and issued a resolution to keep the dam's sluice 
gates closed year round.  
In short, the Thai Government paid little attention to the results of the research it 
commissioned, other than that by the NSO which simply rubber stamped Thaksin’s earlier 
decision. It paid even less attention to research carried out by impacted peoples and NGOs, 
claiming that this was biased and romanticized due to their known anti-dam development 
position.  Instead, the Government created a smoke screen by appearing to support 
scientific research while pursuing its own objective of maintaining dam operations for as 
much of the year as possible. The Pak Mun Dam case was a tantalizing one for scientists 
because of the apparent opportunities it created for serious research to influence decision 
making. In the end it became a sobering reminder of realpolitik, revealing how little 
influence social scientists actually have on the top levels of Government. 
2.5 Hua Na Irrigation Project: Allow the results to determine the decisions 
In an ideal context, decision making on flow allocations would be based not only on solid 
scientific findings but also on stakeholder participation, most especially of those directly 
impacted by the infrastructure. For this participation to be meaningful, stakeholders need to 
be involved in all stages, agreeing on such issues as: (a) the scope of services; (b) the 
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approach to the work; (c) avoidance of conflicts of interest and (d) a commitment to 
accepting the final outcomes and recommendations.  The obvious question to ask is whether 
or not such “ideal contexts” ever exist.  Is it possible to identify situations where 
assessments have been in contexts that at least approximate this ideal?  
In the Mekong Basin we found only one example of a situation that approximates the above 
ideal.  Once again, it is from a riparian state whose leadership is influenced by public 
opinion and it does not involve a shared watercourse.  In this case, project paralysis 
appears to be a key factor motivating different parties to compromise and negotiate a 
solution, and this has opened the way for the social scientist to play an active role. The case 
is the Hua Na Irrigation Project on the Mun River in Northeastern Thailand completed in 
2000. This is a 2.1 billion baht investment where flows have yet to be allocated for the 
intended purpose (irrigation) because opposition from local communities has prevented the 
irrigation project from being brought into operation. This case is worthy of further 
examination, as it is an example of what can happen when an EIA –including a social impact 
assessment– is not done properly at the outset.  
The project was planned to provide water to more than 10,000 households living in 61 
communities in Si Sa Ket Province (Department of Development and Energy Promotion, 
2000), but was never inaugurated because a virtually equal number of riparian residents 
protested about the likely loss of their aquatic resources.  A key point in the controversy 
was that a full, reliable and comprehensive EIA was never undertaken before project 
implementation. It was argued that the “people’s perspectives” on the anticipated benefits, 
and on the costs and social consequences of the project, were never extensively studied 
(Kanokwan, et al., 2006).  Instead, a rapid top-down exercise was conducted that left none 
of the parties satisfied. Consultants hired by the Royal Irrigation Department were accused 
of being careless, and of having conducted a superficial EIA (Thongchai and Pranee, 2004).   
Affected villagers, with the support of NGOs, insisted that an EIA should have been done 
prior to the project design and implementation and that the project should not be allowed to 
operate until a comprehensive exercise was complete. To help resolve the dispute, the 
Royal Irrigation Department (RID) accepted in 2007 that a “People's EIA” (PEIA) should be 
conducted that involves all the key stakeholders, plus independent researchers.  The RID 
allowed an opportunity for scientists to play a facilitating role to assist the Government, the 
villagers and NGOs to work together. PEAI also provided an opportunity for those most 
directly impacted to determine the issues to be studied. As a result the PEIA focused 
primarily on how the scheme should be operated while people’s livelihoods are maintained. 
It ensured that compensation would be fully paid done before the project is commissioned. 
The key elements included: (i) public consultations involving all stakeholders; (ii) an active 
steering committee advising on all stages; (iii) frequent monitoring and reporting of 
progress of the study; (iv) and full participation in the final decision-making stages 
(Kanokwan, 2009).  
The above example suggests that scientists, under the right circumstances, can play a vital 
role in creating a common (or at least a negotiated) vision for flow allocations.   It confirms 
that when agreement is reached by stakeholders beforehand on the scope of services, the 
methods to be used and other critical elements of research, consensus can be reached, and 
acceptance of the results of the common effort are more likely.      
 
3. Other Factors Constraining Scientific Influence on Decision Making   
The preceding section suggests that scientists hoping to provide objective information on 
water resource management issues have limited opportunities to influence decision making, 
largely because of the positions or attitudes of decision makers towards the use of research 
results. In most contexts preference is given to pursuing national ‘hydraulic missions’, or to 
reaching political compromises that attempt to satisfy conflicting demands.  In this section 
we look at two additional factors that constrain the influence of the scientific community as 
a whole and of social scientists in particular. 
3.1 Changes in dam financing 
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Internationally, the role of scientists in assessing the impacts of large dams and flow 
allocations evolved with safeguards and precautionary approaches developed by the World 
Bank. It is worth recalling that in the 1960s dams were generally viewed as engineering 
structures - or even as great feats of scientific achievement - with any social or 
environmental impacts considered to be “inevitable side effects”. This perception started to 
change in the 1980s when the World Bank, and other multilateral development banks 
(MDBs), started to responded to public pressure and protests by adopting a series of 
guidelines to integrate social and environmental concerns into the analysis of proposed 
projects (World Bank, 1996). The shift corresponded to a much broader shift in thinking on 
development, ecology and political participation.1  
The adoption of precautionary approaches gave scientists a greater role in assessing the 
potential impacts of dams and increased their opportunities to forewarn decision makers of 
the likely social and environment consequences. As long as countries remained dependent 
on these institutions to access low-interest capital, the scientists could be guaranteed a role 
in the mandatory environmental and social impact assessments.  However, in recent years, 
there has been a very significant shift in international financing for dam projects, with 
private commercial banks and independent power producers becoming increasingly involved 
(van Gelder, et al, 2002). As these institutions do not have the same safeguards and 
precautionary approaches, they have little need to involve social scientists in a serious 
manner. 
 
In the Mekong region, the increasing availability of alternative financing has recently 
resulted in such institutions signing agreements with national governments to conduct 
feasibility studies for mainstream dams.  Investors from Thailand, Malaysia and China are 
re-examining six dam sites on the Mekong that the MDBs considered too environmentally 
costly to be developed 10 years ago. These plans are now being revived with alternative 
financing, but without proper safeguards or public oversight and apparently in disregard of 
the Mekong Agreement of 1995 (TERRA, 2007). The availability of new financing, 
unconstrained by the ‘old’ safeguards of the multilateral development banks, is possibly the 
greatest threat to scientists working on impact assessments of dams in the Mekong basin. 
There is a real risk that they will either be disregarded or, even worse, manipulated by the 
significant powers that ultimately decide on which dams should be built.  
 
3.2 Linking biophysical and social sciences and ‘translating’ complexity  
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) has a mandate, based on the 1995 treaty, to analyse 
the likely benefits and impacts of different levels of development for the whole basin. The 
results generated are intended to facilitate regional decision making, at least for the four 
member states of the Lower Mekong Basin (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam). Within 
the MRC, a wide range of scientists worked under the Integrated Basin Flow Management 
(IBFM) Programme to look specifically at how changes in river flow might impact on the 
Mekong’s ecosystem - and consequently on all the people who depend on this. While this 
may appear to be a straightforward exercise, it is a highly complex task that requires the 
close collaboration of a large team of biophysical scientists (covering everything from 
hydrology to herpetology and sociology).  As noted by King and Brown (2006), 
environmental flow assessments have many specific challenges including transforming 
hydrological data into an ecologically relevant format, providing quantified predictions of 
environmental responses to flow change and describing the impacts of river change on 
common-property users.   
For the social scientists, in particular, the first challenge is to understand and distil this 
complex information and then predict the likely impacts that the changes will have on 
households and communities.  As social scientists are generally not trained in the 
biophysical sciences, this in itself can be difficult.  Assuming this fundamental hurdle can be 
                                          
1
 Peronal communication. Richard Friend. February 2010 
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overcome, the social scientists must then develop an understanding of how similar 
biophysical impacts will have very different social consequences for resource users, because 
of the varied socio-economic and political contexts where they are felt.  In other words, the 
same changes in river flow and ecology will be felt differently on the Thai and Lao sides of 
the river, because people’s livelihoods and vulnerability are so different.  This requires a 
thorough understanding of the ‘vulnerability contexts’ that the river runs through. 
The next challenge is how to find a way to extrapolate results from a limited number of very 
good case studies. Most of the research done on the likely social impacts of dams and 
diversions is very specific to individual countries.  Indeed, very often the research focuses 
on a small area of particular interest and it is impossible to extrapolate results from the 
study area to a higher level.  Comparable, basin-wide data, that is relevant to river resource 
users, is almost non-existent and even trans-boundary impact assessments are difficult to 
find. 
Assuming the above obstacles can be overcome, then the information has to be distilled and 
put into a form that will facilitate decision making: if it is too detailed and technical it will 
not be used; but if it does not have adequate details it will be returned for further 
clarification; if it presents the likely impacts in too stark a manner, it will be rejected as 
being too anti-development; if it highlights particular problems in one country, it could be 
seen as politically insensitive.  In short, the scientist walks a tight rope trying to find a way 
to provide evidence-based research results, drawn from a complex scientific process, that 
are easily understood and honest, but not insensitive to the decision-making audience from 
mixed political backgrounds. To date, there appear to be very few cases where this tight 
rope has been successfully walked. 
 
4.  Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper suggests that scientists face particular challenges in assisting the Mekong’s 
political and economic leaders make informed decisions about flow allocations. Decision 
makers stand before sign posts that point in vastly different directions: on the one hand, 
the ADB and the World Bank, together with powerful national interests, see the basin as a 
geographical space filled with abundant opportunities for the development of new 
infrastructure, particularly ‘green’ hydropower. They claim this will drive regional economic 
growth and create win-win situations for all. On the other hand, NGOs and rural activists 
see infrastructure development as a potential disaster because, they believe, it will be at the 
expense of powerless groups whose livelihoods rely mostly on river resources. The one side 
claims there is ample space for dams and diversions, the other vehemently denies it. 
In certain contexts, scientists from various disciplines are called upon to provide a basis for 
informed decision making.  However, their work encounters a number of critical challenges, 
including being ignored while decision makers pursue their own development agenda, or 
being used as pseudo-science to justify a fait accompli, or being manipulated as part of a 
“competitive” research effort where the most favourable pro-development results are 
selected.  At regional levels, where common ground has to be found on how to manage 
shared water resources, these challenges are multiplied. The availability of new financing by 
agencies that do not take a pre-cautionary approach is likely to diminish the influence of 
social scientists considerably.  
However, there are also signs of hope for social scientists working in the region. Interviews 
with nine researchers working in the Mekong carried out for this article in late 2008 showed 
that some are having an influence on decision makers, not necessarily on flow allocation 
decisions per se but at least in terms of raising the importance of considering the social 
impacts of changed flow. The key lessons to emerge are that such influence comes about as 
a result of: (a) long-term periods of engagement where the researchers (many of whom are 
Westerners) are able to demonstrate commitment and establish relationships of trust over 
periods exceeding five years; (b) understanding of the broader political setting and (c) 
developing clear communication strategies that ‘translate’ complex scientific results into 
understandable terminology in national languages and (d) addressing issues of real concern 
to decision makers. (Interview, Keskinen, Nov 2008).  
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Some suggest that it is possible, in the right contexts, to create a common vision for 
objective water resource management research. The use of people’s EIAs in Northeastern 
Thailand, suggests that multi-disciplinary scientific teams can play a critical role in 
facilitating a new approach to decision making on national projects. Increasingly dialogues, 
or ‘multi-stakeholder platforms’, are taking place that involve participants from the 
hydropower industry, international agencies, river basin organisations, NGOs and impacted 
people (Dore, 2007).  
It remains doubtful that scientific research on the impacts of hydropower dams will actually 
prevent these being built. However, there are interesting cases emerging outside the water 
sector in Thailand where academics and NGO activities have managed to prevent major 
developments taking place on the grounds that the Government did not fully abide with 
environmental and health impact assessment requirements. For example, in late 2009 the 
Central Administrative Court order 64 industrial projects to be suspended in the Map Ta 
Phut industrial zone as the had not complied with impact assessments specified in the 2007 
Constitution (Bangkok Post, 25 Feb 2010). Future scientific research may be more 
productive if it provides the necessary information for impacted peoples to challenge 
governments to comply to existing legislation, particularly in cases where compensation for 
lost, or diminished, resources is due. 
If PEIAs and similar initiatives are able to gain the necessary political and financial support 
to sustain them, they could serve as models for other projects. However, numerous 
technical challenges will remain. Social scientists will need to develop a capacity to work 
closely with biophysical scientists to gain better insights into how flow changes will impact 
on local livelihoods. They will need to develop a more systematic understanding of how 
vulnerability to changed river flow varies along the length of the river, as impacts will not be 
felt equally. While a long-term focus on basin-wide, trans-boundary impacts is critical, in 
the short term ways need to be found to extrapolate results from a limited number of good 
case studies. To facilitate decision making, all scientists involved in river assessments will 
have to find ways of transforming complex data into messages that are more easily 
understood by those in power and those seeking to influence them.  
 
The extent to which scientists will actually assist decision-makers in determining fair flow 
allocations will depend partly on the context they operate in, but equally on their adherence 
to the highest research standards possible. Fisher advises that before social scientists 
accept research consultancies they should analyse the ‘structures of interest’ and should 
rule out consultancies where such interest would rule out ethical research. He goes on to 
suggest that researchers should assess the ethical opportunities and threats involved in 
social impact assessment contracts and should try to negotiate arrangements for 
transparency to be built into their contracts (Fisher, 2008).  In the Mekong region, where 
the risks of results being ignored, hidden or manipulated is high, such an approach is 
critical. Equally important, discussions need to take place on how different types of 
researchers (consultants, universities, institutes, activists and villagers) can create common 
‘spaces’ and use varied opportunities to influence change.  
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